OXFORD

JOHN **BAYLIS**   STEVE **SMITH**   PATRICIA **OWENS**

THE **GLOBALIZATION**
OF **WORLD POLITICS**

AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

EIGHTH EDITION

The Globalization of World Politics

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To Marion, Jeannie, and Maggie/Edith

Brief contents

Part One International relations in a global era

Part Two The historical context

Part Three Theories of world politics

Part Four   Structures and processes

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Detailed contents

Part One International relations in a global era

Part Two The historical context

Part Three   Theories of world politics

Part Four **Structures and processes**

Preface

In this new edition of *The Globalization of World Politics* we have followed a similar format and structure to previous editions, but we have added several new and exciting chapters that we believe make this already popular and successful book even better. These alterations are based on the editors' sense of changes that are happening in the field of International Relations, but they are also in response to feedback from students from around the world, comments from teachers and scholars of International Relations, and the extremely detailed reviews of the seventh edition commissioned by Oxford University Press. Together, all these comments have helped us identify a number of additional areas that should be covered. We have included a thoroughly rewritten chapter on globalization and global politics that explores the implications of the current crisis of globalization for world politics and world order. We have made the excellent section on the diversity of theoretical perspectives even better by strengthening the historical contextualization of the theories that have shaped the field and by including a new chapter on postcolonial and decolonial approaches. We have improved the section on international issues by commissioning new chapters on human rights and on refugees and forced migration. We have also updated the learning features, including nearly two dozen brand new case studies and many new suggestions for further reading.

Praise for *The Globalization of World Politics*

'The chapter on Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches offers many new insights and excellent examples and debates. The Opposing Opinions feature will ignite heated and reflexive debate amongst students.'

Birsen Erdogan, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of
International and European Law, Maastricht University

'The new chapter on Refugees and Forced Migration covers a topic of great relevance and interest to students, including good discussion of the theoretical and legal debate of various categories of refugees and effective examples and case studies to illustrate the complexities of such a challenging policy issue.'

Craig Mark, Professor in the Faculty of International Studies,
Kyoritsu Women's University

'The updated chapter on Human Rights pushes the reader to challenge and re-think common assumptions – the critical and reflective focus is a very welcome addition to the current IR textbook market.'

Samuel Jarvis, Teaching Fellow in International Relations,
University of Southampton

'It still does what it has always set out to do, introducing students to the main theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of global politics while offering a set of highly relevant and contemporary case studies to show these ideas in action. I am really delighted that the editors are engaging with authors from the Global South - this is long overdue and demonstrates the quality of scholarship from these regions. In particular, Chapter 10 provides excellent coverage of the origins, historical context and main intellectual contribution of postcolonial and decolonial approaches.'

Neville Wylie, Deputy Principal and Professor of International History,
University of Stirling

Acknowledgements

New to this edition

The eighth edition has been rigorously updated following extensive reviewer feedback. Key changes include:

- New Chapter 25 on refugees and forced migration by Professor Ariadna Estévez, University of Mexico
- Incorporation of postcolonial and decolonial approaches in Chapter 10 by Dr Meera Sabaratnam, SOAS University of London
- Newly authored Chapter 31 on human rights encourages you to think critically about key issues in the field and consider whether human rights are universal
- Expanded coverage of non-Western approaches, particularly perspectives from the Global South, is woven throughout the chapters to ensure you appreciate the importance of viewing international relations from representative and varied perspectives
- Updated International Relations theory chapters reflect a more contextualized and historical perspective, allowing you to gain a thorough, nuanced understanding of the historical and political context in which these approaches emerged

How to use the learning features

The Globalization of World Politics provides a range of carefully selected learning tools and additional material to help you navigate the text and contextualize your understanding, supporting development of the essential knowledge and skills you need to underpin your International Relations studies.

Framing Questions
Each chapter opens with provocative questions to stimulate thought and debate on the subject area.

Glossary terms
Glossary terms highlight the key terms and ideas in IR as you learn, and are a helpful prompt for revision.

Feminism: a politic that has collapsed and cannot pro-change, women's inequ out substantial external support, is the aim to move lent of the state has ceased to matters; for others al borders of the state. experiences, an al project to understand, so as to change inequality or oppression. For some, this is the aim to move beyond gender, so that it no longer matters; for others, it is to validate women's interests, experiences, and choices; for others, it is to work for more equal and inclusive social relations overall.

Feminized labour: work that is in large part done by women, and which is associated by social convention

Funds and progra are subject to the s and which depend other donors.

Futures market: a can place bets on fu ing to either buy or specified date.

G20 (Group of 20 in which major a discuss global finan inception, it has h

Opposing Opinions boxes
Fully updated opposing opinions feature with accompanying questions will help you evaluate theory and facilitate critical and reflective debate on contemporary policy challenges, from campaigns to decolonise the curriculum to debates over open borders and migration.

Opposing Opinions: Universities can be decolonized

For

Universities have changed me with the times, with lots **ore women, working** of the barriers of colonial preju-dice. This means that s out of the classroom are being broken down. Different types of students can expand the horizons of knowledge that universities provide, meaning that they can become less tied to the imperial attitudes of the West.

Thanks to globalization, there are more resources available in terms of knowledge, resources, and perspectives available in different subjects. One of the factors limiting the kinds of knowledge taught by universities has been access to sources of knowledge from different groups, in different languages, and

Against

Universities tend to promote elite know views. Precisely because the West has dom universities have promoted forms of knowle that reinforce this domination. Many unive South have sought to emulate, rather tha organization of knowledge.

The domination of English language a lishing formats limits access. As long as nant language for academic research, there in terms of access to knowledge. The globa publishing has not meant an end to imperia corporate publishers located in the West o

Case Studies
Two engaging and relevant Case Studies in every chapter illustrate how ideas, concepts, and issues are manifested in the real world. Each Case Study is followed by questions to encourage you to apply theory to current and evolving global events.

Case Study 26.1 Hunger in Haiti: food security and rice imports

imported rice was available in the below that of local growers. Forced farmers abandoned their farms and r of work, adding further to the legion

The 2008 global economic crisis br price of rice (and many other staple short of the daily calorie intake recon Programme. In 2010, Haiti was struc further misery, killing an untold num 1.5 million with limited access to foo brought Category 4 Hurricane Matth ple in need of emergency food su further aggravated by a three-year the El Niño effect of 2015–16, brin in local food production. Accordi

© US Navy Photo / Alamy Stock Photo

Boxes

Each chapter offers a rich supply of concise boxes that enhance your understanding of key IR developments, definitions and debates and facilitate critical thinking skills.

Box 25.1   Colonial powers and forced migration

Today, people who are forced to leave their home countries are not necessarily threatened by political forces linked to international conflict. The situation has changed to such an extent that if forced migration was defined by this type of political conflict, it would not be such a pressing issue. Mainstream literature argues that forced migration is produced by problems of governance and the legitimacy of 'fragile states' (Stepputat

Key Points

Lists of Key Points throughout the text sum up the most important arguments, acting as a useful revision tool and provide an at a glance overview of the issues raised within each chapter.

Key Points

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches are a way of thin about the world rather than a rigid theory.
- The approaches include insights about how we think abo and know the world (epistemology), what we study (ontology), and our ethical or normative responsibilities.
- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches seek to understand things from the perspectives of the coloniz

Questions

End-of-chapter questions not only probe your understanding of each chapter, but also encourage you to reflect on the material you've just covered.

Questions

1. Why is security a 'contested concept'?
2. Why do traditional realist writers focus on national security?
3. Why do wars occur?
4. Why do states find it difficult to cooperate?
5. Do you find 'liberal institutionalism' convincing?
6. Why might democratic states be more peaceful?
7. How do 'constructivist', human security, 'feminist', and poststructur security differ from those of 'neorealists'?

Further Reading

Annotated recommendations for further reading at the end of each chapter help you familiarise yourself with the key academic literature and suggest how you can explore your interest in a particular aspect of IR.

Further Reading

For a general survey of the realist tradition

Smith, M. J. (1986) *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louis Press). An excellent discussion of many of the seminal realist thinkers

Walt, S. M. (2002), 'The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition', in I. Katzelson (eds), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (New York: W. W. Norton). An e realist tradition from one of its leading proponents.

Twentieth-century classical realism

Carr, E. H. (1939), *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study* *Relations* (London: Macmillan). An important critique of liberal idealism.

How to use the online resources

This textbook is accompanied by many helpful additional resources for both students and lecturers, providing opportunities to consolidate understanding and further develop skills of critical analysis and apply theory to practice.

Student Resources

- **International relations simulations encourage you to develop negotiation and problem solving skills by engaging with topical events and processes**

- **Web links to journal articles, blogs and video content to deepen your understanding of key topics and explore your research interests**

- **Video podcasts of contributors from this book analysing current issues and new situations, supporting you to engage with real-world cases in a lively, accessible manner**

- **Guidance on how to evaluate the Opposing Opinions arguments and approach the questions, supporting you to engage in nuanced debate over key policy challenges**

- **Extended IR Case Studies encourage you to apply theories to current and evolving global events**

- **Multiple choice questions—a popular interactive feature that provide instant feedback, helping you test your knowledge of key points in each chapter and also at revision time**

- **Interactive flashcards of key terms and concepts from the book, so you can check your understanding of IR terminology**

The second case study in this chapter focuses on the rights of gender equality

Lecturer Resources

These resources are password-protected, but access is available to anyone using the book in their teaching. Please contact your local sales representative.

- **Additional Case Studies** to use in class discussions to contextualise and deepen theoretical understanding

- Customizable **PowerPoint® slides**, arranged by chapter, for use in lecture or as hand-outs to support efficient, effective teaching preparation

- A fully customizable **test bank** containing ready-made assessments with which to test your students' understanding of key concepts

- **Question bank** of short-answer and essay questions encourages critical reflection on core issues and themes within each chapter

- All **figures and tables from the book** available to download, allowing clear presentation of key data to support students' data analysis

Case Study 2: Brazil

- Notion of Brazil as rising power emerged under President Luís Inácio Lula
- Lula urged Brazil to challenge unipolarity and strive toward more balanced multipolar world order:
  - reassert national autonomy
  - form coalitions with other developing states
  - increase bargaining power
- However, Brazil has become mired in economic and political problems

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Question bank

Chapter 19: International law

Short answer questions

1. Define 'customary international law' (50 words or less).
2. What is meant by *opinio juris*?
3. Describe what is meant by 'standard of civlization.'
4. What is the difference between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*?
5. What is meant by a 'fundamental institution'?

List of case studies

About the contributors

Tarak Barkawi is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George Washington University.

John Baylis is Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations and a former Pro-Vice-Chancellor at Swansea University.

Alex J. Bellamy is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland.

Edward Best is Head of Unit at the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, and Senior Fellow of Maastricht University.

John Breuilly is Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Thomas Christiansen is Professor of Political Science and European Integration at Luiss Università Guido Carli in Rome, Italy.

Michael Cox is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Director of LSE Ideas.

Devon E. A. Curtis is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge.

Tim Dunne is Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, where he is also Pro-Vice-Chancellor.

Ariadna Estévez is a Professor at the Centre for Research on North America, the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

Tony Evans was Professor of Global Politics at the University of Southampton.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri.

Lene Hansen is Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen.

Stephen Hobden is Reader in International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences, University of East London.

Andrew Hurrell is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University.

Jutta Joachim is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.

Ratna Kapur is Professor of International Law at Queen Mary University of London.

Helen M. Kinsella is Associate Professor of Political Science, Affiliate Faculty in Gender, Women, and Sexuality Studies, and at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change at the University of Minnesota–Minneapolis.

James D. Kiras is Professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Paul Kirby is Assistant Professorial Research Fellow at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

George Lawson is Associate Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Anthony McGrew is currently Distinguished Professor in Global Public Policy at Shanghai University, Shanghai, and previously Pro-Vice-Chancellor at La Trobe University, Melbourne.

Patricia Owens is Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex.

Susan Park is Associate Professor in International Relations at the University of Sydney.

Nicola Phillips is Professor of Political Economy and Vice-President and Vice-Principal (Education) at King's College London.

Christian Reus-Smit is Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland.

Meera Sabaratnam is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at SOAS University of London.

Brian C. Schmidt is Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.

Len Scott is Emeritus Professor of International History and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University.

Richard Shapcott is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland.

Robbie Shilliam is Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University.

Sir Steve Smith is Vice-Chancellor and Professor of International Politics at the University of Exeter.

Paul Taylor is Emeritus Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Caroline Thomas was Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Professor of Global Politics at the University of Southampton, until her death in October 2008.

John Vogler is Professorial Research Fellow in International Relations at the University of Keele, UK.

Matthew Watson is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Warwick, and a UK Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Fellow.

Nicholas Wheeler is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security at the University of Birmingham.

Richard Wyn Jones is Professor and Director of Cardiff University's Wales Governance and Dean of Public Affairs.

Main map labels:

80°N 180° 160°W 140°W 120°W 100°W 80°W 60°W 40°W 20°W 0

Arctic Circle

Greenland (Denmark)

USA

ICELAND

UNITED KINGDOM

CANADA

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Azores (Portugal)

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

MEXICO

Bermuda (UK)

NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN

Madeira (Portugal)

MOROCCO

Canary Islands (Spain)

WESTERN SAHARA

THE BAHAMAS

CUBA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

JAMAICA HAITI

Puerto Rico (USA)

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

DOMINICA

MAURITANIA

CAPE VERDE

BELIZE

GUATEMALA

EL SALVADOR

HONDURAS

NICARAGUA

COSTA RICA

PANAMA

ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES

ST. LUCIA

BARBADOS

GRENADA

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

VENEZUELA

GUYANA

SURINAME

French Guiana (France)

COLOMBIA

SENEGAL

G-

G-B

GUINEA

MALI

BU

SIERRA LEONE

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

LIBERIA

PACIFIC OCEAN

Equator 0°

ECUADOR

KIRIBATI

PERU

BRAZIL

American Samoa

French Polynesia (France)

SAMOA

Cook Islands (New Zealand)

BOLIVIA

St. Helena (UK)

TONGA

20°S

Tropic of Capricorn

PARAGUAY

CHILE

SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN

URUGUAY

40°S

ARGENTINA

Falkland Islands (UK)

South Georgia (UK)

Antarctic Circle

ANTA

160°W 140°W 120°W 100°W 80°W 60°W 40°W 20°W 0

Arctic inset map:

USA

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

CANADA

ARCTIC OCEAN

Prime Meridian

GREENLAND (Denmark)

ICELAND

Arctic Circle

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Antarctic inset map:

40°W

undefined

NORWAY

60°W

UNITED KINGDOM

ARGENTINA

Antarctic Circle

60°E

80°W

CHILE

Prime Meridian

AUSTRALIA

80°E

ANTARCTICA

100°W

100°E

FRANCE

120°W

AUSTRALIA

120°E

NEW ZEALAND

140°W 160°W 180° 160°E 140°E

Legend:

— international boundary

···· disputed boundary

AR	ARMENIA
AZ	AZERBAIJAN
BANG	BANGLADESH
BE	BENIN
BR	BRUNEI
BU	BURKINA
BUR	BURUNDI
CAR	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

G	THE GAMBIA
G-B	GUINEA-BISSAU
IS	ISRAEL
L	LEBANON
Q	QATAR
R	RWANDA
T	TAJIKISTAN
TU	TURKMENISTAN
U	UGANDA
UAE	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ZIM	ZIMBABWE

Part One

International relations in a global era

In this part of the book, we introduce you to how this book makes sense of international relations in a global era. We have two main goals in this part.

First, we want to provide you with a context in which to read the different chapters that follow. We do this by explaining why the main title of this book refers to 'world politics' rather than 'international politics'; giving you a brief history of the study and discipline of International Relations; and providing a very brief introduction to the main theoretical approaches to the study of International Relations, including how each conceives of globalization.

Second, we go into much more detail on the dynamics, complexities, and contradictions of contemporary globalization. What is globalization, and what are its main engines and drivers? How should we understand the contemporary crisis of globalization and its implications for the current world order? Making sense of these questions is essential to understanding world politics in the twenty-first century. We hope that these two chapters provide a powerful entry point into what follows in the rest of the book.

From international politics to world politics

PATRICIA OWENS · JOHN BAYLIS · STEVE SMITH

Reader's Guide

This book provides a comprehensive overview of world politics in a global era. The term most often used to explain world politics in the contemporary period—'globalization'—is controversial. There is considerable dispute over what it means to talk of 'globalization', whether this implies that the main features of contemporary world politics are different from those of the past, and whether much of the world is experiencing a backlash against 'neoliberal globalization'. The concept can be most simply used to refer to the process of increasing interconnectedness among societies such that events in one part of the world increasingly have effects on peoples and societies far away. On this view, a globalized world is one in which political, economic, cultural, and social events become more and more interconnected, and also one in which they have more impact. For others, 'globalization' is the ideology associated with the current phase of the world economy—neoliberal capitalism—which has most shaped world politics since the late 1970s. In this introduction we explain how we propose to deal with globalization in this book, and we offer some arguments both for and against seeing it as an important new development in world politics.

We will begin by discussing the various terms used to describe world politics and the academic discipline—International Relations (IR)—that has led the way in thinking about world politics. We then look at the main ways in which global politics has been explained. Our aim is not to put forward one view of how to think about world politics somehow agreed by the editors, let alone by all the contributors to this book. There is no such agreement. Rather, we want to provide a context in which to read the chapters that follow. This means offering a variety of views. For example, the main theoretical accounts of world politics all see globalization differently. Some treat it as a temporary phase in human history; others see it as the latest manifestation of the growth of global capitalism; yet others see it as representing a fundamental transformation of world politics that requires new ways of understanding. The different editors and contributors to this book hold no single agreed view; they represent all the views just mentioned. Thus, they would each have a different take, for example, on why powerful states cannot agree on how to tackle global climate change, why a majority of British people voted to leave the European Union, the significance of the Arab Spring and the global financial crisis, or the causes and significance of economic, gendered, and racialized inequality in world politics.

There are three main aims of this book:

- to offer an overview of world politics in a global era;
- to summarize the main approaches to understanding contemporary world politics; and
- to provide the material necessary to develop a concrete understanding of the main structures and issues defining world politics today.

In Part Two we will examine the very important historical background to the contemporary world, including the rise of the modern international order; the major crises of international order that defined the twentieth century; more recent developments since the end of the cold war; and the significance of the rise of new, non-Western powers in contemporary world politics. Part Three gives a detailed account of each of the main theories of world politics—liberal internationalism, realism, Marxism, constructivism, poststructuralism, postcolonial and decolonial approaches, and feminism—along with a chapter on normative approaches that focuses on a series of important ethical questions, such as whether it can ever be morally right to wage war. In Part Four we look at the main structures and processes that do most to shape the central contours of contemporary world politics, such as global political economy, international security, war, gender, and race. Then in Part Five of the book we deal with some of the main policy issues in the globalized world, such as poverty, human rights, refugees, and the environmental crisis.

From international politics to world politics

Why does the main title of this book refer to 'world politics' rather than 'international politics' or 'international relations'? These are the traditional terms used to describe the kinds of structures and processes covered in this book, such as the causes of war and peace or the global economy and its inequalities. Indeed, the discipline that studies these issues is nearly always called International Relations. We will say more about this discipline shortly. The point here is that we believe the phrase 'world politics' is more inclusive than either of the alternative terms 'international relations' or 'international politics'. It is meant to signal that in this book we are interested in a very wide set of actors and political relations in the world, and not only those among nation-states (as implied by 'international relations' or 'international politics'). It is not that relations between states are unimportant; far from it. They are fundamental to contemporary world politics. But we are also interested in relations among institutions and organizations that may or may not be states. For example, this book will introduce you to the significance of multinational corporations, transnational terrorist groups, social classes, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as human rights groups. We also think that relations among transnational corporations, governments, or international organizations can be as important as what states and other political actors do or don't do. Hence,

we prefer to use the more expansive term 'world politics', with the important proviso that we do not want you to define 'politics' too narrowly. You will see this issue arising time and again in the chapters that follow, since many contributors also understand 'politics' very broadly.

Consider, for example, the distinction between 'politics' and 'economics'. Clearly, a great deal of power accrues to the group that can persuade others that the existing distribution of wealth and resources is 'simply' an economic or 'private' question rather than a political or 'public' issue. Of course, the very distinction between 'politics' and 'economics' has a history and is open to dispute. When, where, and why did this particular distinction between public and private, politics and economy, develop? What role does it play in global political economy today? As you read this book, already 82 per cent of the world's global wealth is held by 1 per cent of its population; the world's richest 27 people possess the same wealth as its poorest 50 per cent—3.8 billion people. And the global wealth gap increases every year. The point here is that we want you to think about politics very broadly because many of the chapters in this book will describe as 'political' features of the contemporary world that you may not have previously thought of as such. Our focus is on the political and power relations, broadly defined, that characterize the contemporary world. Many will be between states, but many—and perhaps most—will not.

The study of International Relations

As you will discover reading this book, International Relations (IR) is an incredibly exciting and diverse field of study. It is exciting because it addresses the most

pressing problems shaping the lives of everyone on the planet: matters of war and peace, the organization of the global economy, the causes and consequences of

global inequality, the pending global environmental catastrophe, to name just a few of the most obvious. The key concepts that organize debate in the field are also some of the most contentious: power, violence, **sovereignty**, states, **empire**, genocide, intervention, inequality, justice, and democracy, again to name just a few.

The field is highly diverse, organized into various subfields and specialisms, including international history, international security, international political economy, international law, and international organizations. Scholars of International Relations also often work with regional specialisms, focusing on Latin America, East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, or North America.

International Relations is also highly interdisciplinary, drawing on theoretical and methodological traditions from fields as diverse as History, Law, Political Science, Geography, Sociology, and increasingly Anthropology, Gender Studies, and Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies. In Britain, historians were most influential in the earliest decades of the organized study of international relations (Hall 2012). In more recent decades, especially after the end of the Second World War, and especially in the United States, Political Science has tended to have the greatest influence on the discipline of International Relations. This tended to narrow the range of acceptable approaches to the study of IR and also led to an excessive focus on US foreign policy, to the detriment of non-Western history and theories of world politics. However, very recently, both inside and outside the United States, scholars have started to pay much more attention to how and why IR has neglected non-Western histories and experiences, and have begun to rectify this (Tickner and Wæver 2009). In doing so, they have increasingly moved the field away from Eurocentric approaches to world politics and begun to take seriously the project of developing a Global IR (Acharya 2014*b*).

Watch a video of Sir Steve Smith discussing the move away from a Eurocentric approach to world politics **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

People have tried to make sense of world politics for centuries. However, the formation of the academic discipline of International Relations is relatively recent. This history also partly accounts for some of the issues just described. Consider how the history of the discipline of IR is itself contested. One of the most influential accounts of its history is that the academic discipline was formed in 1919 when the Department of International Politics was established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (now Aberystwyth University). The emphasis in this version of the story is that the Department of International Politics was founded after the horrors of the First World War to help prevent a future war. If scholars could find the causes of war, then they could put forward solutions to help politicians prevent them from breaking out. According to this view, the discipline of IR was—or should be—marked by such a commitment to change the world; the task of academic study should be one of making the world a better place.

Others have challenged this story as a foundation myth for a field with a much darker history, situating the emergence of IR somewhat earlier in the history of colonial administration and the study of imperialism (Long and Schmidt 2005; Vitalis 2015). For example, the first journal in the field was called *Journal of Race Development*, first published in 1910, and which is now the influential US-based publication known as *Foreign Affairs*. The beginning of the twentieth century was not only a period of world war, but also one of empire, theft of land, and belief in racial supremacy—that is, maintaining and justifying white supremacy in world politics. In the United States, African-American scholars interested in studying race and world politics were systematically marginalized from the emerging discipline of IR (Vitalis 2015). However, situating the history of the field in this context gives a very different gloss to the role of academic International Relations today, which exists in a context of **international hierarchy** and the continuing significance of race and racism in world politics, as discussed later in this book.

The point to note here is that there are important debates about how academic knowledge is produced, the contexts in which academic disciplines are formed, and some of the enduring legacies of this history. Another example is how histories of international thought and the discipline of International Relations almost entirely exclude women thinkers and founders of the discipline (for an exception, see Ashworth 2014). Yet, women in the past thought and wrote a great deal about international politics (Sluga and James 2016; Owens 2018). Their work has yet to be fully recovered and analysed. Knowledge about world politics—and the academic subjects that you study at university—also has a history and a politics. This history is relevant for the identity of the academic field of International Relations and for how we should think about world politics today. Indeed, you should keep in

mind that the main theories of world politics did not arise from nowhere. They were developed by intellectuals and practitioners in specific circumstances for very concrete and political reasons. International theories have histories too (Knutsen 1997; Keene 2005; Ashworth 2014).

Theories of world politics

The basic problem facing anyone who tries to understand contemporary world politics is that there is so much material to look at that it is difficult to know which things matter and which do not. Where on earth would you start if you wanted to explain the most important political processes? How, for example, would you explain the failures of climate change negotiations, 'Brexit' from the EU, the 9/11 attacks, or the rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS, otherwise known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) after the United States' invasion and occupation of Iraq? Why was the apparent economic boom in much of the capitalist world followed by a near devastating collapse of the global financial system? Why are thousands of migrants from North Africa seeking to make the extremely dangerous voyage across the Mediterranean Sea to the European Union? Why does the United States support Israel in its conflict with Palestinians in the occupied territories? As you will learn, there are very different responses to these questions, and there seems no easy way of arriving at definitive answers to them.

Whether you are aware of it or not, whenever you are faced with questions like these you have to turn, not only to the study of history, though that is absolutely essential, but also to theories. Theory is a kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which historical or contemporary facts matter more than others when trying to develop an understanding of the world. A good analogy is using sunglasses with different-coloured lenses: put on the red pair and the world looks red; put on the yellow pair and it looks yellow. The world is not any different; it just looks different. So it is with theories. Shortly, we will summarize the main theoretical views that have dominated the study of world politics so that you will get an idea of which 'colours' they paint world politics. But before we do, please note that we do not think that theory is an option. It is not as if you can say you do not want to bother with theory; all you want to do is to look at the 'facts'. We believe that this is impossible, since the only way you can decide which of the millions of possible facts to look at is by adhering to some simplifying device that tells you which ones matter the most. Theory is such a simplifying device. Note

also that you may well not be aware of your theory. It may just be the view of or even ideology about the world that you inherited from your family, social class, peer groups, or the media. It may just seem common sense to you and not at all complicated. But we fervently believe that in such a case your theoretical assumptions are just implicit rather than explicit. We prefer to try to be as explicit as possible when it comes to thinking about world politics.

Of course, many proponents of particular theories also claim to see the world the way it 'really is'. Consider the International Relations theory known as 'realism'. The 'real' world as seen by realists is not a very pleasant place. According to their view, human beings are at best selfish and domineering, and probably much worse. Liberal notions about the perfectibility of human beings and the possibility of a fundamental transformation of world politics away from conflict and hierarchy are very far-fetched from a realist perspective. Indeed, realists have often had the upper hand in debates about the nature of world politics because their views *seem* to accord more with common sense, especially when the media daily show us images of how awful human beings can be to one another. Again, we will say more about realism in a moment. The point here is to question whether such a realist view is as neutral as it seems commonsensical. After all, if we teach world politics to generations of students and tell them that people are selfish, then does this not become common sense? And when they go to work in the media, for government departments, or for the military, don't they simply repeat what they have been taught and act accordingly? Might realism simply be the ideology of powerful states, interested in protecting the status quo? What is the history of realism and what does this history tell us about its claims about how the world 'really is'? For now, we would like to keep the issue open and simply point out that we are not convinced that realism is as objective, as timeless, or as non-normative as it is often portrayed.

What is certainly true is that realism has been one of the dominant ways in the West of explaining world politics over the last 150 years. But it is not the only

theory of international relations, nor the one most closely associated with the earliest academic study of international relations. We will now summarize the main assumptions underlying the main rivals as theories of world politics: liberal internationalism, realism, **Marxism**, **constructivism**, poststructuralism, **postcolonialism and decolonialism**, and **feminism**. These theories will be discussed in much more detail in Part Three of this book; although we do not go into much depth about them here, we need to give you a flavour of their main themes since, after summarizing them, we want to say something about how each might think about globalization.

Watch a video of Sir Steve Smith discussing the value of theory **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Liberal internationalism

Liberal internationalism developed after the First World War, in a period defined by competing but unstable empires, class conflict, women's suffrage, and experiments in international organization (Sluga and Clavin 2017). As you will later learn, there are many kinds of 'liberalism'. But the main themes that run through liberal thought are that human beings and societies can be improved, that representative democracy is necessary for liberal improvement, and that ideas—not just material power—matter. Behind all this lies a belief in progress, modelled on the achievements of liberal capitalist societies in the West. Hence, liberals reject the realist notion that war is the natural condition of world politics. They also question the idea that the state is the main actor on the world political stage, although they do not deny that it is important. They see individuals, multinational corporations, **transnational actors**, and international organizations as central actors in some issue-areas of world politics. Liberals tend to think of the state not as a unitary or united actor, but as made up of individuals and their collective, societal preferences and interests. They also think of the state as comprised of a set of bureaucracies, each with its own interests. Therefore, there can be no such thing as one '**national interest**' since it merely represents the result of whatever societal preferences or bureaucratic organizations dominate the domestic decision-making process. In relations among states, liberals stress the possibilities for **cooperation**; the key issue becomes devising **international institutions** in which economic and political cooperation can be best achieved.

The picture of world politics that arises from the liberal view is of a complex system of bargaining among many different types of actors. Military force is still important, but the liberal agenda is not as restricted as the realist one of relations between great powers. Liberals see national interests in more than just military terms, and stress the importance of economic, environmental, and technological issues. Order in world politics emerges from the interactions among many layers of governing arrangements, comprising laws, agreed **norms**, **international regimes**, and institutional **rules** to manage the global capitalist economy. Fundamentally, liberals do not think that sovereignty is as important in practice as realists believe. States may be legally sovereign, but in practice they have to negotiate with all sorts of other actors, with the result that their freedom to act as they might wish is seriously curtailed. **Interdependence** between states is a critically important feature of world politics.

Realism

Realists have a different view of world politics and, like liberals, claim a long tradition. However, it is highly contested whether realists can actually claim a lineage all the way back to ancient Greece or whether realism is an invented intellectual tradition for cold war American foreign policy needs. Either way, there are many variants of something called 'realism'. But in general, for realists, the main actors on the world stage are states, which are legally sovereign actors. Sovereignty means that there is no actor above the state that can compel it to act in specific ways. According to this view, other actors such as multinational corporations or international organizations have to work within the framework of inter-state relations. As for what propels states to act as they do, realists see human nature as centrally important, and they view human nature as rather selfish. As a result, world politics (or, more accurately for realists, international politics) represents a struggle for power among states, with each trying to maximize its national interest. Such order as exists in world politics is the result of the workings of a mechanism known as the **balance of power**, whereby states act so as to prevent any one state from dominating. Thus, world politics is all about bargaining and alliances, with **diplomacy** a key mechanism for balancing various national interests. But finally, the most important tool available for implementing states' foreign policies is military force. Ultimately, since there is no sovereign body above the

states that make up the international political system, world politics is a **self-help** system in which states must rely on their own military resources to achieve their ends. Often these ends can be achieved through cooperation, but the potential for conflict is ever present.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, an important variant of realism has developed, known as **neorealism**. This approach stresses the importance of the structure of the **international system** in affecting the behaviour of all states. Thus, during the cold war two main powers dominated the international system, and this gave rise to certain rules of behaviour; now that the cold war has ended, the structure of world politics is said to be moving towards **multipolarity** (after a phase of **unipolarity**), which for neorealists will involve very different rules of the game.

Social constructivism

Social constructivism is a relatively new approach in International Relations, one that developed in the United States in the late 1980s and has been becoming increasingly influential since the mid-1990s. The approach arose out of a set of events in world politics, notably the disintegration of the Soviet empire, as symbolized most dramatically by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. These events indicated that human agency had a much greater potential role in world politics than implied by realism or liberalism. But the theoretical underpinnings of social constructivism are much older; they relate to a series of social-scientific and philosophical works that dispute the notion that the 'social world' is external to the people who live in it, and is not easily changed. To different degrees, realism and liberalism stress the regularities and 'certainties' of political life (although liberalism is somewhat less adamant).

By contrast, constructivism argues that we make and remake the social world and so there is much more of a role for human agency than realism and liberalism allow. Moreover, constructivists note that those who see the world as fixed underestimate the possibilities for human progress and for the betterment of people's lives. To this degree, social constructivism strongly overlaps with liberalism and can even be seen as providing the social theory underpinnings of liberal political theories of world politics. In the words of one of the most influential constructivist theorists, Alexander Wendt, even the self-help international system portrayed by realists is something that we make and

remake: as he puts it, '**anarchy** is what states make of it' (Wendt 1992). Therefore, the world that realists portray as 'natural' or 'given' is in fact far more open to change, and constructivists think that self-help is only one possible response to the anarchical structure of world politics. Indeed, not only is the structure of world politics amenable to change, but so also are the identities and interests that neorealism or neoliberalism take as given. In other words, constructivists think that it is a fundamental mistake to think of world politics as something that we cannot change. The seemingly 'natural' structures, processes, identities, and interests of world politics could in fact be different from what they currently are. Note, however, that social constructivism is not a theory of world politics in itself. It is an approach to the philosophy of social science with implications for the kinds of arguments that can be made about world politics. Constructivists need to marry their approach to another political theory of world politics, such as realism but usually liberalism, to actually make substantive claims.

Realism, liberalism, and social constructivism are generally considered to be the 'mainstream' theories of world politics. This means that they are the dominant approaches in the most influential location for IR scholarship, which is currently in the United States. But this is changing. And by no means should realism, liberalism, and social constructivism be considered the only compelling theories. On the contrary, outside the United States these theories are often considered to be far too narrow and thus unconvincing. We now turn to some other approaches that are highly critical of the mainstream and move beyond it in quite far-reaching ways.

Marxist theories

The fourth main theoretical position we want to mention, Marxist theory, is also known as historical materialism, which immediately gives you clues as to its main assumptions. But first we want to point out a paradox about Marxism. On the one hand, Marxist theory has been incredibly influential historically, inspiring socialist revolutions around the world, including during the process of decolonization, and also in the recent global uprisings in response to the global financial crisis since 2007, for instance in Greece. On the other hand, it has been less influential in the discipline of IR than either realism or liberalism, and has less in common with either realism or liberalism than they do with each

other. Indeed, from a Marxist perspective, both realism and liberalism serve the class and imperial interests of the most powerful actors in world politics to the detriment of most of the rest of the world.

For Marxist theory, the most important feature of world politics is that it takes place in a highly unequal world capitalist economy. In this world economy the most important actors are not states but classes, and the behaviour of all other actors is ultimately explicable by class forces. Thus states, multinational corporations, and even international organizations represent the dominant class interest in the world economic system. Marxist theorists differ over how much leeway actors such as states have, but all Marxists agree that the world economy severely constrains states' freedom of manoeuvre, especially that of smaller and weaker states. Rather than an arena of conflict among national interests or an arena with many different issue-areas, Marxist theorists conceive of world politics as the setting in which class conflicts are played out. In the branch of Marxism known as world systems theory, the key feature of the international economy is the division of the world into core, semi-periphery, and periphery areas. In the semi-periphery and the periphery there exist cores that are tied into the capitalist world economy, while even in the core area there are peripheral economic areas. In all of this, what matters is the dominance of the power not of states but of global capitalism, and it is these forces that ultimately determine the main political patterns in world politics. Sovereignty is not nearly as important for Marxist theorists as for realists since it refers to political and legal matters, whereas the most important feature of world politics is the degree of economic autonomy, and here Marxist theorists see all states as having to play by the rules of the international capitalist economy.

Poststructuralism

Poststructuralism has been a particularly influential theoretical development throughout the humanities and social sciences in the last 30 years. It reached international theory in the mid-1980s, but it can only be said to have really arrived in the last few years of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, in recent years poststructuralism has probably been as popular a theoretical approach as any discussed in this book, and it overlaps with a number of them. Part of the difficulty, however, is precisely defining poststructuralism, which is also sometimes referred to as postmodernism. This is in addition to the fact, of course, that there are substantial theoretical differences within its various strands. One useful definition is by Jean-François Lyotard (1984: xxiv): 'Simplifying to the extreme, I define post-modern as incredulity towards metanarratives'. 'Incredulity' simply means scepticism; 'metanarrative' means any theory that asserts it has clear foundations for making knowledge claims and involves a **foundational epistemology**. You do not need to worry too much about what this means right now. It's explained in more detail in the chapter on poststructuralism, and we say a little bit more about these meta-theory questions below (**see 'Some meta-theoretical questions'**). Put simply, to have a foundational epistemology is to think that all truth claims (about some feature of the world) can be judged true or false (epistemology is the study of how we can claim to know something).

Poststructuralism is essentially concerned with distrusting and exposing any account of human life that claims to have direct access to 'the truth'. Thus realism, liberalism, social constructivism, and even Marxism are all suspect from a poststructuralist perspective because they claim to have uncovered some fundamental truth about the world. Michel Foucault, an important influence on poststructuralists in International Relations, was opposed to the notion that knowledge is immune from the workings of power. Instead, and in common with Marxism, he argued that power produces knowledge. All power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations. Thus there is no such thing as 'truth' existing outside of power. Truth is not something external to social settings, but is instead part of them. Poststructuralist international theorists have used this insight to examine the 'truths' of International Relations theory, to see how the concepts that dominate the discipline are in fact highly contingent on specific power relations. Poststructuralism takes apart the very concepts and methods of our thinking, examining the conditions under which we are able to theorize about world politics in the first place.

Postcolonial and decolonial approaches

Postcolonialism has been an important approach in cultural studies, literary theory, and anthropology for some time now, and has a long and distinguished pedigree. However, postcolonial approaches have until quite recently largely been ignored in the field of International Relations. This is now changing, not least because old

disciplinary boundaries are breaking down. As noted earlier in this chapter, more and more scholars studying international politics are drawing on ideas from other disciplines, including postcolonial ideas, especially those that expose the Eurocentric character of IR. It is noteworthy that all the major theories we have discussed so far—realism, liberalism, Marxism, social constructivism, and poststructuralism—emerged in Europe in response to specific European problems. They are all 'Eurocentric'. Postcolonial scholars question whether Eurocentric theories can really purport to explain world politics as a whole, or world politics as it relates to the lives of most people on the planet. It is more likely that they help to continue and justify the military and economic subordination of the Global South by powerful Western interests. This process is known as 'neocolonialism'. Postcolonialism has also become more popular since the 9/11 attacks, which encouraged people to try to understand how the histories of the West and the Global South have always been intertwined. For example, the identities of the colonized and colonizers are constantly in flux and mutually constituted. Postcolonial scholars argue that the dominant theories, especially realism and liberalism, are not neutral in terms of race, gender, and class, but have helped secure the domination of the Western world over the Global South. In this way, postcolonialism suggests that traditional Marxism did not pay sufficient attention to the way that racial and gendered identities and power relations were central to upholding class power. Decolonial scholarship, which comes out of and is closely linked to postcolonialism, then proceeds to think about how to 'decolonize' the dominant theories and ways of knowing. Thus, an important claim of postcolonial and decolonial approaches is that global hierarchies of subordination and control, past and present, are made possible through the historical construction and combination of racial, gendered, and class differences and hierarchies. As other chapters in this volume suggest, IR has been slightly more comfortable with issues of class and gender. But the issue of race has been almost entirely ignored. This is even though race and racism continue to shape the contemporary theory and practice of world politics in far-reaching ways, as shown in the chapter on racism in this book. In 1903, W. E. B. DuBois famously argued that the problem of the twentieth century would be the problem of the 'colour-line'. How will transnational racism continue to shape global politics in the twenty-first century?

Feminism

Feminists were among the earliest and most influential writers on international politics in the period during which the academic discipline of International Relations was said to emerge (Ashworth 2011; Sluga 2017). But, as noted earlier, this tradition of international theory was marginalized from the discipline of International Relations after the Second World War until the 1980s. The first and most important thing to note about feminism itself is that there is no one feminist theory; there are many kinds of feminisms. However, the different approaches are united by their focus on the construction of differences between 'women' and 'men' in the context of hierarchy and power and the highly contingent understandings of masculinity and femininity that these power relations produce. Indeed, the very categories of 'women' and 'men', and the concepts of masculinity and femininity, are highly contested in much feminist research. Some feminist theories assume natural and biological (i.e. sex) differences between men and women. Some do not. However, what all of the most interesting work in this field does is analyse how gender both affects world politics and is an effect of world politics; in other words, how different concepts (such as the state or sovereignty) are gendered and, in turn, how this gendering of concepts can have differential consequences for 'men' and 'women'.

Some feminists look at the ways in which women are excluded from power and prevented from playing a full part in political activity. They examine how women have been restricted to roles critically important for the functioning of things (such as reproductive economies) but that are not usually deemed to be important for theories of world politics. Other feminists argue that the cause of women's inequality is to be found in the capitalist system; overthrowing capitalism is the necessary route for the achievement of the equal treatment of women. 'Standpoint feminists' identify how women, as a particular class by virtue of their sex rather than economic standing (although the two are related), possess a unique perspective—or standpoint—on world politics as a result of their subordination. For example, in an important early essay, J. Ann Tickner (1988) reformulated the famous 'Six principles of political realism' developed by the 'godfather' of realism, Hans J. Morgenthau. Tickner showed how the seemingly 'objective' rules of realism actually reflect hegemonic 'male' values and definitions of reality. As a riposte, she reformulated these same rules taking women's experiences as the starting point.

Postcolonial and decolonial feminists work at the intersection of class, race, and gender on a global scale, and especially analyse the gendered effects of transnational culture and the unequal division of labour in the global political economy. From this perspective, it is not good enough to simply demand (as some liberal feminists do) that men and women should have equal rights in a Western-style democracy. Such a move ignores the way in which poor women of colour in the Global South remain subordinated by the global economic system—a system that liberal feminists were too slow to challenge in a systematic way.

Some meta-theoretical questions

For most of the twentieth century, realism, liberalism, and Marxism tended to be the main theories used to understand world politics, with constructivism, feminism, and poststructuralism becoming increasingly influential since the mid-1990s and postcolonialism gaining some influence in the 2000s.

While it is clear that each of these theories focuses on different aspects of world politics, each is saying more than this. Each view is claiming that it is picking out the most important features of world politics and that it offers a better account than do its rival theories. Thus, the different approaches are really in competition with one another. While you can certainly choose among them and combine some aspects of some of the theories (see, for example, Marxism, feminism, and postcolonialism), it is not always so easy to add bits from one to the others. For example, if you are a Marxist then you think that state behaviour is ultimately determined by class forces, which realists and liberals do not think affect state behaviour in any significant way. In other words, these theories are really competing versions of what world politics is like rather than partial pictures of it. They do not agree on what the 'it' is.

One way to think about this is in relation to meta-theoretical questions (questions above any particular theory). Such terms can be a little unsettling, but they are merely convenient words for discussing fairly straightforward ideas. First consider the distinction between **explanatory** and **constitutive** theories. An explanatory theory is one that sees the world as something external to our theories of it. In contrast, a constitutive theory is one that thinks our theories actually help construct the world. In a very obvious way our theories about the world shape how we act, and thereby make those theories self-confirming. For

example, if we think that individuals are naturally aggressive then we are likely to adopt a different posture towards them than if we think they are naturally peaceful. However, you should not regard this claim as self-evidently true, since it assumes that our ability to think and reason makes us able to determine our choices (i.e. that we have free will rather than having our 'choices' predetermined). What if our human nature is such that we desire certain things 'naturally', and that our language and seemingly 'free choices' are simply rationalizations for our needs? The point is that there is a genuine debate between those who think of the social world as like the natural world, and those theories that see our language and concepts as helping create that reality. Theories claiming the natural and the social worlds are the same are known as naturalist (Hollis and Smith 1990).

In IR, realist and liberal theories tend to be explanatory, with the task of theory as reporting on a world that is external to our theories. Their concern is to uncover regularities in human behaviour and thereby explain the social world in much the same way as a natural scientist might explain the physical world. By contrast, nearly all the approaches developed in the last 30 years or so tend to be constitutive theories. Here theory is not external to the things it is trying to explain, and instead may construct how we think about the world. Or, to put it another way, our theories define what we see as the external world. Thus, the very concepts we use to think about the world help to make that world what it is.

The foundational/**anti-foundational** distinction refers to the simple-sounding issue of whether our beliefs about the world can be tested or evaluated against any neutral or objective procedures. This is a distinction central to the branch of the philosophy of social science known as epistemology (the study of how we can claim to know something). A foundationalist position is one that thinks that all truth claims (about some feature of the world) can be judged true or false. An anti-foundationalist thinks that truth claims cannot be judged in this way, since there are never neutral grounds for doing so. Instead each theory will define what counts as the facts and so there will be no neutral position available to adjudicate between rival claims. Think, for example, of a Marxist and a liberal arguing about the 'true' state of the economy. Foundationalists look for 'meta-theoretical' (above any particular theory) grounds for choosing between truth claims. In contrast, anti-foundationalists think that there are no such positions available, and that believing there to be some

is itself simply a reflection of an adherence to a particular view of epistemology.

Most of the contemporary approaches to international theory are much less wedded to foundationalism than were the traditional theories. Thus, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and some feminist theory would tend towards anti-foundationalism, whereas neorealism and neoliberalism would tend towards foundationalism. Interestingly, social constructivism wishes to portray itself as occupying the middle ground. On the whole, and as a rough guide, explanatory theories tend to be foundational while constitutive theories tend to be anti-foundational. The point at this stage is not to construct some checklist, nor to get you thinking yet about the epistemological differences among these theories. Rather we want to draw your attention to the important impact of these assumptions about the nature of knowledge on the theories that you will learn about. The last 30 years have seen these underlying assumptions brought more into the open. The most important effect of this has been to undermine realism's and liberalism's claims to be delivering *the* truth.

Note that this is a very rough representation of how the various theories can be categorized. It is misleading in some respects, since there are quite different versions of the main theories and some of these are less foundationalist than others. In other words, the classifications are broadly illustrative of the theoretical landscape, and are best considered a useful starting point for thinking about the differences among theories. As you learn more about them you will see how rough and ready a picture this is, but it is as good a general categorization as any other.

Theories and globalization

None of these theories has all the answers when it comes to explaining world politics in a global era. In fact, each sees 'globalization' differently. We do not want to tell you which theory seems best, since the purpose of this book is to give you a variety of conceptual lenses through which you might want to look at world politics. All we will do is say a few words about how each theory might respond to the debate about 'globalization'. We will then go on to say something about the possible rise of globalization and offer some ideas on its strengths and weaknesses as a description of contemporary world politics.

- For liberals, globalization is the end product of a long-running, progressive transformation of world politics. Liberals are particularly interested in the revolution in economy, technology, and communications represented by globalization. This increased interconnectedness among societies, which is economically and technologically led, results in a very different pattern of world political relations from that which has gone before. States are no longer such central actors as they once were. In their place are numerous actors of differing importance according to the issue-area concerned. The world looks more like a cobweb of relations than like the state model of realism or the class model of Marxist theory. From this perspective, the British vote to exit from the EU was a foolish and very expensive decision to reject political and economic integration.

- For realists, the picture looks very different. For them, globalization—however its advocates define it—does not alter the most significant feature of world politics, namely the territorial division of the world into nation-states. While the increased interconnectedness among economies and societies might make them more dependent on one another, the same cannot be said about the state system. Here, powerful states retain sovereignty, and globalization does not render obsolete the struggle for political power among those states. Nor does it undermine the importance of the threat of the use of force or the importance of the balance of power. Globalization may affect our social, economic, and cultural lives, but it does not transcend the international political system of states. We might think of the decision of the British people to leave the European Union as a demonstration of the enduring significance of national sovereignty.

- For constructivist theorists, globalization tends to be presented as an external force acting on states, which leaders often argue is a reality that they cannot challenge. This, constructivists argue, is a very political act, since it underestimates the ability of changing social norms and the identity of actors to challenge and shape globalization, and instead allows leaders to duck responsibility by blaming 'the way the world is'. Instead, constructivists think that we can mould globalization in a variety of ways, notably because it offers us very real chances, for example, to create

cross-national human rights and **social movements** aided by modern technological forms of communication such as the internet.

- For Marxists, globalization is a sham, and the recent backlash against 'globalization' is evidence of this. From a historical perspective, it is nothing particularly new, and is really only the latest stage in the development of international capitalism: neoliberalism. It does not mark a qualitative shift in world politics, nor does it render all our existing theories and concepts redundant. Above all, it is a Western-led capitalist phenomenon that simply furthers the development of global capitalism, in a neoliberal vein. Neoliberalism, in this sense, is less a variant of liberal internationalism, though there are links, than the effort to deregulate global capitalism for the benefit of the rich. Rather than make the world more alike, neoliberal globalization further deepens the existing divides between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. From this perspective, the decision of British people to retreat from transnational collaboration, voting to exit the EU, was because ordinary working people did not feel the benefits of it.

- For poststructuralists, 'globalization' does not exist out there in the world. It is a discourse. Poststructuralists are sceptical of the grand claims made by realists, liberals, and Marxists about the nature of globalization, and they argue that any claims about the meaning of so-called 'globalization' make sense only in the context of a specific discourse that itself is a product of power. These various regimes of truth about globalization merely reflect the ways in which both power and truth develop together in a mutually sustaining relationship throughout history. The way to uncover the workings of power behind the discourse of 'globalization' is to undertake a detailed historical analysis of how the practices and statements about globalization are 'true' only within specific discourses.

- Postcolonial and decolonial scholarship on globalization is similar to much Marxist thought in that it highlights the important degree of continuity and persistence of colonial forms of power in the globalized world. For example, the level of economic and military control of Western interests in the Global South is in many ways actually greater now than it was under direct control—a form of 'neo'-colonialism that is compatible with neoliberal capitalism. So, although the era of formal colonial imposition by force of arms is largely over, an important starting point for postcolonial scholarship is the issue of vast inequality on a global scale, the forms of globalizing power that make this systematic inequality possible, and the continued domination of subaltern peoples, those classes dominated under hegemony such as poor rural women in the Global South.

- Each of the different branches of feminist scholarship responds differently to the question of globalization, but they all address and debate the effects that it has on gendered forms of power. Liberal feminists, as is to be expected, are most positive and hopeful about globalization, viewing it as a way to incorporate more women into the existing political and economic system. Others are much more sceptical, pointing to the negative effects of neoliberalism and economic globalization on the global wealth gap, which has a disproportionately negative effect on women, especially women of colour. From a feminist perspective, to really assess the significance, causes, and effects of globalization requires concrete analysis of the lived experiences of men and women, showing how seemingly gender-neutral issues are highly gendered, reinforcing relations of power and other forms of gender injustice.

By the end of the book we hope you will work out which of these theories (if any) best explains not only 'globalization', but world politics more generally. The central point here is that the main theories see globalization differently because they have a prior view of what is most important in world politics.

Globalization: myth or reality?

The focus of this book is to offer an overview of world politics in a global era. But what does it mean to speak of a 'global era'? Societies today are affected both more extensively and more deeply by events in other societies. The world seems to be 'shrinking', and people are increasingly aware of this. The internet is the most graphic example, since it allows you to sit at home and have instant communication with people around the world. Email and

social media such as Facebook and Twitter have also transformed communications and hence how we come to know about world politics. But these are only the most obvious examples. Others would include: global newspapers, international social movements such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, global franchises such as McDonald's, Coca-Cola, and Apple, the global economy, and global problems such as pollution, climate change, and HIV/AIDS. Have these developments really changed the nature of world politics? The debate about globalization is not just the claim that the world has changed but whether the changes are qualitative and not merely quantitative. Has a 'new' world political system really emerged as a result of these processes?

Our final task in this introduction is to offer you a summary of the main arguments for and against globalization as a distinct new phase in world politics. We do not expect you to decide where you stand on the issue at this stage, but we think that we should give you some of the main arguments so that you can keep them in mind as you read the rest of this book. Because the arguments for globalization as a new phase of world politics are most effectively summarized in **Chapter 1**, we will spend more time on the criticisms. The main arguments in favour are:

- The pace of economic transformation is so great that it has created a new world politics. States are less and less like closed units and they cannot control their own economies under global capitalism. The world economy is more interdependent than ever, with cross-border trade and financial flows ever expanding.
- Communications have fundamentally revolutionized the way we deal with the rest of the world. We now live in a world where events in one location can be immediately observed on the other side of the world. Electronic communications alter our notions of the social groups we live in.
- There is now, more than ever before, a global culture, so that most urban areas resemble one another. Much of the urban world shares a common culture, a good deal of it emanating from Hollywood.
- Time and space seem to be collapsing. Our old ideas of geographical space and of chronological time are undermined by the speed of modern communications and media.
- A global polity is emerging, with transnational social and political movements and the beginnings of a transfer of allegiance from the state to sub-state, transnational, and international bodies.

- A cosmopolitan culture is developing. People are beginning to 'think globally and act locally'.
- A risk culture is emerging, with people realizing both that the main risks that face them are global (pollution, HIV/AIDS, and climate change) and that individual states are unable to deal with these problems.

However, just as there are powerful reasons for seeing globalization as a new stage in world politics, often allied to the view that globalization is progressive—that it improves people's lives—there are also arguments that suggest the opposite. Some of the main ones are:

- Globalization is merely a buzzword to denote the latest phase of capitalism: neoliberalism. In a very powerful critique of globalization theory, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996) argue that one effect of the globalization thesis is that it makes it appear as if national governments are powerless in the face of global economic trends. This ends up paralysing governmental attempts to subject global economic forces to control and regulation. Just think about how this played out in the negotiations between Greece and its debtors in 2015. Believing that most globalization theory lacks historical depth, Hirst and Thompson point out that it paints the current situation as more unusual than it is, and also as more firmly entrenched than it might in fact be. Current trends may well be reversible. They conclude that the more extreme versions of globalization are 'a myth', and they support this claim with five main conclusions from their study of the contemporary world economy (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 2–3). First, the present internationalized economy is not unique in history. In some respects, they say it is less open than the international economy was between 1870 and 1914. Second, they find that 'genuinely' transnational companies are relatively rare; most are national companies trading internationally. Third, there is no shift of finance and capital from the developed to the underdeveloped world. Overseas direct investment continues to be highly concentrated among the countries of the developed world. Fourth, the world economy is not global; rather trade, investment, and financial flows are concentrated in and among different blocs—Europe, North America, China, and Japan. Finally, if they coordinated policies, this group of blocs could regulate global economic markets and forces. Hirst and Thompson offer a very powerful critique of one of

the main planks of the globalization thesis: that the global economy is something beyond our control. Their central criticism is that this view both misleads us and prevents us from developing policies to control national economies. All too often we are told that our economy must obey 'the global market', with enormous consequences for social spending and social justice. Hirst and Thompson believe that this is a myth.

- Another obvious objection is that globalization is very uneven in its effects. At times it sounds very much like a Western theory applicable only to a small part of humankind. To pretend that even a small minority of the world's population can connect to the internet is clearly an exaggeration when in reality most people on the planet are not so technologically connected. In other words, globalization applies only to the developed world. We are in danger of overestimating both the extent and the depth of globalization.

- A related objection is that globalization may well be simply the latest stage of Western imperialism. It is the old modernization theory in a new guise. The forces that are being globalized are conveniently those found in the Western world. What about non-Western experiences and values? Where do they fit into this emerging global world? The worry is that they do not fit in at all, and what is being celebrated in globalization is the triumph of a Western worldview, at the expense of the worldviews of others.

- Critics have also noted that there are very considerable losers as the world becomes more globalized. This is because globalization represents the seeming 'success' of neoliberal capitalism in an economically divided world. Perhaps one outcome is that neoliberal globalization allows the more efficient exploitation of poorer nations, and segments of richer ones, all in the name of 'openness'. The technologies accompanying globalization are technologies that benefit the richest economies in the world, and allow their interests to override those of local communities. Not only is globalization imperialist; it is also exploitative.

- Not all globalized forces are necessarily 'good' ones. Globalization makes it easier for drug cartels and terrorists to operate, and the internet's anarchy raises crucial questions of censorship and preventing access to certain kinds of material, including among those trading in the sexual exploitation of children.

- Turning to the so-called **global governance** aspects of globalization, the main worry here is about responsibility. To whom are the transnational social movements responsible and democratically accountable? If IBM or Shell becomes more and more powerful in the world, does this not raise the issue of how accountable it is to democratic control? One of the arguments for 'Brexit' was that EU decision-making is undemocratic and unaccountable. Most of the emerging powerful actors in a globalized world are not accountable to democratic publics. This argument also applies to seemingly 'good' global actors such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace.

We hope that these arguments for and against the dominant way of representing globalization will cause you to think deeply about the utility of the concept of globalization. The chapters that follow do not take a common stance for or against. We end by posing some questions that we would like you to keep in mind as you read the remaining chapters:

- Is globalization a new phenomenon in world politics?
- Which theory discussed above best explains globalization?
- Is globalization a positive or a negative development?
- Is neoliberal globalization merely the latest stage of capitalist development?
- Does globalization make the state obsolete?
- Does globalization make the world more or less democratic?
- Is globalization merely Western imperialism in a new guise?
- Does globalization make war more or less likely?
- In what ways is war a globalizing force in itself?
- Do you think that the vote for Brexit and the election of President Donald Trump in 2016 represent a major new challenge to globalization?

Watch a video of Sir Steve Smith discussing the impact of Brexit and the election of President Donald Trump **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

We hope that this introduction and the chapters that follow help you to answer these questions, and that this book as a whole provides you with a good overview of the politics of the contemporary world. Whether or not you conclude that globalization is a new phase in world politics, whether you think it is a positive or a negative development, or that it doesn't really exist at all, we leave

to you to decide. But we think it is important to conclude this chapter by stressing that globalization—whatever it is—is clearly a very complex phenomenon. How we think about politics in the global era will reflect not merely the theories we accept, but also our own positions in this globalized world. In this sense, how we respond to world events may itself be ultimately dependent on the social, cultural, gendered, racialized, economic, and political spaces we occupy. In other words, world politics suddenly becomes very personal: how does your economic position, your ethnicity, race, gender, culture, or your religion determine what globalization means to you?

Further Reading

On the history of the academic field of International Relations, see **L. M. Ashworth** (2014), *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge); **D. Long and B. Schmidt** (2005), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press); **R. Vitalis** (2015), *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); and **A. Acharya and B. Buzan** (2019), *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

On the history of international political thought and international theories more generally, see **E. Keene** (2005), *International Political Thought: An Historical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity); **D. Armitage** (2013), *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and **T. L. Knutsen** (2016), *A History of International Relations Theory*, 3rd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

There are several good introductory guides to the globalization debate. On the intellectual origins of 'globalism', see **O. Rosenboim** (2017), *The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Comprehensive discussions are found in **A. McGrew and D. Held** (2007), *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies* (Cambridge: Polity Press) and **F. J. Lechner and J. Boli** (eds) (2014), *The Globalization Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell). Also see **C. el-Ojeili and P. Hayden** (2006), *Critical Theories of Globalization* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

C. Enloe (2016), *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link*, 2nd edn (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield) is a good analysis from a leading feminist of the connections between globalization and various forms of violence. **K. Mahbubani** (2013), *The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World* (New York: PublicAffairs) provides an interesting analysis of the argument that a power shift is needed to reflect new global political realities. On this subject, also see **A. Acharya** (2014), *The End of American World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

We also point you to other books in the Rowman & Littlefield series on globalization edited by **M. B. Steger and T. Carver**, in particular **J. Agnew** (2017), *Globalization and Sovereignty: Beyond the Territorial Trap*, 2nd edn; **S. Krishna** (2008), *Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century;* and **M. E. Hawkesworth** (2018), *Globalization and Feminist Activism*, 2nd edn.

Excellent critiques of the globalization thesis are **J. Rosenberg** (2002), *The Follies of Globalization Theory* (London: Verso); **D. Held and A. McGrew** (2007), *Globalization/Anti-globalization: Beyond the Great Divide*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press); **B. K. Gills** (ed.) (2002), *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); **B. K. Gills and W. R. Thompson** (eds) (2006), *Globalization and Global History* (London: Routledge); **J. E. Stiglitz** (2017), *Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: The Era of Trump* (London: Penguin); **L. Weiss** (1998), *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Cambridge: Polity Press); and **P. Hirst and G. Thompson** (1999), *Globalization in Question*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press).

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Globalization and global politics

ANTHONY MCGREW

Framing Questions

- **Why is globalization so contentious?**

- **What are the implications of the current crisis of globalization for world politics and world order?**

- **How does the study of globalization advance understanding of world politics?**

Reader's Guide

Globalization is a concept which refers to the widening, deepening, and acceleration of worldwide connectivity or **interconnectedness**. Popular metaphors portray it in vivid terms as: a 'shrinking world', 'networked world', the 'death of distance', a 'global village', or 'global civilization'. Globalization, in simultaneously unifying and dividing the world, is a much more complex and contradictory phenomenon than these metaphors presume. This chapter will explore these complexities and contradictions through an analysis of the characteristics and dynamics of contemporary globalization. Making sense of globalization is essential to comprehending and explaining world politics in the twenty-first century.

Introduction

A little over a century ago, the so-called 'belle époque' of European globalization catastrophically imploded with the onset of the First World War. Global connectivity, as with **war**, has been central to the formation of the modern world system and essential to understanding contemporary world politics (Bayly 2004, 2018; Osterhammel 2014). Yet within the academy, the significance of globalization is seriously contested, while beyond the academy it is deeply detested by many, including advocates of nationalist **populism** (paradoxically itself a global phenomenon). This chapter is organized into three parts. The first is concerned with making sense of globalization by addressing some fundamental questions: What is globalization? What are its dominant features? How is it best conceptualized and defined? The second part reassesses the current 'crisis of globalization' alongside its potential consequences for the liberal world order and world politics. The third considers the contributions of globalization scholarship to advancing a critical understanding of twenty-first-century global affairs. The chapter concludes with brief reflections on the three core framing questions.

Making sense of globalization

Globalization today is evident in almost every aspect of modern life, from fashion to finance, social media to supermarket merchandise, multinational corporations to the #MeToo movement. Indeed, it so integral to the functioning of modern economies and societies that it is an institutionalized feature of contemporary life, at least for the world's most prosperous citizens. Universities, for instance, are literally global institutions, from the recruitment of students to the dissemination of academic research.

Mapping globalization

In today's global economy, the fate and fortunes of entire **nations**, communities, and households across the world is bound together through complex webs of global trade, finance, and production networks. Such is the integration of the world economy that no national economy can insulate itself from the workings of global markets, as the 2008 **global financial crisis** (GFC) demonstrated to such disastrous effect (**see Ch. 16**). A global crash was only averted through coordinated action by the world's major economies at the 2009 G20 summit which (at the time) prompted the ironic headline: '(Communist) China comes to the "rescue of global capitalism".

Before the eruption of the GFC, economic globalization (measured by global flows of capital, trade, and production) reached historic levels, consistently outpacing for almost three decades the growth of the world economy. At its peak in 2007, global flows of capital, goods, and services were estimated at a staggering 53 per cent of world economic activity (GDP) (McKinsey Global Institute 2016). Global economic integration had intensified and expanded to embrace most of the world's population as the emerging economies of China, Brazil, India, and others were fully incorporated into a 24-hour world economy. Following the GFC, the pace of economic globalization slowed dramatically, as capital and trade flows temporarily reversed, prompting much commentary about the end of globalization or deglobalization. Although today (2019) global economic flows remain below peak 2007 levels, they have for the most part recovered to levels near or above those of the turn of this century, now estimated at 39 per cent of world GDP, and expected to continue to grow (although more slowly than in the recent past) (McKinsey Global Institute 2016; WTO 2018*a*; Lund et al. 2019).

Every single working day, total turnover on the world's money markets amounts to a remarkable $5 trillion, only just short of the combined annual GDP of the UK and France, the fifth and seventh largest economies in the world, respectively, as of 2017. Few governments today have the resources to resist sustained 24-hour global market speculation against their currency without significant consequences for domestic economic stability and prosperity (**see Ch. 27**). Nor are governments necessarily the primary decision-makers in today's global economy, since **transnational corporations**, scores of which have turnovers which well exceed the GDP of many countries, account for over 33 per cent of world output, control global production networks which account for 30 per cent of world trade, and are the primary sources of

international investment in manufacturing and services (UNCTAD 2018). Every iPhone is the product of design services and components supplied by some 700 companies across the globe from Malaysia to Malta. Transnational corporations therefore have enormous influence over the location and distribution of productive, economic, and technological power. Their operations confound the traditional distinction between the foreign and the domestic: the German automotive company BMW is the top exporter of automobiles from the US. BMW's largest manufacturing plant is in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and, together with other German-owned car plants located in the US, accounts for over 60 per cent of American car exports to China as of 2018.

Contemporary globalization is associated intimately with the revolutions in modern transport and communication technologies, from jet transport and containerization to mobile phones and the internet (**see Box 1.1**). Digitalization has revolutionized worldwide communications through relatively cheap, instantaneous, round-the-clock global communication and information flows. Between 2005 and 2014, global data flows increased by a remarkable 45 times, while access to the internet, although still highly uneven, expanded from over 1 billion users to 4.1 billion in 2018 (55 per cent of the world's population), with the majority in Asia (McKinsey Global Institute 2016).

These global communication and mobility infrastructures have made it possible not only to manage just-in-time production networks across continents, but also to organize and mobilize like-minded people across the globe in virtual real time (**see Box 1.2**). The #MeToo movement became a spontaneous global phenomenon in late 2017 as women, from Afghanistan to Nepal, organized to advocate for justice for women. Somewhat paradoxically, the current wave of nationalist populism has acquired a global reach through transnational networking and **cooperation** across Europe, the US, and Latin America between like-minded political parties and ideological factions (Moffitt 2017). People organize across borders on a remarkable scale, such that currently over 38,000 international **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs), from Amnesty International to Women Working Worldwide, operate across 166 countries, hosting some 481,000 meetings in 2018 alone (**see Ch. 22**). Alongside these global civil society NGOs, the same communication and mobility infrastructures facilitate the uncivil activities of transnational organized criminal and terrorist networks, from the Yakuza to Al Shabaab, human trafficking to money laundering. This illicit globalization, which has expanded exponentially over the last two decades, contributes to a more disorderly, violent, and insecure world. Globalization is a source of unprecedented risks and societal vulnerabilities.

Box 1.1 Global entrepreneurs: the agents of globalization

Globalization is not an autonomous process, but is very much a product of the actions of individuals as well as large organizations such as multinational companies. A powerful illustration of this is the *moambeiras* or suitcase traders of Luanda, Angola. Each week, an estimated 400 women fashion traders from the poorer districts of Luanda organize buying trips to São Paolo, Brazil. They head straight to the city's global fashion district, *Feira da Madrugada*, to purchase the latest Brazilian fashion merchandise, produced in the local informal economy, which they bring back in suitcases to sell in Luanda's markets. Why Brazil? Because Angolans and Brazilians share a colonial history and language from the era of Portuguese empire. As a result, Brazilian *telenovelas* are hugely popular in Angola as is Brazilian fashion, not to mention Havaianas flip-flops. There is also a significant Angolan diaspora in Brazil. More recently, some *moambeiras* have begun trading with China too, as competition increases. These women 'global entrepreneurs' are the agents of an informal globalization which for many in the Global South is a bridge to economic security.

(Barreau Tran 2017)

Box 1.2 The engines of globalization

Explanations of globalization tend to focus on three inter-related factors: technics (technological change and social organization); economics (markets and capitalism); and politics (power, interests, and institutions).

- **Technics**—central to any account of globalization, since it is a truism that without a modern communications infrastructure, a global system or worldwide economy would not be possible.
- **Economics**—crucial as technology is, so too is globalization's specifically economic logic. Capitalism's insatiable demand for new markets and profits leads inevitably to the globalization of economic activity.
- **Politics**—shorthand here for ideas, interests, and power, politics constitutes the third logic of globalization. If technology provides the physical infrastructure of globalization, politics provides its normative infrastructure. Governments, such as those of the US, China, Brazil, and the UK, have been critical actors in nurturing the process of globalization.

As Goldin and Mariathasan (2014) observe, the scale and intensity of global connectivity today has created a world of highly complex systemic interdependencies not just between countries, but also between global systems, from finance to the environment (**see Chs 15, 24, 27, 28, and 29**). Such complexity, in turn, creates profound systemic risks in which, for example, household mortgage defaults in Ohio precipitate a financial chain reaction culminating in a global shock which threatens the collapse of the entire global financial system. If this seems somewhat fantastical, histories of the 2008 GFC describe such a scenario and just how close the world came to financial collapse and economic catastrophe (Tooze 2018). From health pandemics to the proliferation of technologies of mass destruction, hacking of critical infrastructures to global warming, globalization is implicated in the emergence of a global risk society in which national borders provide little protection from distant dangers or the consequences of systemic failures. Preventing and managing these systemic risks has contributed to the expanding jurisdiction of global institutions and regulatory regimes (**see Chs 19, 20, and 23**).

Over the last four decades, there has been a dramatic growth in transnational and global forms of governance, rule-making, and regulation, from formal G20 summits (sometimes referred to as the government of globalization) to the 2018 Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Treaty, alongside the many private global regulatory bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board and the Forest Stewardship Council. Today there are over 260 permanent intergovernmental organizations constituting a system of **global governance**, with the United Nations at its institutional core. While in no sense a **world government**, this system of multilateral governance has been critical to both the promotion and regulation of globalization, from the **World Trade Organization's (WTO)** mandate to liberalize world trade to the International Labour Organization's role in promoting workers' rights. For much of the world's population, more significant are the humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping functions of this system, which are vital to the human security of the most vulnerable.

With the expanding jurisdiction of global governance has come its deepening reach into the domestic affairs of states, as global standards, norms, and legal rules are incorporated into domestic law or public policy and political discourse. National and local government bureaucracies are increasingly regionally and globally networked, sharing information and collaborating with their opposite numbers abroad on matters from agricultural policy to human trafficking, from the Financial Action Task Force (which brings together government experts on money-laundering from major OECD countries) to the **BRICS** National Security Advisors network (which connects senior national security officials from the BRICS governments). Just as national economies have been globalized, so too have national politics and governance.

While capital freely circulates the globe, the same is not the case for people: borders and national controls continue to matter even more than during the 'belle époque' of nineteenth-century globalization. Despite this, people—along with their cultures—are on the move on a scale greater than those historic nineteenth-century migrations. Though most migration is still within countries, the pattern of global migration has significantly altered: from the world's South to North and from East to West, contributing to public perceptions, especially in the West, of a migrant crisis, despite evidence to the contrary (**see Chs 14 and 25**). Migration to affluent OECD countries increased from 3.9 million in 2000 to over 6 million in 2015, while across the entire world 258 million people (almost 49 per cent of whom are women, and 164 million are migrant workers) were resident in countries outside those of their birth (UN IOM 2018; ILO 2018). Furthermore, despite the GFC, the world's expanding middle classes are touring the globe on a historically unprecedented scale, with some 1.3 billion tourist visits in 2017 (compared with 680 million in 2000 and 952 million in 2010). These tourists spent some $1.34 trillion in 2017, equivalent to the GDP of Australia (WTO 2018*a*).

With the resurgence of identity politics and the populist backlash against globalization, migration has become a contentious global issue even within nominally multicultural and liberal societies. Migration highlights difference, which is perceived to threaten orthodox ethnic and cultural ideologies of national identity—what Kwame Anthony Appiah (2018) refers to as the 'lies that bind'. It is an especially conspicuous illustration of how globalization both unites and divides neighbourhoods, communities, nations, and the world. Indeed, in this digitally hyperconnected world there is little evidence of significant cultural convergence, despite the fact, for instance, that Netflix's 137 million subscribers across 190 countries stream the same programmes, or Facebook's 2.27

billion monthly worldwide users swap much content, or even the 3.2 billion global viewings of PSY's 'Gangnam Style'. Rather than bridging cultural divisions, some argue the internet reinforces heightened awareness of irreconcilable cultural or religious differences (**see Chs 17, 18, and 30**). However, this view overlooks the growing significance of the mixing or hybridization of cultures expressed in everything from cuisine to the assertion of hyphenated identities (Asian-British, Italian-American, Japanese-Brazilian, Greek-Australian). If anything, cultural globalization is associated with a world of increasing cultural complexity in which, for instance, the youth of northeast India revere 'Hallyu' (a global wave of Korean popular culture) whilst Ibeyi (a French-Cuban twins musical duo) performs in Yoruba, English, French, and Spanish.

Analysing globalization

Globalization is a historical process characterized by:

- the *stretching* of social, political, and economic activities across national frontiers such that events, decisions, and actions in one region of the world have the potential to impact directly and indirectly on individuals, communities, and countries in distant regions of the globe. For instance, civil war and conflict in Syria and Yemen has displaced millions of people, who have fled to adjacent states and even further to Europe and beyond seeking asylum.
- the *intensification*, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness in almost every sphere of modern life, from the economic to the ecological, from the global presence of Google to the spread of harmful microbes such as the SARS virus.
- the *accelerating* pace of global flows and processes as the velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information, capital, and technology circulate the world increases. For example, during 'Red October' 2018, stock markets across the globe experienced a synchronized collapse within minutes of the opening of trading.
- the *deepening* enmeshment of the local and global such that the domestic and international are indistinguishable. For instance, reducing carbon emissions in Mumbai or Glasgow can moderate the impact of climate change on the Pacific Islanders of Samoa and Kiribati (**see Ch. 24**).

Box 1.3 Approaches to conceptualizing globalization

- **Materialist**: The most common approach conceives of globalization as a substantive process of increasing worldwide connectivity which is open to empirical and historical methods of enquiry.
- **Constructivist**: Globalization is conceived in ideational terms as a principally discursive phenomenon which has no objective or permanent meaning, but rather is 'what we (or they) make of it' (**see Chs 11 and 12**).
- **Ideological**: Globalization is conceived as a political and economic project and ideology advanced by the most powerful (states and elites) to fashion the world order according to their interests, e.g. neoliberal globalization.

This chapter rests primarily on the materialist approach, although it draws on the other approaches. Accounts of globalization often elide or combine these three distinct approaches.

The concept of globalization focuses attention on the flows, connections, systems, and networks which transcend states and continents, the virtual and material world wide webs which sustain modern existence (**see Box 1.3**). It is indicative of an unfolding structural change in the scale of human social and economic organization. Human affairs are no longer organized solely on a local or national territorial scale, but are also increasingly organized on transnational, regional, and global scales. Examples include the global production networks of GAP and the year-long (2011–12) worldwide protests of the Occupy movement in 951 cities across 82 countries in the wake of the GFC. The concept of globalization denotes this significant shift in the scale of human social organization, in every sphere from the economy to security, connecting and transcending all continents—what Jan Aart Scholte (2005: ch. 2) refers to as 'transworld' (as opposed to international) relations. In this respect, globalization is associated with a process of **deterritorialization**: as social, political, or economic activities are organized at the global or transnational levels, they become in a significant sense disembedded or detached from their place or locale. For instance, property prices in the most expensive neighbourhoods of the world's major global cities are more highly correlated with each other than with prices in their respective national real-estate markets.

Under conditions of globalization, the very idea of a national economy as coterminous with national territory is compromised because corporate ownership and production transcends borders. Many of the UK's largest companies have their headquarters in India, Japan, and Germany, while many small enterprises outsource their production to China, Vietnam, and other East Asian countries. Even national borders are no longer always coterminous with national territory: Toronto airport is home to the US border.

However, this structural shift is not experienced uniformly across the world. Indeed, the concept of globalization should be differentiated from that of universality, which implies worldwide convergence and inclusivity. By contrast, globalization is marked by highly differential patterns of inclusion, giving it what Castells (2000) calls a 'variable geometry'. Western countries are much more comprehensively globalized than are the poorest sub-Saharan African states (**see Chs 16 and 26**). Even within countries, globalization is differentially experienced, varying significantly between cities and rural areas, sectors of the economy, and between households in the same neighbourhood. Thus, in both Western and sub-Saharan African states, elites are enmeshed in global networks, while the poorest find themselves largely excluded. Globalization exhibits a distinctive geography of inclusion and exclusion with significant distributional consequences, creating economic winners and losers not just among countries but also within them. Indeed, globalization is associated with growing global inequality of wealth, income, and life chances (Alvaredo et al. 2018). For the most affluent, it may very well translate into 'one world', but for much of humanity it is associated with a deeply divided world marked by inequality and exclusion. Beyond the West, globalization is frequently perceived as Westernization, stoking fears of **imperialism** and provoking anti-Western movements and resistance. Accordingly, the concept of globalization has no implied teleology: it does not presume that the process has a historical logic (teleology) or singular purpose (telos) leading inevitably towards a harmonious world society.

Although geography and distance very much still matter, the concept of globalization is associated with a process of **time–space compression**. This refers to the impact of new technologies of mobility and communication effectively 'shrinking' geographical space and time. From live global coverage of the inauguration of Donald Trump on 20 January 2017 to the global supply chains which put fresh fruit on UK supermarket shelves within days of being harvested thousands of miles away, the world appears to be literally shrinking. A 'shrinking world' is also one in which the sites of power and the subjects of power quite literally are often continents apart. During the GFC, the principal agencies of decision-making, whether in Washington, Beijing, New York, or London, were oceans apart from the local communities subject to their policies. In this respect, the concept of globalization highlights the ways in which power is organized and exercised (or increasingly has the potential to be) at a distance transcending the constraints of geography and territorial jurisdiction (**see Case Study 1.1**). This highlights the relative **denationalization** of power in world politics in so far as power is organized and exercised not only on a national scale but also on transregional, transnational, and worldwide scales. This, combined with the complexity of a networked world, makes the exercise of power enormously opaque, such that identifying responsible and accountable agencies is almost impossible, a situation dramatically illustrated by the GFC (Tooze 2018). Such complexity and opacity has very significant implications for all states, but most especially for liberal democracies which champion democratic accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, because it creates a public perception that they are subject to global or external forces over which elected governments exert little control.

To summarize: the concept of globalization can be differentiated from that of **internationalization** or international **interdependence**. Internationalization refers to growing connections between sovereign independent **nation-states**; international interdependence refers to mutual dependence between sovereign states such that each is sensitive or vulnerable to the actions of the other. By contrast, the concept of globalization refers to a process of widening, deepening, and accelerating worldwide interconnectedness which transcends states and societies, dissolving the distinction between domestic and international affairs. Globalization can be defined as:

> a historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents.

Case Study 1.1 Rubbishing globalization: the crisis in toxic trade

Thailand: used plastic bottles for recycling
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In 2018, just as the worldwide Save our Oceans campaign to ban plastic waste disposal in the world's seas gained political momentum, a largely unnoticed crisis in the global recycling system erupted. The residents of Thathan in eastern Thailand were unaware that the increasing lorryloads of electronic waste which arrived at the local recycling facility were connected to the crisis. A decision in Beijing in July 2017 to ban from January 2018 this import of all recycled waste, to improve the nation's environment, led almost overnight to the near collapse of the global trade in recycled waste. The ban was further extended in 2018 to include solid waste. In 2016, almost 50 per cent of the world's 270 million tonnes of recyclable waste was processed outside its country of origin, with over 60 per cent of plastic and electronic waste exports from the G7 countries and 37 per cent of the world's paper waste ending up in China and Hong Kong (Brooks, Wang, and Jambeck 2018; Hook and Reed 2018; van der Kamp 2018). The global recycling trade transfers rubbish from North to South and West to East. Critics refer to it as 'toxic colonialism'.

One of the more significant consequences (externalities) of the ban has been to divert recycling exports from the West to other countries across Asia, which by the end of 2018 had become large-scale importers of the West's plastic waste. Thailand's imports recorded a staggering 1,370 per cent increase. A second consequence of the ban was to alter fundamentally the economics of recycling. Governments in G7 countries, both local and national, were forced to rethink recycling policies and to manage the immediate consequences of the crisis. In many British cities and others across Europe, Australia, and the US, recycled waste piled up or was disposed of in landfill.

As awareness of the crisis grew, through the activities of Greenpeace and other transnational environmental groups, resistance to the trade mobilized across Asia, Europe, and the US from the village, local, and national levels to the global level. Although the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste seeks to regulate the trade in hazardous materials, an amendment to the Convention to cover recycling waste is yet to come into force (2019) as it has not acquired a sufficient number of country ratifications. It is significantly opposed by vested interests in industry and by some Western governments, including the US. The Basel Action Network, along with other environmental groups, plays a significant advocacy role in this multilateral context by pressuring like-minded governments for tougher global regulation similar to the more restrictive Bamako Convention among African states.

Sources: Brooks, Wang, and Jambeck 2018; Hook and Reed 2018; van der Kamp 2018.

Question 1: What key features of globalization does the recycling case illustrate?

Question 2: What are the ethical and normative issues raised by this case?

Debating globalization

Globalization is a contentious issue in the study of world politics. Indeed, some theorists would probably contest the discussion so far as taking globalization too seriously. Theoretical disagreement concerns the descriptive and explanatory value of globalization scholarship: whether it constitutes either a 'conceptual folly' or alternatively a new paradigm for understanding world politics. Although the controversy is far more nuanced, two broad clusters of arguments can be identified in this great globalization debate: the sceptical and the globalist.

The sceptical argument contends that globalization is a highly exaggerated and superficial phenomenon—a myth or 'conceptual folly' that distracts attention from the primary forces which determine world politics: state power, geopolitics, nationalism, capitalism, and imperialism (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Rosenberg 2000; Gilpin 2002). Those of a traditional realist or neorealist persuasion argue that geopolitics and the anarchical structure of the state system remain the principal determinants of world politics today (Gilpin 2001; Mearsheimer 2018) (**see Ch. 8**). Globalization, or more accurately internationalization, quite simply, is a product of hegemonic power. It is dependent entirely on the most powerful state(s) creating and policing an open world order (whether the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century or the Pax Americana of the twentieth) which is conducive to global commerce (**see Box 1.4**). It is therefore

Box 1.4 Waves of globalization

Globalization is not a novel phenomenon and historians suggest it has occurred in distinct waves.

In the first wave, the 'age of discovery' (1450–1850), globalization was decisively shaped by European expansion and conquest.

The second wave (1850–1914), often referred to as the 'belle époque' or 'Pax Britannica', involved a dramatic expansion in the spread and entrenchment of European empires, followed by the collapse of globalization in 1914.

The third wave of contemporary globalization (from the 1960s on) marks a new epoch of global connectivity which many argue exceeds that of the belle époque.

Some argue that a fourth wave of globalization is now in the making, driven by new digital technologies and the emerging economic powers of China, Brazil, and India.

a contingent phenomenon, its fortunes entirely tied to those of its hegemonic sponsor(s). As such, globalization or internationalization does not alter the basic structures of world politics, nor the centrality of states and state power to national security and survival. While sceptics acknowledge growing interconnectedness, they argue that to label this condition 'globalization' is entirely misleading since these flows are far more international and regional than global. Moreover, they rarely involve the deep integration of national economies, so are merely evidence of international interdependence.

Those associated with the Marxist tradition share this scepticism towards globalization, though from a substantively different (historical materialist) perspective. Globalization has its origins in the inevitable expansionary logic of capitalism, and as such shares much in common with, though its form is different to, the imperialisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Harvey 2003, 2010*b*). Globalization is a new label for an old phenomenon, but it has little explanatory value (Rosenberg 2005). It is a myth or 'conceptual folly' which conceals the principal forces shaping world politics, namely capitalism and capitalist imperialism (Rosenberg 2000). Sceptics therefore conclude that globalization is **epiphenomenal**: a derivative of more primary forces, such as geopolitics or capitalism. Globalization scholarship thus not only lacks explanatory power, but also offers a misleading interpretation of contemporary world politics.

In contrast, globalists reject this harsh dismissal of globalization scholarship. Globalization, they argue, is a fundamental source of disruptive change in world politics. Castells, for instance, links globalization to significant changes in the form of modern capitalism, which he argues is best conceived as a new epoch of 'global informational capitalism' (Castells 2009). Other neo-Marxist accounts explore how this new epoch of global capitalism is reshaping the world order (W. Robinson 2014). Liberal accounts, by contrast, emphasize how globalization is creating a 'flat world' or an 'emerging global network civilization' overlaying the inter-state system (T. Friedman 2011; Khanna 2017: xvii). Finally, critical globalization scholarship, which embraces a diverse range of theoretical approaches, explores how globalization from below is associated with new forms of transnational politics and (communicative) power in world politics: expressions of **alter-globalizations** advocating for a more just and fair world (**see Chs 9, 10, 11, and 22**). Besides a shared focus on disruptive global social change, these accounts are united by their critiques of orthodox theories of international relations.

For some globalists—often referred to in the literature as the **transformationalists**—this disruptive change is associated with significant transformations in world politics, creating a profoundly more complex, dangerous, and unpredictable world. This is evident not just in historic power shifts—from West to East and from state to non-state forces—but also in changes to modern statehood, societies, and the dynamics of world politics. Although transformationalists emphasize that globalization is neither inevitable nor irreversible, they argue it is deeply socially embedded in the comprehensive functioning of all aspects of modern societies. For transformationalists, the epoch of contemporary globalization is not only historically unique but is also associated with a fundamental reconfiguration of how power is organized, distributed, exercised, and reproduced (**see Box 1.3**) (Held et al. 1999; Keohane and Nye 2003; Castells 2009; Khanna 2017). Transformationalists therefore argue that globalization requires a corresponding radical conceptual shift in the study of international relations.

The next part will explore how both sceptical and globalist perspectives offer distinctive insights into the current crisis of globalization and its implications for world politics.

Key Points

- Globalization refers to the widening, deepening, and acceleration of worldwide interconnectedness. Following the GFC, economic globalization temporarily reversed and remains below its peak in 2007, though higher than at the turn of the century. By contrast, the non-economic dimensions of globalization have continued to intensify despite the GFC, especially digital globalization.

- Globalization has contributed to a dramatic growth in transnational and global forms of governance, rule-making, and regulation.

- Contemporary globalization is a not a uniform process. It is highly uneven in terms of its inclusivity and distributional consequences.

- Globalization is associated with a process of time–space compression and linked to the deterritorialization and the denationalization of power.

- Sceptical accounts consider globalization to be a conceptual folly, and argue that hegemony or imperialism better describe and explain world politics.

- Globalist accounts conceive globalization as a really existing condition which is associated with significant disruptive change in world politics. Some globalists—the transformationalists—take this further, arguing that globalization is transforming world politics and requires a corresponding conceptual or paradigm shift.

The crisis of globalization and the liberal world order

It was the GFC which precipitated 'the first crisis of globalization' (G. Brown 2011). Global economic flows reversed with alarming speed and ferocity, proving an existential threat to the global economic system. As a result of unprecedented G20 coordinated state intervention, the immediate crisis was contained. Although global economic depression may have been averted, the GFC and the great recession which followed added momentum to an already resurgent movement of the 'left behind' (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). This resurgence of nationalist populism and widespread public disenchantment in the West with the 'system' which produced and 'fixed' the GFC crystallized in the 2016 UK referendum result to withdraw from the European Union (EU) and the electoral success of Donald Trump's MAGA (Make America Great Again) campaign in the US. These two 'shocks', followed by national populist electoral victories across Europe, in Brazil, and in the Philippines, among others, signified a powerful popular backlash not just against globalization but also the liberal multilateral order which nurtured and sustained it. Somewhat ironically, by the two hundredth anniversary celebrations of Karl Marx's birth, the 'spectre haunting Europe' and far beyond was not a progressive ideology but an illiberal, nationalist, populist revolt (M. Cox 2017). Many believe this 'grave new world' heralds, if not the 'end of globalization', certainly the second great 'crisis of globalization' (S. King 2017). As French President Emmanuel Macron proclaimed at the 2018 Davos Summit, 'globalization is going through a major crisis and this challenge needs to be collectively fought by states and civil society'.

What makes this current crisis of globalization especially perilous is that it is primarily a political crisis: one in which the international consensus that promoted and sustained globalization for many decades appears to be dissolving. Three developments have coalesced which threaten not only the legitimacy of this consensus, but also that underlying the post-war Western liberal world order itself (Acharya 2014*a*; Kagan 2017; Haass 2018; Layne 2018). These three interlocking developments comprise: the global populist revolt; the drift towards authoritarianism; and the return of great power rivalry.

The dominant form of populism today is that of the right: nationalist populism or radical right populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). It has assimilated into mainstream politics across Europe, the Americas, and beyond: from Hungary and the Philippines to the US and Australia. Although the GFC accelerated its rise in the West, it is by no means simply a movement of the 'left behind' or 'the forgotten people'. It has built on festering public distrust with mainstream politics that well predates the GFC, combined with a growing aversion to multiculturalism, widening economic inequality, and the decline of traditional allegiances to political parties (dealignment) (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Public support for Brexit, for instance, cut across traditional party allegiances and class divisions. Such developments have contributed not only to the erosion of the international political consensus which sustained globalization through the GFC, but also declining international support and advocacy for

the liberal world order (Stokes 2018). This has been compounded by dramatic shifts in US policy with the Trump administration's 'America First' agenda, captured in the aphorism, 'Americanism not **globalism** will be our credo', which is displacing US advocacy for globalization and multilateralism with an emphasis on protectionism, unilateralism, and anti-globalism—what Barry Posen calls a strategy of illiberal hegemony (Posen 2018). It has been articulated in, among other actions, withdrawing from the global Climate Change Treaty and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, imposing tariffs on China, and rejecting multilateralism (Curran 2018). In some respects, the most significant threats to globalization and the liberal world order now emanate from the US and within the West, as Brexit too illustrates (Kagan 2018).

These threats are exacerbated by the reversal of the global trend towards liberal democratic rule which followed in the aftermath of the cold war, as a global drift towards authoritarianism has gathered pace (Diamond 2018). This, according to Freedom House, is evident on all continents as authoritarian practices take hold in nominally liberal democratic states, such as the 'illiberal democracies' of Hungary and Turkey, and as more emerging democracies, such as Thailand, fail (Freedom House 2018). Some predict that by 2025 the share of the world economy controlled by autocratic states will outstrip that of liberal democratic states—a condition last experienced in the 1930s (Mounk and Foa 2018). The rise of authoritarianism presents a growing normative challenge to the liberal world order, since the norms and values that underpin it are increasingly openly contested and resisted. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes seek to restrict globalization.

The resurgence of great power rivalry is the third significant development. Even before the GFC, the world was experiencing a historic redistribution of power with the rise of new economic powers, such as China, Brazil, and India. This power transition represents a movement from a unipolar world, with the US as the sole superpower, to a world of many great powers—a multipolar world. In 2010, China became the second largest economy in the world, displacing Japan, and by 2015 had overtaken the US (according to some measures) to become the world's largest economy, with India now the third largest after the US (IMF 2017). This power shift has resulted in growing rivalry and strategic competition between the US, China, India, and Russia. Such strategic competition threatens to undermine global stability, and with it the consensus which, for many decades, has fostered and sustained the liberal world order and globalization (Ikenberry 2018*a*).

These three developments constitute a dangerous conjuncture in world politics. Whether this conjuncture necessarily prefigures the end of globalization and the liberal world order, as many conclude, is a matter of significant disagreement.

Sceptical interpretations emphasize that it is principally symptomatic of the underlying (relative) decline of US power. As US hegemony is eroded, so too are the foundations of the post-war liberal order and the neoliberal globalization it fostered. Such crises are inevitable since they reflect the historical cycle of the rise and decline of great powers and the differential (uneven) development between countries associated with capitalism. However, although some realists fear the consequences of the demise of the liberal world order and globalization, for others their demise will not be mourned (Kagan 2018; Mearsheimer 2018). Many realists and most Marxists are long-standing critics of both, since they conceal the reality of US hegemony and imperialism. Both the crisis of the liberal world order and of globalization, therefore, are primarily ideological, brought on, respectively, by the failure and hypocrisy of Western liberal hegemony in the wake of endless futile wars to promote democracy abroad and the contradictions of global capitalism so ruthlessly exposed by the GFC. Dangerous as this conjuncture may initially appear, it is primarily a crisis of the legitimacy of Western liberal hegemony. As historically significant as this is, sceptics suggest it does not automatically threaten a coming new world disorder, a grave new world, or the collapse of globalization (Mearsheimer 2018).

Globalist interpretations of this conjuncture divide into two broad kinds: liberal accounts and transformationalist accounts. Liberal accounts emphasize that it is indicative of a return to a dystopian world without a rules-based order, and one in which might is right. Defenders of the liberal world order and globalization therefore prescribe that the only effective response to both crises is to strengthen and defend the existing order through more assertive US and Western leadership (World Economic Forum 2016).

By contrast, transformationalist accounts are not persuaded by either such nostalgic prescriptions, nor the deep pessimism concerning the futures of globalization and the liberal world order. They argue that the twin crises of globalization and the liberal world order have been exaggerated (Ikenberry 2018*b*; Deudney and Ikenberry 2018) in two senses: first, the liberal world order has never been entirely liberal, nor universal, nor orderly, but has always been contested; and second, the empirical evidence is not consistent with either deglobalization

Box 1.5 The multiplex order

Amitav Acharya describes the emerging global order as a '**multiplex order**'. This is a global order which is:

1. *decentred*: there is no global hegemon or Western hegemony, but instead many powers;

2. *diverse*: it is less US- and Western-centric than the liberal world order, more global in scope, and inclusive;

3. *complex*: there are multiple and overlapping levels of governance, while the world is highly interconnected and interdependent;

4. *pluralistic*: there are many actors or agents, not just states; power, ideas, and influence are widely diffused.

Acharya's metaphor for this order is the multiplex cinema: multiple theatres with different films all showing simultaneously but all 'under one complex … sharing a common architecture'. This order is 'a decentralised and diversified world in which actors, state and non-state, established and new powers from the North and the South, interact in an interdependent manner to produce an order based on a plurality of ideas and approaches' (Acharya 2018*a*: 10–11). It is a form of order which has many features in common with the historical international orders of both medieval Europe and the Indian Ocean from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century (Bull 1977; Phillips and Sharman 2015; Acharya 2018*a*, 2018*b*).

or any profound erosion of worldwide public support for globalization and the liberal world order (M. Smith 2016; Bordo 2017; Lund et al. 2017, 2019). Despite these dangerous times, globalization and the liberal world order have proven much more embedded and resilient than even their strongest advocates have presumed (Deudney and Ikenberry 2018; Ikenberry 2018*a*).

Transformationalist accounts assert the current conjuncture marks a historic transition involving not only a major global power shift, but also the emergence of a post-American or post-Western global order (Acharya 2018*a*, 2018*b*). Amitav Acharya argues that this emerging post-American global order is not simply a more inclusive liberal order (**see Box 1.5**). Rather, it is a much more diverse and pluralistic order defined by the coexistence and overlap between elements of the old liberal order alongside the parallel orders of emerging powers, regional institutions, and the patchwork of private transnational governance. As Robert Keohane concluded in his classic study of the liberal world order, hegemony is not a necessary condition for international orders to function effectively (Keohane 1984). Contrary to those who fear the passing of the liberal world order, a post-American or post-Western global order is not necessarily an anti-Western order, but rather a

non-Western order: an order of neither confrontation nor chaos (Stuenkel 2016). Neither, too, is the world witnessing the demise of globalization.

Globalization has proved much more resilient than its critics assumed. In the decade after the GFC, three developments have contributed to its resurgence. First, the digital revolution is powering a new phase of economic globalization with exponential growth in global e-commerce (McKinsey Global Institute 2016; Lund and Tyson 2018). Second, in the wake of the GFC, other non-Western centres of economic power, particularly China, have become increasingly significant drivers of globalization, accounting today for 50 per cent of world trade, and by 2025 (current predictions suggest) home to 230 of the world's 500 largest multinational corporations (McKinsey Global Institute 2016). Third, in 2013, as globalization was faltering, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the One Belt One Road 'project of the century', a parallel model of globalization with 'Chinese characteristics' (**see Case Study 1.2**). As Acharya observes, 'instead of the "end" of globalization . . . The new globalization is likely to be led more by the . . . emerging powers such as China and India than by the established powers' (Achayra 2018*b*: 204–5).

The demise of the liberal world order and the end of globalization are not imminent, but both are undergoing significant reconfiguration to align with the changing circumstances of power in the twenty-first century. What are the implications of this for the study of contemporary world politics?

Key Points

- There is a prevalent discourse in the West concerning the crisis of the liberal world order and the crisis of globalization.

- Three developments are central to this discourse: the rise of nationalist populism, the growth of authoritarianism, and the revival of great power rivalry.

- Sceptical accounts suggest the scale and implications for world politics of both crises are exaggerated.

- Globalist accounts are of two kinds: liberal and transformationalist.

- Liberal accounts stress the deep threats to the liberal world order and globalization, and the profound consequences for global security and prosperity of their inevitable breakdown.

- Transformationalist accounts are more sanguine and contend that the intersecting crises of the liberal world order and globalization are associated with the emergence of a new post-Western global order alongside a resurgence of new forms of globalization.

Case Study 1.2 Globalization 4.0: the next phase

President Xi Jinping addressing the 2017
Belt and Road Forum in Beijing
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Globalization is not in retreat, but, on the contrary, is entering a new phase. Two significant developments are shaping this new phase: digital globalization and globalization 'with Chinese characteristics'.

Consider the case of SpeedOutfitters in Elkhart, Indiana. Run by motorcycle enthusiast Travis Baird, it started as a traditional retail store named Baird Motorcycles, before expanding to include online sales. Some 41 per cent of SpeedOutfitters' total sales are now outside the United States in 131 different countries. This business is not unique; 97 per cent of eBay sellers export. Global e-commerce is growing rapidly, and by 2020 is predicted to reach $1 trillion. A new form of digital globalization is rapidly emerging as the services sectors of economies become increasingly disrupted by the digital revolution. The fusing of robotics, artificial intelligence, supercomputing, and advanced communications technologies with other new manufacturing technologies and methods (the fourth industrial revolution) is driving a renewed phase of globalization (or globotics) (Baldwin 2019). This is more decentred, and is more the preserve of small companies, rather than huge corporations. In 2017, for instance, small UK companies on Amazon Marketplace exported a record £2.3 billion of merchandise.

A continent away from Elkhart, Indiana, the ceremonial opening by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of the Addis Abba to Djibouti railway took place on 1 January 2018. Following years of construction, the successful completion of the 720 km project marked a significant milestone for China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa. The railway is critical to Ethiopia's development strategy and national prosperity since over 90 per cent of its trade flows through Djibouti. The railway was financed through China's 'project of the century', initiated in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, as an ambitious global infrastructure investment programme covering 70 countries on all continents, with a $1 trillion budget. China's project 'aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road . . . and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries' (PRC State Council 2015). In effect, the BRI is a high-speed version of the ancient Silk Road, both on land and across the oceans: a form of infrastructural globalization on a historic scale distinct from the digital globalization of the virtual world. It involves the financing and construction of many infrastructure projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Central Asia, from hospitals in Iran to the Pan-Asia railway. In Pakistan alone, there are infrastructure projects to the value of $60 billion. Not surprisingly, it has attracted considerable global interest but also much criticism, with some referring to it as 'high speed empire'. The BRI, however, is a significant force shaping this new phase of decentred globalization, albeit 'globalization with Chinese characteristics'.

Sources: PRC State Council 2015; Woetzel et al. 2017; Baird 2018.

Question 1: How does the globalization of past eras differ from this new phase?

Question 2: What ethical questions does this new phase of globalization raise?

Globalization and the transformation of world politics

Globalization presents several related challenges to traditional approaches to the study of world politics. First, in focusing attention on worldwide interconnectedness —those global flows, networks, and systems which transcend societies and states—it invites a conceptual shift from a state-centric imaginary to a decidedly geocentric, world-centric, or global imaginary (Steger 2008). It takes a holistic global systems (economic, political, social) perspective, rather than one principally focused on the state system (Albert 2016). Second, the focus on the global highlights the Western-centric nature of much scholarship in International Relations and thereby challenges the discipline to be more reflective about its principal assumptions and theories (**see Box 1.6**) (Hobson 2004; Mahbubani 2018). Third, much globalization scholarship focuses on disruptive change or transformations in world politics, compared with those traditional approaches which emphasize the essential continuities in world politics. Drawing from this transformationalist scholarship, this final section will discuss briefly several of the most significant transformations associated with globalization.

Box 1.6 Globalization and world order: global perspectives

A genre is emerging of original studies of world politics which adopt a critical global approach. This genre bridges Western and non-Western perspectives and scholarship. Many figures in this genre combine the roles of academic and public intellectual: Amitav Acharya (Professor, American University, Washington DC), Parag Khanna (former Senior Research Fellow, National University of Singapore), Kishore Mahbubani (Professor, National University of Singapore), and Oliver Stuenkel (Professor, Getulio Vargas Foundation, São Paulo). Their work is distinctive and an essential corrective to much Western centrism in the discipline.

From (state-centric) international politics to (geocentric) global politics

Just as nineteenth-century Europe witnessed the nationalization of politics, a noticeable trend in the last five decades has been towards the globalization of politics. Globalization is associated with an evolving global political system. This system embraces an enormous diversity of states, international agencies, non-state actors, and civil society organizations. Power in this global political system is no longer the monopoly of states, but is highly diffused, with important consequences for who gets what, how, when, and where. This gives rise to a distinctive form of contentious **global politics**: a politics of domination, competition, and resistance among and between powerful states and powerful transnational non-state forces.

'Global politics' is a term which acknowledges that the scale of political life has been transformed: politics is not confined within territorial boundaries. Decisions and actions taken in one locale affect the security and prosperity of communities in distant parts of the globe, and vice versa, such that local politics is globalized and world politics becomes 'localized'. The substantive issues of political life consistently escape the artificial foreign/domestic divide. Thus, the study of global politics encompasses much more than solely the study of conflict and cooperation among the great powers or states more generally (inter-state or international politics), vital as this remains. Indeed, even the great powers are themselves bound together through thickening webs of global connectivity. Geopolitics in the twenty-first century is therefore best understood as 'inter-polar'—a system of highly interconnected or interdependent great powers—rather than multipolar (Grevi 2009).

From the liberal world order to a post-Western global order

Globalization is associated with a historic power shift in world politics propelling China, India, and Brazil to the rank of major twenty-first-century powers (**see Ch. 5**). This power transition is eroding several centuries of Western dominance of the global order and transforming the political and normative foundations of the liberal world order. These new powers are increasingly assertive about refashioning the rules and institutions of world order to reflect their transformed status and power (Stuenkel 2016). The architecture of this post-Western global order is already visible, signifying a remarkably profound transformation in world politics. Whether the transition to this new order is peaceful or conflictual is perhaps the most critical and controversial issue in contemporary world politics, for on this will depend whether the twenty-first century, as with the twentieth, is defined by the spectre of great power war or a continuing 'long peace'.

From intergovernmentalism to global governance

Since the UN's creation in 1945, a vast nexus of global and regional institutions has evolved, in tandem with globalization, into what Michael Zurn refers to as a global governance system. Although by no means historically unique in itself, its scale, jurisdictional scope, and authority undoubtedly is (Zurn 2018). This accelerating transformation from intergovernmentalism—cooperation between sovereign states—to global governance is associated with globalization. World politics today is marked by a proliferation of enormously diverse 'trans-boundary issues', from climate change to migration, which are a direct or indirect product of globalization and the systemic interdependencies or systemic risks/vulnerabilities it creates (**see Case Study 1.1**).

While world government remains a fanciful idea, this shift has significant implications for the nation-state (**see Opposing Opinions 1.1**). Far from globalization leading to 'the end of the state', it engenders a more activist state. In a radically interconnected world, governments are forced to engage in extensive multilateral **collaboration** and cooperation simply to achieve domestic objectives. States confront a real dilemma: in return for more effective domestic policy and delivering on their citizens' demands, their capacity for self-governance—**state autonomy**—is compromised. Today,

Opposing Opinions 1.1   Globalization is eroding the power and sovereignty of the state

For

States are impotent in the face of global markets. This is particularly true for financial markets, as the events of the GFC demonstrated. Moreover, national economic policies are severely constrained by global market disciplines, as evidenced by the austerity policies 'forced on' many indebted countries in the wake of the GFC.

States are ceding power in many key areas to unelected global and regional institutions, from the EU to the WTO. States are bound by global rules, such as cutting CO_2 emissions. This erodes both their **sovereignty** and their democratic autonomy to manage their own affairs.

States are increasingly vulnerable to disruption or violence orchestrated from abroad. This may include terrorism, organized crime, or cyber attacks. These vulnerabilities undermine national security and states' effective ability to ensure the security of their citizens.

States are experiencing an erosion of democracy. Growing inequalities resulting from economic globalization undermine trust in democratic institutions and unelected international bureaucracies determine the rules. Both reinforce the belief that global capital and international institutions trump the democratic will of the people. Such concerns have been crystallized in the recent revival of nationalist populism.

States' control of borders is central to the principle of sovereign statehood, but many states appear ineffective in controlling immigration and preventing illicit migration. The very same infrastructures which facilitate economic globalization enable the mobility of peoples.

Against

State power is not in decline, as the responses to the GFC signally demonstrate. It was only extensive state intervention that prevented a global depression. When the crisis hit, the bankers called their finance ministries or central banks, not the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF).

States are not ceding power or sovereignty to unelected international bureaucracies. On the contrary, by acting multilaterally they increase their power to act effectively in world politics. Although global agencies may require states to trade some of their national autonomy for a greater chance of realizing their national interests, it does not diminish national sovereignty, understood as their absolute legal right to rule within their own territory.

Globalization is part of the solution to states' growing vulnerabilities. Although states are increasingly vulnerable to distant threats, globalization offers increased global surveillance capacity and intelligence cooperation, rather than undermining national security.

States are indeed experiencing challenges to democracy, but these are not the result of globalization, but rather of other domestic factors. Nor is the tension or contradiction between capitalism and democracy in any sense new: it is structural. Globalization simply raises this to a new level and makes it more publicly visible. The reform and democratization of global governance would go some way to addressing these challenges and the inequalities of globalization. But it is a fallacy to argue that because of globalization governments are unable to address such challenges or inequalities, as the Scandinavian welfare systems indicate.

State control of borders (or at the least the capacity to control) has probably never been greater. Impressive technologies and systems of monitoring and control of people movements are available today. While globalization has certainly increased people mobility, national and international controls remain restrictive by comparison with the free movement of capital around the globe. Illicit migration and people trafficking is an issue which can only be resolved through multilateral cooperation.

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1. Why do you think the issue of state power and sovereignty is so central to globalization studies?

2. Are you more persuaded by the 'for' or 'against' position? If so, why? If neither, what other arguments and evidence might be relevant?

3. What political values and normative beliefs underlie your judgement on this proposition?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

all governments confront a trade-off between effective governance and self-governance. In this respect, the sovereignty of the state appears to be in question since governments appear to have dwindling control over national affairs. However, the doctrine of sovereignty never presumed control, but rather the undisputed right to rule within a defined territory (**see Chs 2 and 19**). Sovereignty remains a principal juridical attribute

of states, but it is increasingly divided and shared among local, national, regional, and global authorities. The sovereign power and authority of national governments—the entitlement of states to rule within their own territorial spaces—is being reconfigured or transformed, but in no meaningful sense eroded.

Key Points

- Globalization scholarship presents three challenges to traditional approaches to the study of world politics: state-centrism, Western-centrism, and static analysis.
- Globalization is associated with several on-going transformations in world politics: from international to global politics, from a liberal world order to a post-Western global order, and from intergovernmentalism to global governance.
- Globalization requires a conceptual shift in thinking about world politics, from a principally state-centric perspective to the perspective of geocentric or global politics—the politics of worldwide social relations.

- Global politics is best described as contentious global politics because it is imbued with significant inequalities of power, information, opportunities, and capabilities.
- Globalization is not leading to the demise of the sovereign state, but rather to the transformation of sovereign statehood.
- Global governance is associated with a reconfiguration of the power and authority of national government.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to clarify the concept of globalization and to explain why it is so significant for understanding contemporary world politics. It began by examining critically the concept of globalization and exploring differing theoretical interpretations, notably the sceptical and globalist accounts. Globalization is a contentious subject in the study of international relations because there is still fundamental theoretical disagreement with respect to its descriptive and explanatory power, not to mention its conceptual and theoretical status. Similarly, it is a highly contentious and divisive issue in political life since there are very divergent normative and political perspectives on whether it is a benign or malign force, whether it should be promoted, resisted, or reformed, and what viable alternatives to globalization are desirable or feasible. Indeed, one of the most critical issues in world politics today is how globalization should be governed, to what purpose, and in whose interests: a struggle, played out across the globe every day, from the town hall to the citadels of global power (**see Chs 5 and 13**).

The chapter went on to analyse the three major sources of the current crisis of globalization and how it is implicated in a wider crisis of the liberal world order. Rather than the collapse of globalization, as many have argued, the evidence suggests it is entering a new phase. Furthermore, the alleged demise of the liberal world order is confused with a historic transition towards a post-Western global order which builds on the institutions and principles of the liberal order.

The final part of the chapter discussed the challenges posed by globalization to traditional approaches to the study of world politics. It concluded by identifying and examining three major on-going transformations in world politics associated with globalization. Understanding globalization remains essential to comprehending and explaining twenty-first-century global politics.

Questions

1. Distinguish the concept of globalization from those of internationalization and international interdependence.
2. Critically review the three major transformations in world politics associated with globalization.
3. Why is global politics today more accurately described as contentious global politics?
4. Compare the globalist and sceptical interpretations of globalization.

5. What are the sources of the current crisis of globalization? Is the world entering a period of deglobalization?
6. What is meant by the term 'liberal world order'?
7. What is meant by the term 'global governance system'? How does global governance impact the sovereignty and power of states?
8. Distinguish the concept of global politics from those of geopolitics and international (inter-state) politics.
9. Critically assess some of the key arguments of the transformationalists.
10. Why do some argue the world is witnessing the emergence of a post-Western global order?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Eriksen, T. H. (2014), *Globalization: The Key Concepts* (London: Bloomsbury). An excellent introductory survey of approaches to globalization from across the social sciences.

Goldin, I., and Mariathasan, M. (2014), *The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). An accessible and comprehensive examination of the worldwide systemic risks associated with globalization, with particular emphasis on the economic, financial, and technological.

Harvey, D. (2010), *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (London: Profile Books). A neo-Marxist account of globalization and the global financial crisis of 2008.

Held, D., and McGrew, A. (2007), *Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press). A short introduction to all aspects of the current globalization debate and its implications for the study of world politics.

Hirst, P., Thompson, G., and Bromley, S. (2009), *Globalization in Question*, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press). A sceptical and robust critique of the globalization thesis.

Khanna, P. (2017), *Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson). An accessible introduction to the new phase of globalization.

Mahbubani, K. (2013), *The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World* (New York: PublicAffairs). Argues that globalization is creating the conditions for a global convergence in which the rising powers of Asia will shape the future of global politics.

Singer, P. (2016), *One World Now: The Ethics of Globalization*, 3rd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). A superb examination of the normative and ethical issues raised by globalization.

Steger, M. (2017), *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). This is a brief but very informative account of globalization and the controversies to which it gives rise.

To find out more follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Part Two
The historical context

In this part of the book, we provide a historical context within which to make sense of international relations. We have two main aims.

Our first aim is to introduce you to some of the most important aspects of international history, and we shall do this by giving you a chronologically concentrated set of chapters. We start with an overview of the rise of the modern international order itself. We think that you need to have some basic understanding of the main developments in the history of world politics, as well as some kind of context for thinking about the contemporary period of world history. This is followed by a chapter that looks at the main themes of twentieth-century history up to the end of the cold war. The third chapter looks at developments in international history since 1990. The final chapter of this part of the book examines the historical significance of the emergence of new powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, that are challenging the existing Western-centric world order. These chapters give you a great deal of historical information that will be of interest in its own right.

Our second aim is to draw to your attention the main themes of international history so that you can develop a deeper understanding of the structures and issues—both theoretical and empirical—that are addressed in the remaining three parts of this book. We hope that an overview of international history will give you a context within which to begin thinking about globalization: is it a new phenomenon that fundamentally changes the main patterns of international history, or are there precedents for it that make it seem less revolutionary?

The rise of modern international order

GEORGE LAWSON

Framing Questions

- **When did modern international order emerge?**
- **To what extent was the emergence of modern international order shaped by the experience of the West?**
- **Is history important to understanding contemporary world politics?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter explores the rise of modern international order. It begins by surveying international orders before the modern period, examining how trade and transport helped to tie together diverse parts of the world. The chapter then examines debates about the 1648 **Peace of Westphalia**, which is often said to mark the origins of modern international order. Next it turns to nineteenth-century developments, ranging from industrialization to imperialism, which played a major role in the formation of modern international order. Particular attention is paid to the main ideas that underpinned modern international order, the 'shrinking of the planet' that arose from the advent of new technologies, and the emergence of a radically unequal international order. The chapter closes by assessing the significance of nineteenth-century developments for twentieth- and twenty-first-century international relations.

Introduction

All international systems are made up of multiple political units. Whether these units are empires, city-states, or nation-states, the key feature that distinguishes international from domestic politics is that, in the international sphere, political units are forced to coexist in the absence of an overarching authority. This means that the discipline of International Relations is fundamentally concerned with the issue of 'political multiplicity' (Rosenberg 2010). Its guiding question is how order can be generated in an environment that is fragmented rather than unified.

Political multiplicity, though, is only part of the story. Although international systems are fragmented, this does not stop political units from interacting with each other. These interactions are what make up **international orders**: regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent. International orders have existed ever since political units began to interact with each other on a regular basis, whether through trade, diplomacy, or the exchange of ideas. In this sense, world history has seen a great many *regional* international orders. However, it is only over the past two centuries or so that we can speak of a distinctly modern international order in the sense of the construction of a *global* economy, a *global* system of states, and the *global* circulation of ideas. This chapter explores both historical international orders and the emergence of the modern, global international order to show how world politics has become marked by increasingly deep exchanges between peoples and political units.

One of the most noteworthy aspects of the contemporary international order is the dominance of 'Western' ideas and institutions. 'The West' is usually taken to mean Europe (with particular emphasis on the northern and western parts of the continent) and the Americas (with particular emphasis on the United States). The West looms large in the functioning of the global political economy—just think of the importance of London and New York as financial centres. The West is also central to global political institutions—the main home of the United Nations (UN) is in New York, and most of the permanent members of the UN Security Council are Western powers. Western ideas (such as human rights) and Western culture (particularly music) are well known around the world. But *why* is this the case? Some people argue that Western power has arisen because of its innate strengths: liberal ideas, democratic practices, and free markets (Landes 1998). These people tend to see Western power as both natural and enduring. Others see Western domination as rooted in specific historical circumstances, many of them the product of practices of exploitation and subjugation (Hobson 2004). For these people, Western power in the contemporary world is unusual and likely to be temporary. This debate is discussed in **Opposing Opinions 2.1**.

For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note two preliminary points. First, the 'rise of the West' has occurred only relatively recently: over the past two or three centuries. Second, many aspects of its rise can be traced to *international* processes, such as imperialism and the global expansion of the market. These international dynamics allowed a small number of mostly Western states to project their power around the world. As they did so, they generated a range of new actors that subsequently became leading participants in international affairs: nation-states, transnational corporations, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs). They also helped to bind the globe together through new forms of transport (such as the steamship) and technologies (such as the telegraph). This chapter explores these dynamics and explains how they helped to shape contemporary world politics.

Historical international orders

When should we start thinking about the emergence of 'international orders'? Although the term 'international order' is a relatively recent innovation, some accounts trace the historical origins of international orders to the period when nomadic groups first settled and became sedentary communities (Buzan and Little 2000). The earliest recorded example of this process took place around 13,000–14,000 years ago in Sumer—modern day Iraq. Sedentary communities in Sumer accumulated agricultural surpluses that allowed for year-round **subsistence**. These surpluses generated two dynamics: first, they fostered trade between groups; and second, they put groups at risk of attack. The response of sedentary communities was to increase their capabilities:

Opposing Opinions 2.1   The rise of the West was the result of its own strengths

For

The West alone had inclusive political institutions. Representative institutions promoted negotiation among elites and heightened links between elites and publics.

The Enlightenment promoted new forms of scientific thinking. These ideas fostered an independence of thought and an experimental tradition that, in turn, led to advances in engineering and the sciences.

The West pioneered a range of new economic practices. Double entry bookkeeping and comparable innovations allowed for a clear evaluation of profit, thereby enabling companies to provide credit in depersonalized form—the hallmark of commercial capitalism.

The West enjoyed unusually beneficial geographical circumstances. For example, British industrialization was aided greatly by the unusual co-location of coal and iron.

Against

Very few, if any, of the materials that were fundamental to the rise of the West originated from within Western-societies. Most notably, cotton is not indigenous to England. Similarly, Europe's pre-industrial trade with Asia was largely underpinned by gold and silver mined in Africa and the Americas.

For many centuries, Asian powers were held in respect, even awe, in many parts of Europe. The West interacted with Asian powers sometimes as political equals, and at other times as supplicants. Between 1600 and 1800, India and China were so dominant in manufacturing and many areas of technology that the rise of the West is sometimes linked to its relative 'backwardness' in comparison to major Asian empires.

European success was based on imperialism. Between 1815 and 1865, Britain alone conquered new territories at an average rate of 100,000 square miles per year. Many of the resources that enabled the rise of the West originated from imperialism: Indian textiles, Chinese porcelain, African slaves, and colonial labour.

European power was premised on multiple forms of inequality. Particularly crucial was the restructuring of economies into a primary producing 'periphery' and a secondary producing 'core'. Western powers established a global economy in which they eroded local economic practices and imposed their own price and production systems. This allowed Western states to turn an age-old, and more or less balanced, system of trade in elite goods into a global market sustained by mass trade and marked by inequality.

1. Did the 'rise of the West' stem from its own distinct institutions and ideas?

2. To what extent was Western power forged through its encounters with non-Western states?

3. What are the implications of the history of the 'rise of the West' for the West's contemporary relations with the rest of the world?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

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they got bigger, they developed specializations (such as dividing people into distinct ranks of soldiers and cultivators), and they developed political hierarchies, establishing order through the command of a leader or group of leaders (Buzan and Little 2000). These leaders increasingly interacted with their counterparts in other groups, establishing rituals that we now know as diplomacy. In the process, these communities generated regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent—the definition of international orders.

Beyond ancient Sumer can be found a great many historical international orders. Indeed, if we take world history as our canvas, every region in the world has been home to regular, widely shared practices of commerce, war, diplomacy, and law. Many of these historical international orders developed through encounters with other parts of the world: the extensive interactions between the Byzantine and Ottoman empires is one example; a second is the early modern international order centred on the Indian Ocean that incorporated actors from Asia, Africa, and Europe (Phillips and Sharman 2015).

Most accounts of international order, however, begin not in early modern South Asia, but in early modern Europe. The majority of accounts date the birth of 'modern' international order to a specific date—the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which marked the end of the wars of religion in Europe (Ikenberry 2001; Philpott 2001;

Spruyt 1994). Westphalia is seen as important because it instituted the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* ('whose realm, their religion'). This principle, it is argued, acted as a brake on the reasons by which states could go to war. After Westphalia, so the story goes, European states could no longer intervene in other states on the basis of religious belief. In other words, states assumed **sovereignty** over their own territories—first in terms of their right of confession, and later over other spheres of activity, such as the ways in which they organized their governance and economies. In this sense, Westphalia is seen as important because it established the principle of 'sovereign territoriality' (a claim to political authority over a particular geographical space).

A number of criticisms of the Westphalian narrative have emerged in recent years. Three of these are worth considering. First, Westphalia was not a European-wide agreement, but a local affair—its main concerns were to safeguard the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire and to reward the victors of the Wars of Religion (France and Sweden). The impact of Westphalia on European international relations, let alone *global* affairs, was not as great as is often imagined (Teschke 2003). Second, even within this limited space, the gains of Westphalia were relatively slight. Although German principalities assumed more control over their own affairs after 1648, this was within a dual constitutional structure that stressed loyalty to the Empire and that was sustained by a court system in which imperial courts adjudicated over both inter-state disputes and internal affairs (a bit like the modern-day European Union). Third, Westphalia actually set limits to the principle of sovereignty established at the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, for example by retracting the rights of polities to choose their own religion. Westphalia decreed that each territory would retain the religion it held on 1 January 1624. For the most part, after 1648, European international order remained a patchwork of marriage, inheritance, and hereditary claims. Imperial rivalries, hereditary succession, and religious conflicts remained at the heart of European wars for several centuries after Westphalia.

Although Westphalia is usually considered to be the basis for 'modern' international order, it is not the only starting point for thinking about these issues. In part, the choice of *when* to date the emergence of modern international order depends on what people consider to be the most important components of international order. In the paragraphs above, international orders were described as: 'regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other

to be independent'. But what form do these 'regularized practices of exchange' take?

One type of regularized exchange occurs through economic interactions. Here we might stress the importance of long-distance trade routes in silks, cotton, sugar, tea, linen, porcelain, and spices that connected places as diversely situated as Malacca, Samarkand, Hangzhou, Genoa, Acapulco, Manila, and the Malabar Coast for many centuries before Westphalia (Goldstone 2002). Another example is systems of transport and communication. Here, we could highlight the European 'voyages of discovery' during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which opened up sea-lanes around Africa and across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Hobson 2004). As discussed earlier, when Europeans moved into the Indian Ocean, they found a well-developed international order in place. India's huge coastline, skilled artisans, and plentiful traders had long made it a central node in the trans-Eurasian exchange of goods, ideas, and institutions. Further east could be found an equally well-developed regional international order, mainly thanks to Chinese advances in ocean-going shipbuilding and navigation techniques, which were in many respects more advanced than those of the Europeans.

It is also possible to combine economic and infrastructural interactions, highlighting dynamics such as the trafficking of African slaves, which fostered a 'triangular trade' in which the demand for sugar in London fostered the plantation system in the Caribbean, which was supplied by African slaves and North American provisions (Blackburn 1997). This vile feature of international order was linked both to increasing trade and to advances in transport technologies; it helped to forge the Atlantic into a regional international order. Also important to this process was the increasing number of ecological transfers between the Americas and Europe: maize, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, and tobacco were imported from the 'New World', while horses, cattle, pigs, chickens, sheep, mules, oxen, vines, wheat, rice, and coffee travelled in the opposite direction. Even more important was the transatlantic transfer of diseases: smallpox, measles, influenza, and yellow fever killed two-thirds of the population of the Americas by the middle of the sixteenth century (Crosby 2004). These examples help to illustrate the ways in which, over time, regularized exchanges among political units generate forms of **interdependence** in which events in one place have a major effect on others. One of the consequences of the increasingly dense interactions that have characterized international orders over recent centuries has been heightened levels of interdependence.

Despite the plentiful examples of regional international orders in world history, before the last two centuries or so, the ties of interdependence that bound international orders were relatively limited in scope. For example, until the nineteenth century, the vast majority of economic activities did not take place over large distances, but in 'microeconomies' with a 20-mile circumference (Schwartz 2000: 14). Those activities that went beyond the micro-scale, such as the long-distance trading corridors noted above, were usually lightly connected. A journey halfway around the world would have taken a year or more in the sixteenth century, five months in 1812, and one month in 1912. In the contemporary world, it takes less than a day. In general, the pace of change during the period before the nineteenth century was much slower than the rapid, incessant change that has become a feature of the past two centuries. In this sense, although we can speak of many *regional* international orders before the nineteenth century, we should locate the emergence of a distinctly *modern* international order only in the last two centuries.

What makes the last two centuries such a strong candidate for thinking about the emergence of modern international order? As noted in the previous paragraph, during this period, multiple regional international orders were linked in a global order in which all parts of the world were closely connected. This period is sometimes known as the 'global transformation': a term used to denote the shift from a world of multiple *regional* international systems to one characterized by a *global* international order (Buzan and Lawson 2015). The global transformation brought to an end a long period in which human history was mainly local and contact among peoples fairly light. It replaced this with an era in which human history was increasingly global and contact among far-flung peoples intense. For better or worse, and often both together, the nineteenth century saw the transformation of the daily condition of peoples nearly everywhere on the planet (Hobsbawm 1962; Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2014).

Key Points

- International orders are regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent.

- It is possible to speak of multiple international orders in world history, perhaps even as far back as ancient Sumer.

- In International Relations, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia is often considered to be the benchmark date from which 'modern' international order emerged.

- More recently, scholars have viewed the emergence of modern international order as the product of the last two centuries, as this is when various regional systems were forged into a deeply interdependent, *global* international order.

How did modern international order emerge?

Up until around 1800, there were no major differences in living standards among the most developed parts of world: in the late eighteenth century, **gross domestic product** (GDP) per capita levels in the Yangtze River Delta of China were around 10 per cent lower than the wealthiest parts of Europe, less than the differences today between most of the European Union (EU) and the US. Major sites of production and consumption such as Hokkaido, Malacca, Hangzhou, and Samarkand enjoyed relative parity with their European counterparts across a range of economic indicators, and were technologically equal or superior in many areas of production (Pomeranz 2000).

A century later, the most advanced areas of Europe and the United States had levels of GDP per capita between tenfold and twelvefold greater than their Asian equivalents. In 1820, Asian powers produced 60.7 per cent of the world's GDP, and 'the West' (defined as Europe and the United States) only 34.2 per cent; by 1913, the West produced 68.3 per cent of global GDP and Asia only 24.5 per cent. Between 1800 and 1900, China's share of global production dropped from 33 per cent to 6 per cent and India's from 20 per cent to 2 per cent (Maddison 2001). The rapid turnaround during the nineteenth century represents a major shift in global power (**see Box 2.1**).

Box 2.1 The importance of the nineteenth century

The nineteenth century saw the birth of international relations as we know it today.

(Osterhammel 2014: 393)

During the nineteenth century, 'social relations were assembled, dismantled and reassembled'.

(Wolf 1997: 391)

Nothing, it seemed, could stand in the way of a few western gunboats or regiments bringing with them trade and bibles.

(Hobsbawm 1962: 365)

What happened to generate this shift in global power? There are a number of explanations for what is sometimes called the 'great divergence' between East and West (Pomeranz 2000). Some accounts concentrate on innovations such as the capacity of liberal constitutions in the West to restrict levels of domestic conflict (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Others, in contrast, focus on the frequency of European inter-state wars: European powers were involved in inter-state wars in nearly 75 per cent of the years between 1494 and 1975 (Mann 2012: 24). The frequency of European inter-state wars, it is argued, led to technological and tactical advances, the development of standing armies, and the expansion of permanent bureaucracies (Tilly 1990). In this way, nineteenth-century European states combined their need for taxation (in order to fight increasingly costly wars) with support for financial institutions that could, in turn, deliver the funds required for investment in armaments. A third set of explanations highlights the role of ideas in producing the great divergence, most notably the scientific advances associated with the European Enlightenment (Israel 2010). A fourth set of approaches concentrate on the geographical and demographic advantages enjoyed by the West: a temperate climate that was inhospitable to parasites, and later marriage habits, which led to lower fertility rates and, in turn, lower population densities (E. Jones 1981). Finally, some accounts stress the role of capitalism in generating Western 'take-off', whether this is seen as emerging from favourable access to credit and bills of exchange (P. Kennedy 1989), or through the ways in which private property regimes enabled capital to be released for investment in manufacturing and finance (Brenner 1985).

Relatively few of these accounts stress the international dimensions of the global transformation. Yet these were significant (**see Box 2.2**). First, European success was predicated on imperialism. Between 1878 and 1913, Western states claimed 8.6 million square miles of overseas territory, amounting to one-sixth of the Earth's land surface (Abernathy 2000: 81). By the outbreak of the First World War, 80 per cent of the world's land surface, not including uninhabited Antarctica, was under the control of Western powers, and one state—Britain—claimed nearly a quarter of the world's territory. Germany's colonies in East Africa were forced into producing cotton for export, just as Dutch Indonesia became a vehicle for the production of sugar, tobacco, and later rubber. In a similar vein, after the British East India Company

was ceded the right to administer and raise taxes in Bengal, they made the cultivation of opium obligatory, subsequently exporting it to China in a trading system propped up by force of arms. Through imperialism, European powers exchanged raw materials for manufactured goods and used violence to ensure low production prices. Although the gains from these circuits are difficult to measure precisely, they were certainly profitable. The Atlantic slave trade, for example, returned profits to British investors at an average rate of 9.5 per cent at the turn of the nineteenth century (Blackburn 1997: 510).

Second, European powers assumed control, often coercively, over the trade of commodities as diverse as sandalwood, tea, otter skins, and sea cucumbers, as well as silver, cotton, and opium. Europeans used silver from the Americas and opium from India to buy entry into regional trading systems. This led to radically unequal patterns of trade: while Britain provided 50 per cent of Argentina's imports and exports, and virtually all of its capital investment in 1900, Argentina provided

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Box 2.2 Key dates in the emergence of modern international order

- 1789/1791: The French and Haitian revolutions begin a long 'wave' of 'Atlantic Revolutions' that lasts until the 1820s. These revolutions introduced new ideas such as republicanism and popular sovereignty, and challenged the central place of slavery in the Atlantic economy.

- 1842: In the First Opium War the British defeat China, perhaps the greatest classical Asian power.

- 1857: The Indian Revolt prompts Britain to assume formal control of the Indian subcontinent, while serving as a forerunner to later anti-colonial movements.

- 1862: The British Companies Act marks a shift to limited liability firms, opening the way to the formation of transnational corporations as significant international actors.

- 1865: The International Telecommunications Union becomes the first standing intergovernmental organization, symbolizing the rise of permanent institutions of global governance.

- 1866: The opening of the first transatlantic telegraph cable begins the wiring together of the planet with instantaneous communication.

- 1884: The Prime Meridian Conference establishes world standard time, easing the integration of trade, diplomacy, and communication.

- 1905: Japan defeats Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, becoming the first non-Western, non-white great power.

just 10 per cent of Britain's imports and exports (Mann 2012: 39). European control of trade also led to radically unequal patterns of growth: whereas India's GDP grew at an average of 0.2 per cent per year in the century before independence, Britain's grew at ten times this rate (Silver and Arrighi 2003: 338). India provided a colonial tribute to Britain that saw its budget surpluses expatriated to London so that they could be used to reduce British trade deficits. The inequality that marks modern international order is discussed in the final section of this chapter (**see 'The consequences of the global transformation'**).

Third, Western advances arose from the emulation and fusion of non-Western ideas and technologies. Technologies used in the cotton industry, for example, drew heavily on earlier Asian advances (Hobson 2004). These ideas and technologies were carried, in part, via migration. Up to 37 million labourers left India, China, Malaya, and Java during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, many of them to work as bonded labour in imperial territories. Over 50 million Europeans also emigrated between 1800 and 1914, most of them to the United States. By 1914, half of the population of the US was foreign-born. Six million Europeans emigrated to Argentina between 1857 and 1930; at the onset of the First World War, one-third of Argentinians, and half the population of Buenos Aires, had been born outside the country (Crosby 2004: 301).

The great divergence was therefore fuelled by a global intensification in the circulation of people, ideas, and resources—what was described in the previous section as interdependence. More precisely, it can be linked to three main dynamics: industrialization, the emergence of 'rational' states, and imperialism.

Industrialization

Industrialization took place in two main waves. The first (mainly British) wave occurred in the early part of the nineteenth century and was centred on cotton, coal, and iron. Here the crucial advance was the capture of inanimate sources of energy, particularly the advent of steam power, an innovation that enabled the biggest increase in the availability of power sources for several thousand years. Also crucial was the application of engineering to blockages in production, such as the development of machinery to pump water efficiently out of mineshafts. Engineering and technology combined to generate substantial gains in productivity: whereas a British spinner at the end of the eighteenth

century took 300 hours to produce 100 pounds of cotton, by 1830 the same task took only 135 hours; by 1850, 18 million Britons used as much fuel energy as 300 million inhabitants of Qing China (Goldstone 2002: 364).

The second (mainly German and American) wave of industrialization took place in the last quarter of the century and was centred on advances in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electronics. Once again, new sources of energy were crucial, with oil and electricity emerging alongside coal, and internal combustion engines replacing steam piston engines. The oil industry took off in Russia, Canada, and the US from the middle of the nineteenth century, initially to provide kerosene for lighting. Before the century's end, pipelines and tankers were bringing oil to a global market, and further advances in distillation and mechanical engineering were opening up its use as a fuel. During the 1880s, electricity began to be generated and distributed from hydroelectric and steam-powered stations. Advances in light metals and electrics, allied to the use of oil products for fuel, provided an impetus to the development of cars, planes, and ships.

These two waves of industrialization helped to produce a dramatic expansion of the world market. After several centuries in which the volume of world trade had increased by an annual average of less than 1 per cent, trade rose by over 4 per cent annually in the half century after 1820 (Osterhammel 2014: 726). By the early years of the twentieth century, world trade was increasing at a rate of 10 per cent per year, increasing levels of interdependence and heightening practices of exchange. The expansion of the market brought new opportunities for accumulating power, particularly because of the close relationship between industrialization in the West and deindustrialization elsewhere. For example, Indian textiles were either banned from Britain or levied with high tariffs—the British government tripled duties on Indian goods during the 1790s and raised them by a factor of nine in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. In contrast, British manufacturing products were forcibly imported into India without duty. Between 1814 and 1828, British cloth exports to India rose from 800,000 yards to over 40 million yards; during the same period, Indian cloth exports to Britain halved. For many centuries before 'the global transformation', India's merchant class had produced the garments that 'clothed the world' (Parthasarathi 2011: 22). By 1850, the English county of Lancashire was the new centre of a global textiles industry.

Rational states

The extension of the market was accompanied by important changes in how states were organized. During the nineteenth century, states began to assume greater control over the use of force within their territory. This was not as straightforward as it might seem when viewed from the vantage point of the contemporary world and its nearly 200 nation-states (**see Ch. 30**). In the eighteenth century, institutions such as the Dutch East India Company held a constitutional warrant to 'make war, conclude treaties, acquire territory and build fortresses' (P. Stern 2011). These companies remained influential throughout the nineteenth century: the British parliament provided a concession of several million acres of land to the British North Borneo Company as late as 1881, while the Imperial British East Africa Company and the British South Africa Company also held state-like powers of governance.

In general, though, after the French Revolution in 1789, armies and navies became more distinctly national, increasingly coming under the direct control of the state. Although nation-states coexisted with other political units—and most Western polities were states and empires simultaneously—there was a general 'caging' of authority within states (Mann 2012). Most notably, states became staffed by permanent bureaucracies, selected by merit and formalized through new legal codes. State personnel in the last quarter of the century grew from 67,000 to 535,000 in Britain and from 55,000 to over a million in Prussia/Germany. During the same period, state military personnel tripled in Britain and quadrupled in Prussia/Germany. The term 'rational state' refers to the ways in which states become organized less through interpersonal relations and family ties, and more by abstract bureaucracies such as a civil service and a nationally organized military.

Once again, there was a distinctly international dimension to this process: many aspects of the modern, professional civil service were formed in India before being exported to Britain; cartographic techniques used to map colonial spaces were reimported into Europe to serve as the basis for territorial claims; and imperial armies acted as the frontline troops in conflicts around the world. Britain deployed Indian police officers, bureaucrats, and orderlies in China, Africa, and the Middle East, and Indian troops fought in 15 British colonial wars. Other Western states also made extensive use of colonial forces: 70 per cent of the Dutch army deployed in the Dutch East Indies were colonial forces, while 80 per cent of the French expeditionary forces that fought in North and East Africa were colonial conscripts (MacDonald 2014: 39–40). These imperial wars increased the coercive capacities of European states, while requiring states to raise extra revenues, which they often achieved through taxation. This, in turn, fuelled further state development.

Imperialism

Until the nineteenth century, nearly three-quarters of the world's population lived in large, fragmented, ethnically mixed agrarian empires. During the nineteenth century, these empires were swamped by mono-racial Western powers. The bulk of European imperialism took place during the 'scramble for Africa', which saw European powers assume direct control of large parts of Africa. But experiences of imperialism went much further than this. Between 1810 and 1870, the US carried out 71 territorial annexations and military interventions (Go 2011: 39). The US first became a continental empire, seizing territory from Native Americans, the Spanish, and Mexicans. It then built an overseas empire, extending its authority over Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands. Other settler states also became colonial powers in their own right, including Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific.

Imperialism took many forms. In the case of the British, their imperial web included direct-rule colonies (e.g. India after 1857), settler colonies (e.g. Australia), protectorates (e.g. Brunei), bases (e.g. Gibraltar), treaty ports (e.g. Shanghai), and spheres of influence (e.g. Argentina). The image of a late nineteenth-century map of the world in which imperial territories are represented by a single colour is, therefore, highly misleading. British India included several hundred 'Princely States' that retained a degree of 'quasi-sovereignty', as did nearly 300 'native states' in Dutch East Asia. Where imperialism was successful, it relied on establishing partnerships with local power brokers: the Straits Chinese, the Krio of West Africa, the 'teak-wallahs' of Burma, and others (Darwin 2012: 178). Two hundred Dutch officials and a much larger number of Indonesian intermediaries ran a cultivation system that incorporated 2 million agricultural workers. A little over 75,000 French administrators were responsible for 60 million colonial subjects (Mann 2012: 47).

Imperialism was deeply destructive. At times, this destruction took the form of ecocide. Manchuria was

deforested by the Japanese in the interests of its mining and lumber companies, while 'wild lands' in India were cleared by the British so that nomadic pastoralists could be turned into tax-paying cultivators. At other times, destruction took the form of genocide. The Belgians were responsible for the deaths of up to 10 million Congolese during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth. In the opening years of the twentieth century, Germany carried out a systematic genocide against the Nama and Herero peoples in its South West African territories, reducing their population by 80 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. Similar stories could be told about the conduct of the Americans in the Philippines, the Spanish in Cuba, the Japanese in China, the British in Kenya, the French in

Algeria, and the Australians in the Pacific. Overall, the casualty list of imperialism numbered tens of millions (Osterhammel 2014: 124–7).

> **Key Points**
>
> - After 1800, there was a 'great divergence' between some Western states and much of the rest of the world.
> - There were three main sources of the 'great divergence': industrialization, the 'rational' state, and imperialism.
> - These three dynamics served as the mutually reinforcing foundations of modern international order.
> - These dynamics were deeply intertwined with international processes, most notably industrialization with deindustrialization, and rational states with imperialism.

The consequences of the global transformation

The previous section examined the main dynamics that underpinned the global transformation. This section explores three of its main consequences: the 'shrinking' of the planet, the emergence of international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and the development of an unequal international order.

Shrinking the planet

A thin global trading system existed for many centuries before 'the global transformation'. Lightweight luxury goods such as silk, porcelain, spices, precious metals, and gems moved across Eurasia and other transnational trading circuits for millennia, although generally at a slow pace. During the eighteenth century, it took three years for a caravan to make the round trip from Moscow to Peking. This meant that, until the nineteenth century, international orders tended to be somewhat limited in scale. Two thousand years ago, imperial Rome and Han China knew of each other, and had a significant trade in luxury goods. But their armies never met, they had no diplomatic relations, and the trade between them was indirect rather than direct, taking the form of a relay through a range of intermediaries.

The infrastructural gains prompted by the global transformation generated major efficiency savings: communication times between Britain and India dropped from a standard of around six months in the 1830s (via sailing ship), to just over one month in the 1850s (via rail and steamship), to the same day in the 1870s (via telegraph) (Curtin 1984: 251–2).

There were three main sources that lay behind these efficiency savings: steamships, railways, and the telegraph.

During the nineteenth century, as steam engines became smaller, more powerful, and more fuel-efficient, they began to be installed in ships, initially driving paddle wheels, and later the more efficient screw propeller. As a result of these improvements, ocean freight rates dropped by 80 per cent during the century as a whole, with a corresponding expansion in the volume of trade. One million tons of goods were shipped worldwide in 1800; by 1840, ships carried 20 million tons of tradable goods; by 1870, they carried 80 million tons (Belich 2009: 107). By 1913, steam tonnage accounted for 97.7 per cent of global shipping. Steam engines both freed ships from dependence on wind (although at the cost of dependence on coal or oil) and tripled their average speed. Because steamships were not dependent on weather or season, they provided predictable, regular services to replace sporadic and irregular links by sail.

Equally important was the arrival of railways. Widespread railway building began in Britain during the 1820s, spreading to the United States, France, and Germany during the 1830s. By 1840 there were 4,500 miles of track worldwide, expanding to 23,500 miles by 1850 and 130,000 miles by 1870; by the end of the century, there were half a million miles of track worldwide (Hobsbawm 1962: 61). As with steamships, the expansion of the railway had a major effect on trade. By the 1880s the cost of transportation by rail in Britain was less than half of that by canals, and a sixth of transport

by road. The figures for the US were even more dramatic, with late nineteenth-century railways between 30 and 70 times cheaper than trade via road in 1800. Investment in railways served to internationalize capital: France invested heavily in Russian railways, while British investors provided the capital for railways in continental Europe, the Americas, and Asia. By 1913, 41 per cent of Britain's direct overseas investments were in railways (Topik and Wells 2012: 644).

Railways had two further effects on international order. First, they prompted the emergence of timetables and, in turn, pressed states to regularize time. World standard time was pioneered at the Prime Meridian Conference in Washington in 1884, and the universal day of 24 time zones was consolidated at the 1912 Paris International Conference on Time. Second, as railways spread, they became pipelines from continental interiors to coastal ports, linking with steamships to provide a global transportation system. Railways linked Argentinian food producers to the port of Buenos Aires, Australian wool to the port of Sydney, and South African diamonds and gold to the port of Cape Town. This allowed Western states to import products in a way that had not been possible before, and they could establish mass industries that depended on raw materials grown in India, Egypt, and the US. The combination of railways and steamships underpinned the division of labour between an industrial 'core' and a commodity-producing 'periphery' that first emerged as a defining feature of the global political economy during the nineteenth century.

The final breakthrough technology was the telegraph. During the 1840s, telegraph networks spread throughout Europe and North America, increasing from 2,000 miles in 1849 to 111,000 miles by 1869. By 1870, a submarine telegraph system linked the UK and India. By 1887, over 200,000 km of underwater cable connected (mainly imperial) nodes in the world economy. And by 1903, there was a global network in place consisting of over 400,000 km of submarine cabling (Osterhammel 2014: 719). Use of the telegraph was widespread, if uneven. At the end of the nineteenth century, two-thirds of the world's telegraph lines were British owned. In 1913, Europeans sent 329 million telegraphs, while Americans sent 150 million, Asians 60 million, and Africans 17 million (Topik and Wells 2012: 663).

The impact of the telegraph on the speed of communications was dramatic: a letter sent from Paris to St Petersburg took 20 days in 1800, 30 hours in 1900, and 30 minutes in 1914. This, in turn, had a major impact on key features of international relations, from war and diplomacy to trade and consumption. Governments could learn about political and military developments almost as they happened, while financiers and traders had faster access to information about supply, prices, and market movements. One consequence of this was the formation of command structures over long distances. With instant communication, ambassadors, admirals, and generals were not granted as much independence of action, and firms kept tighter control over their distant subsidiaries.

Steamships, railways, and the telegraph were the core technologies of modern international order, adding greatly to levels of interdependence and prompting far deeper practices of exchange. In combination, they helped to construct a global economy and a single space of political–military interactions. They also ratcheted up cultural encounters, enabling (and often requiring) people to interact on a previously unprecedented scale. Increasingly, the human population knew itself as a single entity for the first time.

Intergovernmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations

Technological changes created demands for international coordination and standardization. This resulted in the emergence of **intergovernmental organizations** (IGOs) as permanent features of international order. The link between these dynamics is made clear by the functions of most early IGOs: the International Telecommunications Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union (UPU) (1874), the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875), and the International Conference for Promoting Technical Unification on the Railways (1882). The UPU, for example, responded to the need for inter-operability among state and imperial postal systems that was created by new forms of transportation.

As they developed, IGOs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) covered a wide range of issue-areas, from religion and politics to sport and the environment. By the 1830s, transnational associations were taking part in vigorous public debates on issues as varied as trade policy and population growth. Several prominent INGOs, including the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and the International Red Cross, were formed in the 1850s and 1860s, as were issue-based groups such as those seeking to improve animal welfare, promote the arts, and formalize academic

subjects ranging from botany to anthropology. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw a further growth in INGO activity with the emergence of a number of groups formed in response to the inequities of industrialization and, in the last part of the century, the first industrial-era depression. An organized labour movement emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. A further tranche of INGOs put pressure on states to enact faster, deeper processes of democratization. A transnational movement for women's suffrage emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; by the early years of the twentieth century, the membership of the International Council of Women counted up to 5 million women around the world (Osterhammel 2014: 507).

Inequality

As previous sections have explored, the global transformation generated a deeply unequal international order. This section explores this inequality through two issue-areas: racism and economic exploitation.

Racism

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a new form of racism emerged. **'Scientific' racism** was based on a radically unequal view of world politics (**see Ch. 18**). Its proponents argued that it was possible—and desirable—to establish a political hierarchy based on biological markers, either visible (as in skin colour) or according to bloodline (as in who counts as Jewish, black, or Chinese). Broadly speaking, for 'scientific' racists, lighter-skinned peoples inhabited the highest rung on the evolutionary ladder and darker-skinned peoples were situated at the bottom. These ideas allowed Europeans to racially demarcate zones within imperial territories, as well as to homogenize diverse indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans, into a single category of 'Indians'. The result was the formation of an international order premised in large measure on a 'global colour line' (Du Bois 1994 [1903]). This colour line, in turn, served as the basis for a global 'standard of civilization' (**see Case Study 2.1**).

The global colour line and its accompanying 'standard of civilization' were strengthened by mass emigration from Britain to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. These emigrations created 'settler states' ruled by white elites who saw themselves as inherently superior to the indigenous peoples. The scale of this enterprise is striking: white settlers in Australia increased

from 12,000 in 1810 to 1.25 million in 1860; one million white British emigrated to Canada between 1815 and 1865, multiplying the country's population by a factor of seven. In 1831, the white population of New Zealand was little more than 1,000; 50 years later, it was 500,000 (Belich 2009: 83). The cumulative effect of these repopulations was significant. Whereas at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the white English-speaking world was made up of 12 million (mostly poor) people, by 1930 it constituted 200 million (mostly rich) people.

The racism fostered by white emigration forged what W. E. B. Du Bois (1994 [1903]: 61) called 'the new religion of whiteness'. Settler colonists became a racial caste united by fear of rebellion by the indigenous population and by a sense of their own cultural and racial superiority. As white Westerners became a 'global people', settlers helped to racialize international politics, making the colour bar a globally recognized tool of discrimination.

Economic exploitation

Industrialization and associated processes, such as the commercialization of agriculture, were global in form. As profits from these processes could only be achieved through higher productivity, lower wages, or the establishment of new markets, capitalist expansion was constant, leading to the development of both new areas of production (such as southeastern Russia and central parts of the United States) and new products (such as potatoes). In 1900, Malaya had around 5,000 acres of rubber production; by 1913, it contained 1.25 million acres (Wolf 1997: 325). Deindustrialization was equally rapid. As discussed in earlier sections, after 1800, the British government ensured that British products undercut Indian goods and charged prohibitive tariffs on Indian textiles. Within a generation or two, the deindustrialization of India meant that centuries-old skills in industries such as cloth dyeing, shipbuilding, metallurgy, and gun making had been lost (Parthasarathi 2011).

The profits from capitalist expansion helped to forge an unequal global economy. In the cultivation system operated by the Netherlands in Indonesia, Dutch settlers enjoyed 50 times the level of per capita income as indigenous Indonesians. Around half of the revenue collected by the Indonesian government under the cultivation system was remitted to the Netherlands, constituting 20 per cent of the state's net revenue (Osterhammel 2014: 443). This is just one example of the ways in which imperial powers adapted global

Case Study 2.1 The standard of civilization

Nineteenth-century German illustration comparing racial characteristics

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The idea that people around the world could be ranked, culturally and/or racially, was the hallmark of the nineteenth-century 'standard of civilization'. The standard of civilization determined which parts of the world lay outside the 'civilized' realm of white, Christian peoples. Distinctions between the 'civilized' world of the white West, 'barbarians' (mostly light-skinned peoples with an urban 'high culture'), and 'savages' (mostly dark-skinned peoples without an urban 'high culture') formed the basis for a range of international practices, such as the rules of war. These rules distinguished between 'privileged belligerents' (inhabitants of the 'civilized' world) and 'unprivileged belligerents' (those living outside this zone). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, privileged belligerents became increasingly subject to rules that determined the scope of legitimate violence, not least that it should be *discriminate* and *proportional*. Unprivileged combatants were considered to be outside such rules—violence in 'uncivilized' spaces took place largely without legal restrictions.

The standard of civilization was also central to the way in which Western powers interacted with other peoples. This interaction came in many forms: unequal treaties for those polities left nominally independent (like China); partial takeovers, such as protectorates, where most functions of local government were allowed to continue, but finance, defence, and foreign policy were handled by a Western power (as in the case of Sudan); and formal colonization, resulting in elimination as an independent entity (as in India after the 1857 revolt). Those states, like Japan, that sought to emulate European power underwent both a restructuring of their domestic society through rapid 'modernization' and a reorientation of foreign policy towards imperialism: Japan invaded Taiwan in 1874 (annexing it formally in 1895), fought wars for overseas territory with both China (1894–5) and Russia (1904–5), and annexed Korea (1910). Becoming a 'civilized' member of international society meant not just abiding by European law and diplomacy; it also meant becoming an imperial power.

It is important to note that, in many ways, the standard of civilization was a moving target. When being 'civilized' was considered to be exclusively Christian, majority Muslim polities such as the Ottoman Empire automatically fell outside its scope. However, the shift to an idea of 'civilization' based on the 'modern' capacities of a state meant that, in theory, every state could be 'civilized'. This is one reason why the Ottomans, the Japanese, and others embraced 'modernizing' projects—implementing legal, administrative, and fiscal reforms held out the promise of equal international status. In theory, if less so in practice, 'civilization' was a ladder that could be climbed (**see Box 2.3**).

Question 1: What was the basis of the 'standard of civilization'?

Question 2: How did the 'standard of civilization' impact the formation of the contemporary international order?

production to their needs, setting up the modern hierarchy between providers of primary and secondary products. While colonized countries could be the main producers of primary products, as India was with tea, Burma with jute, Malaya with rubber, Nigeria with palm oil, Bolivia with tin, and Brazil with coffee, imperial powers maintained an advantage in high-value exports and finance. This division of labour, with its accompanying upheavals, was first established in the nineteenth century; it came to dominate the global political economy in the twentieth century. **Case Study 2.2** illustrates how these dynamics worked.

Key Points

- A major consequence of the global transformation was the 'shrinking of the planet' via steamships, railways, and the telegraph.
- These technologies increased the 'regularized exchanges' that serve as the foundations of international order.
- These exchanges were increasingly managed by IGOs and INGOs.
- The modern international order that emerged during the nineteenth century was profoundly unequal. The sources of this inequality included racism and economic exploitation.

Case Study 2.2 Imperialism with Chinese characteristics

American cartoon, circa 1900
© Granger Historical Picture Archive/Alamy Stock Photo

At the heart of imperialism was a claim about the material, cultural, and moral superiority of the West. As **Case Study 2.1** illustrated, Western powers exacted vastly unequal terms of exchange with those they dominated, even if these polities had once been great empires, as was the case with China. Indeed, the decline of China helps to illustrate the ways in which imperialism served to transform international order in the nineteenth century.

During the nineteenth century, Western powers pressed China to open up to higher levels of trade. This was particularly important for the British, for whom the (illegal) opium trade was extremely lucrative: by the 1830s, the British were exporting 30,000 chests of opium from India to China each year, each of which carried 150 pounds of opium extract. It was little surprise when, in 1840, Britain used the pretext of a minor incident involving the arrest of two British sailors to instigate conflict with China (the 'First Opium War'), which it won easily.

The Treaty of Nanjing that followed the war required China to cede Hong Kong to the British, pay an indemnity for starting the conflict, and open up five new treaty ports. The treaty also legalized the opium trade. After defeat in the Second Opium War of 1856–60, which included the sacking of the Summer Palace in Beijing by British and French forces, China signed a further series of unequal treaties, including some that guaranteed low tariffs on European imports.

If these treaties weakened China, so too did domestic unrest. During the 1850s, a rebellion originating among the Hakka minority in Guangxi spread to the Yangtze region and the imperial capital of Nanjing. The rebellion was oriented around a strain of apocalyptic Christianity, blended with elements of Manchu and Confucian thought. Over the next decade, the 'Taiping Rebellion' mobilized over a million combatants and spread to an area the size of France and Germany combined. The conflict severely diminished imperial control. It also destroyed both land and livelihoods, and between 1850 and 1873, over 20 million people were killed. War and related dynamics, including starvation, saw China's population as a whole drop from 410 million to 350 million during this period.

The Taiping Rebellion was not the only uprising experienced by China during this period. In 1898, a series of 'modernizing' reforms by the 17 year old Emperor Guangxu prompted a coup by the Empress Dowager Cixi. Cixi fanned a wave of assertive nationalism, including a movement—the Boxer Rebellion—that sought to overturn the unequal rights held by Westerners. The defeat of the Boxers by a coalition of Western forces led to the stationing of foreign troops in China, as well as a range of new concessions. Key aspects of public finances were handed over to outsiders, most notably the Maritime Customs Services, which was used to collect taxes, regulate tariffs, and finance the substantial indemnity owed to the Western powers.

All in all, China's experience of Western imperialism was deeply destructive. During this period, Chinese per capita income dropped from 90 per cent to 20 per cent of the world average, while the country's share of global GDP fell from around a third to just 5 per cent. China lost wars with Japan, Britain, and France. It saw large parts of its territory handed over to foreign powers and suffered the ignominy of being forced to sign a number of unequal treaties. China went through two major rebellions, including one (the Taiping Rebellion) that produced more casualties than any other conflict during the nineteenth century. No wonder that this period is known in China as the 'Century of Humiliation'.

Question 1: What were the main features of China's 'Century of Humiliation'?

Question 2: How has China's experience of imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries impacted its contemporary foreign policy?

Conclusion

This chapter defined international order as 'regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent'. There have been many international orders in world history. However, it is only over the past two centuries that an international order has emerged that is global in scale and deeply interdependent politically, economically, and culturally. Not everything has changed over the past two centuries. But the world has undergone a major transformation enabled by imperialism, the emergence of industrialization, and rational states. These dynamics have prompted far-reaching changes to how international order has been organized and understood. And they have deepened degrees of both interdependence and inequality to levels that are unprecedented in world history.

The legacies of this period are profound: a global economy, a global system of states, global communication and transportation systems, a huge number of IGOs and INGOs, and more. Even the basic terminology used to describe much of the contemporary world has nineteenth-century origins, from the idea of 'the West' to framings such as 'the Middle East' and 'Latin America' (Osterhammel 2014: 73–86). Equally important are the legacies of imperialism, racism, and economic exploitation that continue to generate resentment in many parts of the world. The West ignores these sentiments at its peril. Although the world continues to be based largely on Western terms, this is changing (**see Ch. 5**). The 'modernizing mission' first undertaken by nineteenth-century Japan (**see Box 2.3**) has now been undertaken in various forms by many of the world's states. Understanding how we got here is crucial to assessing both the shape of contemporary international order and the challenges it faces.

Box 2.3 Japan's 'modernizing mission'

The most spectacular example of a nineteenth-century 'modernizing mission' outside the West was that of Japan. Following the shock caused by the appearance of American gunboats in Tokyo Bay in 1853 and the subsequent signing of unequal treaties, Japan sent over a hundred representatives on a mission to 11 European countries and the United States in order to negotiate revisions to these treaties and learn from Western practices. The Iwakura Mission subsequently borrowed extensively from the institutions and technologies of Western states.

The result was a radical programme known as the Meiji Restoration. The Charter Oath of the Meiji Restoration made frequent references to Confucianism. However, it did so in the context of the need to revive Japanese thought and practices within a new, 'modern' context. Under the slogan *fukoku kyohe* (rich country, strong military), the Meiji oligarchy sought to erode feudal forms of governance, abolish the Shogunate, and replace the Samurai (who numbered over 5 per cent of the population) with a conscript army.

The Meiji pioneered the idea of the developmental state. They imported industrial technologies (often through 'international experts'), increased military spending (which climbed from 15 per cent of government spending in the 1880s to around 30 per cent in the 1890s, and nearly 50 per cent in the 1900s), and mobilized the population through an ideology of (sometimes chauvinistic) nationalism. A new private property regime was introduced alongside new systems of taxation, banking, and insurance. The Meiji state built cotton mills, cement works, glass factories, and mines, and maintained a leading interest in arms: between 1873 and 1913, Japan constructed the sixth largest merchant marine in the world.

During the Meiji period as a whole, the state was responsible for 40 per cent of the capital investment in the country. This was state-led development with a vengeance. And it served as a model for later such projects around the world.

Questions

1. What are the main components of 'international order'?
2. How important was the Peace of Westphalia to the formation of modern international order?
3. What were the international dynamics that helped Western powers become so powerful during the nineteenth century?
4. What was the significance of industrialization to Western ascendancy?
5. What ideas sustained the 'global transformation'?
6. How significant was the 'standard of civilization' to the formation of global inequality?
7. What were the consequences of the 'shrinking of the planet'?
8. Why did IGOs and INGOs emerge in the nineteenth century?
9. In what ways did imperialism impact the construction of modern international order?
10. What have been the main consequences of the global transformation?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Bayly, C. A. (2004), *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell). This is the best place to start for those interested in the global origins of modern international order.

Belich, J. (2009), *Replenishing the Earth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Explores the role of a distinct 'Anglosphere' in constructing key aspects of modern international order.

Buzan, B., **and Lawson, G.** (2015), *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of Modern International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Blends International Relations and global history in order to show how nineteenth-century dynamics have impacted contemporary world politics.

Buzan, B., **and Little, R.** (2000), *International Systems in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). One of the only volumes to engage thoroughly with historical international orders before the modern era.

Getachew, A. (2019), *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Outlines the ways in which anti-colonial thinkers, such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Kwame Nkrumah, imagined world order during the twentieth century.

Goswami, M. (2004), *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). An account that stresses the global features of the transformation from colonialism to the nation-state in India, with particular emphasis on issues of political economy.

Hobson, J. (2004), *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Argues that many of the institutions we now think of as 'Western' were forged through encounters between East and West, with the former playing a particularly crucial role.

Mann, M. (2012), *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. 3: *Global Empires and Revolution*, *1890–1945* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press). A major analysis of how modern international order came into being.

Osterhammel, J. (2014), *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. P. Camiller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). The definitive global history of the nineteenth century. A long book, but written in bite-sized chapters that allow readers to pick and choose which topics they are interested in.

Pomeranz, K. (2000), *The Great Divergence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A breakthrough book making the case that Western powers became more powerful than their Asian counterparts only after 1800. Pomeranz pays particular attention to the role of colonialism in generating Western take-off.

To find out more about the historical context follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Chapter 3

International history of the twentieth century

LEN SCOTT

Framing Questions

- To what extent do you believe that the colonial powers were mainly responsible for the violence and armed conflict that characterized much decolonization?

- Do you agree that nuclear weapons were vital to keeping the peace after 1945?

- Do you think that the cold war is best understood as the defence of Western values and interests against Soviet aggression?

Reader's Guide

This chapter examines some of the principal developments in world politics from 1900 to 1999: the development of total war, the end of European imperialism, the advent of nuclear weapons, and the onset of cold war. Confrontation between the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) became the key dynamic in world affairs, replacing the dominance of—and conflict among—European states in the first half of the twentieth century. The cold war encompassed the ideological, political, and military interests of the two states (and their allies) and extended around the globe. To what extent, and in what ways, the cold war promoted or prevented conflict are central questions. Similarly, how decolonization became entangled with East–West conflicts is crucial to understanding many struggles in the 'Third World'. Finally, how dangerous was the nuclear confrontation between East and West? This chapter explores the role of nuclear weapons in specific phases of the cold war, notably détente, and then during the deterioration of Soviet–American relations in the 1980s.

Introduction

The First World War (also known as the Great War) began among European states on European battlefields, and then extended across the globe. It was the first modern, industrialized total war, as the belligerents mobilized their populations and economies as well as their armies, and as they endured immense casualties. The Second World War was yet more total in nature and global in scope, and fundamentally changed world politics. Before 1939, Europe was the arbiter of world affairs, when both the USSR and the US remained, for different reasons, primarily preoccupied with internal development. The Second World War brought the Soviets and Americans militarily and politically deep into Europe, and transformed their relationship from allies to antagonists. This transformation was reflected in their relations outside Europe, where various confrontations developed. Like the First and Second World Wars, the cold war had its origins in Europe, but quickly spread, with enormous global consequences.

The First World War led to the demise of four European empires: Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman (in Turkey). After 1945, European power was in decline. The economic plight of the wartime belligerents, including victors, was increasingly apparent, as was growing realization of the military and economic potential of the US and the USSR. Both emerged as 'superpowers', combining global political ambition with military capabilities that included weapons of mass destruction. European political, economic, and military weakness contrasted with the appearance of Soviet strength and growing Western perception of malign Soviet intent. The onset of the cold war in Europe marked the collapse of the wartime alliance between the UK, the USSR, and the US. The most ominous legacy of the Second World War was the atomic bomb, built at enormous cost, and driven by fear that Nazi Germany might win this first nuclear arms race. After 1945, nuclear weapons posed unprecedented challenges to world politics and to leaders responsible for conducting post-war diplomacy. The cold war provided both context and pretext for the growth of nuclear arsenals that threatened the very existence of humankind, and which have continued to spread well after the end of the East–West confrontation (**see Ch. 29**).

Since 1900, world politics has been transformed in multiple ways, reflecting political, technological, and ideological developments, of which three are examined in this chapter: (1) the transition from crises in European power politics to total war; (2) the end of empire and withdrawal of European states from their imperial acquisitions; and (3) the cold war: the political, military, and nuclear confrontation between East and West. There have, of course, been other important changes, and indeed equally important continuities, which other chapters in this volume address. Nevertheless, these three principal developments provide a framework for exploring events and trends that have shaped world politics during the twentieth century.

Modern total war

The origins of the First World War have long been debated. For the victorious allies, the question of how war began became a question of how far the Germans and their allies should be held responsible. At Versailles, the victors imposed a statement of German war guilt in the final settlement, primarily to justify the reparations they demanded. Debates among historians about the war's origins focus on political, military, and systemic factors. Some suggest that responsibility for the war was diffuse, as its origins lay in the complex dynamics and imperatives of the respective alliances. The West German historian Fritz Fischer, however, argued in his influential 1967 book, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, that German aggression, motivated by the internal political needs of an autocratic elite, was responsible for the war. Whatever the causes, the pattern of events is clear. A Serbian nationalist's assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, triggered Austro-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. Russia's alliance with Serbia, and Germany's alliance with Austro-Hungary, then became catalysts for European-wide conflict. Germany feared war on two fronts against France and Russia, and so attacked France in search of a speedy victory. This not only failed, but British treaty obligations to Belgium brought the UK into the war.

However complex or contested the origins of the Great War, the motivations of those who fought were more explicable. The peoples of the belligerent nations shared nationalist beliefs and patriotic values. As they marched off to fight, most thought war would be short, victorious, and, in many cases, glorious. The reality of the European battlefield quickly proved otherwise. Defensive military technologies, symbolized by the machine gun and trench warfare, triumphed over the tactics and strategy of attrition. It was not until November 1918 that the allied offensive finally achieved rapid advances that helped end the fighting. War was total in that whole societies and economies were mobilized: men were conscripted into armies and women into factories. Germany's western and eastern fronts remained the crucibles of combat, although conflict spread to other parts of the globe, as when Japan went to war in 1914 as an ally of Britain. Most importantly, the United States entered the war in 1917 under President Woodrow Wilson, whose vision of international society, articulated in his **Fourteen Points**, later drove the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The overthrow of the Tsar and seizure of power by Lenin's Bolsheviks in November 1917 quickly led Russia (soon to become the USSR) to seek peace. Germany no longer fought on two fronts, but faced a new threat as America mobilized. With the failure of its last great offensive in the west in 1918, and an increasingly effective British naval blockade, Berlin agreed to an armistice.

The **Treaty of Versailles** in 1919 promised a new framework for European security and a new international order. Neither was achieved. There were crucial differences among the victorious powers over policies towards Germany and over principles governing the international order. Moreover, the treaty failed to tackle, what was for some, the central problem of European security after 1870—a united and frustrated Germany. Moreover, it further encouraged German revanchism by creating new states and contested borders. Economic factors were also crucial. The effects of the **Great Depression**, triggered in part by the Wall Street Crash of 1929, weakened liberal democracy in many countries and strengthened the appeal of communist, fascist, and Nazi parties. The economic impact on German society was particularly damaging. While all European states suffered mass unemployment, in Germany there was hyperinflation. The value of the German currency plummeted as more and more money was printed and the cost of living rose dramatically. Economic and political instability provided

the ground in which support for the Nazis took root. In 1933, Adolf Hitler gained power, and transformation of the German state began. Debate remains about the extent to which Hitler's ambitions were carefully thought through and to what extent expansion was opportunistic. A. J. P. Taylor provided a controversial analysis in his 1961 book, *The Origins of the Second World War*, in which he argued that Hitler was no different from other German political leaders. What was different was the philosophy of Nazism and the combination of racial supremacy with territorial aggression. British and French attempts to negotiate with Hitler culminated in the Munich Agreement of 1938. Hitler's territorial claims on the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia were accepted as the price for peace, but within months Germany had seized the rest of Czechoslovakia and was preparing for war on Poland. Recent debates about **appeasement** have focused on whether there existed realistic alternatives to negotiation, given the lack of allied military preparedness.

In 1939, the defensive military technologies of the First World War were overwhelmed by armoured warfare and air power, as the German blitzkrieg brought speedy victories against Poland and in Western Europe. Hitler was also drawn into the Balkans and North Africa in support of his Italian ally, Benito Mussolini. With the invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the scale of fighting and the scope of Hitler's aims were apparent. Massive early victories gave way to winter stalemate and the mobilization of the Soviet people and military. German treatment of civilian populations and Soviet prisoners of war reflected Nazi ideas of racial supremacy and caused the deaths of millions. Nazi anti-Semitism and the development of concentration camps gained new momentum after a decision on the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in 1942. The term **Holocaust** entered the political lexicon of the twentieth century as the Nazis attempted the genocide of the Jewish people and other minorities, such as the Roma.

The rise and fall of Japan

After 1919, attempts to provide collective security were pursued through the League of Nations. The US Senate prevented American participation in the League, however, and Japanese aggression against Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and German involvement in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–9 were met with ineffectual international responses. In 1868, Japan emerged from centuries of isolationism to pursue

industrial and military modernization and then imperial expansion. In 1937, it invaded China, already embroiled in civil war between communists and nationalists. The brutality of the Japanese troops is best remembered for 'The Rape of Nanjing' in 1937–8, when 40,000–300,000 civilians were massacred and over 20,000 women raped. Tokyo's strategic ambitions, however, could only be realized at the expense of European empires and American interests. President Franklin D. Roosevelt increasingly sought to engage America in the European war, against strong isolationist forces; by 1941, German submarines and American warships were in an undeclared war. The American imposition of economic sanctions on Japan precipitated Japanese military preparations

for a surprise attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. When Germany and Italy declared war on America in support of their Japanese ally, Roosevelt committed the United States to the liberation of Europe. After a combined strategic bombing offensive with the British against German cities, the allies launched a 'second front' in France in 1944, for which the Soviets had been pressing.

Defeat of Germany in May 1945 came before the atomic bomb was ready. The subsequent destruction of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains controversial (**see Opposing Opinions 3.1 and Table 3.1**). Aside from moral objections to attacking civilian populations, fierce debate emerged, particularly

Opposing Opinions 3.1 The use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified

For

Dropping atomic bombs was decisive in bringing about Japanese surrender and ending the Pacific war. Up until then, the Japanese had continued to fight on regardless of casualties—even in the face of military defeat, the bombing of their cities, and an increasingly effective naval blockade. Other demonstrations of allied military power would not have been decisive.

Bombing several targets was necessary to shock Tokyo into surrender. The bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 caused some 80,000–120,000 deaths, yet the Japanese government remained determined to fight on. Using atomic bombs on several cities, and against non-military installations, was necessary to convince Tokyo that burning cities would continue until Japan surrendered.

Other military options would not have ended the war swiftly. Japanese military resistance, including *kamikaze* suicide attacks, inflicted significant casualties on allied forces. Invasion of Japan would have meant huge losses among allied soldiers as well as Japanese civilians. Continuing naval blockade and conventional air power would not have ended the war in 1945.

The legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has strengthened the nuclear taboo. The demonstration of the horror of nuclear weapons has strengthened deterrence and the avoidance of war since 1945.

Against

The war was already won. Soviet entry into the war against Japan was imminent, and President Truman knew from American signals intelligence that the Japanese government was already pursuing peace feelers through Moscow. The only significant obstacle to peace was retention of the emperor. Although the allies continued to insist on unconditional surrender, once the bomb was dropped, they accepted the emperor as a constitutional monarch after 1945.

It was morally wrong to target cities when other options existed. Inadequate thought was given to alternatives, including attacks on military targets or adjusting unconditional surrender to preserve the emperor. Even if the bombing of Hiroshima might be justified, the destruction of Nagasaki was wholly unnecessary. Truman himself displayed moral qualms by stopping the dropping of a third bomb.

The bomb helped to create the cold war. One reason why Truman used the atomic bomb was to end the war before Moscow could extend its influence in Asia. Atomic bombing underscored America's nuclear monopoly and aimed to extend US political and economic power in Asia and Europe.

Dropping the bomb fuelled nuclear proliferation. Demonstrating the destructiveness of nuclear weapons strengthened states' determination to acquire them, both to enhance their political status and to deter attacks on themselves. After Hiroshima, the Soviets accelerated their atomic programme. Dropping the bomb may have ended the war, but it started a global arms race.

1. Do you believe that it was morally acceptable to use atomic bombs against Japanese cities?

2. Are you convinced that the only reason for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to end the war?

3. What in your view were the positive and negative consequences for world politics after 1945 of using atomic bombs against Japan?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Table 3.1 Second World War estimated casualties

Hiroshima (6 August 1945): 70,000–80,000 'prompt'; 140,000 by end 1945; 200,000 by 1950
Nagasaki (9 August 1945): 30,000–40,000 'prompt'; 70,000 by end 1945; 140,000 by 1950
Tokyo (9 March 1945): 80,000–120,000
Dresden (13–15 February 1945): 24,000–35,000+
Coventry (14 November 1940): 568
Leningrad (siege 1941–44): 1,000,000+

Key Points

- Debates about the origins of the First World War focus on whether responsibility should rest with the German government or whether it resulted from more complex factors.

- The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 failed to address central problems of European security, and in restructuring the European state system created new sources of grievance and instability. Principles of self-determination, espoused in particular by Woodrow Wilson, did not extend to the colonial empires of the European powers.

- The rise of Hitler presented threats that European political leaders lacked the ability and will to meet, culminating in the outbreak of the Second World War.

- The German attack on the Soviet Union extended the war from short and limited campaigns to extended, large-scale, and barbaric confrontation, fought for total victory.

- The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into the war in Europe, and eventually forced Germany into war on two fronts (again).

- Debate persists about whether the atomic bomb should have been used in 1945.

among American historians, about why the bomb was dropped. Gar Alperovitz, in his 1965 book *Atomic Diplomacy*, argued that, as President Truman already knew Japan was defeated, his real motive was to coerce Moscow in pursuit of post-war American interests in Europe and Asia. Such claims generated angry and dismissive responses from other historians. Ensuing scholarship has benefited from the greater availability of historical evidence, though debate persists over whether Truman dropped the bomb simply to end the war, or how far other factors, including coercion of the Soviets, informed his calculations.

End of empire

The demise of imperialism in the twentieth century marked a fundamental change in world politics. It reflected, and contributed to, the decreasing importance of Europe as the arbiter of world affairs. The belief that national **self-determination** should be a guiding principle in international politics marked a transformation of attitudes and values. During the age of imperialism, political status accrued to imperial powers. After 1945, imperialism became a term of opprobrium. Colonialism and the United Nations Charter were increasingly recognized as incompatible, although achievement of independence was often slow and sometimes marked by prolonged and armed struggle. The cold war frequently complicated and hindered the transition to independence. Different factors influenced decolonization: the attitude of the colonial power; the ideology and strategy of the anti-imperialist forces; and the role of external powers. Political, economic, and military factors played various roles in shaping the transfer of power. Different imperial powers and newly emerging independent states had different experiences of the end of empire (**see Table 3.2**).

Britain

In 1945, the British Empire extended across the globe. Between 1947 and 1980, 49 territories were granted independence. In 1947, the independence of India, the imperial 'Jewel in the Crown', created the world's largest democracy, although division into India and Pakistan led to inter-communal ethnic cleansing and hundreds of thousands of deaths. Indian independence was largely an exception in the early post-war years, however, as successive British governments were reluctant to rush decolonization. The end of empire in Africa came towards the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, symbolized by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's speech in South Africa in February 1960, when he warned his hosts of the 'wind of change' blowing through the continent.

British withdrawal from empire was comparatively peaceful, except for India and conflicts in Kenya (1952–6)

Table 3.2 Principal acts of European decolonization, 1945–80

Country	Colonial state	Year of independence
India	Britain	1947
Pakistan	Britain	1947
Burma	Britain	1948
Sri Lanka	Britain	1948
Indonesia	Netherlands	1949
French Indo-China	France	1954
Ghana	Britain	1957
Malaya	Britain	1957
French African colonies*	France	1960
Zaïre	Britain	1960
Nigeria	Britain	1960
Sierra Leone	Britain	1961
Tanganyika	Britain	1961
Uganda	Britain	1962
Algeria	France	1962
Rwanda	Belgium	1962
Kenya	Britain	1963
Guinea-Bissau	Portugal	1974
Mozambique	Portugal	1975
Cape Verde	Portugal	1975
São Tomé	Portugal	1975
Angola	Portugal	1975
Zimbabwe	Britain	1980**

* Including Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta.

** In 1965, the white minority government in (what was then) Rhodesia declared independence from Britain. Civil war ensued, eventually followed by the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980.

and Malaya (1948–60). In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the transition to 'one person one vote' and black majority rule was opposed by a white minority willing to disregard the British government and world opinion. The South African government aided and abetted this minority. Under apartheid, after 1948, South Africans engaged in what many saw as the internal equivalent of imperialism, while South Africa also conducted traditional imperialist practices in its occupation of Namibia. In addition, South Africa exercised important influence in postcolonial/cold war struggles in Angola and Mozambique after the last European empire in Africa—that of Portugal—collapsed when the military dictatorship in Lisbon was overthrown.

France

The French experience of decolonization stood in contrast to that of the British. France had been occupied during the Second World War, and successive governments sought to preserve French international prestige by maintaining its imperial status. In Indo-China after 1945, Paris withdrew only after prolonged guerrilla war and military defeat at the hands of the Viet Minh, the Vietnamese revolutionary forces led by Ho Chi Minh. In French Africa, the picture was different. Under President Charles de Gaulle, France withdrew from empire while attempting to preserve its influence. In Algeria, however, the French refused to leave. Many French people regarded Algeria as part of France itself. The resulting war, from 1954 to 1962, caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, and France itself was brought to the brink of civil war.

Legacies and consequences: nationalism or communism?

From the perspective of former colonies, the principles of self-determination that underpinned the new global order were often slow to be realized, and required political, ideological, and in some cases military mobilization. The pattern of decolonization in Africa was diverse, reflecting the attitudes of colonial powers, the nature of local nationalist or revolutionary movements, and in some cases the involvement of external states, including cold war protagonists. Tribal factors were also important in many cases. The most horrifying example of the political exploitation of tribal divisions came in the former Belgian colony, Rwanda, when in 1994 some 800,000–1,000,000 Tutsis were massacred by the Hutu majority (of whom an estimated 100,000 were also killed). Tutsi women were also subjected to mass rape, including with the purpose of spreading HIV/AIDS. To what extent the imperial powers created or exacerbated tribal divisions is an important question in examining the political stability of newly independent states. Equally important is how able new political leaderships in these societies were in tackling formidable political challenges and economic problems of poverty and underdevelopment.

In Asia, the relationship between nationalism and revolutionary Marxism was a potent force. In Malaya the British defeated an insurgent communist movement (1948–60). In Indo-China (1946–54) the French failed to do likewise. For the Vietnamese, centuries of foreign oppression—Chinese, Japanese, and French—soon focused on a new adversary: the United States. For Washington, early reluctance to support European imperialism gave way to incremental and covert involvement, and, from 1965, growing military commitment to the newly created state of South Vietnam.

American leaders embraced a domino theory: if one state fell to communism, others would follow. Chinese and Soviet support for North Vietnam highlighted the cold war context. However, Washington failed to coordinate limited war objectives with an effective political strategy; once victory was no longer possible, it sought to disengage through 'peace with honor'. The 1968 Tet (Vietnamese New Year) offensive by the 'Viet Cong' guerrillas marked a decisive moment, convincing many Americans that the war would not be won, although it was not until 1973 that American forces finally withdrew, two years before South Vietnam collapsed.

The global trend towards decolonization was a key development in world politics in the twentieth-century, one frequently shaped by both local circumstances and the international dynamics of the cold war. Yet, while imperialism withered, other forms of domination or **hegemony** took shape. This term has been used to critique the behaviour of the superpowers, notably Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and US hegemony in Central America.

Key Points

- Decolonization was founded on the principle of self-determination and marked the eclipse of European power.
- Different European powers had differing attitudes to decolonization after 1945: some sought to preserve their empires, in part (the French) or whole (the Portuguese).
- The process of decolonization was relatively peaceful in many cases; in others, however, it led to revolutionary wars (Algeria, Malaya, and Angola) whose scale and ferocity

reflected the attitudes of the colonial powers and nationalist movements.
- Independence and national liberation became embroiled in cold war conflicts when the superpowers and/or their allies became involved, for example in Vietnam. Whether decolonization was judged successful depends, in part, on whose perspective you adopt—that of the European power, the independence movement, or the people themselves.

Cold war

The rise of the United States as a world power after 1945 was of paramount importance in international politics. Its relationship with the USSR provided a crucial dynamic in world affairs, one that affected—directly or indirectly—every part of the globe. In the West, historians have debated with vigour and acrimony who was responsible for the collapse of the wartime alliance between Moscow and Washington. The rise of the Soviet Union as a global power after 1945 was equally crucial. Moscow's relations with its Eastern European 'allies', with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and with revolutionary forces in the Third World were vital issues in world politics and key factors in Soviet–American affairs.

Some historians date the origins of the cold war to the Russian Revolution of 1917, while most focus on events between 1945 and 1950. Whether the cold war was inevitable, whether it was the consequence of mistakes and misperceptions, or whether it reflected the response of courageous Western leaders to malign and aggressive Soviet intent, are central questions in debates about its origins and dynamics. For many years, these debates were supported by evidence from Western archives and sources, and reflected Western assumptions and perceptions. With the end of the cold war, greater historical evidence of the motivations and perceptions of other states, notably that of the Soviet Union, has emerged.

1945–53: onset of the cold war

The onset of the cold war in Europe reflected failure to implement the principles agreed at the wartime conferences of Yalta and Potsdam. The issue of the future of Germany and various Central and Eastern European countries, notably Poland, produced growing tension between the former wartime allies. Reconciling principles of national self-determination with national security proved a formidable task. In the West, feeling grew that Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe was guided not by historic concern with security but by ideological expansion. In March 1947, the Truman administration justified limited aid to Turkey and Greece with rhetoric designed to arouse awareness of Soviet ambitions, and declared that America would support those threatened by Soviet subversion or expansion. The **Truman doctrine** and the associated policy of **containment** expressed the self-image of the US as inherently defensive. It was underpinned by the **Marshall Plan** for European economic recovery, proclaimed in June 1947,

which was essential to the economic rebuilding of Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, democratic socialist and other anti-communist forces were undermined and eliminated as Marxist–Leninist regimes, loyal to Moscow, were installed. The exception was Yugoslavia, where the Marxist leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, consolidated his authority while maintaining independence from Moscow. Tito's Yugoslavia subsequently played an important role in the Third World Non-Aligned Movement.

The first major confrontation of the cold war took place over Berlin in 1948. The former German capital was left deep in the heart of the Soviet zone of occupation, and in June 1948 Stalin sought to resolve its status by severing road and rail communications. A massive airlift kept West Berlin's population and its political autonomy alive. Stalin ended the blockade in May 1949. The crisis saw deployment of American long-range bombers in Britain, officially described as 'atomic-capable', although none were actually armed with nuclear weapons. US military deployment was followed by political commitment enshrined in the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) treaty in April 1949. The key article of the treaty—that an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all—accorded with the principle of collective self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In practice, the cornerstone of the alliance was the US commitment to defend Western Europe. This soon meant American willingness to use nuclear weapons against Soviet 'aggression'. For Moscow, 'political encirclement' encompassed a growing military, and specifically nuclear, threat.

While the cold war originated in Europe, conflicts in Asia and elsewhere were also crucial. In 1949, the 30-year-long Chinese civil war ended in victory for the communists under Mao Zedong. This had a major impact on Asian affairs and perceptions in both Moscow and Washington (**see Case Study 3.1**). In June 1950, the North Korean attack on South Korea was interpreted as part of a general communist strategy and a test case for American resolve and the will of the United Nations to resist aggression. The resulting American and UN military commitment, followed in October 1950 by Chinese involvement, led to a war lasting three years in which over 3 million people died before pre-war borders were restored. North and South Korea themselves remained locked in hostility, even after the end of the cold war.

Assessing the impact of the cold war on the Middle East is more difficult. The founding of the state of Israel in 1948 reflected the legacy of the Nazi genocide and the failure of British colonial policy. The complexities of Middle Eastern politics, diplomacy, and armed conflict in the years immediately after 1945 cannot be readily understood through the prism of Soviet–American ideological or geo-strategic conflict. Both Moscow and Washington supported the creation of Israel in previously Arab lands, although by the 1950s the Soviets supported Arab nationalism. The pan-Arabism of the charismatic Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, embraced a form of socialism, but one far removed from Marxism–Leninism. The state of Israel was created by force, and owed its survival to a continuing capability to defend itself against adversaries who did not recognize the legitimacy of its existence. Israel developed relations with the British and the French, culminating in their secret agreement to attack Egypt in 1956. Over time, Israel built a more crucial relationship with Washington, with whom a de facto strategic alliance emerged. Yet Britain, France, and the United States also developed a complex web of relationships with Arab states, reflecting historical, strategic, and economic interests.

1953–69: conflict, confrontation, and compromise

One consequence of the Korean War was the build-up of American forces in Western Europe, as communist aggression in Asia heightened perceptions of the Soviet threat to Europe. The idea that communism was a monolithic political entity controlled from Moscow became an enduring American fixation, not shared in London or elsewhere. Western Europeans nevertheless depended on Washington for military security, and this dependence grew as cold war confrontation in Europe deepened. The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 precipitated the creation of the **Warsaw Pact** in 1955. Military build-up by Washington and Moscow continued apace, creating unprecedented concentrations of conventional and, moreover, nuclear forces. As the Soviets developed the capacity to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, the credibility of 'extended deterrence' was questioned as American willingness to risk 'Chicago for Hamburg' was called into doubt. The problem was exacerbated as NATO strategy continued to depend on American willingness not just to fight, but to initiate, nuclear war on Europe's behalf. By the 1960s, there were some 7,000 nuclear weapons in Western Europe alone. NATO deployed nuclear weapons to offset Soviet

Case Study 3.1 China's cold wars

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The Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong came to power in 1949 after 30 years of civil war (interrupted only by the Japanese invasion of 1937). Mao's theories of socialism and of guerrilla warfare helped inspire revolutionary struggle across the Third World. Ideology framed China's internal development and informed its external relations. Mao's attempts to modernize agriculture and industry brought great change, though often at huge cost to China's people. The Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, resulted in famine (and repression) on an enormous scale. Estimates vary, but suggest some 30 to 42 million people died as a consequence. Subsequent attempts at radical reform during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and Mao's death in 1976 brought political instability and further alienated China from the West.

Relations between Mao and Stalin initially reflected ideological fraternity, but under Khrushchev ideological differences became apparent. Mao was critical of Khrushchev's aim of coexistence with the West. The Soviets ended support for Beijing's atomic programme, but failed to prevent China from exploding an atomic bomb in 1964. The two countries also competed ideologically and politically for leadership of the international socialist movement, particularly in the Third World.

Beijing's earlier involvement in the Korean War brought large-scale fighting between Chinese and American troops. And China's regional and ideological interests clashed with those of the US in Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), and Southeast Asia in the 1960s. East–West détente, and America's search for a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam, however, helped facilitate **rapprochement** between Washington and Beijing.

Western perceptions of a communist monolith were further weakened in 1978 when newly unified Vietnam invaded Kampuchea (Cambodia) and overthrew the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot, who was backed by Beijing. The ideologically driven genocide by the Khmer Rouge killed an estimated 1 to 2 million people. In 1979, communist China launched a punitive attack on communist Vietnam and moved conventional forces to the border with the Soviet Union, Vietnam's ally.

In the 1980s, economic reform under Deng Xiaoping cautiously embraced market principles. Economic reform was to bring economic transformation and global expansion. Yet the cold war legacy of an all-powerful communist party remained. Western-style democratic institutions and human rights failed to follow economic change, and, in contrast to Gorbachev, Deng used force to repress his radical opponents. Whereas reform precipitated the collapse of the USSR, the PRC survived and prospered. China has become a global economic power with the military accoutrements of a 'superpower', and plays an increasingly important role in the UN Security Council and the global politics of the post-cold war world.

Question 1: Which internal developments in the People's Republic of China most influenced its role in the cold war?

Question 2: How successfully did China manage its relations with the US and the USSR after 1949?

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conventional superiority, while Soviet 'theatre nuclear' forces in Europe compensated for overall American nuclear superiority.

The death of Stalin in 1953 portended significant changes for the USSR at home and abroad. Stalin's eventual successor, Nikita Khrushchev, strove to modernize Soviet society, but helped unleash reformist forces in Eastern Europe. Moscow backed away from confrontation with Poland. However, the situation in Hungary threatened Soviet hegemony and, in 1956, the intervention of the Red Army brought bloodshed to the streets of Budapest and international condemnation. Soviet intervention in Hungary coincided with the attack on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel, precipitated by Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal. The British government's actions provoked fierce domestic and international criticism, and the most serious rift in the 'special relationship' between London and Washington. President Dwight D. Eisenhower

strongly opposed his allies' action, and in the face of punitive American economic action the British abandoned the operation (and their support for the French and Israelis). International opprobrium at Soviet action in Budapest was lessened and deflected by what many saw as the final spasm of European imperialism.

Khrushchev's policy towards the West combined a search for political coexistence with continued ideological confrontation. Support for national liberation movements aroused Western fears of a global communist challenge. American commitment to liberal democracy and national self-determination was often subordinated to cold war considerations, as well as to American economic and political interests. The cold war saw the growth of powerful intelligence organizations in both the US and USSR, whose roles ranged from estimating intentions and capabilities of adversaries to secret intervention in the affairs of other states. Crises over Berlin

in 1961 and Cuba in 1962 (**see Case Study 3.2**) marked the most dangerous moments of the cold war. In both, there was risk of direct military confrontation and, certainly in October 1962, the possibility of nuclear war. How close the world came to Armageddon during the Cuban missile crisis, and exactly why peace was preserved, remain matters of debate among historians.

A more stable period of cold war coexistence and competition developed after 1962. Nevertheless, nuclear arsenals continued to grow. Whether this situation is best characterized as an arms race, or whether internal political and bureaucratic pressures drove the increases in nuclear stockpiles, is open to interpretation. For Washington, commitments to NATO allies also provided pressures and opportunities to develop and deploy shorter-range ('tactical' and 'theatre') nuclear weapons. The nuclear dimension of world politics increased with the emergence of other nuclear weapons

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Case Study 3.2 The Cuban missile crisis

Military personnel observing an atomic test
© Everett Historical / Shutterstock.com

In October 1962, the Americans discovered that, contrary to private and public assurances, the Soviets were secretly deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy responded with a naval blockade of the island, and American nuclear forces moved to unprecedented states of alert. The superpowers stood 'eyeball to eyeball', and most historians believe this was the closest we have been to nuclear war. American nuclear war planners calculated that US attacks alone would kill hundreds of millions of people. Scientists later estimated that the result would have been an environmental apocalypse, now known as a 'nuclear winter', which would have caused the virtual extinction of humankind.

The crisis reached its climax on 26–28 October, by when Kennedy and Khrushchev were determined to reach a diplomatic

settlement, involving political concessions. However, subsequent evidence suggests the risk of 'inadvertent nuclear war'—arising from misperceptions, the actions of subordinates, and organizational failures—was much greater than realized by political leaders at the time or by historians later. Luck may have played a frighteningly large part in the survival of humanity.

The diplomatic impasse was resolved six days after the blockade was announced, when Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal of the missiles in return for assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. Kennedy also undertook to ensure the removal of comparable nuclear missiles from Europe. While much of the literature has focused on the Soviet–American confrontation, greater attention has been given to Cuba and the role of its leader, Fidel Castro. As the crisis reached its climax, he cabled Khrushchev, who interpreted his message as advocating pre-emptive nuclear attack on America. Castro's message reinforced Khrushchev's determination to strike a deal with Kennedy, which he did without consulting Havana. Later, Castro said he would have wanted to use the tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviets sent to fight an American invasion.

In the aftermath of the crisis, there was progress towards the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 that banned testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Moreover, the two superpowers recognized that future crises should be avoided, and Moscow made no further attempts to coerce the West over Berlin. Nevertheless, both sides continued to build up their nuclear arsenals.

Question 1: Why did the Soviets and Americans come to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962?

Question 2: What was the role of Cuba in the Cuban missile crisis?

states: Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), and Pakistan (1998). Israel and South Africa also developed nuclear weapons, though the South Africans dismantled them as apartheid ended. Growing concern at the proliferation of nuclear weapons led to negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, wherein states that had nuclear weapons committed themselves to halting the arms race, while those that did not promised not to develop them.

1969–79: the rise and fall of détente

As American military involvement in Vietnam was deepening, Soviet–Chinese relations were deteriorating. Indeed, by 1969 the PRC and the USSR fought a minor border war over a territorial dispute. Despite (or perhaps because of) such tensions, the foundations for what became known as **détente** were laid between Moscow and Washington, and for what became known as **rapprochement** between Beijing and Washington. Détente in Europe originated from the **Ostpolitik** of the German Socialist Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and resulted in agreements that recognized the peculiar status of Berlin and the sovereignty of East Germany. Soviet–American détente had its roots in mutual recognition of the need to avoid nuclear crises, and in the economic and military incentives to avoid an unconstrained arms race.

In the West, détente was associated with the political leadership of President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger (both of whom were also instrumental in Sino-American rapprochement). During this phase in Soviet–American relations, each side pursued political goals, some of which were increasingly incompatible with the aspirations of the other superpower. Both supported friendly regimes and movements, and both subverted adversaries. Détente came as political upheavals were taking place in the Third World (**see Table 3.3**). The question of to what extent the superpowers could control their friends, and to what extent they were entangled by their commitments, was underlined in 1973 when the Arab–Israeli war embroiled Washington and Moscow in a potentially dangerous confrontation. Getting the superpowers involved in the war—whether by design or by serendipity—nevertheless helped to create the political conditions for Egyptian–Israeli rapprochement. Diplomatic and strategic relations were transformed as Egypt switched allegiance from Moscow to Washington. In the short term, Egypt was isolated in the Arab world. For Israel, fear of a war of annihilation fought on two fronts was lifted. Yet continuing political

Table 3.3 Revolutionary upheavals in the Third World, 1974–80

Ethiopia	Overthrow of Haile Selassie	Sept. 1974
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge takes Phnom Penh	April 1975
Vietnam	North Vietnam/'Viet Cong' take Saigon	April 1975
Laos	Pathet Lao takes over state	May 1975
Guinea-Bissau	Independence from Portugal	Sept. 1974
Mozambique	Independence from Portugal	June 1975
Cape Verde	Independence from Portugal	June 1975
São Tomé	Independence from Portugal	June 1975
Angola	Independence from Portugal	Nov. 1975
Afghanistan	Military coup	April 1978
Iran	Ayatollah Khomeini installed in power	Feb. 1979
Grenada	New Jewel Movement takes power	March 1979
Nicaragua	Sandinistas take Managua	July 1979
Zimbabwe	Independence from Britain	April 1980

Source: F. Halliday (1986), *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso): 92.

violence and terrorism, and enduring enmity between Israel and other Arab states, proved insurmountable obstacles to a regional settlement.

Soviet support for revolutionary movements in the Third World reflected Moscow's self-confidence as a superpower and its analysis that the Third World was turning towards communism. Ideological competition with the West and with China ensued. In America this was viewed as evidence of Soviet duplicity. Some claimed that Moscow's support for revolutionary forces in Ethiopia in 1975 killed détente. Others cited the Soviet role in Angola in 1978, where Moscow supplied arms and helped transport Cuban troops to support the Marxists. The perception that Moscow was using arms control to gain military advantage was linked to Soviet behaviour in the Third World. Growing Soviet military superiority was reflected in increasing Soviet influence, it was argued. Critics claimed that the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process failed to prevent the Soviets from deploying multiple independently targetable warheads on large

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), threatening key American forces. The United States faced a 'window of vulnerability', they claimed. The view from Moscow was different, reflecting divergent assumptions about the scope and purpose of détente and the nature of nuclear deterrence. Other events weakened American influence. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 resulted in the loss of an important Western regional ally, although the subsequent revolutionary Islamic government was hostile to both superpowers.

December 1979 marked a point of transition in East–West affairs. NATO agreed to deploy land-based Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe if negotiations with Moscow did not reduce what NATO saw as serious military imbalances. Later that month, Soviet armed forces intervened in Afghanistan to support the USSR's revolutionary allies. Moscow was bitterly condemned in the West and in the Third World, and was soon embroiled in a protracted and bloody struggle that many compared to America's war in Vietnam. In Washington, President Jimmy Carter's view of Moscow changed dramatically. He withdrew the SALT II Treaty from Senate ratification, sought an international boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and announced the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force for use in an area stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, Republicans increasingly used foreign and defence policy to attack the Carter presidency. Perceptions of American weakness permeated US domestic politics, and in 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president, committed to a more confrontational approach with Moscow on arms control, Third World conflicts, and East–West relations in general.

1979–86: 'the second cold war'

In the West, critics of détente and arms control argued that the Soviets were acquiring nuclear superiority.

Some suggested that the United States should pursue strategies based on the idea that victory in nuclear war was possible. Reagan's election in 1980 was a watershed in Soviet–American relations. He inherited the issue of nuclear missiles in Europe, which loomed large in the breakdown of relations between East and West. Changes in the strategic and European nuclear 'balances' had generated new anxieties in the West about the credibility of extended deterrence (**see Table 3.4**). NATO's resulting decision to deploy land-based missiles capable of striking Soviet territory precipitated great tension in relations between NATO and the USSR, and political friction within NATO. Reagan's own incautious public remarks reinforced perceptions that he was ill-informed and dangerous in nuclear matters, although his key arms policies were largely consistent with those of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. However, Reagan was uninterested in agreements that would freeze the status quo for the sake of reaching accord, and Soviet and American negotiators proved unable to make progress in talks on long-range and intermediate-range weapons. One particular idea had significant consequences for arms control and for Washington's relations with both its allies and adversaries. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), quickly dubbed 'Star Wars', was a research programme designed to explore the feasibility of space-based defences against ballistic missiles. The Soviets appeared to take SDI very seriously; they claimed that Reagan's real purpose was to regain the American nuclear monopoly of the 1940s. Reagan himself retained an idiosyncratic attachment to SDI, which he believed could make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. However, the technological advances claimed by SDI proponents did not materialize and the programme was eventually reduced and marginalized.

The ensuing period of superpower confrontation between 1979 and 1986 has been described as the

Table 3.4 Principal nuclear weapons states: number of intact nuclear warheads, 1945–90

	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
USA	6	369	3,057	20,434	31,982	26,662	27,826	24,304	24,327	21,004
USSR	–	5	200	1,605	6,129	11,643	19,055	30,062	39,197	37,000
UK	–	–	10	30	310	280	350	350	300	300
France	–	–	–	–	32	36	188	250	360	505
PRC	–	–	–	–	5	75	185	280	425	430
Total	6	374	3,267	22,069	38,458	38,696	47,604	55,246	64,609	59,239

Source: R. S. Norris and H. Kristensen (2006), 'Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2006', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 62(4) (July/August): 66.

second cold war and compared to the early period of confrontation between 1946 and 1953. In both Western Europe and the USSR there was fear of nuclear war. Much of this was a reaction to the rhetoric and policies of the Reagan administration. American statements on nuclear weapons, and military interventions in Grenada in 1983 and against Libya in 1986, were seen as evidence of a new belligerence. Reagan's policy towards Central America, and support for the rebel Contras in Nicaragua, generated controversy in the United States and internationally. In 1986, the International Court of Justice found the United States guilty of violating international law for the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) covert attacks on Nicaraguan harbours.

The Reagan administration's use of military power was nonetheless limited: rhetoric and perceptions were at variance with political action. Some overseas operations ended in humiliating failure, notably in Lebanon in 1983. Nevertheless, there is evidence that some in the Soviet leadership took seriously the Reagan administration's words (and deeds) and became anxious that Washington might be planning a nuclear first strike. In 1983, Soviet air defences shot down a South Korean civilian airliner in Soviet airspace. The American reaction, and imminent deployment of American nuclear missiles in Europe, created a climate of great tension in East–West relations. Some historians believe that in November 1983 Soviet intelligence may have misinterpreted a NATO training exercise (codenamed 'Able Archer') leading to fear in Moscow that NATO was preparing an attack. How close the world came to a serious nuclear confrontation in 1983 remains a subject of debate (**see Table 3.5**).

Throughout the early 1980s, the Soviets were handicapped by a succession of aging political leaders (Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko), whose ill-health further inhibited Soviet foreign policy. This changed dramatically after Mikhail Gorbachev became premier in 1985. Gorbachev's 'new thinking' in foreign policy, together with domestic reforms, created a revolution in Moscow's foreign relations and within Soviet society. At home, **glasnost** (or openness) and **perestroika** (or restructuring) unleashed nationalist forces that, to Gorbachev's dismay, brought about the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Gorbachev's aim in foreign policy was to transform international relations, most importantly with the United States. His domestic agenda also catalysed change in Eastern Europe, although, unlike Khrushchev, he was not prepared to use force or coercion. When confronted with revolt in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's foreign ministry invoked Frank Sinatra's song 'I Did it My Way' to revoke the **Brezhnev doctrine** that had earlier limited Eastern European sovereignty and political development. The **Sinatra doctrine** meant Eastern Europeans were now allowed to 'do it their way'. Moscow-aligned regimes gave way to democracies, in what was, for the most part, a peaceful as well as speedy transition (**see Ch. 4**). Most dramatically, Germany was united and the East German state (the German Democratic Republic) disappeared.

Gorbachev pursued arms agreements that helped ease tensions that had characterized the early 1980s. In 1987, he travelled to Washington to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles, including Cruise and Pershing II. While this agreement was heralded as a triumph for the Soviet premier, NATO leaders, including Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, argued that it vindicated the policies pursued by NATO since 1979. The INF Treaty was concluded more quickly than a new agreement on cutting strategic nuclear weapons, in part because of continuing Soviet opposition to SDI. Instead, it was Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, who concluded a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement reducing long-range nuclear weapons (though only back to the level they had been in the early 1980s). Gorbachev used agreements on nuclear weapons to build trust and to demonstrate the serious and radical nature of his purpose. However, despite agreements on conventional forces in Europe (culminating in the Paris Agreement of 1990), the end of the cold war marked success in nuclear arms control rather than nuclear disarmament (**see Table 3.6**). The histories of the cold war and nuclear weapons are connected very closely, but while the cold war is over, nuclear weapons are still very much with us.

Table 3.5 Cold war crises

1948–9	Berlin	USSR/US/UK
1954–5	Taiwan straits	US/PRC
1961	Berlin	USSR/US/NATO
1962	Cuba	USSR/US/Cuba
1973	Arab–Israeli war	Egypt/Israel/Syria/Jordan/US/USSR
1983	Exercise 'Able Archer'	USSR/US/NATO

Table 3.6 Principal arms control and disarmament agreements

Treaty	Purpose of agreement	Signed	Parties
Geneva protocol	Banned use of chemical weapons	1925	140
Partial Test Ban Treaty	Banned atmospheric, underwater, outer-space nuclear tests	1963	125+
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Limited spread of nuclear weapons	1968	190+
Biological Weapons Convention	Banned production/use	1972	180+
SALT I Treaty	Limited strategic arms*	1972	US/USSR
ABM Treaty	Limited anti-ballistic missiles	1972	US/USSR
SALT II Treaty	Limited strategic arms*	1979	US/USSR
INF Treaty	Banned two categories of land-based missiles	1987	US/USSR
START 1 Treaty	Reduced strategic arms*	1990	US/USSR
START 2 Treaty	Banned multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)	1993	US/USSR
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	Banned all nuclear tests in all environments	1996	180+

* Strategic arms are long-range weapons.
Source: adapted from Harvard Nuclear Study Group (1985), 'Arms Control and Disarmament: What Can and Can't be Done', in F. Holroyd (ed.), *Thinking About Nuclear Weapons* (Buckingham: Open University): 96.

Key Points

- Disagreements remain about when and why the cold war began, and who was responsible. Distinct phases can be seen in East–West relations, during which tension and the risk of direct confrontation grew and receded.

- Some civil and regional wars were intensified and prolonged by superpower involvement; others may have been prevented or shortened.

- Nuclear weapons were an important factor in the cold war. To what extent their development had a momentum of its own is a matter of debate. Agreements on limiting and controlling the growth of nuclear arsenals played an important role in Soviet–American (and East–West) relations.

- The end of the cold war did not result in the abolition of nuclear weapons.

- Various international crises occurred in which there was risk of nuclear war. How close we came to catastrophe at these times remains open to debate.

Conclusion

The changes that took place in twentieth-century world politics were enormous. Assessing their significance raises many complex issues about the nature of international history and international relations. How did war come about in 1914? What accounts for the rise of Hitler? What were the origins, dynamics, and costs of the cold war? These questions have generated robust debate and fierce controversy. This conclusion emphasizes several points about the relationship between total war, the end of empire, and cold war. However war broke out in 1914, the transformation of warfare into industrialized total war reflected a combination of technological, political, and social forces. Subsequently, political leaders proved incapable of restoring peace and stability; attempts to reconstruct the European

state system after 1919 failed to address enduring problems while creating new obstacles to a stable order. The rise of Nazi Germany brought global conflagration and new methods of fighting and killing. The scale of carnage and suffering was unprecedented. Nazi ideas of racial supremacy resulted in brutality and mass murder across Europe and culminated in genocide against the Jews. One consequence was the creation of Israel, which set in motion conflicts that continue to have global repercussions today. In the 1930s, the rise of an expansionist military regime in Tokyo likewise portended protracted and brutal war across the Pacific.

The period since 1945 witnessed the end of European empires constructed before, and in the early part of, the twentieth century, and saw the rise and fall of the

cold war. The relationship between the end of empire and cold war conflict in the Third World was a close, though complex, one. In some cases, involvement of the superpowers helped bring change. In others, it resulted in escalation and prolongation of conflict. Marxist ideology in various forms provided inspiration to Third World liberation movements, and provocation to the United States (and others). The Vietnam war was the most obvious example of this. Precisely how the cold war affected decolonization is best assessed on a case-by-case basis, but one key issue is the extent to which the objectives of revolutionary leaders and movements were nationalist rather than Marxist. It is claimed that both Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Fidel Castro in Cuba were primarily nationalists, who turned to Moscow and to communism only in response to Western hostility. Divisions between Moscow and Beijing also demonstrated diverging trends in the practice of Marxism. In several instances, conflict between communists became as bitter as that between communists and capitalists. In other areas, notably the Middle East, Marxism faced the challenge of pan-Arabism and revolutionary Islam, which held greater attraction for the peoples involved. Superpower involvement was more complex and diffuse, though in moments of crisis nevertheless significant.

Similarly, the relationship between the cold war and nuclear history is close, though problematic. Some historians contend that the use of atomic weapons played a decisive part in the origins of the cold war. Others see the prospect of annihilation as central to understanding Soviet defence and foreign policy, and the unprecedented threat of devastation as crucial to understanding the mutual hostility and fear of leaders in the nuclear age. Yet it is also argued that without nuclear weapons, direct Soviet–American conflict would have been much more likely, and had nuclear weapons not acted as a deterrent,

war in Europe could have happened. Still others contend that nuclear weapons played a limited role in East–West relations, and that their importance is exaggerated.

Nuclear weapons have, nevertheless, constituted a focus for political agreement, and during détente, arms agreements acted as the currency of international politics. Yet how close we came to nuclear war in 1961 (Berlin), or 1962 (Cuba), or 1973 (Arab–Israeli war), or 1983 (Exercise 'Able Archer'), and what lessons might be learned from these events, are crucial questions for historians and policy-makers alike. One central issue is the extent to which cold war perspectives and the involvement of nuclear-armed superpowers imposed stability in regions where previous instability had led to war and conflict. The cold war may have produced unprecedented concentrations of military and nuclear forces in Europe, but it was also a period characterized by stability and great economic prosperity, certainly in the West.

Both the cold war and the age of empire are over, although across the globe their legacies—good and bad, seen and unseen—persist. The age of 'the bomb', and of other weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological), continues. To what extent the clash of communist and liberal/capitalist ideologies helped to facilitate or to retard globalization is a matter for reflection. Despite the limitations of the human imagination, the global consequences of nuclear war remain all too real. The accident at the Soviet nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in 1986 showed that radioactivity knows no national boundaries. In the 1980s, scientists suggested that the explosion of even a fraction of the world's nuclear weapons over a fraction of the world's cities could end life itself in the northern hemisphere. While the threat of strategic nuclear war has receded, the global problem of nuclear weapons remains a common and urgent concern for humanity in the twenty-first century.

Questions

1. Do you agree that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914?
2. Why do you think the Versailles Treaty failed to solve the problems of European political instability from 1919 to 1939?
3. Do you accept that there were no feasible alternatives to the appeasement of Hitler?
4. Why do you think atomic bombs were dropped on Japan?
5. How would you explain why the United States became involved in the Korean and Vietnam wars?
6. Do you think that American and Soviet objectives during détente were compatible?
7. Do you agree that the British were more successful at decolonization than the French?

8. How would you compare the end of empire in Africa with that in Asia after 1945?
9. What role do you believe nuclear weapons played in world politics between 1945 and 2000?
10. How close do you think we came to nuclear war during the cold war?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Best, A., Hanhimäki, J. M., **Maiolo, J. A., and Schulze, K. E.** (2014), *International History of the Twentieth Century And Beyond* (London: Routledge). A comprehensive and authoritative account of twentieth-century history.

Betts, R. (2004), *Decolonization* (London: Routledge). Provides an introductory theoretical overview that examines the forces that drove decolonization and interpretations of postcolonial legacies.

Brown, C. (2019), *Understanding International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A valuable introduction to how theories of international relations provide interpretation and understanding.

Chamberlain, M. E. (1999), *Decolonization: The Fall of the European Empires* (Oxford: Blackwell). An analysis of the end of British, French, and smaller European empires on a region-by-region basis.

Ferguson, N. (2006), *The War of the World: History's Age of Hatred* (London: Allen Lane). A panoramic view of war and conflict in the twentieth century.

Keylor, W. R. (2012), *The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive and balanced assessment of twentieth-century international history.

Reynolds, D. (2005), *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London: Penguin). A highly authoritative, comprehensive, and nuanced analysis of world politics since 1945.

Young, J., and Kent, J. (2013), *International Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive survey of the impact of the cold war on world politics since 1945, providing analysis of war in the Middle East, the development of European integration, and the demise of the European empires in Africa and Asia.

To find out more about the historical context follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Chapter 4

From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?

MICHAEL COX

Framing Questions

- **Has the international system become more or less stable since the end of the cold war?**
- **Does the rise of other powers signal the decline of the West?**
- **Is globalization under threat?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter provides a broad overview of the international system between the end of the cold war—when many claimed that liberalism and the West had won the long battle against their ideological rivals of the twentieth century, communism and the USSR—through to the second decade of the twenty-first century, when the West itself and the liberal economic order it had hitherto promoted appeared to be coming under increased pressure from political forces at home and new challengers abroad. But before we turn to the present, the chapter will look at some of the key developments since 1989—including the Clinton presidency, the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy following the attacks of 9/11, the 2008 financial crash, the crisis in Europe, the transitions taking place in the Global South, the origins of the upheavals now reshaping the Middle East, the political shift from Barack Obama to Donald Trump, the emergence of Asia, and the rise of China. The chapter then concludes by examining two big questions: first, is power now shifting away from the West, and second, to what extent does the current wave of populism in the West threaten globalization and the liberal order?

Introduction

The modern world system is in many ways a by-product of a cold war that took on the appearance of permanency until it suddenly ended in 1989. But the cold war was itself the outcome of the greatest war ever known in history: the Second World War. Fought on two continents and across three great oceans, the Second World War led to a major reordering of world politics which left Germany and Japan under Allied control, most of Europe and Asia in tatters, former colonies in a state of political turmoil, and two states—the US and the USSR—in positions of enormous strength. Indeed, as early as 1944, analysts such as the American writer W. T. R. Fox were beginning to talk of a new world order dominated by something quite new in international relations: **superpowers**— the United States, the USSR, and, in 1944, the British Empire. With enormous **capabilities** under their control, a reach that was truly global, and allies who were entirely dependent on their protection, it was evident that two of these superpowers at least—the United States and the USSR—would go on to shape a post-war international system quite different in structure from what had existed earlier in the twentieth century.

The causes of the cold war have been much debated. But several factors in the end can be identified, including a deep incompatibility between the social and economic systems of East and West, mutual fears on the part of the USSR and the US concerning the other's intentions, and insecurities generated by an on-going nuclear arms race. Beginning in Europe, the cold war soon spread to what became known as the Third World. Here, the conflict assumed a far more deadly form, with over 25 million people being killed as a result of real wars being fought from Korea to Vietnam, Latin America to southern Africa.

Inevitably, the discipline of International Relations (IR) was influenced by the cold war. Indeed, having also become a largely American discipline after the Second World War, IR was now very much shaped by the theoretical preferences of key US scholars such as Hans J. Morgenthau, whose 1948 textbook *Politics Among Nations* went into seven editions, and a little bit later by Kenneth Waltz, whose 1959 *Man, The State, and War* soon became a classic. Though different in their approaches to world politics, both Morgenthau and Waltz championed the theoretical case for what became the dominant IR paradigm during the cold war: realism. Waltz did something else as well: he provided what many believed was a rationalization for the cold war, in a much-quoted article published in 1964. In this article, he even went so far as to suggest that by reducing the number of major international actors to only two (bipolarity by any other name) the cold war had created its own form of stability (Waltz 1964).

This way of thinking about the cold war may in large part explain the failure of IR academics to seriously contemplate the possibility of it ever coming to an end. Nor was there much reason to think that it could, given the then standard Western view that the USSR was a serious superpower stretching across 11 time zones with enormous human and natural resources (oil and gas most obviously), not to mention formidable military and scientific capabilities. The cold war therefore would go on. But—as we now know—it did not. Economic decline, the cost of the cold war itself, East European discontent with Russian rule, and the reformist policies pursued by the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, finally spelled doom for the Soviet system.

The United States: managing the unipolar 'moment'

The collapse of Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe, followed two years later by the end of the USSR itself, did not just change the way in which millions of people around the world regarded their own political futures. It also led to profound changes in the structure of the international order. Indeed, with the passing of the USSR, scholars of International Relations began to talk of a rapid transition from a world in which there had been two balancing powers—a bipolar system— to another in which there was no balance at all—a **unipolar** system in which the United States would now shape international politics almost completely.

This new global conjuncture raised a series of important questions. One, of course, was how stable would the new international order be? Another was how long could US primacy last? And yet a third was what kind of foreign policy would the United States pursue now that it no longer had a single enemy to fight?

In the end, these particular questions were not answered on the pages of foreign policy journals so much

as by the election of President William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton in 1992. Helped into office by an electorate that was now more focused on domestic matters rather than international affairs—and sensing that the American people were seeking a new foreign policy approach—he concentrated mainly on economic issues, linking prosperity at home with the US's ability to compete abroad. This did not preclude the US having to address other more traditional threats, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. But having won the cold war, not only were the American people deeply reluctant to intervene abroad, there seemed to be no pressing reason for the US to get sucked into conflicts overseas either.

Yet, as Clinton conceded, the US could neither escape from the world nor retreat from it. There may have been little appetite for military intervention, especially following the 1993 debacle in Somalia, but the US was hardly inactive. It did after all impose its own military 'solution' on the Serbs in the unfolding war in former Yugoslavia. Clinton then pushed hard for the enlargement of NATO. And he was anything but hesitant when it came to trying to resolve some fairly intractable

regional conflicts, including in Northern Ireland. It was very easy for more conservative critics at the time to argue that the US had no 'grand strategy'. But this was less than fair or accurate. It may have had no single enemy to fight, but it could hardly be accused of having no foreign policy at all. Moreover, if Clinton displayed caution when it came to employing American military power overseas, this seemed to correspond to the wishes of most Americans during the 1990s. It also allowed the United States to focus on the one thing it seemed to do best: unleashing the power of the market at home while spreading American liberal values abroad.

Key Points

- The end of the cold war increased the US's weight in the international system.
- Under President Clinton there was a great focus on economic issues as a central part of US foreign policy.
- President Clinton was attacked by his conservative critics for having no 'grand strategy'.

After the USSR: Yeltsin to Putin

Scholars of International Relations have long been deeply interested in the interplay between the great powers and the reasons why even the most powerful have in the end disappeared from the stage of history—something that happened to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after the First World War, then to the European colonial empires after the Second World War, and finally to the Soviet empire itself between 1989 and 1991. But history also demonstrates that when empires fall this is not always followed by stability and prosperity. So it was in the past; so it turned out to be following the collapse of Soviet communism. Many challenges faced the new Russia.

First there was the issue of what to do with the USSR's nuclear arsenal, and how to either prevent weapons leaving the former USSR or ensure that control of them remained in Russian hands. Second, there was an equally serious problem posed by the break-up of the USSR. Not only did 25 million Russians now find themselves living outside of Russia proper, but the other nations of the former USSR also had to work out some kind of relationship with a Russia which found it almost impossible to think of its relationship with such states as Ukraine and Georgia in anything other than imperial terms. Finally, there was the even more basic problem of making the transition

from a centralized, planned economy, designed to guarantee full employment, to a competitive market economy where many of the old industries that had been the bedrock of the USSR (including its huge military-industrial complex) were evidently no longer fit for purpose. Clearly some very tough times lay ahead, made tougher still by the extraordinarily painful market reforms that Russia adopted from 1992 onwards. Indeed, as a result of its speedy adoption of Western-style privatization, Russia experienced something close to a 1930s-style depression, with industrial production plummeting, living standards falling, and whole regions once devoted to cold war military production going into free fall. Nor did the economic situation show much sign of improvement as time went on. Indeed, in 1998 Russia experienced its own financial crisis, one that wiped out the savings of ordinary people and made the new post-communist regime under Boris Yeltsin even less popular than it had been a few years earlier. Not surprisingly, a year later he decided to resign.

It was not at first clear that Yeltsin's successor would behave any differently. Indeed, it was no less a person than Yeltsin himself who chose Vladimir Putin as his anointed successor in 1999. Nor, it seems, did the new oligarchs voice any degree of opposition to Putin's elevation. In fact,

there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that they were perfectly happy with his accession to power. Already immensely wealthy himself, Putin only demanded one thing from the new Russian super-rich: acquiescence. Those who were prepared to go along with this did very well. Those who did not found themselves either in prison (such was the fate of the richest Russian of all, Mikhail Khodorkovsky) or in exile (which in the end is what happened to the hugely powerful Boris Berezovsky).

A product of the KGB (the Soviet security agency) and a central figure in the creation of its successor organization in the shape of the FSB, Putin seemed to have few, if any, original ideas of his own. However, he did understand power in the purest sense. Ruthless even by Russian standards, he brooked no opposition. But his wider task, as he saw it, was not just to impose his will on others but to restore Russian prestige after what he saw as its precipitous decline during the 1990s. Putin never hid his ambitions. Nor did he lack for a coherent narrative. The disintegration of the USSR, he repeated, had been a tragedy, and even though it would not be possible to put the old empire back together again there would be no

further concessions. This might not take Russia back to anything like the Soviet era. But Russia, he insisted, had to assert itself more forcefully—most obviously against those in the West who thought they could take Russia for granted. Nor should the newly wealthy simply be serving their own needs. They should also be asking what they could do for Russia. This would not lead (and did not lead) to a restoration of the old-style communist economic system. However, it did mean the newly privatized Russian economy was placed under much greater control by the Russian state. Putin even redefined the notion of democracy and gave it what many saw as a distinctly Russian or 'sovereign' character, in which the outward form of democracy remained intact while its inner content, in terms of an independent parliament and equal access to free media, was gradually hollowed out.

This shift in outlook produced some confusion in the West. At first the Americans and the Europeans turned something of a blind eye to these developments on the realist assumption that it was important to work closely with Russia: partly for economic reasons—Russia was a major supplier of oil and gas to Europe; partly

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Case Study 4.1   Russia and the West: a new cold war?

Ukrainians protesting against Russian intervention
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It has become increasingly fashionable among commentators to define the Russian relationship with the West as being like a 'new' cold war. Perhaps the first to use the term was Edward Lucas in his 2008 bestseller, *The New Cold War*. Russian military intervention in Georgia, he believes, signalled the beginning of a new and dangerous period in the relationship. Subsequent developments have only seemed to confirm this early assessment. The murders of investigative journalists in Russia itself, targeted assassination outside Russia, its meddling in the internal affairs of the Baltic republics, Russia's use of cyberwar, its various disinformation campaigns designed to undermine the West, and finally its interventions in Ukraine after

2013 all point to a profound crisis in relations—a new cold war in effect. Lucas also blames the West, not so much for having caused the conflict—Russia, he insists, is the guilty party—but rather for having failed to recognize the threat and confront it in its early stages. Preoccupied as the West once was with building a partnership with Russia, it didn't see the writing on the wall until it was too late.

Critics of the term 'new' cold war do not so much dispute the facts—though some would blame the West as much as Russia for having precipitated the crisis. Rather they question the use of the term itself. They make four specific arguments. First, the cold war coincided with the existence of the old communist superpower, the USSR, and as the USSR no longer exists the term 'cold war' is not a suitable term to define the crisis in Russia's relations with the West today. Second, the cold war was basically an ideological clash between opposing socio-economic systems—one communist and the other capitalist—whereas the current clash has little or nothing to do with ideology. It is just a pure power struggle. Third, the cold war kept the two sides apart. The new contest, on the other hand, seems to recognize no such boundaries, and as such might be much more dangerous. Finally, critics of the idea of a new cold war argue that one must beware of using terms drawn from history like 'cold war' which do more to obscure contemporary reality than illuminate it (M. Cox 2011).

Question 1: Is the term 'new cold war' useful or misleading?

Question 2: Is the West or Russia most to blame for growing tensions between Russia and the West?

because Putin appeared to be popular among ordinary Russians; and partly because Russia was a permanent member of the UN Security Council and remained a nuclear weapons state. However, the cumulative impact of Putin's policies could not but complicate Russia's relations with the West. Some even began talking—very loosely—of a 'new' cold war between Russia and the West (**see Case Study 4.1**). Whether or not it had become one remains open to question. Yet whatever one called it, one thing was becoming increasingly obvious: the relationship was fast becoming increasingly bitter and fractious. Russia blamed the West; the West, Russia. But it was clear that in spite of efforts on the US side to 'reset' the relationship, one event after another was pushing things towards a breaking point.

The situation deteriorated noticeably following Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008. Justifying this on the grounds that the West was trying to foment liberal change in its own 'backyard', Russian rhetoric against Western policies then began to intensify. Its use of the veto against the West in the UN became more frequent. It then decided it would use all means necessary to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in Syria. Then, and most seriously, in 2013–14 came the crisis in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea. Evidence also began to emerge that Russia was not only trying to destabilize Ukraine but the West too by backing the Trump presidential candidacy in 2016 while giving ideological and possibly financial support to parties and persons in Europe hostile to the European Union. A political corner seemed to have been turned. The relationship had reached what some regarded as a point of no return.

> **Key Points**
>
> - The break-up of the USSR inevitably unleashed problems which proved difficult to solve.
> - Economic reforms in the 1990s created a new class of super-rich Russians but exacerbated Russia's overall economic decline.
> - Vladimir Putin has attempted to reverse what he saw as Russia's decline in the 1990s.
> - The relationship between the West and Russia has deteriorated drastically, particularly since Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Europe: rise and decline?

Though Americans may have claimed that it was the US that 'won' the cold war, it was in fact Europe and in particular Germany that were the most immediate beneficiaries. First, a continent and a country that had once been divided were now united. Second, the states of Eastern Europe achieved one of the most important of international rights: the right of self-determination. Finally, the threat of serious war with potentially devastating consequences for Europe as a whole was eliminated. Naturally, the move from one order to another did not happen without conflict, as events in former Yugoslavia (1990–9) revealed only too tragically. Even so, the new united Europe, with its open borders and democratic institutions, clearly had much to look forward to.

But what kind of Europe would it be? Here there was much room for debate, with some, especially the French, believing that Europe should now develop its own specific European security arrangements independent of the United States—the old Gaullist dream. Others, meanwhile, believed Europe should remain closely tied to the US—a view most forcefully expressed by both the new elites of Central Europe themselves, not to mention the other, more established members of the NATO alliance. Europeans could not agree either about what kind of Europe they preferred. There were those, of course, who sought an ever deeper union that would fulfil their dream of building a United States of Europe, one that among other things would be able to play a major independent role in international politics. There were others who feared such a development. Europe, they asserted, should be a Europe composed of its very different nation-states, a Europe that recognized national difference and did not try to undermine the principle of sovereignty. Finally, Europeans divided over economics, with a clear line being drawn between *dirigistes*, who favoured greater state involvement in the management of a specifically European social model, and free marketeers—led by the British—who argued that under conditions of global competition such a protected system was simply not sustainable and that thoroughgoing economic reform was essential.

While many in 'old' Europe debated Europe's future, policy-makers themselves were confronted with the more concrete issue of how to bring the 'East' back into the 'West', a process that went under the general heading of 'enlargement'. In terms of policy outcomes,

the strategy scored some notable successes. Indeed, by 2007 the European Union had grown to 27 members (and NATO to 26). In the process, the two bodies also changed their club-like character, much to the consternation of some older members, who found the new entrants to be as much trouble as asset. In fact, according to critics, enlargement had proceeded so rapidly that the essential core meaning of both organizations had been lost. The EU in particular, some now argued, had been so keen to enlarge that it had lost the will to integrate. Still, it was difficult not to be impressed by the capacity of institutions that had helped shape part of Europe during the cold war being employed now in quite new roles to help manage the relatively successful (though never easy) transition from one kind of European order to another. For those realists who had earlier disparaged the part that institutions might play in preventing anarchy in Europe, the important roles played by the EU and NATO seemed to prove that institutions were essential.

But even if the EU proved to be more resilient than some of its critics argued at the time, its role outside the European area remained unclear. Europeans may have wished for a stronger Europe; however, there was marked reluctance to hand over serious security powers to Brussels. Nor did Europeans seem especially keen on boosting their collective strength by investing more in hard power. Indeed, only the UK and France maintained anything like a serious military capability, meaning that when 'Europe' did feel compelled to act militarily—as it did in Libya in 2011 and then a year later in Mali—it was not 'Europe' as a collective actor that intervened, but one or both of these two countries, with US support.

Nonetheless, Europe still retained what American political scientist Joseph Nye has defined as significant 'soft power' assets. By the turn of the century it had also become a formidable economic actor, with a market

capacity larger even than that of the United States. Not only that: it continued to be the US's most favoured economic partner.

Still, not all the news was positive, and as one century gave way to another, Europe slipped from being the 'poster child' of international politics (some writers even talked of the EU becoming a model for the twenty-first century) to looking like the sick man of the West. Indeed, with the onset of the so-called 'euro crisis' followed by economic turmoil in Greece, and then—quite unexpectedly—the decision by the British people in 2016 to leave the EU, the whole project looked to be under serious stress. Some, in fact (including financier George Soros), even predicted the EU's demise, while others talked increasingly gloomily about an 'existential' threat facing Europe. And to add to its woes, the EU did not seem to have a ready solution to perhaps the biggest modern challenge of all: how to deal with the free movement of peoples both within and from outside Europe itself. Optimists could of course claim (and did) that in spite of all this, the EU would muddle through; some even insisted that the EU would emerge stronger than ever precisely because of these various challenges. But as one critical event followed another, it was difficult to believe that the European Union would or could emerge unscathed. Difficult and troubling times lay ahead.

> ### Key Points
>
> - In spite of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Europe benefited from the end of the cold war.
> - Europe may not possess much collective military power, but it does retain important soft power.
> - Europe also remains a major economic actor in the world.
> - Many believe that the crisis in modern Europe is the most serious it has faced since 1945.

A new Asian century?

Perhaps nowhere in the modern world does history, with its memories and myths, exercise a greater influence than in Asia. First subjected to European power during the nineteenth century, and then to the even worse depredations of Japan before 1945, it was hardly surprising that Asia became one of the most unsettled parts of the world after the Second World War. Indeed, while Europe was acquiring some degree of stability after 1945, Asia experienced at least two devastating wars in Korea and Vietnam, several revolutionary insurgencies, a genocidal revolution

in Cambodia, a short and bloody war between Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam a year later. If the cold war remained 'cold' elsewhere, this could hardly be said of Asia before 1989.

The contrast between postcolonial Asia and post-Second World War Europe could not have been more pronounced. Indeed, scholars of International Relations have been much taken with the comparison, pointing out that whereas Western Europe after 1945 managed to form a new liberal security community in which

nationalism and 'ancient hatreds' came to play much less of a role over time, Asia remained a complex tapestry of often warring and suspicious states, whose hatreds ran deep and where nationalism played a central part in defining identity. Nor did the end of the cold war lead to the same results in Asia as in Europe. In Europe, 1989 concluded with free elections, the resolution of territorial issues, a move to the market, the unification of one country, and the disintegration of another (Yugoslavia). In Asia, 1989 concluded with powerful communist parties remaining in power in at least three countries (North Korea, Vietnam, and China), several territorial disputes remaining unresolved, Korea remaining divided, and memories from the past—in particular Japanese aggression before 1945—still souring relations in the region. This is not to say that Asia was not impacted by the end of the cold war at all: clearly it was. However, the consequences were not always liberal. Indeed, in China they were anything but. Having witnessed what was unfolding in the former USSR under the reformist leadership of Gorbachev, the Chinese communist leadership decided to do the opposite, namely abandon political reform and impose even tighter control from the centre. North Korea, too, drew its own lessons. In fact, after having seen what had happened to another communist state which had once looked so stable—East Germany— it now did everything it could to ensure that it did not suffer the same fate, including using 'nuclear blackmail' against its various neighbours as a crude but most effective way of ensuring the regime's survival.

Because of the very different ways the end of the cold war played itself out in Asia, many writers (including one very influential American scholar, Aaron Friedberg) argued that far from being primed for a liberal peace, Asia in general, and East Asia in particular, was ripe for new rivalries. Indeed, according to Friedberg, Europe's very bloody past between 1914 and 1945 could easily turn into Asia's future. This was not a view shared by every commentator, however. In fact, as events unfolded, this uncompromisingly tough-minded realist perspective came under sustained criticism. This did not deny the possibility of future disturbances. Indeed, how could one argue otherwise given the bitter legacy of history, Japan's ambiguous relationship with its own bloody past, North Korea's nuclear programme, and China's claim to Taiwan? But there were still several reasons to think that the future might not be quite so bleak as Friedberg predicted.

The first and most important reason was the great material advances achieved in the region since the late 1990s. The sources of this have been much debated, with some suggesting that the underlying reason for economic success was a strong entrepreneurial spirit wedded to a powerful set of cultural (Asian) values, and others that it was the by-product of the application of a non-liberal model of development employing the strong state to drive through rapid economic development from above. Some believed that the active part played by the US in Asia was critical too: by helping to manage Japan's re-entry into the international community during the post-war years, opening up its huge market to Asian exports, and providing many countries in the region with security on the cheap, the US played that famous indispensable role. Even the former colonizing countries, now organized through the European Union, were significant actors in the Asian economic success story, buying Asian goods and investing heavily into the region.

Finally, though Asia is not institutionally rich and lacks bodies such as NATO or the European Union, it has over time been able to build an important array of bodies that do provide some form of collective voice and identity. Potentially the most important of these has been ASEAN (**see Ch. 23**). Formed during the midst of a very unstable part of the cold war in 1967 to enable dialogue to take place between five Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand), ASEAN has over time evolved to include five more states: communist Vietnam, war-torn Cambodia, oil-rich Brunei, the once military-led Myanmar, and the tiny republic of Laos. ASEAN is, of course, a much looser institution than the EU, and its underlying principle remains the very traditional one of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Yet over time its fields of interest have widened considerably, making it today much less than a union but more than just the talking-shop it used to be.

In the end, though, the key to Asia's current prosperity and future stability is what happens to its new economic powerhouse—China. Much has now been written about China's rise and the impact this has had on the world in general, and Asia more particularly. But until recently China's rise did not seem to be a cause of much concern. A number of Chinese writers even fashioned their own particular theory, known as the 'peaceful rise'. This made it abundantly clear that China was not like Germany or Japan in the inter-war period, and that it was more than happy to rise within the system rather than outside it. Nor did China seek confrontation with the United States. Indeed, according to the same analysts, the US should be seen as more partner than enemy. And even if some had their doubts about

US intentions, China, they advised, should always keep its head down and not arouse American anger.

Developments in the South China Sea where China is now trying to claim control—not to mention China's less accommodating foreign policy stance since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013—have cast serious doubts on all this, confirming what some realist IR scholars had been saying all along: that when new powers rise and emerge onto the international stage they are bound to act in a more assertive fashion. This prediction now appears to have been borne out by recent events, and certainly many Asian countries have responded accordingly by doing what they have always done in the past: calling on the United States to balance the power of the local hegemon. The United States in turn has responded, first in a relatively benign way under Obama by saying it would 'pivot' to Asia in order to reassure regional allies, and then, following the election of Donald Trump in 2016, by declaring that China was now a revisionist power which, along with its ally Russia, was seeking to 'erode American security and prosperity' in the Asia-Pacific. The impact of all this on the region has been striking. Caught between two great powers—one (China) growing in economic importance and the other (the United States) on whom they have always depended for their security—many Asian countries now feel themselves to be between a 'rock and a hard place'. The region may not be at some '1914 moment' as some declared 100 years after the First World War. But there is no denying that the region is beginning to feel increasingly uncertain about the future. China's belief that it has every right to shape the politics of Asia (without US interference), its growing military strength, its economic leverage, and its talk of building a new 'Silk Road' embracing the whole of the region, have inevitably had a big impact across the Asian region. Asia, it would seem, is living in what some in China have termed 'interesting times', and is likely to be doing so going forward (**see Opposing Opinions 4.1**).

Opposing Opinions 4.1   The twenty-first century will be Asian

For

The GDP of Asia taken together is rising fast. By the middle of the twenty-first century, it will be bigger than that of the US and the EU combined. At least three of the economies expected to be among the largest in the world by 2050—China, India, and Japan—are located in Asia.

The Western-led international order is on the decline. New economic realities will force the West to give up its monopoly of global power. In the future, Western countries will no longer be able to run all the major international institutions, such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF. China's creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a multilateral development bank, is just a sign of things to come.

China has already begun to take a more assertive role in global affairs. In a 2017 speech, President Xi Jinping announced the start of a 'new era … that sees China moving closer to center stage' (Xi 2017). China's eagerness to take a leadership role on global issues such as climate change demonstrates its belief that its economic power entitles it to international influence over a range of important issues.

Against

Asia still abides by the West's economic norms and rules. Asia's economic rise has largely been dependent on adopting Western economic norms, exporting to Western markets, and playing by the West's economic rules. There is no Asian model.

The transatlantic region remains central in global security, economy, and education. The EU and the US taken together still account for nearly 50 per cent of world GDP and more than 75 per cent of world foreign direct investment. The US dollar also remains the most important currency in the world and its economy the most innovative; and nearly 90 per cent of the world's top universities are located in the EU and the US, while only two are to be found in 'mainland' China.

Asia is composed of countries which have a strong sense of their own identity, but little common identity. Asia thus has few regional institutions of its own. It is more divided than united by history, while culturally and linguistically there is nothing holding the region together. There is no Asian 'order'.

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1. Does Asia's economic rise pose a challenge to the West?

2. Is the United States an Asian power?

3. Does China pose an opportunity or a threat to other Asian powers?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Key Points

- The cold war in Asia was in fact very 'hot'—marked by revolutions, wars, and insurgencies.

- Asia has experienced relative peace and great prosperity since the end of the cold war.

- Asia is one of the most dynamic economic regions of the world.

- China's ascent—especially clear since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013—has increased regional tensions.

A new Global South

The economic success of Asia poses a much larger question about the fate of the less developed countries in general during the post-cold war era. As noted earlier, the cold war had a massive impact on the Third World in the same way that political struggles in the Third World had an enormous impact on the cold war. Liberation movements were of course animated by different ideas and employed quite different strategies to achieve their many goals. But they were all united by some common aims: emancipation from their former colonial masters, rapid economic development, and the speedy creation of societies where poverty, hunger, and illiteracy would become but distant memories.

These high ideals expressed by new elites, buoyed up by the enthusiasm of the poor and the dispossessed—the 'wretched of the earth', as Frantz Fanon called them—helped carry the newly independent countries through some very difficult times. But many of the high hopes expressed by such leaders as Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in the end foundered, though for different reasons. Some of the new rulers succumbed to the temptation of power and high office. In other countries, the rhetoric of liberation was soon overtaken by the reality of strife and civil war. Quite a few of the original elites were also overthrown by various rivals only too keen to share in the spoils of office. And in many more countries, the military—the so-called 'men on horseback'—simply seized power and replaced civilian leaders with their own people. Nor did the new economies prove to be especially productive: on the contrary, the majority turned out to be extraordinarily inefficient. Meanwhile, many less developed countries ran up enormous debts that rendered them vulnerable to renewed Western economic pressure. Finally, with the end of the cold war came the collapse of the idea that some form of state-led development offered a better way forward than the market.

The collapse of the 'Third World' as a political project left behind a complex legacy, from on-going civil wars on some continents (most notably in sub-Saharan Africa) to the opportunity in others of rejoining the world economic order. Certainly, with the USSR no longer playing an active political role, the way now seemed open for major change. However, the consequences often proved to be deeply problematic. Indeed, some states that had been propped up by one or other of the two superpowers during the cold war simply collapsed into complete chaos, a fate that awaited Somalia and the Congo. Nor did economic reform always deliver on its promise. In fact, in many countries the implementation of Western-style structural reform often led to greater inequality, a decline in public services, and the exponential growth of ever more rampant forms of corruption as more and more money began to flood into the newly emerging economies.

Economic reform and the rapid reintegration of the 'Third World' back into the world economy thus had profound consequences, both for the countries themselves and for the wider international system. To many, of course, the adoption of market reforms in places as far apart as Brazil and India could have only positive results. But wealth-creating reforms did not always lead to the alleviation of economic distress. A new middle class may have been in the making, but this did not lead to a redistribution of wealth across the board. On the contrary, as the less developed countries 'developed' they still could not rid themselves of some fundamental problems associated with poverty, including widespread disease, malnutrition, and the deaths of young children. Furthermore, as the threat of climate change intensified, its effects were felt far more acutely in poor countries than in the rich ones. A new world economic order may have been in the making, but that did not mean that the basic needs of millions of people were being met. Nor did it mean that many economies in the South had achieved balanced growth. When commodity prices began to fall after 2014, many then found themselves in very deep trouble indeed. From

Venezuela and Brazil in South America, to Nigeria and Angola in Africa, the story became uniformly depressing. The good times were over.

In these less than propitious circumstances, it was hardly surprising that millions of ordinary people in the South expressed their frustration not by taking up arms (as they might have done during the cold war), but rather by doing what poor peoples have always done: migrate in increasingly large numbers. The new **Global South**, as it became popularly known, thus had at least one obvious thing in common with the old Third World: millions of its people without much to look forward to did what people had done through the ages: they moved to those parts of the world—the more prosperous North in effect—where there was at least

the chance of a better life. The Third World as a political project might have passed, but many of the problems facing the majority of humanity remained much the same.

> ### Key Points
>
> - The Third World was a political project that aimed to create 'real' independence from the West.
> - The end of the cold war effectively saw the end of the Third World as a project.
> - The less developed countries continue to be burdened by debt and poverty.
> - In the new Global South, resentments against the more powerful West remain.

From 9/11 to the Arab Spring

Whether or not there was, or is, a connection between the unequal distribution of wealth and power in the world and terrorism remains an open question. What is not in doubt is the impact that the September 2001 attack on the United States had on international politics. Indeed, if the end of the cold war marked one of the great turning points in modern international relations, then 9/11 marked another. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were no doubt motivated by far more than a desire for social justice and a distaste for globalization. As bin Laden's many would-be analysts have pointed out, his vision pointed back to a golden age of Islam rather than forward to something modern. That said, his chosen method of attacking the US using four planes, his use of video to communicate with followers, his employment of the global financial system to fund operations, and his primary goal of driving the US out of the Middle East could hardly be described as medieval. US policy-makers certainly did not regard him as some odd throwback to earlier times. Indeed, the fact that he threatened to use the most modern and dangerous weapons—**weapons of mass destruction**—to achieve his objectives made him a very modern threat, but one that could not be dealt with by the kind of traditional means developed during the cold war. As the Bush administration constantly reiterated, this new danger meant that old methods, such as containment and deterrence, were no longer relevant. If this was the beginning of a 'new cold war', as some argued at the time, then it was one unlikely to be fought using policies and methods learned between 1947 and 1989.

The way in which the Bush administration responded to international terrorism proved to be highly controversial, and, in the end, counter-productive too. In fact, turning the quite legitimate war of self-defence against the Taliban in Afghanistan into a war of choice to rid the Middle East of Saddam Hussein in Iraq turned out to be one of the greatest strategic errors of the age. Not only did it make the United States look like a rogue state bent on imperial aggrandizement: it also destabilized the Middle East as a region—as many realist critics predicted it might. But even the most trenchant of critics could not have imagined how disastrous the wider Bush response to the 9/11 attacks would turn out to be, leaving as it did Iran as the dominant power in the region and jihadi terrorism more entrenched than ever. Little wonder that bin Laden later confessed that George W. Bush had been a godsend to his cause.

This in turn raises an important question: why did the Bush administration decide to go to war to liberate Iraq? Many have, or had, a simple answer: the US' dependency on oil and its desire to maintain access to oil in Iraq. Others in turn laid the responsibility at the door of the Israel lobby in Washington; a few even saw it as part of a wider imperial strategy whose purpose was to restore US credibility worldwide after the Clinton years; and a not insignificant number argued that Iraq was a legacy problem—a leftover from the 1991 Gulf War when the US had gone to war against Iraq under George H. W. Bush but had not removed Saddam Hussein. Whatever the motive—including the official Western one of eliminating Saddam's (non-existent)

cache of weapons of mass destruction—the war ultimately failed to achieve its longer-term objective of creating a stable and functioning democracy in Iraq.

Within a few years of the 2003 Iraq invasion, in a region already burdened by the intractable Arab–Israeli conflict, another unpredicted event in world affairs took place: the peoples in many Middle Eastern countries began to throw off their autocratic rulers without much urging from the West. As the revolt unfolded it assumed an ever more bloody and dangerous form, first in Libya where a NATO-led intervention created a vacuum into which dangerously destabilizing forces then moved. Egypt too went through a series of mass convulsions. Meanwhile, the situation in Syria moved from bad to worse to deeply tragic, and by 2018 over half the country's population had been displaced, approximately 3 million Syrians had become refugees, and at least 400,000–500,000 had been killed. To make matters worse, a new and more deadly form of terrorism began to make its presence felt in Syria and Iraq in

the shape of the so-called Islamic State. Nor did outside interventions help, with the West dithering between seeking the overthrow of Assad and wishing to destroy so-called Islamic State, and others—from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states through to Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah—seeking influence in Syria by supporting different parties to the conflict. It is little wonder that the conflict turned out to be so intractable, its costs so high, and its consequences for the region and indeed for Europe so significant.

> ### Key Points
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> - The 9/11 attacks transformed US foreign policy.
> - It is now agreed that the US failed in Iraq.
> - The Arab Spring has led to instabilities that now threaten the Middle East and the West.
> - The Syrian crisis has so far turned out be costly and almost impossible to resolve.

From Obama to Trump

If 9/11 marked one turning point in the international relations of the early twenty-first century, then so too in its own very different way did the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Obama's election was regarded at the time as a massively significant event. It would never have happened, however, but for two simple facts: the fallout from an increasingly unwinnable and unpopular war in Iraq (for which Obama himself did not vote) and the greatest economic crisis facing the US since the 1930s. The two were closely connected, but it was the economic crisis above all that propelled Obama to power. Indeed, when faced with an economic meltdown that could easily have led to the collapse of the US economy, and possibly a worldwide depression too, Americans in large majority transferred their support away from one president—George W. Bush—who had hitherto seen 'government' as being the problem, to another who accepted that if the US were to avoid another great depression it would have to adopt a set of radical policies that did not shy away from using the state to save the market from itself.

If Obama's first challenge was to put the US back on the road to economic recovery, his second was to restore US standing abroad. Meantime, he hoped (against hope perhaps) that he would be able to shift the focus of American foreign policy away from the political

quicksands of the Middle East to the economically enticing and dynamic region of Asia. But on one thing he seemed to be clear: the US had to start acting with much more caution in those parts of the world that did not welcome its presence. This, however, did not mean that Obama was not prepared to use US military power. It was, after all, on his 'watch' that bin Laden was finally hunted down and killed. And Obama also ordered the use of an increasing number of drones over Pakistan to kill Taliban leaders. Obama may have been cautious, but he was no pacifist.

But perhaps Obama's main contribution to foreign policy was less in terms of specific actions taken and more in relation to rethinking the US's position in the wider world. If Bush had a theory of the world, it was based on the then uncontested view that the world was unipolar and would likely remain so for many years to come. Hence the US could act with a high degree of impunity. Obama's analysis was altogether different. Drawing heavily from a series of influential new studies which accepted that the US was moving into what Fareed Zakaria called a 'post-American' world, Obama and his foreign policy team concluded that if the US wished to retain its leadership in this fast-changing environment it had to devise more flexible policies. Economic power was moving eastwards and

southwards, he felt. A BRIC world of sorts was emerging (**see Ch. 5**). Other economic actors were moving up, if not to replace the still formidable West (Obama was no declinist) then at least to play a bigger role in world affairs. All this left the US with two choices: either to resist these changes and find itself as a result on the wrong side of history, or to manage and lead them and in this way guarantee the US's continued leadership in international affairs.

If Obama's approach to world affairs was balanced and pragmatic, the same could hardly be said of his successor, Donald Trump. Elected on a platform which attacked globalization as un-American—the first US president ever to do so—while boasting that he would 'Make America Great Again', Trump the outsider startled and unsettled the world in ways that no previous American leader had ever done before (**see Case Study 4.2**). Hostile to nearly everything Obama had done during his two terms, Trump set about attacking what had hitherto been considered mainstream foreign policy positions. Thus, climate change, he opined, was a myth. NATO was 'obsolete'. 'Brexit' was a good thing. And Putin

might be somebody with whom the US could do business. On the other hand, signing a nuclear deal with the arch-enemy Iran was dangerous nonsense, and being even mildly critical of Israel was a betrayal of an old and trusted ally in the Middle East. More generally, Trump let it be known that he would not be seeking to reform or change authoritarian systems, so long as those authoritarian countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, stayed loyal to the United States.

Trump's nationalist rhetoric and disregard for more traditional ways of 'doing foreign policy' certainly won him few friends among sections of the liberal establishment at home or democratic friends in Europe. Yet halfway through his first term in office, the US economy continued to boom while his approval ratings among his own domestic supporters remained relatively steady—in spite of his Republican Party losing control of the House of Representatives in the Congressional midterms of November 2018. Many no doubt hoped that the whole Trump project would implode and that he would simply be a one-term 'wonder'. Then the US could return to 'normal'. Others, though, were less

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Case Study 4.2   Populism, globalization, and the end of the liberal order?

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Perhaps the most significant development in world politics since the 2008 financial crisis has been the rapid rise of a new form of nationalist or populist politics, which many fear is leading to increased tensions among states across the world and even threatening the global economy and globalization itself. The impact thus far of this new brand of politics, which identifies distant metropolitan elites as the problem, immigrants and refugees as a threat, and globalization as a challenge to economic security, has been immense. If nothing else, it made the election of Trump a reality and has upended 'normal' politics in the European Union. Some insist that this 'revolt' is primarily driven by rising inequality and stagnant wages, all linked to globalization and the

opening up of the world economy. Others view the new populist wave as expressing a legitimate fear among ordinary citizens of losing control of borders put there to protect their country from outsiders. The fact that 'Brexiteers' in the UK and Trump in the US played up nativist fears by suggesting both countries were being 'swamped' by unwanted foreigners tells us much about one of the key factors spurring the growth of populist movements in the West.

This new phenomenon inevitably raises big questions for students of world politics and those concerned about the future of globalization. The world economy has not yet deglobalized, as some predicted it might after the 2008 'crash'. On the other hand, growing trade tensions between China and the US, and increased opposition in Europe to the free movement of people, point to a world in which the current order is likely to come under increasing scrutiny from disaffected groups, who feel they have gained little and lost much in the headlong rush towards globalization. A new world dis-order appears to be beckoning.

Question 1: Why does populism seem to be appearing much more in the advanced Western countries than in successful emerging economies like India and China, where globalization has been embraced by new rising elites?

Question 2: Has populism become a permanent feature of the political landscape, and, if so, what will be the likely effect on international affairs if the nationalism that normally accompanies populism becomes a more potent force?

sure. After all, Trump had ridden into office on a tide of widespread discontent in America among key groups, from white men to evangelicals, through to a large section of the American working class who felt they had been cheated by globalization and liberal elites in Washington. If that coalition could hold, and Trump could keep the US economy moving forward, then there was at least a chance that he might get re-elected in 2020, with consequences for the rest of the world that could prove to be very disturbing indeed.

Key Points

- Barack Obama was elected in 2008 in large part because of the 2008 financial crisis.
- Obama's foreign policy aimed to restore US soft power standing in the world while drawing US troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Obama rejected the idea that the US was in decline. His view was that the US had to adjust its policies to take account of new economic realities—most notably in Asia.
- Trump's call to 'Make America Great Again' has had a very disturbing impact on world politics.

Conclusion

When the cold war ended and the USSR fell apart in less than three very event-packed years, a good number of experts genuinely believed that we could now look forward to a peaceful and prosperous new era. And for a while a new era did indeed beckon. However, as this chapter as shown, things in the end did not quite turn out like that. New threats came to replace old ones. Old rivalries between former enemies never quite went away. Europe ran into immense problems. The US got sucked into an unwinnable war in Iraq. There was a major economic crash in 2008. And to add to this mix of problems, it seemed to some as if the West's moment in the sun was coming to rapid end with the rise of new powers—China in particular.

Yet one should beware of writing off either the power of the West or that of the United States. Those who now insist with great confidence that power is shifting somewhere else would be well advised to recall the important 'fact' that the West as a whole still controls a formidable set of economic assets, continues to dominate the world's leading institutions, and can lay claim to manifest forms of soft power. Equally, the United States (Trump or no Trump) retains massive military capabilities and can project power globally in ways that no other state can. The US also still accounts for nearly 25 per cent of the world's GDP, has a formidable technological lead over other powers, and still prints the mighty dollar which remains the world's currency of choice. Writing bestselling books with eye-catching titles about American decline may make for good copy. But it tells us little about the world as it is currently constituted.

That said, there is no doubt that the West is facing some severe challenges, and not just from illiberal powers like China and Russia. Indeed, as Trump's own election has revealed, the tide against liberalism appears to have turned in the West as well. When the cold war ended between 1989 and 1991, many assumed that liberalism had triumphed. However, that is not how things seem to be unfolding as we move deeper into the twenty-first century. As events once again unfold in unforeseen ways, scholars of world politics—who perhaps thought the world was becoming a more settled and more tolerant place following the end of the cold war—will once again have to come to terms with a reality they neither anticipated nor, one suspects, much like either.

Questions

1. What was the cold war and why did it end so unexpectedly?
2. What do you understand by the 'unipolar moment'?
3. Is the West facing a 'new cold war' with Putin's Russia?
4. Is the European Union doomed?

5. What was the Third World and why does it no longer exist?
6. Are we heading into a new 'Asian century'?
7. Why did George W. Bush decide to invade Iraq and what were the results?
8. What impact has the crisis in the Middle East had on world politics?
9. How would you explain the rise of populism in the West?
10. How much of a threat does populism pose to liberalism and the liberal economic order?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

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Cox, M. (2016), 'Not Just "Convenient": China and Russia's New Strategic Partnership in the Age of Geopolitics', *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 1(4): 317–34. Argues that the relationship between Moscow and Beijing is deeply significant and increases the illiberal challenge to the West.

Cox, M., and Stokes, D. (2018), *US Foreign Policy*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The fullest guide to US foreign policy, including discussions of the impact of Trump on US relations with the rest of the world.

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Zakaria, F. (2008), *The Post-American World* (New York: W. W. Norton). Influential study which influenced the debate about America's changing role in a changing world.

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Rising powers and the emerging global order

ANDREW HURRELL

Framing Questions

- **Have rising powers effectively challenged the US-led global order?**
- **Are rising powers actually powerful?**
- **What does the debate about rising powers tell us about the longer-term evolution of a new global international society?**

Reader's Guide

After a period of US dominance of the international political and economic systems, the world order began to undergo what many came to see as a fundamental structural change from the mid-2000s. This was initially associated with the rise of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and from 2010 South Africa), and was then accelerated by the financial crisis that hit the core Western countries after 2007. This chapter begins by examining the US-led global order that emerged at the end of the cold war and the arguments that this was likely to remain stable and to endure. The second section considers the challenges to the idea of a US-dominated global order, paying particular attention to the role of large, emerging developing countries, to the idea of the BRICS, to the regional role of these countries, and to the new Southern coalitions that were coming to play an increasingly influential role in negotiations and institutions affecting trade, climate change, and foreign aid. The third section distinguishes between different arguments about the diffusion of power and discusses what is involved conceptually when one talks of 'rising powers'. The fourth section examines some of the major theoretical arguments about how rising powers affect the international political system. The concluding section evaluates the claims about rising powers in a very different international context marked by the return of geopolitical tensions, the growth of nationalist and populist governments in many parts of the world, and serious challenges to multilateralism and global governance. It suggests that rising powers matter not simply because of their current and likely future power but rather because of the longer-term challenge they pose to the Eurocentrism and Western dominance of the international order.

Introduction

At the end of the cold war the structure of global order appeared clear and straightforward. The West had won. The United States was the sole superpower and the world was living through a period of unipolarity that many believed would continue well into the twenty-first century. The US-led order had three pillars: first, the unrivalled extent and many dimensions of US power; second, the Western-dominated institutions and multilateral organizations originally created in the wake of the Second World War—the United Nations, GATT (the World Trade Organization (WTO) from 1995), and the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund; and third, the dense set of transatlantic and transpacific relations and alliance systems. For many commentators, this liberal Greater West had triumphed and was bound to increase its global reach—partly through the intensification of economic and social globalization, partly through the power and attractiveness of Western ideas of democracy, human rights, and liberal capitalism, and partly through deliberate US policies and the effective deployment of American power.

The central question, however, was whether this period of US predominance would last. On one side, analysts considered the stability of US power. To what extent would the US fall prey to 'imperial overstretch', due to the loss of domestic support for its global hegemonic role? On the other side, attention quickly came to focus on the large, fast-growing countries in what had previously been called the Third World, or the Global South. Even if one leaves China in a category of its own, in the next tier down a range of other states were becoming more influential globally, as well as cementing a significant degree of regional influence: Brazil in South America, India in South Asia, Nigeria and South Africa in Africa. These developments came to be seen as a power challenge to the US and Europe, as well as representing a challenge to the historic Eurocentrism of the international order.

The post-cold war order

In the 1990s global order was widely understood through the lens of liberal internationalism or liberal solidarism (see Ch. 6) (Hurrell 2007). Globalization was rendering obsolete the old system of traditional international relations—the so-called Westphalian world of great power rivalries, balance of power politics, and an old-fashioned international law built around state sovereignty and strict rules of non-intervention. Bumpy as it might be, the road seemed to be leading away from Westphalia—with an expanded role for formal and informal multilateral institutions; a huge increase in the scope, density, and intrusiveness of rules and norms made at the international level but affecting how domestic societies are organized; the ever greater involvement of new actors in global governance; moves towards the coercive enforcement of global rules; and fundamental changes in political, legal, and moral understandings of state sovereignty and of the relationship between the state, the citizen, and the international community.

In addition to an expansion of inter-state modes of governance, increased attention was being paid to the world of complex governance beyond the state. Global order and global governance would no longer be the preserve of states. There was already a much more prominent role for NGOs and social movements, for transnational companies, and for the direct involvement of groups and individuals, often empowered by new technologies and new forms of social mobilization. From this perspective, the state was losing its place as the privileged sovereign institution and instead becoming one of many actors in a broader and more complex social, political, and economic process.

Academics, especially in Europe and the United States, told three kinds of liberal stories about the post-cold war world. Some stressed institutions and the cooperative logic of institutions. They argued that institutions are needed to deal with the ever more complex dilemmas of collective action that emerge in a globalized world. The complexity of governance challenges meant that international law and international regimes would necessarily increase in number, scope, and variety. It also meant that as large states, including large developing states, expanded their range of interests and integrated more fully into the global economy and world society—as they 'joined the world', in the popular language of the 1990s—they would be naturally drawn by the functional benefits provided by institutions and pressed towards more cooperative and 'responsible'

patterns of behaviour. They would gradually become socialized into a Western-led global order. The process would not necessarily be easy. It would be uneven and often unsettling. But, on this view, the broad direction of travel was clear.

Others stressed the **Kantian** idea of the gradual but progressive diffusion of liberal values, partly as a result of liberal economics and increased economic interdependence, partly as a result of the growing influence of global civil society, and partly as a result of the successful example set by the multifaceted liberal capitalist system of states. A third group told a more US-centred story. The US was indeed the centre of a unipolar world. But, true both to its own values and to its rational self-interest, Washington would have a continued incentive to bind itself within the institutions that it had created in the cold war era in order to reassure smaller states and to prevent balancing against US power (Ikenberry 2001). A rational hegemon in an age of globalization would understand the importance and utility of soft power and self-restraint. In return for this self-binding and the procedural **legitimacy** it would create, and in return for US-supplied global **public goods** and the output legitimacy that they would confer, other states would acquiesce and accept the role of the United States as the owner and operator of the international system.

The challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its allies (the so-called Second World) had been seen off with the victorious end to the cold war. Through a mix of these three liberal logics, those developing states of the old Third World that had previously challenged the Western order (especially in their demands in the 1970s for a **New International Economic Order**) would now become increasingly enmeshed, socialized, and integrated. The nature and dynamics of power were changing. **Soft power** would outstrip hard coercive power in importance, and concentrations of liberal power would attract rather than repel or threaten. Just as the example of a liberal and successful European Union had created powerful incentives on the part of weaker and neighbouring states towards emulation and a desire for membership, so, on a larger scale and over a longer period, a similar pattern would be observed in the case of the liberal, developed world as a whole. The 1990s, then, were marked by a clear sense of the liberal ascendancy; an assumption that the US had the right and power to decide what the 'liberal global order' was all about; and a clear belief that the Western order worked and that it had the answers. Yes, of course there

would be isolated rogues and radical rejectionists. But they were on the 'wrong side of history', as President Clinton confidently proclaimed.

The idea that this US-led order was stable was not confined to liberals. One group of neorealist thinkers argued that the extent of US power was simply so great that the normal logic of balance of power no longer applied, and that no state was likely to emerge in the foreseeable future with the capacity to disturb US power and primacy (Wohlforth 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2015/16). This was especially the case since, for neorealists, military power is the most important form of power. In terms of military power the United States is in a class of its own: it accounts for 45 per cent of the world's total military spending; it has an enormous lead in new military technologies; it has a vast global network of more than 750 overseas bases in over 100 countries; and it has a unique capacity to project power to any corner of the world. Since active opposition was ruled out, the expectation was that weaker states would have no option but to seek accommodation with the US and with the US-led global order.

Many critical political economists also saw continuity. Across the developing world, neoliberal economic reforms were spreading, partly imposed by the US and the international financial institutions that it dominated, and partly reflecting the choices and class interests of elites in the Global South. The commonality of worldviews and class interests linking the transnational elite that met each year in Davos would ensure the on-going dominance of Western-led capitalism.

After the end of the cold war, the Global South came to be redefined in transnational social terms rather than as a grouping or category of nation-states (**see Ch. 4**). Attention was focused more and more on the social movements that were emerging in response to neoliberalism: the **World Social Forum**, anti-globalization groups, and the protest movements that had come to prominence at the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999. The challenge, then, to the US-led order would not come from large developing countries (such as India, China, or Brazil). Rather, it would come from radical rejectionist states (such as Venezuela and other South American countries that shifted to the left politically or Iran and North Korea); from grassroots anti-globalization movements; and from transnational anti-Western Islamic groupings and terrorist organizations.

Key Points

- During the 1990s there was near universal agreement that the global system was led by the power of the United States and its allies and by the institutions that it dominated.

- From the perspective of the emerging powers, the US order involved a powerful move to change many of the existing rules, norms, and practices of global politics. Seen from the Global South, the United States has rarely been a status quo power but has often sought to mould the system in its own image. After the end of the cold war it was in many ways a strongly revisionist power: in the 1990s, in terms of pressing for new norms on intervention, for the opening of markets, and for the embedding of particular sets of what it saw as liberal values in international institutions; and, in the early years of the twenty-first century, in terms of its attempt to

recast norms on regime change, on the use of force, and on the conditionality of sovereignty more generally.

- The states of the Global South did not face the United States within a stable notion of a 'Westphalian order'. In their view, the dominant Western states were insisting that many of the most important norms of the system ought to change, above all in ways that threatened greater interventionism. But, at the same time, it seemed to many that there was little alternative but to accommodate Western power.

- There was widespread consensus that challenges to the US-led order would result from 'blowback' or 'backlashes' against US and Western power and would be focused around anti-hegemonic social movements and radical states.

The US order under challenge

By the late 1990s, this picture of a stable, US-dominated global order was coming under increasing challenge. The terrorist attacks of **11 September 2001** underscored the darker side of globalization. The experience of trying to fight a 'war' on global terrorism and of using hard coercive power to dominate weaker societies (as in Iraq or Afghanistan) brought to the fore the limits of military power for achieving political goals. The mismatch between Washington's rhetoric of human rights and democracy and its systematic willingness to violate human rights in defence of its national security (as with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the policy of so-called rendition of terrorist suspects) undercut Western claims to moral superiority. And the unilateralism of the Bush administration, for many people, undercut the legitimacy and acceptability of US leadership.

One of the most visible signs that something was changing was increased diplomatic activism by large developing countries. The activist coalitional policies of Brazil and India in the WTO provide a good example, most notably in terms of the G20 coalition of developing countries created at Cancun in 2003 (known as the Trade G20). At the fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO at Cancun in September 2003, developing countries came together in several overlapping coalitions and decided to block the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda until their demands were met. The conference ended in deadlock. Cancun represented a symbol of the dissatisfaction of the developing world with globalization, and indicated its greater willingness to act in pursuit of its collective interests and against

the developed world. In expressing this collective dissatisfaction, the emerging powers of the developing world—Brazil, China, India, and South Africa—took the lead, and were joined by many other developing countries.

A further example was the creation of IBSA: a cooperation project between the three democratic countries of India, Brazil, and South Africa. The organization was formalized by the Brasilia Declaration in June 2003, and was followed by other linked initiatives that fuelled cooperation in a broad range of areas. A third example is provided by the BASICs (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). This group sidelined Europe in climate change negotiations at Copenhagen in December 2009 and forced the United States to negotiate in a very different institutional context.

On their own these events might have attracted only passing attention. Yet, for many, they reflected a much deeper structural change that was taking place in the global economy and in the dynamics of global capitalism. The idea of the BRICS captures this phenomenon. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and South Africa from 2010) comprise the five largest economies outside the OECD. By the early years of the twenty-first century they held around 50 per cent of total global foreign exchange reserves. They had reduced or eliminated any residual dependence on foreign aid and, in the cases of China, India, and Brazil, had themselves become major aid donors. In 2009 these new donors provided around US\$11 billion of foreign aid. And they had expanded their relations with each other, with

China eclipsing the US as Brazil's major trading partner and Sino-Indian trade approaching US$60 billion a year. South–South trade rose from being marginal as late as the early 1990s to accounting for 17.5 per cent of global merchandise exports by 2010 (Zoellick 2010).

The language of BRICS and of rising and emerging powers took off from around 2003. Both popular commentary and a great deal of political rhetoric focused on the diffusion of power and the emergence of new powers. The central point of these debates was not where world order is now, but where it will go in the future. The BRICS were important not just because of their recent rapid development, but because of the predicted changes that were going to transform the global economy and change the balance of global economic power (**see Case Studies 5.1 and 5.2**). The financial crisis that hit the advanced capitalist core in 2007 fed into these changes and these perceptions. For many influential figures, it was historically extremely significant that the financial crisis broke out in the core Western countries. It not only seriously damaged these economies but also undermined the technical and moral authority at the centre of the global capitalist system. Finally, the crisis reinforced the view that international

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Case Study 5.1 The BRICS

BRIC leaders meet for talks
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The 'BRICs' began as an acronym that referred to four emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, and Russia (**see Case Study 16.1**). The term was first coined in the research paper *Building Better Global Economic BRICs* by economist Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001. O'Neill regarded these four countries as the key emerging market economies, and projected that the relative size and share of the BRICs in the world economy would rise exponentially. In his report, O'Neill also described the implications of this for the Group of Seven (G7) and called for a rearrangement of the representation in such groupings as the G7. From this start there have been two ways of thinking about the BRICs.

The first, and most common, has been to understand the BRICs in the context of the future of the global economy. In 2003, a Goldman Sachs report compiled by Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, *Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050*, expanded on O'Neill's argument. Their report predicted that in all likelihood, by 2025 the BRICs would account for over half of the size of the G7 in terms of GDP. And in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G7. Several reports have followed up on this, offering more detailed analyses and readjusted projections of the BRIC economies.

The key underlying argument behind these predictions was that China and India would rise as the world's principal suppliers of manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia would become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. They all have an enormous potential consumer market, complemented by access to regional markets, and an abundant workforce.

More recently, attention has shifted to the fragility and vulnerability of the emerging economies. The growth of world trade has slowed very considerably; commodity prices have fallen; corporate and sovereign debt has surged; the flight of foreign capital and foreign investment from the emerging world has gathered pace; and the Global South has been hit hard by the slowdown in China and by the rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards a greater focus on domestic growth and consumption. The return of geopolitical tensions and the emergence of trade wars, especially between the United States and China, has added to economic uncertainty, and fears remain of a further financial crisis with severe limits on the ability of international institutions to do much to help.

The other way of talking about the BRICs has been in terms of a diplomatic grouping. The foreign ministers of the four BRIC states—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—first met as a group in New York at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2006. The first BRIC summit was held in Russia in 2009, and South Africa joined the grouping in 2010. Since then annual summits have been held. Understandings of the nature of the grouping vary widely. Some see it as a bargaining coalition or even a proto-alliance designed to balance the power of the United States. Others see it as a caucus for developing common positions on the part of a group of large states that have been marginalized by the power of the West. Still others see it as the embryo for attempts to build an alternative set of global order institutions, most clearly illustrated in the creation of the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Question 1: What are the differences between the ways in which investors and IR analysts view the emerging world?

Question 2: Is the BRICS grouping an alliance?

Case Study 5.2 Brazil

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In November 2009 the *Economist* magazine had an illustration on its cover of the famous statue of Christ the Redeemer taking off from the Corcovado mountain. The idea that Brazil had finally 'taken off' captured much of the imagery of rising powers.

Brazil developed very rapidly in the period from 1930 to 1980. But, like most of the developing world, it was very badly hit by the debt crisis of the 1980s. In the 1990s, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso—one of the architects of the theory of dependency in International Relations—the focus was on financial stabilization at home, an important degree of economic liberalization, and a cautious foreign policy of re-establishing the country's credibility through joining agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

But it was under Cardoso's successor President Luis Inácio Lula, universally known as Lula, that the notion of Brazil as a rising power really gained ground. Lula's speeches repeatedly stressed the idea that Brazil is not a small or insignificant country and that it has options in a world where, despite all the challenges, unipolarity is more apparent than real. Brazil should reassert its national autonomy, form coalitions with other developing states in order to reduce its external vulnerability and to increase its own bargaining power, and work with others to promote a more balanced and multipolar world order.

The claims about Lula's Brazil raise many questions about the nature of power. Although Brazil possesses enormous natural resources, it does not have any significant degree of military or hard power. Its rise would therefore have to depend on its soft power, in particular its diplomatic agility or what has sometimes been called its 'diplomatic GNP', and the legitimacy deriving from its role as a spokesperson of the developing world and from the significant successes of the Lula government at home in reducing economic inequality and hunger.

Yet, in contrast to the image on the cover of the *Economist*, Brazil now faces deep structural economic problems, high levels of social violence, and stark political polarization. Lula is in jail; his chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff, was impeached; and in 2018 the country elected a far-right outsider, Jair Bolsonaro, as president. The political and party system was unable to cope with a sprawling corruption scandal; street protests brought millions onto the streets; and, while Brazil had been able to navigate the 2008 financial crisis, economic conditions became far more constraining. Many orthodox commentators blame domestic policy failure, especially the absence of serious reform during the boom years of the early 2000s. Others highlight the difficulties facing a traditional political system in incorporating the new social forces thrown up by the immense social and economic changes produced by rapid development. Others again point to the structural weaknesses facing a country like Brazil in trying to climb the global power hierarchy. Brazil has remained structurally vulnerable to shifts in the global economy. Success had come on the back of huge Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities and Brazil was hit hard by the slowdown in Chinese growth. Brazil did achieve greater voice in international institutions. But what appeared as the epitome of an activist emerging and regional power could quickly shift into the image of a country in deep crisis with few international options.

Question 1: Can soft power substitute for hard power?

Question 2: To what extent can coalitional policies among developing and emerging powers affect negotiations on global issues such as trade or climate change?

economic institutions had to be reformed to reflect shifting economic power. Brazil and India had long demanded reform of international economic institutions as well as seats on the United Nations Security Council. Although there had been little progress with UN reform, considerable change occurred in the WTO, with Brazil and India becoming members of the inner negotiating circle along with the US and the EU (the so-called 'new Quad'). For many, a further major symbolic step occurred with the expansion of the G7 grouping of industrialized countries into the Group of 20 (G20),which would now include the major emerging

countries. The inaugural leaders' summit took place in 2008, and the following year it was announced that the G20 would replace the G7 as the primary grouping of major economies, with regular summits of heads of government and an expanded agenda. Across the emerging world the G20 appeared to be a symbol of how the structures of global governance were shifting in response to the new geometry of power, and a sign of what the future would bring.

Those stressing the continued importance of rising powers have pointed to a series of on-going developments, including: the continuation of annual BRICS summits; the creation of the BRICS Development Bank (now the New Development Bank) at the fifth summit in Brazil in 2014; the demand by first Brazil and then China for a new norm of 'responsibility while protecting' in response to what was seen as the West's abuse of the idea of the responsibility to protect in the case of Libya in 2011; and the implications for the emerging world of China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative to establish a new Silk Road, announced in 2013, and its creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 (**see Case Study 20.1**). For the past several years, 'One Belt, One Road'—subsequently renamed the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI)—has been the focus of speculation both about China's geopolitical ambitions and the broader emergence of a post-Western global order (Hameiri and Jones 2018).

If poverty, weakness, and political marginalization had previously defined the Third World, something important seemed to have changed. As the *Economist* wrote, 'The salient feature of the Third World was that it wanted economic and political clout. It is getting both' (*The Economist* 2010: 65). There was much greater divergence in the development levels and power of the countries of the Global South. Western governments insisted that emerging powers should no longer use underdevelopment, poverty, and a prior history of colonialism or historical marginality as 'excuses' to evade their 'responsibilities' as emerging major powers.

Key Points

- In the first decade of the century, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, the **ASEAN** states, and Mexico experienced significant economic development.

- Many believed that the continuation of this trend would lead in the longer term to an alteration in the economic balance in favour of the dynamic emerging markets.

- With this greater economic share of the world market, emerging countries felt they deserved a greater political say in the international community as well. The financial crisis that began in 2007 seemed to underscore the shift in relative economic weight and made this call for a seat at the top negotiating tables stronger and more urgent.

- Recent developments such as China's implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative and the creation of the New Development Bank by the BRICS countries suggest the increasing global influence of rising powers.

Three questions about the power of rising powers

Debates about the diffusion of power and the emergence of new powers have become ubiquitous. But there are many more questions than clear answers.

First, if power is shifting, where exactly is it shifting to? One view is that power is simply shifting to major emerging states as part of the on-going dynamic of the rise and fall of great powers. This is the whole point of stories about 'superpower China', 'India rising', or 'Brazil's moment', and about the rise of the BRICS or the BASICs. We can debate exactly who these new actors are, how they have behaved in the past, and what they might want in the future. But the issues have fundamentally to do with what 'they' will do with 'their' power—a limited number of important new actors acquiring substantial amounts of new power.

An alternative view, however, is that we are witnessing a much more general diffusion of power, which is often linked to technological changes, to changes in the global economy, and to new forms of social and political mobilization. Thus if rising China is one central part of contemporary global politics, the **Arab Spring** is another. Both illustrate how power may be diffusing, but in very different ways. The 'general power diffusion' view holds that the story is really about the 'rise of the rest' (Khanna 2009). This will include other fast-developing societies, such as the so-called MINTs—Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey. But it is also going to involve a multiplicity of new actors. According to this account, the international system is increasingly characterized by a diffusion of power, to emerging and regional powers but also to many private

actors and transnational groups; by a diffusion of preferences, with many more voices demanding to be heard both globally and within states as a result of technology, globalization, and democratization; and by a diffusion of ideas and values, reopening the big questions of social, economic, and political organization that were supposedly ended with the conclusion of the cold war and the liberal ascendancy. The combination of technological innovation with social and political mobilization has been extremely powerful. In some cases it has underpinned mass social protests—as with the Arab Spring and the massive protests in Brazil in June 2013 that brought 1.5 million people onto the streets, facilitated by social media and new forms of political mobilization. In others the challenge to the capacity and legitimacy of existing states and regional orders has provided space for new forms of challenge, as with the so-called Islamic State.

If this view of a general diffusion of power is true, then effective power and influence will be harder for everyone to achieve, including both the currently strong and the new emerging powers. It will be harder for the emerging powers to control their own regions and to secure sustained support from weaker states. This suggests that we need to pay as much attention to the relations between emerging powers and weaker actors as we do to relations between emerging powers and the currently dominant. Another likely consequence is that it will be harder for the governments of large fast-developing states to maintain coherent and consistent foreign policies as more groups domestically are mobilized and empowered. The overall expectation would be of less effective power, both within states and internationally.

Second, what is power? Power is one of the most complex and contested ideas in the social sciences (**see Ch. 12**). It is an essentially contested concept in that it is subject to the kind of debate that is not rationally resolvable. There is no overarching theory of social power and no single analytical approach that can provide a magic key. Political scientists differentiate between different levels of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). These include:

- relational power and the capacity of a political unit to impose its will on another and to resist the attempts of others to impose their will;
- institutional power—power here becomes the ability to control the agenda, to determine what gets decided, and to exclude those issues that threaten the interests of the most powerful;

- different forms of structural power that have to do with the constitution of action and the material and discursive conditions for action.

Others distinguish between hard, coercive power on the one hand and soft power on the other—the power of attraction, of getting others to emulate your own society and its values. Almost all the arguments that reject the decline of the US and the West highlight the importance of combining these different levels: global military dominance, the economic resilience and attractiveness of US society, and its continued pivotal role across global governance institutions. They also emphasize its unrivalled structural power, including the capacity to generate and promote the most powerful conceptions of international and global order (Nye 2011, 2019).

When told that a country is an emerging power, the first question one needs to ask is: influential over what actors, in what period, with respect to what matters? Thus one might want to trace the growing role of South Africa, India, or Brazil in terms of their influence within a particular region and the way in which being recognized as a regional power may be an important part of their growing global influence. Or one might want to understand Brazil's influence not in terms of its very limited military capabilities but rather in terms of its diplomatic skill and what one analyst called its 'diplomatic GNP' (Hurrell 2010).

A further lesson from the literature on social power is still more important. Discussion of power and influence cannot be separated from the analysis of motives and values. It may be true that all states, including emerging powers, seek power and security, but the real question is the one pressed by constructivists: what sorts of power do they seek and for what purposes? Thus what makes a rising state want to revise or challenge the system is unlikely to come solely from calculations of hard power and material interest. Historically, **revisionism** has been far more frequently the result of particular sets of foreign policy ideas within rising states that explain why the existing status quo is resented and seen as unacceptable, even intolerable—for example, that the existing order embodies historical humiliations (as in the case of China); or that it does not grant the social recognition to which the rising state feels entitled as a result of its power, its values, and its culture (as in the case of India or Brazil); or that the existing order works against legitimate claims to special status within 'its' region.

Opposing Opinions 5.1   Today's rising powers are powerful enough to affect international order

For

Most change in world politics is incremental and gradual. There has been a long-term erosion of the Western dominance of international society. International society today is far more strongly global—not just in terms of economic globalization but also in terms of the capacity of a much wider range of states and societies to mobilize, to express their values and interests, and to contest the policies of the old powers of the Western, US-led order. The capacity of the United States to unilaterally reassert its hegemony and to use its coercive military and other power to achieve its goals is, and will remain, limited.

Rising powers' diplomatic achievements have been considerable and have persisted despite a more adverse international environment. In contrast to the Third World movement in the 1970s, today's emerging powers are far more centrally a part of the global economy and international system. South–South economic exchange is far more deeply rooted than was the case in the 1970s.

The power of today's rising powers is not just their economic resources. It derives from the role they are playing in functional institutions created to deal with ever more pressing sets of challenges (such as the management of the global economy, climate change, and nuclear proliferation). And it derives from their equally necessary role in the creation of legitimate institutions and representative structures of global governance.

Against

Realists are right that military power remains the most important source of power in international relations. There is no challenger to the United States, and its dominance of the new military technologies means that this supremacy is set to continue well into the future.

The United States continues to have unparalleled influence over international institutions and global governance. It can use its agenda-setting power to shape new norms and to control what gets decided. Faced with the deadlock of existing institutions or criticism of its policies, it has a unique capacity to create alternative options. For example, it has brought together groups of like-minded states to negotiate so-called mega-regional trade blocs across the Atlantic and Pacific. The marginal role of the emerging world in these negotiations is a clear sign of their weakness in the global order.

The BRICS—and similar groupings—face deep divisions that have prevented them from achieving cohesion and influence. For all the talk of new coalitional politics, China, India, and Russia are competitors for power and their economic preferences and interests are strongly divergent. They have very little in common.

1. Does military power help countries to achieve political goals?

2. To what extent does the success of economic development underpin diplomatic influence?

3. Can you assess the influence of rising powers without advancing a clear view of global order?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Third, power for what? This is the most important question. It is impossible to make any sense of the idea of a power shift unless one has in mind some idea of why shifting power is important and what it might be affecting (**see Opposing Opinions 5.1**). The BRICs mattered to Goldman Sachs because they were emerging markets. They were therefore important for profits and long-run investment decisions. But this says absolutely nothing about why these same countries might matter politically or geopolitically. This is why the analysis of rising powers cannot just involve lists of power resources and evaluations of how different kinds of power have shifted from one state or society to another. It has to connect with our theoretical understanding of world politics.

Key Points

- Realists believe that power is the common currency of international relations. But for many analysts there can be no generally accepted definition or understanding of power in international relations.

- Power diffusion can be understood in two different ways. Sometimes it is seen as a shift in the balance or distribution of power between and among states. Sometimes it is viewed as a broader and more complex process by which different groups across the world become economically more important and politically more mobilized.

- For both liberals and constructivists, power is always connected with actors' values, purposes, and identities.

- Power is very rarely understood in terms of the resources that a single actor possesses. It is a relational concept and usually best understood in a given social context.

Debating the impact of rising powers on international relations

For some, the history and theory of emerging powers is simple and straightforward. International relations has always been a story of the rise and fall of great powers. For realists, this forms the very heart of the subject and there is a well-established set of ideas for understanding what is going on and for guiding policy responses (**see Ch. 8**). The names of the countries may change but the logic does not. From this perspective one should most certainly care about power transitions.

Periods of shifting power are difficult and dangerous times. Rising states will naturally seek to challenge the status quo and to revise the dominant norms of the system in order to reflect their own interests and their own values. Established powers will be tempted to use their power to block the emergence of rising or revisionist states, including through the use of military force. Classical realists, neoclassical realists, neorealists, and power transition theorists differ as to whether conflict derives more from the actions of revisionist powers seeking to remake the rules of international order, or from the status quo powers anxious to preserve their power. However, in the realist camp there is wide consensus that if new powers are to 'count' globally it will be exclusively through their impact on the global balance of power, and that power transitions are dangerous and unsettling (Mearsheimer 2001).

As one would expect, this approach to emerging powers devotes great attention to the measurement of material power, the construction of hierarchies of power, and the implications of power transitions and power differentials for both institutionalized cooperation and for the outbreak of major war. It is the possession of material capabilities, and especially of coercive power, that determines whether a state counts as a great power. And for many in the realist tradition, it is the successful deployment of coercive power, above all in a conflict against another major power, that is the true entry card into the world of great power politics.

If the results of power transitions are manifest in crises, conflicts, and hegemonic wars, the underlying dynamic results from structural changes in the global economy. As Paul Kennedy expressed it in the most influential modern version of this old idea:

> The argument of this book has been that there exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social

structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states and empires…this uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term impacts upon the relative military power and strategical position of the members of the state system … economic prosperity does not *always* and *immediately* translate into military effectiveness, for that depends upon many other factors, from geography and national morale to generalship and tactical competence. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of the major shifts in the world's *military-power* balances have followed from alterations in the *productive* balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.

> (P. Kennedy 1988: 566–7)

The most powerful and persuasive part of the realist tradition moves beyond material power and stresses instead the importance of the search for status and the acquisition of prestige. For Robert Gilpin (1981), the existence of a 'hierarchy of prestige' is central to the ordering of international relations; it is precisely the disjuncture between existing perceptions of prestige and changing material capabilities that underpins the logic of hegemonic conflict and the dynamics of change in international relations. Prestige is the currency of international politics. International politics is characterized by a recurring distance that opens up between changes in material capabilities and the hierarchy of status, perceptions, and markers of prestige and esteem. This means that emerging powers are likely to pursue particular policies for reasons of prestige (India's nuclear test in 1998 is often seen as an example), or because of feelings of stigma, resentment, and the sense of being denied the status to which they feel themselves worthy (Zarakol 2010). Equally, we need to examine the way in which emerging powers attempt to persuade their peers that they are worthy of greater power status through various forms of 'recognition games'—for example, Brazil sending troops to Haiti partly to show that it was qualified for membership in the UN Security Council (Suzuki 2008).

Finally, if power is shifting and if conflict is to be avoided or limited, then it is crucial that new powers are accommodated. The 'Haves' and the 'Have Nots' need to seek new forms of accommodation and negotiation.

This perspective is stressed by classical realists and especially by writers about international society, who see great powers and great power **concerts** as fundamental to the ordering of international society. From this perspective, the natural response to shifting power and to the greater heterogeneity and diversity of culture and values is to return to a pluralist and power-centred order—both to avoid tensions and potential conflict among the existing and rising powers, and to achieve the consensus needed to tackle new and complex challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and global economic governance. This can involve the reform of formal multilateral institutions—such as bringing new members into the UN Security Council. But it can also involve increasing emphasis on different sorts of informal groupings, clubs, concerts, and coalitions. Indeed, the proliferation of discussion of new groups such as the G2 (US–China), the G8 + 5, or the G20 can be viewed in terms of a revival of concert diplomacy.

Liberal institutionalists look at these same changes through different lenses (**see Ch. 6**). From their perspective there has been a combination of power shifts together with an increased role for countries that have much more varied interests, preferences, and values. This has intensified many of the collective action problems facing global governance, leading to the deadlock of negotiations on many international issues, such as trade within the WTO. The emerging world has achieved greater voice and some institutional reform (as with the G20 and the WTO), and it has certainly achieved a significant level of veto power. Emerging countries have sought some ways to build alternatives to the existing institutional order (for example through the creation of the New Development Bank), but these opportunities have thus far been limited. As the still dominant country, the United States responded to the challenge of emerging powers by creating new agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), although it later withdrew from this agreement because of domestic pressures. The result is the paralysis or fragmentation of existing institutions and the danger that significant parts of the emerging world will be left behind in the new processes of smaller-group and selective multilateralism.

Finally, critical political economists challenge the whole idea of thinking about international relations in terms of the rise and fall of great powers. From a neo-Marxist perspective, it is simply mistaken to focus on the emerging nation-states of the Global South (**see Ch. 7**). Instead, what we have been witnessing involves the on-going transformation of global capitalism from an old core centred on the advanced industrialized states into a far more global and far more thoroughly transnationalized capitalist order. A new deterritorialized global capitalism is emerging that is made up of flows, fluxes, networked connections, and transnational production networks, but marked by inequality, instability, and new patterns of stratification (W. Robinson 2007; Starrs 2014). On this account, trying to count and categorize the 'power' of emerging powers tells us very little. Rather the intellectual challenge is to understand the 'transnational whole' in which so-called emerging powers are embedded, and to trace the patterns of class conflict within and across societies, the transformations in the nature of states in the emerging world, and the structural patterns of instability and inequality produced by global capitalism.

Key Points

- For mainstream realist and neorealist writers, rising powers matter because their growing material power disrupts the balance of power, resulting in conflict. Hence many neorealists predict that conflict between the US and China is inevitable.

- These materially based approaches to rising powers and global order do not tell enough about the potential pathways that might lead to the emergence of major power competition. What remains unexplained is precisely how an international system might move across a spectrum from the general diffusion of power, to a situation of **multipolarity**, to a system in which the foreign policies of the major states are driven by balance of power politics and logics.

- Material understandings of power provide an insufficient basis for comprehending the crucial importance of status and recognition as factors in the foreign policy behaviour of emerging powers. Even if one accepts the idea of rising states as revisionist, it is difficult to understand the sources of their dissatisfaction purely within a world of material power and systemically given incentives.

- For international society theorists, great powers constitute a particular social category. Being a great power is of course related to material power, but also to notions of legitimacy and authority. Membership in the club of great powers depends on recognition by others—by peers in the club, and also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the **international hierarchy**. The stability of power transitions will be crucially affected by the accommodation of rising powers.

- Marxist and critical political economists stress the need to look at the underlying structural changes in global capitalism rather than the world of nation-states.

Beyond the BRICS

In the early years of the twenty-first century, the narrative of 'emerging powers' and 'rising powers' seemed to provide a clear and powerful picture of how international relations and global politics were changing. Yet the story has not unfolded in the way many analysts expected. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the focus on the BRICS reflected a moment in time that has now passed. On this account, the storyline is now about backlash at the core and, with the exception of China, rising powers have returned to their role as secondary or supporting actors in the drama of global politics.

There are four aspects to this argument.

In the first place, economic frailties and vulnerabilities in many of the countries in transformation have become more evident. Many emerging economies have witnessed slower growth or even outright recession, an intensification of capital flight, and an erosion of the possibilities for export-led growth on which their emergence was seen to depend. At the same time, social tensions and political instability have spread, often driven by corruption and by protests against corruption. The political crises in Brazil and South Africa, for example, are deep, systemic, and undoubtedly the most serious since their respective democratic transitions (P. Anderson 2019). Expectations that the emerging powers would overhaul and reform global governance institutions were overly optimistic. Once heralded as the engine of global growth, many analysts now highlight the hype surrounding the BRICS, which amounted to a 'BRICS fallacy' (Pant 2013). Rather than a single collective story about the BRICS' linear trajectory to greater growth and power, we have instead observed multiple narratives of more measured and uneven growth across the emerging world, together with a much greater emphasis on both domestic and systemic instability and vulnerability (on India see Narlikar 2017; and on Brazil see P. Anderson 2019).

Second, the global system into which the BRICS were said to be emerging has changed dramatically as a result of the return of geopolitics, the structural instabilities and inequalities of global capitalism, and the impact of new and disruptive patterns of social and political mobilization. Especially from a realist perspective, economics does not exist in a vacuum and economic globalization will inevitably affect the balance of global power—feeding back into the structures and dynamics of a Westphalian state system rather than pointing towards its transcendence, as liberals had expected. The state as an economic actor has proved resilient in seeking to control economic flows and to police borders, and in seeking to exploit and develop state-based and mercantilist modes of managing economic problems on such issues as preventing foreign investment in sensitive sectors, the control of cyberspace, and access to natural resources. Most significant, the very dynamism and successes of liberal globalization are having a vital impact on the distribution of inter-state political power—above all towards the East and parts of the South.

In addition, other factors have pushed global order back in a broadly Westphalian direction. These include the renewed salience of security and geopolitical conflict in the South and East China Sea and in Ukraine and Crimea, the re-valorization of national security, and a renewed preoccupation with war-fighting and counter-insurgency. The continued power of nationalism is evident; it is no longer potentially containable politically or analytically in a box marked 'ethnic conflict' but manifest in the identity politics and foreign policy actions of all the major states in the system. The renewed importance of nuclear weapons is apparent; they are central to the structure of regional security complexes, and in the construction of great power hierarchies and the distribution of seats at the top tables. And the balance of power has quietly returned as both a motivation for state policy (as with US policies in Asia) and as an element in the foreign policy of all second-tier states—not hard balancing and the building up of hard power, but what is called 'soft balancing', either in the form of explicit attempts to delegitimize US hegemony or to argue for alternative conceptions of legitimacy (Paul 2018).

Finally, of course, the election of Donald Trump and the referendum win for Brexit have become a shorthand to capture the salience of backlash and nationalist politics: anti-immigrant sentiment; anti-elite and anti-expert feeling; dissatisfaction with traditional political parties; and a multifaceted reaction against globalization, 'free trade', and global governance (**see Chs 4 and 23**). The spread of backlash politics and populist nationalism and the specific rhetoric and policies of the Trump administration place the primary challenge to the existing global order at the centre of the system. As a result, many global governance institutions are

under severe strain. Gridlock, stagnation, fragmentation, contestation, and, most recently, backlash have become the dominant frame within which to analyse global governance. And in many advanced economies, new cleavages have opened up between those in favour of continued global integration and global governance on the one hand, and those who reject the opening of borders, the transfer of political authority beyond the nation-state, and the promotion of proclaimed universal values on the other.

As a result, both the players and the plot look very different. The challenge to the Western-centred global order now seems to come from the heartland of that order, and many of the assumptions behind notions of emergence no longer hold. For example, much work on rise and emergence centred on institutions and on global governance. Large emerging countries mattered because of their obvious centrality to tackling global challenges such as climate change. Equally, if one is concerned with bolstering the legitimacy of global governance institutions, then greater inclusion of the largest and most dynamic countries of the Global South and greater regional representation are obvious political avenues to explore. For emerging countries, institutions are logical 'paths to power', both as domains for voice and as constraints on the powerful. But in a world in which the most powerful can either seek alternative institutions (as was already evident under Barack Obama, for example in relation to TPP) or where the United States simply walks away from institutions and multilateralism (as now under Trump), then such pathways to power will inevitably be undermined. For realists, power has been exposed for what it really is: hard

power and especially military and coercive power. On this calculus of 'who is up and who is down', the generalized pretensions to greater influence made by, or on behalf of, the emerging world fall away. And in any case, when it comes to global economic governance, emerging countries have powerful interests in the stability of liberal economic institutions as bulwarks against protectionism in the West and as protectors of the very globalized economic environment that has helped to secure their rise. They are far more likely to be status quo powers than radical revisionists.

See a video of Professor Andrew Hurrell discussing the changing role of the BRICS **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

> ### Key Points
>
> - Contrary to expectations at the beginning of the twenty-first century, emerging powers, with the exception of China, have returned to their role as secondary actors in global affairs.
> - Many of the emerging powers have experienced economic frailties, social tensions, and political instability.
> - The global system has been characterized by the return of geopolitics, the structural instabilities and inequalities of global capitalism, and the impact of new and disruptive patterns of social and political mobilization.
> - The Westphalian state system has been more durable than many expected.
> - The biggest threats to global order come from backlash and nationalist politics, characterized by the Trump administration and Brexit, rather than from emerging powers.

Conclusion: rising states and the globalization of world politics

Yet it is important to note the powerful arguments as to why rising states continue to matter in global politics.

In the first place, the emerging and developing world remains central to understanding both the causes of current challenges to global order and the debates on what kind of order is likely to emerge. In the context of Trump or Brexit, it seems obvious that we should focus on the losers of globalization, on the 'left behind', and on those threatened both by globalization and trade and by movement and migration. In the emerging world the global distribution of winners and losers also matters but it plays out in different ways:

globalization has led to significant 'winners'. As Branko Milanovic (2016) has argued, 'In short: the great winners have been the Asian poor and middle classes; the great losers, the lower middle classes of the rich world'. But what does this mean politically? It means that there are increasing numbers of people who are still poor and highly exposed to the vulnerabilities and vicissitudes of the market; at the same time, they are more mobilized politically, including in new, technologically enabled ways, and more effective in raising demands against governments—over participation, over corruption, and over the delivery of basic state services. Yet

these demands are being raised against governments, regimes, and state structures that are often unable to meet or satisfy them, and for whom the siren calls of nationalism are an obvious political expedient. To understand the challenges to global order we need to place the contestation over global governance and the demands to 'take back control' in the developed world side by side with the emergence of populist nationalism in the emerging world.

Second, it may be the case that emerging powers share with nationalist and conservative forces in the developed world an emphasis on harder sovereignty, a resistance to talk of 'universal values' and humanitarian intervention, and a desire for an order that allows for greater pluralism. Hence they should not be seen as challengers. Yet this view downplays their historical distinctiveness. Even if China is placed in a category of its own, countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa are large developing countries that nevertheless continue to be relatively poor in per capita terms. They are very different from the rising powers of the early twentieth century: the US, Germany, and Japan. Poverty and inequality are still major problems, and high growth rates remain a major political imperative. For all their economic success, these countries remain developing economies and developing societies, marked both by incomplete development and by incomplete integration into a global economy whose ground rules have been set historically by the industrialized North. In addition, dominant foreign policy ideas are often shaped by the legacy of historical perceptions of second-class treatment, of subalterneity, of marginalization, and of subordinate status in what has been widely viewed across the Global South as an unequal and exploitative global political and economic system. What distinguishes today's emerging powers is their historic position outside, or on the margins of, some notion of the West. Historically, large parts of the world have sought to reject or revise a Western-dominated order that was built around their marginalization and around structured patterns of hierarchy and inequality; in which they suffered consistently at the hands of US and Western intervention; and in which they are now faced by powerful political forces in the West proclaiming new versions of the very old ideologies of racial, religious, and civilizational superiority.

This leads, finally, to the continued developing reality of a post-Western global order. Here it is important to escape from the shadow of the post-1990 world and to see the BRICS as only one element in the longer-term historical process by which an originally Western-dominated international society became global, and as one stage in a longer-term revolt against Western dominance that has by no means wholly ended (Bull and Watson 1985). The focus on the post-cold war period and on the apparent naturalness of a Western-dominated, self-described 'liberal' order has led to a foreshortening of history. There was never a liberal global order during the cold war. A central part of the problem of global order in the twentieth century involved the struggle of the Third World, or later the Global South, against what was widely understood as the on-going legacy of the Western-dominated international society (Bull and Watson 1985). The empowerment and social and political mobilization of the previously subordinate has been one of the great drivers of historic change, indeed perhaps the most important of all. As a consequence, the global order in which we live is now far more strongly global. The longer-term movement towards a post-Western world was interrupted, but not fundamentally dislodged, by the brief and fleeting period of US unipolarity. From this perspective, the period from 1990 to the early 2000s is the historical anomaly, and the BRICS do not stand as some unique and novel development but rather as one element in a longer-term story. History has not ended, and major ideological cleavages about the best ordering of politics, economics, and international relations have re-emerged. Among these questions the continued economic and developmental success of an illiberal and non-democratic China poses the greatest ideological challenge to ingrained Western liberal assumptions.

The most crucial dimension of 'global' does not, therefore, lie in the nature of the problems (climate change, nuclear proliferation, etc.), nor in notions of interdependence and globalization and the degree to which states, societies, and peoples are everywhere affected by global processes. It lies rather in the increased capacity of a far wider range of states and social actors to become active subjects and agents in the politics and practices of global politics and different forms of ordering, both around and beyond states. It is the diffusion of agency and of political consciousness that has been the most important feature of the globalization of international society and which explains why the emerging world continues to matter. This means that the historical self-understandings of a much wider and culturally diverse range of players need to be central to the theoretical and practical analysis of global politics.

Questions

1. Has the United States been a status quo or a revisionist power since the end of the cold war?
2. Should the United States, Japan, and Europe be 'afraid' of the BRICS?
3. What is left of the BRICS without China?
4. Does the BRICS grouping represent a cohesive economic unit and power bloc?
5. Does realism tell us all we really need to know about rising powers and power transitions?
6. Which is more important: to measure changes in the relative power of the nation-states in the emerging world or to understand the underlying processes of social and economic change taking place domestically?
7. Is India a great power?
8. Does Brazilian foreign policy indicate that a state can be a major power without significant military capabilities?
9. Do today's emerging powers mean the end of the Third World?
10. Do you think that the permanent members in the UN Security Council will ever be willing to offer an additional seat to countries such as India, Brazil, or South Africa?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

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To find out more follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Part Three
Theories of world politics

In this part of the book we introduce you to the main theories that try to explain world politics. We have two principal aims.

First, we want you to be able to grasp the essential claims of the theories that have been most influential in explaining world politics. To this end, we have included chapters on the main theoretical perspectives on world politics: liberalism, realism, Marxism, social constructivism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. Of these, liberalism has perhaps been most influential in shaping the current world order and realism has been the most influential in the academic discipline of International Relations. Both have also attracted fierce criticism for being ideologies masquerading as objective theories. Most of the history of International Relations theory in academia has seen a dispute between realist, liberal, and Marxist rivals, with the debate between realism and liberalism being the most long-standing and well developed. We have also included a chapter on the increasingly important approach of social constructivism. We then introduce you to other recent theoretical work in world politics, in chapters focusing on feminist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial/decolonial approaches to international theory. Given the growing importance of explicitly normative approaches to world politics, this part of the book ends with a chapter on international ethics that explains contemporary world politics in relation to a series of important ethical questions, such as whether it can ever be morally right to wage war, and the obligations wealthy states have towards poor ones. By the end of this part we hope you will be able to understand the main ideas of the various theories and to assess their comparative strengths and weaknesses.

Our second aim is to give you an overview of theory that you need to be able to assess the significance of globalization for an understanding of world politics. After reading these chapters on theory, we hope that you will be in a better position to see how these theories of world politics might interpret globalization in different ways. We feel that you should then be able to decide for yourself both which interpretation you find most convincing, and what kind of evidence you might find in the remaining parts of the book to enable you to work out just how much globalization marks a new distinct stage in world politics, requiring new theories, or whether it is simply a fad or fashion that might alter the surface of world politics but not its main underlying features.

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Chapter 6

Liberal internationalism

T I M   D U N N E

Framing Questions

- **How has liberal internationalist thinking evolved?**
- **Why is there a persistent imperial impulse in the practice of liberal states' foreign policy?**
- **When it comes to international reform, is liberal internationalism flawed but indispensable?**

Reader's Guide

The practice of international relations has not been accommodating to **liberal internationalism**. Whereas the domestic political realm in many states has witnessed an impressive degree of progress, with institutions providing for both order and justice, the international political realm in the era of the modern states system has been characterized by a precarious order and the absence of justice. Liberal internationalists do not accept that the world has to be this way. The international—a term coined by the liberal philosopher Jeremy Bentham—could be a place where states follow the rule of law as well as furthering moral purposes such as civility, prosperity, and peace. The chapter argues that it is important to think about three waves of liberal internationalist thinking: the insights of visionary nineteenth-century philosophers and reformers; the idealist moment of the inter-war period; and the current crisis that confronts liberal internationalism in an era in which democracy as a system of government is in 'recession' and the capabilities of key Western states to drive liberal world order are in decline.

Introduction and context

Liberalism as a model of government has been remarkably successful. On one simple but important measure, there are 75 liberal democracies in the world, which is more than any other regime-type. While liberal democracies predominate in Europe and the Americas, and increasingly in parts of Africa and Asia, it is also the case that liberal values and institutions have made fewer inroads into global governance. This point was made several decades ago by Harvard scholar Stanley Hoffmann, who famously said, 'international affairs have been the nemesis of Liberalism'. His explanation was equally stark: 'the essence of Liberalism is self-restraint, moderation, compromise and peace', whereas 'the essence of international politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace, at best, or the state of war' (S. Hoffmann 1987: 396). Hoffmann's reasoning comes as no surprise to realists, who argue that there can be no progress, no law, and no justice where there is no common power (see Ch. 8). Despite the weight of this realist argument, those who believe in the liberal project have not conceded defeat. Liberal internationalists believe that power politics itself is the product of ideas, and—crucially—ideas can change. Therefore, even if international affairs have been inhospitable to liberal ideas of progressive change, this does not mean that the international cannot be remade in liberalism's own image.

Writers and intellectuals as far back as the Enlightenment have advocated for conceptions of liberal internationalism in which governments are just when they face the people, and lawful when they face each other (see 'Founding ideas of nineteenth-century liberal internationalism'). These great but flawed thinkers—Immanuel Kant, J. S. Mill, and Jeremy Bentham—provided the language and concepts used by later liberals who were able to embed them in international practice (albeit not without setbacks). Bentham, for instance, first used the term 'international' as he was dissatisfied with the phrase 'the law of nations', used by predecessors such as Emer de Vattel. Bentham thought 'international' was a more accurate adjective to describe relations between sovereigns—and very soon after his use of the term in 1780 it was in widespread use (Suganami 1978: 231).

The second wave of liberal internationalism concerns the 'idealist moment' that occurred after the First World War (see 'Internationalism and institutionalism: peace through law'). After the futile slaughter of around 40 million soldiers and civilians, the League of Nations was created to solve disputes between countries rather than allowing them to degenerate into open warfare. The birth of the League coincided with the establishment of the world's first dedicated Professorship in International Politics—appropriately named the Woodrow Wilson Chair—at what was then called the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth (see Box 6.1). Not only was the First World War a trigger

Box 6.1 E. H. Carr and the critique of liberal internationalism

A major component in the story of the development of academic thinking on International Relations (IR) was the inauguration of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in Aberystwyth (see 'Introduction and context'), soon to be followed by two other Chairs at the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics (also funded by philanthropy). E. H. Carr was appointed to the Woodrow Wilson Chair in 1936, and held this position for ten years; thereafter he concentrated on a monumental 14-volume study, *A History of Soviet Russia*. In so doing, he turned his back on the newly developing field of IR that he had done so much to create.

In common with many other intellectuals in the period between Versailles in 1919 and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, Carr was much more than a scholar—he was variously a diplomat, commentator, and agitator. His classic work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939*, wove these strands together. Carr's preferred title for the work is worthy of note: he wanted to call the book *Utopia and Reality*, but this was thought by the publisher to be too abstract. What was important for Carr was to show how liberal conceptions of a rational and moral world order (utopia) needed to be corrected by an analytical approach to politics that understood how power operates (realism).

The rise of internationalism, Carr argued, could not be separated from the interests of the most powerful states in the system. Internationalist ideas of perpetual peace flourished during the height of French military hegemony in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; internationalist ideas of free trade and the right of great powers to dominate the non-European world flourished as Britain became the dominant world power in the mid-nineteenth century. As America became first among equals after 1919, internationalist ideas of democracy, self-determination, and collective security became the universal moral principles of the era. The task for political realism is to show that these various articulations of internationalism were all connected to prevailing patterns of power and interests. Despite the inadequacies of internationalism, Carr recognized that the struggle to uncover a moral code that was applicable to all members of international society was an indispensable part of building a theory of international politics.

for the teaching of international politics in many countries, but the concern to prevent future destruction on a global scale was a priority for a large coalition of committed internationalists—activists, writers, representatives, intellectuals, and societies—that sought to build a new international order.

A third wave of liberal internationalist thinking takes us to the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century (**see 'The challenges confronting liberal internationalism'**). In the US heartland of liberal internationalism, there is a sense of crisis pervading both leadership and followership in world politics. Many leading thinkers, such as Princeton's G. John Ikenberry, question whether other states and institutions are in a position to take up the mantle of leadership given America's relative decline. Despite the increased visibility of and coordination among the so-called rising powers (such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Russia), there is no evidence that they believe themselves to have a special responsibility for managing world order in a manner paralleling the role played by the US after 1945. Does this mean that a post-Western world will be hostile to liberal internationalist norms and purposes? Or do we need to take seriously the belief that there are moral universals that unify the plurality of peoples and societies, and that liberal internationalism has come closer to articulating those shared values than the alternatives? The position adopted in this chapter can be summed up in the following way: liberal internationalism is inadequate in many respects, yet at the same time internationalist thinking remains indispensable as a way of mediating between different values and preferences (Chakrabarty 2000).

Founding ideas of nineteenth-century liberal internationalism

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) were two of the leading liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment. Both reacted to the barbarity of international relations, or what Kant graphically described as 'the lawless state of savagery', at a time when domestic politics was on the cusp of a new age of rights, citizenship, and constitutionalism. Their abhorrence of the lawless state of savagery led them separately to elaborate plans to establish governance over matters of peace and war. Although written over two centuries ago, their moral and political philosophies contain the seeds of core liberal internationalist ideas, in particular the belief that reason could deliver freedom and justice in international relations.

The term 'international' was invented by Jeremy Bentham, along with other terms that have also found their way into the political lexicon such as 'codification' (**see 'Introduction and context'**). Bentham was an expansive thinker, writer, and publicist. He hoped to do for law and morality what Captain Cook and other voyagers had done for exploration, namely conquer the world: at one point, he immodestly declared that 'The Globe is the field of Dominion to which the author aspires' (Armitage 2011: 65). It was in his book *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1780) that Bentham argued for a new concept of international jurisprudence that was based on the equality of sovereigns. Bentham applied his utilitarian maxim of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' to the international, such that the task for a judge or legislator would be to establish the greatest happiness among the family of nations.

Forty years later, a new edition of the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* was published. By this time, the term 'international' had come into widespread usage. And by the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become an *ism*. Internationalism became a shorthand to describe the growing band of activists, feminists, publicists, and organizations, all pushing for various reforms in domestic society and in the wider international society.

For Kant, the imperative to achieve perpetual peace required the transformation of individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a federal contract among states to abolish war (rather than to regulate it, as earlier international lawyers had argued). This federation can be likened to a permanent peace treaty, rather than a 'super-state' actor or world government. The three components of Kant's hypothetical treaty for a permanent peace are outlined in **Box 6.2**.

Kant's claim that liberal states are pacific in their international relations with other liberal states was revived in the 1980s. In a much-cited article, Michael Doyle (1986: 1151) argued that liberal states have created a 'separate peace'. According to Doyle, there are two elements to the Kantian legacy: restraint among liberal states and 'international imprudence' in relations with non-liberal states. Although the empirical

evidence seems to support the **democratic peace** thesis, it is important to bear in mind the limitations of this argument. First, for the theory to be compelling, believers in the thesis need to explain why war has become unthinkable among liberal states. Kant argued that if the decision to use force were taken by the people, rather than by the prince, then the frequency of conflicts would be drastically reduced. Logically, this argument also implies a lower frequency of conflicts between liberal and non-liberal states, but this is contrary to historical evidence. An alternative explanation for the democratic peace thesis might be that liberal states tend to be wealthy, and therefore have less to gain (and more to lose) by engaging in conflicts than poorer authoritarian states. Perhaps the most convincing explanation of all is the simple fact that liberal states tend to be in relations of amity with other liberal states. War between Canada and the United States is unthinkable, perhaps not because of their liberal democratic constitutions, but because they are allies who share the same approach to managing economic and political affairs. Indeed, war among states with contrasting political and economic systems may also be unthinkable when they have a history of friendly relations. One such example is Mexico and Cuba, two countries that maintain close bilateral relations despite their history of divergent economic ideologies.

Irrespective of the scholarly search for the reasons why liberal democratic states are more peaceful, it is important to note the political consequences of this

hypothesis. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote an article entitled '**The End of History**', which celebrated the triumph of liberalism over all other ideologies, contending that liberal states were more stable internally and more peaceful in their international relations (Fukuyama 1989: 3–18). Other defenders of the democratic peace thesis were more circumspect. As Doyle (1995: 100) recognized, liberal democracies are as aggressive as any other type of state in their relations with authoritarian regimes and stateless peoples. How, then, should states inside the liberal zone of peace conduct their relations with authoritarian governments? How can the positive Kantian legacy of restraint triumph over liberal states' historical imperial temptation? These are fascinating and timely questions (**see 'Conclusion: incomplete, but indispensable, internationalism'**).

Internationalism and institutionalism: peace through law

The idea of a natural **harmony of interests** in international political and economic relations came under challenge in the early part of the twentieth century. The fact that Britain and Germany had highly interdependent economies before the First World War (1914–18) seemed to confirm the fatal flaw in the association of economic interdependence with peace. From the dawn of the twentieth century, the contradictions within European civilization, of progress and exemplarism on the one hand and the harnessing of industrial power for military purposes on the other, could no longer be contained. Europe stumbled into war, killing 15 million people. The war not only brought an end to three empires, but was also a contributing factor to the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a recognition that peace is not a natural condition but is one that must be constructed. In a powerful critique of the idea that peace and prosperity were part of a latent natural order, the publicist and author Leonard Woolf argued that peace and prosperity required 'consciously devised machinery' (Luard 1992: 465). But perhaps the most famous advocate of an international authority for the management of international relations was Woodrow Wilson. According to this US president, peace could only be secured with the creation of an **international organization** to regulate international anarchy. Security could not be left to secret bilateral diplomatic deals and a blind faith in the balance of power. Just as peace had to be enforced in domestic society, the international domain had to have a system of regulations for addressing disputes and an international force that could be mobilized if non-violent conflict resolution failed. In this sense, more than any other strand of liberalism, idealism rests on the domestic analogy (Suganami 1989: 94–113).

In Wilson's famous '**Fourteen Points**' speech, addressed to Congress in January 1918, he argued that 'a general association of nations must be formed' to preserve the coming peace—and the League of Nations was to be that general association. For the League to be effective, it had to have the military power to deter aggression and, when necessary, to use a preponderance of power to enforce its will. This was the idea behind the collective security system that was central to the League of Nations. Collective security refers to an arrangement where 'each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression' (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 30). It can be contrasted with an alliance system of security, where a number of states join together, usually as a response to a specific external threat (sometimes known as 'collective defence'). In the case of the League of Nations, Article 16 of the League's Charter noted the obligation that, in the event of war, all member states must cease normal relations with the offending state, impose sanctions, and, if necessary, commit their armed forces to the disposal of the League Council should the use of force be required to restore the status quo.

The League's constitution also called for the **self-determination** of all nations—another central characteristic of liberal idealist thinking on international relations. Going back to the mid-nineteenth century, self-determination movements in Greece, Hungary, and Italy received support from liberal powers and public opinion. Yet default support for self-determination masked a host of practical and moral problems that were laid bare after Woodrow Wilson issued his proclamation. What would happen to newly created minorities who felt no allegiance to the self-determining state? Could a democratic process adequately deal with questions of identity—who was to decide what community should be self-determining? And what if a newly self-determined state rejected liberal democratic norms?

The experience of the League of Nations was a disaster. While the moral rhetoric at the League's creation was decidedly idealist, in practice states remained imprisoned by self-interest. There is no better example of this than the US' decision not to join the institution it had created. With the Soviet Union in opposition for ideological reasons, the League of Nations quickly became a talking-shop for the 'satisfied' powers. Hitler's decision in March 1936 to reoccupy the Rhineland, a designated demilitarized zone according to the terms of the **Treaty of Versailles**, effectively pulled the plug on the League's life-support system (it had already been put on the 'critical' list following the Manchurian crisis in 1931 and the Ethiopian crisis in 1935).

The collapse of the League of Nations brought a swift end to the idealist moment in the first half of the twentieth century. It is important to note that the thinkers of the inter-war period were not straightforwardly Benthamites who thought that reason and science could resolve political disputes. Instead, there was a backward-looking and conservative strand to their internationalism. Idealists such as Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern opposed the idea that the League of Nations should have the kind of coercive authority that was reserved for sovereign states. Such a radical alteration to the structure of the system might have risked non-Western powers—such as the Bolsheviks, or the colonized races considered not yet 'fit' to govern—taking control. 'Their dependence on this strikingly conservative understanding of international order became a kind of supplement … for their unwillingness to imagine political alternatives to sovereignty, to envision a global economy regulated by workers, and to theorize a democratic form of international governance with real political (not just moral and symbolic) power' (Morefield 2009: 15). A powerful strand of internationalism in the inter-war period was backward-looking, privileging an international order that was hospitable to empire and inhospitable to radical internationalist ideas about democracy and the subordination of sovereign authority to the rule of law.

There is no doubt that, after 1945, the language of liberal internationalism was more pragmatic; how could anyone living in the shadow of the Holocaust be optimistic? Yet familiar core ideas of liberalism remained. Even in the early 1940s, states recognized the need to replace the League with another international institution with responsibility for international peace and security. This time, however, in the case of the United

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Case Study 6.1 The 1990–1 Gulf War and a 'new world order'

Fighter aircraft fly over burning oil wells in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991
© US Air Force Photo / Alamy Stock Photo

Iraq had always argued that the sovereign state of Kuwait was an artificial creation of the imperial powers. When this political motive was allied to an economic imperative, caused primarily by accumulated war debts following the eight-year war with Iran (1980–8), the annexation of Kuwait seemed to be a solution to Iraq's problems. The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, also assumed that the West would not use force to defend Kuwait, a miscalculation fuelled by the West's support of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War (because it considered the so-called 'fundamentalism' of Iran to be a graver threat to international order than the extreme nationalism of the Iraqi regime).

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 prompted a series of UN resolutions calling for Iraq to withdraw unconditionally. Economic sanctions were applied while the US-led coalition of international forces gathered in Saudi Arabia. Operation 'Desert Storm' crushed the Iraqi resistance in a matter of six weeks (16 January to 28 February 1991).

The 1990–1 Gulf War certainly revived the UN doctrine of collective security, although a number of doubts remained about the underlying motivations for the war and the way in which it was fought (for instance, the coalition of national armies was controlled by the US, rather than by a UN military command as envisaged in the UN Charter). President George H. W. Bush declared that the war was about more than one small country, it was about a 'big idea; a new world order'. The content of this new world order was 'peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples'.

Question 1: Was George H. W. Bush right to repel Iraq from Kuwait but leave Saddam Hussein in power?

Question 2: Evaluate Bush's view that the international system after 1990 constituted a 'new world order'.

Nations, the framers of its Charter were aware of the need for a consensus among the great powers in order for enforcement action to be taken—hence the veto system (Article 27 of the UN Charter), which granted the five permanent members of the Security Council the power of veto. This revision constituted an important modification to the classical model of collective security, as each of the great powers would veto any coercive action proposed by the others (Roberts 1996: 315). It was not until the end of the cold war that cooperation among the great powers was sufficiently well developed for collective security to be realized, as was evident in the UN's response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 (**see Case Study 6.1**). Later post-cold war interventions, particularly Kosovo (1998) and Iraq (2003), made it abundantly clear that normal business

had resumed as the UN Security Council was once again sidelined by the US and its allies, who were not prepared to refrain from military action just because there was no permissive Security Council resolution.

As the end of the millennium approached, liberal internationalists saw America as the 'indispensable nation' who could use force without first asking for permission. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced in 1998 in the context of disarming Iraq: 'if we have to use force it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.' This imperial impulse lasted well into the first decade of the twenty-first century when the United States fought the so-called 'war on terror'. This global war required rules prohibiting war to be subverted when these rules became an impediment to the exercise of American power.

Key Points

- The idea of a natural harmony of interests in international political and economic relations came under challenge in the early part of the twentieth century as Britain and Germany went to war, despite their high degree of economic interdependence.

- The First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a recognition that peace is not a natural condition but is one that must be constructed. To this end, Woodrow Wilson advocated for the creation of a League of Nations to regulate international anarchy through the exercise of collective security.

- The League's constitution also called for the self-determination of all nations. However, despite widespread agreement on this principle, a host of practical and moral problems limited its implementation.

- Although there are important continuities between Enlightenment liberal thought and the 'idealist moment', the thinkers of the inter-war period were flawed. They overlooked the distribution of power and interests in the international system (a critique mounted by E. H. Carr), and they failed to understand that values and purposes were inextricably linked to power. Notably, leading internationalists in the inter-war period tied the future of the League of Nations to the dominance of international society by European colonial powers.

- The imperial impulse of the Anglo-American powers continued in the post-1945 order—in fact, after the fall of communism in 1989 internationalists hoped that the UN could impose collective security in response to a state that had traduced the rules-based order.

The challenges confronting liberal internationalism

The ascendancy of liberal ideas and institutions has been one of the most striking trends in world politics for the last two centuries. Furthermore, with the demise of the cold war system it seemed like liberalism had defeated all other contending political ideologies. We have seen how, at the start of the 1990s, leading Western politicians hailed a 'new world order' as international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council began to operate as envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter back in 1945. These new and welcome patterns of cooperation prompted the British prime minister Tony Blair (1999*a*) to declare at the end of the 1990s that 'we are all internationalists now'.

But from the vantage point of the second decade of the twenty-first century, confidence in the liberal international order has ebbed and liberalism is now in question both in international theory and in practice (**see Box 6.3**). Recurring crises and disagreements in the multilateral institutions designed to provide governance over security, trade, and finance have demonstrated that cooperation is harder to achieve and to sustain than liberals assumed. The on-going violence in the Middle East and Africa, the uneven record of post-cold war liberal foreign policies in delivering a more secure and just world order, and continued unrest triggered by global economic inequalities have turned the

Box 6.3 Crisis and division in liberalism?

The theme of liberal world order in crisis has received a great deal of scholarly attention in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. For example, in his *A Liberal World Order in Crisis*, Georg Sørensen compares the optimistic sentiments of the 1990s with the post-9/11 world in which terror and great power rivalry darken the horizon of international relations. Sørensen (2011: 12) defines world order as 'a governing arrangement among states' and believes that sovereign states remain the primary building blocks of these governance arrangements. The book's main contribution is its account of the ways in which tensions arise when liberty is pursued in the world. One example of this tension is the practice of democracy promotion that has been followed by most liberal states, to varying degrees, in the last two decades. Outsiders promoting democracy risk becoming overly paternalistic and thereby lapsing into a form of imperialism that has no legitimacy in international politics today. Another example of this tension concerns the criteria for membership in international institutions: should they be open to states with illiberal constitutions, or should they be restricted to liberal, democratic countries only? Such voices are frequently heard in Western capitals when the will of liberal great powers has been stymied by others, as was the case in 2003 when the UN Security Council refused to give its consent to the war against Iraq. Sørensen describes this tension, and the protagonists' portrayal of one or other liberal position, as a choice 'between Imposition and Restraint' (Sørensen 2011: 64). The values and practices associated with 'Imposition' include intervention, foreign policy activism, scrutiny of other states, and the pursuit of universal principles. The values and practices associated with 'Restraint' include non-intervention, toleration, empathy, and pragmatism.

triumphalism of the 'liberal decade' to despondency. It is now more common to read about liberal internationalism's demise than it is to hear about its ascendancy.

G. John Ikenberry is the most prominent analyst of the influence liberal ideas have exerted over world order in the last hundred years. In a frequently cited article, Ikenberry (1999) maps liberalism's influence through three phases, conveniently labelled 'liberal internationalism 1.0', '2.0', and '3.0'. Liberal internationalism 1.0 corresponds with the 'idealist moment' of the inter-war period and the failed attempt to replace the old balance of power order with the rule of law. After 1945, America set about constructing liberal internationalism 2.0. It did this by embedding certain fundamental liberal principles into the UN Charter while building other institutions to manage trade and other cross-border flows of people, goods, and services. Internationalists in the post-1945 era argued that the realists were wrong about state behaviour: they pointed to the fact that the

world's pre-eminent power chose to forsake the pursuit of short-term gains in return for a durable settlement that benefited its European allies and those in Asia too. While America had more power than other states in the system, it also accepted a greater share of the burden when it came to setting and upholding the rules of economic and security governance.

Yet Ikenberry is surely right to argue that this model of an American-led international order—liberal internationalism 2.0—is experiencing a crisis today. Why is this? First and foremost, American hegemony 'no longer appears to be an adequate framework to support a liberal international order' (Ikenberry 2009: 79). Even if the US had sufficient power, there are signs that the rest of the world no longer wants an order in which a single state is preponderant. Related to this point is the sense that the liberal principle of **sovereign equality** is under threat. The security policies driven by the United States and its allies in NATO rest on a conception of sovereignty that has become conditional on good behaviour, understood either as being on-side with the war on terror or ensuring basic human rights are protected.

The controversy generated by the 2011 NATO-led war against Muammar Gaddafi's Libya is an example of the deep divisions that Western leadership is generating. Shortly after the no-fly zone began to be enforced militarily, Russia and China argued that the other three permanent members of the Security Council (France, the UK, and the US) had shifted the mandate from one of protecting civilians to one of regime change. Whether this is a correct understanding of the NATO-led enforcement action is less important than understanding the magnitude of the struggle that is under way between influential Western states and re-emerging powers such as India, China, and Russia (**see Ch. 5**). In the realigned world order, the question of where authority lies to decide questions of intervention is one that will need to be answered. The responsibility to protect doctrine (or RtoP) could become a key test for whether liberalism can endure despite systemic changes to the distribution of material and normative power (**see Ch. 32**). **Opposing Opinions 6.1** discusses the arguments for and against the view that liberal internationalists have a responsibility to protect the victims of atrocity crimes.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, it is apparent that the US lacks the capacity, and Western institutions the legitimacy, to maintain the liberal world order into the future. Alternative configurations of liberal internationalism remain a distant possibility. Liberal

Opposing Opinions 6.1 Liberal internationalist governments have a responsibility to protect other people from atrocity crimes

For

Since the formation of the modern state system in the mid-seventeenth century, certain influential legal philosophers have argued that states have a duty to protect non-citizens in danger of persecution and mass killings. Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century international lawyer, believed that sovereign states had a right to intervene to protect innocents abroad.

At the heart of RtoP is the basic right to security from the following atrocity crimes: war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The right to life and the right to security from violence are inalienable and independent from the fact of cultural diversity in world politics.

The 2005 World Summit codified RtoP in relation to a 'three pillars' framework. Pillar 1 stipulates that the host government has the primary responsibility to protect; Pillar 2 notes that other states and regional organizations have a responsibility to assist the host government when that assistance has been requested; and Pillar 3 requires that the international community take timely and decisive action, including force, providing coercive measures are supported by a Security Council Resolution.

A normative consensus exists. While most states reject the argument that they can be compelled to use force even as a last resort, there remains a high degree of consensus in international society that the other duties stipulated in the RtoP framework apply to all states all of the time.

Against

A so-called right of humanitarian intervention was largely rejected during the cold war despite several cases in which force was used to contain a worsening atrocity. These cases include India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971; Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978; and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979. Arguments against intervention include the negative impact it would have on international order.

The rules of the global order prohibit the use of force and intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state. RtoP puts into question two of the key articles in the UN Charter: non-intervention (Article 2.7) and non-use of force (Article 2.4).

The RtoP framework has largely been silenced during the Syria crisis, particularly given the disunity inside the UN Security Council. This shows that simply codifying sovereign states' obligations is not in itself sufficient to galvanize action.

RtoP supports the imperialist impulse. The history of UN peace operations in Africa has been closely tied to wars and conflicts generated by the retreat of European states in the era of decolonization. Given the prominence of the United States, Britain, and France on the UN Security Council, RtoP is seen by critical legal scholars as another regime of control exercised by wealthy Atlantic powers over countries in the Global South who have only become 'independent' in the era of the UN system (Orford 2011).

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1. Are critics of RtoP correct to argue that the framework established by the UN is yet another instrument to enable the Global North to control the Global South?

2. What, if anything, is new in the RtoP principle that the use of force should be a last resort?

3. Is there a risk of becoming fixated on 'Pillar 3' debates about the use of force, rather than thinking about the range of non-coercive measures that governments, and the international community, can use?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

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internationalism 3.0 requires a movement away from a sovereignty-based order towards one where global institutions become the new rulers of the world. While less tied to American power, the governance institutions of the future will nevertheless be driven by liberal values. The dilemma for Ikenberry is that liberal internationalism 2.0 is in crisis, yet 3.0 remains hopelessly unrealistic.

Given that liberalism has produced such unequal gains for the West and the rest, it is perhaps unsurprising that contemporary US-based liberal scholars have become preoccupied with the question of preserving the current order rather than reconstituting it according to

more just distributive principles. Rather than seeing reform as a task that wealthy Western countries have a responsibility to undertake, the use of Western power is more often equated with extending control of existing institutions, and protecting markets and securing access to precious resources. When a hegemonic liberal order comes under challenge, as it did on 9/11, the response was uncompromising. It is noticeable in this respect that former President George W. Bush framed the 'war on terror' in the language of liberal internationalism: he referred to the 2003 war against Iraq, for example, as 'freedom's war'.

The potential for liberal internationalism to embrace imperialism is a tendency that has a long history (**see Case Study 6.2**). Liberty enables the creation of wealth, which can trigger a drive to find new markets. And how are these new markets to be configured such that they are hospitable to the needs of the imperial power? Historically, professional militaries worked in tandem with the great trading companies to ensure favourable terms of trade. In this sense, US foreign policy in the post-1945 period has a close resemblance to the great expansionist republican states of the pre-modern period such as Athens and Rome.

Few liberals today would openly advocate territorial expansion along the lines of nineteenth-century European colonial powers; at the same time, many have been drawn to consider the virtues of informal empire as a way of delivering liberty in an insecure world. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, intellectuals in Washington and London advocated for a new liberal imperialism as a way of managing the security problem posed by failed and collapsing states. An influential voice in British foreign policy circles, Robert Cooper, openly regretted that the supply of imperial governance was at an all-time historic low at a moment when the demand for liberal imposition had never been greater. This was echoed by the influential Canadian intellectual Michael Ignatieff, who argued that only 'empire lite' can manage the chaos and catastrophes happening in many former colonized countries.

It is important to note that both mainstream scholarship on liberal internationalism and its critics agree that the sovereign state can no longer be relied on to sustain the institutions and purposes of the liberal order. While Ikenberry believes it is 'unrealistic' to expect states to cede sovereignty to the institutions of global governance, critics of liberal internationalism argue that such narratives about a post-sovereign state world are unjust. As Mazower (2012: 7) argues, the scale of Western military involvement around the world is such that 'we find ourselves once more in a hierarchical world in which some states are more sovereign than others'.

Case Study 6.2 Imperialism and internationalism in nineteenth-century Britain

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The life of J. S. Mill illustrates the ambivalent character of nineteenth-century liberal thinking in Britain. Mill was born in London in 1806 and became the intellectual protégé of Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian philosopher who coined the term 'international'. By mid-century, Mill was a dominant figure in Victorian intellectual life. He was no stranger to international issues and concerns; in fact, he was an employee of the East India Company for 35 years and later became a Member of Parliament at a time when Britain was at the height of its imperial power. Like many other Victorian intellectuals, Mill regarded liberal government as the highest stage of civilization.

A social reformer domestically, Mill was an imperialist internationally. He contrasted European liberal modes of governance with barbarism and savagery beyond Europe's boundaries. These two coexisting but opposite states of development required the existence of different moral codes. Among civilized countries, the only matter to be resolved was 'the question of interference' (Jahn 2006: 195). Between civilized and barbarian peoples, it was both necessary and proper to permit imperial—even despotic—systems of authority.

It became commonplace for Victorian intellectuals to divide international order into the three domains of 'civilized', 'semi-civilized', and 'barbaric'. As such distinctions entered the language of international law, they produced a highly stratified view of international society—one in which membership was based on race and religion. The consequences of this application of the standard of civilization to nineteenth-century diplomacy was 'horrible', to borrow Mark Mazower's description (2012: 72). By the century's end, Africa was reordered in ways that reflected the interests of the great colonial powers; such naked exploitation was justified by a mission to 'civilize' the 'savages'. Small wonder that one of the territories procured by King Leopold of Belgium in 1885, the Congo Free State, has been in such turmoil for the last two decades. With millions of civilians murdered, displaced, beaten, and raped, Congo is at the epicentre of what has been described as Africa's first world war. From the time of the Berlin Conference (1884–5) to today, imperialists and internationalists have conspired to colonize the territory, then decolonize it, and finally condemn it through neglect and moral indifference.

Question 1: Why do traditional accounts of empire separate imperialism from internationalism, yet world historians such as Mark Mazower bring them together?

Question 2: Despite the formal end of colonial rule, is there a new standard of civilization in international relations today? If so, how would you characterize it?

Key Points

- Some observers argue that the internationalist principles that have been a feature of the liberal order since 1945 are in crisis.

- The following arguments support this view: the relative power of the United States is diminishing and hence its capacity to deal with global risks is also reducing; rising powers want a greater share of authority; the hope that Europe could emerge as a second superpower which could strengthen internationalist rules and values has proven to be false; and there is widespread evidence of a return to a form of state sovereignty in which intervention on internationalist grounds will not find support in the UN Security Council or among the majority of member states in the UN.

- If Ikenberry is right and liberal internationalism is in decline, it is not clear what will replace it. If the liberal order

associated with the UN system collapses, then history will have repeated itself: in the first half of the twentieth century, great power rivalry led to major power wars which the League was powerless to prevent. If liberal internationalism 2.0 is reinvigorated, then global institutions will adapt to the challenge of new emerging powers without losing their distinctively liberal character.

- Alongside those who lament the inability of the state and global institutions to deliver a liberal peace are more critical voices who point out how structural patterns of hierarchy persist. These patterns are actively reproduced by security and development doctrines and policies. As a result, the liberal international order remains conveniently favourable to the most powerful states in the system.

Conclusion: incomplete, but indispensable, internationalism

The euphoria with which liberals greeted the end of the cold war in 1989 has dissipated. The pattern of conflict and insecurity present at the beginning of the twenty-first century suggests that liberal internationalism remains at best an incomplete project. At worst, internationalism continues to be imbued with an imperial impulse in which new schemes for governing the world reproduce patterns of dominance and dependence established during the era of empires. 'The history of internationalism', as Glenda Sluga argues, 'has always involved forgetting' (Sluga 2013: 45).

One response to the perceived crisis of liberal internationalism is *more* liberalism. This means not forgetting the fact that even during the high watermark of British imperial rule, liberalism not only justified empire, it provided the resources 'to launch stinging

critiques of it' (Bell 2016: 371). Stinging critiques are needed with respect to the on-going harms and atrocities that are experienced by vulnerable peoples—harms that can only be challenged using a language of universal rights and responsibilities.

Channelling the great nineteenth-century reformers, and the thinkers of the 'idealist moment' between the two World Wars, internationalists today need to be activists too. They should demand that international institutions be more effective, and insist that decisions are better when they are made democratically, that good governance requires transparency and fairness, that rights are irrelevant unless responsibilities are taken seriously, and that economic and social justice is critical to peaceful change on a global scale.

Questions

1. Do you agree with Stanley Hoffmann that international affairs are 'inhospitable' to liberalism?
2. What arguments might one draw on to support or refute this proposition?
3. Was E. H. Carr right to argue that the language of international morality, used by liberal idealists in the inter-war period, was a convenient way of masking the interests of Britain and France in maintaining their dominance of the international system after the First World War?
4. Should liberal internationalists promote their values abroad? Is force a legitimate instrument in securing this goal?
5. Is the ascendancy of democratic regimes explained by the superiority of liberal institutions and values?
6. Is liberal internationalism too wedded to a state-centric view of international relations?
7. What does RtoP tell us about rights and responsibilities in the global order?
8. What explains the imperial impulse in the liberal internationalist tradition?

9. Is the liberal order in crisis today, as G. John Ikenberry and G. Sørensen argue?
10. Are emerging global powers a threat to the liberal international order?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Armitage, D. (2011), 'Globalising Jeremy Bentham', *History of Political Thought*, 32(1): 63–82. Offers a rich account of Bentham's soaring ambition as a public intellectual and moral philosopher, and shows how his hopes of creating a 'universal jurisprudence' were dashed by developments in nineteenth-century international law.

Bell, D. (2016), *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Provides detailed portraits of leading Victorian-era thinkers, including Mill, Spencer, and Hobhouse, and their efforts to advance free trade, liberty, and the rule of law, while at the same time defending the civilizing mission of the British Empire.

Chakrabarty, D. (2000), *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). See the Introduction to the book, in which the author talks about Western thinking on modernity as being both 'inadequate' and 'indispensable' (16). Note how the argument in this chapter appropriates Chakrabarty's terms to chart a course between the attractions of internationalism and its many flaws.

Doyle, M. W. (1997), *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: W. W. Norton). Doyle classifies liberalism into the following strands: liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and liberal internationalism.

Dunne, T., and Flockhart, T. (eds) (2013), *Liberal World Orders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/British Academy). Critical reflections on liberal world orders by leading IR scholars, including Emanuel Adler, Richard Devetak, Stefano Guzzini, John Hobson, Kim Hutchings, and Christopher Reus-Smit.

Ikenberry, G. J. (2009), 'Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order', *Perspectives in Politics*, 71(1): 71–87. A pivotal case for the reform of the post-1945 order, by an influential liberal thinker.

Mazower, M. (2012), *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Press). A brilliant study of liberal internationalist policies and programmes. It traces governance back to the early nineteenth century and shows how many of the flaws in the current global order have causes that reach far back into history.

Morefield, J. (2009), *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). An excellent contemporary account of liberal thought in the inter-war period that also touches on the return to empire by some contemporary intellectuals who should know better.

Orford, A. (2011), *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An excellent critical account of the history of human protection.

Sørensen, G. (2011), *A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing Between Imposition and Restraint* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A good account of the division within liberalism between advocates of 'imposition' and advocates of 'restraint'.

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Chapter 7

Marxist theories of international relations

STEPHEN HOBDEN · RICHARD WYN JONES

Framing Questions

- Is the analysis of 'class' just as important as the analysis of 'state' for our understanding of global politics?

- Is globalization a new phenomenon or a long-standing feature of capitalist development?

- Is 'crisis' an inevitable feature of capitalism, and if so, does this mean that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction?

Reader's Guide

This chapter introduces, outlines, and assesses the Marxist contribution to the study of international relations. It first identifies a number of core features common to Marxist approaches and then discusses how Marx's ideas were internationalized by Lenin and subsequently by writers in the world-system framework. It then examines how Frankfurt School critical theory, and Gramsci and his various followers, introduced an analysis of culture into Marxist analysis, and, more recently, how new (or orthodox) Marxists have sought a more profound re-engagement with Marx's original writings. The chapter argues that no analysis of globalization is complete without an input from Marxist theory. Indeed, Marx was arguably the first theorist of globalization, and from the perspective of Marxism, the features often pointed to as evidence of globalization are hardly novel, but are rather the modern manifestations of long-term tendencies in the development of capitalism.

Introduction

When the **cold war** ended in the late 1980s with the defeat of communism and the victory of global 'free market **capitalism**', it became commonplace to assume that the ideas of Karl Marx and his numerous disciples could be safely consigned to the dustbin of history. Even if communist parties retained **power** in China, Vietnam, and Cuba, they no longer constituted a threat to the **hegemony** of the global capitalist system. Indeed, the way that these parties had been forced to adapt themselves to capitalism in order to retain power only served to underline the sense that, as far as the market was concerned, resistance was futile. The future was liberal and capitalist. Marxism had proven to be a dead end.

That was then. A generation later, things appear very different. Even if its mortal enemy appeared utterly defeated, the problems of capitalism have persisted. Not only do the regular crises that characterize capitalism continue to wreak havoc, but the ever-deepening crisis that is humanity's relationship with the natural world raises fundamental concerns about the sustainability of our current patterns of production and consumption. Of ever increasing concern, also, are the ethics of a world in which massive global corporations harvest information about the most intimate habits and behaviours of private individuals as part of their ingenious efforts to persuade the already sated to buy more of what they do not really need. This when even the most basic needs of many hundreds of millions of our fellow humans remain unfulfilled (**see Case Study 7.1**).

Case Study 7.1   The Naxalite Rebellion in India

Supporters of Naxalite group, People's War
© PRAKASH SINGH / AFP / Getty Images

India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and a member of the BRICS organization. Yet it also remains the site of one of the world's longest-running peasant rebellions, strongly influenced by Marxist ideology. The term 'Naxalite' originates from the village of Naxalbari in Western Bengal. In 1967, a peasant uprising erupted in which landlords were attacked, land occupied, records burnt, and old debts cancelled. This uprising was a source of inspiration to revolutionaries across India, and in particular to students in the urban areas. Since then the term 'Naxalite' has been used to describe a variety of groups active mainly in rural India that draw inspiration from Marx and, in particular, the example of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party.

Ideologically, the Naxalite rebellion can be traced to splits in the Communist Party of India (CPI). In 1964, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) emerged from the CPI as a more radical offshoot determinedly committed to fighting the kind of protracted 'people's war' advocated by Mao; a revolutionary struggle based predominantly on the rural peasantry rather than the urban proletariat, the classic subject of Marxist agitation. The rebellion has gone through several waves or cycles, with periods of growth and enhanced activity by Naxalites prompting severe and invariably brutal clampdowns by the Indian security forces.

Naxalites view India as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state, and in parts of the so-called 'red corridor' traversing some of the states of eastern India, they have sought to establish their own 'liberated areas' where landlords have been driven out, people's courts created, and programmes initiated to empower and mobilize the rural poor. These programmes have been accompanied by equally brutal purges of so-called 'class enemies' including landlords, rich peasants, government employees, and suspected informers.

In 2004, two of the main revolutionary groups combined to create the Communist Party of India (Maoist). A party statement describes its aim as 'to accomplish the New Democratic Revolution in India by overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism … through the Protracted People's War'. However, since 2006 when the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described Naxalism as 'the greatest internal security threat to our country', the number of areas of activity of the Naxalites appears to have decreased significantly. Given, however, that the Naxalites have been pushed back in the past only to reappear, it seems likely that any setback will be temporary, particularly given the desperate levels of deprivation in many of those areas in which they have previously been most active, as well as the persistence of caste differences and discrimination against so-called 'tribal' populations.

Question 1: What is the Naxalite movement and why did it emerge?

Question 2: How does the Naxalite analysis differ from a traditional Marxist approach?

Not only that, but resistance to capitalism has continued and even taken on new forms. In many states, traditional 'moderate' left-centre political parties have either been radicalized in their opposition to the capitalist system (for example, the British Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn) or have been partially or wholly displaced by newer more radical parties (for example, Greece; **see Case Study 7.2**), many of which stress their green credentials. New social movements emerge with almost dizzying regularity. All the while, countless millions attempt to modify their own behaviour in order to try to take a stand against the relentless waste and commodification of daily life.

Against this background, Marx is back as an intellectual force to be reckoned with. This is not only because there are some uncanny parallels between his own times and our own—both periods of huge technological, socio-economic, and political turmoil and

transformation (for Marx's life and times, see Liedman 2018). More fundamentally, Marx's forensic examination of both the extraordinary dynamism and inherent contradictions of capitalism has arguably never been improved upon. Its great strength is that it allows us to see how so many apparently different crises and instances of resistance, from the global to the most personal and local, link together. Thus, even if Marx and Marxism failed to supply a prescription that would guarantee progressive social change, as a diagnosis of what ails us, they remain essential tools for those who continue to strive for that goal.

Compared to liberalism and realism (**see Chs 6 and 8**), Marxist thought presents a rather unfamiliar view of international relations. While the former portray world politics in ways that resonate with those presented in the foreign news pages of our newspapers and magazines, Marxist theories aim to expose a deeper,

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Case Study 7.2 Greece and the disciplining power of capitalism

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A core conclusion of Marx's analysis of capitalism was that it would be subject to recurrent crises. Such a crisis has engulfed the world economy since 2008. The impact of the crisis on Greece has been particularly severe, imposing serious hardship on the most vulnerable members of society. Events in Greece also provide a glaring example of the power of global capitalism to achieve its ends, or what Stephen Gill has described as 'disciplinary neoliberalism' (S. Gill 1995). David Harvey (2010: 10) has nicely summarized this process as 'privatise profits and socialise risks; save the banks and put the screws on the people'.

The experience of Greece, even when following the election of a supposedly radical government, underscores the practical difficulty—perhaps even impossibility—of posing a frontal challenge to the prevailing order. There, a heavily indebted government was put under extreme pressure by its fellow eurozone members to slash public spending. Predictably, this in turn led to dramatic cuts in wages and levels of social protection, as well as extremely high levels of unemployment. Greece experienced several years of austerity imposed by the European Union and

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the price for continuing to support the financing of the country. As a result of austerity measures, wages in Greece fell by more than a third, pensions were cut by nearly a half, the country's gross domestic product fell by a quarter, and unemployment rose to 26 per cent. The resulting crisis led to a fracturing of the traditional party system, eventually propelling the 'far left' Syriza to power in January 2015. Syriza came to power on an anti-austerity mandate that rejected the bailout conditions that had been imposed by the European Union. After the election, the Syriza government held further negotiations with the so-called 'troika' (the European Commission, European Central Bank, and the IMF). Following these negotiations, the terms demanded by the troika were put to the Greek people in a referendum on 5 July 2015. Sixty-one per cent of the voters rejected the package. This vote and the actions of the Syriza government appeared to be a beacon for anti-austerity movements globally, and evidence of active resistance to global capitalism. Yet just five days after the referendum, the Syriza government proposed a package of austerity measures identical to the ones that the outcome of the referendum had rejected. Why had this happened? The troika made it clear that failure to implement the austerity package would be incompatible with continued membership of the Euro and the European Union itself. Faced with the choice of implementing the neoliberal discipline of the eurozone or possible economic collapse outside the single European currency, Syriza chose the former. While Marxist-inspired critiques of capitalism abound, viable alternatives are seemingly in much shorter supply.

Question 1: What was the background to the election of Syriza in Greece in January 2015?

Question 2: What explains the decision of Syriza to proceed with austerity measures even after they had been decisively rejected in a referendum of the Greek people?

underlying—indeed hidden—truth. This is that the familiar events of world politics—wars, treaties, international aid operations—all occur within structures that have an enormous influence on those events. These are the structures of a global capitalist system. Any attempt to understand world politics must be based on a broader understanding of the processes operating in global capitalism.

In addition to presenting an unfamiliar view of world politics, Marxist theories are also discomfiting, for they argue that the effects of global capitalism are to ensure that the powerful and wealthy prosper at the expense of the powerless and the poor. We are all aware that there is gross inequality in the world, and that the gap between the richest and poorest is expanding at an accelerating rate (Oxfam 2018). Statistics concerning the human costs of **poverty** are numbing in their awfulness (global poverty is further discussed in

Ch. 26). Marxist theorists argue that the relative prosperity of the few is dependent on the destitution of the many. In Marx's own words, 'Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality at the opposite pole.'

The next section outlines some of the central features of the Marxist approach—or historical materialism, as it is often known. Following from this, subsequent sections will explore some of the most important strands in contemporary Marx-inspired thinking about world politics. Given, however, the richness and variety of Marxist thinking about world politics, the account that follows is inevitably destined to be partial and to some extent arbitrary. Our aim is to provide a route map that we hope will encourage readers to explore further the work of Marx and of those who have built on the foundations he laid.

The essential elements of Marxist theories of world politics

In his inaugural address to the Working Men's International Association in London in 1864, Karl Marx told his audience that history had 'taught the working classes the duty to master [for] themselves the mysteries of international politics'. However, despite the fact that Marx himself wrote copiously about international affairs (see K. Anderson 2010), most of this writing was journalistic in character. He did not incorporate the international dimension into his theoretical mapping of the contours of capitalism. This 'omission' should perhaps not surprise us. The staggering ambition of the theoretical enterprise in which he was engaged, as well as the nature of his own methodology, inevitably meant that Marx's work would be contingent and unfinished.

Marx was an enormously prolific writer, and his ideas developed and changed over time. Hence it is not surprising that his legacy has been open to numerous interpretations. In addition, real-world developments have also led to the revision of his ideas in the light of experience. Various schools of thought have emerged that claim Marx as a direct inspiration, or whose work can be linked to Marx's legacy. Before discussing what is distinctive about these approaches, it is important to examine the essential common elements that connect them.

First, all the theorists discussed in this chapter share with Marx the view that the social world should be analysed as a totality. The academic division of the social

world into different areas of enquiry—history, philosophy, economics, political science, sociology, international relations, etc.—is both arbitrary and unhelpful. None can be understood without knowledge of the others: the social world has to be studied as a whole. Given the scale and complexity of the social world, this exhortation clearly makes great demands of the analyst. Nonetheless, for Marxist theorists, the disciplinary boundaries that characterize the contemporary social sciences need to be transcended if we are to generate a proper understanding of the dynamics of world politics.

Another key element of Marxist thought is the materialist conception of history. The central contention here is that processes of historical change are ultimately a reflection of the economic development of society. That is, economic development is effectively the motor of history. The central dynamic that Marx identifies is tension between the **means of production** and **relations of production** that together form the economic base of a given society. As the means of production develop, for example through technological advancement, previous relations of production become outmoded, and indeed become fetters restricting the most effective utilization of the new productive capacity. This in turn leads to a process of social change whereby relations of production are transformed in order to better accommodate the new configuration of means. Developments in the economic base act as a catalyst for the broader

Figure 7.1 The base–superstructure model

transformation of society as a whole. This is because, as Marx argues in the Preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, 'the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general' (Marx 1970 [1859]: 20–1). Thus the legal, political, and cultural **institutions** and practices of a given society reflect and reinforce—in a more or less mediated form—the pattern of power and control in the economy. It follows logically, therefore, that change in the economic base ultimately leads to change in the 'legal and political superstructure'. (For a diagrammatical representation of the base–superstructure model, **see Fig. 7.1**.) The relationship between the base and superstructure is one of the key areas of discussion in Marxism, and for critics of Marxist approaches.

Class plays a key role in Marxist analysis. In contrast to liberals, who believe that there is an essential harmony of interest between various social groups, Marxists hold that society is systematically prone to class conflict. Indeed, in the *Communist Manifesto*, which Marx co-authored with Engels, it is argued that 'the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle' (Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]). In capitalist society, the main axis of conflict is between the bourgeoisie (the capitalists) and the proletariat (the workers).

Despite his commitment to rigorous scholarship, Marx did not think it either possible or desirable for the analyst to remain a detached or neutral observer of this great clash between capital and labour. He argued that 'philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it'. Marx

was committed to the cause of **emancipation**. He was not interested in developing an understanding of the dynamics of capitalist society simply for the sake of it. Rather, he expected such an understanding to make it easier to overthrow the prevailing order and replace it with a communist society—a society in which wage labour and private property are abolished and social relations transformed.

It is important to emphasize that the essential elements of Marxist thought, all too briefly discussed in this section, are also fundamentally contested. That is, they are subject to much discussion and disagreement even among contemporary writers who have been influenced by Marxist writings. There is disagreement as to how these ideas and concepts should be interpreted and how they should be put into operation. Analysts also differ over which elements of Marxist thought are most relevant, which have been proven to be mistaken, and which should now be considered as outmoded or in need of radical overhaul. Moreover, they diverge substantially in terms of their attitudes to the legacy of Marx's ideas. The work of the new Marxists, for example, draws more directly on Marx's original ideas than does the work of the critical theorists.

> **Key Points**
>
> - Marx himself provided little in terms of a theoretical analysis of international relations.
> - Marx's ideas have been interpreted and appropriated in a number of different and contradictory ways, resulting in a number of competing schools of Marxism.
> - Underlying these different schools are several common elements that can be traced back to Marx's writings: a commitment to analysis of the social world as a totality, a materialist conception of history, and a focus on class and class struggle.
> - For Marx and Marxists, scholarship is not a disinterested activity: the ultimate aim is to assist in a process of human emancipation.

Marx internationalized: from imperialism to world-systems theory

Although Marx was clearly aware of the international and expansive character of capitalism, his key work, *Capital*, focuses on the development and characteristics of nineteenth-century British capitalism. At the start of the twentieth century a number of writers took on the task of developing analyses that incorporated

the implications of capitalism's transborder characteristics, in particular **imperialism** (see Brewer 1990). Rosa Luxemburg was a major contributor to these debates. Her 1913 book, *The Accumulation of Capital* (Luxemburg 2003 [1913]), argued that by analysing capitalism as a closed system, Marx had overlooked

the central role played by the colonies. In order to survive, Luxemburg argued, capitalism constantly needed to expand into non-capitalist areas. A 1917 pamphlet by Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, made similar arguments. Lenin accepted much of Marx's basic thesis, but argued that the character of capitalism had changed since Marx published the first volume of *Capital* in 1867 (Marx 1992 [1867]). Capitalism had entered a new stage—its highest and final stage—with the development of monopoly capitalism. Under monopoly capitalism, a two-tier structure had developed in the world economy, with a dominant core exploiting a less-developed periphery**.** With the development of a core and periphery, there was no longer an automatic **harmony of interests** between all workers as posited by Marx. The bourgeoisie in the core countries could use profits derived from exploiting the periphery to improve the lot of their own proletariat. In other words, the capitalists of the core could pacify their own working class through the further exploitation of the periphery.

Lenin's views were taken up by the Latin American Dependency School, adherents of which developed the notion of core and periphery in greater depth. In particular, Raúl Prebisch (1949) argued that countries in the periphery were suffering as a result of what he called 'the declining **terms of trade**'. He suggested that the price of manufactured goods increased more rapidly than that of raw materials. So, for example, year by year it requires more tons of coffee to pay for a refrigerator. As a result of their economies' reliance on raw material production, countries of the periphery become poorer relative to the core. Other writers such as André Gunder Frank (1967) and Henrique Fernando Cardoso (who was President of Brazil from 1995 to 2003), developed this analysis further to show how the development of less industrialized countries was directly 'dependent' on the more advanced capitalist societies. It is from the framework developed by such writers that contemporary world-systems theory emerged.

World-systems theory is particularly associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein. For Wallerstein, global history has been marked by the rise and demise of a series of world systems. The modern world system emerged in Europe at around the turn of the sixteenth century. It subsequently expanded to encompass the entire globe. The driving force behind this seemingly relentless process of expansion and incorporation has been capitalism, defined by Wallerstein (1979: 66) as 'a system of production for sale in a market for profit and

appropriation of this profit on the basis of individual or collective ownership'. In the context of this system, all the institutions of the social world are continually being created and recreated. Furthermore, and crucially, it is not only the elements within the system that change. The system itself is historically bounded. It had a beginning, has a middle, and will have an end.

In terms of the geography of the modern world system, in addition to a core–periphery distinction, Wallerstein added an intermediate semi-periphery, which displays certain features characteristic of the core and others characteristic of the periphery. Although dominated by core economic interests, the semi-periphery has its own relatively vibrant indigenously owned industrial base (**see Fig. 7.2**). Because of this hybrid nature, the semi-periphery plays important economic and political roles in the modern world system. In particular, it provides a source of labour that counteracts any upward pressure on wages in the core. It also offers a new home for those industries that can no longer function profitably in the core (e.g. car assembly and textiles). The semi-periphery also plays a vital role in stabilizing the political structure of the world system.

According to world-systems theorists, the three zones of the world economy are linked together in an exploitative relationship in which wealth is drained away from the periphery to the core. As a consequence, the relative positions of the zones become ever more

Figure 7.2   Interrelationships in the world economy

deeply entrenched: the rich get richer while the poor become poorer.

Together, the core, semi-periphery, and periphery make up the geographic dimension of the world economy. However, described in isolation they provide a rather static portrayal of the world system. A key component of Wallerstein's analysis has been to describe how world systems have a distinctive life cycle: a beginning, a middle, and an end. In this sense, the capitalist world system is no different from any other system that has preceded it. Controversially, Wallerstein (1995) argues that the end of the cold war, rather than marking a triumph for liberalism, indicates that the current system has entered its 'end' phase—a period of crisis that will end only when it is replaced by another system. On Wallerstein's reading, such a period of crisis is also a time of opportunity. In a time of crisis, actors have far greater agency to determine the character of the replacement structure. Much of Wallerstein's recent work has been an attempt to develop a political programme to promote a new world system that is more equitable and just than the current one (Wallerstein 1998, 1999, 2006; see also Wallerstein et al. 2013). From this perspective, to focus on **globalization** is to ignore what is truly novel about the contemporary era. Indeed, for Wallerstein, current globalization discourse represents a 'gigantic misreading of current reality' (Wallerstein 2003: 45). The phenomena evoked by 'globalization' are manifestations of a world system that emerged in **Europe** during the sixteenth century to incorporate the entire globe: a world system now in terminal decline.

Feminist Marxists have also played a significant role in theorizing the development of an international capitalist system. A particular concern of feminist writers (often drawing their inspiration from Engels's 1884 work *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*) has been the role of women, both in the workplace and as the providers of domestic labour necessary for the reproduction of capitalism. For example, Maria Mies (1998 [1986]) argued that women play a central role in the maintenance of capitalist relations. There is, she argues, a **sexual** (or one could say **gendered**) **division of labour**: first, women in the developed world working as housewives, whose labour is unpaid but vital in maintaining and reproducing the labour force; and second, women in the developing world as a source of cheap labour. Women, she later argued, were the 'last colony' (Mies, Bennholdt-Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988), a view that can be traced back to Rosa Luxemburg's claim regarding the role of the colonies in international capitalism (Luxemburg 2003 [1913]).

In the wake of the attacks of **9/11**, and the subsequent response by the US administration of George W. Bush, questions of imperialism returned to the political and academic agenda. A number of authors called for the creation of a new empire with the United States at its centre, supposedly recreating the stabilizing and positive role that Britain had played in the nineteenth century (Ferguson 2003). A number of Marxist-influenced authors responded with critiques both of empire and of US foreign policy after 9/11 (for example, Harvey 2003).

> ### Key Points
>
> - Marxist theorists have consistently developed an analysis of the global aspects of international capitalism—an aspect acknowledged by Marx, but not developed in *Capital*.
> - World-systems theory can be seen as a direct development of Lenin's work on imperialism and the Latin American Dependency School.
> - According to world-systems theorists, the three zones of the world economy—the core, periphery and semi-periphery—are linked together in an exploitative relationship in which wealth is drained away from the periphery to the core.
> - Feminist writers have contributed to the analysis of international capitalism by focusing on the specific roles of women.

Gramscianism

Antonio Gramsci—the importance of hegemony

This section examines the strand of Marxist theory that has emerged from the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci's work has become particularly influential in the study of international political economy, where a neo-Gramscian or 'Italian' school is flourishing. Here we shall discuss Gramsci's legacy and the work of Robert W. Cox, the contemporary theorist who did most to introduce his work to an International Relations audience.

Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was a Sardinian and one of the founding members of the Italian Communist

Party. He was jailed in 1926 for his political activities and spent the remainder of his life in prison. Although many regard him as the most creative Marxist thinker of the twentieth century, he produced no single, integrated theoretical treatise. Rather, his intellectual legacy has been transmitted primarily through his remarkable *Prison Notebooks* (Gramsci 1971). The key question that animated Gramsci's theoretical work was: why had it proven to be so difficult to promote revolution in Western Europe? After all, Marx had predicted that revolution, and the transition to socialism, would occur first in the most advanced capitalist societies. But, in the event, it was the Bolsheviks of comparatively backward Russia that had made the first 'breakthrough', while all the subsequent efforts by putative revolutionaries in Western and Central Europe to emulate their success ended in failure. The history of the early twentieth century seemed to suggest, therefore, that there was a flaw in classical Marxist analysis. But where had they gone wrong?

Gramsci's answer revolved around his use of the concept of hegemony, his understanding of which reflected his broader conceptualization of power. Gramsci developed Machiavelli's view of power as a centaur—half beast, half man—a mixture of coercion and consent. In understanding how the prevailing order was maintained, Marxists had concentrated almost exclusively on the coercive practices and capabilities of the state. On this understanding, it was simply coercion, or the fear of coercion, that kept the exploited and alienated majority in society from rising up and overthrowing the system that was the cause of their suffering. Gramsci recognized that while this characterization may have held true in less developed societies, such as pre-revolutionary Russia, it was not the case in the more developed countries of the West. Here the system was also maintained through consent.

Consent, on Gramsci's reading, is created and recreated by the hegemony of the ruling class in society. It is this hegemony that allows the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant group to become widely dispersed throughout society and to be accepted by subordinate groups and classes as their own. This takes place through the institutions of civil society: the network of institutions and practices that enjoy some autonomy from the state, and through which groups and individuals organize, represent, and express themselves to each other and to the state (for example, the media, the education system, churches, and voluntary organizations).

Several important implications flow from this analysis. The first is that Marxist theory needs to take superstructural phenomena seriously, because while the structure of society may ultimately be a reflection of social relations of production in the economic base, the nature of relations in the superstructure is of great relevance in determining how susceptible that society is to change and transformation. Gramsci used the term 'historic bloc' to describe the mutually reinforcing and reciprocal relationships between the socio-economic relations (base) and political and cultural practices (superstructure) that together underpin a given order. For Gramsci and Gramscians, to reduce analysis to the narrow consideration of economic relationships, on the one hand, or solely to politics and ideas, on the other, is deeply mistaken. It is their interaction that matters.

Gramsci's argument also has crucial implications for political practice. If the hegemony of the ruling class is a key element in the perpetuation of its dominance, then society can only be transformed if that hegemonic position is successfully challenged. This entails a counter-hegemonic struggle in civil society, in which the prevailing hegemony is undermined, allowing an alternative historic bloc to be constructed.

Gramsci's writing reflects a particular time and a particular—and in many ways unique—set of circumstances. This has led several writers to question the broader applicability of his ideas (see Burnham 1991; Germain and Kenny 1998). But the most important test, of course, is how useful ideas and concepts derived from Gramsci's work prove to be when they are removed from their original context and applied to other issues and problems. It is to this that the chapter now turns.

Robert W. Cox—the analysis of 'world order'

It was the Canadian scholar Robert W. Cox (1926–2018) who arguably did most to introduce Gramsci to the study of world politics. He developed a Gramscian approach that involves both a critique of prevailing theories of international relations and international political economy, and the development of an alternative framework for the analysis of world politics.

To explain Cox's ideas, we begin by focusing on one particular sentence in his seminal 1981 article, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'. The sentence, which has become one of the most often-quoted lines in all of contemporary International Relations theory, reads: 'Theory is always for some one, and for some purpose' (R. Cox

1981: 128). It expresses a worldview that follows logically from the Gramscian, and broader Marxist, position that has been explored in this chapter. If ideas and values are (ultimately) a reflection of a particular set of social relations, and are transformed as those relations are themselves transformed, then this suggests that all knowledge (of the social world at least) must reflect a certain context, a certain time, a certain space. Knowledge, in other words, cannot be objective and timeless in the sense that some contemporary realists, for example, would like to claim.

One key implication of this is that there can be no simple separation between facts and values. Whether consciously or not, all theorists inevitably bring their values to bear on their analysis. This leads Cox to suggest that we need to look closely at each of those theories, those ideas, those analyses that claim to be objective or value-free, and ask who or what is it for, and what purpose does it serve? He subjected realism, and in particular its contemporary variant **neorealism**, to thoroughgoing critique on these grounds. According to Cox, these theories are for—or serve the interests of—those who prosper under the prevailing order: the inhabitants of the developed states, and in particular the ruling elites. The purpose of these theories, whether consciously or not, is to reinforce and legitimate the status quo. They do this by making the current configuration of international relations appear natural and immutable. When realists (falsely) claim to be describing the world as it is, as it has been, and as it always will be, what they are in fact doing is reinforcing the ruling hegemony in the current world order.

Cox contrasted problem-solving theory (that is, theory that accepts the parameters of the present order, and thus helps legitimate an unjust and deeply iniquitous system) with **critical theory**. Critical theory attempts to challenge the prevailing order by seeking out, analysing, and, where possible, assisting social processes that can potentially lead to emancipatory change.

One way in which theory can contribute to these emancipatory goals is by developing a theoretical understanding of world orders that grasps both the sources of stability in a given system, and also the dynamics of processes of transformation. In this context, Cox drew on Gramsci's notion of hegemony and transposes it to the international realm, arguing that hegemony is as important for maintaining stability and continuity there as it is at the domestic level. According to Cox, successive dominant powers in the international system have shaped a world order that suits their interests, and have done so not only as a result of their coercive capabilities, but also because they have managed to generate broad consent for that order, even among those who are disadvantaged by it.

For the two hegemons that Cox analyses (the UK and the US), the ruling hegemonic idea has been 'free trade'. The claim that this system benefits everybody has been so widely accepted that it has attained 'common sense' status. Yet the reality is that while 'free trade' is very much in the interests of the hegemon (which, as the most efficient producer in the global economy, can produce goods which are competitive in all markets, so long as it has access to them), its benefits for peripheral states and regions are far less apparent. Indeed, many would argue that 'free trade' is a hindrance to their economic and social development. The degree to which a state can successfully produce and reproduce its hegemony is an indication of the extent of its power. The success of the United States in gaining worldwide acceptance for neoliberalism suggests just how dominant the current hegemon has become.

But despite the dominance of the present world order, Cox did not expect it to remain unchallenged. Rather, he maintained Marx's view that capitalism is an inherently unstable system, riven by inescapable contradictions. Inevitable economic crises will act as a catalyst for the emergence of counter-hegemonic movements (**see Case Study 7.2**). The success of such movements is, however, far from assured. In this sense, thinkers such as Cox face the future on the basis of a dictum popularized by Gramsci—that is, combining 'pessimism of the intellect' with 'optimism of the will'.

Key Points

- Drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci for inspiration, writers in an 'Italian' school of International Relations have made a considerable contribution to thinking about world politics.

- Gramsci shifted the focus of Marxist analysis more towards superstructural phenomena.

- In particular, Gramsci explored the processes by which consent for a particular social and political system was produced and reproduced through the operation of hegemony. Hegemony allows the ideas and ideologies of the ruling stratum to become widely dispersed, and widely accepted, throughout society.

- Thinkers such as Robert W. Cox have attempted to 'internationalize' Gramsci's thought by transposing several of his key concepts, most notably hegemony, to the global context.

Critical theory

Both Gramscianism and critical theory have their roots in Western Europe in the 1920s and 1930s—a place and a time in which Marxism was forced to come to terms not only with the failure of a series of attempted revolutionary uprisings, but also with the rise of fascism. However, contemporary critical theory and Gramscian thought about international relations draw on the ideas of different thinkers, with differing intellectual concerns. There is a clear difference in focus between these two strands of Marxist thought, with those influenced by Gramsci tending to be much more concerned with issues relating to the subfield of international political economy than critical theorists. Critical theorists, on the other hand, have involved themselves with questions concerning **international society**, international ethics, and **security** (the latter through the development of critical security studies). This section introduces critical theory and the thought of one of its main proponents in the field of International Relations, Andrew Linklater.

Critical theory developed out of the work of the **Frankfurt School**. This was an extraordinarily talented group of thinkers who began to work together in the 1920s and 1930s. As left-wing German Jews, the members of the school were forced into exile by the Nazis' rise to power in the early 1930s, and much of their most creative work was produced in the US. The leading lights of the first generation of the Frankfurt School included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. A subsequent generation has taken up the legacy of these thinkers and developed it in important and innovative ways. The best known is Jürgen Habermas, who is regarded by many as the most influential of all contemporary social theorists. Given the vast scope of critical theory writing, this section can do no more than introduce some of its key features.

The first point to note is that their intellectual concerns are rather different from those of most other Marxists: they have not been much interested in the further development of analysis of the economic base of society. They have instead concentrated on questions relating to culture, bureaucracy, the social basis and nature of authoritarianism, and the structure of the family, and on exploring such concepts as reason and **rationality** as well as theories of knowledge. Frankfurt School theorists have been particularly innovative in terms of their analysis of the role of the media, and what they have famously termed the 'culture industry'.

In other words, in classical Marxist terms, the focus of critical theory is almost entirely superstructural.

Another key feature is that critical theorists have been highly dubious as to whether the proletariat in contemporary society does in fact embody the potential for emancipatory transformation in the way that Marx believed. Rather, with the rise of mass culture and the increasing commodification of every element of social life, Frankfurt School thinkers have argued that the working class has simply been absorbed by the system and no longer represents a threat to it. This, to use Marcuse's famous phrase, is a one-dimensional society, to which the vast majority simply cannot begin to conceive an alternative.

Finally, critical theorists have made some of their most important contributions through their explorations of the meaning of emancipation. Emancipation, as we have seen, is a key concern of Marxist thinkers, but the meaning that they give to the term is often very unclear and deeply ambiguous. Moreover, the historical record is unfortunately replete with examples of unspeakably barbaric behaviour being justified in the name of emancipation, of which imperialism and Stalinism are but two. Traditionally, Marxists have equated emancipation with the process of humanity gaining ever greater mastery over nature through the development of ever more sophisticated technology, and its use for the benefit of all. But early critical theorists argued that humanity's increased domination over nature had been bought at too high a price, claiming that the kind of mind-set that is required for conquering nature slips all too easily into the domination of other human beings. In contrast, they argued that emancipation had to be conceived of in terms of a reconciliation with nature—an evocative, if admittedly vague, vision. By contrast, Habermas's understanding of emancipation is more concerned with communication than with our relationship with the natural world. Setting aside the various twists and turns of his argument, Habermas's central political point is that the route to emancipation lies through radical democracy—a system in which the widest possible participation is encouraged not only in word (as is the case in many Western democracies) but also in deed, by actively identifying barriers to participation—be they social, economic, or cultural—and overcoming them. For Habermas and his many followers, participation is

not to be confined within the borders of a particular sovereign state. Rights and obligations extend beyond state frontiers. This, of course, leads Habermas directly to the concerns of International Relations, and it is striking that his recent writings have begun to focus on the international realm. In particular, he has become an impassioned defender of European integration. However, thus far, the most systematic attempt to think through some of the key issues in world politics from a recognizably Habermasian perspective has been made by Andrew Linklater.

Linklater has used some of the key principles and precepts developed in Habermas's work to argue that emancipation in the realm of international relations should be understood in terms of the expansion of the moral boundaries of a **political community** (**see Ch. 11**). In other words, he equates emancipation with a process in which the borders of the sovereign state lose their ethical and moral significance. At present, state borders denote the furthest extent of our sense of duty and obligation, or at best, the point where our sense of duty and obligation is radically transformed, only proceeding in a very attenuated form. For critical theorists, this situation is simply indefensible. Their goal is therefore to move towards a situation in which citizens share the same duties and obligations towards non-citizens as they do towards their fellow citizens.

To arrive at such a situation would, of course, entail a wholesale transformation of the present institutions of governance. But an important element of the critical theory method is to identify—and, if possible, to

nurture—tendencies that exist in the present conjuncture that point in the direction of emancipation. On this basis, Linklater (very much echoing Habermas in this regard) identifies the development of the European Union as representing a progressive or emancipatory tendency in contemporary world politics. If true, this suggests that an important part of the international system is entering an era in which the sovereign state, which has for so long claimed an exclusive hold on its citizens, is beginning to lose some of its pre-eminence. Given the notorious pessimism of the thinkers of the Frankfurt School, the guarded optimism of Linklater in this context is indeed striking.

Key Points

- Critical theory has its roots in the work of the Frankfurt School.
- Critical theorists have tended to focus their attention on culture (in particular the role of the media), bureaucracy, the social basis and nature of authoritarianism, and the structure of the family, and on exploring such concepts as reason and rationality.
- Jürgen Habermas is the most influential contemporary advocate of critical theory; he advocates radical democracy as a means of unlocking the emancipatory potential inherent in the realm of communication.
- Andrew Linklater has developed critical theory themes to argue in favour of the expansion of the moral boundaries of the political community, and has pointed to the European Union as an example of a post-Westphalian institution of governance.

New Marxism

'New Marxists'

This section examines the work of writers who derive their ideas more directly from Marx's own writings. To indicate that they represent something of a departure from other Marxist and post-Marxist trends, we have termed them 'new Marxists'. They themselves might well prefer to be described as 'historical materialists' (one of the key academic journals associated with this approach is called *Historical Materialism*); however, as that is a self-description which has also been adopted by some Gramsci-inspired writers, the appellation may not be particularly helpful for our present purposes. At any rate, even if there is (at present) no settled label for this group of scholars, the fundamental approach that they embody

is not hard to characterize. They are Marxists who have returned to the fundamental tenets of Marxist thought and sought to reappropriate ideas that they regard as having been neglected or somehow misinterpreted by subsequent generations. On this basis, they have sought both to criticize other developments in Marxism, and to make their own original theoretical contributions to the understanding of contemporary trends.

The most outstanding advocate of what one might term 'the return to Marx' is the geographer David Harvey, whose explorations and explanations of Marx's masterpiece *Capital* have reached an enormous online audience as well as being published in book form (see davidharvey.org; Harvey 2018). In another important contribution, Kevin B. Anderson's *Marx at the Margins*

(2010) focuses on Marx's little-known writing on the world politics of his day to recover his ideas about nationalism, ethnicity, and race.

Uneven and combined development

Meanwhile, in a series of articles Justin Rosenberg (1996, 2013; also see Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008) has developed an analysis based on Leon Trotsky's idea of uneven and combined development, which Trotsky outlined primarily in his history of the Russian Revolution. Contrary to the traditional Marxist line, Trotsky observed that capitalism was not having the effects that were anticipated. Certainly it was spreading around the globe at a rapid rate as Marx and Engels had predicted in the *Communist Manifesto*. However, Marx and Engels had predicted that capitalism would create a world 'after its own image'. Elsewhere Marx (1954 [1867]: 19) had stated that 'the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future'. Marx at this point appeared to have a unilinear perspective on historical development and, while there is evidence in some of his later writing that he became sceptical about this view, it was not an issue that he had time to develop. Therefore it became Marxist orthodoxy that capitalist development was a singular road, with countries joining the process at different times. There was just one route through capitalist modernization, the path having been mapped out by Britain as the pioneering capitalist economy. While some countries would start the journey at different times, the sequence and destination would be the same.

Trotsky's insight was that paths to development were indeed uneven in that different countries started the road to capitalism at different times, and from differing starting points. They were also, however, combined, in the sense that the development of capitalism in the states that were already started on the process had implications for those that followed. In other words, the context for capitalism in any one country would be set by all the other countries that had already embarked on capitalist development. Hence the process in Russia occurred in the context of capitalist developments elsewhere and particularly in Western Europe. The advance of capitalism can thus be seen as an international process with latecomers having certain disadvantages but also some advantages. One particular advantage was what Trotsky called the 'privilege of historic backwardness' (cited in Rosenberg 1996: 7). Countries joining the capitalist road had the possibility of leapfrogging

states that had started earlier, because they had access to investment and technology that had not been previously available. However, this came at a potential cost: a distorted political structure. Whereas in Britain, the country on which Marx had focused his attention, the political system had evolved over a lengthy period of time and was relatively stable, in Russia the political structure that emerged from a rapid process of modernization was highly unstable. It was characterized by an authoritarian state leading the process of development in conjunction with international finance, a growing but concentrated working class, an enormous peasantry on which the state was reliant for raising tax, but only a small and weak bourgeoisie. Hence the social formation in Russia was markedly different from that of Britain, and its structure made sense only in the context of the *international* development of capital.

While Trotsky used the concept of uneven and combined development to analyse the events leading up to the Russian Revolution, Kamran Matin (2013) has employed it to consider the history of Iran. Criticizing Eurocentric accounts of historical progress that focus on European states as the model for state development, Matin argues that while the study of International Relations is crucial to understanding Iran's history, it has to be considered in conjunction with an assessment of Iran's domestic history. Matin shows how Iran's history is a complex interaction between its domestic social and economic systems and the priorities of international politics and economics. The country's historical progress has been impacted by both the influence of events, such as the Russian Revolution, and the economic and political incursions by European countries and subsequently the United States. This has resulted in a largely unstable combination, in which attempts at modernization, for example by the last Shah, have faced a system combining a modern industrial sector, largely dominated by the state in collaboration with foreign capital, and a small cosmopolitan middle class combined with a large agricultural and merchant class with established institutions and close links to the religious establishment. During the economic downturn of the 1970s and in conjunction with pressure from the US Carter administration, this combination became increasingly unstable until the revolutionary overthrow of 1979. Development in Iran, then, Matin argues, can be understood only as uneven, in that Iran commenced on the capitalist path at a later time and from a different starting point, yet combined in terms of the influence of already existing global capitalism.

Key Points

- New Marxism is characterized by a direct re-engagement with and reappropriation of the concepts and categories developed by Marx himself or other classic Marxist thinkers.

- One example of New Marxist scholarship is Justin Rosenberg's work on uneven and combined development, which draws on Trotsky's examination of the development of Russia in the global political economy.

- Uneven and combined development suggests that rather than all countries following a single path of economic and political development, each country's path will be affected by the international context.

- The uneven and combined development approach has been utilized to analyse Iran's economic and political development in the twentieth century.

Conclusion

As outlined in the first chapter of this book, globalization is the name given to the process whereby social transactions of all kinds increasingly take place without accounting for national or state boundaries, with the result that the world has become 'one relatively borderless social sphere'. Marxist theorists would certainly not disagree that these developments are taking place, nor would they deny their importance, but they would reject any notion that they are somehow novel. Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Marx and Engels were clearly aware not only of the global scope of capitalism, but also of its potential for social transformation. In a particularly prescient section of the *Communist Manifesto*, they argue:

> The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country…All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.

> *(Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]: 83–4)*

According to Marxist theorists, the globe has long been dominated by a single integrated economic and political entity—a global capitalist system—that has gradually incorporated all of humanity within its grasp. In this system, all elements have always been interrelated and interdependent. The only thing that is 'new' is an increased awareness of these linkages. Similarly, ecological processes have always ignored state boundaries,

even if it is only recently that growing environmental degradation has finally caused this fact to permeate public consciousness.

While the intensity of cross-border flows may be increasing, this does not necessarily signify the fundamental change in the nature of world politics proclaimed by so many of those who argue that we have entered an era of globalization. Marxist theorists insist that the only way to discover how significant contemporary developments really are is to view them in the context of the deeper structural processes at work. When this is done, we may well discover indications that important changes are afoot. For example, many Marxists regard the delegitimation of the sovereign state as a very important contemporary development. However, the essential first step in generating any understanding of those trends regarded as evidence of globalization must be to map the contours of global capitalism itself. If we fail to do so, we will inevitably fail to gauge the real significance of the changes that are occurring.

Another danger of adopting an ahistoric and uncritical attitude to globalization is that such an attitude can blind us to the way in which reference to globalization has become part of the ideological armoury of elites in the contemporary world. 'Globalization' is now regularly cited as a reason to promote measures to reduce workers' rights and lessen other constraints on business. Such ideological justifications for policies that favour the interests of business can only be countered through a broader understanding of the relationship between the political and economic structures of capitalism (**see Opposing Opinions 7.1**). The understanding proffered by the Marxist theorists suggests that there is nothing natural or inevitable about a world order based on a global market. Rather than accept the inevitability

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Opposing Opinions 7.1 The global economy is the prime determinant of the character of global politics

For

Economic power determines states' capability to project military power. Economic resources are needed to purchase military equipment or to maintain the research and development necessary to keep military capability at the highest level. It is no coincidence that the most militarily powerful states in the international system (the US and China) are also the most economically powerful.

Periods of economic turmoil are linked to increased instability in the international system. The Second World War was preceded by a long period of economic instability caused by the Great Depression. Marxists, following Lenin, locate the cause of the First World War in the competition among capitalist states for control over the colonies. Since the economic crisis of 2008, international tensions have been mounting, particularly between Russia and the United States. By contrast, the 'long peace' of the cold war was marked by a period of relative economic stability.

Capitalist interests determine states' foreign policy. For example, Paul Wolfowitz, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush administration, openly declared that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was about securing access to oil. There is a long history of large corporations influencing US policy towards Latin America. For instance, United Fruit played a key role in lobbying for the overthrow of the Arbenz administration in Guatemala in 1954.

Against

The balance of power determines the character of international politics. Periods of relative balance coincide with greater stability in the international system. The 'long peace' of the second half of the twentieth century occurred because there was a relative balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly since 'mutual assured destruction' meant that neither side could 'win' a nuclear conflict. The current instability in the international system derives from the relative decline of the United States.

The spread of democracy produces greater global stability. While we may not have reached 'the end of history' in Francis Fukuyama's term, the claim that democracies don't go to war with each other retains its validity, and democracy promotion is the best hope for a more peaceful and stable future. Europe, which is now a peaceful community of democracies, was, historically, the most war-torn region in the world. With the exception of the break-up of post-communist Yugoslavia, Europe has not experienced a major conflict since the end of the Second World War.

Reducing state behaviour to the expression of capitalist interests does not explain actions that appear at least partly motivated by genuine altruistic or other concerns. Behaviour such as contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, for example, or pressure-group-inspired debt forgiveness, cannot readily be explained in terms of the operation of crude economic interests. More controversially, it might even be argued that some behaviours—such as the United States' continuing and largely uncritical support for Israel—may well work against the state's long-term economic interests. Simplistic, reductionist readings of the influences on state behaviour are almost always inadequate.

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1. Does the balance of power provide a better explanation for periods of stability than economic prosperity?

2. Can state actions be reduced purely to economic interests?

3. What is the connection between economic power and military capability?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

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of the present order, the task facing us is to lay the foundations for a new way of organizing society—a global society that is more just and more humane than our own. In our world of multiple crises, Rosa Luxemburg's observation that we have a choice between socialism or barbarism appears more relevant than ever.

Questions

1. How would you account for the continuing vitality of Marxist thought?
2. How useful is Wallerstein's notion of a semi-periphery?
3. Why has Wallerstein's world-systems theory been criticized for its alleged Eurocentrism? Do you agree with this critique?

4. In what ways is 'combined and uneven development' a useful lens through which to view the development of world politics?
5. In what ways does Gramsci's notion of hegemony differ from that used by realist International Relations writers?
6. How might it be argued that Marx and Engels were the original theorists of globalization?
7. What do you regard as the main contribution of Marxist theories to our understanding of world politics?
8. How useful is the notion of emancipation employed by critical theorists?
9. Do you agree with Cox's distinction between 'problem-solving theory' and 'critical theory'?
10. Assess Wallerstein's claim that the power of the United States is in decline.

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Further Reading

Anderson, K. B. (2010), *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and Non-Western Societies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). A brilliant reconstruction of Marx's own writing on world politics.

Brincat, S., **Lima, L., and Nunes, J.** (eds) (2012), *Critical Theory in International Relations and Security Studies: Interviews and Reflections* (London: Routledge). Interviews with some of the key proponents of critical theory in the field, along with further reflections both supportive and more critical.

Cox, R. W. (1981), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10(2): 126–55. Cox's much-quoted essay continues to inspire.

Derluguian, G. M. (2005), *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). This unconventional book is a dazzling display of the insights generated by the world-system approach.

Eagleton, T. (2018), *Why Marx was Right* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). A short, highly entertaining and deceptively erudite defence of the core tenets of Marx's worldview.

Lenin, V. I. (1917), *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (multiple editions available). While of limited contemporary relevance, it is still worth reading this once-influential pamphlet.

Linklater, A. (2007), *Critical Theory and World Politics: Sovereignty, Citizenship and Humanity* (London: Routledge). An important book from one the most influential critical theorists working on international relations.

Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1848), *The Communist Manifesto* (multiple editions available). The best introduction to Marx's thinking. Essential reading even after 150 years.

Wallerstein, I., Collins, R., **Mann, M.**, **Derluguian, G., and Calhoun, C.** (2013), *Does Capitalism Have a Future?* (New York: Oxford University Press). A fascinating exploration of the problems of contemporary global capitalism by prominent world-system theorists and their (sympathetic) critics.

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Realism

TIM DUNNE · BRIAN C. SCHMIDT

Framing Questions

- Is there a timeless wisdom of realism?
- How do realists conceptualize world politics?
- Do all of the different theories of realism share a similar set of assumptions?

Reader's Guide

Realism is the dominant theory of international relations. Why? Because it provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war that is the regular condition of life in the international system. This is the bold claim that realists make in defence of their tradition, a claim that this chapter critically examines. After introducing the theory of realism, the second section asks whether there is one realism or a variety of realisms. The argument presented is that despite some important differences, all realist theories share a set of core assumptions and ideas. The third section outlines these common elements, identified as self-help, statism, and survival. The final section returns to the question of the extent to which realism is relevant for understanding the globalization of world politics.

Introduction

The theory of realism has significantly influenced both the practice of world politics and the academic study of International Relations (IR). Many claim that before there was even a distinguishable subject matter of IR, states' diplomatic and military practices conformed to the principles that would later be identified as realism. Some go so far as to argue that the power-seeking behaviour of human beings and their motives of fear, honour, and profit illustrate the universality of realism. The argument is that wherever and whenever groups of people have sought to survive and perpetuate their own political communities, they have had no choice but to pursue power and engage in struggle to defend themselves. The claim that realism possesses a timeless quality is based on such arguments. Although often deeply pessimistic, realists profess to describe the world the way it really is rather than how we wish it to be.

At the conclusion of the Second World War, a new group of self-identified realist scholars rose to prominence in the emergent field of IR. Many were German émigrés who fled Europe and sought refuge in the United States. These scholars were highly critical of the approach taken by those writing and teaching during the inter-war period, whom they dubbed 'idealists' and 'utopians'. These realists argued that idealists' search to find a cure for the disease of war resulted in their ignoring the role of power; overestimating the degree to which **nation-states** shared a set of common interests; and being overly optimistic that rational solutions could be found to settle disputes peacefully. The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 confirmed, for the realists at least, the inadequacies of the idealists' approach to studying international politics.

A new approach, one based on the timeless insights of realism, replaced the discredited idealist approach. Histories of IR describe a Great Debate that took place in the 1940s between the inter-war idealists and a new generation of realist writers who all emphasized the ubiquity of power and the competitive nature of politics among **nations**. The standard account of the Great Debate is that the realists emerged victorious, and that idealism was relegated to the dustbin of history. Recently, however, a new body of revisionist history has challenged the story of the Great Debate by revealing that many of the realists completely misrepresented the inter-war scholars' views (Schmidt 2012). Robert Vitalis (2015) has suggested that by viewing this period in terms of a debate between idealists and realists, the roles of race, imperialism, and empire have been erased from the field's early development. Other disciplinary historians have noted that by retrospectively constructing an 'idealist tradition', the realists produced a caricature of several quite diverse (left, liberal, feminist) political and intellectual movements in the inter-war period (Wilson 1998). Yet, given the context of rising tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States immediately after the Second World War, the realists argued that idealism had to be banished from the policy-making process. Realists argued that the United States had to act on the basis of its core national interests, rather than on the basis of abstract universal interests. With the dawn of the nuclear age, the core national interest of state survival could no longer be taken for granted. Realism taught foreign policy officials to focus on interests rather than on ideology, to seek peace through strength, and to recognize that great powers can coexist even if they have antithetical values and beliefs. The fact that realism offers something of a 'manual' for decision-makers looking to maximize the interests of their **state** in a hostile environment helps explain why it gained such popularity in the late 1940s and 1950s, and why it remains the dominant tradition in the study of world politics.

Realism in context

The development of realism after the Second World War is often claimed to rest on an older tradition of realist thought. For the realists, tradition connects seminal texts with context. In other words, it is important to understand the political circumstances in which various realist thinkers were living. Contemporary realists are commonly portrayed as belonging to an ancient tradition of thought that includes such illustrious figures as Thucydides (*c*.460–406 bc), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) (**see Table 8.1**). Despite the different time periods and political contexts in which

Table 8.1 The realist tradition

Thinker	Key text	Big idea	Context
Thucydides	*History of the Peloponnesian War*	International politics is driven by an endless struggle for power, which has its roots in human nature. Justice, law, and society either have no place or are circumscribed.	Greek city-state system
Machiavelli	*The Prince*	Political realism recognizes that principles are subordinated to policies; the ultimate skill of a state leader is to accept and adapt to changing political and power configurations in world politics.	Italian city-states
Hobbes	*Leviathan*	Human beings have an insatiable lust for power. Life in the state of nature, which is similar to the condition of world politics, is full of fear and worry about violent death.	English civil war
Rousseau	*The State of War*	It is not human nature but the anarchical system that fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity.	European state system

these theorists wrote, their place in the realist tradition is based on their shared recognition that international politics is a continuous struggle for power. Those in the realist tradition contend that the condition of international politics is analogous to a state of war in which political actors have little choice but to be concerned with their own security. The ever present possibility of war necessitates that political actors take appropriate measures, including the use of lethal force, to ensure their own survival.

The insights these political theorists offered into the way in which state leaders should conduct themselves in the realm of international politics are often grouped under the doctrine of *raison d'état*, or **reason of state**. According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke (1957: 1), *raison d'état* is the fundamental principle of international conduct, the state's First Law of Motion: 'It tells the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State.' Most importantly, the state, which is identified as the key actor in international politics, must pursue power, and it is the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment. The survival of the state can never be guaranteed, because the use of force culminating in war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. As discussed later in this chapter, the assumption that the state is the principal actor, coupled with the view that the environment that states inhabit is a perilous place, helps to define the essential core of

realism. There is, however, one issue in particular that theorists associated with *raison d'état*, and realism more generally, were concerned with: the role, if any, that morals and ethics play in international politics.

Realists are sceptical of the idea that universal moral principles exist, and therefore warn state leaders against sacrificing their own self-interests in order to adhere to some indeterminate notion of 'ethical' conduct. Moreover, realists argue that the need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional notions of morality. Machiavelli argued that these principles were positively harmful if adhered to by state leaders. It was imperative that state leaders learned a different kind of morality, which accorded not with traditional Christian virtues but with political necessity and prudence. Proponents of *raison d'état* often speak of a **dual moral standard**: one moral standard for individual citizens living inside the state and a different standard for the state in its external relations with other states. But before one reaches the conclusion that realism is completely immoral, it is important to add that proponents of *raison d'état* argue that the state itself represents a moral force, for it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility for an ethical **political community** to exist domestically.

Some in the realist tradition attribute the war-like condition of international politics to certain propensities found in human nature, while others emphasize the unique environment in which international politics takes place. Still others combine these two levels

of analysis—human nature and the environment or structure of international politics—to account for the state of war. Machiavelli's moral scepticism derived from his analysis of human nature as well as from the observations he made while serving as a public official of the Florentine Republic. To be successful in politics, Machiavelli argued, one had to act on the basis of what human nature is really like, not how one wishes it to be. In his writings, Machiavelli provided a cynical and pessimistic description of human nature. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli wrote that men 'are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, greedy for gain' (Bondanella and Musa 1979: 131). Based on this account of human nature, Machiavelli provided a set of 'realist' maxims such as: it is better to be feared than loved; a prince should act like both a lion and a fox; and it is sometimes necessary to learn how not to be good. According to Machiavelli, the necessities of politics, such as the need to ensure the survival of the state by any means, were derived from human nature.

Hobbes's place in the realist tradition is often said to rest on his description of human nature in a hypothetical state-of-nature condition. Like Machiavelli, Hobbes's account of human nature was deeply pessimistic. Some have argued that Hobbes's pessimism and profound sense of fear resulted from the fact that he was writing during the tumultuous English Civil War and that his own premature birth coincided with the threat posed by the Spanish Armada. While Hobbes's account of human nature incorporates a number of characteristics, perhaps most important is his claim that all men have a restless desire for power that ceases only in death. In the state of nature, where there is no higher authority to provide security, Hobbes argues that the condition resembles a state of war of every man against every man. The constant fear of violent death in the state of nature leads Hobbes to conclude that the life of man is 'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes 1985 [1651]: 186).

Although Hobbes acknowledges that a state of nature has never truly existed, he suggests that the condition of international politics closely resembles a state of war. In an important passage of Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), he writes: 'though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; . . . which is a posture of War' (Hobbes 1985 [1651]: 188). The claim

that world politics is analogous to the life of human beings in a hypothetical state of nature was developed further by Rousseau. Although Rousseau was critical of how Hobbes depicted human nature, he too recognized the necessity of human beings leaving the state of nature and forming a social contract. Unlike Hobbes, however, Rousseau was deeply concerned that the contract establishing sovereignty should reflect the general will of the people; he argued that this was the only way in which the exercise of authority could be deemed legitimate. The problem, however, was that even if the newly formed contract embodied the general will of its members, each state merely articulates a particular will vis-à-vis other states. In other words, while the formation of a social contract solves one set of problems, it creates another set of problems for international relations: namely, no higher power exists to help settle conflicts among independent sovereign states. Rousseau's insights are important for neorealists, who emphasize anarchy and the lack of central authority, rather than human nature, to explain international conflict.

Thucydides holds a prominent place in the realist tradition because his insights, in many ways, help to define the essence of realism. Thucydides was both an active participant in, and observer of, the Peloponnesian War, a conflict between Athens and Sparta, two great powers in the ancient Greek world. Subsequent generations of realists have admired Thucydides' work for the insights he raised about many of the perennial issues of world politics. The classical realist lineage begins with Thucydides' representation of power politics as a law of human behaviour. The desire for power and the need to follow self-interest are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature. The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be a reflection of the characteristics of human beings. It is human nature and the motivations of fear, honour, and self-interest that explain why international politics is necessarily power politics.

At the same time, while Thucydides offered profound insights about human nature, he was equally cognizant of the international environment's impact on the behaviour of states. Thucydides' explanation of the underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War was 'the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta' (Thucydides 1972 [1954]: 1.23). This is considered to be a classic example of the impact that the distribution of power has on the behaviour of state actors. Thucydides emphasizes that Sparta's **national interest**, like that of all states, was survival, and the

changing distribution of power represented a direct threat to its existence. Sparta was, therefore, compelled by necessity to go to war in order to forestall the threat of being vanquished by Athens. Thucydides also makes it clear that Athens felt equally compelled to pursue power in order to preserve the **empire** it had acquired. The Athenian leader, Pericles, claimed to be acting on the basis of the most fundamental of human motivations: ambition, fear, and self-interest (**see Case Study 8.1**).

While the thinkers discussed above are commonly grouped together in the realist tradition, despite the different contexts in which they were writing, it is important to note that their ideas are open to rival interpretations (M. Williams 2005). Although often considered to be the quintessential realist, Thucydides did demonstrate that acting purely on the basis of power and self-interest without any consideration of moral and ethical principles frequently results in self-defeating policies. After all, as Thucydides showed, Athens suffered an epic defeat while attempting to follow its self-interest. Nevertheless, the three core elements that we identify with realism—**statism**, **survival**, and **self-help**—are present in the work of those who constitute the realist tradition, stretching from Thucydides to the present.

Realism identifies the group as the fundamental unit of political analysis. When Thucydides and Machiavelli were writing, the basic unit was the *polis* or city-state, but realists consider that since the **Peace of Westphalia** (1648), the sovereign state has been the principal actor

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Case Study 8.1 The Melian dialogue—realism and the preparation for war

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The 'Melian dialogue', one of the most significant episodes of the war between Athens and Sparta, illustrates several key realist principles. This case study reconstructs the dialogue between the Athenian leaders who arrived on the island of Melos to assert their right of conquest over the islanders, and the response this provoked. In short, what the Athenians are asserting over the Melians is the logic of power politics. Because of their vastly superior military force, they present a fait accompli to the Melians: either submit peacefully or be exterminated. The Melians, for their part, try to buck the logic of power politics, responding with arguments invoking justice, the gods, and their allies the Spartans.

The following is a short excerpt from the dialogue (Thucydides 1972 [1954]: 401–7). Note that the symbol […] indicates where words from the original text have been omitted.

ATHENIANS: Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians […] you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.

MELIANS: […] you should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men—namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing […]

ATHENIANS: This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and shame on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and not resisting those who are far too strong for you.

MELIANS: It is difficult […] for us to oppose your power and fortune […] Nevertheless we trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours […]

ATHENIANS: Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way […] You seem to forget that if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour involves one in danger […] This is the safe rule—to stand up to one's equals, to behave with deference to one's superiors, and to treat one's inferiors with moderation.

MELIANS: Our decision, Athenians, is just the same as it was at first. We are not prepared to give up in a short moment the liberty which our city has enjoyed from its foundation for 700 years.

ATHENIANS: […] you seem to us […] to see uncertainties as realities, simply because you would like them to be so.

Question 1: Are the Athenians correct that might makes right?

Question 2: Whose arguments, the Athenians' or Melians', do you find to be the most persuasive?

in international politics. This is often referred to as the state-centric assumption of realism. Statism is the term given to the idea of the state as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the people. The legitimacy of the state is what enables it to exercise authority within its domestic borders. Yet outside the boundaries of the state, realists argue that a condition of **anarchy** exists. Anarchy means that international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above individual sovereign states. Thus, rather than necessarily denoting chaos and lawlessness, realists use the concept of anarchy to emphasize the point that the international realm is distinguished by its lack of a central authority.

Under anarchy, the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed. Realists correctly assume that all states wish to perpetuate their existence. Looking back at history, however, realists note that the actions some states have taken to ensure their survival has resulted in other states losing their existence. This is partly explained by the power differentials that exist among states. Intuitively, states with more power have a better chance of surviving than states with less power. **Power** is crucial to the realist lexicon and has traditionally been defined narrowly in military strategic terms. Yet irrespective of how much power a given state may possess, the core national interest of all states must be survival. Like the pursuit of power, the promotion of the national interest is, according to realists, an iron law of necessity.

Self-help is the fundamental principle of state action in an anarchical system. According to realism, each state actor is responsible for ensuring its own survival. Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to entrust its safety and survival to another actor or to an **international institution**, such as the United Nations. Unlike in domestic politics, there is no emergency number that states can dial when they are in mortal danger.

What options do states have to ensure their own security? Consistent with the principle of self-help, if a state feels threatened it should seek to augment its own power by increasing its military capabilities. However, this is not always possible. States have therefore pursued other options, such as forming military alliances and initiating preventive wars with the aim of ensuring their own survival. The fact that all of these options were discussed by Thucydides and continue to be relevant today is what gives realism its timeless quality. Despite all of the criticisms of realism, there is little doubt that the collective wisdom of the realist tradition is helpful in understanding some of the enduring patterns of world politics. The question of realism's resilience touches on one of its central claims, namely that it embodies laws of international politics that remain true across time (history) and space (geopolitics). Thus, while political contexts change, realists believe that the world continues to operate according to the logic of realism. The conclusion of the chapter returns to this question of whether realism does embody 'timeless truths' about politics.

> ### Key Points
>
> - Realism has significantly influenced both the theory and practice of world politics.
> - Outside the academy, realism has a much longer history in the work of classical political theorists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.
> - The unifying theme around which all realist thinking converges is that states find themselves in the condition of anarchy such that their security cannot be taken for granted.
> - Statism, survival, and self-help are three core elements of the realist tradition.

One realism, or many?

The notion of a monolithic theory of realism is increasingly rejected by both proponents and critics of the realist tradition. The belief that there is not one realism, but many, leads logically to a delineation of different types of realism. The most simple distinction is a form of periodization that differentiates realism into three historical periods: **classical realism** (up to the twentieth century), which is frequently depicted as beginning with Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War; modern realism (1939–79), which

typically takes as its point of departure the so-called First Great Debate between idealism and realism; and structural or neorealism (1979 onwards), which officially entered the picture following the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979). But rather than opt for the neat but intellectually unsatisfactory system of historical periodization, this chapter outlines a taxonomy of realisms. A summary of the varieties of realism outlined here is contained in **Table 8.2**.

Table 8.2 Taxonomy of realisms

Type of realism	Key thinkers	Key texts	Big idea	Context
Twentieth-century classical realism (human nature)	Morgenthau (1948)	*Politics among Nations*	Politics is governed by laws that are created by human nature. The mechanism we use to understand international politics is the concept of interests, defined in terms of power.	End of the Second World War, onset of the cold war
Structural realism/ neorealism	Waltz (1979)	*Theory of International Politics*	Anarchy leads to a logic of self-help in which states seek to maximize their security. Balances of power recurrently form.	The cold war, end of the cold war
	Mearsheimer (2001)	*Tragedy of Great Power Politics*	The anarchical, self-help system compels states to maximize their relative power positions as they can never be sure of other states' intentions.	Post-cold war
Neoclassical realism	Zakaria (1998)	*From Wealth to Power*	The systemic account of world politics provided by structural realism is incomplete. It needs to be supplemented with better accounts of unit-level variables such as how power is perceived, and how leadership is exercised.	Post-cold war

Twentieth-century classical realism

Many of those originally advocating realism after the Second World War were émigré scholars who fled Nazi Germany and arrived in the United States where they sought positions at American universities. Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–80), who spent the majority of his career at the University of Chicago, was undoubtedly the most important of these realists. While ostensibly couching his realist theory in terms of objective laws, Morgenthau recognized that the study of politics was more of an art than a science. Nicolas Guilhot (2011) has recently argued that the turn to theory by Morgenthau and other like-minded scholars should be viewed as a realist gambit that was meant to limit the influence of behaviouralists who were championing a science of politics. Trying to shed what he took to be his adopted country's idealist thinking, Morgenthau never tired of repeating his main proposition that 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power', and that 'whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim' (Morgenthau 1955 [1948]: 25). For Morgenthau, human nature provided the best explanation for how states behave. Like some of the realist thinkers discussed in the previous section, Morgenthau argued that human beings were hard-wired to pursue power over others and were continually looking for

opportunities to increase their own power. He claimed that the goal of every state, as of every individual, was to maximize its power. Morgenthau identified three basic patterns of the struggle for power among states—to keep power (status quo), to increase power (imperialism), and to demonstrate power (prestige)—which he argued were all rooted in humankind's lust for power.

One of realism's key concepts is interest defined in terms of power. In the realm of foreign policy, the most important interest is securing the physical survival of the state. Beyond this core national interest, countries have an abundance of other interests, but what was crucial for Morgenthau and the other post-Second World War realists was that the pursuit of any interest always had to be congruent with the power a state possessed. In this manner, the concept of the national interest imposed a measure of discipline on foreign policy officials to ensure that the interests they were pursuing were consistent with the power they possessed relative to other states. It is sometimes wrongly assumed that the concept of the national interest is devoid of any moral content. Morgenthau argued that choice between the national interest and morals was a false choice. Although he was sharply critical of the notion that states should act on the basis of so-called universal moral principles, Morgenthau recognized that the national interest

included a moral component that could only be realized through the medium of power. Morgenthau further recognized that there were fewer constraints on the struggle for power among nations compared to domestic politics. This is one of the reasons why he urged foreign policy officials to maintain a **balance of power**.

Realists throughout the ages have considered a balance of power to be essential to preserving the liberty of states. Although various meanings have been attributed to the concept of a balance of power, the most common definition holds that if a state's survival is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, it should join forces with other states, and they should establish a formal alliance and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing side. The balance of power is a mechanism that seeks to ensure an equilibrium of power, so that no one state or coalition of states is able to dominate all the others. The **cold war** competition between the East and West, as institutionalized through the formal alliance system of the **Warsaw Pact** and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), provides a prominent example of the balance of power mechanism in action (**see Ch. 3**).

Structural realism/neorealism

In 1979, the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* established structural realism, or neorealism, as a dominant theory of world politics. Writing in the context of the cold war, Waltz concurred that international politics is a struggle for power, but he did not attribute this to human nature. Instead, Waltz argued that security competition, inter-state conflict, and the difficulties of achieving international cooperation resulted from the structure of the international system: namely, the lack of an overarching authority above sovereign states. Neorealists define the structure of the international system in terms of three elements: organizing principles, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities. Waltz identifies two different organizing principles: anarchy, which corresponds to the decentralized realm of international politics; and hierarchy, which is the basis of domestic order. He argues that the units of the international system are functionally similar sovereign states; hence unit-level variation, such as whether a state is a democracy or not, is inconsequential. It is the third element, the distribution of capabilities across units, that is, according to Waltz, of fundamental importance to understanding outcomes in international politics. According to structural realists, the relative

distribution of power in the international system is the key independent variable in understanding war and peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power. Structural realists are interested in providing a rank-ordering of states so that they can discern the number of great powers that exist at any particular point in time. The number of great powers, in turn, determines the overall structure of the international system. For example, during the cold war from 1945 to 1989, there were two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—that constituted a bipolar international system, and since the end of the cold war most argue that the international system has been unipolar (**see Ch. 4**).

How does the relative distribution of power impact the behaviour of states? Waltz argues that states, especially the great powers, have to be concerned about the capabilities of other states. The possibility that any state may use force to advance its interests causes all states to worry about their survival. According to Waltz, power is a means to an end, the end being security. In a significant passage, Waltz writes: 'because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it'. He adds, 'in crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security' (Waltz 1989: 40). In other words, rather than being power maximizers, states are security maximizers according to neorealists. Waltz argues that power maximization often proves to be counter-productive because it triggers a counterbalancing coalition of states. Like Morgenthau, Waltz firmly believed that balances of power recurrently form.

John Mearsheimer's theory of **offensive realism**, which is another variant of structural realism, provides a different account of the power dynamics that operate in the anarchic international system. While sharing many of neorealism's basic assumptions, Mearsheimer differs from Waltz when it comes to describing the behaviour of states. Most fundamentally, offensive realism argues that states are power maximizers in that they 'understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system' (Mearsheimer 2001: 33). Under anarchy, Mearsheimer agrees that self-help is the basic principle of action, yet he argues that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Consequently, he concludes that all states are continuously searching for opportunities to gain more power at the expense of other states. Indeed, the ideal position, although one that Mearsheimer argues is impossible to achieve, is to be the global hegemon of the **international system**.

This has not, however, prevented states from trying to become the hegemon, which tragically leads to a world where states are primed for offence, periodically resulting in inter-state war.

Neoclassical realism

While structural realists attribute the drivers of state behaviour to the anarchical international system, some contemporary realists are sceptical of the notion that the distribution of power can sufficiently explain the behaviour of states. Since the end of the cold war, a group of scholars have attempted to move beyond the parsimonious assumptions of structural realism by adding a number of individual- and domestic-level factors into their explanations of world politics. While the relative distribution of power is recognized to be an important influence on the behaviour of states, so are factors such as the perceptions of state leaders, state–society relationships, and state identity. In attempting to build a bridge between structural and unit-level factors, this group of scholars has been characterized by Gideon Rose (1998) as 'neoclassical realists'. According to Stephen Walt, the causal logic of neoclassical realism 'places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior' (Walt 2002: 211).

One important intervening variable is leaders themselves, namely how they perceive the distribution of power. There is no single objective account of the distribution of power; rather, what matters is how state leaders derive an understanding of the distribution of power. While structural realists assume that all states have a similar set of interests, neoclassical realists such as Randall Schweller (1996) argue that historically this has not been the case. He argues that, with respect to Waltz, the assumption that all states have an interest in security results in realism exhibiting a profoundly status quo basis. Schweller returns to the writings of earlier realists to remind us of their key distinction between status quo and revisionist states. Neoclassical realists argue that the fact that Germany was a revisionist state in the 1930s, and has been a status quo state since the end of the Second World War, is of fundamental importance to understanding state behaviour in the international system. Not only do states differ in terms of their interests, but they also differ in terms of their abilities to extract resources from the societies they rule. Another intervening variable is state power; neoclassical realists argue that states possess different capacities to translate the various elements of national power into state power. Thus, contrary to Waltz, all states cannot be treated as 'like units'.

Given the varieties of realism that exist, it is hardly surprising that the coherence of the realist tradition has been questioned. The answer to the question of 'coherence' is, of course, contingent on how strict the criteria are for judging the continuities that underpin a particular tradition. It is a mistake to understand traditions as a single stream of thought, handed down in a neatly wrapped package from one generation to another. But despite the different strands running through the tradition over time, there is a sense in which all realists share a common set of propositions.

Key Points

- There is a lack of consensus as to whether we can meaningfully speak about realism as a single coherent theory.
- There are good reasons for delineating different types of realism.
- Classical realists attribute power-seeking behaviour to human nature.
- Structural realism divides into two camps: those who argue that states are security maximizers (neorealism), and those who argue that states are power maximizers (offensive realism).
- Neoclassical realists bring individual and unit variation back into the theory.

The essential realism

The previous paragraphs argued that realism is a theoretically broad church, embracing a variety of thinkers and texts. Despite the numerous denominations, this chapter argues that all realists subscribe to the following 'three *S*s': statism, survival, and self-help. The next three subsections consider each of these elements in more detail.

Statism

For realists, the state is the main actor in international politics and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait. The meaning of the sovereign state is inextricably bound up with the use of force. Realists concur with Max Weber's famous definition of the state as 'the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'

(M. Smith 1986: 23). Within this territorial space, **sovereignty** means that the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws. This is the basis of the unwritten contract between individuals and the state. According to Hobbes, for example, we trade our liberty in return for a guarantee of security. Once security has been established, **civil society** can begin.

Realist theory operates according to the assumption that, domestically, the problems of order and security are largely solved. However, in the external relations among independent sovereign states, insecurities, dangers, and threats to the very existence of the state loom large. Realists attempt to explain this by pointing to the fact that the very condition for order and security—namely, the existence of a sovereign—is missing from the international realm.

Realists claim that, in anarchy, states compete with other states for power and security. The nature of this competition is viewed in zero-sum terms; in other words, more for one actor means less for another. This competitive logic of power politics confounds agreement on universal principles, apart from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. But even this principle, designed to facilitate **coexistence**, is not accepted by realists, who argue that in practice non-intervention does not apply in relations between great powers and their 'near abroad'. As evidenced by the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, powerful states believe they are able to suspend the non-intervention principle on the grounds of national security and international order.

Given that the state's first move is to organize power domestically, and the second is to accumulate power internationally, it is important to consider in more depth what realists mean by their ubiquitous fusion of politics with power. It is one thing to say that international politics is a struggle for power, but this merely begs the question of what realists mean by power. Realists make two important points about the concept of power. First, power is a relational concept: one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another entity. Second, power is a relative concept: calculations need to be made not only about one's own power capabilities, but also about the power that other state actors possess. Yet the task of accurately assessing the power of other states is infinitely complex, and is often reduced to lumping a number of factors together, such as gross national product (GNP), military spending, and population size.

A number of criticisms have been made about how realists define and measure power (Schmidt 2005), many of which are discussed in later chapters in this book. Critics argue that realism has been purchased at a discount precisely because its currency, power, has remained under-theorized and inconsistently used. Simply asserting that states seek power provides no answer to multiple crucial questions. Why do states struggle for power? Surely power is a means to an end rather than an end in itself? Is there not a difference between the mere possession of power and the ability to change the behaviour of others?

Structural realists have attempted to define the meaning of power with more conceptual clarity. Waltz tries to overcome the problem by shifting the focus from power to capabilities. He suggests that states' capabilities can be ranked according to their strength in the following areas: 'size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence' (Waltz 1979: 131). The difficulty here is that resource strength does not always lead to military victory. For example, in the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the distribution of resources clearly favoured the Arab coalition and yet the supposedly weaker side annihilated its enemies' forces and seized their territory. The definition of power as capabilities is even less successful at explaining how states have used economic leverage to achieve their goals. A more sophisticated understanding of power would focus on the ability of a state to control or influence its environment in situations that are not necessarily conflictual.

An additional weakness of the realist treatment of power concerns its exclusive focus on state power. For realists, states are the only actors that really 'count'. Transnational corporations, **international organizations**, and ideologically driven terrorist **networks** such as the so-called Islamic State and Al Qaeda do not figure very prominently in realists' analysis of power. Yet given the influence that non-state actors exercise in world politics today, many question the adequacy of realism's state-centric assumption.

Survival

The second principle that unites realists is the assertion that, in world politics, all states have a vital interest in survival. Although realists disagree on whether the accumulation of power is an end in itself, few would dissent from the argument that states' ultimate concern is survival, which is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals. However, as the previous section mentioned, controversy among structural realists has arisen over the question of whether states are principally security maximizers or power maximizers. Neorealists such as Waltz

argue that states have security as their principal interest and therefore seek only the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival. According to this view, states are profoundly defensive actors and will not seek greater power if that means jeopardizing their own security. In contrast, offensive realists such as Mearsheimer argue that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. According to this view, states always desire more power and, if the opportunity arises, will seek to alter the existing distribution of power in their favour. Moreover, offensive realists point out that sometimes states bandwagon with, rather than balance against, dominant powers.

Machiavelli tried to make a 'science' out of his reflections on the art of survival. He wrote *The Prince* with the explicit intention of codifying a set of maxims that would enable leaders to maintain the survival of their states. Two related Machiavellian themes recur in the writings of modern realists, both of which derive from the idea that the realm of international politics requires different moral and political rules from those that apply in domestic politics. The task of protecting the state at all costs (even if this requires sacrificing one's own citizens) places a heavy burden on state leaders' shoulders. In the words of Henry Kissinger, the academic realist who became Secretary of State during the Nixon presidency, 'a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk' (Kissinger 1977: 204). State leaders' guide must be an **ethic of responsibility**: the careful weighing of consequences and the realization that individual acts of an immoral kind might have to be performed for the greater good. For example, think of the ways in which governments frequently suspend the legal and political rights of 'suspected terrorists' in view of the threat they pose to **national security**.

Self-help

In the international system, there is no higher authority to counter the use of force. War is always a possibility because there is nothing that can prevent a state from using force against another state. Security can therefore only be realized through self-help. Waltz explains that in an anarchic structure, 'self-help is necessarily the principle of action' (Waltz 1979: 111). States must ultimately rely on themselves to achieve security. But in the course of providing for one's own security, the state in question will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states.

The term given to this spiral of insecurity is the security dilemma. According to Wheeler and Booth, security dilemmas exist 'when the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for "defensive" purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)' (Wheeler and Booth 1992: 30). This scenario suggests that one state's quest for security is often another state's source of insecurity. States find it difficult to trust one another and are often suspicious of other states' intentions. Thus the military preparations of one state are likely to be matched by those of neighbouring states. The irony is that, at the end of the day, states often feel no more secure than before they undertook measures to enhance their own security.

In a self-help system, neorealists argue that the balance of power will emerge even in the absence of a conscious policy to maintain the balance. Waltz argues that balances of power result irrespective of the intentions of any particular state. In an anarchic system populated by states that seek to perpetuate themselves, alliances will be formed that seek to balance against the power of threatening states. Classical realists, however, are more likely to emphasize the crucial role that state leaders and diplomats play in maintaining the balance of power. In other words, the balance of power is not natural or inevitable; it must be constructed.

Case Study 8.2 shows how the US sought to maintain a balance of power between Egypt and Israel—a policy that has been called into question by the transformation that has been under way since 2010 when mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square brought an end to President Mubarak's 40-year rule over Egypt.

Realists and their critics have always debated the balance of power system. This is especially the case today, as some critics argue that the unipolar position of the United States has made the balance of power inoperative (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). The question of whether balance of power politics continues to be relevant in the contemporary globalized era is closely related to the debate about American hegemony (**see Opposing Opinions 8.1**).

It is questionable whether other countries are willing to balance against the US, as neorealism would predict. Whether it is the contrived balance of the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth century or the more fortuitous balance of the cold war, balances of power are broken—either through war or through peaceful change—and new balances emerge. What the perennial collapsing of the balance of power demonstrates is

Case Study 8.2 Strategic partnerships with 'friendly' dictators

Egyptian-Americans demand a new government in Egypt
© Jim West / Alamy Stock Photo

Unflinching American support for Israel has been one of the most remarkable features of the post-1945 world order. What shaped this partnership was America's empathy with a people who had experienced genocide at the hands of the Nazis but who had gone on to build a democratic society in a region of authoritarian states. What is less well known is the strong support that successive US governments have given to Egypt, particularly since the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty of 1979. In addition to providing material rewards for this 'cold peace', successive American administrations took the view that stability in the Middle East was more likely to be achieved by propping up a stable Egyptian dictatorship.

The case for building and maintaining close ties with friendly dictators was made by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, who rose to prominence as a fierce critic of President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy. She castigated Carter for collaborating in the social revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, which had the consequence of replacing 'moderate autocrats' who were friendly to American interests with 'less friendly autocrats of an extremist persuasion'. Not grasping this distinction showed 'a lack of realism' and was the main failing of the Carter administration—according to Kirkpatrick (1979).

In the case of Egypt, successive American administrations, from Reagan onwards, have operationalized this distinction between a 'moderate friendly autocrat' and an unfriendly revolutionary regime. President Mubarak profited from this policy, as did his clique of army generals, party apparatchiks, and military police. During the post-9/11 decade, when the US was looking for allies in the global war on terror, the Egyptian leadership showed itself to be a valuable ally—not least in suppressing alleged jihadist terrorist groups in that country. Yet, by the time of the Arab Spring, the Egyptian people had come to despise Washington for colluding with the hated dictator. This dynamic shows that Kirkpatrick's distinction between friendly and unfriendly tyrants might just be in the eye of the beholder: for the hundreds of thousands of Egyptians who took to the streets and marched on Tahrir Square, the Mubarak era was anything but friendly. It is too soon to tell whether the realist argument for aligning American foreign policy with unpopular dictators across the Middle East will prove costly in the long run as civil wars and social revolutions sweep away the old regional order.

Question 1: Do dictators really make good allies?

Question 2: What are the implications for national security when potential enemies can unleash weapons of mass destruction?

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that states are at best able to mitigate the worst consequences of the security dilemma but are not able to escape it. The reason for this terminal condition is the absence of trust in international relations.

Realists have illustrated the lack of trust among states by reference to the parable of the 'stag hunt'. In *Man, the State and War*, Waltz revisits Rousseau's parable:

> Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they 'agree' to cooperate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows.

> *(Waltz 1959: 167–8)*

Waltz argues that the metaphor of the stag hunt provides a basis for understanding the problem of coordinating the interests of the individual versus the interests of the common good, and the pay-off between short-term interests and long-term interests. In the self-help system of international politics, the logic of self-interest militates against the provision of collective goods, such as 'security' or 'free trade'. In the case of the latter, according to the theory of **comparative advantage**, all states would be wealthier in a world that allowed free movement of goods and services across borders. But individual states, or groups of states like the European Union, can increase their wealth by pursuing protectionist policies. Of course the logical outcome is that the remaining states become protectionist, international trade collapses, and a world recession reduces the wealth of each state. Thus the question is not whether all will be better off through **cooperation**, but rather who is likely to gain more than another. It is because of this concern with **relative gains** that realists argue that cooperation is difficult to achieve in a self-help system.

Opposing Opinions 8.1 US hegemony is durable

For

US power is unmatched. In terms of raw power capabilities, the United States continues to be unrivalled. The United States militarily outspends all other states, enjoys command of the commons, has the largest GDP, the best universities, and continues to be at the forefront of technological innovation.

Absence of balancing. There is no evidence that other states are challenging US hegemony by forming military alliances or engaging in counterbalancing. In fact, most states continue to welcome American hegemony and are more worried about China's power than that of the United States.

Decline is not inevitable. The fact that previous hegemons, such as Great Britain, declined does not mean US hegemony will inevitably come to an end. Proponents contend that the institutionalized, rule-based, and liberal character of American hegemony has widespread appeal, which diminishes the incentives to establish a new hegemonic order (Ikenberry 2011). The international system will continue to be characterized by unipolarity.

Against

US relative power is declining. The United States' share of GDP is declining as a result of the rise of China and other emerging market nations. China is now the world's leading manufacturing nation and is predicted to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy by 2050 or earlier.

Balancing is occurring. States such as China and Russia are increasing their military capabilities (internal balancing) and taking actions that inhibit the exercise of US hegemony (soft balancing). The inability of the United States to secure a UN Security Council resolution prior to its invasion of Iraq is evidence that states are worried about the unilateral exercise of American power.

Decline is inevitable. No state in history has managed to maintain its predominant position forever. Today the facts speak for themselves: America's relative power, especially its economic power, is declining while that of other states, specifically China, is rising (Layne 2011). The international system is quickly shifting towards **multipolarity**.

1. Is there enough empirical and historical evidence to support the optimists' opinion that US hegemony is durable?

2. Do you agree with the pessimists' opinion that decline is inevitable and that current trends support the view that US hegemony is waning?

3. How is it possible for realist scholars to be on different sides of the debate about US hegemony?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Key Points

- Statism is a central assumption of realism. This involves two claims. First, the state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics. Second, state sovereignty signifies the existence of an independent political community, one that has juridical authority over its territory.

- Key criticism: statism is flawed on both empirical grounds (challenges to state power from 'above' and 'below') and normative grounds (the inability of sovereign states to respond to collective global problems such as famine, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses).

- Survival is the primary objective of all states; this is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere.

- Key criticism: are there no limits to what actions a state can take in the name of necessity?

- Self-help: no other state or international institution can be relied on to guarantee a state's survival.

- Key criticism: self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world government; it is a logic that states have selected. Moreover, there are examples where states have preferred collective security systems, or forms of regional security communities, in preference to self-help.

Conclusion

This chapter began by considering the repeated realist claim that the pattern of international politics—wars interrupted by periods characterized by the preparation for future wars—has remained constant over the preceding 25 centuries. Realists have consistently held that the continuities in international relations are more important than the changes, but critics find this claim to be increasingly problematic in the present age of globalization (**see Ch. 1**). Recent critics such as John Hobson (2012) have challenged the alleged universalism

of realism on the grounds of a pervasive Eurocentric conception of world politics. But critics should recall that the death-knell of realism has been sounded a number of times already, only to see the resurgence of new forms of realism. Although the conclusion of the cold war caught many realists off guard, they, unlike liberal scholars, did not predict that the post-cold war era would necessarily be peaceful. While proponents of globalization highlight new developments in world politics, such as regional integration, global interconnectedness, and the growth of transnational and non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations (**see Chs 23**, **32**, and **28**), realists point out that we are increasingly witnessing a return to great power politics as China and Russia continue to challenge the position of the United States. The United States, in turn, appears to recognize this, as President Trump has launched a trade war with China, withdrawn from a number of multilateral treaties on the grounds of protecting state sovereignty, and taken measures to increase the military's capabilities. The rise and fall of great powers is deeply rooted in history, and many realists are concerned about how this dynamic will unfold in the coming years (**see Ch. 5**). Trump's nationalist rhetoric has resulted in a great deal of trepidation among scholars of all stripes about the durability of the liberal order that has both underpinned so-called globalization and facilitated peace among the great powers. If the United States abandons the liberal order that it helped to create after the Second World War, it is not clear what comes next. Will the globalization project continue unabated, perhaps under the leadership of China, or will nativism and nationalism derail globalism (**see Ch. 4**)?

Realists do not have to situate their theory of world politics in opposition to globalization per se; rather, what they offer is a very different conceptualization of the process. Given the preponderance of power that the US held at the end of the cold war, it should not be a surprise that it was one of the foremost proponents of globalization. The core values of globalization—liberalism, capitalism, and consumerism—are exactly those espoused by the US. At a deeper cultural level, realists argue that modernity is not, as liberals hope, dissolving the boundaries of difference among the peoples of the world. From classical realists such as Rousseau to structural realists such as Waltz, realist thinkers have argued that **interdependence** is as likely to breed 'mutual vulnerability' as peace and prosperity. And while questioning the extent to which the world has become more interdependent in relative terms, realists insist that the state is not going to be eclipsed by global forces operating either below or above the nation-state. Nationalism, realists have continuously reminded us, remains a potent force in world politics.

There are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a realist century. Despite efforts to rekindle the idealist flame, Europe continues to be as divided by different national interests as it is united by common goals. In the Middle East, the slow and painful process of regime change is generating significant instability across the region, as external powers fuel proxy wars to safeguard their own vital interests. China continues to emerge as a serious economic and strategic competitor to the US and, if current trends continue, will eventually replace the US as the leading economic power. At that point, realism leads us to predict that Western norms of individual rights and responsibilities will be under threat. Rather than transforming global politics in its own image, as liberalism sought to do in the twentieth century, realism has the intellectual resources to assert itself as a defensive doctrine which recognizes that international relations is a realm of value conflicts, and that responsible statecraft involves careful calibrations of interests. Above all, realism demands that states' leaders act prudently—a quality that has been in short supply in the early part of the twenty-first century.

Questions

1. How does the Melian dialogue illustrate key realist concepts such as self-interest, the balance of power, alliances, capabilities, empires, and justice?
2. Do you think there is one realism, or many?
3. Do you know more about international relations now than an Athenian student did during the Peloponnesian War?
4. Do realists confuse a description of war and conflict for an explanation of why they occur?
5. Does the return of great power politics once again vindicate realism?

6. How would a realist explain the 9/11 wars?
7. Will Western governments and their institutions (such as NATO) have to become more realist if the ideas associated with Western civilization are to survive in the twenty-first century?
8. What is at stake in the debate between defensive and offensive realism?
9. Is structural realism sufficient to account for the variation in states' behaviour?
10. How can realism help us to understand the globalization of world politics?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

For a general survey of the realist tradition

Smith, M. J. (1986), *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press). An excellent discussion of many of the seminal realist thinkers.

Walt, S. M. (2002), 'The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition', in I. Katznelson and H. V. Milner (eds), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (New York: W. W. Norton). An exposition of the realist tradition from one of its leading proponents.

Twentieth-century classical realism

Carr, E. H. (1939), *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan). An important critique of liberal idealism.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1948), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). A foundational text for the discipline of International Relations.

Structural realism

Keohane, R. O. (ed.) (1986), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press). This collection of essays includes key chapters by Kenneth Waltz, an interesting defence of realism by Robert Gilpin, and powerful critiques by Richard Ashley, Robert Cox, and J. G. Ruggie.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton). This is the definitive account of offensive realism.

Waltz, K. (1979), *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley). This is the exemplar for structural realism.

Neoclassical realism

Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., and Taliaferro, J. W. (eds) (2009), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A comprehensive survey of neoclassical realism.

Rose, G. (1998), 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics*, 51(1): 144–72. An important review article that is credited with coining the term 'neoclassical realism'.

Zakaria, F. (1998), *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Puts forth Zakaria's theory of state-centric realism.

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Feminism

HELEN M. KINSELLA

Framing Questions

- **Are feminist international relations theories necessary for understanding international politics?**

- **What do feminist international relations theories provide for understanding international politics?**

- **How have feminist international relations theories influenced the practice of international politics?**

Reader's Guide

Feminist international relations theories are diverse, proliferating, and transforming the field and practice of international politics and, in different forms, have been part of the field of International Relations since its inception (Ashworth 2014). This chapter introduces the reader to international feminism, highlighting the gains made during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85) in collecting information about, and data on, women's experiences, roles, and status globally.

Feminist international relations theories that emerged soon after the decade's end drew from varieties of feminism and the wealth of knowledge developed during that time to critique the exclusion of women and gender from the discipline of International Relations, and the erasure of female scholars of international relations (Owens 2018). This chapter defines liberal, critical, postcolonial, and poststructural international feminist theories and illustrates the purchase they provide on issues such as global governance, war and violence, and international political economy.

Introduction

The end of the cold war and the emergence of new theoretical debates set the broader context for the revitalization of feminist theories of international relations. These two events, one global and the other disciplinary, together reduced the credibility of the dominant approaches in the discipline of International Relations in two ways. Both the unexpected political alteration in the international system and the introduction of influential new actors in world politics—such as international networks, non-state actors, and users of social media—required new forms of understanding and new methods of research. Additionally, in the social sciences, explanatory theory (which holds that the world is external to and unaffected by theories of it) was rapidly losing credence because identity and cultural politics challenged its ontology (ways of being), epistemology (ways of knowing), and methodology (ways of studying) (**see the Introduction to this book**). Instead, what is often called **constitutive theory** (which holds that the world is intrinsic to and affected by theories of it) was deemed the better choice, because it eschews ahistorical and transcendental explanation. It also allows for the study of language, identity, and difference—all of which seemed necessary for understanding the complexity of world politics in which struggles over social identities and cultural meanings are inextricable from demands for reforms in institutions and law.

Feminist international relations theories are constitutive, interdisciplinary theories, and the only ones in the field of International Relations that consistently prioritize the study of women and/or engage in significant debates over the meaning of gender (**see Box 9.1**). The meaning(s) of gender is (are) contested in feminist theories and in feminist international relations theories. For now, we can start with Terrell Carver's (1996) statement that 'gender is not a synonym for women'. Although more will be said on definitions of gender (**see Ch. 17**), it is fair to say that at the start of feminist international relations theorizing, gender was understood to be primarily about social construction of biological sex differences (**see Box 9.2**).

Box 9.1 Why 'feminism' and not 'human rights'?

Some people ask, 'Why the word feminist? Why not just say you are a believer in human rights, or something like that?' Because that would be dishonest. Feminism is, of course, part of human rights in general—but to choose to use the vague expression human rights is to deny the specific and particular problem of gender. It would be a way of pretending that it was not women who have, for centuries, been excluded. It would be a way of denying that… the problem was not about being human, but specifically about being a female human. For centuries, the world divided human beings into two groups and then proceeded to exclude and oppress one group. It is only fair that the solution to the problem should acknowledge that.

(Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, 2012)

Box 9.2 The social construction of gender

'Throwing like a girl' is one way in which we can understand social construction—having female sex characteristics is presumed to define the innate capacity to throw a ball. And yet we know that access to sports and training opportunities, and expectations and encouragement to do so, have nothing to do with biological sex. Instead, they have everything to do with social order and expectations. Therefore 'throwing like a girl' is neither natural nor accidental. Moreover, the very statement is laden with judgement as to the worth of such a throw. To throw 'like' a girl is an insult. To throw like a girl is to be lesser in relation to throwing like a boy—supposedly its only and natural opposite.

According to feminist theorists, these binary oppositions—in which the primary and superior one (i.e. man) defines the desired norm (i.e. masculinity) and the secondary inferior one (i.e. woman) functions as the failure of the norm (i.e. femininity)—structure most social, political, and economic meanings. The opposition is not simply symmetrical but is also hierarchical. In other words, what we associate with masculinity is encoded as privileged and positive, while what we associate with femininity is encoded as subordinate and negative. This encoding 'de-valorizes not only women, but also racially, culturally, or economically marginalized men' (Peterson 2003: 14). For example, to be rational, autonomous, and independent is associated with men and masculinity, while to be irrational, relational, and dependent is associated with femininity. Feminists argue that these hierarchical binaries function as ahistorical and fixed, and they are presumed to be self-evident and universal. This constrains understanding of the *construction* of differences, which cannot be reduced to the simple opposition of men versus women, because these binaries are falsely taken to *explain* differences.

What is feminism?

An introduction to feminist international relations theories must begin with a working definition of **feminism**. There is no one single definition of feminism, just as there is no single definition of liberalism or Marxism. Notwithstanding this, it would be correct to say that feminism is fundamentally rooted in an analysis of the global subordination of women—which can occur economically, politically, physically, and socially—and is dedicated to its elimination. Feminism promotes equality and justice for all women, so that women's expectations and opportunities in life are not unfairly curtailed solely on the basis of being a woman. Consequently, feminism is also an analysis of power and its effects.

Feminism has contributed to the development of new methods of research and forms of knowledge. Making women's diverse experiences, roles, and status visible required that feminists re-examine and rewrite histories which either excluded women altogether or treated them as incidental, and that they reformulate basic concepts to address their gendered definitions. For example, feminist historians re-conceptualized conceptions of power to demonstrate how women exercised indirect, personal, or private forms of power when denied the opportunity to exercise power directly, socially, or publicly. In doing so, feminists have tried to understand what women are saying and doing, rather than relying on what men are saying about, and doing to, women. This effort had the effect of denaturalizing women's experience, roles, and status as simply given by their biological sex, instead exposing the ways in which social, political, economic, and cultural relations constructed interpretations of women's identities, experiences, status, and worth.

Feminism informs both theories and vibrant social movements, making the interplay among theorists, practitioners, policies, and practice a vital part of its definition and generating an evolving sense of what it means to be a feminist or to practice feminism. Consequently, definitions of feminism have changed over time, reflecting changes in both social contexts and understandings of the situation and status of women. Issues of race, colonialism, and sexuality that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as they had in earlier decades of women's international thought e.g. the early twentieth-century writings of Rosa Luxemburg, Emma Goldman, and Merze Tate bring this into particularly sharp focus, and they continue to inflect feminist theories and feminist movements today (**see Chs 10**, **17**, and **18**).

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Global South and Global North feminisms struggled to accept and incorporate the experiences of lesbian/bisexual women into their analyses of subordination and into their movements for liberation, while women of colour (in both the Global North and South) challenged white women (in both the Global North and South) to confront their racism and their privileging of white experiences as a template for feminist action. Although it may be difficult to imagine now, lesbian/bisexual women were explicitly and implicitly asked to hide their sexuality for fear that it would jeopardize the credibility of the feminist movement. Cast as 'abnormal' and 'deviant', lesbian/bisexual women confronted the homophobia of the feminist movement and questioned its claim to universal 'sisterhood'. Barbara Smith, an influential political activist and a founder of the powerful black feminist Combahee River Collective, wrote in the 1990s: 'Feminism is the political theory and practice that struggles to free all women: women of colour, working-class women, poor women, disabled women, lesbians, old women, as well as white, economically privileged heterosexual women. Anything less than this vision of total freedom is not feminism, but merely female self aggrandizement' (B. Smith 1998: 96).

Similarly, women from the Global South argued that 'feminism as appropriated and defined by the west has too often become a tool of cultural imperialism'. In the words of Madhu Kishwar, a pioneering Indian scholar and activist, 'the definitions, the terminology, the assumptions … even the issues are exported west to east … and we are expected to be the echo of what are assumed to be the more advanced movements of the west' (Kishwar 1990: 3). These critiques challenged the presumptions of particular Western, European feminisms that perjured, rejected, or colonized indigenous forms of feminism, and ignored the legacies of imperialism and exploitation. Many women from the Global South were loath to define themselves as feminist. The great Nigerian novelist Buchi Emecheta explained it this way: 'I do believe in the African type of feminism. They call it womanism because, you see, Europeans don't worry about water … you are so well off' (Emecheta 1990). The words of Kishwar and

Emecheta also highlight the disconnect that many women from the Global South felt about the priorities of Global North feminism. After all, if you don't have access to clean water or daily meals, what does formal legal equality really mean? Who decides on the priorities of a feminist agenda? Who shares in it?

It is difficult to convey the depth and intensity of these debates among women and the intensity and nuance they expressed. Yet these tensions and debates informed the evolution of feminism and feminist movements as—in a process not yet ended nor fully successful—each strove for a more integrative understanding of women's experiences and status and, in particular, to gain purchase on the ways in which they intersected with other elements of identity—such as race, sexuality, class, geographical location, and age. To understand women's experiences, status, and roles, the differences among women, as well their similarities, had to be at the forefront of any organizing. Thus, feminism is not only about asking, in the words of international relations theorist Cynthia Enloe, '*where* are the women', but also ensuring that her question is nuanced to ask *which* women are *where*?

It was not until the 1970s that we were even able to begin to answer these questions, for until then we lacked the information to do so. The International Women's Year Conference of 1975, held in Mexico City, was the most visible origin of women's global organizing for the twentieth century. As a result, in 1975 the United Nations formally designated 1976–85 as the United Nations Decade for Women. This was pivotal because it encouraged and legitimized research and action on the experiences, roles, and status of women globally, highlighting not only the stark absence of attention to women, but also the magnitude of women's contributions. Research on women's lives and opportunities signalled the validity and importance of women's issues. If at the start of the Decade for Women 'study after study revealed the lack of statistical data and information about women', by its end this was less true (Fraser 1987: 21). It was during this decade that the United Nations Fund for Women (now known as UN Women) and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INstraw) were founded, and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) entered into force. Think about that: it was only about 50 years ago that the international community accepted—and somewhat grudgingly at that—that knowledge and understanding of women's

experiences, status, contributions, and concerns were worth pursuing. The knowledge subsequently gained was ground-breaking, revelatory, and revolutionary.

For instance, Ester Boserup's book *Women's Role in Economic Development*, published in 1970, challenged conventional economic and social development programmes by proving that women were essential to productive—as well as reproductive—processes and to developing nations' economic and social progress. This led to an entirely new development agenda at the United Nations, 'Women in Development'. Until that time, international and national actors and organizations did not recognize or support women's essential economic roles, productive and/or reproductive. Moreover, the waged and unwaged work of women was seen as incidental to the overall progress and development of the state. Most significantly, the work undertaken during this decade exposed the fundamental inequalities of women's status and experience both globally and domestically. To be clear, it was not that there were no international movements or organizations dedicated to increasing the opportunities and status of women before this time (for example, **see Case Study 9.1**). Rather, it was because the United Nations Decade for Women was the first extended period of time when the United Nations and its member states were forced to grapple with the experiences, status, and roles of women globally, as a direct result of lobbying *by* women, and ultimately to take responsibility for alleviating the subordination of women.

Thus, we can argue that women suffer global subordination because we now know, through data collected over the last decades, that neither states nor households distribute resources and opportunities equally between men and women. Consider some relevant statistics from 2013–4 taken from the United Nations' report *Progress of the World's Women* (UN Women 2015). Globally, women earn 24 per cent less than men. In the United States, women make approximately 78 cents for every dollar that men make. When this figure is broken down in terms of race, African American women earn 64 cents for every dollar that men make, and Latinas only 56 cents. Worldwide, women do 75 per cent of unpaid labour in the home, while in 100 of the 173 countries assessed in the 2015 World Bank report *Women, Business and the Law*, women face gender-specific job restrictions which impede their ability to earn an income outside of the home (World Bank 2015). In 2015, only 11 women were heads of state while over 60 per cent of women remained functionally illiterate.

Case Study 9.1 Women's International League of Peace and Freedom

Suffragists Mrs P. Lawrence, Jane Addams, Anita Molloy

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The Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is the oldest formal women's international peace organization in the world. It began in 1915 at an international gathering of women who had come together during the First World War endeavouring to end that war and all wars. In the decades since, WILPF has been a strong and vocal actor in pursuing world peace through economic and social justice, women's rights, and disarmament. From its inception, WILPF articulated the necessity of including women, and women's experiences, in all elements of international and domestic politics. One of its first efforts was ensuring that the mandate of the League of Nations addressed the participation and status of women in international politics, and that the League undertook an inquiry into the legal, social, and economic status of women—the first of its kind. Throughout its history, WILPF has been forced to deal with many of the divisive issues caused by its original membership and organization as Western, primarily European, affluent women. However, as historian of its work Catia Cecilia Confortini writes, even if WILPF was not founded as a self-consciously radical organization, it evolved into 'a leading critic of militarism, racism, sexism, environmental destruction, and unfettered capitalism, emphasizing the connection between all forms of oppression and exclusion' (Confortini 2012: 8). One of its recent notable successes has been its leadership (through its spin-off PeaceWomen) in monitoring the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda is the concerted result of the effort of feminist organizations and civil society to educate the United Nations and other international and national actors and organizations as to the necessity of the equal and full involvement of women in all processes of peace and security. Since the passing of the historic resolution SC 1325 in 2000, the first ever Security Council Resolution to directly address the role of gender in conflict, seven more resolutions have advanced and detailed the ways in which gender, understood as one axis of difference, matters in understanding and resolving conflict. Although these resolutions have been widely hailed there is a significant gap between aspirations and actual support, and implementation is plagued by a lack of political will and economic commitment by member states.

The resolution SC 2242, passed in October 2015, centralizes WPS as a necessary element in all efforts to address the challenges of international politics, including rising violent extremism, climate change, and displaced peoples. In a well-regarded change, rather than simply mandating and training women's organizations to participate in peace processes, the emphasis shifted to training all peace negotiators in gender-sensitive and inclusive peace processes. It also underscored the need for women in positions of leadership, and for more funding to be directed towards all of these ends.

Question 1: WILPF's trajectory has changed over its decades of activism; what would have influenced this change?

Question 2: The WPS agenda has only taken root in the United Nations since 2000; what changes in international politics contributed to its introduction?

In 2011, due to feminist organizations' work and lobbying, the United Nations recommitted itself to researching and collecting accurate statistics on women. In particular, it is developing what it calls the Evidence and Data for Gender Equality initiative that it hopes will contribute to movements for women's equality and empowerment.

The United Nations Decade for Women sparked an outpouring of resources and information through the work of women's organizations, networks, and gatherings, as well as the flourishing of research and analysis on women's experiences, roles, and status. It could no longer be said that women did not matter to the study of international relations, or that feminists had no claim on influencing and explaining the events of international politics. And, yet, the discipline of International Relations was silent. It was in this context that feminist international relations theorists began to make their mark on the discipline of International Relations. Importantly, the revitalization of feminism and of attention to women in international politics that occurred during the United Nations Decade for Women does not mean that forms of feminism or active women scholars were utterly absent prior to this. As international relations scholars have demonstrated, the histories of feminist international relations and of women scholars were erased after the Second World War (Ashworth 2011; Owens 2018). Thus, the UN Decade for Women marked a revitalization of feminism and recognition of female scholars of international relations.

> **Key Points**
>
> - Feminism has no single definition.
> - Feminism is concerned with equality, justice, and the elimination of women's subordination and oppression.
> - Feminism and feminist movements struggle with issues of inclusion and exclusion, specifically regarding race, sexuality, class, and geographic location. By asking not only 'where are the women?', but also 'which women are where?', feminism and feminist movements work towards overcoming exclusions.
> - Without feminism and feminist movements, women's experiences and roles would have remained of little importance or interest to states.
> - Feminism and feminist movements have succeeded in radically changing the understanding of international organizations and states regarding women's significance for, and contribution to, international politics.

What is feminist international relations theory?

Feminist international relations theories that emerged in the late 1980s arose from a disciplinary dissatisfaction with the conventional and dominant theories and methods of International Relations. Feminist scholars such as Marysia Zalewski, Ann Tickner, Jan Jindy Pettman, and V. Spike Peterson, to name only a few, had no interest in advocating or defending any particular dominant approach. Rather, the positivist, rationalist theories of realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism were seen as restricting the pursuit of knowledge about international politics writ large, as well as excluding different post-positivist approaches to international politics, such as interpretive, ideational, or sociological approaches (**see Chs 6**, **8**, **and 12**). Feminist international relations theorists pointed out that neither the positivist nor post-positivist approaches paid particular attention to women, much less to gender. To remedy this, feminist international relations scholars were intent on identifying and explaining how the essential theories, concepts, and case studies of International Relations were, at the very least, partial, biased, and limited because they reflected only (certain) men's experiences, roles, and status. As Charlotte Hooper explains, feminist scholars made obvious how 'the range of subjects studied, the boundaries of the discipline, its central concerns and motifs, the content of empirical research, the assumptions of theoretical models, and the corresponding lack of female practitioners both in academic and elite political and economic circles all combine and reinforce each other to marginalize and often make invisible women's roles and women's concerns in the international arena' (Hooper 2001: 1).

While feminist international relations theorists first advocated, at a minimum, for including women in the study of international politics, it was with the full recognition that to do so was not simply to expand the scope of the field, but also to radically alter its predicates. The study of women would not only introduce a new subject, it would also demand a critical analysis of the presuppositions and presumptions of the existing discipline. V. Spike Peterson (1992) describes these initial efforts as simultaneously deconstructive, in their critique of the state of the field, and reconstructive, in introducing new methods and theories for understanding international politics.

One of the most obvious examples of feminist international relations theorists' deconstructive and reconstructive work is their analysis of the concept and practice of the state. Women have long been absent from, or sorely underrepresented in, institutions of state and global governance. Representation of women is one of the ways that the United Nations measures the degree of inequality within and across states (see the United Nations Development Programme Gender Inequality Index). The absence of women and/or low numbers of women in positions of government indicates a state that is gender unequal. Gender unequal means that not only are women underrepresented empirically, they are also neglected conceptually as their particular experiences and skills are not integrated into the practice of government. In addition, women are denied the social and political, and sometimes economic, power imparted by these positions. Once this was empirically demonstrated, feminist international relations scholars queried: why and how had this occurred? And why had the discipline, through liberalism or realism and its derivatives, not previously addressed these questions? One of multiple, complex answers pivoted on the very concept of the state itself: how it had been theorized and defined historically and politically.

Drawing on feminist work in history, anthropology, and political theory, international feminist theorists demonstrated how the concept and practices of the state in its emergence, and even as it changed over time, consistently excluded women from full participation. In addition, feminist international relations scholars critiqued the discipline's uncritical reliance on such texts and scholars as Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Machiavelli's *The Prince* in articulating its basic precepts. Most immediately, as feminist philosophers and theorists made clear, these authors wrote at a time and in a context in which women lacked full legal status and were considered the property of a male guardian. Women were relegated to ancillary, privatized, and apolitical roles that undermined their economic and social stature and centralized male control. Broadly speaking, this relegation was justified through recourse to arguments that held that women were to be protected from politics due to their innate weakness and emotionality rooted in their reproductive capacity. Feminist political theorists agree 'the tradition of Western political thought rests on a conception of "politics" that is constructed through the exclusion of women and all that is represented by femininity and women's bodies' (Shanley and Pateman 2007: 3). Feminist theorists demonstrated that this tradition of thought, to which conventional international relations scholars turn, was fundamentally predicated on the absence and insignificance of women, as well as highly constructed interpretations of women's character and, essentially, reproductive heterosexuality.

In fact, as Carol Pateman underscores, according to Hobbes, the subordination of women through heterosexual marriage is a necessary step in the establishment of civil society and eventually the state. She writes 'through the civil institution of marriage men can lawfully obtain the familiar "helpmeet" and gain the sexual and domestic services of a wife, whose permanent servitude is guaranteed by the law and sword' (Pateman 2007: 67). Thus, the state regulated that men were rulers and women were to be ruled through a constant state of legal and social violence. Consequently, the state could not be said to be a neutral concept or institution, but is a 'main organizer of the power relations of gender' in both its formal expression and effects (Peterson 1992: 9).

Evidence of this organization of the power relations of gender emerges through an examination of how gender affects the beliefs about, and the institutions and actions of, soldiering and the military. Feminist scholars study how beliefs about masculinity and the roles men are expected to play as protectors of women and as rulers of the state directly impact conceptions of soldiers as male and militaries as masculine. Expectations and beliefs about masculinity are constitutive with expectations and beliefs about soldiers, such that states institutionalize militaries to reflect and consolidate men as soldiers, in part by excluding women from combat as incapable. As Megan MacKenzie demonstrates through her research in Sierra Leone and the United States, holding to this premise requires that we ignore the history and evidence of women's participation in combat. She argues that women's forceful exclusion from the military simply reaffirms male prowess in combat and persists 'primarily because of myths and stereotypes associated with female and male capabilities and the military's "band of brothers" culture' (MacKenzie 2015: 1). As Aaron Belkin points out, this construction of masculinity through the military also has repercussions on men who are not, in effect, soldiers in the band of brothers. These men must justify and defend their own manifestations of masculinity. Soldiers 'attain masculine status by showing that they are not-feminine, not-weak, not-queer, not-emotional' (Belkin 2012: 4). In this way, masculinity is dissociated from some men and is no longer their property by birth, and the fixed binary distinction of men (protectors/rulers) and women (protected/ruled) is shown to be constructed through the interaction of beliefs, institutions, and politics, which in turn informs and reflects gendered states. Now, the inclusion of women and the relaxation of the norms and requirement of heterosexuality in many state militaries points to the possibility of new configurations of the relationship among military, state, and gender.

The simple empirical question initially posed—where are the women?—led to a re-examination of the historical, conceptual question of the state's formation and emergence. This, in turn, prompted investigation of the effects of the state's historical and conceptual evolution, which ultimately helped to explain the absence of women in state governance and the fundamental gendering of the state. The regulation of social and political relations that ground the state (marriage and the subordination of women) and structure the state (military) are fundamentally relations of power which take women and gender as central to their operation. This analysis also suggests that international relations scholars' theorizing about state and militaries must deconstruct any facile notions of protector/protected as a natural relationship. Such a conception is decidedly not natural but legislated; and its effects lead to, for example, the erasure of violence done in the name of protection and violence wielded by women (compare Sjoberg and Gentry 2007).

Gender and power

Among scholars of gender, how gender and power are defined and understood to be related varies according to the conceptualization of gender itself. Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prügl (2001) distinguish the use of gender in at least three ways, each of which has implications for understandings of power. As they note, some scholars treat gender as an empirical variable that explains social, political, and economic inequalities, whereby gender is understood as the biological (sex) difference between men and women. Power, then, rests in social, political, and economic hierarchies. This is the approach of liberal feminist international relations. Others identify gender as a social construct that exists in social practices, identities, and institutions. Gender becomes the social interpretation of biological (sex) differences, and power rests in the practices, identities, and institutions that interpret and fix those differences. This is the approach of critical feminist international relations. Finally, some argue that gender is an effect of discourses of power. In this reading, gender is neither biological difference, nor is it the social interpretation of biological difference, but is itself constitutive of that difference. This understanding of gender identifies it as 'code' for the operation of power, and gender becomes an analytical category that is not necessarily linked to male and female bodies. This

understanding of gender requires thinking of gender as a useful analytic even if male and female bodies are absent. This is the approach of poststructural feminist international relations (**see Ch. 11**). Postcolonial feminism is defined less by its theorization of gender, as it encompasses at least two of the approaches—critical and poststructural—in its scope (**see Ch. 10**).

Considering these differences in interpreting gender, it is logical that gender scholars rely on a diverse range of methodological approaches that examine institutions, agents, discourses, and symbols in the production and reproduction of gender in international politics. And, although this chapter discusses four types of feminist international relations theories, this is an analytic separation for ease of explanation; it does not mean that there are only four or, indeed, that these four are wholly conceptually distinct.

Four feminist international relations theories

Liberal feminist international relations

Liberal feminism challenges the content of International Relations, but it does not challenge its fundamental epistemological assumptions (**see Ch. 6**). Liberal feminist international relations theorists advocate that the rights

and representation conventionally granted to men be extended to women. To correct gender inequality, liberal feminists focus on changing institutions, in particular increasing the representation of women in positions of

power in the primary institutions of national and international governance. They also highlight the need to change laws to allow for women's participation, which they believe will also correct the distribution of power between the sexes. A recent global initiative to achieve gender parity in international tribunals and courts exemplifies this approach. Noting that 'as of September 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has no female judges; the International Court of Justice has 15 judges and only 3 are women; the United Nations Human Rights Committee has 18 members and only 5 are women', the Center for Justice and International Law through its organization Gqual argued, 'when only a small fraction of the global population creates, develops, implements and enforces rules for all, the legitimacy of their decisions and policies, and even of the institutions themselves is called into question … the inclusion of women in these spaces is important for equality and to improve the justice we all deserve' (Gqual website).

According to liberal feminist international relations theorists, gender inequality is a major barrier to human development and leads to greater incidences of war and violence. In their book, Hudson et al. (2012) maintain that gender inequality, by which they mean the subordination of women, is itself a form of violence. Through a collation of quantitative data (available at http://www.womanstats.org/) the authors argue that the higher the domestic index of social, political, and economic inequality between men and women in a state, the more likely it is that force and violence will be used to settle disputes both within and among states. They contend: 'the fate of nations is tied to the status of women'. Mary Caprioli (2004) similarly claims that gender inequality makes conflict both within and among states more likely. For these authors, systemic gender inequality and discrimination against women are the root causes of violence.

These are fascinating studies and are well received by policy-makers and the discipline of International Relations. They also raise important questions regarding what exactly is the mechanism by which gender inequality increases risks of violence. Is it, as Hudson et al. (2012) and Hudson and De Boer (2004) suggest, rooted in male sexuality (and a surplus male population) and the evolutionary heterosexual reproductive practices? Caprioli cautions that 'rather than focusing on the genesis of, or justification for differences between the sexes, the more important question should concentrate on how those differences are used to create a society primed for violence' (Caprioli 2005: 161). Other feminists suggest that these scholars do not make clear why both questions

cannot be investigated simultaneously. They suggest that a more comprehensive approach addresses questions regarding the genesis, justification, and use of the differences between the sexes, rather than presuming that we know in advance what these differences are and that accepting them is the necessary starting point.

Critical feminist international relations

Critical feminists question liberal feminisms for relying too faithfully on the neutrality of their methods, and for their vision of power as a positive social good that can be successfully redistributed without fundamental social change. Many of these feminists highlight the broader social, economic, and political relationships that structure relational power, and they often draw from Marxist theories to prioritize the role of the economy, specifically critiquing the dominance of capitalism as the desired mode of exchange. Critical international relations feminists, drawing on socialist ideas, pay particular attention to the unequal diffusion of global capital accumulation. As Iris Young puts it, 'women's oppression arises from two distinct and relatively autonomous systems. The system of male domination, most often called "patriarchy", produces the specific gender oppression of women; the system of the mode of production and class relations produces the class oppression and work alienation of most women' (I. Young 1990: 21). Therefore, drawing from both Marxist and socialist thought, critical feminist scholars identify gender and class oppressions as interdependent and intertwined (**see Ch. 7**). Scholars including Sandra Whitworth (1994) and Elisabeth Prügl (1999), studying international institutions such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Planned Parenthood Federation, demonstrate how gender is produced and reproduced through the institutionalization of divisions of 'paid' and 'unpaid' labour. V. Spike Peterson's innovation of 'triad analytics' broadens the view of institutions and economies by analysing globalization through the intersection of reproductive, productive, and virtual economics on which the global economy rests. In her analysis, Peterson draws attention to the 'explosive growth in financial markets that shape business decision-making and flexible work arrangements' and the 'dramatic growth in informal and flexible work arrangements that shapes income generation and family well being' (Peterson 2003: 1). The devaluation of women's work; the still extant differential valuing of reproductive and productive work;

the 'double burden' of household labour and waged labour that women carry disproportionately; and the massive global shifts in the structure of work itself all influence the worldwide feminization and racialization of poverty.

Like postcolonial feminist theories, these critical feminist theories are wary of gender essentialism, which is the assumption of the sameness of all women's experiences by virtue of being female. They critique the normalization of white, affluent women's experiences as universal and instead highlight the dynamic and intersectional facets of identity, of which gender and sex are but two elements. Like postcolonial feminist theorists, critical feminist theories also emphasize the tight link between feminist theorizing and feminist actions, in part due to their recognition that the marginalized, exploited, and colonized have much to teach about the violent practices of global politics in particular locations. Maria Stern (2005) illuminates how the violence of war affects the intimacies of self and family. Stern questions why the experiences of Mayan women are not considered 'valid texts of world politics', as they illuminate the constitutive topics of war, violence, and security central to the discipline of International Relations (M. Stern 2005: 56).

Critical and postcolonial feminists were united in their excoriation of the use of feminism, specifically liberal feminism, by former President George W. Bush and his administration to justify the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; to distinguish the United States from those whom it targeted; and, subsequently, to appropriate the putative emancipation of Afghani and Iraqi women as evidence of their victories. According to many feminists, however, not only did this 'embedded feminism' falsely claim a monolithic feminism to be wielded against a supposedly savage Islam, in order to once again 'save' Muslim women, it distracted from the detailed empirical evidence that Afghan women are not now free from violence but rather continue to experience it in other forms (Kinsella 2007; K. Hunt 2006: 53).

Postcolonial feminist international relations

Postcolonial feminism 'link(s) everyday life and local gendered contexts and ideologies to the larger, transnational political and economic structures and ideologies of capitalism' (Mohanty 2003: 504). Focusing on the particular situations, experiences, and histories as materializing colonialism within these larger patterns

is a means to confront the universalizing instinct found in much of feminist theorizing.

Postcolonial feminism seeks to situate historical knowledge of the contours of colonialism and postcolonialism as intersecting with economic, social, and political oppression and change, highlighting the centrality of conceptions of gender and of women to colonial regimes and their continuing effects. Imperialism demanded 'complex household arrangements where white colonizers officially mandated a system of superiority and disdain against' local communities and peoples. 'Yet colonization would not have functioned without these local communities and peoples—especially nannies, maids, houseboys, gardeners, prostitutes, pimps, soldiers, and other coerced workers for the colonial state' (Agathangelou and Ling 2004: 518).

Rules governing proper and improper sex were key to the maintenance of difference between the colonized and the colonizer, and control of sexualities was fundamentally differentiated according to race and position. Only white men were free to have sex with whomever they so desired, often in exploitative proprietary relations of rape and concubinage with women of colour. In contrast, men of colour were policed as savage sexual libertines against whom white women were to be protected and preserved. Highlighting the link between individual households, materiality, and sexuality, postcolonial feminists reminds feminism that not all women are colonized equally. Women from the Global North benefited from imperialism as the 'inferior sex within the "superior race" ' (quoted in Pettman 1996: 30).

Postcolonial feminism takes as its point of entry the recognition that the feminism of the Global North is rooted in and dependent on discourses of rights and equality that were, and arguably are, of pre-eminent concern to Western Europe. Rey Chow describes this as the Eurocentric 'hierarchizing frame of comparison' (Chow 2006: 80). Postcolonial feminists also underscore that while colonialism and imperialism may be formally past, their effects are not. Norma Alarcón describes this as the 'cultural and psychic dismemberment … linked to imperialist racist and sexist practices [that are] not a thing of the past' (Alarcón 1999: 67). Certainly, the expansion of characteristics said to identify the enemy in a time of global war rejuvenates and vivifies racial and colonial characterizations. For example, in the contemporary war on terror, the freedom of Muslim and Arab men and women, or those who appear to be so, is subject to increased scrutiny through policing and surveillance. The number of

traits said to identify the threat—'travelling while brown'—intensifies the alliances consolidated by race and class, while testing those made only by sex (Sharma 2006: 135).

Additionally, women from the Global South are all too often depicted and treated as 'an object of protection from her own kind', to justify the concerted efforts of 'white men saving brown women from brown men' (Spivak 1988: 296). Thus, as feminist scholars note, the existence of those so designated in need of protection frequently becomes a *rationale* for violence, as it did when the United States launched its ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For this reason, postcolonial feminists resist the imposition of women's rights as 'all too often conceived in terms of paternal relations of protection and benign salvation rather than exercises of agency and sovereignty of women for themselves' (Kinsella 2007: 218; **see Case Study 9.2**). The embedded feminism of the United States' efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan obscured the decades of agency and mobilization of Iraqi and Afghan peoples on their own behalf. Instead, former President Bush and his administration (standing in for the Global North) portrayed such efforts as the exclusive actions of the United States. In addition, postcolonial feminists suggest that the individualism and autonomy implicit in the definitions

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Case Study 9.2 The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan

Demonstration of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) in Peshawar, Pakistan

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The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) was founded in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1977. It was founded to promote women's rights and social justice; to increase women's participation in social, political, and economic activities; and to advocate for a secular democratic state. Its goals were women's emancipation, the separation of religion and politics, economic democracy, eradication of poverty, and networking with other national/international pro-democracy and pro-women's rights groups based on the 'principle of equality and non-interference in internal affairs' (Brodsky 2004: 169).

Founded only a year before the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, RAWA expanded its activities to resist Soviet rule. RAWA never aligned itself with any other resistance movements, many of which adhered to a more stringent interpretation of Islam than that practiced by RAWA's members. RAWA is anti-fundamentalist, but not anti-Islam. Meena, the charismatic founder of RAWA, was murdered in 1987 because of her unrelenting criticism of both sides in the war—Soviet and fundamentalists. In response, RAWA began to hold more public events and to reach out for international support from other women's and human rights organizations. One of RAWA's members, all of whom use pseudonyms for safety, shared: 'we knew there would be more assassinations and imprisonment if we kept silent. If we had a public face and we could make ourselves more known, we could scare the enemy' (Brodsky 2004: 98).

During the Soviet rule and the resultant civil war that preceded the advent of Taliban rule, RAWA members (women and 'male supporters') opened schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan, housing, educating, and employing men and women who fled from Afghanistan due to unremitting war. Under the Taliban, RAWA members in Afghanistan went into hiding; many members were killed and wounded and their families threatened and harmed by the Taliban. Notwithstanding this threat, under which it had always operated, RAWA opened underground schools to educate women and girls and founded a magazine which members circulated clandestinely. Every activity RAWA undertook meant its members risked immediate death if discovered, and their lives were actively circumscribed by daily and minute security concerns.

According to RAWA, the rule of the Soviets, the warlords, and the Taliban were marked by similarity in repression and brutality that varied primarily in degree and justification. RAWA roundly criticized the invasion by the United States, not only for its premise but also because of its effects. Moreover, RAWA members noted that indigenous women's rights networks and organizations' expertise and knowledge were utterly ignored in the push to 'liberate' them. RAWA itself was characterized as too radical and dogmatic in its critique of all forms of economic, political, and social repression, and in its advocacy for an Afghan democracy.

RAWA has stated: 'RAWA believes that freedom and democracy can't be donated; it is the duty of the people of a country to fight and achieve these values. Under the US-supported government, the sworn enemies of human rights, democracy and secularism have gripped their claws over our country and attempt to restore their religious fascism on our people.'

Question 1: What forms of feminism can you identify in this short description of RAWA?

Question 2: Why would RAWA be or not be an ally to the United States' ground war in Afghanistan?

of rights and liberties are culturally ill-suited, and that collective and relational rights are a better fit.

Lastly, with the international community only now beginning to respond to climate change and the devastating impacts of resource extraction and environmental exploitation, postcolonial feminists call attention to it as another manifestation of the legacies of imperialism (**see Ch. 24**). They highlight its differential impact on the Global South, the global poor, and specifically women and girls within those categories. Among the global poor, climate change disproportionately affects women and girls. They comprise the majority of the globe's small-scale farmers and are primarily responsible for producing food to feed their families and their communities. For example, in Asia, women cultivate more than 90 per cent of rice, and in Ghana women produce 70 per cent of subsistence crops. Yet women and girls are struggling due to climate-induced changes affecting temperatures, rainfall, disease, weather patterns, and crop failure. While recognizing this fact, postcolonial feminism cautions against the construction of women and girls as especially responsible for conservation, as being 'closer to nature', and as especially vulnerable, without any corresponding increases in their authority or agency (Arora-Jonsson 2011).

Poststructural feminist international relations

Poststructural feminism draws most specifically from the scholarship of Judith Butler. Butler argued, contrary to the commonplace and accepted definition that gender is the social construction of sex, sex is in fact constructed by gender. As might be imagined, her argument caused no end of consternation for it challenged the seemingly stable and shared attribute of a biological sex of all women. Without this fixed and permanent referent in sex itself, how could it be that 'women' could exist, much less be united across differences of class, sexuality, race, and location? Butler explains that 'originally intended to dispute the "biology is destiny" formulation, the distinction between sex and gender' in fact masks the cultural construction of sex itself. In other words, sex is not the foundation or origin of gender, but is itself an effect. To understand gender as 'a social category imposed on a sexed body' assumes that the sexed body is itself not an effect of power (Scott 1999: 32). To help us grasp this argument, Butler introduces the concept of gender performativity, which simply means that gender is not what we are, but rather what we do. Cautioning

against misinterpretation, Butler points out that gender is not simply what one freely chooses to do (it is not an unfettered performance), but that performativity occurs in highly regulated contexts including that of normative heterosexuality. Socially, one becomes a woman by taking on the imperative to identify with the female/femininity and to desire the male/masculinity. This production of identity is not accomplished in one act, but rather requires constant iteration and bears with it the constant possibility of failure. As Sarah Salih (2002: 58) explains, 'gender is a "corporeal style", an act (or a sequence of acts), a "strategy" which has cultural survival as its end, since those who do not "do" their gender correctly are punished by society'. Evidence of this is seen in the worry, discussed previously in the section about the United Nations Decade for Women, that the presence of lesbian/bisexual women would undermine the credibility of the feminist movement through their 'deviant' sexuality. Cynthia Weber (2015), along with other queer theorists, draws from the insight about normative heterosexuality, or the 'heterosexual matrix', to continue to analyse how bodies are never merely described, but are constituted in the act of description, calling on international relations theories to recognize the punitive and productive circulation and regulation of homo/heterosexualities as fundamental to world politics.

As well as subversively reworking gender/sex, poststructural feminism illuminates the constitutive role of language in creating gendered knowledge and experiences. Laura Shepherd (2008*a*) shows this in her analysis of the constitutive effects of the discourses formalized in UN Security Council Resolution 1325. While purporting an emancipatory intent, the Resolution consistently reifies women and girls as passive victims of violence even as it seeks to promote them as agents of change. In a slightly different vein, Kathy Moon (1997) uses interviews, archival research, and discourse analysis to demonstrate how the sexual economy of prostitution figured in the US–Korean security relationships of the mid-1970s. Charlotte Hooper (2001) examines the masculinization of states and states' masculinization of men through a rereading of central economic texts and journals. Overall, what these scholars demonstrate is how gender is created through the workings of international politics and, in turn, how paying attention to this construction reveals relations of power that are otherwise overlooked.

See Opposing Opinions 9.1 for discussion on whether feminism influences states' foreign policy decision-making.

Key Points

- These four approaches to feminist international relations theory help explain the range of feminist theorizing, but do not sum it up completely.

- Each approach offers different insights into the operations of power in international and domestic politics.

- Each approach can be understood best in relation to the other, e.g., postcolonial feminism as a critique of liberal feminism, and in conversation with the others.

- Each approach has different historical origins and developments, and all continue to evolve.

Opposing Opinions 9.1 Feminist foreign policy changes states' foreign policy decisions

For

Feminist foreign policy places gender equality at the crux of foreign policy decisions. During her US Senate confirmation hearings to become Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton vowed, 'I want to pledge to you that as secretary of state I view [women's] issues as central to our foreign policy, not as adjunct or auxiliary or in any way lesser than all of the other issues that we have to confront.' Margo Wallström, former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden, stated that the Three Rs of feminist foreign policy are rights, resources, and representation.

Feminist foreign policy makes a difference in how states act. In 2015, Sweden did not renew a decades-old trade agreement with Saudi Arabia, in part because of that state's treatment of women. This caused a diplomatic scandal, as well as predictions of the loss of billions to Sweden's economy. In 2010, the United States Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review—a blueprint for the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development—integrated gender into its foreign policy goals and began tracking dollars spent on women-focused programming.

Against

Feminist foreign policy does not place gender equality at the crux of foreign policy decisions for its own sake, but merely to legitimate conventional policy goals. Margot Wallström explained that 'striving toward gender equality is not only a goal in itself but also a precondition for achieving our wider foreign, development, and security-policy objectives'. Likewise, Hillary Clinton stated in an interview: 'This is a big deal for American values and for American foreign policy and our interests, but it is also a big deal for our security.'

Feminist foreign policy makes no difference in how states act. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton never sanctioned other states for their treatment of women and girls. For example, Saudi Arabia remained a vital partner for the US national security strategies in the Middle East, and after promises not to 'abandon' Afghan women and girls during the drawdown of US troops in Afghanistan, the United States did little to ensure their security. Sweden's relatively weak stature internationally allows it to proclaim a feminist foreign policy without any real risks, and it has yet to engage in any complicated issues of multilateral foreign policy (such as the conflict in Ukraine) under a feminist foreign policy.

1. As Swedish scholar Ulf Bjereld suggests, do 'military defense and feminism represent two branches of the same tree: that citizens' security is guaranteed by having a strong military and that the feminist agenda is guaranteed through diplomacy, aid, and other arsenals beyond defense' (quoted in Rothschild 2014)?

2. Are feminist foreign policy and the Hillary Doctrine iterations of an imperial feminism that serves the interests of only (some) sovereign states and obscures their true goals of military and economic dominance?

3. Does it matter if feminist foreign policy doesn't change state behaviour? How else could it have significant effects on international politics?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Conclusion

Feminist international relations theories have been present in the discipline of International Relations in various forms since its inception (Tickner and True 2018). In its incarnations since the UN Decade for Women, feminist international relations theories have demonstrated the crucial importance of including women, and theorizing gender, when attempting to make sense of international politics. Feminist international relations theories draw from a long history of feminist theorizing and actions to make specific claims about the concepts of

International Relations—such as security, the economy, war, and trade—as well as its methods of study. Feminist international relations theories employ a wide range of methodological approaches, but they share a focus on understanding gender as an analytical category, not simply a descriptive one. In addition, feminist international relations scholars straightforwardly examine how gender is a relationship of power, one that affects all individuals, institutions, and interactions in international politics. Bringing this to the fore of their research and methods, feminist international relations scholars demonstrate the difference that gender makes.

Questions

1. Name two ways in which the United Nations Decade for Women changed international politics.
2. What methods do feminist international relations theories draw on to conduct their research?
3. How does the study of gender affect our understandings of the role of women and men in politics?
4. How do theories of power differ among the four different categories of feminist international relations theories?
5. Which feminist international relations theory posits that 'gender is doing', and what does this mean?
6. The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) is best described as what type of feminist organization: liberal, critical, postcolonial, or poststructural?
7. The Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is best described as what type of feminist organization: liberal, critical, postcolonial, or poststructural?
8. Why is postcolonial feminism concerned with the question of climate change?
9. Would a liberal feminist find a poststructural feminist critique of heterosexuality convincing? Why or why not?
10. In which ways are international feminist theories necessary for the study of international politics?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Ackerly, B. A., **Stern, M., and True, J.** (eds) (2006), *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Introduces a wide variety of feminist methodologies and examples of their use.

Agathangelou, A. M., and Ling, L. H. M. (2009), *Transforming World Politics: From Empire to Multiple Worlds* (London: Routledge). A stimulating theoretical and empirical discussion of the impact of imperialism on world politics.

Al-Ali, N. S., and Pratt, N. C. (2010), *What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation of Iraq* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). An informed critique of the United States' claim to liberate the women of Iraq.

Alexander, M. J., and Mohanty, C. T. (1997), *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures* (New York: Routledge). A feminist classic and a continuation of the discussion of colonialism and feminist practices and theories.

Biswas, S., and Nair, S. (2010), *International Relations and States of Exception: Margins, Peripheries, and Excluded Bodies* (London: Routledge). An analysis of contemporary international relations, discipline and practice, with specific regard to marginalized and excluded peoples and subjects.

Jauhola, M. (2013), *Post-tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia: Negotiating Normativity through Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives in Aceh* (London: Routledge). A critical, postcolonial feminist examination of institutions and redevelopment in Indonesia.

Rai, S. (2008), *The Gender Politics of Development: Essays in Hope and Despair* (New Delhi: Zubaan). After working in development and gender politics for over 20 years, Shirin Rai sets forth the relationship of gender politics and state formation in postcolonial states, focusing specifically on India.

Tickner, J. A. (2014), *A Feminist Voyage through International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press). An overview of the work of one of the most influential feminist international relations theorists, with old and new writings over the course of her career.

Wilcox, L. B. (2015), *Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A poststructural feminist analysis of violence and embodiment.

Films

Enemies of Happiness, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/309/
Pray the Devil Back to Hell, http://www.forkfilms.com/pray-the-devil-back-to-hell/
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's speech 'We Should All Be Feminists'

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Postcolonial and decolonial approaches

MEERA SABARATNAM

Framing Questions

- **What are the most important features of world politics according to postcolonial and decolonial approaches?**

- **How do postcolonial and decolonial scholars approach the study of international relations?**

- **Is it possible to decolonize world politics?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter focuses on postcolonial and decolonial approaches to studying world politics, arguing that these are multilayered and diverse. These do not constitute a single 'theory' of the international but rather a set of orientations to show how the world works and how we should think about it. The chapter begins by separating some different elements involved in theorizing the world, and how postcolonial and decolonial approaches look at them. These include questions of **epistemology** (how we know things), **ontology** (what we know), and norms/ethics (what values are important to us). It goes on to examine the historical context in which postcolonial and decolonial approaches arose, showing that there was a dynamic relationship between political struggles for decolonization and the development of different intellectual arguments. It examines where postcolonial and decolonial approaches have emerged and where they depart from each other in terms of analysis and focus. Having traced these traditions through the twentieth century, the chapter examines the key concepts used in postcolonial and decolonial thought across different disciplines, before looking at their impact on the field of International Relations (IR). Within IR, postcolonial and decolonial approaches have examined the forms of hierarchy that characterize the world, as well as the ways in which they are discussed. The chapter also explores the similarities and differences between these approaches and other theories in the field of IR. Finally, the chapter contemplates the on-going popularity of postcolonial and decolonial approaches in the present day.

Introduction

Postcolonialism is one of the fastest growing areas of research in International Relations. It begins with the insight that the modern world has been deeply shaped by experiences of **empire** and **colonialism**, particularly as conducted by European countries over the last five centuries. It says that our theories of international relations and accounts of world order need to deal with this issue directly, and also asks why the majority of them fail to do so. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to the field are therefore seen as forms of **critical theory** because they challenge the very foundations of the field. However, these approaches also seek to develop their own alternative ways of theorizing the world.

In these approaches, special attention is paid to the history, ideas, and practice of **decolonization** around the world. Decolonization usually refers to the processes of formal colonial and imperial withdrawal from many countries in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and South America, especially in the twentieth century. As a result of decolonization struggles and processes, the number of states recognized in the international system increased from around 70 in 1945 to more than 190 in 2018. These struggles involved the mobilization of huge numbers of people, the development of intellectual critiques of empire and colonialism, and, often, armed struggles against imperial rule where colonial powers attempted to maintain their control.

In IR, postcolonial and decolonial approaches interrogate the claims of existing theoretical approaches such as liberalism and realism (**see Chs 6** and **8**), often arguing that these are flawed because they are built on faulty premises, such as the assumptions of international **anarchy** or that sovereign states are all essentially alike. These theories obscure the role of empire and colonialism in producing patterns in international order. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches also note that virtually all other recent approaches to IR have left out questions of race and racism from their analysis (**see Ch. 18**). Finally, they argue that these theories are built on very narrow philosophical grounds, which use a specific tradition of Western philosophy as a universal template for thinking through questions of being, society, and ethics.

By bringing questions of empire, colonialism, and race back into the study of world politics, postcolonial and decolonial approaches present alternative accounts of many of the thematic issues in IR presented in this book, such as globalization, war, sovereignty, trade, international law, weapons control, gender, security, environmental crises, development, and labour. These alternative accounts trace the ways in which imperial hierarchies continue to orient identities, policies, and actions in these fields, examine the kinds of resistance that they encounter, and imagine alternative ways of thinking about these issues.

What are postcolonial and decolonial approaches?

Like social constructivism (**see Ch. 12**) or feminism (**see Ch. 9**), postcolonial and decolonial approaches in IR and other social sciences should be understood as a way of thinking about the world rather than a single theory of how the world works. These approaches draw their influences from a range of sources, including anti-colonial thought from around the world, and also research in the fields of history, philosophy, education, literary theory, anthropology, and political economy. The variety of influences on the field also means that there is considerable diversity among these approaches. However, they can be understood as being united by three levels of theoretical engagement—epistemological, ontological, and **normative**.

Postcolonial and decolonial approaches share a concern with the ways we generate knowledge about the world—our epistemologies. Alongside many social theories, they reject the assumption that knowledge is ever objective or neutral. They argue that the way that many people know and represent the world depends on hierarchies established by colonial attitudes, and the perspectives of the colonially or racially privileged. Consider, for example, the language used to describe people living in countries that are not their countries of birth; for Westerners living in formerly colonized countries, Westerners often use the term 'expats', but for people from formerly colonized countries moving into the West, they use the term 'immigrants'. The use of these and similar terms means that the orientation towards and treatment of particular groups is very different depending on their position in the hierarchy. Some postcolonial and decolonial approaches identify these epistemological habits as deeply rooted in the

racialized and supremacist assumptions of influential Western philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, who saw white Europe as the pinnacle of humanity, and non-white peoples as backward or uncivilized.

By contrast, postcolonial and decolonial approaches have emphasized the importance of seeing and knowing the world from the perspectives and worldviews (that is, the epistemologies) of those who are disempowered or dispossessed by imperial and racial hierarchies. However, there are some differences between postcolonial and decolonial approaches. Postcolonial approaches have emphasized the importance of **subaltern** perspectives (**see 'What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial and decolonial thought?'**) as a site for thinking through relations of power. These can include criticisms rendered back in the language of the colonial power—for example, in the use of Christianity to criticize slavery in the Americas. In decolonial approaches, more emphasis is put on retrieving **indigenous** epistemologies and **cosmologies** with which to think about relations among humans and, often, non-humans (**see Case Study 10.1**).

Case Study 10.1 The *Buen Vivir* movement

A protest against the government in the city of La Paz, Bolivia

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The Sumac Kawsay/*Buen Vivir* philosophy can be seen as an example of decolonial thinking which has become embedded in a political movement in recent decades. '*Sumac Kawsay*' is a phrase from the Quechua language, indigenous to the Andes. It is translated as 'living well' or 'good living' ('buen vivir' in Spanish). It is intended as an alternative to the idea of economic 'development' as unlimited growth and modernization.

The idea of 'development' has been criticized for a long time in South America and from different positions. Historically speaking, there has been conflict between indigenous people who lived on the land and colonizing forces who desired it for the purposes of mining, industrial modes of farming, or urbanization. These conflicts often ended with indigenous people being dispossessed of the land they lived on and the break-up of their community structures. The appropriation of land for mining or farming has also often led to the degradation of the environment. This is because many of these 'development' processes involve widespread deforestation, the introduction of chemical pollutants, the erosion of soil, the disturbing and pollution of water sources, and the introduction of large numbers of non-indigenous animals, their waste products, and their diseases.

Awareness of these ecological problems grew in prominence globally through the 1970s and 1980s, although they were known locally before this. Combined with this awareness were the Third World critiques of 'development' as a kind of colonial ideology, which presumed that the industrialized West was the model to be emulated globally. These critiques became known as 'post-development' thinking. In dialogue with each other, the Sumac Kawsay/*Buen Vivir* movement emerged as a way of thinking differently about the objectives of society.

The Sumac Kawsay/*Buen Vivir* movement has three main differences from conventional understandings of capitalist development: it emphasizes the community rather than the individual as a subject of well-being, it argues that it must be ecologically balanced rather than growth-maximizing, and it asserts that it should be culturally sensitive rather than universalist. These approaches are said to be more in keeping with the cosmologies or worldviews of the indigenous people of the region and more environmentally responsible.

This alternative way of thinking has impacted governments in the region and has made ripples elsewhere. For example, in 2008 the Ecuadorian constitution legally recognized the rights of ecosystems to exist and for them to be represented in court by anyone. This has led to individuals and groups holding companies and governments to account for environmentally damaging action. In 2010, Bolivia passed a law recognizing the legal standing of Mother Earth (the indigenous word 'Pachamama' meaning 'World Mother'), emphasizing rights to water, clean air, balanced ecosystems, and biodiversity. This approach has influenced others elsewhere—for example, the Whanganui River in New Zealand's North Island has acquired 'rights to personhood' and the River Ganges in India has been granted 'human rights' by the government.

However, in many cases, the ideas of Sumac Kawsay/*Buen Vivir* have not been as transformative of attitudes to extractive development as supporters hoped, and for some they are now acting as a cover for the same patterns of development that they criticized.

Question 1: Why has the idea of 'development' been criticized for being colonial?

Question 2: What has been the political impact of Sumac Kawsay/*Buen Vivir*?

Postcolonial and decolonial approaches also take issue with the ontological assumptions of conventional social science and IR—that is, *what* it is that is being studied, *who* is being studied, and more generally *what* the world consists of. Since 1945, IR has understood itself as being concerned with sovereign states, focusing mostly on Western great powers and the relations between them. It has sought to devise theories that explain these relations, specifically where they result either in forms of conflict or cooperation. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches, however, note that the histories they use and the cases they pay attention to miss out the experiences of most of the world's peoples and polities, which are located outside the West. They also miss out the experiences of empire and colonialism in the shaping of Western international histories themselves. For postcolonial and decolonial approaches, this means that conventional IR cannot fully explain or understand world politics. Decolonial approaches engage the idea of 'modernity/coloniality' (**see 'What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial and decolonial thought?'**) as a way of talking about how the modern world is structured fundamentally by colonial hierarchy.

This ontological shift causes a re-examination of knowledge in IR. For example, the conflict known as the First World War (1914–18) is a very important reference point in the conventional story of IR. It is understood to be the point at which the 'Long Peace' of the nineteenth century broke down, the point at which the balance of power was being tested, a point at which states became averse to violence, and a point at which they established the principle of national self-determination. It is sometimes called the 'graveyard of empires', referring to the break-up of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. However, the conventional story treats the key players (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) as themselves nation-states rather than empires. Yet the protection or assertion of imperial territorial claims was a major source of competition between them, meaning that fighting also took place across Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, and heavily involved troops from those areas fighting for imperial powers. The principle of national self-determination espoused by US President Woodrow Wilson was only really intended for application in Eastern Europe, leading to the violent repression of anti-colonial protests in India and Ireland by Britain immediately following the war. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire also directly facilitated British and French colonial control of the Middle East and the establishment of new territorial borders to regulate their spheres of influence. For postcolonial and decolonial approaches, then, colonialism and imperialism are crucial ontological foundations for understanding world politics. Moreover, it becomes impossible to disentangle the 'West' from the 'non-West' in terms of thinking about world history because of imperial and colonial experience.

These considerations are also connected to the normative or ethical foundations for world politics. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches have tended to understand the attitudes, practices, and structures supporting Western supremacy in the world as unequal, racist, and dehumanizing. This is because they tend to elevate Western states and peoples as being fundamentally more important, historically significant, and worthy of attention than non-Westerners. They often lead to the consequences of producing attitudes of superiority, entitlement, and indifference towards the non-West. They also produce what many see as hypocritical attitudes towards the non-West.

For example, in the field of economics, it is understood that the ways in which the West became wealthier are now effectively banned by international agreements and treaties. Some of these are seen to be morally appropriate, such as agreements against the use of enslaved labour and colonial territorial expansion. However, it is argued that the West also became rich through the assertion of control over markets and state financial and legal support for particular sectors, which poorer countries are not permitted to do under contemporary development regimes. This has been called 'kicking away the ladder' by economist Ha-Joon Chang (2002), because it deprives poorer countries of the same opportunities for economic growth. Moreover, the West continues to enforce unfair trade and taxation rules that benefit their own economies at the expense of poorer producers and governments (**see Ch. 27**). Given the role of Western imperialism in shaping the economic structures that govern the world economy today, many argue that there are strong moral obligations on the West to make reparations for the effects that these have had, particularly towards the descendants of formerly enslaved people.

See a video of Dr Meera Sabaratnam discussing 'What are postcolonial and decolonial approaches?' **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Key Points

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches are a way of thinking about the world rather than a rigid theory.
- The approaches include insights about how we think about and know the world (epistemology), what we study (ontology), and our ethical or normative responsibilities.
- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches seek to understand things from the perspectives of the colonized/ formerly colonized and to challenge the ways that such people are often represented in mainstream approaches.

- They seek to think about world politics by keeping imperialism and colonialism in view as a structure of power which influences and shapes many other forms of power in the world, such as sovereignty.
- They challenge the West in terms of its moral responsibility for inequalities in the world today, arguing that the West is often hypocritical and dehumanizing because it fails to recognize the bases for its own wealth and power, which are rooted in domination over and exploitation of people and resources around the world.

Where did postcolonial and decolonial ideas come from?

Postcolonial and decolonial ideas are inspired by the history and practice of decolonization. They share many common historical reference points, but the differences between them are also shaped by different geographic and philosophical locations. Whereas postcolonial approaches have been commonly associated with thinkers of Asian and African descent, decolonial approaches have been principally cultivated by Latin American thinkers. We will look at the common historical roots of their approaches before looking at the differences between them.

An important foundation is a shared understanding of the history of Western empires. Many Western countries controlled and dominated other parts of the world, beginning with the Spanish conquest and occupation of the

Americas in the sixteenth century, continuing through the Dutch occupations around the Indian Ocean, and reaching a high point in the British and French empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which claimed territorial sovereignty over large sections of Asia and Africa (**see Fig. 10.1**). At its height, the British Empire is said to have controlled over a quarter of the world's land area. Empires engaged in many different forms of control and transformation, usually based on their ability to militarily subdue or co-opt the rulers of the area. However, sometimes colonial control also involved forms of extensive land dispossession and genocidal violence against the indigenous peoples, as in the Americas and Australasia. While there have been other powerful empires in world

Figure 10.1 Map of Empires in 1914

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history, such as in Japan, China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, their influence has often been curtailed and overwritten by Western influence in recent centuries.

Whatever kind of imperial or colonial control was exercised by European powers, however, there were a number of common patterns to these practices (**see Box 10.1**). Politically, they forced a formal recognition of imperial rule in the area, such as through declaring loyalty to a European monarch. Economically, they often forced indigenous or imported enslaved peoples to work and produce mostly for imperial markets, for little or no reward. They also extracted raw materials and established trade monopolies on key imports and exports. Culturally, they promoted and imposed their own languages, laws, and often religions. Socially, they often invented, appropriated, or reinforced racial hierarchies, tribal divisions, and gender norms among people in order to divide and manage them.

Resistance to this system of control could be found in multiple places, right from the beginning of imperial practices, but then was particularly facilitated by the improved transport and communication infrastructures of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (**see Box 10.2**). From the earliest times, many ordinary people subjected to enslavement and/or colonial rule simply ran away, either by temporarily evading the imperial officials or through establishing communities beyond their reach, with their own cultures and economies. These low-profile zones of independence and autonomy became important in facilitating wider forms of resistance.

Others rejected their unequal treatment through asserting themselves politically and militarily, ultimately demanding independence from colonial powers.

Box 10.1 Aimé Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism*

Between colonizer and colonized there is room only for forced labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses.

No human contact, but relations of domination and submission which turn the colonizing man into a class-room monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous man into an instrument of production.

My turn to state an equation: colonization = 'thing-ification.'

I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about 'achievements,' diseases cured, improved standards of living.

I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary *possibilities* wiped out.

They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad tracks.

I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo-Océan. I am talking about those who, as I write this, are digging the harbor [sic] of Abidjan by hand. I am talking about millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, their life-from life, from the dance, from wisdom.

I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like flunkeys.

They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has been exported, the acreage that has been planted with olive trees or grapevines.

I am talking about natural *economies* that have been disrupted—harmonious and viable economies adapted to the indigenous population—about food crops destroyed, malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development oriented solely toward the benefit of the metropolitan countries, about the looting of products, the looting of raw materials.

They pride themselves on abuses eliminated.

I too talk about abuses, but what I say is that on the old ones—very real—they have superimposed others—very detestable. They talk to me about local tyrants brought to reason; but I note that in general the old tyrants get on very well with the new ones, and that there has been established between them, to the detriment of the people, a circuit of mutual services and complicity.

They talk to me about civilization. I talk about proletarianization and mystification.

(Césaire 2000 [1955]: 42–4)

Box 10.2 Selected instances of anti-colonial revolt

1791–1804	Haitian Revolution
1798	Irish Rebellion
1808–33	Spanish–American wars of independence
1857	Indian Revolt
1881–99	Mahdi Rebellion
1893	Franco–Siamese War
1896	Battle of Adwa
1899	Philippine Insurgency
1899–1901	Boxer Rebellion
1915	Chilembwe Uprising
1916	Easter Rising
1920–2	Indian Non-Cooperation Movement
1929	Aba Women's Riots
1946–54	First Indochina War
1952–64	Mau Mau Rebellion
1952–62	Algerian War of Independence

A key episode here was the Haitian Revolution starting in 1791, in which the currently and formerly enslaved ousted French masters and troops, declaring themselves free and slavery abolished (**see Ch. 18**). In Haiti, as in the Indian independence movement over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was simultaneously an appropriation of 'Western' ideals (such as the Rights of Man, national self-determination, and democracy) and the retention/cultivation of alternative religious, cultural, and political standpoints (such as those rooted in Voodoo or Hindu asceticism) in the search for independence and freedom. Transnational forms of identification were also cultivated and celebrated as part of the resistance to the West, including Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. Their legacies are now present within the African Union and the Arab League. Violent military and political struggles for independence continued well after the Second World War, particularly in French and British colonies such as Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, and Algeria. These struggles produced famous intellectuals and leaders such as Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) and Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969).

Anti-colonial movements also contributed to and were influenced by Marxist critiques of imperialism and **capitalism**, which were associated with left-wing movements around the world. Although Marx and Engels themselves considered India backward and did not accord the 1857 Rebellion much historical importance, non-white thinkers on the left such as W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, and M. N. Roy saw the development of global capitalism as fundamentally dependent on colonial structures. Such views were shared by some European leftists such as Rosa Luxemburg, and the climate of anti-imperial and anti-capitalist thought was also cultivated among Chinese thinkers such as Liang Qichao. Many intellectuals who became prominent in the anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century also studied, trained, and travelled outside their own countries, often in the metropole and sometimes extensively, sharing ideas with other anti-imperial and anti-colonial movements. Not only were critiques of colonial capitalism shared, but strategies of worker organization and strikes, mass non-cooperation, and monopoly breaking became part of the core repertoire of anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance.

During and after formal political independence, a common **Third World** identity took shape in different international forums, such as the **Bandung Conference** of 1955 and the **Havana Tricontinental Conference** of 1966. In these spaces, Asian, African, and Latin American leaders came together to discuss their mutual concerns, which included on-going forms of racial discrimination and imperial control in the world economy. The United Nations (UN) also became a space for Third World collaboration, despite its initial design as a vehicle for continuing imperial control (Mazower 2009). For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964 and led by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentinian economist who had contributed to the development of **dependency theory**, which explained why formerly colonized countries remained relatively poor and in many cases got poorer.

In addition, universities in formerly colonized countries often became an important space where anti-colonial and postcolonial thought flourished. The University of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania was associated with the on-going fight for southern African liberation and resistance to **apartheid** in South Africa. In India, the University of Delhi was home to a number of leftist historians who developed a form of postcolonial historiography known as Subaltern Studies, and in the United States a number of exiled and diasporic intellectuals continued to write about imperial rule, culture, and governance.

Simultaneously, in Latin America a range of interconnected intellectual projects associated with liberation were growing, including **liberation theology**, radical **pedagogies**, and the recovery of indigenous philosophies. These were historically contextualized by the on-going problems of global dependency as well as the emergence of authoritarian governments in Latin America and the repression of different groups. Key intellectual figures of this time included Enrique Dussel and Rodolfo Kusch, who drew historical critique and philosophical dialogue with European thinkers together with indigenous and popular forms of political resistance.

In Western scholarship, the field which became known as 'postcolonial studies' evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, in dialogue with debates within history, philosophy, and literature. Famous thinkers in these circles included Ranajit Guha, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak. In the years that followed, writers from Latin America such as Aníbal Quijano and María Lugones developed 'decolonial' thinking, which functioned as a sympathetic critique both of dependency theory and of the cultural emphasis in postcolonial studies.

Key Points

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches are inspired by the history and practice of decolonization struggles, which entailed intellectual, political, and military strategies against colonial empires.
- Colonial and imperial rule had a number of common political, economic, cultural, and social features, most of which were functionally related to the control of territories and people, despite differences in historical context.
- Resistance to imperialism and colonialism took place at many historical moments, but picked up organizational and political momentum in the early twentieth century due to

improved infrastructures and mobility as well as the growth of anti-colonial ideas.
- Anti-colonial intellectuals had many transnational influences and connections which shaped their ideas, political strategies, and material capabilities for resistance. Many were linked to communist organizations in the USSR and China.
- A Third World identity and way of thinking continued after formal political independence, consolidated at conferences such as the Bandung Conference in Indonesia and the Tricontinental Conference in Havana.
- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches are strongly influenced by this history of transnational anti-colonial activity.

What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial and decolonial thought?

In line with the idea that postcolonial and decolonial approaches are a way of thinking about the world rather than a rigid theory, they are guided by a number of key concepts and ideas. In this section, we will examine some of the most influential ideas in the tradition and the thinkers they have been associated with. Although not necessarily originating in the field of IR, they clearly have insights into the functioning of world politics. We will see in the next section how they have been used in more recent IR scholarship.

Colonialism as a system of (total) violence

Frantz Fanon argued that, as a system, colonialism represents a totalizing form of violence. This is because it operates not only at physical, economic, and political levels, putting colonizers and settlers above 'natives' in the colony, but also because it involves their psychological, social, and cultural destruction through forms of racism and linguistic/cultural imperialism. Fanon, a trained psychiatrist, wrote about the alienating and dehumanizing character of racism in French colonial metropolitan culture in *Black Skin, White Masks* (2008 [1954]), as well as the nature of the struggle against colonialism based on experiences in Algeria in *The Wretched of the Earth* (2001 [1965]). In Fanon's view, there was no possibility of political reconciliation or accommodation with colonialism since it was founded on this fundamental negation of the humanity and rights of the colonized. This situation meant that the colonized needed to completely overturn colonialism, ultimately through

forms of violent resistance which could form the basis for a more equal, fraternal footing in the future.

Neo-colonialism as an economic and political structure

The term '**neo-colonialism**' was coined by Kwame Nkrumah, an anti-colonial activist and the first leader of independent Ghana, in the early 1960s. He published *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* in 1965. According to Nkrumah (1965), 'The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside'. Nkrumah was specifically referring to situations (often former French colonies) where, despite independence, foreign military troops had stayed in the country, where foreign investors or corporations owned land, industries, and mining concessions, and where policies on a range of domestic and international affairs were being directed by external forces—typically the former colonial power, but also often superpower interference. Neo-colonialism was seen as a key driver of violence and economic impoverishment in newly independent countries.

Orientalism and Otherness as modes of representation

The word 'Orientalists' at one time referred to scholars who studied Eastern cultures, religions, and languages

in Western universities. In Edward Said's famous work, *Orientalism* (Said 2003 [1978]), however, he argued that Orientalism was also a way of imagining and representing the world in ways that justified and supported imperialism. This meant depicting Europeans as rational, strong, enlightened, and liberal, in contrast to non-Europeans who were shown as barbaric, effeminate, weak, dangerous, and irrational Others. He showed these romanticizing attitudes and forms of representation to be widespread in English literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Valentin Mudimbe (1988) has made a related argument about the imagination of 'Africa' through relations of Otherness in Western thinking. For both scholars, the ways in which we represent the non-Western Other is a significant factor in justifying imperial control and paternalistic practices towards them.

Eurocentrism as an intellectual habit/practice

'Eurocentrism' can be understood as the widespread tendency to treat Europe as the primary subject of and reference point for world history, civilization, and/or humanity. The use of the term was popularized by a number of critical thinkers associated with dependency theory, such as Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein, although it is also associated with postcolonial historians such as Dipesh Chakrabarty. In Eurocentric thinking, for example in economics or history, it might involve the assumption that all societies will or should evolve along the lines of European ones, or a comparison of other societies' failures in relation to a European 'universal' standard. It also generally entails the ignoring of histories, cultures, and knowledges originating from outside Europe in the discussion of world affairs. In many cases, this is because such knowledges and cultures are represented as stagnant or non-dynamic.

Subaltern as the social position of the colonized

The term 'subaltern' is often connected with the thought of Sardinian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937). Gramsci reflected on how power was exercised not just through violence but also through culture and ideology in society. He described the forms of ideological and cultural domination exercised by the ruling classes as 'hegemony', and those groups excluded from these forms of representation as 'subaltern'. In researching the colonial histories of India's peasantry, the Subaltern Studies collective established by Ranajit Guha used this framework to analyse the political, economic, and cultural exclusion of peasants from imperial hegemonic structures of law, rights, languages, and property. However, due to the fact that such groups were subaltern, they were not well represented in the historical record, posing methodological challenges which needed to be overcome. Gayatri Spivak's (1988) cautious critique of attempting to write such histories drew attention to the intersecting roles of colonialism and patriarchy in rendering Indian peasant women doubly colonized/subaltern.

Modernity/coloniality as overarching historical/philosophical structure

'Modernity/coloniality' is a term developed among Latin American thinkers, principally Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and María Lugones. It is a central idea in decolonial theory. Contrary to the conventional view of modernity as progressive, equalizing, and democratic, it says that the philosophical and political project of modernity is foundationally premised on coloniality—that is, a racialized, hierarchical binary that empowers people and ideas seen as 'modern' over those seen as 'non-modern'. Such a hierarchical structure is seen to animate modern global processes such as capitalism, science, state-building, and development, and has been expanding since the Spanish conquest of the Americas in 1492. As argued by Lugones (2007), it has also shaped a particular form of colonial patriarchy and remade gender relations along colonial lines. This 'dark' side of modernity is rooted deeply in the conceptions of man and knowledge that underpin European philosophy. This structure of modernity/coloniality monopolizes and universalizes its own ways of thinking, erasing and exploiting others through forms of modern power.

'Border thinking' as a way to think decolonially

'Border thinking' is a term coined by Chicana thinker Gloria Anzaldúa (2012 [1987]) and associated with Walter Mignolo, which can be understood as thinking from the 'underside' of modernity. It means to think with the perspectives of people who are marginalized, undervalued, or excluded by the ideals of modernity—for example, indigenous peoples, non-white migrants, and women. This kind of thinking is subversive because it rejects the authority of European 'reason' and introduces the possibility of alternatives to colonial

modernity. Ramón Grosfoguel offers the Zapatista philosophy as an example of border thinking. The Zapatista movement has combined indigenous Mexican ideas about land and spirituality with leftist critiques of capitalism and the state in their project to create and defend an alternative way of life in Chiapas, Mexico (**see Case Study 10.1**). The concept of border thinking resonates strongly with longer-established historical practices of resistance to colonial ideas and systems of rule.

Decolonization as practices to overturn colonialism and coloniality

The term 'decolonization' has been experiencing something of a renaissance in recent years. In the mid-twentieth century, during the widespread struggles against colonialism, 'decolonization' usually referred to processes of gaining political independence in the framework of national self-determination. However, it was also used by intellectuals such as Fanon, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, and Ashis Nandy to refer to the psychological and intellectual struggle against colonialism through the retrieval of indigenous agency, language, and spirituality—that is, to 'decolonize the mind'. More recently, 'decolonization' has been used to refer to a range of critical projects across many social, cultural, and scientific fields that seek to interrogate and overturn the legacies of colonialism, such as decolonizing the curriculum (**see Opposing Opinions 10.1**). This usage of 'decolonization' has attracted some criticism from indigenous scholars in settler-colonial societies (**see Box 10.3**), such as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2012),

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Opposing Opinions 10.1 Universities can be decolonized

For

Universities have changed in line with the times, with lots more women, working-class students, and students of colour. This means that some of the barriers of colonial prejudice keeping various students out of the classroom are being broken down. Different types of students can expand the horizons of knowledge that universities provide, meaning that they can become less tied to the imperial attitudes of the West.

Thanks to globalization, there are more resources available in terms of knowledge, resources, and perspectives available in different subjects. One of the factors limiting the kinds of knowledge taught by universities has been access to sources of knowledge from different groups, in different languages, and made in different media. Due to the revolution in communication, knowledge production has become more global and more democratic. 'Decolonizing' the university must mean drawing on these wider perspectives and sources of information to understand different issues.

Education has historically functioned as a tool of liberation. Many activists involved in decolonization struggles and other struggles for rights have found that universities across the world are spaces to develop their ideas, create social networks, and produce writing of their own. The university is therefore not a static institution, but rather becomes whatever its students and staff make of it.

Against

Universities tend to promote elite knowledges and worldviews. Precisely because the West has dominated the world, its universities have promoted forms of knowledge and worldviews that reinforce this domination. Many universities in the Global South have sought to emulate, rather than to challenge, this organization of knowledge.

The domination of English language and expensive publishing formats limits access. As long as English is the dominant language for academic research, there will be inequalities in terms of access to knowledge. The globalization of academic publishing has not meant an end to imperial hierarchies either—corporate publishers located in the West dominate the market and set the agenda for universities around the world. They control access to the most prestigious knowledge in order to extract income from it.

Most people across the world regard university education as a means to help them participate in a capitalist, Western-dominated world economy. For most people, surviving in the world they encounter is a more important priority than trying to change it. This means that it is more likely that the university education they seek will be about training them to fit in with established fields of knowledge or ways of doing things rather than radically changing them.

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1. Do you agree that today we have more democratic forms of knowledge-making and knowledge-sharing than in the past?

2. Is the predominance of the English language a barrier to decolonization?

3. Are more people interested in trying to survive in the world than in trying to change it?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Box 10.3 Settler colonialism

'Settler colonialism' refers to forms of colonialism which involve eliminating 'native' society and establishing other populations and their laws as sovereign in a territory. This type of colonialism has been most recently associated with European settlement in North and South America, North Africa, Southern Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Palestine. In these instances, European empires acquired land through a combination of force and agreements (many of which are contested/forgotten), and set about establishing control of entire territories or continents. They often did so by claiming that the land was unoccupied ('*terra nullius*'), and by encouraging mass immigration from Europe. 'Natives' were initially displaced from strategic rivers, coasts, and farming land and often contained in poorly resourced 'reservations'. Many died either from direct, sometimes genocidal, violence or from famine and disease incurred by displacement (such as in the US). Native rulers, languages, and laws were ignored or discouraged, and in many territories (such as Canada and Australia) native children were forcibly removed from their families and sent to settler families or boarding schools in order to make them 'assimilate' to settler culture. Patrick Wolfe (2006) has famously argued that settler colonialism is a 'structure' rather than an event. Many indigenous groups continue to press for their rights, either as granted to them in particular treaties (such as the Waitangi Treaty in Aotearoa/New Zealand), or for sovereignty that was never officially ceded (such as in Canada and Australia). Some of these dynamics are also key features of the on-going conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

who argue that its principal meaning in terms of regaining territorial sovereignty is being diluted and therefore its political potential is neutralized or co-opted.

Key Points

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches have developed their own conceptual apparatus for understanding the world through terms such as 'neo-colonialism', 'Orientalism', 'Eurocentrism', 'modernity/coloniality', and others. These terms have specific meanings when used by writers in this context, but are sometimes used in a more general way.

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches emerge in slightly different geographical and historical locations, with postcolonial approaches mostly associated with thinkers from regions formerly colonized by Britain or France such as Asia and Africa, and decolonial approaches associated with thinkers from regions formerly colonized by Spain or Portugal such as Central and South America.

- There are some different emphases between postcolonial and decolonial approaches in terms of vocabulary and thinking, such as the emphasis in decolonial thought on the cosmologies of indigenous peoples.

- Decolonization is a contested term with multiple meanings, but it is a term increasingly applied to activity in different spheres such as art, education, and culture that seeks to dislodge the centrality of Western epistemologies and viewpoints.

Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to studying world politics

Questions of empire, race, and colonialism were pressing issues in the early twentieth century, when International Relations was being established as a scholarly field. As Robert Vitalis (2000) has shown in political science, there was a distinct subfield of study known as 'Colonial Administration'. The famous International Relations journal *Foreign Affairs* began life as the *Journal of Race Development* in 1900, unusually including contributions from African-American scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois.

Du Bois's contributions have been overlooked until recently in IR, but he was prominent in his time. In 1902, Du Bois argued that the 'global colour line' was the major problem of the twentieth century. In his analysis, developed over the following years, he argued that one of the main causes for war between European states was competition for control of colonies and imperial possessions, and that this itself was driven by racial discrimination and a sense of white superiority. For Du Bois (1917), the

invention of 'whiteness' as a sense of identity was linked to the emergence of capitalism and democracy in Europe. This had produced a mass of people who wanted to consume different goods and to feel a sense of political pride—imperialism was a solution to both problems for them.

Du Bois's work, and that of others around him such as the Howard School (Vitalis 2015), however, was not retained as part of the canon of IR. For various reasons, not least the chilling political climate associated with the cold war in the West, anti-colonial and postcolonial thinking did not receive much attention on its own terms in the field of IR until the 1990s. At most, people were familiar with dependency theory and conventional accounts of decolonization such as that of Hedley Bull (1984). However, following work in the 1990s by Roxanne Doty (1993), Sankaran Krishna (1993), Siba Grovogui (1996), and Phillip Darby and A. J. Paolini (1994), postcolonial and decolonial approaches began to flourish in the field from the 2000s onwards.

International relations theory

One major line of attack was on conventional international relations theory. Scholars such as Krishna (2001) argued that IR theory abstracted too much from reality when it treated states as independent units and only wrote about the Western states. This enabled IR scholarship to depict the nineteenth century as a 'Hundred Years' Peace' in the international system, for example, completely ignoring the dynamics of empire. It also allowed a view of international law that saw it as part of the civilizing influence of the West (Grovogui 1996). By contrast, viewed from the perspective of colonized peoples, the nineteenth century was anything but peaceful, involving the violent, sometimes genocidal, suppression of resistance to imperial control. Instruments such as international law and trade were not developed because the West was naturally civilizing, but because it was attempting to assert sovereign rule over non-European spaces on sea and land. From this perspective, international relations theory was part of the problem of imperial violence, allowing Western intellectuals to sanitize and limit their understanding of international order through selective forgetting. An example of this problem is the 'failed states' debate (**see Case Study 10.2**).

Case Study 10.2 The debate over 'failed states'

Somalia, 1993

© Photo by Scott Peterson / Liaison / Hulton Archive / Getty Images

This case study illustrates one of the controversies in international relations theory that emerges from different attitudes towards questions of colonialism and empire. Whereas many mainstream scholars are comfortable with the term 'failed states', postcolonial scholars have tended to oppose its use.

Writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the English School scholar Robert Jackson (1993 [1990]) argued that states in the Global South were not 'real' states but 'quasi-states'. Quasi-states, often created by processes of decolonization, had legal or 'juridical' sovereignty that was recognized by other countries, but not 'empirical' sovereignty, understood as control over their internal affairs. In short, they might have a flag, a capital, and a seat at the United Nations, but they could not be treated like other states. They were understood to be illegitimate in the eyes of their people and unstable in terms of their internal and external relations. IR theorists tended to exclude them from substantive consideration.

At a similar time, in the early 1990s, political elites in the West began to think of particular states in Africa as being 'failed states' that required intervention. High on the list of 'failed states' were Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, both of which had experienced considerable repression during the cold war and violent conflict following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The understanding of states as being 'failed' or 'fragile' resulted in many international 'state-building' activities designed to promote 'good governance' in these countries. Some Western scholars such as Robert Rotberg (2004) argued that the problem stemmed from bad African leadership in a number of countries.

Postcolonial scholars, however, objected to the use of the terms 'quasi-states' and 'failed states' as a means of describing and explaining the conflicts in these countries (Gruffydd Jones 2008). One objection was that colonial political structures were set up to facilitate economic extraction within imperial structures, rather than to facilitate democracy, development, or citizenship. These structures often continued through the globalization of the world economy. The term 'failed states' suggested erroneously that it was African incapacity that had led to states failing, rather than these economic structures. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the leader Mobutu Sese Seko was kept in power through international support in exchange for access to mining concessions.

Another objection was that the language of 'failed states' idealized Western states but did not acknowledge that they themselves had often been built through war, repression, and even genocide. In this perspective, 'state-making' and the construction of national structures was an inherently violent affair around the world. Regrettable as this was, it did not mean that African states were therefore 'failed' in comparison to the West. In general, critics saw that language of 'failed states' as legitimizing another Western 'civilizing mission' in the Global South.

For both supporters and opponents of the terminology of 'failed states' there is more than just language at stake. Rather, the status of the state itself is a critical factor in determining whether and how much external intervention can be allowed to take place.

Question 1: Should we think of states as being 'failed' or 'successful'?

Question 2: What factors can cause states to 'fail', according to postcolonial scholars?

Other scholars further developed the idea that Eurocentric or colonial thinking was a constitutive part of Western IR theory, and even forms of 'critical' theory (Gruffydd Jones 2006; Hobson 2012; Sabaratnam 2013). They argued that many theories created a mythologized image of the West (either positive or negative) which was then the only focus of attention in developing theory. This persistent tendency to look 'inwards', to have a stereotyped understanding of the West, and to ignore the rest of the world (except as areas where the West might project power) meant that IR had a limited understanding of the world. Many postcolonial and decolonial scholars in IR have suggested alternatives. These include taking an approach to historical development which incorporates non-Western political, economic, and military formations (Bhambra 2007; Zarakol 2010; Phillips and Sharman 2015), studying the thought, perspectives, and practices of people and scholars outside the West (Shilliam 2010, 2015; Tickner and Blaney 2012, 2013; Persaud and Sajed 2018), imagining different geographical starting points for analysis (Ling 2002, 2013; Laffey and Weldes 2008; Acharya 2014b; Niang 2018), and widening our understanding of where 'politics' takes place (Agathangelou and Ling 2009).

These different mechanisms can help widen perspectives and historical understandings. The similarities and differences between postcolonial and decolonial approaches compared to other approaches to IR are given in **Table 10.1**.

Alternative takes on mainstream issues

A second aspect of research has been to study specific 'traditional' issues in world politics through postcolonial and decolonial approaches. A significant early work in this vein was work on US foreign policy by Roxanne Doty in her book *Imperial Encounters* (1996). Most conventional views of US foreign policy in IR at the time were either realist or liberal, with some looking at bureaucratic elements in foreign policy making. Doty, however, demonstrated, using a form of **discourse analysis**, that aspects of US foreign policy, as well as that of Britain, were enabled by imperial, racialized representations of the Philippines and Kenya. These representations were a critical factor in enabling specific foreign policy options to be pursued. In a related vein, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (2008) examine the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspectives of its Cuban

Table 10.1 Similarities and differences between postcolonial and decolonial IR compared to other IR theories

Theory	Similarities	Differences from this theory
Realism	Agree on the self-interested character of elites and states, and the centrality of power	Emphasize system as hierarchical and imperial rather than anarchic and sovereign, and power as much more multifaceted
Liberalism	Agree that cooperation is possible and durable	Emphasize that cooperation is only generally among states considered 'developed'/'civilized' for the purposes of securing their privileges
Marxism	Agree in general that capitalism is a major organizing structure in world politics and that its tendencies are exploitative and immiserating	Emphasize roles of racialization and colonial expansion in determining the character and pattern of exploitation (such as enslavement of Africans, poor conditions for workers in Asia)
Feminism	Agree that patriarchy is a major element in structuring international politics	Emphasize (as many feminists do) that gender intersects with race, class, and nationality in producing structures of power/entitlement
Constructivism	Agree that world is 'socially constructed' in important ways—particular images produce political possibilities (for example, portrayal of Muslims as violent/irrational)	Emphasize the asymmetric, colonial, and purposive character of these constructions
Poststructuralism	Agree with critique of knowledge and power as being always intertwined, and the idea of meaning as being intertextually produced	Emphasize the material as well as discursive character of oppression, exploitation, and violence, plus the importance of strategic essentialism in advancing critical claims (rather than only deconstruction)

participants, rather than the perspectives of the US and Soviet strategists. Seen in this light, the missile crisis is not a surprising example of nuclear brinksmanship, but rather its causes are seen in the series of attempts made by the US in the 1950s and 1960s to destabilize the Cuban government.

The utility of postcolonial and decolonial approaches to world politics became more pronounced in light of the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 and the global war on terror that ensued. Following these attacks, conservative and liberal US intellectuals actively encouraged the US to see itself as a benevolent kind of empire and to embrace the assertion of its power in different spaces. Leftist intellectuals, however, attacked the US for its imperialist policy towards the Middle East, which they considered illegitimate, criticizing the 2003 invasion of Iraq in particular. Postcolonial and decolonial scholars were, however, able to contextualize US policy in a longer historical structure of imperial and colonial power in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gregory 2004; Khalili 2012; Manchanda 2017), demonstrating the significance of those relations to the kinds of decisions made about the region, including the techniques of counter-insurgency.

Retrieving the (formerly) colonized as subjects of IR

A third area of research paid attention to the histories, ideas, and practices of (formerly) colonized peoples around the world. This aimed both to deal with the problem of their neglect in the discipline, as well as to demonstrate the alternative possibilities for politics that could be understood within them. A significant body of decolonial work in this area has been produced by Robbie Shilliam (2006, 2011, 2015; **see Ch. 18**), who examines the political thought and practice of the descendants of enslaved Africans around the world. This examination reveals alternative forms of sovereignty, rights, solidarity, and justice which are attentive to histories of colonial violence and the possibilities of rethinking the 'human'. This work serves

as a counterpoint to liberal narratives that see ideas for emancipation, rights, and solidarity as fundamentally Western in their origins and orientations.

Other work in the field has emphasized the ways in which postcolonial/colonized subjects present alternative ways of thinking about international issues (this is similar to 'border thinking'; **see '"Border thinking" as a way to think decolonially'**). For example, Rahul Rao (2010) has looked at Third World cosmopolitanisms as a series of creative responses to the twin problems of nationalism and imperialism. For Rao, these thinkers demonstrate that it is possible to address conundrums in international ethics usually posed as an opposition between the domestic and the international (see also Gruffydd Jones 2010; Jabri 2012). More widely, postcolonial and decolonial scholars have thought about how starting with the perspectives and worldviews of the colonized can build alternative forms of theory and structural analysis about world politics (Blaney and Tickner 2017; Sabaratnam 2017).

Key Points

- Colonialism and empire were central to the early discipline of IR, particularly among African-American thinkers such as Du Bois and the Howard School, but later ignored by the central traditions in the field.

- The cold war environment meant that criticisms of the West were often suppressed because of a real or imagined relationship with communism, which had a chilling effect on the development of International Relations as a field of study.

- Postcolonial and decolonial scholarship in international relations has been growing steadily since the 1990s alongside other critical traditions, with an increasing presence of scholars with heritage in the Global South.

- Postcolonial and decolonial scholarship has challenged mainstream IR theory in terms of its fundamental categories and assumptions, developed alternative readings of particular issue areas such as war and security, and paid attention to the political thought of (formerly) colonized people as a basis for analysing global order. As such, it offers many alternative perspectives from which to view central problems in the field.

Decolonization: the struggle continues?

It is an interesting historical fact that the rise of postcolonial and decolonial approaches has continued, and perhaps even grown, several decades after many countries successfully claimed political independence from

European empires. This has coincided with the fall of many leaders associated with decolonization struggles, either through death or a political fall from their image as liberator (such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe). It

has also coincided with the growth of many countries in the Global South to positions of relative wealth and power, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. In fact some of these countries are themselves accused of acting in an 'imperial' manner towards others. What do postcolonial and decolonial approaches have to offer in an era of relatively decreasing Western power?

One set of contributions reflects the continued persistence of imperial relations in different aspects of world order. These are readily apparent when examining such diverse issues as the composition and practice of the UN Security Council, the debates about nuclear disarmament, negotiations about the environment, trade, and international law, the militarization of the Middle East, the conditions of aid and development, the debates around Brexit, the resurgence of extreme right-wing views, the conduct of war, and the regimes around migration. For postcolonial and decolonial approaches, in each case the field is structured through the assumptions of Western superiority and rationality developed during the colonial period, and through forms of collaboration among formerly imperial powers.

Moreover, the conceptual tools developed by postcolonial and decolonial approaches may also be critically applied to the behaviour of non-Western governments. For example, farmers' movements and Green movements in Brazil have criticized the alliance between their own governments, foreign governments, multinational corporations, and Western-dominated international organizations for the state of environmental policy and food policy. For these groups, all members of these alliances are complicit in a form of neo-colonial management of land across the world.

Relatedly, an explosion in anti-racist movements and activities across the world have also generated more interest in the global and historical dimensions of empire and colonialism. Movements such as #RhodesMustFall/#FeesMustFall on South African university campuses and #BlackLivesMatter in the United States have inspired many students across the globe to take issue with the colonial foundations of their education and other forms of racial injustice on campus. The on-going drowning of thousands of Middle Eastern and African migrants in the Mediterranean at the borders of the European Union has also drawn attention to the double standards at work in the global human rights regime when it comes to the difference between white and non-white lives.

Key Points

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches have remained popular despite the achievement of political independence, the fall in popularity and stature of anti-colonial leaders, and the rise of non-Western powers such as China, India, and Brazil.

- Postcolonial and decolonial approaches seek to explain many features of the contemporary world order through a consideration of relations of imperialism and colonialism, which they see as persisting in global institutions, international trade, identities in the West, arms control, and other issues.

- Increasingly, decolonization struggles have turned against non-Western governments for their continuation of, or complicity with, forms of colonial development, such as in the struggles over land in Brazil and education in South Africa.

- There are on-going political struggles which link their objectives to the overturning of imperial and colonial hierarchies, particularly where these relate to the unequal and violent treatment of people who are racialized as non-white in both 'international' and 'domestic' contexts.

Conclusion

Postcolonial and decolonial approaches consider the study of world politics at many different levels. At the level of theory in IR, they draw attention to the categories that are used, the way that knowledge is constructed, and the histories that are remembered and forgotten. For these approaches, International Relations has been too ready to ignore its imperial origins, the questions of racism and colonialism in the constitution of international order, and the on-going inequalities that have been produced. Postcolonial and decolonial research has, however, sought to retrieve these and bring about a more globally comprehensive perspective on the foundations of world order.

Historically speaking, postcolonial and decolonial approaches have emerged in a close relationship with the political struggles for decolonization from European rule in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many do not believe that a politically neutral approach to international relations can exist per se, although there can be better and worse understandings of what is going on in the world. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches are

generally sympathetic to ethical interests in promoting a more equal world order, or at least one in which colonialism and racism become less powerful.

The key intellectual challenge ahead for postcolonial and decolonial approaches will be to see how the heralded geopolitical shifts in power between West and East affect the behaviour of states and other international actors. Will new powers in the East remember their struggles for decolonization and make a new set of rules for running the world? Or will they conform to existing imperial patterns of power and domination? Either way, postcolonial and decolonial approaches will have much to offer the understanding of world politics for some time to come.

Questions

1. Where did postcolonial ideas begin?
2. What are the main differences between postcolonial and decolonial approaches?
3. Is there a difference between the ideas that influence political activists involved in decolonization struggles and the academic approaches to decolonization?
4. Is it fair to say that International Relations is a colonial discipline?
5. Is it possible to 'decolonize' International Relations?
6. Who are the main driving forces behind 'decolonizing' the field?
7. Does neo-colonialism present the same ethical problems as formal colonialism?
8. Can we separate the effects of capitalism from the effects of colonialism?
9. 'Decolonization is not a metaphor' (Tuck and Yang 2012). Discuss with reference to education.
10. With which other theories in IR are postcolonial and decolonial approaches most compatible?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Barkawi, T., and Laffey, M. (2006), 'The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies', *Review of International Studies*, 32(2): 329–52. A critical examination of Eurocentric tendencies in mainstream studies of security.

Doty, R. L. (1996), *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North–South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). An analysis of foreign policy discourses in the US and UK which explores questions of racialization and imperialism.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1915), 'The African Roots of War', *The Atlantic*, 115(5): 707–14. An early critique of the failure to account for the colonial origins of inter-imperial competition in the First World War.

Fanon, F. (2001 [1965]), *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (London: Penguin). A rousing analytical polemic working through the challenges of decolonization, the problem of violence, and the future to come.

Gruffydd Jones, B. (2006), *Decolonizing International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). A collection of work from scholars in International Relations examining diverse colonial dynamics in the field and proposing analytic alternatives.

Krishna, S. (2001), 'Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 26(4): 401–24. An engaged critique of dominant narratives in international relations which brings colonial violence into view.

Lugones, M. (2007), 'Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System', *Hypatia*, 22(1): 186–219. A prominent statement of the relationship between coloniality as a structure and its remaking of gender relations in South America.

Mignolo, W. D. (2011), *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). A historical-philosophical critique of modernity as always constituted by coloniality.

Sabaratnam, M. (2017), *Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). A critique of Eurocentric debates in critical international relations and a reconstruction of analysis using decolonizing methods.

Shilliam, R. (2011), 'Decolonising the Grounds of Ethical Inquiry: A Dialogue between Kant, Foucault and Glissant', *Millennium*, 39(3): 649–65. A critical dialogue staged between liberal, poststructuralist, and postcolonial philosophers, drawing out the contributions of the latter.

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Chapter 11

Poststructuralism

LENE HANSEN

Framing Questions

- **Does language matter for international relations?**
- **Do all states have the same identity?**
- **Is the state the most important actor in world politics today?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter focuses on poststructuralism, one of the international relations perspectives furthest away from the realist and liberal mainstream. Poststructuralists in IR draw on a larger body of philosophical texts known as poststructuralism. They argue that the state stands at the centre of world politics and that we should understand the state as a particular form of political community. This challenges mainstream IR's conception of the state as a rational actor driven by a self-help imperative and relative or absolute gains. Poststructuralism argues that this conception is ahistorical and that it marginalizes non- and trans-state actors, stateless people, and those persecuted by 'their own' states. The central status that the state now has is not inevitable, but rather the result of political and academic practices that reproduce this status. Poststructuralists hold that foreign policies always imply a particular representation of our and others' identities. These identities have no fixed meaning, but are constituted in language. Using the concept of discourse, poststructuralists argue that material 'things' only come to have meaning as they are represented by particular words and images. Poststructuralists also argue that world politics is practiced not only by governments and international organizations, but through popular culture including film, video games, and television shows.

Introduction

Like **constructivism**, poststructuralism became part of International Relations (IR) in the 1980s (**see Ch. 12**). As constructivists, poststructuralists in IR were influenced by social and philosophical theory, which had played a major role in the humanities since the 1970s. Politically, the **second cold war**'s domination of the early and mid-1980s impacted poststructuralists, who feared that the two blocs would destroy each other in a nuclear **holocaust** (**see Ch. 3**). Poststructuralists held that the key to the **cold war** lay in the enemy constructions that both East and West promoted. The cold war is now long gone, but poststructuralism is still very much focused on **high politics** (themes high on the foreign policy agenda, such as war, security, and the military), and it maintains a concern with states' constructions of threats and enemies.

Poststructuralists bring a critical perspective to the study of world politics in two important respects. They are critical of the way that most states conduct their foreign policies and how most IR theories tell us to study what states do. Poststructuralists disagree with **realism** (**see Ch. 8**) that we should see the state as a **self-help** actor or as a unit that stays the same through history. Rather, the state is a particular way of understanding **political community**—that is, who we can trust and who we feel we have something in common with (**see Ch. 30**). Likewise, if the **international system** is **anarchic**, it is because states and other actors reproduce this system, not because it is given once and for all. Poststructuralism wants us to take seriously what existing policies and theories exclude and marginalize, and it tells us to think critically about how we construct the world. To poststructuralists, there is no objective yardstick that we can use to define threats, dangers, enemies, or underdevelopment. We need to investigate how constructions of the world, and the people and places in it, make particular policies seem natural and therefore legitimate.

Studying the social world

Because poststructuralism adopts a critical attitude to world politics, it raises questions about **ontology** (what is in the world) and **epistemology** (how we can study the world). For students of world politics, the most important ontological questions concern the state. Is the state the only actor that really matters, or are non-state actors as—or more—important? Does the state that we know today act in essentially the same terms as states in the past, or are the historical changes so important that we need specific theories for other times and places? Are states able to change their views of others from hostility and fear to collaboration? As you have learned from previous chapters, there has never been a consensus in IR on how to answer these ontological questions. Realists hold that the self-help state is the essential unit in international relations and that its drive for **power** or security makes it impossible to move beyond the risk of war (**see Ch. 8**). Liberalists (**see Ch. 6**) disagree, arguing that states can build a more cooperative and peaceful international system. Both realism and liberalism agree, though, that the state is the main building block.

Although ontological assumptions are absolutely central for how we think about the world, scholars and students often go about studying world politics without giving ontology much thought. That is because it comes into view only when theories with different ontological assumptions clash. As long as one works within the same **paradigm**, there is no need to discuss one's basic assumptions, and energy can be devoted to more specific questions. For example, instead of discussing what it requires to be a state, one tests whether democratic states are more or less likely to form alliances than non-democratic ones. One of the strengths of poststructuralism has been to call attention to how much the ontological assumptions we make about the state actually matter for how we view the world and for the more specific explanations of world politics that we formulate.

Poststructuralism also brings epistemology—questions of knowledge—to the fore. As with ontology, the importance of epistemology is clearest when theories clash over which understanding should be adopted. Mainstream approaches adopt a positivist epistemology. They strive to find the causal relations that 'rule' world politics, working with dependent and independent variables. In the case of **democratic peace** theory, for example, this implies a research agenda where the impact of state type (democratic/non-democratic) on foreign policy behaviour (going to war or not) can be tested systematically (**see Chs 6 and 15**).

Poststructuralists, by contrast, embrace a post-positivist epistemology. They argue that the social world is so far removed from the hard sciences where causal epistemologies originate that we cannot understand world politics through causal cause–effect relationships. Compared to constructivists, who adopt a concept of causality as structural pressure, poststructuralists hold that causality conceptualized as such is inappropriate, not because there are no such things as **structures**, but because these structures are constituted through human action. Structures cannot therefore be independent variables (**see Box 11.1**). **Constitutive theories** are still theories, not just descriptions or stories about the world, because they define theoretical concepts, explain how they hang together, and instruct us on how to use them in analysis of world politics. Thus it is not easier or less rigorous to develop non-causal, constitutive theories; it is just different.

The distinction between causal and non-causal theories is also captured by the distinction between **explanatory theories** and constitutive theories. As you read through the literature on world politics, you will encounter other labels that point to much the same things, with causal–constitutive, explanatory–constitutive, and **foundationalist–anti-foundationalist** being the most common ones. Foundationalists hold that we can say whether something is true or not if we examine the facts; anti-foundationalists, by contrast, hold that what counts as 'facts' and 'truth' differ from theory to theory, and that we cannot therefore find 'the' truth. Different IR theories take different views on whether we can and should agree on one set of facts, and thus on whether we should adopt a foundationalist position. Explanatory, positivist theories are usually foundationalist, and constitutive, non-positivist theories are usually anti-foundationalist. Because poststructuralism argues in favour of a constitutive, post-positivist, anti-foundationalist position, it is seen as one of the most alternative approaches in IR.

> ### Box 11.1 Causal and constitutive theories—the example of piracy
>
> Causal and constitutive theories produce different research questions and thus create different research agendas. Taking the example of contemporary piracy, a causal theory might ask: 'What explains variation in the level of piracy in different states in the Global South? Is the cause economic deprivation, military capabilities, or failed political structures?' A constitutive theory asks instead: 'Which activities are being included when governments define piracy? And do such definitions constitute military measures as legitimate policy responses?'

Epistemology is also important at a more concrete level of analysis, because one's epistemology leads one to select different kinds of 'facts' and to treat them differently. To take the example of ethnic war, realist and liberal analyses look for the factors that explain why ethnic wars occur. Here, the relevant facts are the number of ethnic wars, where and when they took place, and facts we hypothesize might explain them: for instance, forms of government or economic **capabilities**. Poststructuralism, by contrast, asks what calling something an 'ethnic war' implies for our understanding of the war and the policies that could be used to stop it. Here, the facts come from texts that document different actors' use of 'war labels'.

> ### Key Points
>
> - Poststructuralists raise questions about ontology and epistemology.
> - Poststructuralism is critical of statism and of taking the anarchical system as fixed and timeless.
> - Poststructuralism adopts a constitutive epistemology.
> - What count as facts depends on the ontological and epistemological assumptions a theory makes.

Poststructuralism as a political philosophy

As mentioned in the Introduction, IR poststructuralists bring philosophical ideas and concepts to the study of world politics. Some of the leading poststructuralist philosophers were French and many of their ideas about identity, power and conflict developed in the context of the decolonization of the French empire, especially the wars of Algerian independence. Poststructuralist concepts can be quite complex and hard to explain, but let us begin with four of them that have been particularly influential: discourse, deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality.

Discourse

Poststructuralism holds that language is essential to how we make sense of the world. Language is social because we cannot make our thoughts understandable to others without a set of shared codes. This is captured by

the concept of **discourse**, which the prominent French philosopher Michel Foucault defined as a linguistic system that orders statements and concepts. Foucault introduced his concept of discourse in the late 1960s in part as a critique of Marxist theories that privileged economic structures. This, to poststructuralist theorists like Foucault, overlooked the way in which humans use language to make sense of the social world in ways that are not determined by the economy. Politically, language is significant because politicians—and other actors relevant to world politics—must legitimate their foreign policies to audiences at home and abroad. The words we use to describe something are not neutral, and the choice of one term over another has political implications. To take an example, if what happens in a place, is described as 'a **genocide**', there is a strong moral pressure on the **international community** to 'do something', but not if what happens is described as '**tribal** warfare'.

As this example demonstrates, poststructuralism understands language not as a neutral transmitter, but as producing meaning. Things do not have an objective meaning independently of how we constitute them in language. This does not mean that things do not happen in the real world—for instance, if someone fires a loaded gun at you, then you will get hurt. But it does mean that there is no given essence to 'a thing' or 'an event': is the shooting an accident, an attack, or divine retribution for something bad you did? What possible meanings can be assigned to a specific event thus depends on the discourses that are available. For example, we might attribute an illness such as a heart attack to either our lifestyle (how we eat, live, drink, and exercise), or to our genes (which we cannot do much about), or to divine punishment. Using the concept of discourse, we can say that heart attacks are constituted differently within a 'lifestyle discourse', a 'genetic discourse', and a 'religious discourse'. Each discourse provides different views of the body, what can be done to prevent disease, and thus what policies of disease prevention should be adopted. Poststructuralists stress that discourses are not the same as ideas, and that materiality or 'the real world' is not abandoned (**see Box 11.2**). To take materiality seriously means, for example, that advances in health technologies can change the way that discourses construct those afflicted by heart attacks or other diseases such as cancer or HIV/AIDS.

Deconstruction

To see language as a set of codes means that words (or signs) make sense only in relation to other words. We cannot know what 'horse' means unless that word is connected to other words: 'animal', 'furry', 'hoofed', and 'fast'. Moreover, we know what something is only by comparing it to something it is not. A 'horse' is not 'human', 'feathered', 'legless', or 'slow'. To see language as connected signs underscores the structural side of poststructuralism (**see Box 11.3**).

What differentiates poststructuralism from structuralism (or more precisely structural linguistics) is that poststructuralism sees sign structures as unstable because connections among words are never given once and for all. To take the 'horse', it might be 'an animal', but in many situations it is seen as more 'human' than

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Box 11.2 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on the materiality of discourse

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence…we will affirm the material character of every discursive structure. To argue the opposite is to accept the very classical dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought.

(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108)

Box 11.3 'Postmodernism' and 'poststructuralism'

Poststructuralism does not mean 'anti-structuralism', but a philosophical position that developed out of structuralism…, a position which in many ways shares more with structuralism than with its opponents.

(Wæver 2002: 23)

'Postmodernism' refers to a historical period (usually after the Second World War) and also to a direction in art, literature, and architecture; it is used to describe new empirical phenomena such as 'postmodern war' (**see Ch. 14**). In contrast, poststructuralism refers to a body of thought that is not confined to a specific historical period. Poststructuralism and postmodernism are often conflated by non-poststructuralists in International Relations.

(D. Campbell 2007: 211–12)

'real animals' such as 'pigs' or 'worms'. Its 'animal-ness' is itself unstable and given through other signs at a given time and place. This might at first seem quite far removed from world politics, but it tells us that the ways we describe events, places, peoples, and states are neither neutral nor given by the things themselves. For example, in 2002, when President George W. Bush spoke about an '**axis of evil**' threatening the Western world, this implied a radical difference between the US and the countries (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) claimed to make up this axis.

The French philosopher Jacques Derrida's theory of **deconstruction** posits that language is made up of dichotomies, for instance between the developed and the underdeveloped, the modern and the pre-modern, the civilized and the barbaric. These dichotomies are not 'neutral', because in each case one term is superior to the other. There is a clear hierarchy between the developed–modern–civilized on the one hand and the underdeveloped–pre-modern–barbaric on the other. Think, for example, of how Western politicians and media represented the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi as irrational—sometimes even crazy—and thus radically different from 'normal', Western heads of state. Deconstruction shows how such dichotomies make something look like an objective description—for instance how developed a country is—although it is in fact a structured set of values. Poststructuralists disagree on whether one might describe deconstruction as a methodology (**see Box 11.4**), but agree that a central

goal is to problematize dichotomies, show how they work, and thereby open up alternative ways to understand world politics.

Genealogy

Genealogy is another of Foucault's concepts, defined as a 'history of the present'. Foucault drew on earlier writings on genealogy by the late nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche—and Foucault—held that a key element of the European tradition is to speak of history as having clear beginnings and endings. This, however, makes a far too homogenous story out of what are in fact gradual, contested and often forgotten histories. A main aim of genealogy in the tradition of Nietzsche is to draw attention to the politics that are involved in making history look a particular way. Genealogy starts from something contemporary, say climate change (**see Ch. 24**), and asks two questions: what political practices have formed the present and which alternative understandings and discourses have been marginalized and often forgotten? A genealogy of climate change might start by asking who are allowed to speak and make decisions at events such as the United Nations Climate Change Conferences. Then it asks what constructions of 'the climate' and '**global responsibility**' are dominant, and how these constructions relate to past discourses. By looking into the past, we see alternative ways to conceptualize humans' relationship with 'the climate' and gain an understanding of the discursive and material structures that underpin the present.

The concept of power

The concepts of genealogy and discourse point us towards Foucault's conception of power. Power, to Foucault, is 'productive': it comes about when discourses constitute particular subject positions as the 'natural' ones. 'Actors' therefore do not exist outside discourse; they are produced through discourse and need to be recognized by others. We can see such actor-recognition processes unfold when oppositional movements challenge existing governments, as occurred during the Arab Spring, making the question of who represents 'the people' become crucial. It is also an instance of power when states and **institutions** establish themselves as having the knowledge to govern a particular issue. Knowledge is not opposed to power—as in the classical phrase 'speaking truth to power'—but is integral to power itself. As a concrete example, take the way Western scholars have 'gained knowledge' about

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Box 11.4 Views on poststructuralist methodology

Poststructuralists differ in their assessment of whether a poststructuralist methodology is possible and desirable.

Lene Hansen holds that 'Many of the methodological questions that poststructuralist discourse analysis confronts are those that face all academic work: what should be the focus of analysis?, how should a research design be built around it?, and how is a body of material and data selected that facilitates a qualitatively and quantitatively reliable answer? Poststructuralism's focus on discourses as articulated in written and spoken text calls in addition for particular attention to the methodology of reading (how are identities identified within foreign policy texts and how should the relationship between opposing discourses be studied?) and the methodology of textual selection (which forums and types of text should be chosen and how many should be included?)' (L. Hansen 2006: 2).

Others, including Rita Floyd, are more sceptical, holding that 'Derrida would have been fundamentally opposed to even the possibility' (Floyd 2007: 216).

non-Western peoples by describing them as inferior, backward, underdeveloped, and sometimes threatening. This takes for granted that a foreign identity exists and that it can be studied (**see Ch. 10**). More broadly, to speak from a position of knowledge is to exercise authority over a given issue.

Poststructuralists in IR have also picked up one of Foucault's more specific conceptualizations of power, namely that of 'biopower'. Biopower works at two levels: at the individual level we are told to discipline and control our bodies, and at the collective level we find that governments and other institutions seek to manage whole populations (Epstein 2007). A good example of **biopolitics** is that of population control, where states have promoted such 'body-disciplining' practices as abstinence before marriage and use of contraceptives

in an attempt to reduce the number of births or prevent particular groups of women from getting pregnant. Practices targeted at the individual are built around the idea that there is 'a' population that can be studied and steered in a particular direction (**see Case Study 11.1**).

It is clear that poststructuralism's concept of power goes beyond that of realism, which defines power as material capabilities (**see Ch. 8**). Compared to constructivism, which also considers knowledge and identities (**see Ch. 12**), poststructuralism looks more critically at how actors get to be constituted as actors in the first place. One of the key issues in the discussions over poststructuralism as an approach to international relations is whether it provides a good account of the way that materiality and power impact world politics (**see Opposing Opinions 11.1**).

Case Study 11.1 Discourses on the Ebola outbreak in 2014

Ebola in Liberia, December 2014
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Epidemic diseases are situated at the heart of discussions of **globalization**, because they move from one country to another, from regions to continents, and from continents to the entire planet (Elbe 2009). Air travel in particular has increased the risk that diseases can 'jump' from one location to another far away. States try therefore to protect themselves from exposure to epidemics through screenings at airports, harbours or other points of entry. In response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa in 2014, for example, the US decided that travellers from that region had to enter the country through five specified airports only.

From a poststructuralist perspective, policies towards epidemics like Ebola are not simply seeking to solve a material problem—combating the Ebola virus—but also to constitute the disease and those who are affected by it in specific ways. To define a 'disease' as an 'epidemic' is not just to use a technical yardstick based on the number of deaths within a specific time span. It is also to invoke a particular discourse: epidemics are threatening because

they risk spreading rapidly and often involve the lack of a cure or viruses that mutate and become resistant to treatment. Historical accounts of the plague during the Middle Ages and contemporary movies such as Outbreak and Contagion alike play important roles in producing and circulating a broader epidemic discourse. As power is central to discourse, poststructuralism asks who has the responsibility—and the right—to define how epidemics should be combated.

We can study how power is performed through discourse in a speech given by US President Barack Obama at a UN meeting on the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (Obama 2014). Obama opened by declaring Ebola 'an urgent threat to the people of West Africa, but also a potential threat to the world', and he continued that 'an urgent, strong and coordinated international response' was needed. He also stressed the responsibility of the international community to help the United States handle the situation. On first view, this might look like a sympathetic attempt to get victims of the epidemic the help that they urgently needed. But on closer examination, and adopting a poststructuralist perspective, we see that the speech constitutes the United States as the unquestioned leader with the authority to determine which policy should be adopted, for example setting up a military command in Liberia. What is strikingly absent is any explicit mention of West African governments, what policies they might have adopted, or what assistance they have requested. In short, it appears as if 'West Africa' is a space devoid of agency, sovereignty and authority.

Question 1: How do representations of the 2014 outbreak of Ebola compare with wider—and older—discourses about the Global South?

Question 2: What forms of power were exercised, and by whom, in the 2014 Ebola outbreak?

Opposing Opinions 11.1 Poststructuralism provides a good account of the role that materiality and power play in world politics

For

Material objects get their meaning through discourse. Taking the hard case of nuclear weapons, it clearly matters which country has them: some countries are considered 'safe' owners, others are not. For example, it is impossible to understand the United States' attempt to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons without an analysis of how 'Iran' is represented in Western discourse.

Discourse is a form of power. Representations of states, institutions, and other actors in world politics are not neutral descriptions that describe the world as it 'really is'. For instance, non-Western countries have historically been constructed through terms that are inferior to those of Europe and the United States and this has legitimized policies of colonialism.

Foreign policies are justified through historical discourse. Foreign policy discourse is saturated with references to history, for example to 'we' as the legitimate inhabitants of a given territory. Such historical claims are also practices of power and often deeply politicized. Thus they cannot be settled by pointing to 'the facts'. For example, the Armenian government is seeking to have events in 1915 where huge numbers of Armenians were killed acknowledged as a genocide, while the Turkish government refuses to represent history using that term.

Against

Material objects exist and matter independently of discourse. Poststructuralists overly emphasize representations in language; this causes them to overlook the importance of non-linguistic factors. For example, there is a real threat that rising sea levels will eradicate small island states such as Tuvalu, independently of whether the threat is talked about or not.

Discourses may overlook structures of power. Poststructuralism misses differences in material power that are not put into language. For instance, only five states are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, while others have less power to influence its decisions and resolutions. And in some cases, individuals might actually put themselves at risk by openly voicing critique of 'their' state.

Not all of history is constructed. Although history might be contested from time to time, we should not dispense with the idea that objective historical facts exist. For example, it is a fact that around 8,000 men and boys were killed by Bosnian Serbian forces at Srebrenica in July 1995.

1. Do you agree with critics that poststructuralism cannot be used to understand the materiality of issues such as nuclear weapons and terrorism?

2. What forms of power are most significant, in your view? What are the strengths and weaknesses of poststructuralism when analysing those forms of power?

3. What role do historical facts—and representations of historical facts—play in the relationship between Israel and Palestine? What can you add to the debates over poststructuralism based on this case?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Intertextuality

The theory on **intertextuality** was developed by the semiotic theorist Julia Kristeva. It argues that we can understand the social world as comprised of texts. This is because texts form an 'intertext'—that is, they are connected to texts that came before them. In some situations this is self-evident. Take, for example, declarations made by international institutions such as the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), the **European Union** (EU), and the United Nations, which quote previous declarations and perhaps statements by member countries. But intertextual relations are also made in more abstract ways. For example, to say that 'the Balkans' is filled with 'ancient hatred' is to draw on a body of texts that

constitutes 'the Balkans' as pre-modern and barbaric. Intertextuality might also involve images, or interpretations of events that are not exclusively written or spoken. For instance, when presidents meet in front of television cameras expressing their commitment to solve international crises, we look not just at what is said but at what having such a meeting signifies. The presidential press conference is, in other words, an important 'sign' within the larger text that defines **diplomacy**. Intertextuality also implies that certain things are taken for granted because previous texts have made the point so many times that there is no need to state it again. If you read through NATO documents from the cold war, you will find that they might not necessarily mention the Soviet

Union all that much. That is because everyone at the time knew that NATO's main purpose was to deter the Soviet Union from attacking members of NATO. Working with intertextuality, we should therefore ask ourselves what a given text does not mention, either because it is taken for granted or because it is too dangerous to say.

At the same time that intertextuality points to the way in which texts always 'quote' past texts, it also holds that individual texts are unique. No text is a complete reproduction of an earlier one. Even when one text incorporates another by quoting it in full, the new context modifies the older text. This is of significance to the study of world politics because it underscores the fact that meaning changes when texts are quoted by other texts. Take the Muhammad cartoons that were printed by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in September 2005. They have now been reproduced by many other newspapers and on the internet, and many different interpretations have been offered. If you look at the cartoons today, you cannot therefore 'read' them in the same way as when they were first published.

Popular culture

The argument that we should understand world politics through the lens of intertextuality has prompted poststructuralists to look at forms of text that are not normally discussed by IR theories. James Der Derian has studied the intertext of popular spy novels, journalism, and academic analysis (Der Derian 1992). Others, including Michael J. Shapiro (1988, 1997) and Cynthia Weber (2006), analyse television shows, film, and photography. Poststructuralists hold that there are several reasons why we should pay attention to **popular culture**. For one, states take popular culture seriously, even if it is 'just fiction'. In 2010, a Turkish television drama's depiction of Israeli security forces led the Israeli Foreign Ministry to protest to the Turkish ambassador. In 2014, the American comedy *The Interview*, which features an assassination plot against North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, became the subject of North Korean government protest and hacking against

Sony Pictures, the company that produced the movie. Another reason why we should take popular culture seriously—and why states do too—is that film, television, music, and video are watched and listened to by millions of people across the world (**see Case Study 11.1**). As the world has become increasingly globalized, popular culture can spread quickly from one place to another and new media technologies, such as smartphones, Facebook, and Twitter, have fundamentally changed who can produce the 'texts' of world politics. Think, for example, of the photos showing inmates being abused by American guards working at the Iraqi prison Abu Ghraib, which caused a global uproar in 2004, and the videos of beheadings that circulate on the internet today. Finally, popular culture provides us with complex, critical, and thought-provoking visions of world politics. For example, films made about the Vietnam War such as *The Deer Hunter* and *First Blood* (the first of the Rambo movies) helped generate debate over the war itself and the traumas faced by returning soldiers. Another example is the widely acclaimed graphic novel *Persepolis* by Marjane Satrapi, which shows what it was like growing up in Iran during and after the revolution in 1979.

> ### Key Points
>
> - Four concepts from poststructuralist philosophy have been used to produce new knowledge about world politics: discourse, deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality.
> - To look at world politics as discourse is to study the linguistic structures through which materiality is given meaning.
> - Deconstruction argues that language is a system of unstable dichotomies where one term is valued as superior.
> - Genealogy asks which political practices have formed the present and which alternative understandings and discourses have been marginalized and forgotten.
> - Intertextuality holds that we can see world politics as made up of texts, and that all texts refer to other texts yet each is unique.

Deconstructing state sovereignty

Poststructuralists use the four key concepts (discourse, deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality) to answer the 'big questions' of IR. What is the status of the state? Is the international system doomed to recurring conflicts and power politics, as realism holds? Or is it possible to move towards more cooperative arrangements, as liberalism argues?

The inside–outside distinction

Poststructuralists agree with realists that the state is absolutely central to world politics. Yet, in contrast to realists, who take the state for granted, poststructuralists deconstruct the role the state plays in world politics as well as in the academic field of IR. Arguing that the state is not 'a unit' that has the same essence across

time and space, R. B. J. Walker (1990) holds that the state is a particular way to organize political community. The question of political community is of utmost importance to national as well as international politics because it tells us why the forms of governance that are in place are legitimate, who we can trust, who we have something in common with, and who we should help if they are under attack, suffering, or hungry (**see Ch. 30**). The significance of political community is perhaps most striking when states fall apart and separate into new states, such as happened with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and more recently with Sudan. Such processes involve reconstruction of who 'we' are and an idea of how new collectives differ from those who were part of the old state.

The sovereign, territorial state's unrivalled position as the unit of political community in contemporary world politics resulted from a series of events and processes that began with the **Treaties of Westphalia** (**see Ch. 2**). Walker tells us that this transition from the medieval to the modern state system is important because it shows us two different ways of organizing political community. In the medieval world there were so-called overlapping authorities. This means that religious and political authorities—the Pope and the emperors and those below them—were interwoven and that there was no single institution that could make sovereign decisions. This changed with the Treaties of Westphalia as states became the sovereign authorities in their own territories and in relations with each other. In terms of relations among people, the medieval world worked according to what Walker calls a principle of 'hierarchical subordination'. Hierarchical subordination assigns each individual to a particular position in society. At the top were the Emperor and the Pope, next came the bishops and the kings, then the priests and local nobility, and at the bottom were those who owned nothing and who had no rights. The Treaties of Westphalia began a process whereby people became more closely linked to states, and after the French Revolution each citizen had the same status. This did not mean that all individuals were citizens or that all citizens had the same amount of wealth, education, or property, but there was no longer anything in a person's nature, as with the principle of hierarchical subordination, that made him or her inherently superior or inferior.

State sovereignty implies, in Walker's words, a division of the world into an 'inside' the state (where there is **order**, trust, **loyalty**, and progress) and an 'outside' (where there is conflict, suspicion, self-help, and anarchy). Walker then uses the principle of deconstruction to show that the national–international distinction is not simply an objective account of how the 'real world' works. The distinction is not maintained by something that is externally given, but rather by the way in which the two sides of the dichotomy reinforce each other: we know the international only by what it is not (national), and likewise the national only by what it is not (the international). The world 'inside' states not only differs from the international realm 'outside'; the two are constituted as each other's opposition. The inside–outside dichotomy is stabilized by a long series of other dichotomies, including those of peace and war, reason and power, and order and anarchy (**see Fig. 11.1**).

Poststructuralists have shown how the inside–outside dichotomy, which like all dichotomies is inherently unstable, is held in place by being reproduced again and again. For example, the negotiations between the EU and Greece over how to handle the latter's debt crisis showed how state sovereignty was challenged by the conditions Greece had to accept. Yet state sovereignty was also reproduced in that the EU could force the Greek government to accept a particular solution in the way it could if Greece had been a county within a state. The debates among Greek politicians on how far one can go before one's sovereignty disappears also showed the continued importance of the inside–outside dichotomy. States reproduce state sovereignty, and so do academic texts. For example, Richard K. Ashley points to realism's 'double move' (Ashley 1987: 413–18). The first move is to assume that we can only understand '**community**' in one way: the one we know

Inside—the state	⟷	Outside—the international
Order	⟷	Anarchy
Community	⟷	Difference
Reason	⟷	Power
Trust	⟷	Suspicion
Progress	⟷	Repetition
Cooperation	⟷	Self-help
Law	⟷	Capabilities
Peace	⟷	War

Figure 11.1 The inside–outside dichotomy and its stabilizing oppositions

from domestic politics. When we think of 'international community', our understanding of this concept is built on what we know from the state. The second move consists of arguing that such a community is possible only within the territorial state. The harmony, reason, and justice that are possible within states cannot be extended to the international sphere, as this is fraught with anarchy, recurring warfare, and power politics. The realist scholar must therefore educate governments not to incorporate ethics and justice in their foreign policies. For example, one group of prominent activists opposed to invading Iraq in 2003 based their opposition on an assessment of the American **national interest**, not moral concerns.

The strength of state sovereignty

When poststructuralists write about the inside–outside dichotomy, however, they are not claiming that the world works neatly that way. There are plenty of states where domestic politics does not follow the description of the 'inside' as one of progress, reason, and justice, yet the national–international dichotomy still manages to govern much of world politics. More critically, we might say that the success of the inside–outside dichotomy is shown by how well it silences numerous 'facts' and 'events' that should undermine it. For example, we can see the national–international dichotomy at work when states choose not to intervene in other states that are persecuting their 'own' citizens, despite increased invocation of the 'right to protect' principle in recent years.

One of poststructuralism's strengths is that it points to how state sovereignty is often both questioned and supported. For instance, the 9/11 attacks and the **war on terror** undermined state sovereignty at the same time that Western states saw them through the lens of state-based territoriality: 'American soil' was attacked and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was held responsible for what happened on 'its' **territory**. Before we declare the inside–outside distinction dead and gone, we should therefore take its flexibility and resilience into account.

Universal alternatives

Poststructuralists warn that although our deconstruction of state sovereignty makes it look less like an objective fact, it is not easy to transcend, nor can it be replaced by a '**global community**'. As R. B. J. Walker puts it, 'The state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not' (Walker 1997: 72). To engage a dichotomy is not simply to reverse the hierarchy between its terms (that is, replace 'the state' with 'the global'), but rather to rethink all the complex dichotomies around which it revolves. If we leave the state in favour of the global, a crucial question becomes how to prevent a return to the model we know from the medieval world—that is, one of a global community where individuals are ranked and given different value. Poststructuralists hold that claims to 'global', 'universal' solutions always imply that something else is different and 'particular'. And that which is different is almost always in danger of being forced to change to become like the universal. Poststructuralists are therefore sceptical of idealists or liberals who advocate universal principles, but who overlook the power involved in defining what is 'the universally' good and right (**see Ch. 31**).

The dangers—and power—of universal discourse are demonstrated by the discourse of Western governments with troops in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid- and late 2000s (**see Ch. 6**). In this discourse, 'fighting **terrorism**' sought to defend 'freedom', 'liberty', 'security', and 'democracy' (**see Ch. 28**). Although this might at first sound unproblematic—even appealing— the problem is that this set of universally good categories is spoken and defined not by a truly global voice, but by a particular set of states. The good 'universal' categories were aimed at those who were not—yet or ever—part of that universal project, and this universalist discourse reinforced 'the West' as the only entity that could define 'real' universalism. To many, and not only poststructuralists (**see Ch. 10**), this echoes the time when the colonial West had the power, right, and 'obligation' to define what was good for the rest of the world.

Poststructuralism's critique of universalism shows that although poststructuralists are critical of realism, they agree with realists that we should take power and the state seriously. Many poststructuralists see much of value in classical realism because it is historically sensitive and concerned with the big political and normative questions of world politics. On the other hand, they criticize **neorealism** for its ahistorical view of the state, its reification of the international structure, and its positivist epistemology.

Key Points

- State sovereignty is a practice that constitutes identity and authority in a particular manner.

- Poststructuralists deconstruct the distinction between the national and the international by showing that the two terms stabilize each other and depend on a long series of other dichotomies.

- The global is not a political category like the state, and therefore cannot replace it.

- Poststructuralists warn against the danger of universalist discourse because it is always defined from a particular position of power.

Identity and foreign policy

Poststructuralists have also moved from the general study of state sovereignty to ask how we should understand foreign policy. In traditional foreign policy analysis, foreign policies are designed to defend the state (security policies), help it financially (economic policies), or make it do good in the world (development policies). By contrast, poststructuralists hold that there is no stable object—the state—from which foreign policies are drawn, but that foreign policies rely on and produce particular understandings of the state. Foreign policies constitute the identity of the Self through the construction of threats, dangers, and challenges— that is, its Other(s). As Michael J. Shapiro puts it, this means that the politics of representation is absolutely crucial. How we represent others affects the representation of our selves, and this representation is decisive for which foreign policies we choose (M. Shapiro 1988). For example, debates in the EU over whether Turkey should be accepted as a new member centre on judgments about whether Turkey is a European country and whether it is possible to be European and Muslim at the same time. The way in which EU countries answer these questions has implications not only for the construction of Turkey's identity, but for that of **Europe**'s. Foreign policies are thus not protecting a given and fixed identity, but rather are discourses through which identities are (re)produced (**see Case Study 11.2** about Russian discourse on and policy towards Crimea).

Identity as performative

Theoretically, poststructuralism conceptualizes identity as relational and performative. The concept of performativity comes from Judith Butler: it holds that identities have no objective existence, but rather that they depend on discursive practices (D. Campbell 1992). Identities are socially 'real', but they cannot

maintain their 'realness' if we do not reproduce them. Because identities have no existence independently of the foreign policies that produce and reproduce them, we cannot say that identities cause foreign policy. To take the example of the EU and Turkey, there is no objective European identity that can be used to arbitrate a decision on Turkish membership. Rather, it is through debates over Turkey's membership application that European identity is being defined. Does this mean, then, that foreign policies cause identities? No, because foreign policies are at the same time made with reference to understandings of identity that are to some extent already in place. In the case of the EU, the discourse on Turkey does not start from scratch, but with historically powerful constructions of Europe as white, Christian, civilized, and modern. In short, identities are simultaneously a product of and the justification for foreign policies. If we go back to the discussion of epistemology at the beginning of this chapter, we see that we cannot theorize the relationship between identity and foreign policy in causal terms. Instead, this is a constitutive relationship (**see Fig. 11.2**). This also means that poststructuralism theorizes identity differently from liberalism. As you may recall from **Chapter 6**, liberalists incorporate identity, but hold that it might determine a state's outward orientation. According to this account, identity has a causal impact on foreign policy.

Figure 11.2 The constitutive relationship between identity and foreign policy

Case Study 11.2 Foreign policy and the construction of identity—Russian discourse on Crimea

Ukrainian soldiers inside the gate of the Perevalne military base near Simferopol Crimea

© Stephen Foote / Alamy Stock Photo

Demonstrations aimed at the pro-Russian policy of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych began in the capital city of Kiev in November 2013. In February 2014, Yanukovych fled to Russia and the Ukrainian Parliament voted in favour of holding a new presidential election. On 16 March 2014, a referendum in the Ukrainian territory of Crimea showed an overwhelming majority in favour of the region becoming a part of Russia. Russia's military and political engagement in Crimea was widely condemned by Western governments and institutions. For example, NATO described the region's changing status as an illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' that breached international law. In response to Russia's involvement in Crimea's secession and the war in Ukraine more broadly, a long list of European countries, as well as the United States and Canada, imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia.

The Russian government adopted a very different discourse to describe the events in Ukraine and Crimea. Taking a speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 18 March 2014, as a case in point, we can see that what is at stake is not simply a question of 'material facts', but representations of identity, history, and the norms that underpin world politics. Putin constituted Crimea and Russia as possessing a long history of shared identity going back to the 980s when Prince Vladimir, the ancestor of modern Russians, was baptized in the Ukrainian town Khersones. This means, he stated, that 'In people's hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through during the entire twentieth century' (Putin 2014). Therefore what happened in 2014 was not an annexation but a logical and rightful return of Crimea to its natural place within Russia. In contrast to the Western discourse on Russia as the aggressor, Putin constructs Russia as a democratic and civilized country committed to 'good-neighbourly relations' with other states. Challenging American representations of itself as upholding international law, Putin holds that the United States prefers 'the rule of the gun'. It and its partners 'have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right'. Thus, when it suits their interests Western powers support republics that want independence, such as Kosovo, and when it does not suit their interests, they do not.

Question 1: What relationship between Western policies and Western identity does Putin construct in his speech?

Question 2: Is the Western representation of Russia—and its role in Crimea—the same today as it was in 2014? If the representation has changed, why might that be the case? If it has not, why not?

Probably the most important development of a performative theory of identity and foreign policy is David Campbell's *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, first published in 1992. Campbell takes a broad view of what foreign policy is and distinguishes between 'Foreign Policy' (the policies undertaken by states in the international arena) and 'foreign policy' (all those discursive practices that constitute something as 'foreign' in relation to the Self). 'Foreign policy' might just as well take place within states as between them. It might, for instance, involve **gender** and **sexual relations**, as when women are deemed unfit to participate in the military because they lack the proper 'mind-set' (and thus would be dangerous for male soldiers to fight alongside), or when homosexuals are described as alien to the national sense of self. By looking not only at Foreign Policy, but also at 'foreign policy', poststructuralism casts light on

the symbolic boundaries that are constituted within and across states.

Much of poststructuralist scholars' concern has focused on what Campbell calls the 'discourses of danger'. Because such discourses work with very clear dichotomies, it is easy to see how the Other defines the Self. Yet poststructuralism also investigates those identities that are not so radically different from the Self. Beyond the simple construction of Self–radical Other, more complex identity constellations exist that can involve several Others. Such Others might threaten each other rather than the Self and be constituted by different kinds of otherness. One case that highlights such more complex constellations is the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, where one Other (Bosnian Muslims) was threatened by another Other (Bosnian Serbs). This challenged the international community to undertake a **humanitarian intervention** (**see Ch. 32**). Poststructuralists

have shown that this was legitimized in a discourse that split the Other into 'innocent civilians' and 'Balkan governments' (D. Campbell 1998). As Western responsibility was extended only to the 'innocent civilians', a full—and more political—understanding of Western involvement was avoided. Another example of how foreign policy discourses try to establish the identity of the Other is the on-going debate about whether China has the ambition to become a fully fledged military superpower, and if so, how it will use this power.

Subject positions

When poststructuralists write about identities as constituted in discourse, they usually use the terms 'subjectivities' or 'subject positions' to underscore the fact that identity is not something that someone has, but rather that it is a position that one is constructed as having. Individuals and institutions navigate among different subject positions and might identify with the positions they are given by others to a greater or lesser extent. Think, for example, about the way the subject position of 'the Muslim' has come to be used in Western Europe. Some 'Muslims' embrace this subject position and seek to give it a positive status by showing, for example, that Muslim organizations are as democratic as, say, 'normal' French, Danish, or Austrian ones. Other 'Muslims' protest that they do not see themselves as Muslim at all, but rather as women, Swedes, or athletes. As you can see, it is crucial which subject positions are defined as important, because they create the 'identity landscape' that we have to operate within. We need to ask not only what constructions of 'the Muslim' are available, but why 'the Muslim' has become such an important identity to construct.

Obviously, some subject positions are more desirable than others because they provide a superior position compared to other identities. Take 'the Muslim' in Western discourses. Here the starting point is that the Muslim is inferior to the European, Western, or Danish subject. Thus, when institutions and individuals try to present a more positive view of Muslims, this happens in critical response to a reigning discourse of 'the Muslims' as not quite as good as the 'real' Europeans. A superior subject position also usually provides the subject with more room for agency. If you recall poststructuralism's view of power as productive, it becomes apparent that power is very much involved in the construction of subject positions.

Poststructuralism's critical take on subjectivity makes it ask '*Who* can speak within this discourse?' and '*How* can the subject speak?' These questions also draw attention to those who cannot speak or who can speak only with limited authority and agency. One example of how discourses exclude and marginalize is that of statism in the UN system. Consider the United Nations General Assembly, which has 193 members, all of them states. Because Palestine is not recognized as a state, it is allowed access only as an observer. To the extent that a state-centric discourse rules world politics, **non-state actors** and **stateless** individuals have severe difficulty gaining a voice. Another example of the 'who can speak and how' issue is development discourse, where those who receive aid are constituted as less knowledgeable than Western donors. As a consequence, the development subject is unqualified to say what kind of aid it wants and can only listen and learn.

As explained in the presentation of the concept of discourse above, discourses are also material. The constitution of subjectivity happens not only as a linguistic process, but as we engage our physical surroundings. Poststructuralists such as Charlotte Epstein (2007) and Mark Salter (2006) have studied how biometric passports, visa restrictions, and the way entry is regulated at airports 'govern' who gains access, and how one should look and act. Material technologies—the incorporation of chips into passports, online applications for entry into a country, large data systems containing huge amounts of information—work together with discourses and policies to affect everyday life.

Key Points

- In keeping with poststructuralism's non-foundationalist ontology, there are no natural or objective identities, only those that are produced in discourse.

- The terms 'subjectivities' or 'subject positions' underscore the fact that identity is not something that someone objectively has, but rather a position that one is constructed as having.

- The relationship between identity and foreign policy is performative and mutually constitutive.

- Poststructuralism asks 'Who are the subjects and how can they speak?' and 'What subjects are prevented from speaking?'

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the main ideas and concepts of poststructuralism. Poststructuralism is particularly good at drawing your attention to the fact that actors, entities, and 'things' that we assume are given actually depend on how we construct them. Academic perspectives play an important role in the reproduction of particular visions of world politics: if we are told over and over again that the state is concerned only with its national interest, power politics, and survival, then we act according to that picture of the state. Poststructuralists also warn that there are no easy solutions to state sovereignty and that liberal calls for universal human rights, freedom, liberty, and democracy inevitably involve constructions of power and exclusions. While sympathetic to much in critical theory's account of the structures that produce global inequalities, poststructuralists are also sceptical that emancipation can tackle power and avoid the pitfalls of universalist discourse (**see Ch. 7**).

Poststructuralism might not offer grand solutions, but it has a critical impact on world politics. Deconstructions of policy discourses and the dominant realist and liberalist positions force us to reconsider what basic ontological assumptions guide our way of thinking. Moreover, poststructuralists have always been keen to point to the ways in which responsibility is constructed.

Like all other theories of international relations, poststructuralism has also been the subject of criticism. Critics have held that poststructuralists use such dense philosophical vocabulary that it borders on the incomprehensible, or that once one cuts through the fancy language there is not much substance. Others argue that poststructuralism fails to account adequately for material processes, and hence for much of what actually happens 'outside of discourse'. Another line of critique centres on epistemological and methodological differences. Those International Relations scholars who hold that theories should make causal claims, like most of the US mainstream, simply do not accept poststructuralists' embrace of constitutive epistemologies. As in the case of the other theoretical perspectives in this book, we advise you to think critically about poststructuralism too.

Questions

1. Do you believe all theories should make causal claims?
2. How do you think that material technology influences discourses, for example in discussions of border control?
3. How would a genealogy of contemporary migration from the Global South to the Global North differ from a liberal or realist study of the same issue?
4. Do you agree that it is a good idea to incorporate popular culture in the study of world politics?
5. How do you see identity constituted in policies on the transnational trafficking of illegal drugs?
6. What are the signs that state sovereignty might still be in place and what points to its erosion?
7. What alternative forms of political community could replace the state?
8. Discuss how realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and poststructuralism would analyse the war in Syria. What are the differences and similarities among them?
9. Could 'terrorism' be replaced by another identity in Western discourse, and what would the political consequences be?
10. Which subject positions are central in the discourses on hunger? Who can speak and how? What are the consequences for international policy-making?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Campbell, D. (1992; 2nd edn 1998), *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Theorizes the importance of otherness for states' foreign policy and provides a thorough analysis of the US case.

Der Derian, J. (1992), *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Cambridge, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell). Uses multiple forms of text to explore how diplomatic interactions take place in many settings, including computer simulations and real-time media coverage.

Der Derian, J., and **Shapiro, M. J.** (1989), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books). Early application of the theory of intertextuality to world politics, with contributions by R. K. Ashley, W. E. Connolly, B. S. Klein, R. B. J. Walker, and others.

Hansen, L. (2006), *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge). Presents a theory of non-radical otherness and a poststructuralist methodology.

Hansen, L., and **Wæver, O.** (eds) (2002), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (London: Routledge). Offers a poststructuralist framework for analysing discourses on European integration and applies it to the Nordic states.

Lisle, D. (2006), *The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Demonstrates how poststructuralism can be used in an analysis of travel writing.

Shapiro, M. J. (1988), *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press). Shows that foreign policy relies on representations of identity and takes place across multiple genres.

Walker, R. B. J. (1993), *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Explains how state sovereignty builds on particular understandings of identity, community, authority, order, and power.

Weber, C. (2006), *Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics, and Film* (London: Routledge). A study of the way films engaged national identity and foreign policy after 9/11.

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Social constructivism

MICHAEL BARNETT

Framing Questions

- Are states motivated by power or by ideas?
- What are the underlying factors that condition patterns of conflict and cooperation?
- Do the norms and rules underlying international order reflect enduring inequality or the possibility of moral progress?

Reader's Guide

This chapter provides an overview of constructivist approaches to International Relations (IR) theory. Constructivism explores how the world is made and remade through action, how the structures of world politics do not merely constrain but also constitute the identities, interests, and practices of the actors of world politics, how these actors unwittingly or purposely reproduce these structures, and how human action is responsible for both stability and change in world affairs. Constructivism generates many distinctive insights, including alternative ways of thinking about power, the role of norms for explaining the rise and decline of world orders, and the importance of transnational movements and other non-state actors in the internationalization of global politics.

Introduction

Constructivism rose from rather humble beginnings to become one of the leading schools in IR. Just 30 years ago constructivism did not exist. Today it is widely recognized for its ability to capture important features of global politics, is viewed as an important theory in IR, and is the most followed theory among scholars of IR (Teaching, Research and International Policy 2014). This chapter explores constructivism's origins, its core commitments, and features of its research agenda as it relates to global change. Mainstream IR, as covered in **Chapters 6 and 8**, assumes that states have enduring interests such as power and wealth, and are constrained in their ability to further those interests because of material forces such as geography, technology, and the distribution of power. Critics counter that social forces such as ideas, knowledge, norms, and rules also influence states' identities and interests and the very organization of world politics.

Constructivism is not the only IR theory to recognize the importance of international norms and to conceptualize international politics as a society, not a system. Various theories that predated constructivism, some of which are included in this volume, made similar claims, including the English School and feminist approaches (**see Ch. 9**). But constructivists were more attentive to the issues that mattered to neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists—how identity, norms, and culture shape patterns of war and peace. Eventually constructivism developed different branches, with some emphasizing structure and others agency, some stability and others transformation.

The concern with the making and remaking of world politics underscores constructivism's strong interest in global change. Although constructivism has investigated various features of global change, this chapter focuses on three: the convergence by states towards similar ways of organizing domestic and international life; how norms become internationalized and institutionalized, influencing what states and non-state actors do and their conceptualizations of legitimate behaviour; and whether these underlying norms and changes maintain relations of inequality or reflect new possibilities of progress.

The rise of constructivism

Once upon a time, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism dominated American IR theory. Neorealism assumed that states are the primary actors in the world; that they exist in a condition of anarchy (the absence of supranational authority); that this condition implies that states must be consumed by security, power, and survival; that states do not and should not have patience for ethics or norms; and that the distribution and balance of power tell us just about everything we need to know about patterns in world politics (**see Ch. 8**). Neoliberalism lightened neorealism's dark view of international politics by demonstrating that states cooperate extensively in order to further their interests, which extend beyond security (**see Ch. 6**). Because a primary obstacle to cooperation is the absence of trust among states, states construct international institutions that can perform various trust-enhancing functions, including monitoring and publicizing cheating.

As recounted in **Chapters 6 and 8**, despite disagreements, these camps shared a commitment to individualism and materialism. Individualism is the view that actors have fixed interests and that the structure constrains their behaviour. Although neorealists believe that the pursuit of security is primary while neoliberals can envision other goals such as wealth, for empirical and theoretical reasons they both assume that state interests are hard-wired and unmalleable. Materialism is the view that the structure that constrains behaviour is defined by the distribution of power, technology, and geography. While neorealism holds that interests trump ideas and norms, neoliberal institutionalism recognizes that states might willingly construct norms and institutions to regulate their behaviour if doing so will enhance their long-term interests. Although both approaches allow for the possibility that ideas and norms can constrain how states pursue their interests, neither contemplates the possibility that ideas and norms might define their interests.

This commitment to materialism and individualism was challenged by the scholars who eventually became associated with constructivism. Constructivism enjoyed a meteoric rise in the 1990s because of two principal factors. First, drawing from sociological and critical

theories, during the 1980s dissidents began to make visible and significant certain key elements—norms, ideas, identity, and rules. Whereas mainstream IR had made invisible and trivial the *social* elements of human activity, these dissidents, who would later be known as constructivists, argued that their inclusion was central for understanding the behaviour of states and non-state actors and understanding why they saw the world and themselves as they did. What was more counterintuitive: rationalism's belief that the world was asocial and without norms, or sociological theory's view that the world was highly social and congested with norms? The proposition that ideas did not matter or that ideas played a role in shaping who actors think they are and what counts as appropriate practice in the world? Because neorealism had stripped everything social from world politics, Waltz and others completely ignored the first principle of modern IR: sovereignty. Did sovereignty truly not matter, as neorealists suggested? Or was it a social capacity, a licence with rights and responsibilities, as constructivists argued? Claims about sovereignty as a social capacity meant that norms and institutions did more than constrain and regulate actors, which was the limit of neoliberal institutionalist thinking. Instead, they implied that norms and institutions could constitute the actors themselves.

These dissidents' claims that mainstream IR was missing the big picture were supported by a second factor—the end of the cold war. Most observers had predicted that the cold war would end with a bang, not a whimper. What made the end of the cold war particularly challenging for neorealists and neoliberals was that they had explicitly jettisoned the intellectual tools required to explain this outcome: the revolutionary impact of ideas to transform the organization of world politics. Nor did these mainstream approaches provide insight into what might come next. The US was enjoying a unipolar moment, but the distribution of power could not determine whether it would aspire to become a global hegemon or work through multilateral institutions. Moreover, the end of the cold war caused states to debate what is the national interest and how it relates to national identity—who are 'we' and where do 'we' belong? What did neorealism have to say about that? The end of the cold war also clipped the prominence of traditional security themes and of neorealism's comparative advantage, and raised the importance of transnationalism, human rights, and other subjects that were outside its wheelhouse. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism were not just unable to explain what happened, but

had voluntarily disarmed themselves of all the intellectual tools they might need for just this occasion.

If neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists were the immediate losers from the end of the cold war, the dissidents of the 1980s were the immediate winners. And soon the dissidents became a tribe called constructivists. The end of the cold war gave constructivists the opportunity to speed past critique to offer genuinely novel, compelling understandings of the world in areas that neorealists considered their bread-and-butter—including alliance patterns, military intervention, arms races, and great power transformation—and demonstrate how identity and norms shape state interests and must be incorporated to generate superior explanations. Constructivism was already working with concepts, such as legitimacy and world order, that were part of the policy conversations. It was pointing to the importance of transnationalism—which many claimed had played a role in the downfall of the Soviet Union and was a transformative force in world politics. A scholarly agenda that seemed constipated because of the overbearing study of the security and economic needs of great powers now had space to expand. Constructivism offered a fresh take on the world at a time when the world needed new ways of thinking.

Constructivists of the period were borrowing from various sociological insights that suggested international society was moving in a more orderly and progressive direction. The very idea of 'society' emerged in the eighteenth century because of various challenges to domestic order. There were liberal views that suggested society was something of a contract, reminiscent of contemporary institutionalist arguments. There were Marxist views that argued society was organized around classes that were in constant and preordained conflict because of property relations—not entirely unlike how realists viewed the world as organized around states that were in constant conflict because of anarchy. And then there were late nineteenth-century sociological arguments that imagined how a society going through stress and transformation, in this case because of modernization, might nevertheless remain orderly and possibly even progressive because of the development of underlying norms and rules (Owens 2015: 658–60). The first generation of constructivists tended to draw from these latter sorts of arguments, as they imagined a post-cold war world that had or might develop a sense of community and unity of purpose because of shared norms, interests, and outlooks. A consequence was that constructivists did not give power and domination the attention they deserved.

Key Points

- Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism dominated IR theory in the 1980s.

- Both theories ascribed to materialism and individualism.

- Various scholars critical of neorealism and neoliberalism drew from critical and sociological theory to demonstrate the effects of ideas and norms on world politics.

- The end of the cold war created an intellectual space for scholars to challenge existing theories of international politics.

- The first wave of constructivist thought tended to emphasize how international society could develop shared identities, norms, and outlooks to create a stable order that even permitted some possibility of progress.

Constructivism

Before detailing constructivism's tenets, a caveat is in order. Constructivism is a social theory and not a substantive theory of international politics. Social theory concerns how to conceptualize the relationship between agents and structures: for instance, how should we think about the relationship between states and the structure of international politics? Substantive theory offers specific claims and hypotheses about patterns in world politics: for instance, how do we explain why democratic states tend not to wage war on one another? In this way, constructivism is best compared with **rational choice**. Rational choice is a social theory that offers a framework for understanding how actors operate as they attempt to maximize fixed preferences under a set of constraints. It makes no claims about the content of those preferences; they could be wealth or religious salvation. Nor does it assume anything about the content of the constraints; they could be guns or ideas. Rational choice offers no claims about the actual patterns of world politics. Although neorealism and neoliberalism subscribe to rational choice, they arrive at rival claims about patterns of conflict and cooperation in world politics because they make different assumptions about the effects of anarchy. Like rational choice, constructivism is a social theory that concerns the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory. For instance, constructivists have different arguments regarding the rise of sovereignty and the impact of human rights norms on states. To generate substantive claims, scholars must delineate the principal actors, their interests and capacities, and the content of normative structures.

Although there are many kinds of constructivism, there is unity within diversity: 'Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life' (Ruggie 1998: 856). This focus on human consciousness suggests a commitment to idealism and holism, which, according to Wendt (1999), represent the core of constructivism (**see Box 12.1**). **Idealism** demands that we take seriously the role of ideas in world politics. The world is defined by material and ideational forces. But these ideas are not akin to beliefs or psychological states that reside inside our heads. Instead, these ideas are social. Our mental maps are shaped by collectively held ideas such as knowledge, symbols, language, and rules. Idealism does not reject material reality but instead observes that the meaning and construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation. The **balance of power** does not objectively exist out there, waiting to be discovered; instead, states debate the meaning of the balance of power and how they should respond. Constructivism also accepts some form of **holism** or structuralism. The world is irreducibly social and cannot be decomposed into the properties of already existing actors. Nevertheless, holism allows for agency, recognizing that agents have some autonomy and their interactions help to construct, reproduce, and transform those structures. Although the structure of the cold war seemingly locked the United States and the Soviet Union into a fight to the death, leaders on both sides creatively transformed their relations and, with them, the very structure of global politics.

This commitment to idealism and holism has important implications for how we think about and study world politics. To appreciate these insights, we must learn more about constructivism's conceptual vocabulary, and demonstrate the value of learning this 'second language'. This chapter contrasts constructivism's vocabulary with that of rational choice. The core observation is the **social construction of reality**. This has a number of related elements. One is an emphasis on the socially constructed nature of actors and their identities and interests. Actors are not born outside of and prior to society, as individualism claims. Instead, actors are produced and created by their cultural environment: nurture, not nature. This points to the importance of identity and the social construction of interests. The American identity shapes national interests and even what are considered to be acceptable and unacceptable means to achieve them.

Box 12.1 Key concepts of constructivism

Agent–structure problem: how to think about the relationship between agents and structures. One view is that agents are born with already formed identities and interests and then treat other actors and the broad structure that their interactions produce as a constraint on their interests. But this suggests that actors are pre-social, to the extent that there is little concern with their identities or the possibility that they might change their interests through their interactions with others. Another view treats the structure as constituting the actors themselves, rather than as a constraint. Yet this might treat agents as cultural dupes because they are nothing more than artefacts of that structure. The proposed solution to the agent–structure problem is to find a way to understand how agents and structures constitute each other.

Constructivism: an approach to international politics that focuses on the centrality of ideas and human consciousness; stresses a holistic and idealist view of structures; and considers how structures construct actors' identities and interests, how their interaction is organized and constrained by structures, and how this interaction serves to either reproduce or transform those structures.

Holism: the view that structures cannot be decomposed into the individual units and their interactions because structures are more than the sum of their parts and are irreducibly social. The effects of structures do not merely constrain the actors but also construct them.

Idealism: although often associated with the claim that it is possible to create a world of peace, idealism as a social theory argues that the most fundamental feature of society is social consciousness. Ideas shape how we see ourselves and our interests, the knowledge that we use to categorize and understand the world, the beliefs we have of others, and the possible and impossible solutions to challenges and threats. Idealism does not disregard material forces such as technology, but instead claims that the meanings and consequences of these material forces are driven by human interpretations, not given by nature.

Identity: the social understanding of the self in relationship to an 'other'. Constructivists generally hold that identities shape interests; we cannot know what we want unless we know who we are. Because identities are social and are produced through interactions, they can change.

Individualism: the view that structures can be reduced to the aggregation of individuals and their interactions. IR theories that subscribe to individualism assume the nature of the units and their interests (usually states and the pursuit of power or wealth), and then examine how the broad structure (usually the distribution of power) constrains how states can act and generates certain patterns in international politics. Individualism contrasts with holism.

Materialism: the view that material forces, including technology, are the bedrock of society. For IR scholars, this leads to technological determinism or emphasis on the distribution of military power for understanding a state's foreign policy and patterns of international politics.

Normative structure: IR theory traditionally defines structure in material terms, such as the distribution of power, and then treats structure as a constraint on actors. In contrast to a materialist structure, a normative structure includes collectively held ideas such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms that not only constrain actors—they also construct categories of meaning, constitute actors' identities and interests, and define standards of appropriate conduct. Critical here is the concept of a norm: 'a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Actors adhere to norms not only because of benefits and costs, but also because they are related to a sense of self.

Practices: socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, produce and reproduce background knowledge and discourse. Action is not simply a product of individual rational thought, but also an enactment of how things are done according to a given community.

Rational choice: an approach that emphasizes how actors attempt to maximize their interests and select the most efficient means to achieve them, and endeavours to explain collective outcomes by virtue of individual actors' attempts to maximize their preferences under a set of constraints. Deriving largely from economic theorizing, the rational choice approach to international politics has been immensely influential and has been applied to a range of issues.

Another element is how knowledge—symbols, rules, concepts, and categories—shapes how individuals construct and interpret their worlds. Reality is not just out there waiting to be discovered; instead, historically produced and culturally bound knowledge enables individuals to construct and give meaning to reality. Existing categories help us to understand, define, and make sense of the world. For instance, there are many ways to classify collective violence, from civil war to ethnic cleansing, to crimes against humanity, to genocide.

This constructed reality frequently appears to us as an objective reality, which relates to the concept of **social facts**. There are things whose existence depends on human agreement, and things whose existence does not. Brute facts such as rocks, flowers, gravity, and oceans exist independently of human agreement, and will continue to exist even if humans disappear or deny their existence. Social facts depend on human agreement and are taken for granted. Money, refugees, terrorism, human rights, and sovereignty are social facts. They will only exist so long as human agreement endures, and their existence shapes how we categorize the world and what we do. Human agreement does not depend on the existence of a contract made between two voluntary

actors, but rather comes from underlying structures that give us the language, categories, and meanings to make sense of the world. Accordingly, constructivists often refer to background knowledge, scripts, and the taken-for-granted nature of many aspects of our world.

Constructivists differ in how they describe human activity. In contrast to rationalists, who often speak of behaviour, constructivists frequently use the language of practices. Practices are an attempt to capture how things are done, to situate these 'doings' within a social context. Adler and Pouliot (2011*a*: 4–5) define practices as 'socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently' produce and reproduce background knowledge and discourse. Practices suggest that there is a proper way of doing something, that it exhibits an enduring and routinized pattern, which often comes from knowledge contained within a smaller community such as a profession, and actors invest meaning in it. For instance, humanitarian organizations that provide life-saving relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters have a set of clear practices: there are right and wrong ways to deliver relief (ideally through principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality); these practices are learned by doing, through networks of professionals, and training; following these standards demonstrates not just competence but also membership in the community; and these practices often connote ethical commitments to humanity.

Constructivists also are concerned with norms and rules. Rules come in two basic varieties. **Regulative rules** regulate already existing activities—rules for the road instruct how to drive; the World Trade Organization's rules regulate trade. **Constitutive rules** create the very possibility for these activities. The rules of rugby not only prohibit blocking but also help to define the very game (and distinguish it from American football); after all, if forwards began to block for backs, not only would this be a penalty, but it would change the game itself. The rules of sovereignty not only regulate state practices but also make possible the very idea of a sovereign state. Rules also vary in terms of their institutionalization. Not all is fair in love, war, or any other social endeavour. But we also know that what counts as playing the games of love or war can vary over time, which means that we should be concerned with their origins, evolution, and corresponding effects. Furthermore, rules are not static; they are revised through practice, reflection, and arguments by knowledgeable actors regarding how they should be applied to new situations. Indeed, actors can engage in strategic social construction (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Actors attempt to change the norms that subsequently guide and constitute state identities and interests. Human rights activists, for instance, try to encourage compliance with human rights norms not only by naming and shaming those who violate these norms, but also by encouraging states to identify with the norms because it is the right thing to do.

Constructivists' claim that the world is not just material but also normative leads them to contrast different kinds of world orders. Realists begin with a world of anarchy, defined by the absence of a supranational authority, from which they identify a logic of state action, almost always bound up with suspicion, rivalry, and conflict. But would a world of Mahatma Gandhis be the same as a world of Osama bin Ladens? Alexander Wendt's (1992) claim that 'anarchy is what states make of it' calls attention to how different beliefs and practices will generate divergent patterns and organization of world politics (**see Box 12.2**).

The existence of different normative environments points to a concept central to constructivism but

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Box 12.2 Alexander Wendt on the three cultures of anarchy

[T]he deep structure of anarchy [is] cultural or ideational rather than material … [O]nce understood this way, we can see that the logic of anarchy can vary … [D]ifferent cultures of anarchy are based on different kinds of roles in terms of which states represent Self and Other. [T]here are three roles, enemy, rival, and friend … that are constituted by, and constitute, three distinct macro-level cultures of international politics, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, respectively. These cultures have different rules of engagement, interaction logics, and systemic tendencies …

The logic of the Hobbesian anarchy is well known: 'the war of all against all …' This is the true self-help system … where actors cannot count on each other for help or even to observe basic-self-restraint … Survival depends solely on military power … Security is deeply competitive, a zero-sum affair … Even if what states really want is security rather than power, their collective beliefs force them to act as if they are power-seeking …

The Lockean culture has a different logic … because it is based on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity … Like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representations are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their life and liberty, as a right, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them … Unlike friends, however, the recognition among rivals does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes.

The Kantian culture is based on a role structure of friendship … within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party.

(Wendt 1999: 43, 279, 251, 298–9)

neglected in rationalism: legitimacy. All actors crave legitimacy, the belief that they are acting according to and pursuing the values of the broader international community, for reasons of identity and interest. Do states always choose what is most 'efficient'? Do the ends always justify the means? Many states want to be seen as acting with the established conventions and norms, and feel the need to explain or justify their actions when they are seen otherwise. There is a direct relationship between their legitimacy and the costs of a course of action: the greater the legitimacy, the easier it is to convince others to cooperate with their policies; the less the legitimacy, the more costly the action. This means, then, that even great powers will frequently feel the need to alter their policies in order to be viewed as legitimate—or bear the consequences. Such considerations help explain why materially challenged human rights activists are able to use 'naming and shaming' tactics; many law-breaking governments change their behaviour so that they are seen as law-abiding citizens.

The earlier distinction between constitutive and regulative rules parallels the conceptual distinction between the **logic of consequences** and the **logic of appropriateness**. The logic of consequences attributes action to the anticipated costs and benefits, mindful that other actors are doing the same. The logic of appropriateness, however, highlights how actors are rule-following, worrying about whether their actions are legitimate. The two logics are not necessarily distinct or competing. What is viewed as appropriate and legitimate can affect the possible costs of different actions; the more illegitimate a possible course of action appears to be, the higher the potential cost for those who proceed on their own. The US' decision to invade Iraq in 2003 without the blessing of the UN Security Council meant that other states viewed the US' actions as illegitimate and were less willing to support them; this raised the costs to the US when it went ahead.

By emphasizing the social construction of reality and questioning how the world is put together, constructivists become archaeologists of the existing world—they want to understand the origins of the social constructs that now appear to us as natural and are part of our social vocabulary. Understanding the origins of these concepts usually requires attention to the interplay between existing ideas and institutions, political calculations by leaders with ulterior motives, morally minded actors who attempted to improve humanity, and contingency. Constructivism's concern with origins and recognition of historical contingencies means that it is attentive to counterfactual and the roads not taken. But it is mainly concerned with unearthing the origins of what is now taken for granted.

For instance, sovereignty did not always exist; it was produced by historical forces that challenged the power of religious actors, state interests, and human interactions, which generated new distinctions regarding where political authority should reside. Although individuals have been forced to flee their homes ever since the exile from Eden, the political and legal category of 'refugees' is only a century old (**see Case Study 12.1**).

Constructivists also examine how actors make their activities meaningful. Following Max Weber's (1949: 81) insight that 'we are cultural beings with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance', constructivists attempt to identify the **meanings** actors give to their practices and the objects they construct. These derive not from private beliefs but rather from **culture**. In contrast to the rationalist presumption that culture, at most, constrains action, constructivists argue that culture informs the meanings people give to their actions. Sometimes constructivists presume that such meanings derive from a hardened culture. But because culture is fractured and society comprises different interpretations of what is meaningful activity, scholars must consider these cultural fault-lines and treat the fixing of meanings as an accomplishment that is the essence of politics. Some of the most important debates in world politics are about how to define particular activities. Development, human rights, security, humanitarian intervention, and sovereignty are all important orienting concepts that can have any number of meanings. States and non-state actors have rival interpretations of the meanings of these concepts and will fight for collective acceptance of their preferred meaning.

The very fact that these meanings are fixed through politics—with consequences for people's ability to determine their fates—suggests an alternative way of thinking about **power**. Most IR theorists treat power as the ability of one state to compel another state to do what it otherwise would not, and tend to focus on material technologies, such as military firepower and economic statecraft, which have this persuasive effect. Constructivists have offered two important additions to this view of power. First, the forces of power go beyond the material; they also can be ideational (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Consider, for instance, the earlier discussion of legitimacy. Moreover, the effects of power go beyond the ability to change behaviour. Power also includes how knowledge, the fixing of meanings, and the construction of identities allocate

Case Study 12.1 Social construction of refugees and the contemporary migration crisis

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Who is a refugee, why does this category matter, and how has it changed? There are many ways to categorize people who leave their homes, including migrants, temporary workers, displaced people, and refugees. Before the twentieth century, 'refugee' as a legal category did not exist, and it was not until the First World War that states recognized people as refugees and gave them rights.

Although the First World War displaced many, Western states limited their compassion to Russians fleeing the Bolsheviks (it was easier to accuse a rival state of persecuting its people); only they were entitled to assistance from states and the new refugee agency, the High Commission for Refugees. However, the High Commissioner began to apply his mandate and the category to others in Europe who had also fled their countries and needed assistance. Although states frequently permitted this, some also pushed back and refused to give international recognition or assistance to many in need—most notably Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany.

After the Second World War, and as a consequence of mass displacement, states re-examined who could be called a refugee and what assistance they could receive. Because Western states worried about having obligations to millions around the world, they defined a refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention as an individual who, 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted … is outside the country of his nationality', as a consequence of events that occurred in Europe before 1951 (Article I.A(2)). This definition excluded all those outside Europe who were displaced by war or natural disasters, or by events after 1951. Objecting to this arbitrary definition that excluded so many, the new refugee agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, working with aid agencies and permissive states, seized on events outside Europe and argued that there was no principled reason to deny to them what was given to Europeans.

Over time the political meaning of 'refugee' came to include anyone who was forced to flee their home and cross an international border; eventually states changed the international legal meaning to reflect new political realities. Today, we are likely to call people refugees if they are forced to flee their homes because of man-made circumstances; crossing an international border is of less concern. To describe these people, we now have the term 'internally displaced people'. One reason why states wanted to differentiate 'statutory' refugees from internally displaced people is because they have little interest in extending their international legal obligations to millions more people, and they do not want to become too involved in the domestic affairs of other states. As states refined the category of refugee, they also created other categories of people on the move, such as migrants, who would not be entitled to the same protections.

The power and politics of the category of refugee became increasingly evident as the Syrian civil war triggered a migration crisis in Europe in 2015, the United States began to develop a 'zero tolerance policy' towards migrants crossing its southern border, and states could not develop a compact on global migration or refugees. The Syrian conflict prompted one of the world's greatest forced migrations in this century. Although the majority of Syrian refugees settled in neighbouring countries, upwards of one million have sought refuge in Europe. Attempting to limit their exposure and duties, many European countries began arbitrarily denying those seeking protection of refugee status, with the implication that these countries had no moral or legal obligations towards them. Similarly, from 2017 the US government began treating all displaced people as if they were illegal migrants; doing so allowed them to obscure how the US is obligated under international law to recognize the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. One of the major obstacles to creating a global migration **regime** is the difficulty of distinguishing between those categories of people that states feel they are obligated to protect and those that deserve no protection whatsoever. Classifications such as 'refugee' are political and moral categories that have expanded and contracted over time, and can be the difference between life and death for millions of displaced people around the world.

Question 1: Why would states accept a distinction between refugees and other kinds of displaced peoples that cross a border?

Question 2: There are many different kinds of people who are forced to leave their homes. Is there a reason why 'refugees' should be accorded more rights than, say, economic migrants?

differential rewards and capacities. If development is defined as per capita income, then some actors, namely states, and some activities, such as industrialization, are privileged; however, if development is defined as basic needs met, then other actors, namely peasants and women, gain voice, and other activities, such as

small-scale agricultural initiatives and cottage industries, are visible. International humanitarian law tends to assume that 'combatants' are men and 'civilians' are women, children, and the elderly; consequently, men and women might be differentially protected by the laws of war (**see Opposing Opinions 12.1**).

Opposing Opinions 12.1 The laws of war have made war less horrific

For

The laws of war prove that not 'all is fair in love and war'. Notwithstanding war's incredible destructiveness, it could be even worse. Chemical weapons and landmines are banned not because they are ineffective but because they are perceived as inhumane. It is acceptable to kill, but not to maim. Military forces are expected to distinguish between civilians and soldiers. There are more laws governing the conduct of war than ever before, making a difference for lives at risk.

The laws of war have reduced the reasons states can give when going to war. A hundred years ago states waged war for various reasons, including territorial acquisition and debt collection. Since the Second World War, self-defence is the only justification for going to war. By narrowing the range of acceptable reasons to go to war, the laws of war reduce its frequency.

The laws of war provide civilians with greater protection during armed conflict. Since the Second World War, states have increasingly altered their military operations to avoid civilian casualties and to demonstrate that any civilian suffering was unavoidable. Despite the huge civilian death toll in Afghanistan and Iraq as a consequence of American military operations, US civilian and defence officials went to extraordinary lengths to avoid unnecessary civilian suffering.

Activists and NGOs are able to use the laws of war to persuade state and non-state actors to demonstrate that they are good members of the international community. By creating new categories to shape what kind of behaviour is considered civilized, organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross have a tool to press states to follow the laws of war. These categories are not just 'soft norms' but rather 'laws' that demand adherence and obligation.

Grounds for optimism exist despite the realities of war. The laws of war should be judged not by a perfect compliance rate or by whether war is outlawed, but rather by whether there are more limits on how and when war can be waged.

The laws of war provide a framework that is useful for identifying what kinds of future technologies are potentially lawful and which ones are unlawful. States increasingly employ new kinds of technology—including drones, robots, lasers, and artificial intelligence—that are changing the character of war. If it were not for the existing laws regulating what kinds of weapons are legal and illegal, there would be no brake on the kinds of weapons states would be willing to use.

Against

The laws of war do not tackle the real issue: war itself. The laws of war are conservative: they are intended not to outlaw war but rather to make it less brutal. Accordingly, they give the illusion that war can be humane and civilized, thus making it more acceptable to wage war. We should work to eliminate war and violence, not control its excesses.

States respect the laws of war only when it is in their self-interest to do so. States have created and complied with laws of war when it is in their mutual interest to do so. Reciprocity and self-interest, not any sense of humanity, account for these laws. And when states decide they can gain a military advantage by violating the laws of war, they do.

Lack of punishment for violators means that compliance will be minimal. States, like all actors, obey laws and norms because of a cost–benefit calculus. But there is no mechanism at the global level for punishment. The International Criminal Court is the closest approximation, but it does not scare any would-be violator.

Non-state actors are not expected to obey the laws of war. The laws of war apply to states, but non-state actors—such as the so-called Islamic State—cause much of today's mayhem. Not only do the laws of war omit a major cause of suffering during conflict, they also suggest that states have to practise restraint while non-state actors do not.

Everything is different after 9/11. The laws of war are inappropriate for today's asymmetrical wars. Terrorists do not play by the rules of war and therefore should not benefit from them. For instance, when these combatants are captured they do not deserve the rights of prisoners of war, but rather should be treated as terrorists who might have knowledge of a ticking time bomb.

States and non-state actors are using international humanitarian law as a weapon of war. States are supposed to distinguish between civilians and combatants; many states that violate this principle face international condemnation. There are some combatants, though, who are willing to exploit this norm to advance their goals. How? They place their forces in densely populated civilian areas, which enables them to use civilians as a human shield. And if the opposing state proceeds to fire on these forces and harms civilians, then they will gain sympathy and the other state will suffer negative publicity.

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1. To what extent are those who focus on the growing web of the laws of war too energized about what is 'on the books' rather than what actually exists in the theatre of war?

2. If the laws of war did not exist, would even the most powerful states feel the need to regulate their conduct?

3. Would the world be better or worse off without the laws of war?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Key Points

- Constructivists are concerned with human consciousness and knowledge, treat ideas as structural factors that influence how actors interpret the world, consider the dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as a consequence of how actors interpret their material reality, are interested in how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents, and focus on the practices that are situated between agents and structures.

- Regulative and constitutive norms shape what actors do, but only constitutive norms shape states as actors, the identity of states, and what counts as legitimate behaviour.

- Normative structures shape how state and non-state actors understand themselves and the world: their beliefs, their

practices, their sense of right and wrong, and their notions of legitimacy.

- Although the underlying culture shapes the meanings that actors bring to their activities, meanings are not always fixed; the fixing of meaning is a central feature of politics.

- Social construction denaturalizes what is taken for granted, asks questions about the origins of what is now accepted as a fact of life, and considers the alternative pathways that might have produced, and can produce, alternative worlds.

- Power is not only the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would not do otherwise, but also the production of identities, interests, and meanings that shape the ability of actors to control their fate.

Constructivism and global change

Constructivism's focus on how the world hangs together, how normative structures construct the identities and interests of actors, and how actors are rule-following might seem ideal for explaining why things stay the same but useless for explaining why things change. This is hardly true. Constructivism claims that what exists might not have existed, and need not—inviting us to consider alternative worlds and the conditions that make them more or less possible. Indeed, constructivism scolded neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism for their failure to explain contemporary global transformations. The **Peace of Westphalia** helped to establish sovereignty and the norm of non-interference, but in recent decades various processes have worked against the principle of non-interference and suggested how state sovereignty is conditional on how states treat their populations—best known as a **responsibility to protect**. **World orders** are created and sustained not only by great power preferences but also by changing understandings of what constitutes a legitimate international order. Until the Second World War, the idea of a world organized around **empires** was hardly illegitimate; now it is. One of today's most pressing and impressive issues concerning global change is the 'end of history' and the apparent homogenization of world politics—that is, the tendency of states to organize their domestic and international lives in similar ways, and the growing acceptance of certain international norms for defining the good life and how to get there. The rest of this section explores three concepts that figure centrally in such discussions—norm diffusion, socialization, and the internationalization and **institutionalization** of norms.

Diffusion is a central theme in any discussion of global change. Accounts of diffusion concern how particular models, practices, norms, strategies, or beliefs spread within a population. Constructivists have highlighted two important issues. One is **institutional isomorphism**, which observes that organizations that share the same environment will, over time, come to resemble each other. In other words, if once there was a diversity of models within a population, over time that diversity yields conformity and convergence around a single model. There used to be various ways to organize state structures, economic activity, and free trade agreements. But now the world is organized around the **nation-state**, many states favour democratic forms of governance and market economies, and most international organizations are multilateral. It is possible that the reason for this convergence is that states now realize that some institutions are just superior to others. An additional possibility is that states look alike because they want acceptance, legitimacy, and status. For instance, one explanation for the post-cold war wave of democratization and elections is that states now accept that democratic elections are a more efficient and superior way to organize politics. It also could be, though, that many states have decided to turn democratic and run elections not because they were persuaded that it would be more efficient, but rather because they wanted to be viewed as part of the 'modern world' and receive the benefits associated with being a legitimate state.

How do things diffuse? Why are they accepted in new places? One factor is coercion. Colonialism and

great power imposition figured centrally in the spread of capitalism. Another factor is strategic competition. Heated rivals are likely to adopt similar weapons systems to try to stay even on the military battlefield. States will also adopt similar ideas and organizations for at least four other reasons. First, states want resources, and to attract these resources they will adopt and reform their institutions to signal to various communities that they are part of the club and are utilizing 'modern' techniques. In other words, they value these new institutions not necessarily because they believe they are superior, but rather because of their symbolic value. And often these symbols have material benefits. Eastern European countries that sought entry into the European Union adopted various reforms not only because they believed in their effectiveness, but also because these reforms were symbols that were the price of admission into the European club.

Second, during periods of uncertainty states are unsure of how to address existing challenges, and in response often adopt those models that are perceived as successful or legitimate. For instance, at the end of the cold war, the 'Western' model appeared to be particularly attractive precisely because it was viewed as the 'gold standard'. Third, frequently states adopt particular models because of their symbolic standing. For example, many Third World governments have acquired very expensive weapons systems although they have very little military value, because they convey to others that they are sophisticates and are part of the 'club'. Iran's nuclear ambitions might reflect its desire for regional dominance, but Iran's government might also want to own this ultimate status symbol. Finally, professional associations and expert communities also diffuse organizational models. Most associations have established techniques, codes of conduct, and methodologies for determining how to confront challenges in their areas of expertise, and they learn them through informal interactions and in formal settings such as universities. Economists have a standard way of analysing and responding to an economic crisis, international lawyers of defining and accusing a state of human rights violations, and humanitarians of organizing and running a refugee camp. In addition to using accepted practices to address on-going challenges, experts also communicate these standards to others, making them agents of diffusion.

In their discussion of changing identities and interests, constructivists have also employed the concept of socialization. How can we explain how states change so that they come to identify with the identities, interests, and manners of the existing members of the club, and, accordingly, change their behaviour so that it is consistent with that of the group? According to Alastair Iain Johnston (2008), one place to look is the intimate relations among states in international institutions and organizations. Specifically, he explores the possibility that China has changed its security policies over the last two decades because of socialization processes contained in various multilateral forums. Furthermore, he argues that socialization can be produced by several mechanisms: by mimicking, when state officials face tremendous uncertainty and decide that the best way to proceed is to adopt the practices that seem to have served others well; by social influence, when state officials aspire to status within the existing group and are sensitive to signs of approval and disapproval; and by persuasion, when state officials are convinced of the superiority of new ways of thinking about the world. Consistent with earlier discussion about the ways in which constructivism and rational choice are both competing and complementary explanations of state behaviour, Johnston argues that some paths to socialization are closer to what rationalists have in mind, especially as they emphasize cost–benefit calculations, and some are closer to what constructivists have in mind, especially as they emphasize the desire to be accepted by the broader community and to show the ability to learn.

Discussions of diffusion and socialization also draw attention to the internationalization of norms. A norm is 'a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Norms of humanitarianism, **citizenship**, military intervention, human rights, trade, arms control, and the environment not only regulate what states do, they can also be connected to their identities and thus express how they define themselves and their interests. Norms constrain behaviour because actors are worried about costs and because of a sense of self. 'Civilized' states are expected to avoid settling their differences through violence, not because war might not pay but rather because it violates how 'civilized' states are expected to act. Human rights activists aspire to reduce human rights violations not only by 'naming and shaming' those who violate these rights but also by persuading potential violators that the observation of human rights is tied to their identity as a modern, responsible state (**see Case Study 12.2**).

These expectations of what constitutes proper behaviour can diffuse across the population to the

Case Study 12.2 The 'human rights revolution'

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How do we understand the dramatic expansion of human rights over the last half-century? Some would argue that human rights have not expanded. Humans have always had rights by virtue of being human. That said, states have not always recognized these rights or been willing to sign treaties enshrining them. Why would they? Part of the answer lies with the growth of transnational activism. Activists have worked alongside sympathetic states to create human rights treaties and laws that limit how states can treat their citizens. These laws and treaties, in effect, identify what rights individuals have and the kinds of claims they can make on international society and their government. But why would states bother to comply with human rights laws? Many states already act in ways that are consistent with human rights law; they do not need the international community to tell them how to treat their citizens. Other states, though, need a nudge. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) might 'name and shame'—that is, organize campaigns to bring pressure to bear on violators. Moreover, once international human rights laws are in place, domestic groups can use them to pressure their governments from below. But states often comply not only because they want to avoid ridicule or domestic protest, but also because those states that identify with human rights are prepared to use foreign policy pressure to get offending governments to clean up their act. Humans might have rights by virtue of their humanity, but ultimately it was new kinds of commitments by principled actors that produced this transformation.

Question 1: Do human rights 'naturally' exist or do they require human agreement?

Question 2: Which human rights are most important, and who decides?

point that they are taken for granted. Norms do not simply appear, but rather evolve through a political process. A central issue, therefore, is the internationalization and institutionalization of norms, or what is now called the **life cycle of norms**. Introduced by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894–905), the notion of the life cycle suggests that norms have three defining stages. First is 'norm emergence', which can often be traced to a **norm entrepreneur** who is able to 'call attention to issues or even "create" issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them' and in ways that capture the attention and concern of the broader public. Because they are interested in introducing change, many norm entrepreneurs work from non-governmental organizations and international organizations. Their success, though, depends on persuading states to lend their power to the change and help create new rules, and international organizations to institutionalize these new norms. Once

this is accomplished, norm emergence has reached a tipping point, leading to the second stage, 'norm cascade', when the norm spreads through the rest of the population. Although there are many reasons for this diffusion, often it is because of 'a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem'. The final stage is 'norm internalization', when '[n]orms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of … debate' and thus are automatically honoured: 'For example, few people today discuss whether women should be allowed to vote, whether slavery is useful, or whether medical personnel should be granted immunity during war' (adapted from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894–905).

Although many international norms have a taken-for-granted quality, they have to come from somewhere, and their path to acceptance is nearly always rough and

rocky and reversible. Most states now recognize that prisoners of war have certain rights and cannot be subjected to summary executions on the battlefield, but this was not always the case. These rights originated with the emergence of international humanitarian law in the late nineteenth century, and then slowly spread and became increasingly accepted over the next several decades in response to considerable debate regarding how to minimize the horrors of war. Now most states accept that prisoners of war have rights, even if those rights are not fully observed. Several decades ago many scholars and jurists objected to the very idea of humanitarian intervention because it violated sovereignty's principle of non-interference and allowed great powers to try to become wolves in sheep's clothing. Over the last 20 years, however, there has been a growing acceptance of humanitarian intervention and a 'responsibility to protect'—when states are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the international community inherits that responsibility. This revolutionary concept emerged through fits and starts, in response to tragedies such as the genocide in Rwanda and propelled by various states and humanitarian organizations.

Three of the various consequences of institutional isomorphism and the internationalization of norms are noteworthy. There used to be myriad ways to organize human activities, but that diversity has slowly but impressively yielded to conformity. Yet just because states look alike does not mean that they act alike. After all, many states gravitate towards particular models to improve their legitimacy, not because they think the model is better. We can expect these states' actions, then, to be inconsistent with the expectations of the model. For instance, if governments adopt democratic forms of governance and elections solely for symbolic reasons, then we should expect the presence of democratic institutions to exist alongside authoritarian and illiberal practices. There is also a deepening sense of an 'international community'. The internationalization of norms suggests that actors increasingly accept standards of behaviour because they are connected to a sense of self that is tied to the international community. These norms, in other words, are bound up with the values of that community. To the extent that these values are shared, it becomes possible to speak of an international community. A third consequence is the presence of power even within an international community. Whose vision of international community is being constructed? Diffusion rarely goes from the developing world to the West; instead, it travels from the West to the developing world. The international society of states began as a European society and then expanded outward; the internationalization of this society and its norms shaped the identities and foreign policy practices of new members. In other words, the convergence on similar models, the internationalization of norms, and the possible emergence of an international community should not be mistaken for a world without power and hierarchy. In general, constructivists' concern with international diffusion and the internationalization of norms touches centrally on global change because of their interest in a world in transformation.

Concepts such as diffusion, socialization, and norm cascades focus attention on how certain norms, beliefs, and ideas become widespread and accepted. To understand why some norms succeed where others fail—patterns of receptivity and resistance—constructivists have used concepts such as a 'cultural match'. Liberal human rights norms, for instance, have been embraced in some contexts but have met fierce resistance in others; acceptance is largely predicated on these norms being understood as consistent with the local culture. Moreover, the same norms can become transmuted and take on different meanings as they are adopted in different contexts. The United States and European countries prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, but many in the United States do not see capital punishment as either cruel or unusual, a position many Europeans find incredible. But always bear in mind that norms once accepted can become contested, resisted, and replaced. Progress itself is elusive.

Key Points

- The recognition that the world is socially constructed means that constructivists can investigate global change and transformation.

- Diffusion is a key issue in any study of global change, captured by the concern with institutional isomorphism and the life cycle of norms.

- Although diffusion sometimes occurs because of the view that a given model is superior, frequently actors adopt a model either because of external pressures or because of its symbolic legitimacy.

- Institutional isomorphism and the internationalization of norms raise issues of growing homogeneity in world politics, a deepening international community, and socialization processes.

Conclusion

This chapter surveyed the global-historical, intellectual, and disciplinary forces that make constructivism a particularly attractive way of thinking about international politics, whose continuities and transformations it invites students to imagine. Constructivism explores why the world is organized the way it is, considers the different factors that shape the durable forms of world politics, and seeks alternative worlds. It is not a substantive theory like other theories in this volume, but rather a social theory that reshapes our way of understanding how the world hangs together. In doing so, it challenges received wisdoms and opens up new lines of enquiry. It insists that the vision of international politics as driven only by materialist forces is strange, not the idea that it is fundamentally social. It demonstrates the social alternative in areas that are central to the research agenda of the discipline's mainstream. It helps uncover the world being made and unmade.

This chapter emphasized how constructivists have tended to be interested in the relationship between the underlying normative structure and patterns of international order. In part because of the post-cold war context in which constructivism originated, there was an emphasis on order as produced not through domination but rather through consensus around fundamental values and norms. The obvious danger was that constructivism might neglect how power ripples throughout the normative order, and how states and non-state actors will compete, sometimes violently, to redefine international society's fundamental norms and the boundaries of communities. Alternative schools of constructivism emphasized power and conflict, and insisted that an international society that appeared to be bound by agreement was in fact in constant combat. If our favoured models of international society are those that fit the times, then arguably the models that were adopted after the end of the cold war to understand the possibility of a denser and more legitimate normative world order will lose ground to those versions of constructivism that emphasize how international society is unmade and disordered. Social construction is an ongoing, and sometimes quite bloody, process.

Questions

1. What were the silences of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism?
2. What is the core of constructivism?
3. Do you find constructivism a useful approach for thinking about world politics?
4. Do you agree that we should try to understand how actors make meaningful their behaviour in world politics? Or is it enough to examine behaviour?
5. How are meanings fixed in world politics?
6. What sort of relationship can exist between rational choice and constructivism?
7. What do you think are the core issues for the study of global change, and how does constructivism help you to address those issues? Alternatively, how does a constructivist framework help you to identify new issues that you had not previously considered?
8. Does it make sense to think about states being socialized, as if they were individuals?
9. How does the concept of diffusion help you to understand why and how the world has changed? Is constructivism better for thinking about conformity or diversity?
10. Does the internationalization and institutionalization of norms imply some notion of progress?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Adler, E. (2003), 'Constructivism', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Reviews the origins and fundamentals of constructivism and its relationship to existing theories of international politics.

Adler, E., and Pouliot, V. (eds) (2011), *International Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A wide-ranging collection of essays on the value of focusing on what actors *do* in international affairs.

Barnett, M. (1998), *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press). Examines how Arab leaders played the game of Arab politics and, in doing so, transformed the very nature of Arab politics. An example of how constructivists might think about how strategic action is shaped by a normative structure.

Fearon, J., and Wendt, A. (2003), 'Rationalism vs. Constructivism', in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Surveys how rational choice and constructivism overlap.

Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1999), 'International Norms and Political Change', in P. Katzenstein et al. (eds), *Explorations and Controversies in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). A pathbreaking article that helped to frame thinking about the emergence and evolution of international norms.

Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (2001), 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1): 391–416. An insightful account of constructivism's insights.

Hollis, M., and Smith, S. (1990), *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press). An exceptionally clear exposition of the contrast between a conception of world politics driven by self-interested action and a conception informed by rules and interpretive methods.

Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1996), *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press). Explores how identities and norms shape state interests in a range of security areas.

Price, R. (ed.) (2008), *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Constructivist scholars gather to consider the relationship between ethics and various outcomes in world affairs.

Wendt, A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The 'bible' of modern constructivism.

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

International ethics

RICHARD SHAPCOTT

Framing Questions

- Do states and their citizens have significant moral duties to the members of other countries?
- Should states and their militaries be morally constrained in the conduct of war?
- Who is morally responsible for the alleviation of global poverty?

Reader's Guide

Ethics is the study of what actors ought to do, rather than the explanatory study of what they have done or are doing. Globalization increases the scope and intensity not only of human political and economic relationships but also of our ethical obligations. Globalization makes it harder to draw clear ethical distinctions between insiders and outsiders. How should we think about ethics, and what principles ought to guide the policies of states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and individuals in their relations with everybody else? This chapter examines how these questions have been answered by different thinkers and actors in world politics and discusses three significant and difficult ethical issues entailed by globalization. The chapter begins by defining and introducing the dominant methods used in thinking about ethics. It then discusses the main approaches to international ethics: **cosmopolitanism**, statism, and realist ethics. It concludes by examining the ethical dimensions of global poverty and just war.

Introduction

International ethics is not concerned with explaining the world but rather with offering guidance about what ought to be done in moral terms. Ethical questions are inherent in all analysis and practice of international politics. Thus in addition to obvious issues such as human rights, states and other actors face ethical issues in all realms of action and practice including trade, immigration, and the conduct of war. International ethics focuses on the nature of transboundary duties and responsibilities, and in particular how members of political communities—mostly nation-states—ought to treat those beyond their borders.

Two types of questions lie at the heart of this field of study. The first is whether 'outsiders' should be treated according to the same principles as insiders, as moral equals. The second examines what treating outsiders as equals might mean in substantive terms. International ethics examines a series of related moral quandaries. Should we be prepared to go without in order to help outsiders, and if so, how much? Do we owe substantive duties of wealth redistribution or merely charity? Should we be willing to forgo advantages from a free trade agreement if it causes harm to others? How should we balance our obligations to compatriots with those to others who are affected by our actions?

Because globalization increases interconnections between communities, it also increases the variety of ways in which communities can harm each other, either intentionally or not. For instance, globalization makes it harder to ignore the impact of day-to-day actions, such as driving a car or buying new clothes, on the global environment and in the global economy. Governance of the global economy also raises ethical issues of fairness associated with the rules of international institutional structures. Globalization exacerbates and intensifies these ethical dilemmas by increasing the frequency and magnitude of effects that different communities and individuals have on each other. In particular, it allows for a far greater awareness of the suffering of 'distant strangers'. Under these conditions, the ethical framework associated with Westphalian sovereignty—which accords only minor moral significance to the suffering of outsiders—seems less adequate. In a globalized world, communities are challenged to develop new principles or refine old ones to govern these interactions. However, the lack of any single standard of fairness and justice among states makes this task more difficult, because it raises the question of whose principles should apply. A fundamental ethical challenge thus emerges in our globalizing world: 'Is it possible to define some principles that everyone might be able to agree on?'

However, not all international ethical questions take this form. Others address the problems associated with the consequences of action, such as how best to deliver humanitarian aid, or whether development aid helps or hinders those it is directed towards. While these ethical debates are important, they assume a positive answer to the question 'Should we treat all people as equal?'

The historical, intellectual, and geopolitical contexts of ethical thought

The terrain of international ethical thought was largely established in the eighteenth century when disputes about the nature of the obligations of states were thrashed out by leading legal scholars and philosophers. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw three developments in world politics that provoked ethical reflection: the first was the Enlightenment and the post-revolutionary world of the French Revolution, the second was the development of European overseas empires and colonialism, and the third was the development of nationalism. In their own ways, each of these developments spurred and provoked thought about the obligations and rights of 'citizens' and humanity. The Enlightenment and the events of revolutionary France foregrounded the idea of human equality, in the form of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and the US Declaration of Independence and subsequent Bill of Rights. Both of these invoked the idea of universal equality through a rights doctrine even while expressing those rights in particular national contexts. At the same time, European imperialism involved moral inequality in the practice of subjecting non-European peoples to European rule, often justified on the basis of their supposed inferiority. The growth of nationalism which characterized the nineteenth century reinforced the distinctions between people by dividing them into separate nations and encouraging chauvinism and disregard for outsiders. These developments set up an enduring tension in ethical thought between what we owe each other as humans and what we owe each other

as fellow nationals and citizens. Since then, neither position has succeeded in completely silencing the voice of the other.

In the more immediate past, international ethical thought has been influenced by the shock of the Holocaust and the implications of its doctrine of racial inequality. After the Second World War, the process of decolonization prompted and contributed to the end of formal racial and political hierarchy between states, while endorsing the idea of national self-determination. At the same time, the signing of the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 provided something of a (contested) universal moral vocabulary of human rights, which sought to bring cosmopolitan values into a world of states. A great deal of international ethical thought in recent years has been concerned with understanding the consequences of how and whether it is possible to reconcile these two values.

The study of ethics: methods

There are many different approaches to ethics which outline how to think methodically about ethical issues. Most academic debate on international ethical issues draws on traditions of reasoning from **analytical philosophy**, specifically **deontological** and **consequentialist** approaches to ethics, and especially Kantianism and **utilitarianism**. Deontological approaches spell out rules that are always right for everyone to follow, because they are right in themselves and not because of the consequences they may produce. Kantian approaches emphasize rules that are right because they can be, in principle, agreed on by everyone (universalizability).

In contrast, consequentialism judges actions by the desirability of their outcomes. Realism (**see Ch. 8**), for instance, judges a statesperson's actions as right or wrong depending on whether they serve the state's interests. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, judges acts by their expected outcomes in terms of human welfare and the 'greatest good of the greatest number'. Of course, not all ethical codes are derived from these traditions; religion arguably provides most of the world's moral guidance. However, most everyday ethics, including religious ethics, are a mixture of both deontological and consequential considerations.

An alternative style of thinking about ethics draws on **continental philosophy**. The difference between analytical and continental philosophy is best characterized as between an abstract decontextualized method which seeks to identify moral rules independent of the values of any particular way of life or perspective, and a deeply contextualized method which sees ethics as extending from the nature of the relationships among people. Analytical philosophy tends to be universalistic, while continental approaches are sceptical of abstract universalism. Analytical philosophy is most associated with liberal ethics, and continental philosophy is more often connected to Hegelian, communitarian, and poststructuralist approaches.

Poststructuralist approaches to ethics are sceptical of the vocabulary of universalism, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism and even of the idea of humanity, as well as that of statism and the state. They argue that these terms are at best contradictory and at worst simply allow further forms of domination. Thus, while cosmopolitanism invokes a universal community of humankind, poststructuralists argue that the content of that community is not universal but the reflection of Western, liberal Enlightenment conceptions of what a human is, therefore justifying exclusion of those who do not fit this description. They argue that concepts such as humanity and humanitarianism are used to justify war and unequal treatment of non-Western 'others'. Proponents of poststructuralism are not necessarily anti-cosmopolitan, but in practice their ethics challenge dominant and taken-for-granted meanings, especially those purporting to be universal.

It should be noted that the heritage of European and Enlightenment thought dominates academic discussion of international ethics. Christianity informs this debate as well, especially with regard to 'just war' thinking discussed later in this chapter (**see 'Just war tradition'**). In contrast, 'non-Western' traditions of ethical thought have been largely absent, with the exception of the so-called Asian values debates of the 1990s. Thus a current challenge for the field from postcolonial thinkers is how to incorporate and engage with ethical thought from outside the dominant canon.

The ethical significance of boundaries: cosmopolitanism and statism

While understanding these distinctions is important in terms of methods, a more important distinction

exists in practice and theory between cosmopolitanism (**see Box 13.1**) and some forms of communitarianism. Cosmopolitans, including deontologists and utilitarians, argue that morality itself is universal: a truly moral code will be applicable to everyone because what defines us morally is our humanity. Communitarians argue that morality is derived from the values of particular communities and is therefore necessarily particular, not universal. The more contested dimension of cosmopolitan thought concerns attempts to define exactly what obligations and rules ought to govern such a universal community and guide the policies of states and other actors. The advent of globalization prompts us to ask whether human beings ought to be considered as a single moral community with rules that apply to all (cosmopolitanism) or as a collection of separate communities, each with its own ethical standards and with no common morality among communities.

Most ethical thought on international relations occurs within a cosmopolitan horizon whereby our fundamental moral claims derive from our status as human beings, which means that we have at least some moral duties to all humans everywhere. At a minimum this means that there are no good reasons for exempting any person from ethical consideration a priori: no human should be treated as less than human. In the international realm, cosmopolitan thought is most often expressed in terms of a commitment to human rights. Universal human rights are applied to all human beings regardless of morally irrelevant features such as race, gender, and beliefs—they embody the idea that all humans have equal moral standing. More generally, a cosmopolitan commitment means one's national identity and well-being should not come at the expense of outsiders. Obligations to friends, neighbours, and fellow citizens must be balanced with obligations to strangers and to humanity.

Long before the existence of modern states and telecommunications, the Stoic philosopher Diogenes claimed he was a 'citizen of the world'. Likewise cosmopolitan thought existed in ancient Rome (see Nussbaum 1996). However, in modern times, the most comprehensive defence of cosmopolitanism was provided by Immanuel Kant. The central concept of Kant's thought, and his project for a perpetual peace between states (**see Ch. 6**), is the principle of the categorical imperative (CI) that humans should be treated as ends in themselves (**see Box 13.2**). The effect of this claim is to recognize every individual's equal moral standing. The basic argument is that treating people as ends in themselves requires us to think universally. Restricting moral concern to members of one's own state or nation renders any belief in equality incomplete. Therefore national borders are 'morally' irrelevant. The major tasks of cosmopolitanism have been to defend moral universalism, to explore what it might mean for individuals and other actors to follow the CI in a world divided into separate states, and to develop an account of a cosmopolitan political order (**see Chs 1 and 31**).

Box 13.1 Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism
We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance.

(Martha Nussbaum 1996: 7)

Liberal cosmopolitanism
First, individualism: ultimate units are human beings, or persons … Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally, not merely to some subset … Third, generality: … persons are the ultimate unit of concern for everyone—not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like.

(Thomas Pogge 1994: 9)

The key point is that it is wrong to promote the interest of our own society or our own personal advantage by exporting suffering to others, colluding in their suffering, or benefiting from the ways in which others exploit the weakness of the vulnerable.
(Andrew Linklater 2002: 145)

Statism
A world of diversity in which the variety of national cultures finds expression in different sets of citizenship rights, and different schemes of social justice, in each community.
(David Miller 2002: 976)

Box 13.2 The categorical imperative

The categorical imperative states that for a rational being to act morally, it must act according to universal laws. For Kant, the most important expression of this imperative was the principle that humans should be treated as ends in themselves: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (quoted in Linklater 1990: 101). An example of a violation of this principle is slavery, because slaves are humans who are reduced to the status of the property of others. Warfare between states is likewise another violation, because it reduces both citizens and non-citizens alike to means of achieving (the states') ends.

Cosmopolitanism takes many forms. Many religious ethics are cosmopolitan in scope; both Christianity and Islam preach the moral unity of humankind. However, cosmopolitanism is largely dominated by some form of liberal deontological ethics, though a spectrum of thought exists within this approach, basing ethics on rights (Shue 1980; Caney 2005), capabilities (Nussbaum 2007), social contract, utilitarianism (Singer 2002), or democratic principles (Held 2003). A distinction is commonly made between *moral* and *institutional* cosmopolitanism, where the first refers to the acts required of individuals, and the second to the rules that govern societies. Cosmopolitan duties to recognize individual equality apply to individuals as well as to the global institutional/legal order.

A further important distinction is made between positive and negative duties. Positive duties are duties to act, which may include duties to create a just social order, or duties of assistance (beneficence, mutual aid). Humanitarianism involves a positive duty to aid those in dire need or who are suffering unnecessarily, wherever they may be and regardless of cause. This includes aid to the victims of famine and natural disasters, but also to those who suffer during wartime, such as non-combatants and soldiers retired from the field. The idea of a positive duty underlies the doctrine of the international **responsibility to protect** (**see Ch. 31**), which spells out the responsibilities of states to uphold human rights both within their own borders and abroad. Negative duties are duties to stop or avoid doing something, usually duties to avoid unnecessarily harming others. States have traditionally recognized a negative duty of non-intervention that requires them to refrain from certain actions. Problems arise in the discussion of negative duties because they rely on a fairly clear line of causation. If one state is harming another, then it should cease doing so; however, sometimes the effects of actions are diffuse, or more than one party may be engaged in a harmful practice, as in the case of global warming (**see Opposing Opinions 13.1**). A negative duty to cease harming implies only a cessation of action; however, some argue that there is also a positive duty to prevent other harms occurring, as well as duties of compensation or redress. This distinction is important in understanding responses to global poverty.

Andrew Linklater argues that it helps to think about cosmopolitan duties in terms of three types of relationships: first, bilateral relationships: what 'we' do to 'them' and vice versa; second, third-party relationships: what they do to each other; third, global relationships: what we all do to each other (Linklater 2002, 2005).

Examples of the first are cases where one community 'exports' damaging practices, goods, or by-products to another. In this case, states have a duty to consider the negative effects they have on each other, as well as a duty to prevent and punish harmful actions of **non-state actors** and individuals for whom they are directly responsible. For instance, some states recognize their negative duties by enacting laws that punish citizens who engage in 'sex tourism' abroad. An example of the second category is when a state is involved in harming either members of its own community or those of other states, as in cases of genocide. Third-party states and the **international community** also have duties to prevent, stop, or punish the perpetrators of these harms. The third relationship refers to practices or harms to which many communities contribute, often in different proportions, as in the case of global warming (**see Opposing Opinions 13.1**).

Thick and thin cosmopolitanism

While cosmopolitanism has traditionally been juxtaposed to communitarianism or statism (the view that states provide the boundaries of our moral concern and are ethical agents in their own right), many thinkers now prefer to distinguish between 'thick' and 'thin' forms of cosmopolitanism, because there is a high degree of convergence on cosmopolitan principles such as the importance of basic human rights. The more significant differences occur over the extent or demandingness, but not the existence, of ethical obligations across borders (**see Case Study 13.1**).

The most ambitious 'thick' liberal cosmopolitans claim that the political institutions of the planet should guarantee global equality of rights and goods, or **global egalitarianism**. 'Thick' cosmopolitans emphasize extensive positive (i.e. justice and aid) and negative (i.e. non-harming) duties across borders and these duties dominate discussion of global distributive justice. Thick cosmopolitans emphasize institutional duties and envision a radically transformed global order in which all states conform to principles of global justice.

While thick cosmopolitanism in one form or another tends to predominate in academic debate, 'thin' cosmopolitanism or statism tends to be a more persuasive account of the practices of states. In contrast to thick cosmopolitans, thin or statist cosmopolitans argue that people have at most only minimal duties not to harm, to aid in case of emergency, and to help uphold minimal human rights standards. Thin cosmopolitans defend the state as a means to realize national and

Opposing Opinions 13.1 The costs of addressing climate change should be met by those states who currently have the highest emissions of greenhouse gases

For

The costs of addressing climate change, including adaptation, transition, and mitigation, should be distributed fairly. Some states, such as the United States, China, and India, as well as Europe, contribute disproportionately to climate change through their high emissions; it is only fair that they should pay their 'fair share', following the 'polluter pays' principle. Currently China and the United States are the world's highest emitters and therefore China bears at least as much of the burden for addressing climate change as the United States and the wealthy states of Europe.

Those states that are committing the most harm through their emissions have a negative duty towards those who are harmed by their emissions. These states should cease their harmful activities and accept the costs involved in doing so: they should shut down their greenhouse gas-producing activities and switch to renewables.

These states also have a positive duty to aid those they are currently harming through their emissions. Because the harm of global warming will be felt in the future and felt mostly severely in states with the lowest emissions—African states and small island states—current high emitters have a positive duty to aid these countries to adapt and prepare for dealing with the cost imposed by the emissions of the high emitters.

It is unfair to base the allocation of costs on historical emissions as past actions were undertaken in ignorance of the effect they were having. It would be unfair to punish someone for a harm they did not know they were committing and had no reason to choose to cease. We now know the effects of our actions and therefore we can choose to do differently, whereas previous generations acted while unaware of the need to make a different choice. We cannot ask their descendants to pay for the honest mistakes of their forebears.

Against

Global warming is caused not only by current emissions but by emissions over the last two centuries. Therefore, the costs should be borne by those who have historically the highest emissions. This includes the United States, Europe, and other OECD countries.

China and India have only been high emitters over the last two decades, whereas the United States and Europe have been emitting higher levels since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution and especially since the start of the twentieth century. If historical emissions are counted, the current contributions of China and India become only a small proportion of the total human emissions of greenhouse gases.

It would be unfair to make China and India contribute the same as the developed states of Europe and the Americas. If we take historical emissions into account, then China and India have only small negative and positive responsibilities to address the costs of climate change based on their total contributions.

Current emissions in OECD states are made up of a much higher proportion of 'luxury' emissions, that is emissions for non-essential activities that accompany maintaining a high-consumption Western lifestyle. Poorer countries have a much higher proportion of 'survival' emissions, essential for economic development. Therefore it is fairer, and less painful, for rich, historically high-emitting states, to forgo some luxury so that poorer states may develop. High-emitting states also have a positive responsibility to help in the transition to renewable energy supplies.

1. Should we calculate the costs of dealing with climate change according to principles of fairness?

2. Is it fair for China to contribute as much as the United States to the costs of dealing with climate change?

3. What principles should we employ to make decisions about dealing with the costs of global warming?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

communal self-determination and autonomy; they are critical of cosmopolitan goals of replacing state sovereignty with a single global ethic. This perspective suggests we still tend to live morally 'constrained' lives, in which national borders have significant ethical status. Thin cosmopolitanism often draws on communitarian arguments that morality is 'local' to particular cultures, times, and places. It emphasizes 'associational' duties that arise as a result of membership in a bounded community with shared social goals and practices, such as a

nation-state. Any duties to humanity are at best attenuated and mediated by states. As a result, individuals in such a community have greater and more specific duties to their 'own kind': compatriots have priority over outsiders. However, this does often involve a commitment to a sort of cosmopolitan 'basic moral minimum', for which the positive duty to offer assistance in times of need, such as temporary famine relief or humanitarian emergency aid, and the negative duty not to harm or inflict unnecessary suffering are the most important.

Case Study 13.1 Ethics of migration

Syrian refugees in Budapest, Hungary

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Ethical debates around migration and people movements examine the ethical justifications of the right of exclusion, and attempt to establish whether and how states can have such rights. Immigration debates address the question of whether states have a right to restrict entry, or whether people ought to have the right to absolute free movement to settle where they choose. The mass movement of peoples, such as those fleeing the civil war in Syria, goes to the heart of the nation-state's rights as a sovereign community. Most states consider the right of territorial exclusion to be a defining prerogative of sovereignty. However, such an assertion ignores the reality that any decision by a state to refuse admission to refugees or potential migrants merely directs such claims to other states, and therefore entails some form of moral responsibility.

Some liberals argue that freedom of movement is a basic right and that immigration restrictions amount to a violation of that right (Carens 2014). On the other hand, others, like Michael Walzer, argue that the right to exclude is primary to the survival and independence of political communities. According to Walzer, 'The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices. It determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, and to whom we allocate goods and services' (Walzer 1981: 2). States have to be able to choose who enters and who does not if they wish to survive as independent political communities. For Walzer, rights of belonging override rights of free movement.

This issue comes to a head in the case of refugees and asylum seekers, who are usually forced to move or face life-threatening situations in their places of origin. This provokes a different ethical dilemma because refusing entry might expose people to life-threatening situations. For this reason, most ethicists agree that there is both a right of asylum, as embodied in international law, and a duty to accept asylum seekers that modifies or overrides the state's right of exclusion because any right that a political community might have to decide membership is overridden by the urgency of the asylum seekers' claims. The cosmopolitan position is that insiders' interests and outsiders' interests must both be weighed and taken into account from an impartial position and the asylum seeker's interest in survival outweighs the state's interests in, say, maintaining a certain quality of life. In other words, the harm of being denied asylum outweighs any possible harm to the state and its members.

Question 1: How should we assess and determine rules regarding migration and entry?

Question 2: Do the rights of asylum seekers outweigh the rights of political communities?

Poststructuralist approaches to ethics aim to disrupt this ethical binary by focusing on the ways in which both liberal cosmopolitanism and statism invoke strategies of exclusion and domination, and can also serve to unjustifiably limit the nature of responsibility to 'others' (D. Campbell 1994). Some poststructuralists see themselves as reframing the meaning of cosmopolitanism away from abstract individualism (Burke 2011; Dallmayr 2013).

Realist ethics

The most influential alternative to cosmopolitanism has been realism (**see Ch. 8**), which claims that the facts of international anarchy and sovereignty mean that the only viable ethics are those of self-interest and survival. Many people have characterized realist ethics as Machiavellian at worst and amoral at best. Realist ethics seems to contradict universal ethics such as human rights. But realists such as Hans Morgenthau and George F. Kennan often argue that underlying this toughness is a different, more pragmatic, morality (**see Box 13.3**).

The statesperson's duty is to ensure the survival of the state in the uncertain conditions of international anarchy. To do otherwise would be to risk the lives and interests of his or her own people. Thus self-help is a moral duty and not just a practical necessity. Realists therefore advise states to focus on material and strategic outcomes rather than on the morality, conventionally

Box 13.3 Morgenthau on realism

The appeal to moral principles in the international sphere has no concrete universal meaning … that could provide rational guidance for political action … it will be nothing but the reflection of the moral preconceptions of a particular nation.

(Morgenthau 1952)

understood, of their actions. For instance, a realist such as Henry Kissinger may advise bombing a neutral state, such as Laos, if this will serve the military goals of defeating the enemy, North Vietnam. Alternatively, this approach may also involve giving support to governments with poor human rights records, such as Chile under the military rule of Augusto Pinochet, or arguably Pakistan today, in order to secure an advantage against a military foe, such as the USSR or ISIS (Daesh). While the critics say that this can slip into opportunism, making it possible to justify almost any actions on ethical grounds, realists maintain that statespeople have a duty to their own people first, and that ignoring this in the name of some Kantian ideal would be a dereliction of that duty (Morgenthau 1948).

Many realists proclaim such self-interested ethics as virtuous and agree with E. H. Carr's (1939) scepticism towards individuals and states who claim to act in the name of universal morality. Realists believe that such statements are usually either a cynical mask or a self-interested delusion. In reality, there are no such universal values, and even if there were, anarchy would prevent states from acting in accordance with them.

Realists are vulnerable to the observation that not every choice that states face is between survival and destruction, rather than, say, advantage or disadvantage. It does not stand to reason that seeking advantage allows the statesperson to opt out of conventional morality in the same way that survival might. It is a limitation of most realist writers that they simply favour the national interest over the interests of outsiders. In other words, realists display a preference for the status quo, the state system,

and nationalism which is not fully defensible. This favouritism reminds us that realism is as much prescriptive and normative as it is descriptive and explanatory.

Some realist theorists have argued that the realism of Hans Morgenthau lends itself to cosmopolitan policy. For instance, Beardsworth contends that under conditions of globalization, realist emphasis on responsibility for one's own community and distinction between the political and moral means there are sound empirical and self-interested reasons for statespeople to engage in cosmopolitan policies regarding matters of global concern, such as climate change (Beardsworth 2015).

> **Key Points**
>
> - Globalization lends support to cosmopolitan ethical theory, which advances the idea of a universal human community in which everybody is treated as equal.
> - Cosmopolitans emphasize both positive and negative duties, usually expressed in terms of responsibilities to provide humanitarian assistance or hospitality and responsibilities not to harm.
> - Thick cosmopolitanism emphasizes the primacy of obligations to humanity, while thin cosmopolitanism emphasizes the primacy of duties to fellow nationals.
> - Realists argue that necessity demands a statist ethics, restricting moral obligations to the nation-state and its survival, and counsel prudence rather than 'moralism' in the pursuit of state interests.
> - Some realists argue that under conditions of globalization the statesperson's responsibilities now include cosmopolitanism.

Global justice, poverty, and starvation

The globalizing of the world economy, especially since the Second World War, has undoubtedly produced large global inequalities and an increase in the number and proportion of humans suffering from absolute poverty and starvation (**see Ch. 26**). Cosmopolitans such as Pogge point out that globalization also means that there is now enough wealth and resources to end global poverty relatively quickly and cheaply. The existence of both significant inequality and massive hunger and starvation raises the question of whose responsibility it is either to reduce inequality or to end absolute starvation, especially in the presence of extreme wealth.

There are three main lines of argument concerning responses to global poverty. The first is the utilitarian

argument in favour of demanding individual positive duties of assistance. The second is the global egalitarian argument for a globally just distributive system. The third is the sufficientarian argument that states have minimal positive duties to aid but not to ensure global equality. Cutting across the latter is Pogge's argument that the powerful have a negative duty to cease violating human rights by imposing an unjust international trading and financial order on the world's poor.

The Singer solution

According to Peter Singer (2002: 190), 'globalization means that we should value equality . . . at the global

level, as much as we value political equality within one society'. Singer argues that an impartial and universalist (and utilitarian) conception of morality requires that those who can help ought to, regardless of any causal relationship with poverty. He argues for a comprehensive principle of assistance where 'if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance we ought, morally, to do it' (Singer 1985: 231). Individual people in affluent countries, and in affluent sections of poor countries, thereby have a positive duty of assistance to those who are in danger of losing their lives from poverty-related causes.

To justify this claim, Singer, in an argument first published in response to the Bangladeshi famine of 1972, asks us to consider the following situation: 'if I am walking past a water pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing' (Singer 1985: 231). If we think it wrong to let a child die for fear of muddying our trousers, then we ought also to think it is wrong to let a child, or millions of other people, die from hunger and poverty when it is in our capacity to prevent it without incurring a significant loss. Therefore we, who are able to help, have a positive duty to aid those in need by devoting a significant percentage of our discretionary income to poverty relief (**see Box 13.4**).

Singer's argument is powerful and intuitively plausible but it faces some serious challenges. The most important criticism is that this approach is likely to be ineffective because it relies on individuals acting out of moral obligation. Many argue that this will be insufficient, and some form of state action is required because of the enormity of the problem and general unwillingness to make the sort of sacrifice that Singer demands. Furthermore, it does not address the issue of the wealthy's role in contributing to poverty.

Global egalitarianism and liberal institutional cosmopolitanism

Liberal institutional cosmopolitans, such as Charles Beitz, Darrel Moellendorf, and Thomas Pogge, argue that global interdependence generates a duty to create a globally just institutional scheme (global egalitarianism) in which all people everywhere enjoy the same basic rights and duties and have an equal chance to lead a full life. This goes far beyond poverty relief or charity and envisions a total overhaul of all global and domestic institutions so that all people benefit equally from participation in the world economy. For Beitz and Moellendorf, John Rawls's substantive account of justice can provide the criteria for justice globally (**see Box 13.5**). Rawls rejected the possibility of global distributive justice modelled on his theory. However, most Rawlsians argue that Rawls's conclusions do not follow from his own premises.

Global egalitarians argue that the basic structure of international order should be governed by cosmopolitan principles focused on the inequalities between individuals rather than states. Beitz and Moellendorf agree with

Box 13.4 Peter Singer on poverty alleviation

Each one of us with wealth surplus to his or her essential needs should be giving most of it to help people suffering from poverty so dire as to be life-threatening. That's right: I'm saying that you shouldn't buy that new car, take that cruise, redecorate the house or get that pricey new suit. After all, a $1,000 suit could save five children's lives.

(Singer 1999)

Box 13.5 Rawls and the 'original position'

Rawls argues that justice begins with the 'basic structure' of society, by which he means 'the way in which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation' (Rawls 1971: 7). To be just, society must have just basic assumptions about who has rights, or equal moral standing, and duties, and who benefits materially from the production of goods and services. Rawls's theory of justice is both a procedural account of justice and a substantive one, concerned with distribution of wealth and advantage. Rawls's social contract is the result of an experiment in which members of a closed society have been told they must design its basic rules. The catch is: no individual can know where he or she may end up within this society. They may be wealthy, poor, black, white, male, female, talented, unintelligent, etc. All they know about themselves is that they have a capacity to conceive of 'the good' and to think rationally about ends, and that they possess certain basic physical needs. Rawls describes this as decision-making behind 'a veil of ignorance'. Rawls thinks rational contractors constrained in this way would choose a society in which each person would have 'an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others' (Rawls 1971: 60). He also thinks there would be a form of equality of outcome, as well as opportunity. This he refers to as the 'difference principle', where inequality is unjust except in so far as it is a necessary means to improving the position of the worst-off members of society. For the international realm, a second contracting session takes place between the representatives of peoples.

Box 13.6 Thomas Pogge on international order

The affluent countries and their citizens continue to impose a global economic order under which millions avoidably die each year from poverty-related causes. We would regard it as a grave injustice, if such an economic order were imposed within a national society.

(Pogge 2001)

Box 13.7 Rawls's 'law of peoples'

1 Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.

2 Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.

3 Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.

4 Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence.

5 Peoples are to honour human rights.

6 Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.

7 Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (mutual aid).

(Rawls 1999)

Thomas Pogge's claim that the difference principle—that 'the terms of international cooperation . . . should . . . be designed so that the social inequalities . . . tend to optimize the worst representative individual share'—should apply globally (Pogge 1989: 251). In practice, this reduces to a claim that the global original position might require compensation 'for the uneven distribution of natural resources or to rectify past injustices . . . and a portion of the global product actually attributable to global (as opposed to domestic) social cooperation should be redistributed' (Beitz 1979: 169) (**see Box 13.6**).

However, not all liberals agree with this claim. Instead a number argue along thin cosmopolitan lines that the circumstances of justice do not apply globally. There is no single global state, or demos, that parallels the domestic state. Rawls argues that justice requires a system of fair social cooperation for mutual advantage; and the global international order is not a system for mutual advantage but rather a 'modus vivendi' or self-interested coexistence. Furthermore, there is no deep consensus or shared sense of community or destiny on which to ground universally applicable norms of distributive justice.

Instead of being a single global economy or polity as envisioned by global egalitarians, statists and others argue that the system is comprised of separate states each with their own purposes. Distributive justice applies only within each state and according to its own purposes. Therefore, they argue, there are only duties of assistance to provide sufficient relief to address the worst aspects of poverty for the world's poor but not to justify a permanent arrangement for redistribution of resources, such as a taxation system. The most systematic account of such a statist ethics is John Rawls's *The Law of Peoples* (1999) which covers rules of self-determination, just war, mutual recognition (sovereignty), non-intervention, mutual aid, and basic human rights (**see Box 13.7**).

Pogge's solution

Unlike Singer, Thomas Pogge emphasizes the causal relationship between the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor. Pogge argues that the rules of the international order actively disadvantage certain sectors of the world's population and that the most powerful states are violating the rights of the world's poor to a just and fair economic system. Indeed, Pogge argues that the richest countries are collectively responsible for about 18 million deaths from poverty each year. Thus the wealthiest states have a negative duty to cease imposing this order on the poorest people of the world.

Pogge also argues that these negative duties not to harm others give rise to positive duties to design a just international order in such a way that the most needy will benefit. The structure of international trade and economic interdependence should ensure that, despite an unequal distribution of material resources worldwide, no individuals should be unable to meet their basic requirements for survival, nor should they suffer disproportionately from a lack of material resources. Statist objections do not cancel out this obligation: 'There is an injustice in the economic scheme, which it would be wrong for more affluent participants to perpetuate. And that is so quite independently of whether we and the starving are united by a communal bond' (Pogge 1994: 97). Pogge is therefore critical of both Singer's solution and the statist alternative, while pointing to the rules and principles of the current international order to show how the most powerful states fail in their own duties as implied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (**see Box 13.6**).

The principal opposition to a thick cosmopolitan account of global justice derives largely from statist premises employing what Pogge calls explanatory nationalism, that the causes of poverty are largely national rather than international or global. According to this

Box 13.8 The international resource privilege

The international resource privilege … is the legal power to confer globally valid ownership rights in the country's resources … Whoever can take power in … a country by whatever means can maintain his [sic] rule, even against widespread popular opposition, by buying the arms and soldiers he needs with revenues from the export of natural resources and with funds borrowed against future resource sales. The resource privilege thus gives insiders strong incentives towards the violent acquisition and exercise of political power, thereby causing coup attempts and civil wars. Moreover, it also gives outsiders strong incentives to corrupt the officials of such countries who, no matter how badly they rule, continue to have resources to sell and money to spend.

(Pogge 2002)

perspective, the primary causes of poverty are domestic culture, corruption, and lack of democracy. Therefore there is no global causal responsibility to address other peoples' mistakes (D. Miller 2007). However, Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar seek to show that the most powerful states are also complicit in the maintenance of undemocratic and corrupt states in a number of ways, including the practice of bribery and what Pogge calls the

international resource privilege. This refers to a sovereign state's entitlement to sell resources and the rights to them, regardless of the legitimacy of the government (**see Box 13.8**). Pogge has also argued that the practices of the global pharmaceutical industry actively, and avoidably, contribute to poverty-related ill health and mortality in the world's poorest states (Pogge 2009; Wenar 2008). However, at least one critic has countered that the world today has much less significant poverty than in the past and that the global economic and political order, despite its inequities, has improved the plight of the world's poor (M. Risse 2009).

Key Points

- Discussions of global justice are dominated by utilitarian and Rawlsian theories which emphasize either individual or institutional responsibilities for poverty alleviation.

- Cosmopolitans argue that the rich have a responsibility to help the poor, stemming from positive and negative duties.

- Thick cosmopolitans argue that justice requires a globally egalitarian distribution of wealth and resources.

- Thin 'statist' cosmopolitans argue that there are only humanitarian duties of assistance to the poor rather than redistributive duties of justice.

Just war tradition

The just war tradition (JWT) (often erroneously referred to as just war theory) is a set of guidelines for determining and judging whether and when a state may have recourse to war and how it may fight that war (**see Box 13.9, Box 13.10, and Case Study 13.2**). The revival of just war thinking in International Relations can be seen as a response to two historical developments: the advent of nuclear weapons and the US war in Vietnam. The first of these provoked reflection largely in theological circles about the ethics of weapons which by their nature were intended to be non-discriminatory. The Vietnam War prompted the most influential and sustained reflection on just war, Michael Walzer's book *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). Walzer's book is largely responsible for the revival of just war thinking in modern times.

The JWT is concerned with applying moral limits to states' recourse to war and to limiting harms that states can commit against other states, military forces, and civilians. It consists of three parts: the *jus ad bellum* (justice of war), the *jus in bello* (justice in war), and the recently formulated *jus post bellum* (justice after war).

Jus ad bellum refers to the occasion of going to war, *jus in bello* refers to the means, the weapons, and tactics employed by a military in warfare, and *jus post bellum* refers to conditions which follow the war (Orend 2002).

The just war tradition has both cosmopolitan and statist elements. It is associated with Christian theology since Augustine as well as with what Michael Walzer calls the legalist tradition. In this view, what is acceptable or unacceptable consists of rules about and for states, concerning what states owe each other. The justifications for war are given not to God or humanity, but to other states. The only acceptable justifications for war are the defence of individual state sovereignty and, arguably, the defence of the principle of a society of states itself.

We can compare this with the more cosmopolitan elements of *jus in bello*, which refer explicitly to civilians and to what is owed to them in terms of harm minimization (**see Case Study 13.2**). The *jus in bello* principle informs and has been codified in international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions, as well as treaties limiting the use and

Box 13.9 The just war

Jus ad bellum

- Just cause: this usually means self-defence or defence of a third party.

- Right authority: only states can wage legitimate war. Criminals, corporations, and individuals are illegitimate.

- Right intention: the state leader must be attempting to address an injustice or an aggression, rather than seeking glory, expansion, or loot.

- Last resort: the leaders must have exhausted all other reasonable avenues of resolution or have no choice because of imminent attack.

- Reasonable hope of success: states should not begin wars they cannot reasonably expect to win.

- Restoration of peace: it is just to wage a war if the purpose is to restore the peace or restore the status quo.

- Proportionality of means and ends: the means of war, including the war itself, must be proportionate to the ends being sought. War itself must be a proportionate response to the threat. States must use minimal force in order to achieve their objectives. For instance, it is not justifiable to completely destroy enemy forces or their civilian populations in order to remove a threat to your territory.

Jus in bello

- Proportionality of means: states must use minimal, or proportionate, force and weaponry. Thus it is not justifiable to completely destroy the enemy's forces if you can use enough force to merely defeat them. For example, a state should not use a nuclear weapon when a conventional one might do.

- Non-combatant immunity: states should not directly target non-combatants, including soldiers retired from the field, or civilians and civilian infrastructure not required to achieve military aims. Non-combatant immunity is central to just war theory, 'since without it that theory loses much of its

coherence. How can a theory that claims to regard wars as an instrument of justice countenance the injustice involved in the systematic suppression of the rights of non-combatants?' (Coates 1997: 263).

- The law of double effect: actions may incur non-combatant losses if these are unintended (but foreseeable) consequences, for example civilians living adjacent to an arms factory. However, the real issue is whether deaths can really be unintended if they are foreseeable. The dilemma facing just war theorists is whether responsibility should be ascribed for those deaths in the same way as for intended deaths.

Jus post bellum (proposed)

- Proportionality and publicity: the peace settlement should be measured and reasonable.

- Vindication of rights: the peace settlement should secure the basic rights, the violation of which originally triggered war.

- Discrimination: civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post-war measures. This rules out sweeping socio-economic sanctions as part of post-war punishment.

- Punishment 1: when the defeated country has been a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate punishment must be meted out.

- Punishment 2: the leaders of the regime, in particular, should face fair and public international trials for war crimes. Soldiers also commit war crimes. Justice after war requires that such soldiers, from all sides to the conflict, likewise be held accountable to investigation and possible trial.

- Compensation: financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination.

- Rehabilitation: the post-war environment provides an opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime (Orend 2005).

Box 13.10 Islamic just war tradition

The ethics of war are central to Islam. It is clear from both the Koran and the teachings (*hadith*) of Muhammad that at (limited) times it is incumbent on Muslims to wage war, if only for defensive reasons. For this reason it is often said that while Islam's ultimate purpose is to bring peace through universal submission to Allah, there is no 'pacifist' tradition in Islam. Others have argued both that Islam is in principle compatible with pacifism and that Islamic pacifists exist (M. Brown 2006). At times some Muslim authorities have argued that there is a duty to spread the realm of Islam through

war, as happened in the centuries after Muhammad's death, with the establishment of the caliphate. Others—the majority—argue that the Koran sanctions war only in self-defence. Most Islamic authorities reject both Al Qaeda's interpretation of 'defence' and its strategy of attacking civilian targets outside the 'occupied' or threatened territory of the 'Dar al Islam' as illegitimate interpretations. Most interpreters argue that there are Islamic equivalents of the *jus ad bellum* clause, right authority, right intent, and some *jus in bello* clauses, including civilian immunity.

deployment of certain weapons, including chemical weapons, landmines, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The ultimate referent is humanity, and the rules about proportionality, non-combatant

immunity, and discrimination all refer to the rights of individuals to be exempt from harm.

From a realist perspective, the just war tradition imposes unjustifiable limits on statecraft. International

Case Study 13.2 Targeting civilians and non-combatant immunity

View from the Town Hall Tower over the destroyed city of Dresden

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Non-combatant immunity is central to just war thinking and asserts that the weapons and tactics used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. During the Second World War, all sides violated this provision routinely. The British and Americans adopted tactics of 'area' bombing in Germany and Japan, and the Axis powers systematically attacked civilian populations. Area bombing relied on massive and largely indiscriminate bombing of enemy cities (often in retaliation for similar attacks against civilian targets in the UK, such as Coventry). The most infamous example was the bombing of the German city of Dresden, which was especially controversial because it had no military significance. In the firestorm that was deliberately created by the allies, at least 100,000 people died. A similar logic fuelled the US bombings of Japanese cities and ultimately was the reason for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The main arguments used to defend these clear breaches of the discrimination principle employed a consequentialist logic that it was necessary in order to bring the war to an earlier close, and it would save lives in the long run. Avoiding one form of suffering outweighs the other. Of course, the danger of consequentialist ethics is that survival can be used to justify anything, and we end up with the argument that the ends justify the means.

The principle of double effect qualifies the non-combatant immunity principle and allows for unintended civilian deaths. However, double effect does not escape the possibility that deaths can be unintended but probable, likely, or foreseen. If deaths are foreseen, that adds a further complexity to making judgements because it means one has knowledge that a death will occur from one's actions, even if that death is an unintended by-product.

In many modern conflicts, belligerents take advantage of both civilian immunity and double effect by placing military sites in predominately civilian areas, thus creating a moral dilemma for anyone attempting to uphold civilian immunity. In December 2008, Israel attacked Hamas sites in the Gaza strip. In choosing its targets in Gaza, because of the density of the population and the Hamas tactic of firing rockets into Israel from this location, Israeli planners would have known that the likelihood of civilian casualties was high. In this context, civilian deaths are unintended but highly foreseeable. Should avoiding the likely death of civilians override the military goals? The dilemma facing just war theorists is whether or not we are then responsible for those deaths in the same way as we would be for intended deaths. Critics say that if we draw the line only at intended deaths, military planners can still get away with anticipating as many civilian deaths as they wish. In this manner, the double effect undermines the rules of discrimination and renders them insufficient, if not altogether pointless (e.g. Sjoberg 2006).

Question 1: Are there any circumstances that can justify violating the civilian immunity clause?

Question 2: Should military planners not only not intend civilian deaths, but also seek to minimize them?

politics is the realm of necessity, and in warfare any means must be used to achieve the ends of the state. Necessity overrides ethics when state survival or military forces are at risk. The state must judge for itself when it is most prudent to wage war and how, and what is necessary for victory.

Pacifists and others argue that the JWT provides war with a veneer of legitimacy and permissibility. For these critics, not only is killing always wrong, but the JWT is also unethical because its core doctrines enable war by providing the tools to justify it morally (Burke 2004, Jochnick and Normand 1994). This problem is not solved by the shift to discourses of humanitarian war. According to Zehfuss (2012), it is a contradiction in terms to defend humanitarian aims while attacking individual human beings; this serves only to provide further arguments for expanding the realm of warfare.

Arguably the biggest ethical problem for just war thinking concerns identifying what circumstances permit the initial suspension during wartime of the usual moral prohibition against killing. Michael Walzer argued that the 'moral equality of soldiers' allows them to kill—that it is legitimate to use lethal force against someone who will do the same against you. It is only because soldiers on the battlefield are mutually vulnerable to each other that they can be permitted to kill each other (Walzer 1977). The minute that any given soldier is no longer a threat to

another, i.e. the minute they lay down their arms, they are no longer permitted to be killed or to kill. The justness of the cause or the unjustness of the opponents are not in themselves sufficient to permit killing.

However, Jeff McMahan has controversially asserted that just cause arguments need to be linked to *jus in bello*: engaging in an unjust cause may permit you to be killed but does not allow you to kill others. Discarding the argument for the moral equivalence of soldiers, McMahan (2006: 30) states: 'For unjust combatants, therefore, there are, with few exceptions, no legitimate targets of belligerent action. In general, noncombatants and just combatants are alike impermissible targets for unjust combatants.'

Broadly speaking, just war thinking tends to be justified on consequentialist grounds, that it is better to have a world where most try to abide by and accept

limits on when and how they wage war than the alternative where there are no such restraints. Pacifists tend to invoke deontological grounds for their opposition to war, which consequentialists reject.

> ### Key Points
>
> - There are three components of the just war tradition: *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum*.
> - Just war thinking permits war but requires it to be fought according to certain restrictions.
> - Just war thinking has both cosmopolitan and statist arguments.
> - The rule of double effect is the most controversial aspect of just war thinking.
> - Justifying war requires thinking carefully about the circumstances in which killing is permissible.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined some of the main approaches to international ethics and applied them to considering several of the most important ethical issues that characterize globalization. Ethical issues confront all actors in the international realm, and especially states because of their greater capacity to aid or harm others. Given the scope of interdependence that occurs under globalization, for most writers the question is not whether, but how to be ethical in the international realm. While there are elements of cosmopolitanism present in the international order, most state practices and most people continue to give priority to their compatriots. This holds true especially with regard to issues like global warming and immigration, where doing otherwise might entail potentially self-limiting compromise. While disagreement remains, there is nonetheless significant agreement that basic human rights should be observed, that freedom from poverty and starvation is universally desirable, and that national boundaries should not prevent us from treating all others with respect.

Questions

1. What is the core idea of cosmopolitanism?
2. What are the ethical implications of globalization?
3. Should communities always give more weight to their members' interests, or should outsiders' interests sometimes come first?
4. Do the leaders of states have responsibilities to the community of humankind as well as their own people?
5. Is national identity as morally irrelevant as gender or race?
6. In what ways does globalization challenge statist ethics?
7. Does realism provide sufficient ethical guidance under conditions of globalization?
8. Is there a responsibility for rich countries to end global poverty?
9. Are negative duties sufficient for addressing global and international ethical issues?
10. Is just war thinking adequate for assessing contemporary ethics of war?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Hashmi, S. H. (ed.) (2002), *Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). An insightful collection of essays exploring the domestic and international ethics of Islam.

Miller, D. (2007), *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A systematic treatment of liberal nationalist anti-cosmopolitanism.

Nardin, T., and Mapel, D. (eds) (1992), *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The most comprehensive account to date of the ways people have thought about international ethics.

Pogge, T. (2008), *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press). Develops the most detailed and rigorous argument in favour of cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice based on negative obligations generated by rich countries' complicity in global poverty.

Rawls, J. (1999), *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Rawls's own contribution to international ethics develops something like an ethics of coexistence among 'reasonable peoples'.

Rosenthal, J., and Barry, C. (2009), *Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader*, 3rd edn (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press). A useful selection of readings covering important contemporary topics in the theory and practice of international ethics.

Shapcott, R. (2010), *International Ethics: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press). A detailed examination of the differences between cosmopolitanism and its critics, exploring their ramifications in the areas of migration, aid, war, and poverty.

Singer, P. (2002), *One World: The Ethics of Globalisation* (Melbourne: Text Publishing). The most important utilitarian argument in favour of positive duties to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. It also examines the ethics of global trade and global warming.

Walzer, M. (2000), *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books). A classic philosophical and historical study on the just war tradition and ethics of war more generally.

To find out more about theories of world politics follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/ baylis8e**

Part Four

Structures and processes

In this part of the book we want to introduce you to the main underlying structures and processes in contemporary world politics. There will obviously be some overlap between this part and the next, since the division between structures and processes and international issues is largely one of perspective. For us, the difference is that by structures and processes we mean relatively stable features of world politics that are more enduring and constant than the issues addressed in Part Five. We have two aims in this part.

Our first aim is to provide a good overview of some of the most important structures and processes in world politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We have therefore chosen a series of ways of thinking about world politics that draw attention to these underlying features. Again, we realize that what

is a structure and what is a process is largely a matter of debate, but it may help to say that, together, these provide the setting in which the issues dealt with in the next part of the book will be played out. All the features examined in this part will be important for the resolution of the issues we deal with in Part Five, since they comprise both the main structures of world politics that these issues surround and the main processes that will determine their fate.

Our second aim is that these structures and processes will help you to think about globalization by forcing you to ask again whether or not it is a qualitatively different form of world politics than hitherto. Does globalization require or represent an overthrow of the structures and processes that have been central in world politics to date?

Chapter 14

War and world politics

TARAK BARKAWI

Framing Questions

- **What is war?**
- **What is the relationship between war and politics?**
- **How should we study war?**

Reader's Guide

Along with trade and diplomacy, war is one of the oldest and most common elements of international relations. Like trade and diplomacy, war has evolved over time and changes with social context. War elicits strong reactions. Many believe it is necessary to prepare for and to fight wars against potential and actual enemies. Others believe war itself is the problem and that it should be eliminated as a means to settle differences and disputes between states and groups of people. This chapter discusses what war is, how it fits into the study of international relations, and how it affects societies and politics in the Global North and South. The chapter begins by examining the work of the leading philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, in order to outline the essential nature of war, the main types of war, and the idea of strategy. It then turns to some important developments in the history of warfare, both in the West and elsewhere. It highlights the close connections between the modern state, armed force, and war.

Introduction

Questions of war and peace are central to the study of international relations. Scholars debate whether democracy offers a path to peace (**see Opposing Opinions 14.1**). Constructivists look at how friends and enemies define one another, and at the social construction of threats. Scholars of civil and ethnic wars, particularly those fought in developing countries, study ways to resolve conflicts and build a durable peace. Feminists and analysts of gender politics draw attention to the centrality of war for gender relations, and to how changing constructions of masculinity shape war and violence against women, as for example in the prevalence of rape in war (**see Chs 9 and 17**). International lawyers study the legal dimensions of going to war and of waging it. Scholars who specialize in ethics and normative philosophy also study war. Yet other scholars advise governments in how to wage war more effectively. They study what kinds of weapons to acquire, consider strategies to pursue, and investigate the character and goals of potential adversaries.

This chapter addresses the essential character of war and how it changes in different social and historical contexts. By centring attention on what war is and how it changes, we can better assess how it fits into the larger study of international relations. One of the paradoxes of war is that it is both a violent conflict between groups, and also a way in which antagonistic groups become connected with one another. That is, war is a *social relation* among the parties to the conflict. Understanding what kind of social relation war is helps to situate it in the study of world politics. Doing so reveals that different parts of the world have experienced war very differently.

Opposing Opinions 14.1 Democracy creates peace among states

For

Immanuel Kant thought representative government could bring an end to war. In *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795, Kant argued that Europe would always be at peace if it were composed only of republics which obeyed the rule of law, guaranteed freedom of travel, and were members of an international federation (Kant 1991: 93–130).

Statistical tests suggest Kant might have been right. Depending on the exact definitions and data sets used, the finding is that no or very few democratic states have waged war against one another since 1816 (Doyle 1983*a*, 1983*b*; Russett et al. 1993; Rummel 1997).

Democratic institutions make it harder for a state to go to war. Separation of powers in government, the rule of law, and a free media and public opinion all constrain the ability of leaders to go to war.

Democrats do not like to go to war against other democrats. Liberal opinion in one democracy will argue against going to war against another democracy. According to John Owen (1998), this is why Britain and the US did not go to war against one another after the War of 1812, despite serious crises in the nineteenth century.

Against

Statistical studies linking democracy with peace are less convincing than they appear. Prior to 1939, there were very few democracies, especially if one considers as democratic only states with universal adult suffrage. After 1947, liberal democracies were allied with one another against the Soviet bloc and had little reason to go to war with each other (Gowa 2000).

Democratic states have fought against democratic movements. Western states have waged war against popular insurgencies, such as anti-colonial movements or those seeking to remove authoritarian governments allied with the West.

Democracies fight covert wars that do not appear in statistical tests. The US overthrew a number of elected regimes it feared were susceptible to communism during the cold war, but used the CIA and foreign proxies to do so (Barkawi 2001).

Explanations for peace are to be found at the level of the international system, not regime type. Factors such as the balance of power, the relationship between the Global North and South, or the advent of nuclear weapons better explain when wars occur and what kinds of wars are fought (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Layne 1994).

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1. Do 'democracy' and 'war' change over time? Can their definitions be fixed for statistical tests?

2. Why do democratic states remain likely to go to war with non-democratic states?

3. Are the exceptions to the 'democratic peace' significant?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Defining war

What is war? How should one think about it in the study of world politics? First, wars have happened in all known recorded histories. War predates the world of sovereign states, as well as that of globalization. War is very old, and it is all too common. It will likely be with us long into the future. If war is a historical constant in one sense, in another it varies endlessly. War takes many different forms, from violent feuds between local clans to the world wars of the twentieth century. In essence, war happens when two or more groups conduct their relations with one another through violence. They organize themselves to fight each other. Many different kinds of groups have done this: tribal peoples, nation-states, street gangs, guerrilla and terrorist groups. They have used diverse weapons, from swords to rifles, slings to drones, wooden ships to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

War is organized violence between political entities. A political entity in this context is any kind of group capable of waging war. Such a group has a leadership and it has resources—the human and material means—to organize violence. To organize violence means to assemble an armed group, one capable of fighting other armed groups. War happens when such groups actually fight each other. War varies greatly because fighting takes so many different forms. War is shaped by the kinds of societies that fight it, by the prevailing level of technology, by culture, by economic circumstances, and by many other factors. War always has an underlying similarity—violence between groups—but this shifts and changes depending on when and where it is fought, and between whom is it fought. This changing character of war can be captured through the idea of **war and society**: society shapes war, and war shapes society.

This discussion yields a definition of war (organized violence between political entities) and a broad approach to studying it (war and society). However,

one last element of war is still missing. When a political entity fights a war, its leadership has in mind a purpose for the violence. They have some idea of what they might gain, or protect, by going to war. This determines how a political entity plans and prepares for war, and the moves it makes once it goes to war. Thinking about the purposes pursued in war, and the planning and preparation involved, is the subject of **strategy**. Political and military leaders try to make war serve as an instrument, a means to an end they are trying to achieve. They think strategically, trying to connect the means—war, violence—to some purpose, such as defending their homeland; seizing a piece of territory; gaining independence; or pursuing an ideological goal, such as spreading communism or Islam, or making the world safe for democracy or from terror. In contrast to strategy, tactics are the techniques employed by armed forces to fight other armed forces, to win the combats or battles that make up a war. Classically speaking, strategy is the art of arranging battles to serve the purposes of the war, while tactics are the art of winning battles (**see Box 14.1**).

In sum, war is organized violence among groups; it changes with historical and social context; and, in the minds of those who wage it, it is fought for some purpose, according to some strategy or plan.

Box 14.1 Clausewitz on strategy and tactics

The conduct of war … consists in the planning and conduct of fighting. [Fighting] consists of a greater or lesser number of single *acts, each complete in itself*, which … are called 'engagements' [or battles]. This gives rise to the completely different activity of *planning and executing these engagements themselves*, and of *coordinating* each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war. One has been called *tactics*, and the other *strategy* … According to our classification, then, tactics teaches *the use of armed forces in the engagement*; strategy, *the use of the engagement for the object of the war*.

(Clausewitz 1976: 128; emphasis in original)

Key Points

- War is organized violence among political entities, including both states and non-state actors.

- War has occurred frequently in history, but changes with context.

- Many kinds of groups can wage war, but in order to do so they have to 'organize violence' or create an armed force.

- A 'war and society' approach to the study of war looks at how war has shaped society and at how society has shaped war.

- Strategy is a plan to make the war serve a political purpose, while tactics are the techniques that armed forces use to win battles.

War: international *and* global

How does war fit into the study of world politics? A first cut at this question begins with the sovereign state. Today's world can be described as national–international. National refers to nation-states, the main 'units' of the international system. International refers to relations among sovereign nation-states.

From this national–international perspective, there are two types of war: **civil war** within a state, and **international war** between two or more states. A civil war happens when internal groups battle over control of a sovereign state, or when a group or groups within a state want to secede and form their own state. In the Spanish Civil War (1936–9), republicans and fascists fought over who was to govern Spain. The American Civil War (1861–5) started when southern states organized a confederacy and tried to secede from the United States. An international war occurs when two or more sovereign states fight each other. An example is the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), which began when Iraq invaded Iran.

International and civil wars comprise an important tradition in the study of war. However, war is both older than the sovereign state and likely to endure into any globalized future. This suggests that we should think also about war outside of the sovereign state system. Until the 1960s, much of the world was made up of empires and colonies. The way in which these empires broke up set the stage for many of the conflicts that followed.

Many of the wars fought to build and defend empires, and those which followed in the wake of empire, do not fit into the model of a world made up of sovereign nation-states. Wars today, and in the past, involve complex combinations of state and non-state actors fighting in a single territory, or across many territories. Civil wars often involve an array of international actors and dimensions (**see Box 14.2**). War has evolved within and beyond the nation-state. The global war on terror has brought together police, intelligence, and military forces, within and among countries, to share information and conduct operations. The war on terror is fought across many different territorial jurisdictions in connected ways. A bewildering array of actors, separately and in combination, engage in contemporary conflict.

The imperial past and the transnational present point to a second, global approach to the study of war in world politics. Globalization involves the circulation of people, goods, and ideas around the planet. War is one form that this circulation takes (Barkawi 2005). War connects the groups waging it. During the US invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003–11), Iraqi and American histories became entangled. What happened in Iraq affected the United States, and what happened in the United States affected Iraq. War reorganizes the political entities and societies that wage it. In doing so, war can have global effects. For example, the Second World War was composed of many different, but connected, conflicts in Europe and the Asia Pacific, and is conventionally dated between 1939 and 1945 (**see Case Study 14.1**). As the war developed, it conjoined conflicts across vast spaces, killing over 60 million people. It was a global experience, even if remembered—and dated—differently by different countries. Some consequences of the Second World War were the formation of the United Nations; the fatal weakening of the European empires, leading to the new states that emerged from decolonization in Africa and Asia; and new technologies, such as jet aircraft and nuclear weapons, which fundamentally altered the world that followed. The Second World War demonstrates how the

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Box 14.2 The international dimensions of 'civil war'

Many contemporary wars are 'civil' wars in that they are fought on the territory of a sovereign state, and ultimately concern how and by whom that territory is to be governed. But these civil wars typically involve an array of international actors, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), humanitarian organizations and NGOs, foreign fighters such as jihadis, and the covert or overt involvement of foreign states. NATO intervention was decisive in civil conflicts in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. In the on-going Syrian civil war that began in 2011, several foreign states are directly and indirectly involved, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United States, France, and Britain. Also involved in Syria is Hezbollah, a political party and armed group in Lebanon. Important populations and groups in the Syrian civil war stretch across different states, such as the Kurds, who are also in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Religion and politics bond together actors across borders, as with Hezbollah, Shi'a Iraqi militias, and Iran. The so-called Islamic State, another party involved in the Syrian civil war, at one point controlled territory across Iraq and Syria and had links to affiliates based in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Nigeria, among other states. These international dimensions of 'civil' war show how the political groups and forces that wage war are in tension with, and spread across, the sovereign territories of the national–international world.

Case Study 14.1 War and Eurocentrism: the Second World War

Chinese soldiers en route to India, Second World War

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While most of the wars mentioned in this chapter are followed by their official dates in parentheses, these dates are subject to dispute. For example, in Britain, the Second World War is dated 1939–45. Britain entered the war in September 1939, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland; the war ended for Britain in 1945, when Germany surrendered in May and Japan in August. In many histories of the war, these dates are taken as definitive, as marking the beginning and ending of the Second World War. We conceive a world war through European lenses (J. Black 1998).

What made the Second World War a world war, and a global experience, was the conjoining of the war in Europe with that in the Asia Pacific. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 brought the United States into the war. For the United States, the war dated from then until Japan's surrender in 1945. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor grew out of its involvement in a war in China, the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), a war rooted in resistance to Japan's invasion and occupation of Manchuria from 1932. The Western powers imposed an embargo on Japan because of its actions in China. Japan decided it had to expand the war to acquire oil and other raw materials for its war effort in China, which led to Pearl Harbor. Japan's war in China, in turn, was nested within the Chinese Civil War between Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China

and Mao Zedong's communist party. This war raged between 1927 and 1936, paused for a truce to fight the Japanese, and started again in 1945, ending in 1950. In China, the Second World War is known as the anti-Japanese Resistance War. It was only a part of the more fundamental struggle over who would govern China that began in 1911 when the last imperial dynasty fell.

For North Americans and Western Europeans, the Second World War is usually understood as a war between democracy and totalitarianism. But for East Europeans, Balts, many Ukrainians, and others, 1945 brought a Soviet occupation that would not end until the Berlin wall fell in 1989. East and West Europeans remain divided to this day over the memory and meaning of the Second World War.

Similarly, for South Asians, the Second World War ultimately brought them independence in 1947, not from the Japanese or Germans, but from the British. As in the First World War, the British did not intend to give their own colonies self-determination. They were only forced to do so because the Second World War drastically weakened Britain and it could no longer afford to hold on to India. Because the British had not promised independence at the beginning of the Second World War, some Indians fought on the side of the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan).

Like the Indians, Koreans (who were ruled by Japan) ended up on both sides; many were recruited to serve in the Japanese army, while others joined Mao Zedong's communists and fought first the Japanese and then Chiang Kai-shek's forces. When Mao was victorious, he sent his Korean soldiers home to North Korea, where they helped invade South Korea in June 1950, beginning the Korean War (1950–3).

When the Second World War happened, and what the war was about politically, shifted with geography. The interconnections among various wars and combatant societies can be difficult to see when we use only the official, Eurocentric dates that separate out different wars.

Question 1: Why is it difficult to definitively date wars?

Question 2: Why do the familiar dates of major wars seem to reflect Western experience?

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war and society approach described above applies not only to the societies directly engaged in war, but to the shape of world politics as a whole.

War, then, connects peoples and places and has global dimensions. At the same time, the contemporary world remains organized around sovereign nation-states. States generally possess the greatest military power, even if they cannot always use it effectively. Wars are shaped by the national–international world in which they are fought. Both the international and the global are important in the study of war and world politics. To think more deeply about what war is, the next section turns to the principal philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz.

Key Points

- International war is a war fought between two or more sovereign states.
- A civil war is a war fought inside a sovereign state, but which in practice may involve many different international actors.
- Wars connect the combatant societies; through war, the parties to the conflict shape one another.
- Wars lead to the global circulation of people, goods, and ideas.
- Wars can shape world politics as a whole and have long-lasting consequences.

Clausewitz's philosophy of war

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian officer in the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15). He served on the staffs of generals and directed Prussia's war college. He died unexpectedly in a cholera epidemic, leaving behind unfinished papers which his wife, Marie, drew together and published as *On War* (Clausewitz 1976). This text is read in nearly every military academy and staff college in the world. Clausewitz was still working out his ideas when he died. His lengthy papers are subject to multiple, even contradictory interpretations.

Clausewitz's trinities

Clausewitz tried to capture the nature of war through the idea of 'trinities'. A trinity is made up of three different factors or tendencies, each of which can vary, creating many different possible combinations. According to Clausewitz, war has three dominating tendencies— passion, chance, and reason—which come together in varying combinations in any given historical instance of war. War always involves passion, in the motives for fighting and in the enmities that inspire and sustain killing in war. War is also a sphere of radical contingency, of sheer chance. Anything can happen. All the different elements involved in military operations, from human error to the weather, created infinite, unpredictable combinations that shape the outcomes of wars and the fates of peoples. Finally, as in the notion of strategy, war involves reason. Political leaders and military staffs seek to achieve objectives through war. In doing so, they subject the use of violence to rationality; they try to contain and direct the violence to particular military and political purposes. Fundamentally, Clausewitz believed that war consists of various combinations of passion, chance, and reason.

Clausewitz went on to connect this primary trinity to a second one, associating each of the three tendencies with a component of a political entity. The realm of passion he connected to the people, their feelings and beliefs about a war, and their will—or lack thereof—to wage it. Chance he gave to the armed forces, who have to test their abilities against the trials and fortunes of war. Reason he attributed to leadership, to the political authorities who decide on the war and set its ultimate aims, and to the generals and other military leaders who have to translate these aims into reality. Like the primary trinity of passion, chance, and reason, the elements of this second trinity come together in variable configurations in any actual instance of war. The character of the combatant peoples, the qualities of their armed forces, and the abilities of their leaders determine the course of wars.

Limited and total war

From the basic framework of the two trinities, Clausewitz developed several additional points about the nature of war. One is that there are broadly two types of war: limited and total. A **limited war** is fought for a lesser goal than political existence, for example a war over a disputed territory or access to markets. The Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) was a limited war for both Argentina and the United Kingdom; whatever happened to the islands it was fought over, both states would exist after the war. They never planned to invade each other's home territories. A **total war** occurrs when a state or other political entity is fighting for its existence. In the Second World War, the Allies demanded unconditional surrender from Nazi Germany. The war ended Adolf Hitler's regime, the Third Reich. Note that a war can be limited for one participant, and total for another. During the First Indochina War (1946–54), Vietnamese forces fought for liberation from the French empire (**see Case Study 14.2**). The war was total for the Vietnamese—about the possibility of independence—while France would continue as a state with or without its empire in Indochina. The war was a limited one for France.

The distinction between limited and total wars is connected to another distinction: between real, or actual, war, on the one hand, and the true, or absolute, nature of war on the other. Real wars, wars that historically happened, were always limited by certain factors. Human beings could only do so much violence to one another (Clausewitz was writing before nuclear and biological weapons). Things always conspired to limit, to some degree, the amount of violence that might occur in war. One limiting force Clausewitz called friction. Friction was like a Murphy's Law of war: everything that can go wrong, will go wrong. Clausewitz thought that another limiting force was policy, the strategy a political entity was following. Leaders would try to keep the war on track, to achieve its purpose.

Case Study 14.2 War and society: France, the United States, and Vietnam

Vietnamese and Western evacuees wait inside the American Embassy compound in Saigon hoping to escape Vietnam via helicopter before the arrival of North Vietnamese troops

© Photo by nik wheeler / Corbis via Getty Images

France and the United States fought two long wars in Vietnam after the Second World War, known respectively as the First and Second Indochina Wars (1946–54, 1955–75). The wars in Indochina are case studies in how war conjoins countries in a violent, mutual embrace in which passion overcomes reason. The wars shaped politics in all the combatant societies during the fighting and even long after it stopped.

Vietnam had been part of the French empire from 1884. The Vietnamese independence leader, later known as Ho Chi Minh, was at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. He had hoped to see President Woodrow Wilson and make his case for the self-determination of the Vietnamese people. Ignored, Ho Chi Minh shifted to communist and radical politics, and returned home to fight for independence. The Japanese occupied Vietnam during the Second World War and Ho Chi Minh was ready to take over when they surrendered. But Britain sent its Indian army to Vietnam to hold it until France returned. Humiliated by its defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany, France hoped to restore its sense of greatness by reasserting its imperial role in the world. A nine-year war ensued between France and the Viet Minh (as Ho Chi Minh's forces were known), with France's involvement largely paid for by the United States. France supported US policy in Europe in exchange. The Soviet bloc supplied the Viet Minh, who finally defeated France at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Even more humiliated, now having been defeated by non-Europeans, the French army returned home and went on to fight in Algeria, where another independence struggle was under way. When the French started to lose in Algeria, elements of the French army along with European settlers in Algeria plotted a coup attempt. The French Fourth Republic fell and Charles de Gaulle returned to power. France had suffered regime change as a result of losing colonial wars.

At the Geneva Peace Conference of 1954, Vietnam was divided between a communist North under Ho Chi Minh and a new state in the South, under Ngo Dinh Diem, supported by the United States. A guerrilla insurgency broke out in South Vietnam, supported by North Vietnam and its Soviet bloc allies. At first the United States sought to conduct the war with advisers and other assistance, but in 1965 it committed its own troops, eventually numbering over 500,000. The United States, like France, believed it could not lose a war to non-Europeans, and was afraid of showing weakness to the Soviets. But it could not decisively defeat the insurgency or the North Vietnamese troops who infiltrated into South Vietnam. The Vietnam war ended President Lyndon Johnson's hopes of re-election, while President Richard Nixon's administration expanded the war into Laos and Cambodia in increasingly desperate efforts to bring it to a close. South Vietnam finally fell to the North Vietnamese in April 1975. The United States, too, had been humiliated.

As a consequence, the war in Vietnam came to occupy a central place in US politics, society, and culture for decades. Presidential candidates were vetted for what they had done during the war. Were they war criminals or heroes? Had they supported the war? Did they evade the draft? Hollywood joined the fray with numerous movies about the war. The films not only traced American society's efforts to come to terms with the war, they also rewrote history and ventured into the realm of masculine fantasy. Sylvester Stallone's character Rambo sought to restore America's honour by returning to Vietnam to rescue US prisoners of war left behind. When the United States went to war against Iraq over the invasion of Kuwait in 1990–1, President H. W. Bush claimed it had kicked the 'Vietnam syndrome', the reluctance of the United States to use force after defeat in Vietnam. Like the French war in Algeria, both of the US wars against Iraq (1990–1, 2003–11) were shaped by the putative lessons of Vietnam. In 2004, the war in Vietnam was again front-page news as the Democratic Party presidential candidate John Kerry was attacked over his military service and his subsequent anti-war activism. In the 2016 Republican primary campaign, candidate Donald Trump argued that Senator John McCain was not a hero because he had been captured by the North Vietnamese.

It took Vietnam decades to recover from the wars. While France and the United States suffered casualties in the tens of thousands, the Vietnamese lost between 2 and 3 million people in three decades of war. Much of South Vietnam had been sprayed with Agent Orange (a herbicide) by the United States, and unexploded ordnance continues to claim lives to this day.

Question 1: How and why do wars continue to shape society and politics after they end?

Question 2: What do the wars in Vietnam tell us about the relationship between democracy and war?

When this was accomplished, or when it was no longer possible, the war would be drawn to a close.

However, in contrast to these limiting factors of real war, the true or absolute nature of war was escalatory. Clausewitz thought that war has an inherent tendency to extremes, to ever more violence. Each side is tempted to increase the amount of force it is using to try to defeat the enemy, to compel surrender. War tries to draw into its cauldron ever more human and material resources. Left to its own devices, in the absence of policy and friction, war would escalate in scale; become more violent; go on longer; and extend over more space. As Clausewitz (1976: 77) noted, war is an act of force and there is no logical limit to an act of force. Each move is checked by a stronger countermove until one of the combatants is exhausted. This inherent tendency of war to escalate is moderated by the real human limits on the use of force.

War and politics

For Clausewitz, some of the limits to the use of force potentially arose from reason, in the form of strategic policy, the goal or purpose leaders were pursuing in going to war. His most famous aphorism was that war is a continuation of politics, with the use of other means (**see Box 14.3**). By this he meant that war does not put a stop to politics, to relations with the other side. What happens is that violence is added to those relations. A state can threaten or use force as a negotiating move, to get another state or political entity to do what it wants. For example, in order to get the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam) to sign the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, the United States heavily bombed Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972. The basic idea is that the political purpose behind the use of force—such as getting the DRV to the negotiating table—limits the use of force. One uses only enough force to achieve the aim, as any more may be counterproductive. In a war, force becomes part, but not all, of the on-going political intercourse between states and other combatants. In making war an instrument to achieve purposes, politics could limit or contain its violence.

But Clausewitz was well aware of a problem with this thesis. A different kind of politics, such as nationalism for example, could have the opposite effect on violence. Especially when it comes to war, passions can overcome reason. Some political ideologies have irrational aims that can only be achieved through extreme violence, such as Hitler's vision of eradicating European Jews. In Clausewitz's own time, the French Revolution had mobilized the people for war, creating large armies of revolutionary citizens. Politics fuelled rather than limited the violence of war: 'War, untrammeled by any conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury' (Clausewitz 1976: 593).

Revolutionary and Napoleonic France pursued ultimate aims. In seeking to establish French-allied republics in states and principalities across Europe, France posed an existential challenge to the monarchical regimes of the continent. Consequently, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were total in character; they provided the historical models for Clausewitz's theories. The twentieth century, with its two world wars and the cold war, opened up new and horrifying possibilities for the totalization of war. The capacities of modern states to organize unprecedented levels of violence seem unlimited.

Clausewitz's aphorism about war being the continuation of politics draws our attention to how politics can both limit and fuel the violence of war. It also highlights that war connects the politics of combatant societies. What happened at the war front affected what happened back home. For example,

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Box 14.3 Clausewitz on the primacy of politics in war

Policy [or political purpose] is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political … In short, at the highest level, the art of war turns into policy—but a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes. We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for *purely military* opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for *purely military advice* … No major proposal for war can be worked in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong … Once again: war is the instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and [be measured] by its standards.

(Clausewitz 1976: 607–8, 610; emphasis in original)

wars in Vietnam and Iraq shaped presidential politics in the United States (**see Case Study 14.2**). President Lyndon B. Johnson ended his campaign for re-election in the wake of the Vietnamese communist Tet Offensive of 1968. Conversely, what happened at home, like the election of a new president, shaped the war. In the 2008 US presidential campaign, American voters chose candidate Barack Obama, who promised to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and bring the troops home. So war is a continuation of politics in a more fundamental sense. The political entities at war impact one another, make one another different in myriad ways, because war connects them together. They continue their relations together by other means, their histories and societies co-mingling in the violence of war.

> ## Key Points
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> - Clausewitz developed two trinities to describe the nature of war: a primary one consisting of passion, chance, and reason, and a second one consisting of political leadership, armed forces, and the people.
> - Clausewitz divided war into two types: limited war fought for a purpose less than political existence, and total war in which existence was at stake.
> - Clausewitz made a distinction between 'real war', or war as it actually happens, and 'true war', the inherent tendency of war to escalate.
> - War for Clausewitz is a continuation of politics between the combatant societies with the addition of other—violent—means.
> - Political purposes can both limit and fuel the violence of war.

War, state, and society in the West

The modern nation-state, which would become the basis of the national–international world, developed in Western Europe from the sixteenth century onwards. Changes in the organization of armed force were central to this process. The state became a war-making machine which monopolized violence in its sovereign territory. Western states went on to dominate world politics through the twentieth century.

From feudalism to the nation-state

Particular kinds of armed forces—military technologies and weapon systems—make possible particular kinds of politics. The control of force provides a basis for political power, so it matters what kind of armed forces are available. Consider the armoured knight of medieval Europe. Historically, when knightly cavalry dominated the battlefield, political power fragmented. Small groups of knights, under a lord and with a fortified place such as a castle at their disposal, could both hold off central authorities—the king—and dominate their local area. They extracted taxes and rents from the peasantry and from commerce. Territorial rule was parcelled out, and the king was dependent on the fealty of his lords to assemble an army or otherwise exercise power.

Two military developments changed this: the emergence of infantry armies and advances in military technology (McNeill 1982). During the Renaissance, European soldiers and scholars recovered ancient Greek and Roman practices concerning the training of disciplined, regular infantry. Armed with pikes and willing to stand against cavalry, infantry could defeat knights. But soldiers took time to train and cost money to equip, pay, and supply. Central authorities had to have sufficient funds on a regular basis, as the Roman Empire did at its height. The second development was the invention of gunpowder, and the development of effective cannon and muskets. Such weapons ended the dominance of knightly cavalry and were eventually able to breach castle walls and other fortifications.

In order to pay for these new armies, European sovereigns drew on the wealth of the great trading cities. These cities wanted protection for themselves and their trade, too often taxed as it crossed every lord's fief. Disciplined armies were raised, bringing more territory under the control of the sovereign. A kind of positive feedback loop was created. Larger territories meant more taxes, which could sustain armies and further conquest. From this fiscal–military cycle, the modern territorial state grew.

Sovereigns went into debt paying to administer, defend, and extend their territories. To help raise funds, from the sixteenth century onwards, sovereigns, cities, and elites turned to long-distance trade in slaves, sugar, spices, precious metals, and other goods, and to the establishment of colonies and trading posts in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The new disciplined soldiers—many recruited locally in the colonies—and their firearms helped to secure these nascent empires.

The state in Europe became a kind of 'bordered power container' (Giddens 1985: 120). Inside its territory, it subjected society and economy to rule by a central authority. The state had 'hard' borders, imposing tariffs and controlling what came in and out of its territory, and it defended these borders with its armed forces. The home population developed new, larger-scale national identities. They came to speak a common language, read about their country and its politics in the newspapers, and were administered under a common set of customs and laws. They imagined themselves part of the same nation (B. Anderson 1983). The 'nation-state' emerged as a form of political organization, in which a national people live on the sovereign territory of their national state (**see Ch. 30**).

The composition of the new infantry armies shifted to male citizens enlisted through mass conscription. Until the French Revolution, the new infantry armies were often described as mercenary. They were paid troops, many recruited abroad. But in 1793, at war with most of Europe, the French Revolutionary government turned to mass conscription, a *levée en masse*. The idea was that male citizens had an obligation to serve the nation in exchange for their increased say in public affairs. Nationalism and citizenship became bound up with military service. Since military service at the time was seen as suitable only for men, this had implications for the extension of voting rights to women, which did not occur until the twentieth century. Nationalism also gave political leaders a new tool to stir the passions of their populations, to encourage them to support the war effort. National conscription made military service a national experience for young men. In continental Europe, many of them did obligatory military service throughout the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth (when women, too, started to participate in the armed forces in significant numbers).

Max Weber, a German social and political thinker from the turn of the twentieth century, captured the centrality of war-making to the nation-state. For Weber, the European state had an administrative staff that upheld its claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given territorial area (M. Weber 1978: 54). The state, the people, and the territory are sealed together in one package by the monopoly on force.

From today's perspective, the idea that we all live in nation-states and typically possess a single national citizenship seems natural. But the nation-state is a particular historical development, and a relatively recent one. Only in the second half of the

nineteenth century were Germany and Italy unified as nation-states through a succession of wars. Western European nation-states became extraordinarily dynamic political, economic, and military entities. The territorial and popular nature of the nation-state made it a particularly effective basis for mobilizing military power, as the world wars of the twentieth century proved. But even in Europe, the nation-state was not everywhere. In the Balkans, in South-eastern and Eastern Europe, and in Russia, large multinational empires—the Ottomans, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire—held sway until the First World War. Moreover, all the great nation-states of Western Europe were also empires. Their colonies were mostly outside of Europe. Spain, Portugal, Holland, Britain, France, and Belgium had large overseas empires, important elements of which survived into the 1960s and 1970s. Angola, for example, won its independence war from Portugal only in 1974.

By the time the Angolans started fighting for independence, the nation-state had already come to be seen as the principal vehicle for self-determination. The problem was that, both in and beyond Europe, populations and identities were not sorted into neat territorial packages. Ethnic identities did not always match the national identity of the state. Population movements from wars, famines, and other causes left people under foreign rule. How to make a patchwork of populations and their identities match neatly the nation-state ideal? Attempts to answer this question bedevilled politics, and often led to war, in and beyond Europe during the twentieth century.

From the world wars to the cold war

Observing Napoleonic France, Clausewitz wrote that war had become the business of the whole people, not just a matter for governments and their small mercenary armies. But the state could not actually conscript every young male. For one thing, it could not afford to feed, house, and clothe such a big army. The economy could not produce enough weapons or supply enough ammunition. At the height of the Napoleonic Wars, armies numbered in the hundreds of thousands. But over the course of the nineteenth century, industrialization, fossil fuels, and modern methods of mass production made possible the raising and equipping of armies of millions. With steam-powered ships and railways, states could mobilize, move, and sustain these armies in the field. Truly total wars became possible. For instance,

Germany mobilized over 10 million to serve in its armed forces in the First World War and nearly 20 million in the Second World War (Bond 1998).

During the world wars, the nation-state was a vehicle for the mobilization of military power and the pursuit of war. State bureaucracies provided the administrative backbone necessary to run wartime militaries and economies. Nationalism and nationalist ideologies, such as National Socialism or fascism in Germany, legitimated the war effort and inspired people to participate. The experiences and sacrifices of war could bond together people, state, and armed forces, if properly managed by political leadership.

However, the world wars also proved bigger than the nation-state. War was waged at such scale, over such vast spaces, that multinational alliances, like the Axis and the Allies, formed to fight it. Wartime planning, both for military operations and for the economy, accustomed the Western allies to working together, laying the basis for NATO during the cold war. Imperial powers such as Britain and France drew heavily on their colonies for recruits and resources. The British Indian army numbered over 1.5 million during the First World War and over 2 million during the Second World War, while hundreds of thousands of West and North Africans fought for France. Imperial Japan ruled Manchuria and much of China as well as Korea, and hundreds of thousands of Koreans served in the Japanese army during the Second World War.

There was another, more deadly sense in which war seemed to outgrow the nation-state: nuclear weapons. The United States ended the war against Japan by dropping nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese had little choice but to capitulate. To avoid being put in such a position during the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union built large nuclear arsenals. The problem with nuclear weapons from a strategic point of view was that they were too destructive. They threatened to destroy whatever it was one might be fighting over. If nuclear strikes on the scale imagined by cold war planners had ever been carried out, they would have caused a 'nuclear winter', the collapse of life on much of the planet. In such a situation, total war, or anything that might lead to it, had to be avoided.

This created a paradoxical situation known as nuclear deterrence, a *cold* war between ideologically hostile blocs. Each side had to have nuclear weapons to keep the other side from using them or threatening to use them. They prepared to wage nuclear war in order to stop each other from waging nuclear war. But just how the Soviet Union and the United States could deter each other was far from obvious. What mix of nuclear and conventional forces was necessary? How was each side to know what the other was capable of?

During the cold war, each side feared what was known as a disarming first strike. This was a nuclear attack that destroyed the other side's ability to retaliate; it would destroy all, or most, of their nuclear weapons. Defenceless, they would have to surrender. Fears like these led to enormous military budgets and huge, redundant nuclear forces composed of thousands of warheads. Jet bombers and intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles were developed to deliver them. Both the Soviet Union and the United States devoted enormous resources to each new generation of weaponry, while each spied on its adversary. Across the Western world during the cold war, transnational peace movements and a campaign for nuclear disarmament got under way. People in many different places protested against the apparent insanity of preparing for nuclear war. In the cold war, as in earlier periods in history, the nature of warfare and the kind of weapons available shaped political developments, inside countries as well as across and between them.

The two sides in the cold war formed blocs, or alliances, of states, each led by one of the superpowers. Both blocs maintained large conventional armed forces in Europe, along the border between East and West Germany. Any actual use of these forces against one another threatened to escalate into nuclear war. Another meaning of *cold* war was this continual preparedness to wage old-style, conventional war, but never actually doing so. The actual fighting in the cold war occurred mostly outside Europe, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These parts of the world were known then as the Third World, the areas from which European empire had retreated. In the Third World, the cold war was often conducted by proxy. The superpowers advised and supported their allies, or covertly intervened in civil wars. Thus, as a global experience, the cold war was largely cold in Europe and North America, and hot nearly everywhere else (Westad 2007).

When the cold war ended, large conventional armed forces were scaled back. Conscription was finally stopped in many European states. Armed forces became professional and volunteer. Nuclear weapons were retained by most of the powers that had them. But without the ideological contest between Soviet communism and Western democracy, the fear of a nuclear war receded. Instead, the concern soon became that unstable states or a terrorist or other militant group might be able to acquire a nuclear weapon (**see Ch. 29**).

War, state, and society in the Global South

War and society in the Global North and South are connected, both historically and in the present. The wars of decolonization and other violence that accompanied the retreat of empire shaped much of today's world. And the fraught outcomes of these wars lie behind many contemporary conflicts. In much of the Global South, armed forces came to be directed primarily at their own populations, on missions of internal security. They regularly fought ethnic and civil conflicts within their sovereign territories, but these conflicts were rife with foreign intervention of various kinds. While in the West conflict often took the form of international war, in the Global South conflict ran in and through sovereign states and involved many non-state actors. What made the war on terror so different from previous eras of armed conflict involving the Global North and South was that non-state actors from the non-European world—the jihadis of militant Islam—directly attacked Western societies.

Wars of empire

If war and society in Europe from the sixteenth century was about state-building, in the non-European world it was about empire-building. European powers first penetrated and then defeated political entities in the non-European world, beginning with the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Britain and France fought over North America and South Asia. Eventually, even large non-European powers such as the Chinese and Ottoman empires were subordinated to Western powers. Africa was carved up by European states.

As the previous section showed, imperial expansion was an important dimension of state-building in the West. This meant that conflicts among European sovereigns had imperial dimensions as they fought over colonies and trade routes. For example, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) was fought partly in North America, where it involved Spain, France, England, and Native Americans and was known as Queen Anne's War (1702–13). The Seven Years' War (1755–64) involved interconnected campaigns fought in North America, Europe, South Asia, and the Philippines. Along with the War of Austrian Succession (1740–8), which involved fighting in Europe, North America, and South Asia, these wars are good candidates for the title of 'world war' (**see Box 14.4**). But because wars are usually studied and named from a Western perspective (**see Case Study 14.1**), only the twentieth-century wars which devastated Europe to an unprecedented degree are known as world wars.

Most of the time, for the states of Europe, the primary threat came from other states and their armed forces. Near continual warfare among European states

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Box 14.4 What is a 'world war'?

What makes a war a 'world' war? The wars listed below consisted of linked campaigns fought across different continents and oceans. In the Seven Years' War, for example, Britain sought to defeat France by attacking its colonies in South Asia and North America as well as by fighting in Europe. A higher standard for considering a war a world war is whether or not a war has led to a new world order. The Second World War, for example, brought an end to the era of formal European empire. Wars that changed world order are marked with an asterisk.

Possible world wars:

War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14)*

War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8)

Seven Years' War (1755–64)

French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802)*

Napoleonic Wars (1803–15)*

First World War (1914–18)*

Second World War (1939–45)*

Cold war (1947–91)*

Global war on terror (2001– on-going)*

helped improve European war-making abilities, eventually giving the West the world's most impressive armed forces. But in an empire, the primary security threat is often from rebellion. The Europeans raised armed forces from the populations they colonized, often recruiting minorities. They used these troops to put down challenges to imperial rule. They also used them in wars of imperial expansion, and as reserves for wars in Europe. The British Indian army was used in the Opium Wars in China (1839–42, 1856–60), in Afghanistan in several wars, and in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It also fought in the First and Second World Wars in Europe and the Mediterranean. During the era of European empire, armed forces in much of the non-European world were extensions of Western military power. Their soldiers were trained and disciplined in Western fashion and officered by Europeans.

The imperial legacy in the Global South

This imperial legacy meant that armed forces had a very different relationship to state and society in the Global South than in the West. In countries that obtained independence without much struggle, the old colonial militaries became the armed forces of the new, independent states. Yet these armed forces retained close links with former colonial powers. Nigerian and Kenyan officers trained at Sandhurst in Britain, while those from former French colonies in Africa went to St Cyr. In other cases, the United States or the Soviet Union took over the role of imperial patron, training officers and soldiers and supplying arms and equipment. For example, in 1946 the United States established a School of the Americas in Panama, where it trained Latin and Central American officers. When civil wars and insurgencies broke out in the Third World during the cold war, the Western and Soviet bloc countries used their links to armed forces to intervene. In other cases, they supported the insurgents. Security assistance became a primary way to influence the outcomes of wars and to protect favoured clients in the non-European world. Much of the fighting and other uses of force, like mass atrocity, were directed against local populations in revolt, rather than against foreign invaders. In the Global South, broadly speaking, war and society was a matter of internal security, civil war, and foreign intervention.

To be sure, many formerly colonized countries developed robust armed forces on the nation-state model. In the Middle East and South Asia, states fought a number of international wars. But the use of armed forces for internal security, in a context of civil war and foreign intervention, remained a pattern in much of the Global South. Foreign powers, sometimes under United Nations auspices, would try and train enough local troops to establish a monopoly on violence over the sovereign territory; other foreign powers might assist the insurgents or rebels. This pattern has reasserted itself in the global war on terror initiated by the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For example, after invading Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the United States and its allies devoted considerable resources to building up the armed forces of these two countries so that they could fight insurgents and militant Islamic terrorists.

War and society today in the Global South and North

A striking feature of contemporary world politics is the way in which the national–international and global dimensions of war have become bound together (Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Attacked by a non-state actor on 9/11, the United States and its allies responded by invading two sovereign states (Afghanistan and Iraq). In response, Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups took advantage of Islam's global presence, expanding their recruiting and cells to new countries. Even though these groups were often small and more concerned with local than global conflicts, they were connected by ideology and by the determination of the United States and its allies to crush them. To do this, the US-led coalition expanded its use of tried and tested tools of security assistance and military training for states in the Global South. At the same time, it adopted new modalities of waging war. Some of these involved blurring the line between war and policing, with the United States and some of its allies abducting suspects and holding them in special prisons and intelligence 'black sites'. Another departure was the increasing use of air and drone strikes to assassinate suspected terrorists in the sovereign territory of other countries, such as Pakistan and Yemen.

As the West reached for new ways to wage war in the non-European world, it was forced to police its own societies to combat the threat of terrorist attacks. Civil liberties were curtailed as democratic governments acquired new rights to surveil the internet, social media, and electronic communications. Religious, racial, and class tensions with Muslim minority populations in the West were stoked. Some Muslims left to join the global **jihad**, others plotted terrorist attacks in their home countries in the West, while the vast majority sought to live their lives

peacefully amid increasingly hostile host societies. Racial prejudice and fears of immigration among Westerners became bound up with the war on terror (**see Chs 18 and 28**). Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere killed many more civilians as so-called 'collateral damage' than jihadi terrorists managed to do on purpose. As in earlier periods in history, but in new ways, war and society in the Global North and South were bound up together. Violent events and actions in one part of the world impacted people in another part of the world, through a global chain of cause and effect.

> ### Key Points
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> - State-building in Europe meant imperial wars in the non-European world.
> - Empires were concerned with internal security and used armies and security forces raised from colonized populations.
> - Great powers used military assistance to intervene in the Global South after decolonization.
> - War and society in the Global South and North have become interconnected in new ways in the war on terror.

Conclusion

From the development of the nation-state in Europe through to the present day, armed forces and war were central to world politics. Military power shaped the kind of politics that were possible, while war decided which powers and ideologies dominated. War and armed force have had both affinities and tensions with the nation-state and the national–international world. They have also had global dimensions. War-fighting required multinational alliances. Western nation-states were also global empires. What was happening in Europe, or between the Soviet Union and the United States, had consequences for the Global South.

This chapter has considered what war is as well as its social and historical character. It used Clausewitz to introduce the fundamental nature of war, the types of war, and the dominant tendencies in war. The chapter has shown how, in different parts of the world, in different moments in history, war has shaped politics and society. In turn, politics and society have shaped the character and purposes of war. The types of military technology available and the prevailing forms of military organization have determined the character of world politics.

War remains an unpredictable, creative, and very violent force in world politics. New ways of organizing violence, and of making war, are evolving. Neither the national–international nor the global dimensions of war and society look set to disappear any time soon. Much will depend on how and in what ways these dimensions continue to intersect with one another in the future.

Questions

1. Explain and evaluate Clausewitz's two trinities.
2. What is the difference between a limited war and a total war?
3. In what ways is war the continuation of politics by other means?
4. Analyse a war using the war and society approach.
5. What is strategy? What are tactics?
6. How did war and armed force shape the development of the modern state?
7. What is the relationship between nationalism and war?
8. Explain the difference between the national–international and global dimensions of war.
9. How are the national–international and global dimensions of war connected?
10. Explain how patterns of warfare differ in the Global South and North.

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Baugh, D. (2014), *The Global Seven Years' War 1754–1763* (London: Routledge). A book about one of the 'world wars' that is not counted as such. Read this to learn about the interconnections between warfare in and beyond Europe during the age of European imperialism.

Freedman, L. (1989), *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan). The best single-volume study of nuclear strategy, it provides a comprehensive discussion of nuclear deterrence during the cold war.

Gill, L. (2004), *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). An overview of how the United States trained Latin and Central American officers. This is a good starting place to learn more about the role of military training and advice as a way of intervening in other countries.

Lovell, J. (2011), *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China* (London: Picador). An analysis of how the two Opium Wars connected war and society in Britain and China during the nineteenth century; an insightful look into the politics of colonial wars.

McNeill, W. H. (1982), *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). This book covers the connections between military technology, armed force, and state-building in Europe, with some attention to China. A good introduction to the development of the modern state, the new infantry armies, and the totalization of warfare in the twentieth century.

Sheehan, N. (1988), *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books). The best single book on the history of the United States in Vietnam.

Strachan, H. (2007), *Clausewitz's* On War*: A Biography* (New York: Grove Press). An accessible examination of Clausewitz's philosophy of war, it offers a deeper look into Clausewitz's ideas and how political and military leaders have made sense of them.

Westad, O. A. (2018), *The Cold War: A World History* (London: Penguin). A concise history of the global and international dimensions of the cold war and how they shaped the contemporary world.

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International and global security

JOHN BAYLIS

- **Does globalization increase or decrease international security?**
- **Which international relations theories best help to provide an understanding of global security and insecurity?**
- **How do the challenges to globalization and the resurgence of nationalism and geopolitics affect the prospects of contemporary international security?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter looks at the question of whether international relations, especially in an era of growing challenges to globalization, are likely to be as violent in the future as they have been in the past. It begins by looking at existing disagreements about the causes of war and whether violence is always likely to be with us. It then turns to traditional/classical realist and more contemporary neorealist and neoliberal perspectives on international security, before considering a range of alternative approaches. The chapter goes on to examine recent debates about globalization and geopolitics. The conclusion considers the continuing tension between national and international security and suggests that, despite the important changes associated with the processes of globalization, there seem to be few signs that a fundamentally different, more peaceful paradigm of international politics is emerging. Indeed contemporary international politics are going through a particularly uncertain and difficult period.

Introduction

Students of international politics deal with some of the most profound questions it is possible to consider. Among the most important of these is whether it is possible to achieve international security in the world in which we live. For much of the intellectual history of the subject, a debate has raged about the causes of war. For some writers, especially historians, the causes of war are unique to each case. Other writers believe that it is possible to provide a wider, more generalized explanation. Some analysts, for example, see the causes lying in human nature, others in the internal organization of states, and yet others in international **anarchy**. In a major work on the causes of war, Kenneth Waltz considers what he calls the three 'images' of war (man, the state, and the international system) in terms of what thinkers have said about the origins of conflict throughout the history of Western civilization (Waltz 1959). Waltz himself puts particular emphasis on the nature of international anarchy ('wars occur because there is nothing to stop them from occurring'), but he also recognizes that a comprehensive explanation requires an understanding of all three.

In this on-going debate, as Waltz points out, there is a fundamental difference among political philosophers over whether conflict can be transcended or mitigated. In particular, there is a difference between '**realist**' and '**idealist**' thinkers, who have been respectively pessimistic and optimistic in their response to this central question in the international politics field (**see Ch. 8**). After the First World War, idealism claimed widespread support as the League of Nations seemed to offer some hope for greater international order. In contrast, during the cold war, which developed after 1945, realism became the dominant school of thought. War and violent conflict were seen as perennial features of inter-state relations stretching back through human history. With the end of the cold war in 1989, however, the debate began again. For some, the end of the intense ideological confrontation between East and West was a major turning point in international history, ushering in a new paradigm in which inter-state violence would gradually become a thing of the past and new cosmopolitan values would bring greater cooperation between individuals and human collectivities of various kinds (including states). This reflected more optimistic views about the development of a peaceful global society. For others, however, realism remained the best approach to thinking about international security. In their view, very little of substance had changed as a result of the events of 1989. Although the end of the cold war initially ushered in a new, more cooperative era between the superpowers, realists argued that this more harmonious phase in international relations was only temporary. Some believe that contemporary events confirm this view.

This chapter focuses on this debate in an era of increasing challenges to globalization, highlighting the different strands of thinking in these two optimistic and pessimistic schools of thought. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to define what is meant by 'security' and to probe the relationship between national security and global security.

What is security?

Most writers agree that security is a 'contested concept'. There is a consensus that it implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups), but there is a major disagreement about whether the main focus of inquiry should be on 'individual', 'national', 'international', or 'global' security. For much of the cold war period most writing on the subject was dominated by the idea of national security, which was largely defined in militarized terms. The main area of interest for both academics and statespeople tended to be the military capabilities that their own states should develop to deal with the threats they faced. More recently, however, this idea of security has been criticized for being ethnocentric (culturally biased) and too narrowly defined. Instead, a number of contemporary writers have argued for an expanded conception of security, outward from the limits of parochial national security, to include a range of other considerations. Barry Buzan, in his study *People, States and Fear* (1983), argues for a view of security that includes political, economic, societal, and environmental as well as military aspects, and that is also defined in broader international terms. Buzan's work raises interesting and important questions about whether national and international security considerations can be compatible, and whether states, given the nature of the international system, are capable of

Box 15.1 Notions of 'security'

A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.

(Walter Lippmann)

Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.

(Arnold Wolfers)

In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity.

(Barry Buzan)

Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, and respect for human rights and the rule of law . . . Moreover, these pillars are interrelated; progress in one area generates progress in another.

(Kofi Annan)

thinking in more cooperative international and global terms (**see Box 15.1**). There has also been a growing interest in the concept of '**human security**', with writers like Kofi Annan and Amitav Acharya emphasizing the individual as the main focus of security analysis (**see 'Critical, feminist, and discursive security studies'**).

Not all writers on security accept the focus on the tension between national and international security. Some argue that the emphasis on state and inter-state relations ignores the fundamental changes that have been taking place in world politics. For others, the dual processes of integration and fragmentation associated with globalization that characterize the contemporary world mean that much more attention should be given to 'societal security' (**see Case Study 15.1**). According to this view, growing integration in regions such as Europe is undermining the classical political order based on nation-states, leaving nations exposed within larger political frameworks (such as the EU). At the same time, the fragmentation of various states, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created new problems of boundaries, minorities, and organizing ideologies that are causing increasing regional instability (Wæver et al. 1993: 196). This has led to the argument that ethno-national groups, rather than states, should become the centre of attention for security analysts.

At the same time, other commentators argue that the emergence of an embryonic global society in the post-cold war era renders the stress on national and international security less appropriate. Like the 'societal security' theorists, they point to the fragmentation of the nation-state; however, they argue that more attention should be given, not to society at the ethno-national level, but to global society. These writers argue that one of the most important contemporary trends is the broad and on-going process of globalization. They accept that this process brings new risks and dangers. These include the risks associated with international terrorism, a breakdown of the global monetary system, global warming, cyber conflict, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. These threats to security, on a planetary level, are viewed as being largely outside the control of nation-states. Only the development of a global community, they believe, can deal with this adequately.

Other writers on globalization stress the transformation of the state (rather than its demise) and the new security agenda in the early years of the twenty-first century. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 and the new era of violence that followed it, Jonathan Friedman argues that we are living in a world 'where polarization, both vertical and horizontal, both class and ethnic, has become rampant, and where violence has become more globalized and fragmented at the same time, and is no longer a question of wars between states but of sub-state conflicts, globally networked and financed, in which states have become one actor, increasingly privatized, amongst others' (J. Friedman 2003: ix). For many of those who feel like this, the post-9/11 era ushered in a new and extremely dangerous period in world history. Whether the world is so different today from in the past is a matter of much contemporary discussion. To consider this issue we need to begin by looking at the way 'security' has been traditionally conceived.

Key Points

- Security is a 'contested concept'.
- The meaning of security has been broadened beyond military considerations to include political, economic, societal, and environmental aspects.
- Differing arguments exist about the tension between national and international security.
- Different views have also emerged about the significance of globalization for the future of international security.

Case Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Democratic Republic of Congo

Campaign rally in December 2018, Democratic Republic of Congo

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Events in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since the end of the cold war provide a good illustration of the complexities of contemporary conflict and the dangers of providing simple explanations of why wars occur (**see Case Study 21.1**). Between 1996 and 2016, in this 'forgotten war' (sometimes called 'Africa's World War'), it is estimated that 6 million people lost their lives as a result of ethnic strife, civil war, and foreign intervention, as well as starvation and disease. The key events are as follows.

In 1996 the conflict and genocide in neighbouring Rwanda (in which 800,000 people died) spilled over into the Congo (named Zaire at the time). Rwandan Hutu forces, who fled after a Tutsi-led government came to power, set up bases in the east of the country to launch attacks on Rwanda. This resulted in Rwandan forces invading the Congo with the aim of ousting the existing government of Mobutu Sese-Soko and putting in power their own government under Laurent-Désiré Kabila. This was achieved in May 1997. Kabila fell out with his backers in August 1998, however, and Rwanda and Uganda initiated a rebellion designed to overthrow him. This led to further intervention, this time by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan, in support of the Kabila government. Although a ceasefire was signed in 1999, fighting continued in the eastern part of the country. In January 2001 Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Fighting continued until 2003, partly due to ethnic divisions (the DRC is a country of 250 ethnic groups and 242 different languages), but also because of the continuing occupation by foreign troops (often engaged in illegal mining of minerals and diamonds). Negotiations designed to broker a peace agreement eventually led to the Pretoria Accord in April 2003. As a result, some of the foreign troops left, but hostilities and massacres continued, especially in the east of the country, as rival militias backed by Rwanda and Uganda continued to fight and plunder the resources of the DRC.

On 18 July 2003, the Transitional Government was set up as a result of what was known as the Global and Inclusive Agreement. The Agreement required all factions to help reunify the country, disarm and integrate the warring parties, and hold elections. Continued instability, however, meant that elections did not take place until 2006. Conflict continued among foreign troops and numerous militia groups on the Rwandan and Ugandan borders, causing serious refugee crises and civilian deaths. Elections to replace President Kabila were scheduled for November 2016 but were postponed until the end of 2017, when they were postponed again. Protests from those opposed to President Kabila led to violence and the deaths of large numbers of people. New elections finally took place in December 2018. In January 2019, it was announced that Felix Tshisekedi, leader of the main opposition party, was the surprise winner, defeating the government candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. This represented the first electoral transfer of power in 59 years. However, concerns remained about electoral fraud and continuing violence, with another opposition candidate, Martin Fayulu, also claiming victory. Continuing militia violence in eastern DRC also complicated attempts by health workers to deal with the outbreak of Ebola during 2019.

Question 1: Why did the Global and Inclusive Agreement of 2002 fail to resolve the conflict in the DRC?

Question 2: Is the conflict in the DRC a good example of the value of the concept of human security?

The traditional approach to national security

As **Chapter 2** shows, from the 1648 **Treaties of Westphalia** onwards, states have been regarded as by far the most powerful actors in the international system. They have been 'the universal standard of political legitimacy', with no higher authority to regulate their relations with each other. This has meant that security has been seen as the priority obligation of state governments. States have taken the view that there is no alternative but to seek their own protection in what has been described as a **self-help** world.

In the historical debate about how best to achieve national security, such writers as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau tended to paint a pessimistic picture of the implications of state sovereignty. They viewed the international system as a rather brutal arena in which states would seek to achieve their own security at the expense of their neighbours. Inter-state relations were seen as a struggle for power, as states constantly attempted to take advantage of each other. According to this view, permanent peace was unlikely to be achieved.

All that states could do was to try to balance the power of other states to prevent any one from achieving overall **hegemony**. This view was shared by writers such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, who developed what became known as the realist (or 'classical' realist) school of thought in the aftermath of the Second World War. More recent attempts to update these ideas can be seen in the works of Alastair J. H. Murray, Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria. Their work is sometimes referred to as **neoclassical realism**.

The realist, pessimistic view of international relations is shared by other writers, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. The pessimism of these **neorealists** rests on a number of key assumptions they make about the way the international system works and its inherent propensity for violence. According to the neorealist view, national security, or insecurity, is largely the result of the structure of the international system (this is why these writers are sometimes called 'structural realists'). The structure of anarchy is seen as highly durable. The implication of this is that international politics in the future is likely to be as violent as international politics in the past. In an important article entitled 'Back to the Future', John Mearsheimer (1990) argued that the end of the cold war was likely to usher in a return to the traditional multipolar **balance of power** politics of the past, in which extreme nationalism and ethnic rivalries would cause widespread instability and conflict. Mearsheimer viewed the cold war as a period of peace and stability brought about by its prevailing bipolar structure of power. With the collapse of this system, he argued, there would be a return to the kind of great power rivalries that had blighted international relations since the seventeenth century.

For neorealist writers such as Mearsheimer, international politics may not be characterized by constant wars, but nevertheless a relentless security competition takes place, with war always a possibility. They accept that cooperation among states can and does occur, but such cooperation has its limits. It is 'constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of co-operation can eliminate' (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 9). Genuine long-lasting peace, or a world in which states do not compete for power, therefore, is very unlikely to be achieved. Neorealists predicted that the post-cold war unipolar structure of power, with US pre-eminence, was likely to give way to a new international structure with the rise of states such as China, India, and Brazil.

Liberal institutionalism

One of the main characteristics of the neorealist approach to international security is the belief that international institutions do not have a very important part to play in the prevention of war. Institutions are seen as the product of state interests and the constraints imposed by the international system itself. It is these interests and constraints that shape states' decisions about whether to cooperate or compete, rather than the institutions to which they belong. Neorealists point to the contemporary problems faced by a number of international institutions (such as the UN and EU) to reinforce their view.

Both statespeople and a number of International Relations specialists challenge these neorealist views on institutions. For example, former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd made the case in June 1992 that institutions themselves had played a crucial role in enhancing security, particularly in Europe. He argued that the West had developed 'a set of international institutions which have proved their worth for one set of problems'. He went on to argue that the great challenge of the post-cold war era was to adapt these institutions to deal with the new circumstances that prevailed (Hurd, quoted in Mearsheimer 1994/5).

Hurd's view reflected a belief, widely shared among Western statespeople, that a framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing institutions—the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—could be developed to promote a more durable and stable European security system. This view is also shared by a distinctive group of academic writers that has developed since the 1980s and early 1990s. These writers share a conviction that the developing pattern of institutionalized cooperation among states opens up unprecedented opportunities to achieve greater international security in the years ahead. Although the past may have been characterized by constant wars and conflict, important changes were taking place in international relations, they argued, creating the opportunity to mitigate the traditional security competition between states.

This approach, known as liberal institutionalism or neoliberalism, operates largely within the realist framework, but argues that international institutions are much more important in helping to achieve cooperation and stability than 'structural realists' realize (**see Ch. 8**). According to Keohane

and Martin (1995: 42), 'institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and, in general, facilitate the operation of reciprocity'. Supporters of these ideas point to the importance of European economic and political institutions in overcoming the traditional hostility among European states.

Liberal institutionalist writers suggest that in a world constrained by state power and divergent interests, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will at least be a component of any lasting peace. In other words, international institutions themselves are unlikely to eradicate war from the international system, but they can play a part in helping to achieve greater cooperation among states.

> **Key Points**
>
> - Realists and neorealists emphasize the perennial problem of insecurity.
> - Some writers see the 'security dilemma' as the essential source of conflict among states.
> - Neorealists reject the significance of international institutions in helping many states to achieve peace and security.
> - In contrast, contemporary politicians and academics who write under the label of liberal institutionalism or neoliberalism see institutions as an important mechanism for achieving international security.
> - Liberal institutionalists accept many of realism's assumptions about the continuing importance of military power in international relations, but argue that institutions can provide a framework for cooperation that can help to mitigate the dangers of security competition among states.

Alternative approaches

Constructivist theory

Another group of writers who describe themselves as 'constructivist theorists' posit that international relations are affected not only by power politics but also by ideas and identities. According to this view, the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. This leads social constructivists to argue that changes in the nature of social interaction among states can bring a fundamental shift towards greater international security (**see Ch. 12**).

At one level, many constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, share a number of the major realist assumptions about international politics. For example, some accept that states are the key referent in the study of international politics and international security; that international politics is anarchic; that states often have offensive capabilities; that states cannot be absolutely certain of the intentions of other states; that states have a fundamental wish to survive; and that states attempt to behave rationally. Some, such as Wendt, also see themselves as structuralists; that is, they believe that the interests of individual states are, in an important sense, constructed by the structure of the international system.

However, constructivists think about international politics in a very different way from neorealists. The latter tend to view structure as comprising only a distribution of material capabilities. Constructivists view structure as the product of social relationships. Social structures are made possible by shared understandings, expectations, and knowledge. For

example, Wendt argues that the security dilemma is a social structure composed of inter-subjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other's intentions and as a result define their interests in 'self-help' terms. In contrast, a **security community** (such as NATO) is a rather different social structure, composed of shared knowledge and identity in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war (**see Box 15.2**).

Emphasis on the structure of shared knowledge is important in constructivist thinking. Social structures include material things, such as tanks and economic resources, but these acquire meaning only through

> **Box 15.2** The security community
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> A security community is a group of people which has become 'integrated'. By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure … dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population. By a 'sense of community' we mean a belief … that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'.
>
> *(Karl Deutsch)*
>
> Security regimes occur when a group of states co-operate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behaviour of others.
>
> *(Robert Jervis)*

the shared knowledge in which they are embedded. The idea of power politics, or realpolitik, has meaning to the extent that states accept the idea as a basic rule of international politics. According to social constructivist writers, power politics is an idea that affects the way states behave, but it does not describe all inter-state behaviour. States are also influenced by other ideas, such as the rule of law and the importance of institutional cooperation and restraint. In his study, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', Wendt (1992) argues that security dilemmas and wars can be seen, in part, as the outcome of self-fulfilling prophecies. The 'logic of reciprocity' means that states acquire a shared understanding about the meaning of power and act accordingly. Equally, he argues, policies of reassurance can bring about a structure of shared knowledge that can help to move states towards a more peaceful security community (Wendt 1999).

Although constructivists argue that security dilemmas are not acts of God, they differ over whether they can be escaped. For some, the fact that structures are socially constructed does not necessarily mean that they can be changed. This is reflected by Wendt's (1995: 80) comment that 'sometimes social structures so constrain action that transformative strategies are impossible'. However, many constructivist writers are more optimistic. They point to the changes in ideas introduced by Gorbachev during the second half of the 1980s, which led to shared knowledge about the end of the cold war. Once both sides accepted that the cold war was over, it really was over. According to this view, understanding the crucial role of social structures is important in developing policies and processes of interaction that will generate cooperation rather than conflict. For the optimists, there is sufficient 'slack' in the international system to allow states to pursue policies of peaceful social change rather than engage in a perpetual competitive struggle for power.

Critical, feminist, and discursive security studies

Despite the differences between constructivists and realists about the relationship between ideas and material factors, they agree on the central role of the state in debates about international security. Other theorists, however, believe that the state has been given too much prominence. Keith Krause and Michael Williams have defined critical security studies in the following terms: 'Contemporary debates over the nature of security often float on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical issues concerning to what and to whom the term security refers . . . What most contributions to the debate thus share are two inter-related concerns: what security is and how we study it' (Krause and Williams 1997: 34). What they also share is a wish to de-emphasize the role of the state and the need to conceptualize security in a different way. Critical security studies, however, includes a number of different approaches. These include critical theory, the concept of human security, 'feminist' approaches, and 'post-structuralist' approaches (see Buzan and Hansen 2009). Given that these are covered in other chapters, they are dealt with only briefly here.

Robert Cox draws a distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories. Problem-solving theorists work within the prevailing system. They take the existing social and political relations and institutions as starting points for analysis and then see how the problems arising from these can be solved or ameliorated. In contrast, critical theorists focus their attention on the way these existing relationships and institutions emerged and what might be done to change them (**see Ch. 11**). For critical security theorists, states should not be the centre of analysis because they are not only extremely diverse in character but are also often part of the problem of insecurity in the international system. They can be providers of security, but they can also be a source of threat to their own people.

According to this view, attention should be focused on the individual rather than on the state. This led to greater attention being given from the 1970s and 1980s onwards to what has been called human security, resulting in a further broadening of the conception of 'security' to include areas such as poverty, disease, and environmental degradation. The concept was developed largely by non-Western scholars such as Mahbub al Haq and Amartya Sen, who felt that traditional national security approaches did not take sufficient account of conflicts that arise over cultural, ethnic, and religious differences. According to Amitav Acharya, 'the most pressing challenges to security come not from great power rivalry or interstate wars, as in the past but from multiple and complex forms of internal conflicts and transitional challenges that defy military action by state actors and that demand economic, political and

normative action by the international community'. He argues that we are experiencing the emergence of a very different and much more complex world than in the past and this brings with it new challenges and approaches to global stability and order. In light of this, he calls for a new Global International Politics approach which focuses on the contemporary threats to peace given the challenges brought about by globalization (Acharya 2014*c*).

In many ways, human security is a contested concept. Some critics argue that it widens the boundaries of the meaning of 'security' too much and that it is too vague to have much conceptual value. Others believe that the focus on internal conflicts ignores the very dangerous geopolitical changes that are currently taking place in international relations. Detractors also argue that it is too moralistic, as well as being unattainable and unrealistic in practice. Even among supporters of the concept there is disagreement between those who focus on the need for greater 'freedom from fear' and those who emphasize the need for more 'freedom from want'. Other supporters, however, argue that there is considerable overlap between the two, and both are important in the search for greater human security. For all supporters of the concept, human security provides an essential non-Western approach to international security (neglected in the past) and is a vital concept in understanding the new world order.

Academics championing the human security approach argue that there is a close relationship with feminist writers who study international conflict. Feminist writers also challenge the traditional emphasis on the central role of the state in studies of international security. While there are significant differences among feminist theorists, all share the view that works on international politics in general, and international security in particular, have been written from a 'masculine' point of view (**see Chs 9 and 17**). In her work, J. Ann Tickner argues that women have seldom been recognized by the security literature despite the fact that conflicts affect women as much as, if not more than, men. The vast majority of casualties and refugees in war are women and children and, as the war in Bosnia confirms, the rape of women is often used as a tool of war (Tickner 1992).

In a major feminist study of security, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, Cynthia Enloe points to the patriarchal structure of privilege and control at all levels that, in her view, effectively legitimizes all forms of violence (Enloe 2014 [1989]). She highlights the traditional exclusion of women from international relations, suggesting 'that they are in fact crucial to it in practice and that nowhere is the state more gendered in the sense of how power is dispersed than in the security apparatus' (Terriff et al. 1999: 91). She also challenges the concept of 'national security', arguing that the use of such terms is often designed to preserve the prevailing male-dominated order rather than protect the state from external attack.

Feminist writers argue that if gender is brought more explicitly into the study of security, not only will new issues and alternative perspectives be added to the security agenda, but the result will be a fundamentally different view of the nature of international security. According to Jill Steans, 'Rethinking security involves thinking about militarism and patriarchy, mal-development and environmental degradation. It involves thinking about the relationship between poverty, debt and population growth. It involves thinking about resources and how they are distributed' (Steans 1998; S. Smith 2000).

The emergence of poststructuralist approaches to international relations have produced a somewhat different perspective towards international security (**see Ch. 11**). Poststructuralist writers share the view that ideas, discourse, and 'the logic of interpretation' are crucial in understanding international politics and security. Like other writers who adopt a 'critical security studies' approach, poststructuralists see 'realism' as one of the central problems of international insecurity. This is because realism is a discourse of power and rule that has been dominant in international politics in the past and has encouraged security competition among states. Power politics is seen as an image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring about war. As such, the attempt to balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that leads to war. According to this view, alliances do not produce peace, but lead to war. The aim for many poststructuralists, therefore, is to replace the discourse of realism or power with a different discourse and alternative interpretations of threats to 'national security'. The idea is that once the 'software program' of realism that people carry around in their heads has been replaced by a new 'software program' based on cooperative norms, then individuals, states, and regions will learn to work with each other and global politics will become more peaceful.

Key Points

- Constructivist thinkers base their ideas on two main assumptions: (1) that the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed; and (2) that changing the way we think about international relations can help to bring about greater international security.

- Some constructivist thinkers accept many of the assumptions of neorealism, but they reject the view that 'structure' consists only of material capabilities. They stress the importance of social structures, defined in terms of shared knowledge and identities as well as material capabilities.

- Critical security theorists contend that most approaches put too much emphasis on the state.

- The concept of human security focuses on the individual and the threats that arise from poverty, disease, and environmental degradation.

- Feminist writers argue that gender tends to be left out of the literature on international security, despite the fact that war impacts men and women differently.

- Poststructuralist writers believe that the nature of international politics can be changed by altering the way we think and talk about security.

Globalization and the return of geopolitics

In recent years there has been a debate among scholars about whether 'globalization' and '**geopolitics**' are compatible in the changing world in which we live. There have also been debates about whether the world is reverting to 'traditional power dynamics with untraditional players' or whether a 'new geopolitics' can successfully emerge based on the importance of soft power rather than traditional hard military power. This section will consider these important contemporary debates.

Some writers argue that 'globalization' and 'geopolitics' represent fundamentally different approaches to policy. Brian Blouet argues that 'Geopolitical policies seek to establish national or imperial control over space and the resources, routeways, industrial capacity and population the territory contains.' In contrast, he sees globalization as 'the opening of national space for the free flow of goods, capital and ideas'. 'Globalization', he says, 'removes obstructions to movement and creates conditions in which international trade in goods and services can expand' (Blouet 2001). Another writer, Ellen Frost, contends that globalization is changing the world in a radical way. We are moving, she argues, towards a much more 'interconnected world system in which independent networks and flows surmount traditional boundaries (or make them irrelevant)'. For Frost, 'external threats have increasingly assumed transnational forms', which renders traditional geopolitics, with its emphasis on balance of power and inter-state conflict, largely irrelevant (Kugler and Frost 2001).

Not all writers, however, accept that globalization and geopolitics are incompatible (or that geopolitics is no longer important). Douglas E. Streusand rejects the idea that there is opposition between the two concepts, 'both as historical forces and as policy alternatives'. He argues that 'the era of globalization has not ended the need for geopolitical analysis' and 'the policy imperatives that geopolitical analysis generates do not contradict the principles of globalization' (Streusand 2002).

Those who take this position argue that traditional ideas of geopolitics remain as important as ever in the twenty-first century, indeed that they are becoming more important. These ideas originate from the works of such writers as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. Mackinder's ideas were very influential after the First World War, especially his dictum:

- *Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland.*
- *Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island.*
- *Who rules the World Island commands the World.*
  (Mackinder 1919)

These ideas were updated during the Second World War and the cold war by writers such as Spykman, who emphasized the need to prevent the emergence of a new hegemon by preventing any single state from dominating Eurasia. Echoing Mackinder, Spykman argued that 'Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who controls Eurasia rules the world' (Spykman and Nicholl 1944). These ideas led to the policy of containment of the Soviet Union in 1946 and the formation of the NATO alliance.

With the end of the cold war, the threat of a Eurasian hegemon receded. In recent years, however, the importance of the '**Rimland**' has re-emerged in the works of such writers as Ross Munro and Richard Bernstein. Their concern focuses on the Pacific Rim and the rise of China. They argue that:

> The central issue for the United States and its Asian allies and friends is whether an increasingly powerful China is going to dominate Asia, as its leaders intend, or whether the United States, working primarily with Japan, can counterbalance China's emergence to great power and eventually to super-power status. That issue will be resolved on Asia's eastern rim—in the band of territory that begins in the Russian Far East and continues through the Korean peninsula, Japan and Taiwan and probably the Philippines and Indonesia as well.
>
> *(Bernstein and Munro 1998)*

For Bernstein and Munro, traditional geopolitics is just as important as ever, and requires a significant shift in American grand strategy. For those who support this view, the shift (or 'pivot') of US strategic priorities from the Middle East towards the Pacific under the Obama presidency and the radical changes to US foreign policy under President Trump indicate that such geopolitical analysis is an important element in contemporary strategic thinking in Washington. Equally, it is argued that the rise of China and Chinese policies regarding islands in the disputed South and East China Seas indicate similar thinking in Beijing (**see Case Study 15.2**). Graham Allison has argued that America and China are currently in a 'Thucydides' Trap'. This refers to the fifth-century BC clash between the rising power of Athens (akin to modern China) and the established military hegemon Sparta (akin to modern America). In Allison's view, disaster is likely unless each shows more respect for the other (Allison 2017).

Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas

Although the origins of territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas go back centuries, there has been a recent upsurge of tensions between China and its neighbours (and among the neighbours themselves). In the South China Sea the disputes centre on the ownership of the Paracel and Spratly islands, together with various uninhabited atolls and reefs, especially the Scarborough Shoal (**see Fig. 15.1**). In the East China Sea the dispute is largely between Japan, China, and Taiwan over what the Chinese call the Diaoyu islands and what the Japanese call the Senkaku islands (**see Fig. 15.2**). These disputes are leading to growing anxiety in the Pacific region.

The South China Sea disputes

The main dispute over the Paracel and Spratly islands is between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China claims historical rights to the islands dating back 2,000 years. China's claims are mirrored by those of Taiwan. Vietnam rejects these historical claims and says it has ruled over both the island chains since the seventeenth century. The Philippines also claims the Spratlys because geographically they are close to its territory. The Philippines also has a further dispute with China over

Figure 15.1 Disputed areas in the South China Sea
Source: UNCLOS and CIA

Figure 15.2 Disputed areas in the East China Sea
Source: UNCLOS and CIA

the Scarborough Shoal. These islands lie 100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. To complicate matters further, Malaysia claims that some of the Spratlys fall within its economic exclusion zone.

The most serious conflicts, however, have been between China and Vietnam. In 1974 China seized the Paracels from Vietnam, and in the late 1980s clashes took place in the Spratlys, with further Vietnamese losses. Tensions have risen higher in recent years due to a belief that the region contains vast quantities of natural gas and oil. Recent rumours suggest that China has plans for an undersea base to exploit the natural resources near the Spratlys. In 2018 Vietnam became increasingly alarmed by further Chinese reclamation work, the development of military airstrips and munitions warehouses, and the reported deployment of missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef.

The East China Sea disputes

Japan's claims over eight uninhabited islands and rocks that it calls the Senkaku islands date back to 1895, when they were incorporated into Japanese territory. It claims that this right was recognized under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. In contrast, China argues that what it calls the Diaoyu islands have been part of its territory since ancient times. Taiwan also claims the islands with a similar argument. Clashes have occurred in recent years between Japanese patrol boats and Chinese and Taiwanese fishing vessels. A confrontation involving a Chinese fishing vessel in 2010 prompted anti-Japanese protests in multiple Chinese cities and diplomatic protests until the Chinese crew were released. In 2012, tensions re-emerged after Chinese and Japanese activists landed on a number of the islands. These tensions escalated after the Japanese government bought three of the islands from

private owners. In recent years new tensions have arisen over Chinese oil rigs near the disputed islands and in 2018 when Japan dispatched a submarine to the disputed waters southwest of Scarborough Shoal as part of an anti-submarine warfare exercise.

In both cases, while major military conflict among the states involved has been avoided in recent years, the renewed disputes have raised the level of regional insecurity. In July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled against China and its claims to rights in the South China Sea in a case brought by the Philippines. The Court said that China's 'nine-dash line', which it uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is unlawful under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China declared that the ruling was 'unfounded' and that it would not be bound by it. More recently, however, there has been a rapprochement between China and the Philippines.

China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' of providing major investment in infrastructure projects in Pacific countries (as well as in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas) caused fears in Australia, Japan, and India that China's 'string of pearls' strategy was designed to establish a chain of air and naval bases from the South China Sea to the Horn of Africa. This led Australia to reopen a major military base (with US support) in Papua New Guinea in 2018, and to a US, Australian, and Japanese initiative to establish 'an alliance of friendly nations' for joint overseas investment to counter Chinese economic diplomacy in the region.

Question 1: What do you understand by the term 'Thucydides' Trap' in relation to the rise of China?

Question 2: What role does the 'security dilemma' play in the territorial disputes between China and its neighbours?

Contemporary international relations appears to be characterized by important challenges to globalization and a greater emphasis on the role of geopolitics. The rise of populism in Europe and the United States, caused in part by the effects of globalization, has resulted in the upsurge of nationalism and trade wars. Many believe that the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States, in particular, has had a disruptive effect on the international order. President Trump was elected on the slogan of 'Make America Great Again', and since his election he has challenged a number of key aspects of the international order which has generally prevailed since the Second World War. He has at times been critical of the NATO Alliance (calling it 'obsolete' at one point) and of the European Union; he has had trade disputes with Canada and Mexico, and has launched a major trade war with China. He has withdrawn from a number of global arms control agreements, supported Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran, and withdrawn from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. At the same time, he has often been reluctant to criticize

Russia for allegedly interfering in the US presidential election, and in its pursuit of a vigorous nationalist foreign policy agenda against many of America's allies, including some of those on the borders with Russia. This has led to concerns among many of America's allies that he has significantly undermined the old international order which since 1945 has been led by the United States. In turn, US policies and the wider spread of populism are seen by many as major threats to contemporary international security. For Trump supporters, however, the possibility of a deal with North Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and pressure on Iran to improve the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (following America's withdrawal from the agreement) indicate that President Trump's more radical approach to diplomacy can bring more peaceful results. Only time will tell if this proves to be the case.

At the heart of geopolitical thinking is the realist notion of the importance of achieving world order through a balance of power that seeks to prevent regional or global hegemons from emerging. The great danger,

however, is that geopolitical competition will create global disorder. This seems to be very much a feature of the contemporary world. Espen Barth Eide, managing director at the World Economic Forum, has written that 'recent developments have led to tectonic shifts in state interaction. Geopolitics—and realpolitik—is once again taking centre stage, with potential wide-ranging consequences for the global economy, politics and society' (Barth Eide 2014). This is evident in the tensions between the West and Russia over Ukraine and Crimea; the dispute between China and its neighbours over islands in the East and South China Seas; Western concerns over the growing strategic partnership between Russia and China; and the differing interpretations of the 2015 nuclear agreement between the P5 + 1 themselves and Iran (**see Opposing Opinions 15.1**); as well as the complex set of alliances designed to deal with the emergence of so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Opposing Opinions 15.1 The 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran enhanced international security

For

It removed nuclear proliferation risks. 'Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off' (Barack Obama). The agreement reduced Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges from 20,000 to 6,104 for ten years; it barred Iran from enriching uranium above 3.37 per cent for 15 years; and it required Iran to sell 98 per cent of its stockpile of uranium. It also restricted the sale of ballistic missile technology to Iran for eight years and conventional weapons for five years.

Verification ensures success. 'This deal is not built on trust' (Barack Obama). All the limitations in the agreement have been verified by an elaborate system of unprecedented on-site inspections. The UN's atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports on whether Iran has complied with the nuclear-related aspects of the agreement. If it identifies a suspicious site, it will convene an arbitration panel to decide whether Iran must grant access to that site. The IAEA believes that Iran has complied with the agreement since 2015.

Arms control benefits international stability. 'We negotiated arms control with the Soviet Union when that nation was committed to our destruction. And those agreements ultimately made us safer' (Barack Obama). The nuclear diplomacy by the P5 + 1 and Iran between 2003 and 2015 was much better for international stability than military attacks on Iranian facilities. For this reason, the other members of the P5 + 1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, and Germany) have continued to support the deal even after the US withdrawal.

Normalization of relations brings security. Gradually lifting economic sanctions, ending the oil embargo and allowing Iranian companies back into the international banking system was designed to help over a period to normalize relations with Iran and to re-integrate it into the international community. This normalization was undermined by President Trump's withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.

Against

It will not prevent a nuclear Iran. The nuclear agreement with Iran is 'a mistake of historic proportions … Concessions have been made in all areas that were supposed to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons' (Benjamin Netanyahu). As a result of the agreement, Iran will eventually become a nuclear power. Prior to withdrawing from the agreement in May 2018, Donald Trump declared that 'the Iran deal is defective to its core'. It was, he said, 'a horrible and one-sided deal'.

Iran will continue to support reactionary forces. 'Instead of making the world less dangerous, this deal will only embolden Iran—the world's largest sponsor of terror—by helping to stabilize and legitimize its regime' (John Boehner, former Republican Speaker of the US House of Representatives). The lifting of sanctions was 'used as a slush fund for weapons, terror, and opposition across the Middle East' (Donald Trump). Following the lifting of sanctions, including the $150 billion of assets frozen abroad, Iran was free to continue its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria.

Insecurity in the Middle East will continue. 'It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace, and it never will' (Donald Trump). Given opposition to the agreement by Israel and Saudi Arabia, the accord has not brought greater stability to the Middle East. Indeed it has accelerated a regional arms race and added insecurity.

A broken agreement will be worse than no agreement. If Iran responds to US withdrawal by breaking the agreement itself, it will be extremely difficult to re-impose the kind of hard-hitting international economic sanctions agreed on in the past, given the contemporary difficulties in relations between the US, China, and Russia.

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1. Why did President Trump withdraw from the Iran agreement?

2. Why have the other members of the P5 + 1 continued to support the agreement?

3. Does the 2015 agreement have a future?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Richard Falk provides a rather different view of the parallel impact of both globalization and geopolitics on contemporary world politics. Falk contends that traditional geopolitics 'was dominated by the United States, and operationally administered from Washington, and continued despite the collapse of colonialism to be West-centric when it came to the shaping of global security policy'. The problem, he argues, is that this 'Old Geopolitics' has not registered the implications for the world order of the collapse of the colonial order or the relative weakening of US primacy. However, he argues that while the 'Old Geopolitics' remains embedded, especially in Western thinking, a 'New Geopolitics' is emerging which rests less on the importance of military power and more on the importance of soft power. This trend, enhanced by the processes of globalization, is exemplified by the emergence of the BRIC countries and the rise in importance of a wide variety of non-state actors. Falk also argues that the 'winless withdrawals' of the US from Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence that superiority in hard military power 'is no longer able to reach desired political outcomes in violent conflicts'. The US should learn that depending on military power, the main currency of the 'Old Geopolitics', will bring only 'frustration and defeat'. The problem, he says, is that the aged architects of the 'Old Geopolitics', for a variety of reasons, are unable to learn from failure, and so the cycle of war and frustration goes on and on with disastrous human results (Falk 2012).

In summary, different views of globalization and geopolitics give rise to very different conclusions about world order. For some, globalization can bring greater peace and security, while for others it can lead to greater fragmentation and conflict as some states and non-state actors challenge the dominant economic and political status quo. Similarly, some view geopolitics as a force that helps to prevent the emergence of overly dominant states in the world. In contrast, others see 'Old Geopolitics' in particular as resulting in thinking that encourages constant violence and war. In the complex world in which we live, globalization and geopolitics are powerful forces and both have contradictory effects on global security.

Key Points

- Some writers see globalization and geopolitics as contradictory concepts, while others argue there is no opposition between them.
- Traditional ideas about geopolitics originate from the writings of such people as Harold Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman.
- Different interpretations of the concepts of globalization and geopolitics give rise to alternative views about how a peaceful world order can be achieved.
- In practice, global politics exhibits the effects of both globalization and geopolitics.

Conclusion

At the centre of the contemporary debates about global and international security discussed in this chapter is the issue of continuity and change, as well as different ways of thinking about 'security'. This involves questions about how the past is to be interpreted and whether international politics is in fact undergoing a dramatic change as a result of the processes of globalization. There is no doubt that national security is being challenged by the forces of globalization, some of which have a positive effect, bringing states into greater contact with each other, while others have a more malign effect. Bretherton and Ponton have argued that the intensification of global connectedness associated with economic globalization, ecological interdependence, and the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction means that 'co-operation between states is more than ever necessary' (Bretherton and Ponton 1996: 100–1).

At the same time, however, globalization also appears to be having negative effects on international security, in part due to the challenges it creates. It is often associated with the rise of populism, fragmentation, identity politics, rapid social change, increased economic inequality, terrorism, threats to cyber security (**see Box 15.3**), and challenges to cultural and religious identities that contribute to conflicts both within and among states. The role of social media, in particular, played an important part in the rise of so-called Islamic State, which led to major global insecurity in recent years (**see Box 15.4**). Globalization has also facilitated the proliferation of weapons technologies, including those associated with weapons of mass destruction, which remain a major potential source of international insecurity, especially with the contemporary challenges to a number of arms control agreements. This

Box 15.3 Globalization and cyberwar

The damage that can be done in cyberwar now is in principle almost unlimited … Unlike nuclear weapons, you won't know where the attack has come from … and there is no deterrent. Or if there is, they haven't told us.

(Professor Sir Michael Howard)

Globalization has introduced a new form of warfare: cyberwar. More than 30 countries … have the capability to launch strategic level cyber attacks. The interconnectedness of many nation's infrastructures means that a successful cyber attack against a single sector in one country could result in adverse effects in other sectors within the same country, or those of its neighbours. Indeed, intended (or unintended) adverse effects could well travel globally.

(Antuliuo J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Nature of War *(Carlisle: Pennsylvania, 2003))*

Box 15.4 So-called Islamic State (ISIS) viewed through the lens of globalization

ISIS draws its support from disaffected people from across the world. Moreover, its very method of advertising itself on social media is one that is likely aped from combatants, civil society and individuals seeking to draw attention to their narratives during previous conflicts. Its support network is multifarious and transnational (amongst a number of complex networks) and … its goal—the restoration of the caliphate … is directly opposed to the status quo of a state-centric international system. It is not merely a 'threat' or a 'brutal' criminal organisation, in the singular … rather it should be seen as representative of an emergent category of non-state actor that is desperately opposed to the status quo … It is certainly the worst kind of representative of a non-state actor one can imagine.

(Philip Leech, Middle East Monitor, 30 September 2014)

ambivalent effect of globalization, in turn, reinforces the search for national security and unilateralism, while at the same time encouraging other states to seek greater multilateral and global solutions as they are less able to provide security for their citizens.

Despite important changes taking place in world politics, the traditional ambiguity about international security remains. In some ways the world is a much safer place to live in as a result of the end of the cold war and the removal of nuclear confrontation as a central element in East–West relations. It can be argued that some of the processes of globalization and the generally cooperative effects of international institutions have played an important part in mitigating some of the competitive aspects of the security dilemma among states.

These trends, however, are offset to a significant extent by geopolitical changes and regional conflicts that threaten the contemporary world order (**see Box 15.5**). It is evident that military force continues to be an important arbiter of disputes both among, and particularly within, states, as well as a weapon used by terrorist movements who reject the status quo. Also, conventional arms races continue in different regions of the world. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons still exert a powerful influence on the security calculations of many states as some global arms control agreements begin to unravel; crazy and ambitious politicians remain at the head of some governments; and cultural differences, as well as diverse values and the tensions inherent in globalization itself, prevent the emergence of global agreements on a wide range of important issues. Water resources, food, energy, and large-scale migration are all potential sources of conflict, and it

Box 15.5 Alternative contemporary views about world order

In recent years we have seen the steady erosion of the liberal order and the institutions that protect it. Citizens of many nations have turned away from universal values toward old ties of ethnicity, race and sectarianism. They have become increasingly resentful of immigrants, refugees and minority groups. They have turned inwards economically and prioritized protectionism over integration. They have warmed to authoritarianism and embraced strong man politics . . . they seem to have given up on the very idea of liberalism itself, betraying the underlying will that is necessary to maintain any world order.

(John McCain)

The old liberal international order was designed and built in the west. Brazil, China, India and other fast emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anti-colonialist pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist states.

(G. John Ikenberry)

The traditional centres of global politics are unable to play a leading role in establishing a new world order . . . the previous Yalta-based global political system has been all but destroyed . . . yet there is nothing to replace it. The world is increasingly sliding towards chaos . . . Over the past two decades Russia and China have been promoting the idea of a 'multi-polar world' as the most sustainable, dependable, and fair structure for international relations.

(Igor Ivanov)

remains unclear how great power relations will develop in the years ahead as geopolitical and geostrategic changes unfold. There are also the security issues associated with what one commentator has called the 'crisis of international institutions' (Weiner 1995).

At a time of uncertainty and anxiety, compounded by the challenging and what some regard as the disruptive effects of the diplomacy pursued by President Trump and the emergence of other 'strongman leaders' in recent years, individual and societal insecurity is increasingly evident as the forces of fragmentation and integration associated with globalization destabilize traditional identities and thereby complicate relationships within and among states.

In many ways, contemporary international politics are characterized by what might be described as a 'security paradox'. Many in the West argue that international security since the Second World War has been largely maintained at a global level by a rules-based Western liberal international order. In recent years, however, that order has been challenged by claims that it serves only Western interests and undermines the security of non-Western states and non-state actors. There has also been some unease in the US and some other Western counties that some dictatorial regimes have exploited the prevailing order against their own interests. Attempts to mitigate, or even overturn, what some regard as the injustices of the prevailing order have resulted in greater contemporary international insecurity. Lawlessness is becoming 'the new normal' (according to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres). In this sense, the prevailing international order is both stabilizing and destabilizing at the same time. One of the great challenges of the age, therefore, is to rethink or renew the world order. If this is not achieved, there are dangers of miscalculation leading to serious international conflicts in the future.

There seems no sign that a paradigmatic shift towards a more peaceful world is taking place in international politics, or indeed perhaps that such a permanent shift is possible. The empirical historical evidence, as well as contemporary events, suggest caution. Periods of more cooperative inter-state (and inter-group) relations have often in the past led to a false dawn and an unwarranted euphoria that 'perpetual peace' was about to break out. The structure of the international system, geopolitical challenges, particular kinds of political systems, human nature, and the forces of nationalism and globalization all impose important constraints on the way that individuals, states, and international institutions behave. So does the continuing predominance of realist attitudes towards international and global security among many of the world's political leaders (**see Ch. 8**). It is also possible that contemporary discussions and discourse about 'geopolitics' may themselves be self-fulfilling.

This is not to argue that there is no room for peaceful change, or that new ideas and discourses about world politics are unimportant in helping us to understand the complexities of contemporary global security and to open up the opportunities for reducing international tension and conflict. In a world of continuing diversity, mistrust, and uncertainty, however, it is likely that the search for a more cooperative global society will remain in conflict with the powerful pressures that exist for states, and other political communities, to look after what they perceive to be their own sectional, religious, national, or regional security against threats from without and within. Whether and how greater international and global security can be achieved still remains, as Herbert Butterfield once argued, 'the hardest nut of all' for students and practitioners of international politics to crack. This is what makes the study of global security such a fascinating and important activity.

Questions

1. Why is security a 'contested concept'?
2. Why do traditional realist writers focus on national security?
3. Why do wars occur?
4. Why do states find it difficult to cooperate?
5. Do you find 'liberal institutionalism' convincing?
6. Why might democratic states be more peaceful?
7. How do 'constructivist', human security, 'feminist', and poststructuralist views about international security differ from those of 'neorealists'?

8. What are the implications of populism and the rise of the 'strongman leader' for the future of international security?
9. Is the rise of China *the* great geopolitical story of the twenty-first century?
10. What might a new world order look like?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Acharya, A. (2014), *Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics: Whose IR?* (New York: Routledge). A very good account of non-Western approaches to security. The author focuses on the concept of human security, which he argues has been neglected by a Western emphasis on national security and the role of military force.

Allison, G. (2017), *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt). An interesting comparison between the conflict between Athens and Sparta and the contemporary difficulties in the relationship between America and China.

Buzan, B., and Hansen, I. (2009), *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A good account of the intellectual history of the development of international security studies, from the rather narrow early cold war definitions of security associated with the confrontation between the superpowers to the current diverse understandings of environmental, economic, human, and other securities.

Garnett, J. C., and Baylis, J. (2019), 'The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace', in J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, and C. S. Gray (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). An up-to-date approach to the causes of war.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2nd edn (New York: Norton). This study looks at the key role of the major powers in world politics from a neorealist perspective. The new edition includes a chapter on the rise of China.

Ortman, S., and Whittaker, N. (2019), 'Geopolitics and Grand Strategy', in J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, and C. S. Gray (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Analyses both the history and the contemporary relevance of geopolitics in an era of globalization.

Rodriques, T., Perez, R. G., and Ferreira, S. E. (2014), *The Globalization of International Security* (New York: Nova). Gives an overview of the way that globalization has affected defence, security, and strategy in the twenty-first century.

Waltz, K. N. (1959), *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press). Waltz's classic work is one of the best sources for the study of the causes of war.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Global political economy

NICOLA PHILLIPS

Framing Questions

- How should we think about power in the contemporary global political economy?
- How does International Political Economy (IPE) help us to understand what drives globalization and what is likely to be its future?
- What does IPE tell us about who wins and who loses from globalization?

Reader's Guide

International Political Economy (IPE) is a tremendously rich, exciting, and relevant field of study. It builds on varied theoretical foundations and covers a huge empirical terrain. Its vibrant debates centre on questions about power, asking what forms power takes in the global political economy, who or what exercises power, and with what political, economic, and social consequences. Wherever one looks, the developments in the global political economy which shape the world we live in and most affect our everyday lives speak directly to the themes and insights of IPE.

This chapter provides an introduction to the field and what it offers in the study of contemporary globalization. It begins with an overview of IPE's theoretical contours and how the major approaches in the field have evolved. The chapter then focuses on two core debates in IPE: what drives globalization; and who wins and who loses as a consequence. In discussing the first of these debates, it explores how globalization has unfolded and the different ways in which international political economists have understood the driving forces behind these processes. In discussing the second, it looks in more detail at the consequences of globalization, delving into IPE debates about inequality, labour exploitation, and global migration. It ends with a reflection on the future of globalization, in the context of the rise of nationalist politics in some parts of the world, including the United States, since the mid-2010s.

Introduction

IPE takes as its point of departure a very simple premise: that it is impossible to understand the evolution of world affairs without understanding how the political and the economic are intertwined. Perhaps more than any other field, IPE has staked a major claim to the study of 'globalization' (**see Box 16.1**), seeking to understand the array of processes, trends, actors, and arenas that the term encompasses. But in many ways, the field of IPE also developed as a *response* to the processes of structural change that were associated with globalization, building on well-established theoretical traditions in International Relations (IR), political science, and political economy, among other disciplines, in order to understand the changing global political economy.

Box 16.1 IPE or GPE?

A tussle has emerged in the field concerning what it should be called. International Political Economy is the most used label across scholarly communities, and provides a common vocabulary for the field, but it is clearly problematic. Many rightly view the 'I' to be misleading. The field is not concerned with relations among states (the 'inter-national'); rather, all of the processes of structural change are better considered to be global in scope, involving non-state and private actors as well as, or independently of, nation-states. The label Global Political Economy (GPE) has therefore found favour in some circles as an alternative, as it is deemed to capture more of the field's thematic and theoretical substance.

Some people go further to argue that both 'I' and 'G' are essentially unnecessary. All political economy is, by definition, international or global—one only has to go back to the classical thinkers in political economy, such as Adam Smith or Karl Marx, to understand that. Attaching 'I' or 'G' also draws inappropriate distinctions between this field and the field of *comparative* political economy (CPE), which has been associated with the field of political science rather than IR. In fact, we need both comparative perspectives (focusing on national and regional dynamics) and global perspectives in order to understand the contemporary world. 'Political economy', it is argued, is therefore enough. However, disciplinary boundaries are powerful things, and CPE and IPE unfortunately often remain somewhat distinct from one another.

Lastly, the labels also need to be used as descriptive nouns, rather than as the names of scholarly fields. We have already referred several times to *the* global political economy, connoting the real-world context defined by the political-economic processes and actors that are of interest. To avoid confusion, this chapter adopts the acronym IPE to refer to the field, and the noun 'the global political economy' to refer to the complex arena of change which is its focus.

The central questions in IPE revolve around the concept of power. Some accounts of the field's remit emphasize the relationship between power and wealth, which opens up a fascinating set of questions about how power is exercised and by whom, and with what consequences, in the contemporary global political economy. Others emphasize the relationship between public and private forms of power. Susan Strange, in one of the earliest statements about what the field of IPE should look like, framed this influentially as the relationship between 'states and markets' (Strange 1988). Many people, rightly, came to view this as too restrictive a definition, as states were not the only actors of significance in the global political economy. One modified definition saw IPE as being about 'the interrelationship between public and private power in the allocation of scarce resources' (Ravenhill 2014: 18)—a useful way of thinking about the broader scope of IPE which this chapter employs. For our purposes, public power can be understood as the authority concentrated in state institutions and actors, and by extension in state-led international organizations. Private power can be understood as the diverse forms of authority exercised by non-state institutions and actors, including firms and global markets, private regulatory bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (**see Ch. 22**), and social movements. The distinction between public and private power is inevitably blurred, and perhaps increasingly so. Many of the functions of public power are being assumed more and more by private actors and institutions, with important consequences for distribution and legitimacy in the global political economy.

IPE is not driven by a single, or even dominant, theoretical or methodological approach. Some strands of the field choose to define it as being concerned first and foremost with the study of institutions, and how institutions shape the possibilities and patterns of cooperation among states. Particularly in North America, institutionalist theories have been a major theoretical influence on the field. But this is not the full extent of IPE. Many other theoretical frameworks have been applied to study its subject matter, stretching across the conventional frameworks of liberalism, realism, and Marxism, and reaching deeply into newer theoretical currents and perspectives such as constructivism, feminism, and neo-Gramscian theory.

Likewise, IPE's rich thematic interests are generally considered to centre on the trio of trade, production,

and finance. But they reach much more widely, touching on all of the big issues in today's global political economy, including development, inequality, the environment, and migration. We are still feeling the after-effects of the global financial crisis, the most significant economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, which began in 2008 with the collapse of the US financial firm Lehman Brothers and was accompanied by a parallel debt crisis that engulfed southern Europe around the same time. Europe continues to grapple with the impact of an unprecedented refugee crisis which brings into sharp relief the political-economic dynamics of migration and security, at the same time as the United Kingdom's proposed exit from the European Union (EU) has raised existential questions about the future of the bloc and its integration project. China continues its rise to global economic dominance and increasing global political power, alongside a number of other 'rising powers', auguring a reorganization of the global order and the way it is governed. At the

same time, significant economic and political turmoil in some of those economies, such as Brazil, has led to a questioning of the more excited rhetoric about the 'rising powers' (**see Ch. 5**). The escalation of protectionist trade policies by the United States since President Donald Trump took office in 2016, bringing with it fears of a 'trade war' between China and the United States, is contributing to renewed anxiety about the health and stability of the global economy. Political battles continue over the power of transnational corporations (TNCs), notably in such matters as taxation and labour conditions in global production. The global environment appears to be under relentless threat, as the Trump administration consistently undermines multilateral agreements and rejects climate change science, and the President of Brazil elected in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, intends aggressively to roll back protection of the Amazon rainforest. The list of contemporary preoccupations for international political economists could go on and on.

Approaches to IPE

Introductions to IPE often refer back to the theoretical framing that Robert Gilpin set out in 1987, when the field was beginning to crystallize as a major subdiscipline of IR. In his now classic overview of the new field, he identified three main bodies of theory that underpinned the field: liberalism, Marxism, and nationalism (sometimes also called realism) (**see Chs 6**, **7, and 8**). These three labels quickly became a standard categorization of approaches, and often still provide the starting point of undergraduate and postgraduate syllabi in IPE.

More recently, the field has evolved in more diverse directions, embracing a wide range of bodies of theory to aid its task of understanding the distributive consequences of the interplay between private and public power. These 'newer' perspectives include social constructivism, evolving forms of rational choice theory and institutionalism, and varied directions in Marxist and critical thought, such as neo-Gramscian theory, feminist theories, and poststructuralism. Recalling the definition of IPE outlined at the start of the chapter, each of these bodies of theory brings to bear a different understanding of the nature of power, the relationship between public and private power, and the consequences for the distribution of material and power resources.

The liberal tradition in IPE builds on ideas about free markets and the view that markets are the most

efficient mechanism by which resources can be allocated. States are not invisible in this tradition, but their role should be limited to securing the conditions in which markets can operate as freely as possible, and correcting some of the undesirable consequences of their workings. A minimal role for the state builds on the idea that governments are subject to pressures from powerful interests in society, seeking advantages or 'rents' from government policies, and therefore that governments potentially distort the efficient operation of markets. The emphasis on both states and interests runs through contemporary neoliberal theories of IPE. Institutionalism, as noted above, is concerned first and foremost with patterns of cooperation among states, and how the 'inter-national' dynamics of power, refracted through the creation of national and international institutions, shape outcomes in terms of collective action among states (Keohane 1984; Milner 1997). Rational choice theory, by extension, is concerned with the strategic decisions made by actors in the global political economy; it assumes that actors are 'rational' in their decision-making processes, possess fixed interests and preferences, and adapt to particular structures of incentives (Aggarwal and Dupont 2014).

Conversely, nationalist or realist perspectives on IPE focus closely on 'inter-national' relations among states

and see the global political economy as being shaped by competition among states to maximize their power and security (Krasner 1976). Their interest in political economy centres on economic policy decisions by states that are assumed to be pursuing the goals of economic nationalism and independence. However, they reserve particular attention for the role of hegemonic power in the global political economy, focusing on whether and how one hegemonic state can create and enforce rules to maximize the stability of the system, often through the creation of institutions.

By comparison, Marxism and its neo-Marxist off-shoots are concerned with the system—the *structure* of the global political economy—which is defined by capitalism. Capitalism is understood to be about competition between interests, as in liberal and nationalist theories, but interests here are understood not through the primary prism of states and governments, but rather as relating to class. The dynamics of the global political economy are, in this sense, about the conflict inherent in capitalism between those who own the means of production and those who are oppressed as a means of generating 'surplus value' or profit in the system. Neo-Marxist theories associated with the schools of dependency theory and world systems theory, which were particularly influential in the 1960s and 1970s, transposed these insights to a global level, arguing that the global economy was divided into a 'core' and a 'periphery', and that class conflict was international or global in scale (Frank 1967; Dos Santos 1970; Wallerstein 1979).

More recently, Marxist perspectives have been married with insights from the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (R. Cox 1981, 1987); this strand of theoretical thinking has become particularly influential as a part of a broader universe of 'critical' IPE. This body of work has advanced the core Marxist concern with the power structures that underpin capitalism, but also placed more emphasis than in previous phases on the 'ideology', or sets of ideas, that themselves form a part of the structure of the global political economy.

In this regard, these critical currents in IPE share some terrain with social constructivist approaches (Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010). The core question here concerns how ideas shape outcomes in the global political economy. One strand of this research focuses on questions of ideology, and how dominant ideologies—such as the free market ideas associated with neoliberalism—themselves structure the world around us and the principles or 'logics' by which it functions. Other strands focus more on how ideas

inform the decisions which public and private actors take, and more specifically the interests that define their preferences. Whereas Marxist theorists would see these interests as being defined by class or position in the capitalist structure, and rational choice theorists would ascribe them to incentive structures that actors face, social constructivists are more interested in the ideational dimensions of interest formation: how individual perceptions and cultural influences can combine to shape patterns of ideas, and, in turn, how particular sets of ideas become dominant in the global political economy, and with what consequences (**see Ch. 12**).

Feminist approaches to IPE bring many of these concerns together (Peterson 2003; Bakker and Silvey 2008). While theoretical orientations differ among feminist scholars, they are united in a focus on how the power structures, interests, and ideas that underpin the global political economy are fundamentally gendered in their nature and consequences. Other chapters in this volume highlight many of the questions that animate feminist theories of IPE, including the many dimensions of the 'gendered division of labour' (**see Chs 9 and 17**).

There are many other theoretical approaches to IPE and many other theoretical influences. It is not possible to survey them all in detail here, nor even to do full justice to the depth and richness of those mentioned above. However, this brief overview has highlighted two aspects of IPE. First, IPE has come a long way since its early conception as resting on the trilogy of liberalism, nationalism/realism, and Marxism. It has become a flag under which many ships have been able to sail, departing from different theoretical shores and traversing the expansive thematic waters that characterize the field.

Second, IPE is a highly diverse field; sometimes what divides the field can be more apparent than what unites it. Even so, IPE's principal approaches are united by a common set of theoretical and conceptual pillars. While very different, and placing their emphasis in dramatically different ways, it can be said that all of the above theories rest on three ingredients of the study of political economy—material capabilities, institutions, and ideas (R. Cox 1981). As the introduction to this volume discussed, each body of theory will paint these ingredients in different colours, will understand the relationship among them in different ways, and will produce different pictures of the outcomes of their interactions. But they stand as the core ontological building blocks of approaches to IPE, providing a useful starting point for exploring some of the field's main issues and themes.

What drives globalization?

Globalization is not new. What we refer to as 'globalization' in IPE relates to the latest, contemporary phase in a long-standing historical process. This phase can be said to have started in the 1960s and 1970s. It is also often referred to as 'neoliberal' globalization, denoting the ideological principles on which it rests, and the forms of political-economic organization that it has ushered in. However, the globalization of the world economy began much earlier than this conventionally indicated starting point. Many histories of globalization go back to the sixteenth century in tracing the advent of a world economy, for centuries centred on Europe and organized around European colonialism, moving through the Industrial Revolution to the late nineteenth-century world order of expanding world trade, imperialism, technological advances, and the introduction of the international **Gold Standard** as the basis for coordinating international currency arrangements. The early twentieth century saw the outbreak of the First World War, and with it the abandonment of the Gold Standard, the proliferation of barriers to trade, and the period of worldwide recession commonly called the 'Great Depression' in the 1930s, followed by the Second World War.

Towards the end of the Second World War, two commitments were shaped which laid the foundations for the post-war international economic order (Ravenhill 2014: 13). The first was what John Ruggie (1982) famously termed 'embedded liberalism', in which governments reached a compromise between the twin objectives of safeguarding their domestic economies and pursuing the goal of full employment to aid post-war recovery, on the one hand, and, on the other, opening up domestic economies in order to re-establish the footing for international trade and investment flows. The second commitment was to the construction of an institutional architecture capable of sustaining the stability of the world economic order and achieving renewed prosperity following the period of war in Europe and Asia. The result was the

so-called Bretton Woods system, named for the location of an international meeting held in 1944, which yielded the creation of the major international economic institutions that still characterize the multilateral landscape: the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Bank (which was originally called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, the project to rebuild Europe generated a process of deepening European integration, with the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, laying the foundations for the European Economic Community (EEC) and eventually the European Union (EU).

The result was the achievement of unprecedented rates of economic growth and advances in living standards in the post-1945 period, leading the renowned historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994) to refer to this period as a 'Golden Age'. However, not all of the countries and regions of the world enjoyed this accelerating growth and developmental progress, and the gap between what were called at the time the 'developed' world and the 'developing' worlds widened. At the same time that many economies in East Asia were achieving rapid growth, leading to talk of an 'East Asian miracle', other regions, notably Africa, were falling further and further behind.

Two schools of thought emerged to explain this divergence in development trajectories. The first, modernization theory, popular in the 1950s and 1960s, mapped out a route to development based on the experiences of what many referred to as the 'advanced' Western world, plotting a path for the less developed countries to 'catch up', in the parlance of the time, with North America and Europe. Following this prescribed path to modernization would yield developmental success; deviating from this route would result in developmental failure. Hence the divergence in development trajectories was understood as a result of inappropriate strategies and

the absence in the developing world of the political and cultural characteristics of Western 'modernity'.

The second, underdevelopment theory, which gained currency in the 1960s, took a different view. Its variants drew on Marxist perspectives to argue that 'catching up' was not possible for all, because, alongside the lasting effects of colonialism, the fundamental truth about capitalism was that development depended on underdevelopment. In other words, the Third World's continuing underdevelopment was not a product of its failure, but rather a result of structural limitations to the possibilities for it to achieve development. The '**terms of trade**' in the international economy—a concept which highlights the relative competitiveness of national economies by measuring the relationship between the price that a country's exports can command in international markets and the price that country pays for its imports—worked systematically against the Third World and its development prospects. In André Gunder Frank's famous formulations, capitalism generates 'economic development for the few and underdevelopment for the many', as 'development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin' (Frank 1967: 8–9).

The 1970s marked the end of the Golden Age. The decision in 1971 by the administration of US President Richard Nixon to allow the dollar to float freely is commonly viewed as the starting point of the contemporary globalization of financial markets. The oil crisis of 1973 ushered in a period of '**stagflation**'—economic stagnation combined with high inflation—prompting a period of crisis across the advanced industrialized world. To make matters worse, a turn by countries such as the United States to greater trade protectionism—the erection of barriers to restrain free trade—undermined the post-war commitment to economic openness.

Meanwhile, the evolution of the Bretton Woods institutions had sowed seeds of discontent among developing countries. They viewed the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT system either as neglectful of developing countries' interests, or as being organized in such a way that their interests were systematically marginalized. In other words, the governments of developing countries encountered a multilateral system in which they had very limited bargaining power, and which functioned to serve the interests of the powerful states and capitalist forces. Together with the possibilities that high oil prices and control over commodities afforded, these concerns led developing countries to turn to each other in an effort to rectify the disadvantageous terms on which they were integrated into the international

economy. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) were key political movements that emerged over the 1960s and 1970s, oriented to reducing developing economies' dependence on the international economy as well as their vulnerability to adverse terms of trade.

However, a series of economic and political developments prevented these movements from bringing about conclusive adjustments to the power structures of the world order. Following an explosion of available credit in the international economy over the 1960s and 1970s, many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, had borrowed extensively in international financial markets and accumulated massive amounts of debt. The debt crisis that ensued at the start of the 1980s, triggered by the US government raising interest rates, both caused these debts rapidly to become unpayable and acted as a significant brake on development in the affected countries. At the same time, conservative governments were elected in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere; they interpreted the experience of stagflation, growing state intervention (especially in Europe), and resurgent political conflict to signal the exhaustion of the post-war model associated with the Golden Age.

So started the 'neoliberal counter-revolution' (Toye 1993). Strongly associated with the traditions of Western liberal thought, the neoliberal counter-revolution was based on the assumption that 'human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade' (Harvey 2005: 2). This assumption quickly gained the status of orthodoxy—neatly summed up in the phrase ascribed to UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 'there is no alternative'—and formed the basis for the development of a distinctive policy agenda to achieve an extensive programme of trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization worldwide. This programme was broken down into something resembling a 'recipe' of policy change, which came to be called the **Washington Consensus** (**see Box 16.2**).

The Washington Consensus was rolled out aggressively across the developing world, with the Bretton Woods institutions becoming the main channels for this purpose. Their 'structural adjustment programmes' (SAPs)—programmes imposing major economic policy reform packages on developing countries—made compliance with these Washington Consensus prescriptions a condition of access to loans and financing from those institutions, which developing countries needed urgently

Box 16.2 The policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus

- Maintenance of fiscal discipline (budget deficits should not exceed 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP))
- Reordering of public expenditure priorities (reduction and elimination of subsidies; prioritization of spending in education, health, and infrastructure)
- Tax reform (broadening of tax base; maintenance of 'moderate' marginal tax rates)
- Maintenance of positive real interest rates (to discourage capital flight and increase savings)
- Maintenance of 'competitive' exchange rates
- Trade liberalization
- Elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment
- Privatization of state-owned enterprises
- Deregulation of the economy
- Enforcement of property rights

Williamson 1990

to achieve growth and development following the debt crisis. Colin Leys put it well when he observed that, by the end of the 1980s, 'the only development policy that was officially approved was not having one—leaving it to the market to allocate resources, not the state' (Leys 1996: 42).

Yet neoliberalism was not just about domestic policy change. It pushed forward a vision of the global political economy as resting on deregulated and globalized financial markets, free trade, and globalized production structures in which TNCs were free to roam the world and organize their production activities wherever they found the most conducive conditions. The globalization of trade, finance, and production are discussed in finer-grained detail elsewhere in this volume (**see Ch. 27**). The extent to which any of these facets of globalization have been achieved fully remains open to debate: is global trade really 'free', for example, or indeed 'global'? The question of whether the process of 'globalization' has stalled in the first two decades of the twenty-first century will also pre-occupy us for some years to come, and we will reflect on this towards the end of the chapter. Nevertheless, the far-reaching and on-going consequences of neoliberal globalization cannot be doubted, and debates rage in IPE about their implications for the distribution of power and wealth. Before considering these debates, however, let us first look through IPE lenses at the question of what has driven these processes of global political-economic change.

One set of interpretations highlights the role of ideas and ideology in driving global political-economic change. Scholars associated with 'critical' strands of IPE have been particularly keen to expose the ideological underpinnings of globalization. Robert Cox, the foundational voice in articulating a critical approach to IPE, established the core insight that the ideational and material dimensions of power are 'always bound together, mutually reinforcing one another, and not reducible one to the other' (R. Cox 1983: 168). Material power relates to control over material resources, including raw materials, capital, and markets, and was traditionally more commonly the focus across the field of IPE. Yet ideational power is arguably even more important: that is, the particular ways of thinking about the global political economy that neoliberalism has come to impose on a wide variety of public and private actors. Just as neoliberalism is 'constructed' as an ideological project (Peck 2010), so too is globalization 'constructed' by sets of ideas and associated discourses that have come to represent a 'common sense' of the contemporary era.

A second set of interpretations focuses on the powerful interests and institutions that drive globalization. According to this perspective, the processes of change that make up globalization are driven by the changing political landscape in which, above all, powerful corporate interests have risen to dominance. These include both financial corporations (banks and other financial firms) and non-financial corporations associated with global production. The power of these private actors is not a new phenomenon—think, for instance, of the power of the East India Company or its counterpart, the Dutch East India Company, in the early seventeenth century. But it is nevertheless the case that the rapid rise of the multinational corporation, more commonly now called the TNC, was the key phenomenon of the post-war world economy. TNCs are now considered to be among the most powerful actors in the global political economy, increasingly able to dictate the terms of production and trade, and the key driving forces behind globalization. However, this does not mean that states are now irrelevant in driving or governing globalization (**see Opposing Opinions 16.1**). As much as TNCs wield enormous political power and we can find ample evidence of their using this power to ensure that governments act in accordance with their preferences, states and international institutions have also been—and remain—pivotal to creating the conditions in which TNCs can operate.

A third perspective on the drivers of global political-economic change underscores the role of **technological revolution** in creating the conditions for globalization. Firms and economic actors are able to operate globally

Opposing Opinions 16.1 National states are irrelevant in an era of economic globalization

For

National states are ill-equipped to govern globalization. The processes associated with globalization are, by definition, global. They are beyond the capacities of national states to govern. Authority in the global political economy has therefore been dispersed to a wide array of private actors, civil society actors, and international organizations that are more able to govern 'transnationally'.

Markets and global capital have undermined states' power and authority. Global capital operates beyond the political control of states. The deregulation of finance and liberalization of trade have eroded the power that states previously were able to exercise over economic processes and actors.

TNCs' political power far exceeds that of many governments. TNCs are able to wield their political power, especially across the developing world, to diminish the capacity of states and governments to regulate effectively. States wanting to attract investment and trade are bound by the preferences of foreign capital and TNCs.

Global processes have eroded policy space. Governments are no longer able to control national borders, and policy autonomy has been eroded by the need to accommodate global economic and political forces.

Against

Nation-states remain an essential part of global governance. Many of the major international organizations are intergovernmental in character. Nation-states remain the point of reference for many civil society organizations. They are also pivotal in putting in place the governance conditions in which globalization can thrive, and in providing mechanisms of democratic accountability for its consequences.

Powerful states have been the 'authors' of globalization. Propelled by the dictates of neoliberalism, states themselves have been responsible for their decreased role in economic governance, as they continually act to maintain the conditions for deregulation and liberalization. States are often in conflict with private actors, but not because they have been 'eroded'.

Not all states act the same. Some states are more active in regulating global economic processes and actors than others. It is an excessive generalization to suggest that states have become passive in the face of corporate power.

Governments retain significant policy discretion. National policy frameworks vary considerably, and governments retain control over a wide array of policy instruments. As the experience of the global financial crisis shows, states are instrumental in managing economic crises and dealing with the consequences of economic instability. The surge of nationalism in some countries in the 2010s, along with the global economic policies pursued by the US administration of Donald Trump since 2016, also demonstrate that there is no inevitability that state policy will be consistent with neoliberal globalization.

1. Do TNCs now run the world, rather than national governments?

2. In what ways have states, in different parts of the world, adapted to deal with the challenges of globalization?

3. Does it make any sense to talk in general about 'national states' in debating these issues, or should we distinguish between different types of states?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

as a result of the compression of time and space that has been achieved by the evolution of information technologies. Territory and distance are no longer barriers to international economic exchange, and economic transactions have become 'virtual' in character: money moves around the world not in physical form, but instantaneously through computers. The logistics revolution, through advances in such areas as refrigeration technologies and transportation and distribution methods, has also enabled the globalization of production and trade in a way that could barely have been envisaged even 50 years ago. Seen through IPE lenses, then, control over technology is a key attribute

of material power. The story of globalization is at least in part a story of the forms of political and economic activity that technological advances have facilitated, and the power that control over technology can confer on particular actors in the global political economy.

Finally, a fourth interpretation directs attention to the power of states. For much of the time that IPE has existed as a field, this power has been centred in the United States. The origins of neoliberal globalization coincided with the consolidation of US post-war hegemony and the period denoted by it, often called the Pax Americana. Indeed, with its origins in the discipline of IR, much early IPE scholarship was concerned first and

foremost with questions of US hegemonic power and its implications for patterns of cooperation among states and the institutional apparatus of world politics. Just as important is the connection drawn between the globalization project and a set of distinctively US economic interests, in particular the links between the rise of the TNC and the consolidation of US economic power. For some scholars in critical IPE, the debate is more usefully about how the neoliberal globalization project is associated with an idea of US 'imperialism', facilitating the global dissemination of a distinctive ideological agenda and a set of material interests, channelled through the power structures of international institutions.

However, the vision of globalization as the expression of state power is slowly but surely changing. It can no longer be assumed unproblematically that the US occupies a position of global dominance: the rise of China and other states has disrupted this equation of globalization with US hegemony. In one sense, globalization has accelerated as China, India, and the countries of the former Soviet bloc have become increasingly integrated into the global political economy since the

Case Study 16.1 The BRICs and the rise of China

Donald Trump and Vice Premier Liu He of the People's Republic of China speak in the Oval Office

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Since the late 1980s, the dramatic growth of the Chinese and Indian economies, and that of some other emerging economies, has been one of the most notable features of the global political economy. This group of countries have attracted various labels, of which the 'rising powers' and the 'BRICs' became the most popular—the latter acronym referring to the principal countries deemed to fall within the group: Brazil, Russia, India, and China (**see Case Study 5.1**). The term BRICs was first coined in 2001 by Jim O'Neill, then chief economist at Goldman Sachs, to identify the four economies that had the potential to become the largest and most influential economies in the twenty-first century. South Africa is often added to that list. In reality, all of these economies and countries are very different, and it is considered by many a big stretch to include them all in a single category. But this label nevertheless caught on, particularly in global financial and policy communities.

China is of course the key economy in this grouping, becoming the world's largest exporter in 2010, and in 2014 overtaking Japan for the first time as the world's second largest economy. Predictions that the Chinese economy will have outstripped the US economy to become indisputably the world's largest by 2050 run alongside continued concerns about slowing growth and fears of impending recession. Since 2016, the Chinese currency, the yuan, has been included in the basket of currencies used by the IMF, thus becoming an international reserve currency. China's increasing economic power has also been evident in its pursuit of assets and opportunities across the world, with regions such as Africa and Latin America becoming major destinations for Chinese investment. China is the largest foreign holder of US debt. In mid-2018 its holdings of US Treasury bonds, bills, and notes reached some US$1.2 trillion, equivalent to about 20 per cent of US debt held by foreign countries, and some 5 per cent of total debt. If the Chinese were to sell off large quantities of this debt, or stop buying US debt in the future, the implications for the US economy—and by extension the global economy—would be very serious indeed.

The election of Donald Trump in the United States in 2016 ushered in a period of increasing economic tension between China and the US. Trump's rhetoric has consistently centred on the 'unfair' trade advantage enjoyed by the Chinese economy, and its implications for the jobs and wages of American workers. This rhetoric crystallized in an escalating trade dispute in 2018, when the imposition by the US of tariffs on imports of goods from China (as well as some other countries) led to retaliatory tariffs imposed by China, raising the prospect of a destabilizing 'trade war' between the two largest economies in the world.

The questions for students of IPE are pressing. Is China's rise fuelling the emergence of a new global political-economic order, replacing the order based on neoliberal globalization and US hegemony? What are the consequences for global governance of China's increasing power and political assertiveness? What are likely to be the political and economic consequences of significant tension, or indeed a trade war, between China and the United States? Are we once again looking at an accelerating trend towards protectionism in the global economy? The short answer is that it remains too soon to know, but it is clear both that the implications of China's rise will be significant, and that what happens in and around the Chinese economy has wide-ranging repercussions for the global economy.

Question 1: In what ways and to what extent is China now a major economic power in the world?

Question 2: Are the 'rising powers' overturning the established global political-economic order?

start of the 1990s. In a different sense, their rise—particularly that of China—appears to be upending the established order, especially with regard to economic power (**see Case Study 16.1**). At the same time, it can no longer be assumed that powerful states are sponsoring globalization. The rise of nationalist populist politics across some parts of the world, including in the United States under the administration of Donald Trump, has featured a form of 'anti-globalism' which cuts against the pillars of neoliberal globalization, and could reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to 'roll back' the advance of global economic liberalization.

Key Points

- Globalization is not new, but rather is a process that has proceeded through many phases since the sixteenth century.

- The post-war period was characterized by an increase in international cooperation to restore stability in the international economic order, and re-establish economic openness following an extended period of war and crisis.

- The latest phase of globalization is associated with neoliberalism, emerging as a response to the economic crisis of the 1970s and the ascendance of neoliberal ideas about how the global political economy should be organized.

- IPE scholars emphasize a range of drivers behind contemporary globalization, which include the role of ideology and ideas, the power of private economic interests, the technological revolution, and the evolution of state power.

- There is increasing debate as to whether globalization is now stalling or being 'rolled back', as nationalist, anti-globalist politics have become dominant in the United States and elsewhere.

Who wins and who loses from globalization?

Readers will recall that our definition of the field of IPE placed emphasis on the interaction between public and private power in shaping how scarce resources are distributed. In other words, IPE provides rich material for understanding who wins and who loses from globalization. We will focus our attention here on a number of issues that shed interesting light on the dynamics of distribution in the global political economy: globalization and inequality; globalization and labour exploitation; and globalization and migration.

Globalization and inequality

Much debate in IPE has revolved around the relationship between globalization, poverty, and inequality. It is generally accepted that expectations that neoliberal globalization would lift the world's population out of poverty have been misplaced. Between 1990 and 2015, the World Bank estimates that the number of people living in extreme poverty fell to under 10 per cent of the global population. It estimates a slight further decline for 2018 to 8.6 per cent, although, significantly, the rate of improvement also slowed between 2015 and 2018 (World Bank 2018). However, these aggregate figures hide the uneven nature of this progress. The East Asian and Pacific regions account for the bulk of the good news on global poverty, where the dramatic decline in poverty in China has been particularly noteworthy. In Latin America, the data are heavily skewed by upward trends in the large economies, specifically in Mexico and Brazil. Sub-Saharan Africa now accounts for most of the world's poor, with 41 per cent of the region's population living in poverty in 2015. The numbers there were also rising in 2018, rather than declining as in the rest of the world. Significantly, while there has been an overall drop in extreme poverty across the world, there has been much less progress on poverty in general: the number of people living between the $1.25 per day extreme poverty line and the $2 per day poverty line in fact doubled between 1981 and 2008 (World Bank 2012). Despite some good news on global poverty during the period of neoliberal globalization, therefore, it is fair to say that we have not seen the improvements that many thought globalization would bring about.

However, the major trend of our time has been explosive growth in levels of *inequality*, which can rightly be considered to be 'without historical precedent and without conceivable justification—economic, moral or otherwise' (Pieterse 2002: 1024). Yet, critically, it is not primarily a worsening of poverty that has produced greater levels of inequality; rather, it is the dramatic acceleration of wealth accumulation that has caused such a stretching of the spectrum. During the 1990s, the world's rich benefited disproportionately from global growth, while the poor's per capita consumption increased at only half the average global rate (Edward 2006). Between 1993 and 2001, somewhere between 50 and 60 per cent of the increase in world consumption accrued to about

10 per cent of the world's population (Wade 2014: 327). In early 2018, Oxfam's annual calculations revealed that 82 per cent of the wealth generated in 2017 went to the richest 1 per cent of the global population, while the 3.7 billion people who make up the poorest half of the world saw no increase in their wealth at all. Oxfam charts an annual increase in billionaire wealth by an average of 13 per cent since 2010, which exceeds annual average wage growth by six times over the same period, and an unprecedented increase in the number of billionaires between March 2016 and March 2017 (Oxfam 2018).

The question for students of IPE is how to explain these vast divergences in wealth, and the fact that the gaps continue to widen. Does globalization *cause* greater levels of inequality—and if so, does it matter? Views differ dramatically. Some contend that inequality is not a problem so long as everyone is getting richer: what does it matter if we have more billionaires than ever, generating wealth, if extreme poverty is falling and the possibilities for social mobility are greater than ever? According to this logic, globalization is the key to everyone getting richer, as it provides opportunities and removes barriers to development.

Others hold that the dynamics of globalization itself are responsible for growing inequality. While globalization has created opportunities for the massive accumulation of wealth by global elites, it has also left untouched the structural features of the global economy that work against development for large parts of the world and their population. In addition, the skewed distribution of power in the global political economy ensures that inequalities remain entrenched. And yes, this argument holds, inequality *does* matter: if we look across the world in the mid-2010s, for instance, one of the dominant themes in national politics is the backlash from those who are on the sharp end of globalization, those who are on the losing side of inequality, and those who feel 'left out' of the benefits that globalization was supposed to bring. This has been a powerful explanation for political events, including the election of nationalist and populist leaders in many countries, the outcome of the UK referendum on 'Brexit' in 2016, and instances of civil unrest such as the rioting in Paris at the end of 2018.

Globalization and labour exploitation

The second theme of this section, labour exploitation in the global economy, is also associated strongly with the dynamics of inequality. Recall that Marxist theory teaches that labour exploitation is an intrinsic feature of capitalism, as the outcome of the class conflict between capital and labour. But one does not have to be a Marxist theorist to recognize that global production is built on processes which maximize the profits for firms and private actors, and that one of the ways in which this happens relates to the conditions in which people across the world work.

Many sectors of global production are marked by intense competition. TNCs coordinating networks of global production put huge commercial pressures on producers and supplier firms with regard to cost and supply conditions. Producers and suppliers in turn frequently seek to manage these pressures by reducing the share constituted by labour in production costs. To do so, they emphasize the maintenance of a highly 'flexible' workforce—the ability to hire and fire at will in order to respond to changing conditions, to hire workers without any formal contract or on short-term contracts that do not involve extensive obligations in relation to rights and entitlements, to keep wages low, and to make sure workers are easily 'disposable'. The globalization of production has advanced as firms have sought the advantages of cheap and **flexible labour** across the world, with little or no regulation by national governments of their activities.

A direct consequence is the explosion of precarious, insecure, unprotected, and exploitative conditions of work, which have become the hallmark of the global political economy. Informal, migrant, and contract workers have become the backbone of the global labour force. This labour force has also become strongly 'feminized', and women workers are among the most vulnerable to exploitation in many arenas of the global economy. The concept of 'sweatshops' has been familiar for several decades, and there have been many instances in which large corporations have been exposed for sweatshop conditions in factories and other appalling abuses of workers' rights. Nike, Gap, Amazon, and Apple are all examples of the large numbers of brand firms that have suffered damaging exposures of working conditions in their supply chains, some of which have responded by trying to position themselves at the forefront of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda. Across the world we encounter the problems of zero-hours contracts, poor and exploitative conditions of work, and low wages. At the extreme end of the spectrum of labour exploitation are production models reliant on the use of forced labour and child labour (**see Case Study 16.2**).

Globalization and migration

The final theme in this section, migration, provides a fascinating insight into the dynamics of inequality in the global political economy. We live in an 'Age of Migration' (Castles and Miller 2009), in which the

Case Study 16.2 Slavery and forced labour in global production

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The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated in 2017 that there were 24.9 million people working in conditions of forced labour across the world. Of these, about 16 million were in the private economy, 4.8 million in forced sexual exploitation, and 4.1 million in forced labour imposed by state authorities. The ILO also estimated that 152 million children were in child labour across the world (ILO 2017).

The problems of forced labour are encountered in all parts of the world, including in those countries we tend to think of as 'rich'. In Brazil, government data indicated that 21,000 workers were released from conditions defined as 'slave labour' between 2003 and 2010, as a result of a major effort to address the problem of slavery in that country. These workers were mainly in the agricultural economy, in sectors such as sugar cane, cattle ranching, charcoal, and coffee. The 2018 Global Slavery Index (GSI) estimated that there may still be as many as 369,000 people working in conditions of slavery in Brazil. To give a handful of further examples, the estimated figure is 136,000 in the UK, 610,000 in Thailand, 1,045,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 129,000 in France, and 3,186,000 in Pakistan (GSI 2018).

Forced labour also occurs across a wide range of industries and sectors that make up the mainstream of global production, encompassing manufacturing, agricultural, and extractive industries. The United States Department of Labor (2018) confidently identifies 148 goods from 76 countries as being produced using forced or child labour, and its list of suspected goods is very much longer. It is generally thought that we all have garments in our wardrobes made using forced or child labour, will routinely eat food whose ingredients are produced using forced labour, and will conduct our working and personal lives using computers, mobile phones, and other electronic devices produced by people working in these conditions.

Forced labour takes a huge variety of forms. Workers are often coerced into labour arrangements in which there are no formal contracts, and where they assume debts to employers or recruiters, meaning that they are unable to leave, and these debts are manipulated so as to become unpayable. Wages are withheld until the end of a period of time, and then are not paid or paid at pittance levels. Workers are prevented from freely leaving jobs through imprisonment and coercive restrictions on their physical movement, threatened or actual violence (against them and family members or co-workers), and/or the confiscation of documents and possessions. Severely exploitative conditions are invariably associated with harsh, degrading, and dangerous conditions of work, violations of workers' labour rights and often human rights, and diverse forms of coercion and manipulation designed to make people work harder, for longer, and for less money in intensely competitive and cost-driven commercial environments.

Question 1: What forms does forced labour take in global production?

Question 2: Is it surprising that forced labour remains so common in the contemporary global economy?

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number of international migrants reached 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 (UN 2017*a*). Of course, migration is not new: it has underpinned the history of humanity. But what *is* new about the contemporary period is that migration flows are now truly 'global'—no longer centred on Europe or on a 'south–north' movement from poorer to richer countries, but now in large proportion also 'south–south'. Much of this south–south movement involves migration within regions, such as Southeast Asia, southern Africa, or South America. The key phenomenon in China, Brazil, and elsewhere is also that of massive internal movements of people within countries, which are not captured in these estimated figures on inter-state migration. Migration shapes the political economy of all regions of the world. It is impossible to understand the contemporary global political economy, and the

processes wrapped up under the heading 'globalization', without understanding migration.

The many different faces of migration reflect the contours of global inequality discussed above. In the context of neoliberalism, the outcomes for different kinds of migrants are very different. At one end of the spectrum, highly mobile, highly paid, highly educated professionals use their global mobility as a means of generating opportunities for themselves. Their mobility oils the wheels of global economic activity in sectors as diverse as commerce, finance, education, and medicine. At the other end of the spectrum is the kind of global labour force described in the previous section, where migrants are disproportionately represented in the low-paid, low-skill parts of global production, or in sectors supplying services to the more privileged, professional parts of society, including 'lifestyle' services such as

domestic work. Such patterns of migration connected with domestic service are global, and include as examples the movement of workers from the Philippines to Hong Kong, Mexico to the United States, Nicaragua to Costa Rica, or Indonesia to the United Arab Emirates, as well as movement within countries.

The realities of precarious employment are magnified by the particular vulnerabilities of migrant workers. Migrant workers often lack the power to engage in political action concerning wages and working conditions, and they do not possess the rights and entitlements associated with citizenship or residency. Laws governing immigration or internal movements often act to strip workers of labour or welfare protections, and constrain their ability to seek satisfactory working conditions by changing employers. These laws can also provide mechanisms for employers to manipulate workers, particularly if they are undocumented, such as the threat of denunciation to immigration authorities. The global migrant labour force is strongly associated with economic need and the requirements of supporting families at home.

In one sense, this suggests that migrant workers are among the losers from globalization. The deregulation of labour markets, the power of private firms, the retraction of welfare and social protection under neoliberalism, the demand for abundant and cheap labour in global production, and the massive accumulation of wealth in some sections of society—all

have fuelled a situation in which many migrant workers have found themselves at the sharp end of globalization. An alternative viewpoint would argue that increased possibilities for mobility under globalization have presented opportunities for people to migrate to earn better wages, achieve better levels of education, and enhance their social mobility. Clearly, much depends on how migration is *governed* in the global political economy, particularly in relation to working conditions for migrant workers and the kinds of government policies that govern immigration or the movement of people.

Conversely, an IPE lens reveals that migration is itself a driver of globalization. This is not just in an economic sense, relating to the construction of a highly flexible global labour force, or the supply of global talent to particular industries. Migration also has important implications for the global economy, because increasing levels of global migration are associated with vast flows of money through global and national financial systems. Officially recorded remittances to the developing world—the sums of money that migrants send home to their families—stood at $413 billion in 2016 (UN 2017*a*). Finally, migration has important cultural implications. Particularly in the world's 'global cities' (Sassen 2001), migration has played an important part in some of the dramatic cultural changes that we associate with globalization, and consequently the emergence of new political dynamics across the world.

Key Points

- IPE is concerned with the distribution of power and material resources in the global political economy, and lively debates centre on who wins and who loses from globalization.

- Globalization has been associated with a dramatic widening of inequality, between and within countries, and between and within social groups.

- Labour exploitation underpins the generation of wealth and profits in the global political economy.

- Migration has become truly 'global' in its scope, associated with the movement of highly paid professionals at one end of the spectrum, and low-paid, low-skill workers at the other.

- Migration is itself a driver of globalization, in both economic and cultural terms.

The future of globalization

As a historical process, globalization has not unfolded in a linear fashion, and the account of globalization that we outlined earlier in this chapter included many twists and turns. At the end of the 2010s, we have arrived at a point where we are once again questioning the future of globalization, as anti-globalist, nativistic, and populist

strains of politics have gained ground in countries as diverse as the United States, Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines, France, and the United Kingdom, among others. Across the world, left-leaning politics have long been characterized by a questioning of the value of globalization, given all of its uneven social and economic

consequences as we have outlined in this chapter. Does this mean that the process known as 'globalization' has now run aground?

In many ways, this conclusion is probably premature. We should be wary of basing sweeping assumptions about the historical significance of change on recent turns of events. It remains to be seen whether the system of globalization will hold, so to speak, and withstand this moment of resurgent nationalism. Much also depends on what we mean by 'globalization'. We can legitimately distinguish between globalization as a historical process and its current neoliberal incarnation. It might be valid to conclude that neoliberal globalization is under significant strain: indeed, we have been talking about the exhaustion of the neoliberal model for some time. But this model is not the only possibility. As we have seen, while it does not conform with the neoliberal development model, the rise of China remains premised on a particular vision of globalization—and indeed is marked by a globalist outlook. It may be that rather than witnessing its demise, we are in the process of shifting to the next phase in the historical evolution of globalization, one perhaps shaped more by China and the rising powers than by the United States and other Western powers. Yet we do not know what this alternative model will look like, nor how politically and economically acceptable it would be.

Alternatively, it may be that the forces of globalization are now so powerful—centring on the enormous weight of financial and non-financial corporations—that the status quo will be maintained despite a prolonged period of turbulence. The 2008 financial crisis was widely expected to usher in significant change in the way the global political economy is governed, especially in relation to financial regulation, but this has not proved to be the case. A further scenario is that the nationalist impetus could prevail, as the values of internationalism and **globalism** are overwhelmed once again by reactionary populist politics. At the very least, to avoid this scenario, there will need to be a convincing response to the crushing inequalities in the global political economy which we have touched on in this chapter.

Key Points

- At the end of the 2010s, we have arrived at a point where we are once again questioning the future of globalization, as anti-globalist, nativistic, and populist strains of politics have gained ground in diverse countries.

- We should be wary of putting too much weight on current and recent events in predicting the future of globalization.

- Nevertheless, the current neoliberal model of globalization is clearly under significant strain, and it is not yet clear what the future will hold.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the rich resources that IPE offers for understanding globalization. It has emphasized that IPE is a tremendously diverse field, encompassing a range of theoretical and methodological traditions and an expansive terrain of empirical interests. Debates about the nature and consequences of globalization continue to rage in IPE, and this chapter has captured some of them by focusing on two areas of contestation: what drives globalization, and who wins and loses from the processes associated with it.

What will the future of IPE hold? No doubt, the lively debates—and disputes—among different parts of the field will continue to thrive. Diverse theoretical preferences and different methods of analysis will continue to vie with one another for greater purchase on the subject matter of IPE. When these debates are

conducted in the spirit of open exchanges of perspective and view, they are hugely valuable in advancing the field and enriching the work that goes on within it. But greater dialogue among different schools of IPE is also desirable and important, based on a recognition that starting with the big questions, and bringing a range of theoretical perspectives and methods to bear on the task of answering them, can only enhance the breadth and depth of our understanding. After all, much is at stake in understanding how the global political economy works, and in whose interests.

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Questions

1. What are the key differences among the major theoretical perspectives in IPE, and where, if at all, do they share common ground?
2. What were the characteristics of the post-war international economic order, and what were the reasons for its eventual breakdown in the 1970s?
3. What are the main characteristics of neoliberal globalization?
4. How are the driving forces of globalization understood in IPE, and which explanations do you find most compelling?
5. Are ideas as important as material resources and institutions in shaping the global political economy?
6. What do we know about the consequences of the rise of China for the global political economy?
7. How can we explain the vast increase in global inequality since the 1980s, and what have been its consequences?
8. Why is labour exploitation such an endemic feature of the global political economy?
9. What is the relationship between migration and globalization?
10. Are we witnessing the death throes of neoliberal globalization?

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Further Reading

Abdelal, R., Blyth, M., and Parsons, C. (eds) (2010), *Constructing the International Economy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A fine collection of essays informed by constructivist approaches to IPE.

Cohen, B. J. (2008), *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A fresh look at the field of IPE, and a call for greater dialogue between its major approaches.

Cox, R. W. (1987), *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press). One of the founding texts of the contemporary field of IPE, epitomizing the critical IPE approach.

Palan, R. (ed.) (2012), *Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories* (London: Routledge). A survey of contemporary theoretical approaches in IPE.

Peterson, V. S. (2003), *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies* (London: Routledge). An engaging discussion of IPE rooted in critical feminist theory.

Phillips, N. (ed.) (2005), *Globalizing International Political Economy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A critical view of how the theoretical and empirical foundations of IPE are not truly 'global' in scope, but focused on the political economy of advanced capitalism.

Phillips, N., and Weaver, C. E. (eds) (2010), *International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present and Future* (London: Routledge). A collection of short essays representing the lively debate initiated by Cohen's 2008 book, *International Political Economy*.

Ravenhill, J. (ed.) (2019), *Global Political Economy*, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A leading textbook on IPE, offering rich perspectives on the field and its thematic concerns.

Strange, S. (1988), *States and Markets* (London: Pinter). One of the early founding statements of a new field of IPE, and still one of its most influential contributions.

Watson, M. (2005), *Foundations of Political Economy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A rich intellectual history of IPE.

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Gender

PAUL KIRBY

Framing Questions

- **What are the different ways in which gender shapes world politics today?**
- **Do men dominate global politics at the expense of women?**
- **Should international gender norms be radically changed? How?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter is about the power of gender in global politics. Gender influences everything from national security to pop culture, the international economy to United Nations programmes. Gender is not restricted to a single set of issues, and it does not refer only to women. The chapter begins by explaining how gender is usually defined, how it is differentiated from sex, what gender scholars and feminists study, and how what they study contributes to and challenges the discipline of International Relations. The chapter then introduces several theoretical positions on the relationship between masculinity and femininity before examining the impact of gender in three spheres: (1) global politics, from the participation of women in decision-making to the very idea of the state; (2) global security, from the distinction between combatant and civilian to women's involvement in political violence; and (3) the global economy, from transformations in the distribution of work to hidden forms of domestic and reproductive labour.

Introduction

Gender structures our existence in the most intimate ways. How we experience and express gender is inseparable from our personhood, our individuality, and our interactions with others in families, classrooms, workplaces, and cultures. How gender is understood socially—how, in other words, we are *allowed* to do gender—determines who it is possible for us to become. And yet gender is a relatively new issue for the discipline of International Relations (IR). The first works to critically evaluate the international role of gender came from feminist IR scholarship (**see Ch. 9**). It is still primarily feminists who study gender, although there are also scholars who investigate gender dynamics and prefer not to use the term feminist, as well as scholars who might think of themselves first and foremost as constructivists, Marxists, or liberals (among other options) but who incorporate gender into their research. Although not all scholars adopt a gender perspective, every conceivable topic in IR has a gender dimension. Whether in diplomacy or social movements, international courts or terrorist groups, there are **norms** of gender at work. These very often result in disparities between men and women. But to understand how gender structures global politics, we must first consider some key terms.

Sex and gender in international perspective

Our world is divided, almost equally, into men and women. This much appears obvious. With the exception of intersex—when a person is born with reproductive organs that do not clearly fit male or female categories—practically everyone is identified (by medical practitioners, parents, and family) as a boy or a girl within their first minutes of life, indeed often before their birth. It is usually impossible to leave hospital without a birth certificate, so designation as one or other side of this binary (male or female) is a precondition for official recognition as a person. This first attribution of a given, permanent, biological, and sexual identity conventionally follows us throughout our lives. We grow up from boys and girls into men and women. Sexed difference becomes more pronounced during puberty, and for very many people capacities that stem from sexual difference (such as the ability to become pregnant) become crucial aspects of their adult selves. Because men and women have some differing physical characteristics, it is easy to think of cultural, social, economic, and political asymmetries between them as stemming from an original and immutable biological division.

But these commonplaces about gender inequality are mistaken. When we think about appropriate ways to be a man or woman we are not obeying the rules of genetics, but those of society. The characteristics of masculinity and femininity are coded to have a certain range of permissible values, and we all learn those values as a precondition for smooth social functioning. The feminist Kate Millett argued that gender deeply shapes *temperament* (our personality and how we display it), *role* (what kind of activities we are assigned, or are deemed appropriate for us), and *status* (our importance and influence with others) (Millett 2000 [1969]: 26). From private to public, gender is a manifestation of political power because it affects who gets what. Norms and **practices** of gender result in reward, privilege, celebration, and comfort, or conversely in shame, rejection, expropriation, and exclusion. Society is organized in relation to, and stratified by, gender.

Crucially, the meaning of gender behaviour varies according to time and place. In some moments it is fixed and practically without challenge, in others contestable and fluid. Consider the concept of leadership. In recent history, to speak of a leader has usually been to speak of a man, and of characteristics (rationality, strength, courage, autonomy) associated with masculinity. By any reasonable measure, male leaders continue to dominate global politics (**see Box 17.1**). Highly successful women are compelled to work with or against masculine standards. In the 1970s Margaret Thatcher, who went on to become the first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, took coaching to lower the pitch of her voice. Nothing changed in the quality of her mind or her political convictions, but approximating the delivery associated with masculinity (and therefore also with leadership) helped her overcome the negative connotations of femininity (such as emotionality and shrillness) in the minds of the electorate at large. Other female leaders, such as Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir,

Box 17.1 Gender and political leadership

- Number of female leaders (heads of state or government*) out of 193 states: 15 (8 per cent)
- Percentage of women in parliaments (global average, 2018): 24 per cent
- Highest percentage of women in parliament (2015): Rwanda, 61 per cent
- Lowest percentage of women in parliament (2015): Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Yemen, 0 per cent

* Statistics are based on the most senior leader of each country, excluding formal heads of state such as the Queen of England or the Emperor of Japan.

Source: Pew Research Center (2017), correct as of 8 March 2017. Data on percentage of women in parliament taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018a), correct as of 1 November 2018.

were also seen in their time as taking on manly characteristics. Meir was even referred to as 'the best man in the government' by then Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion when she was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Feminists and scholars of gender commonly distinguish *sex* (biological characteristics, primarily genital and reproductive) from *gender* (the social codes that express masculinity and femininity). Even the apparently obvious point at which we began—the existence of primary sex difference—has been challenged, since what we understand as the original division between male and female is also historically variable, shaped by sexist assumptions, and transformed by new forms of medical and biological categorization (Rubin 1975; Butler 1993; Repo 2013). The crucial point is that, although sex is in some sense an element of who we are, gender is what establishes the collective parameters of our identity. Gender has for this reason been called 'the social institutionalisation of sexual difference' (Okin 1998 [1991]: 116) and 'a socially imposed division of the sexes' (Rubin 1975: 179). Gender studies are so often concerned with the distinction between men and women because this is a basic way in which societies manifest gender codes. Understanding gender means analysing how masculinity and femininity are constructed in relation to men and women, while always being conscious that gender norms and ideologies are not reducible to the dichotomy of a sex binary.

Whatever physical differences may exist on average between men and women are elaborated by structures of gender, which can both extend and limit initial tendencies. Across the world, gender norms influence whether a child is born or aborted (Hudson 2009); what kind of food people eat as they grow; how they develop and use their muscles and limbs, and hence how they run, throw, and comport themselves; what interests they are encouraged to pursue; who they are allowed to befriend; what they are allowed to wear; where they can go to the toilet; how they are encouraged to speak and act in company; what kind of education they enjoy (if they are permitted education at all); what work they are given in the home; what they are expected to provide financially for their family or community; their responsibilities as citizens; when and how they can be seen in public; whether they are allowed to drive cars; what international sporting events they can compete in, or attend; whether their sexual orientation is celebrated, permitted, or even recognized; who they can marry, partner, or have sex with; how they worship; how and when they are allowed to use violence in everyday life; how and when they will be expected to use violence in service of their polity or political leaders; what kind of commemoration they receive for any sacrifice given in the name of their state or nation; whether they are expected to use their body in other ways (such as to produce children); whether and how they are written about in history books; how they are portrayed in literature, art, and culture; and what others will assume about their motives and identity after their death.

Of course, gender does not work in isolation. At every point, gender combines with other structures of power such as race, class, or nation (**see Chs 18, 16, and 30**). What opportunities and obstacles individual people face, what freedom and violence, depends not just on their gender, but on many other factors. The interaction of different structures of power mean that there are always multiple and complex positions of political authority and subservience to consider. In some guises, feminism has stressed that all women are excluded and exploited by **patriarchy** (at its simplest, the rule of men) in much the same way. However, others have argued that particular groups of women experience simultaneous and cross-cutting oppressions which *exceed* gender. In societies which institutionalize both racism and sexism, gender alone cannot account for what happens to those also marked as part of a denigrated racial group. The American feminist and lawyer Kimberlé Crenshaw observed such a process at work in how the court system in the United States treated claims of discrimination. When a group of black women were fired from their jobs at the car manufacturer General Motors in the late

1970s, it was ruled that they could bring a case on the basis of racial discrimination or sexual discrimination, but not both. Yet the women's claim was that they had been dismissed on both grounds: not just as women (since white women continued to be employed) and not just because of anti-black racism (because black men were still eligible for some jobs). Because domination could not be understood by reference to just a single axis of power, Crenshaw argued that those interested in redressing discrimination needed to think of combined harms and their **intersectionality** (Crenshaw 1989).

Intersectionality can be observed in global politics in the contrasting degrees of security for citizen and immigrant women accessing domestic violence shelters, in the homophobic policies that prevent male survivors of sexual violence from seeking medical help in refugee settings, and in the relatively privileged position of white feminists writing from universities in the **Global North** (Crenshaw 1991; Sivakumaran 2005; Ackerly and True 2010). So gender matters because the masculine/feminine categorization is key to the operation of political power, but it is at the same time a distinction traversed by other hierarchies on which political power also rests. The gendered histories of discrimination, violence, education, empowerment, trade, diplomacy, community, and love (to name but a few) are global. They take place across physical borders, in the interaction of different political communities, and in the imagination of the foreign and the familiar. Hence the adaptation of the feminist slogan

> **Box 17.2 Becoming gendered**
>
> In the famous words of French feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir:
>
> > One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature, intermediate between male and eunuch, which is described as feminine.
> >
> > *(de Beauvoir 1997: 295)*

'the personal is political' to 'the personal is international' (Hutchings 1994; Enloe 2014). Gender is personal, political, and international (**see Box 17.2**).

> **Key Points**
>
> - Gender is not the same as biological sex, against which it is often contrasted. Gender refers to the social codes that express ideals of masculinity and femininity.
> - Just because gender is constructed does not mean it is imaginary. It has the force of a fact because we behave as if it is a fact. So gender also includes the practices and behaviours that express and enforce social codes.
> - Gender is a structure of power because gender norms and gendered behaviours are the means by which some people receive benefits, while others suffer harms.
> - Gender does not exist in isolation. It intersects with other forms of power in complex ways.

Global gender relations

Those who take the achievement of gender equality as their political goal employ a spectrum of explanations for how masculine dominance functions (**see Ch. 9**). Patriarchy is one possible way of describing gender regimes, but there is disagreement among feminists as to the term's suitability. It has been argued that patriarchy is too static an idea to describe the diversity of **gender relations**, and that it does not sufficiently incorporate questions of intersectionality. One recurrent issue in the debate has been about how best to characterize men's experiences of gender. While many consider feminism compatible with a subtle and critical analysis of men and masculinities, others have suggested that feminism is hindered by its historical focus on women's experiences (A. Jones 1996). Scholars who do not identify as feminists, or who see feminism as primarily an activist rather than a scholarly identity, describe their

work in such terms as 'gender studies', and 'critical masculinity studies'. The field of gender studies, as its more neutral name implies, is less likely to consider explicitly political questions of emancipation, and somewhat less likely to focus on the experiences of women alone, even though gender scholars may frequently identify patterns of power and domination, and even though there are feminist scholars who study men and masculinities in great depth. Thus, while all feminists study gender, not all scholars of gender are feminists.

Because gender is organized through diverse, malleable, and contested social norms, it is best understood not as the property of specific persons but as a situated interaction of concepts and practices. Ideas about gender, and alternative ways of organizing gender roles, come into contact with one another across borders. In any given social situation, 'masculinity' and 'femininity'

are clusters of social codes that exist in relation to each other to such a degree that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to understand how attributions of femininity function without inquiring as to the contrasting sense of masculinity. It has often been observed, for example, that being masculine is not so much about an exacting list of features as it is about appearing suitably *not-feminine*. On this account, gender is not the quality of having a fixed essence, but the meaning that is given to behaviour, the continual counterposing of masculinity and femininity. Given the importance of intersectionality, one can expect that differing but overlapping groups of women will be attributed various characteristics in gendered terms. These might be ideas of motherhood, sexual availability, intelligence, vulnerability, suitability for domestic work, and so on, all cast in relation to a series of contrasting ideas about masculinity. Yet masculinity is not just or always the dominant side in an equation with femininity. Masculinity is also a way to understand the relationships of power that exist among men, and some of the ways in which gender norms can harm them.

In the succinct phrase of Terrell Carver (1996), gender is not a synonym for women. Men both have and perform gender. The most widely adopted framework for understanding how masculinities regulate the behaviour of men is that of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 2005). In developing this concept, R. W. Connell argued that in any gender regime, there will always be a version—an ideal—of masculinity that is dominant in so far as it represents the qualities that most men (and many women) celebrate. Because its elevated status is given value according to a kind of social consensus, this version of masculinity is called hegemonic. Although, like all gender constructions, the exact content of hegemonic masculinity depends on context and historical period, a stereotypical example of hegemonic masculinity from the last decades might include traits associated with heterosexuality, whiteness, athleticism, wealth, rationality, fatherhood, military service, and patriotism (**see Box 17.3**). And hegemonic masculinity travels. To take just one contemporary manifestation, religious or cultural groups opposed to homosexuality collaborate across borders to influence domestic politics, as do movements for greater **LGBTQI** rights (Rao 2014). In this sense, ideas of masculinity and femininity flow, cascade, and fail in international society, just like ideas of national security, human rights, or financial governance (Picq and Thiel 2015). Indeed, gender is always to some degree *a part of* ideas such as national security, human rights, and financial governance.

> ### Box 17.3   What is masculinity?
>
> While men may think that genitals are literally and symbolically central to masculinity, they are mostly not on display, and not that often tested or inspected. Rather they are merely referenced through attire, metaphor, and bravado. Thus, masculinity not only works to confer power on men over women, but also to empower masculinized individuals and groups over feminized ones, and to create power hierarchies of men over men, as well as some masculinities over others.
>
> *(Terrell Carver 2014: 115)*

Almost no actual men fit every aspect of the hegemonic masculine ideal. It is something that is aspired to, a mirage. Hegemonic masculinity is distinguishable from other forms of masculinity that exist in the same gender system. *Complicit* masculinities are those that benefit from association with the hegemonic model even if they are not themselves dominant. For example, men might praise the symbols of the military, and express strongly pro-military opinions, without being able to pass military fitness tests themselves. *Subordinate* masculinities are those that are subject to mockery, dismissal, or discrimination in relation to the hegemonic ideal. Men who exhibit the characteristics of subordinate masculinity are excluded, and unlikely to reap the full benefits of membership in male groups. Until recently, it was common to consider homosexuality a characteristic of subordinate masculinity in societies that either formally or informally discriminated against gay or queer men (as many continue to do). Finally, *marginalized* masculinities are those that are condemned by reference to the hegemonic ideal because they overlap with structures apart from gender. Immigrant or minority men may be recognized as having some of the attributes of hegemonic or complicit masculinity in the society they have emigrated from or in the minority group of which they are a part, but they will not be accepted into the privileged circle of men so long as their existence is seen as a threat to national, racial, or communal identities. The place of masculine identities fluctuates, in part based on the political structure of a society. Fascist states, for example, cast homosexuality as marginal rather than subordinate, with extreme consequences for the gay men sent to concentration camps (Lautmann 1981).

Just as 'women' is not a unified category, but can be subdivided according to different located experiences of gender and intersections, so too masculinity

Box 17.4 Heteronormativity

Heteronormativity is the implicit or explicit privileging of heterosexuality, understood as a sexual-romantic relationship between a man and a woman, as the 'normal' or 'correct' framework for human desire. The notion of heteronormativity can further refer to preference for institutions that are distinctly heterosexual in their history and social meaning, such as the nuclear family (a parenting couple and their children).

refers to a variety of temperaments, roles, and statuses, to the extent that many scholars refer to masculin*ities* in the plural. As the example of subordinate masculinities suggests, expressions of sexuality play a central role in distinguishing gender status (**see Box 17.4**). In some respects social attitudes to both heterosexuality and homosexuality have changed considerably across the world in the last hundred years. Relevant changes include shifts in the legal status of same-sex liaisons (often towards decriminalization, but sometimes towards criminalization); the growth and spread of gay rights and LGBTQI social movements; fears over the influence of homosexual behaviour in some religious, cultural, and political constituencies; greater recognition of a diversity of norms of homosexual masculinity and femininity, as well as growing awareness of **genderqueer** identities; diversification in media depictions of LGBTQI lifestyles; changes in attitudes towards pre-marital sex in heterosexual relationships; and a decline in racist beliefs about **miscegenation**.

Key Points

- Gender studies is not the same as feminism, although they are closely related historically and conceptually.
- Gender is relational. The meanings of masculinity and femininity are not fixed, but established in interaction and contrast with each other.
- Gender is multiple. It means more than 'male' or 'female'; there are always various possible ways of being masculine or feminine, depending on the gender order in place.
- Gender changes over time, at least in part due to political struggles over what it means and should mean.

Gendering global politics

Recall the stark disparity in the proportion of women to men in positions of political leadership and representation found in virtually every country. According to the latest available data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, only Rwanda, Cuba, Bolivia, and Mexico are close to a 50/50 split (61 per cent, 53 per cent, 53 per cent, and 48 per cent women respectively) (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018*b*). On a common understanding of what it means to holds power, it is therefore clear that politics is gendered. Overturning the historical exclusion of women from the political process has been a central theme in decades of feminist scholarship (Fraser and Honneth 2003). This inequity has also been acknowledged repeatedly by states in the highest forum of global governance: the United Nations (**see Ch. 21**).

In 1975 in Mexico City, following mobilization by a global coalition of feminist civil society, the United Nations held the first World Conference on Women, an official intergovernmental summit to respond to the multiple dimensions of gender exclusion, from differences in wages and economic autonomy to women's role in achieving peace. It established a special United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM, subsequently amalgamated with other entities to become UN Women).

Mexico was followed by conferences in 1980 in Copenhagen and in 1985 in Nairobi, the latter since dubbed the 'birthplace of global feminism' due to the number of non-governmental organizations present and the global collaboration among feminist groups. The World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 gave its name to the Beijing Platform for Action, a list of demands for women's inclusion which serves as a benchmark of progress to this day, and which was updated in 2000 as 'Beijing + 5'. In that same year, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325, seen as a landmark for the women's movement because it finally raised a cluster of issues—participation in decision-making and conflict resolution, the inclusion of a gender perspective in peacekeeping and humanitarian contexts, and the prevention of violence against women and girls—at the highest level of state politics. The successful passage of Resolution 1325 inaugurated what is now known as the Women, Peace and Security agenda (see Davies and True 2019).

In the twenty-first century, there have been a number of further Security Council resolutions, each clarifying or deepening the commitment to gender equality and to ending gendered violence. However, the results of **gender mainstreaming** are open to debate. While significant strides have been made in some areas (such as extending primary education, reducing infant mortality, and following up the treaty obligations of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) (**see Box 17.5**), progress has been slow in others. There is also a sense among activists that an early stress on multiple aspects of women's exclusion (including measures of economic and political equality) has been eroded in favour of a narrower agenda of violence prevention in conflict settings, which has the effect of continually casting women in the role of victims to be saved rather than as equal participants alongside men (Kirby and Shepherd

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Box 17.5 Gender milestones in global governance

1975: The first United Nations World Conference on Women is held in Mexico City.

1976: UN 'Decade for Women' begins.

1979: The UN General Assembly adopts the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

1980: Second UN World Conference on Women, Copenhagen.

1985: The third UN World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi, closes and reviews the UN Decade for Women.

1995: The fourth UN World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, puts forward the 'Beijing Platform'.

2000: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1325, inaugurating the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. 'Beijing + 5' meetings are held in New York. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include specific gender-related goals to be achieved by 2015.

2008–19: Eight more Security Council resolutions are passed extending the WPS agenda.

2014: The United Kingdom hosts the Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict summit in London. UN Women launches the #HeForShe campaign to encourage men to participate in achieving gender equality.

2015: Countries follow up the MDGs with Sustainable Development Goals, including the achievement of gender equality.

2016). The legacy of UN activism has also been criticized for its simplistic operationalization of gender as a male/female dichotomy without attention to the complexities of gender and sexual identity.

Whatever their impact, these policies are evidence of the much greater visibility of gender issues in global politics compared with even a few decades ago. There is no area of international political life where disparities between men and women are not a feature, and at the same time no level of analysis is free of gendered associations. And it is possible to trace this gendering of politics even in the basic unit of analysis of IR: the state itself.

The modern nation-state is more than a territorial unit of rule, dividing those within it and under the nominal protection of its government from those without. The very idea of the nation-state is thoroughly gendered. The frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*—perhaps the most famous treatise on the state in all of political theory—shows the body of the sovereign as male, comprised of the people, all apparently also male (Carver 2014). A masculine symmetry is thus established between the aggregate of male citizens, an individual male king, and a 'male' political entity (the state). In addition to such graphical depictions, the very language for describing what happens within a state ('domestic') is a reflection of the division between public and private space, and a long tradition in which male citizens inhabit the public realm while women and children are located in the home.

Yet the representation of the nation is not exclusively masculine. Queens have similarly stood symbolically for the whole political community and commanded accordingly (Towns 2010). The nation appears historically as both Fatherland and Motherland, gathering legitimacy in affinity with the family unit and thereby naturalizing political hierarchy (Collins 1998). Gendered metaphors of loyalty to the state vary, but feminist political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain has argued that they tend towards two gendered ideals. The first is 'the beautiful soul', an image of virginal womanhood in need of protection from foreign invaders. Men, by contrast, are encouraged to take on the role of 'the just warrior', who goes to war in defence of the homeland (Elshtain 1995). Both men and women negotiate gendered loyalty to the state.

Although this stark binary between warrior men and domestic women may appear antiquated, states continue to represent themselves, and to be imagined by their populations, in gendered terms: as having certain kinds of ideal citizens and ideal values. The body of the strong nation is stereotypically masculine—muscular

and heterosexual—and colonialism, occupation, revolution, and national interest are frequently conceptualized through metaphors of manly resistance, feminine submission, and heterosexual virility (C. Weber 1999). Strategies of foreign policy, although obviously carried out by complex combinations of institutions and agents, have always been easily represented by gendered figures. This is most obvious in the visual shorthands of political caricature, as in the example from *Puck* magazine in **Fig. 17.1** which depicts the 1898 United States intervention in Cuba. Populations in apparent need of defence are shown in feminine form, while their defenders (or pretenders to defence) appear upright and stereotypically masculine. The aggressors, unsurprisingly, express the less attractive features of subordinate or marginal masculinity, at least so far as the intended audience for the caricature was concerned.

Since the project of state-making depends so heavily on an idealized gender order, the existence of LGBTQI people with a different understanding of the nation can be deeply unsettling (Berlant and Freeman 1992). Attempts by LGBTQI people either to enter areas of public life from which they have previously been excluded, or indeed to reshape national politics to better include their interests, are consistently resisted in many different countries.

Governments regulate sexuality in part because they see **dissident sexualities** as a threat to social cohesion. As late as 2010, the United States prevented non-citizens living with HIV/AIDS from entering the country. Although HIV/AIDS is clearly not a disease specific to LGBTQI migrants, the ban was reflective of a historical homophobia and deeply linked to fear of contamination from sexual others—not just of the individual bodies of US citizens, but of the 'body' of the state itself (Frowd 2014). Indeed, the very mechanisms of border passage are gendered. In most countries, it is necessary to state one's gender (male or female) for any official form. Until very recently, states have simply been unable to recognize the existence of persons whose gender identity does not conform to a binary choice (in some countries—such as Nepal and Germany—there is now a third gender category on passports). For **trans/transgender** persons, winning recognition by the state is a chronic struggle, heightened whenever crossing international borders (Currah and Mulqueen 2011).

Official systems of discrimination on the basis of sexuality, although implemented domestically, reflect the *global* politics of gender. A significant percentage of anti-sodomy laws in existence today are colonial laws retained by newly independent nations (Human Rights Watch 2008). Comparative research suggests that Britain's former colonies are more likely to criminalize homosexuality today than the ex-colonies of other powers (Han and O'Mahoney 2014). The analysis of which 'cultures' are homophobic is therefore inseparable from an understanding of international patterns of dominance and resistance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has even been argued that the term 'homosexuality' cannot be understood in isolation from imperial history (Massad 2007). Some countries that now pride themselves on tolerance and gender equality justify their military actions on the grounds that they are more civilized than their enemies. In recent years, the combination of gay rights discourse and militarism in the US and its allies' invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq has been termed **homonationalism** (Puar 2008). Gender and sexuality thus shape the politics of violence as much as they do the politics of everyday life.

Figure 17.1 'Save me from my friends': illustration from *Puck* magazine

Source: *Puck* magazine, 7 September 1898, Library of Congress

Key Points

- Gender structures how we think of international politics, right down to how we represent states, their rulers, citizens, and defenders.

- Gendered rules also shape basic elements of international politics, such as border crossing.

- Gender inequality is a major topic of contemporary political debate, and many international organizations are officially dedicated to taking a gender perspective seriously.

- The international community has committed to acting on gender inequalities through treaties, world conferences, UN resolutions, and specialist organizations, but debate exists about the degree of progress and which inequalities are the most pressing.

Gendering global security

The discipline of International Relations has usually seen national security in abstract terms: states with different levels of military, economic, and political power interact as separate entities. In the conventional reading, war is the result of state leaders seeking to maximize their relative power in the international system; exploiting the opportunity provided by a weaker party; miscalculating their national security interests; succumbing to the undue influence of domestic interest groups; acting as part of a collective security agreement; or some combination thereof. Gender scholars are not, on the whole, interested in such hypotheses. Instead, they ask questions about what role masculinity and femininity play in the practice of war (**see Case Study 17.1**),

who counts as participants in war, and how to conceptualize war and security.

The stereotypical representation of the soldier is that of a man, and warrior identity is often included as an element of hegemonic masculine ideals. Gender and feminist scholars widely accept that masculine ideals are historically central to the training of warriors (**see Opposing Opinions 17.1**). Military training regimes frequently stress the loss of feminine qualities and the enhancement of masculine—even **hyper-masculine**—ones (Belkin 2012). Constructions of military masculinity are thought to be so important because good soldiering is not the natural behaviour of biological men, but involves a series of capacities (to cooperate in a unit, to obey orders, to respond

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Case Study 17.1 Female guerrillas in the El Salvadoran civil war

A guerrilla woman stands guard at a roadblock on the outskirts of San Jorge

© Bettmann/Corbis/Getty Images

Women have been active participants in political violence in numerous conflicts. Close to a million women fought as partisans or in the Soviet army during the Second World War (Goldstein 2001: 65). More recently, women have been guerrillas in Sri Lanka, combat troops in the US army, suicide bombers in Lebanon, and militia members in Syrian Kurdistan. One conflict in which women played a major role was the 1980–92 El Salvadoran civil war, in which some 75,000 people are estimated to have died. In a pattern repeated elsewhere in Latin America during the cold war, women joined a revolutionary left-wing armed rebellion against military rule, in response to poverty and exploitation, and in an effort to realize socialism. In many ways, their motives were no different from those of men who joined, but the high degree to which women were involved is unusual (Kampwirth 2004: 76).

The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was the main opposition group in the El Salvadoran civil war; women were reported to comprise 30 per cent of its army by the end of the war (Viterna 2006: 6). Although women joined for reasons similar to men, their experiences differed before, during, and after the war. Gendered expectations meant that mothers were not recruited but treated by the FMLN as refugees, while other women became active guerrillas (Viterna 2006: 27–8). On joining the guerrilla army, women became *las compañeras*—female comrades—who were seen as 'a different category of woman' (Ortega 2012: 494). *Compañeras* rejected traditional female chores, engaged in sustained and dangerous combat, and took major leadership roles in the FMLN. Moreover, women's participation in the insurgency also led to changes in military masculinity as male revolutionaries embraced tenderness, aspects of femininity, and even domestic work (Ortega 2012).

Despite participation by *las compañeras* that was widespread, militant, and violent, and that not infrequently involved combat leadership, after the war they largely returned to traditional gender roles. Expectations that the peace settlement would lead to a restructuring of society went unfulfilled, and previously fluid revolutionary gender norms reverted to stereotype (Ortega 2012). Where the war period had emphasized class solidarity over gender differences, after the peace settlement many former female guerrillas broke with the FMLN in favour of a more explicit feminism, and in doing so sometimes found themselves denounced as traitors (Shayne 2004; Kampwirth 2004).

Question 1: What do historical examples of women's participation in political violence tell us about gender norms?

Question 2: Why do gender norms seem to revert towards traditional roles after war?

Opposing Opinions 17.1   War is inherently masculine

For

Historically, virtually all soldiers have been male. Women have very rarely contributed to combat forces in significant numbers. This is true over great periods of time and across many societies that differ in other respects, strongly suggesting that there is something that closely bonds men, masculinity, and war, for good or ill.

Male physiology is well suited to war. Men are on average physically stronger than women; they are also differently wired. Testosterone and other hormones associated with violence are higher in men than women, and moreover are highest at the age when professional armies recruit most heavily—roughly between 16 and 30 years old (Goldstein 2001: 143–58). The combination of greater physical aptitude and evolutionary heritage creates a permanent bond between men and violence.

The military is a special kind of institution. Even if historical and biological considerations can be overcome, the armed forces serve a distinctive social function. The task of the military is not to represent a population fairly, but to protect it effectively. Militaries work best when they are made up of units of men ('the band of brothers') prepared to make great sacrifices for each other. Regardless of whether women have the ability to serve on equal terms, preserving military cohesion must be the pre-eminent consideration, even if that means indulging the prejudices of male soldiers.

Against

The historical record is neither neutral nor exhaustive. Women soldiers may be relatively rare, but it does not follow that only men can wage war. Close to 300,000 women served with the US military in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars alone (MacKenzie 2012: 32), and many more were involved in combat—officially, unofficially, and in disguise—throughout the twentieth century (see Baker 2018). Where women have been formally forbidden from joining armies, their absence from battle does not prove that they cannot be effective soldiers. They have simply not been given the chance.

Assumptions about the violent nature or physical superiority of male bodies are deeply flawed. Testosterone does not play an uncomplicated or unmediated role in enabling violence. Women are only now being allowed into the most gruelling training courses; it is misleading to extrapolate from the failings of a few innovators (the first women to ever attempt courses of this kind) to a judgement of women's physical capabilities in general. Male bodies fail too, and female soldiers have already completed many advanced military training programmes.

Militaries are complex institutions undertaking complex missions. Many military tasks are better suited to intelligence and situational awareness than to raw physical strength. Professional militaries have integrated women on a greater scale in recent decades precisely because women offer skills that their male colleagues may lack (see Dyvik 2014). Studies have shown that the hyper-masculine culture distinctive of modern militaries may in fact hamper cohesion and reduce mission effectiveness. Diverse militaries are stronger militaries.

1. How much should the long history of war matter in deciding who can take on what roles in militaries?

2. Do new military gender roles suggest that war in the future will be very different from the past?

3. What role do you think physical characteristics should play in deciding who fights?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

effectively to danger, and to kill) that have to be *made*. In addition to denigrating feminine characteristics, some professional militaries have only recently allowed openly gay and lesbian persons to serve. Most famously, the US military long operated a policy known as 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' (DADT), for fear that sexual orientation would undermine the armed forces and therefore potentially threaten the survival of the nation itself (Butler 1997; Kier 1998). It was commonly argued that homosexual soldiers would distract, or be distracted by, their heterosexual colleagues, damaging unit cohesion and the

bonds of military 'brotherhood'. Although DADT was rescinded in 2011, the official ban on transgender service in the US military was only lifted in June 2016, and current US President Donald Trump successfully reinstated it in 2019. A significant number of countries continue to impose sexuality and gender identity restrictions on military roles.

Analysts disagree as to the consequences of military masculinity. On the one hand, the valorization of soldiers as defenders of the nation suggests that there is a social reward for embodying this ideal. On the other hand, soldiering is clearly dangerous, and

Box 17.6 Insight: the 'battle-age male' or 'military-age male'

It is common for military doctrine to consider males between the ages of roughly 16 and 50 as potential combatants, and to treat them accordingly. This was the case with the Bosnian Serb army in the Srebrenica massacre, since it considered all men of a certain age to be a potential threat, even if nominally civilians. It is also an element of the legal definitions in place for the US military's current drone programme, where any battle-age male is assumed to be a combatant unless proved otherwise (Becker and Shane 2012). This assumption is deeply gendered.

many soldiers suffer from their wartime experiences, whether from physical wounds or from the psychological burden of not living up to certain masculine expectations (Whitworth 2004).

If the image of the warrior is gendered male, then the civilian in war is gendered female. As Cynthia Enloe has argued, it is often assumed that men have inherently violent capacities (**see Box 17.6**) while the vulnerable are discussed in undifferentiated terms as 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990). This cognitive shortcut allows an instant judgement about who it is permissible to kill, without critical examination of how gender and political violence work in practice. The belief that there are certain inherent and unchangeable characteristics associated with biological sex is known as **essentialism**. One example of this is the notion that all men are naturally aggressive while all women are naturally caring (A. Phillips 2010). While there are scholars—including feminist scholars—who defend some version of essentialism, in the case of gendered roles in war there are good reasons to be suspicious of reductive views of perpetrators and victims. Indeed, the consequences of such essentialist thinking are nothing less than a matter of life and death.

During the 1992–5 Bosnian war, humanitarian agencies prioritized the evacuation of women and children from areas such as the town of Srebrenica, where Serb forces were predicted to engage in mass violence against mainly Muslim civilians. The agencies' default assumption was that women and children were the most vulnerable, even though a careful application of their own regulations would have produced a more nuanced view. In fact, whatever terrible things would have happened to the women and children, it should have been clear that men and teenage boys would be slaughtered if they were not evacuated.

And that is precisely what happened to some 8,000 male civilians in one of the most infamous massacres of the last decades. The humanitarian system had left behind precisely those civilians most likely to be killed (Carpenter 2003). The failure to perceive the true risk these men and teenage boys faced was a direct result of a gendered shorthand about women's vulnerability and men's resilience and propensity for violence.

When investigating only what occurs during a war's official duration, we are liable to neglect the role that gender plays before and after, as well as how gender structures what happens away from the battlefront. In addition to the gendered ideas of nation already surveyed, preparedness for war is closely related to practices of **militarism**, where military values (usually highly masculine) are encouraged across society (Enloe 2000). Gendered ideas of security and patriotism can thus be found in popular culture, in national holidays and sporting events, and even in the packaging of food. In the aftermath of organized violence, the negotiation of peace is dominated by the leaders of armed groups and diplomats, which in practice has meant that it is dominated by men. A major aim of feminist activism over the last decades has been to argue for women's presence at the negotiating table, because women's different experience of war, and the gendered role they play in society and economy, can otherwise be easily ignored. Women's participation is thus expected to make any agreement more reflective of the full needs of a population, arguably making for a more robust peace.

Key Points

- Gender norms affect who can use violence and who it is used against. These norms make persons into soldiers and civilians and can distort the reality of who is most at risk.
- Global security is shaped by assumptions of masculinity (such as the battle-age male) and femininity (such as 'womenandchildren').
- Simplistic ideas of men as violent and women as vulnerable are unsustainable. Gender analysis helps us to understand the complexity of individuals' situated gender positions.
- Gender matters in the preparation, enactment, and aftermath of war. Gender is reshaped in the process of political violence, but stereotypical gender roles can also re-emerge at war's end.

Gendering the global economy

In addition to saturating politics and war, gender also stratifies power in the global economy. Gender matters in both kinds of economic activity: the formal and the informal.

Over the last century, women's involvement in the formal economy of the labour market—their ability to apply for and to take on jobs in companies or institutions that pay a wage—has grown hugely. Gender restrictions on jobs have been heavily eroded, although there are still countries that explicitly forbid female involvement in certain professions. These changes have not come easily, nor has progress been linear, but the global economy stands transformed. Between 1910 and 1920, the number of women in the United States working in offices and factories increased by around 300,000, while those working as servants or in domestic work fell by almost as much (Greenwald 1980: 14). The main driver of this change was the First World War. Because men were sent abroad to fight, and because the country was geared towards war production, women were needed in jobs traditionally reserved for men. These new jobs also increased women's autonomy (because they received wages directly) and changed perceptions of what women could do.

This pattern was repeated, and more pronounced, during the Second World War (**see Box 17.7**) (Summerfield 2013 [1984]; Higonnet and Higonnet 1987). Yet between and after the wars, women were largely expected to return to their traditional vocations. And in the process of entering the formal labour market, the tasks they undertook were redefined socially as 'feminine' to distinguish them from properly 'masculine' employment, which continued to be remunerated at higher levels (Milkman 1987). Men and women were seen as suited to different tasks, both in the workplace and in the division between formal work (paid, regulated) and domestic labour (unpaid, private). This is what is known as the **sexual division of labour**. However, the distinction between work that is appropriate for men and women has changed over time. This distinction does not track essential capacities, but rather reflects the power imbalance between men and women in society at any given moment (**see Case Study 17.2**).

Women's labour is favoured in certain industries—such as garment production—because it is cheaper than men's; this difference in wages is, once again, a reflection of politics. Companies seek out cheap labour

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Box 17.7 Rosie the Riveter

Rose the Riveter is an archetype and role model illustrating the change in women's economic role in the Second World War. She was partly based on a real woman named Rose Hickey, who held a record for pinning metal sheets on a bomber. The name became associated with an iconic image by Jay Howard Miller, who created the 'We Can Do It' poster (**see Fig. 17.2**) in 1942 to encourage women's participation in the war effort. The poster has since become a visual shorthand for female empowerment, recognizable in hundreds of adapted versions around the world since.

Figure 17.2 War effort poster by Jay Howard Miller, 1942
© Everett Historical/Shutterstock.com

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to yield maximum profit, an often gendered calculation that has been described as 'the comparative advantage of women's disadvantage' (Kabeer 2000: 5). Because the work done by women is often more irregular and insecure than that of men, conditions of work are themselves strongly gendered. When certain commodities depend extensively on this labour, new female entrants tend to displace men. This is not because women are 'naturally' cheaper workers, but because gender—through different educational opportunities, different behavioural norms, differing hierarchies in the home and community, and different social responsibilities—supports and encourages such a division. Less desirable or secure work in turn comes to be associated with specific 'female' qualities. This is what is meant when

Case Study 17.2 Neo-slavery and care labour in Asia

The language of 'domestic', 'home', and 'family' labour gives the impression that care work is the antithesis of politics. Where political life concerns the great questions of war and peace, progress and tragedy, conflict and reconciliation, care work may seem irrelevant, the banal drudgery of simple acts of cooking, cleaning, and clothing. Yet the reproductive economy is founded on substantial cross-border movements and designated state policies to encourage and manage them. Governments design economic agreements and visa programmes to guarantee an inflow of care workers (Peng 2018).

The International Labour Organization estimates that there are 11.5 million migrant domestic workers around the world, and that in high-income countries, almost 66 per cent of all domestic workers are migrants (ILO 2015: 9, 11). There is, then, an international division of reproductive labour, or what have been called 'global care chains' (indicating that 'care' is manufactured in a way analogous to other commodities) (Yeates 2004). Despite men's participation in some care work, the vast majority of domestic labourers are female (Parreñas 2012: 272), and women account for about 75 per cent of all migrant domestic work (ILO 2015: 7). For the Philippines, the emigration of female domestic and care workers is a major feature of the economy. These women migrate to other Asian countries, to the Middle East, and less commonly to Western Europe and the United States. For example, almost 600,000 foreign domestic workers are employed across Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, where they provide the services on which the expanding middle classes depend (Ong 2009). A great many maids in those territories originate from the Philippines, which has acquired a reputation for docile and efficient domestic labour. The work is dirty, demanding, and sometimes dangerous. Because the gendered construction of (female) maids deprives them of certain protections available to others, and because maids take on onerous chores and have restricted freedoms, their condition has even been described as one of 'neo-slavery' (Ong 2009).

Filipina migrant labour is structured by transnational gender relations. Rich and middle-class women hire migrant Filipinas as domestic help, and those migrants in turn send money home, relying on relatives or employing the still lower-wage services of poorer Filipina women located in the Philippines itself to look after their own families. So the international division of reproductive labour also entails an international transfer of caretaking (Parreñas 2000: 561). The ability of wealthier families to afford maids results from their class position, as does the ability of only some Filipina workers to afford migration. Racial assumptions and the strictures of citizenship further shape status and life experiences. These features intersect to constitute the opportunities and vulnerabilities of women in different ways. Although the general predominance of women throughout the global care chain is an effect of gender, the international dynamics of care labour is also a hierarchy within womanhood (Parreñas 2000: 577). For more affluent women, increases in their economic autonomy make it possible for them to escape traditional household duties. Someone, however, must take their place. Since men's established social status largely protects them against housework expectations, and since men are unlikely to become involved in reproductive labour even when they have the time (Groves and Lui 2012), the burden of housework is transferred onto female migrants.

As a 'labour-sending' country, the Philippines engages in diplomacy to reduce barriers to Filipina care labour, promoting its emigrants as a national commodity (Rodriguez 2008). It collaborates closely with corporations to ensure that Filipinas retain a significant share of regional and global markets in care. The state in this sense acts as broker for its migrant workers as part of its own national development strategy. Meanwhile, in host states, Filipina domestic labourers face restrictive work visas, are discouraged from gathering in public, and in some cases are bound to work within the confines of their employer's home alone (Ong 2009). Care, in short, is thoroughly international.

Question 1: Why has care work traditionally fallen to women?

Question 2: What are the implications of transnational care work for mainstream International Relations?

scholars write of **feminized labour** (Ramamurthy 2004; Peterson 2005; F. Robinson 2011).

Because **globalization** (**see Ch. 1**) involves the breaking down of national barriers to trade and the interconnectedness of production processes in a single global system, it has led to a loss of job security for some. And because those stable jobs were largely the preserve of men, some argue that globalization has led to their replacement by insecure female labour (Acker 2004). One consequence has been a backlash against globalization that stresses national autonomy and traditional employment practices with a masculine tone. What we buy as discrete products (a shirt, a smartphone, a cup of coffee) are the end result of a process occurring in

multiple sites across the world; this dissolution of the 'national' basis for producing goods has also changed the relationship between male and female workers both within and across countries. In other words, the unevenness of globalization is gendered.

The gender effects of globalization and trade liberalization are complex and in some ways contradictory. As women have entered the formal economy, they have experienced new kinds of empowerment. But they also experience greater vulnerability due to the mobility of global investment flows (Peterson 2005: 510; Kabeer 2000). More work can therefore also mean less secure or worse-paid work. The combined effects of poverty and gender on the work done by women

in the **Global South** is itself another example of the intersection of gender with other forms of power. The debate over the beneficial or harmful effects of globalization on gender roles is on-going, as are studies into the interaction of economic circumstances with violence and exploitation (True 2012).

In addition to these formal work patterns, which are monetary and often described as part of the productive economy, gender alerts us to the presence of a *reproductive*, and largely non-monetary, economy that exists alongside it (Acker 2004: 25). The reproductive economy includes not just childbirth and parenting, but also a whole range of domestic and care work that tends to be taken on by women. Economists primarily analyse the productive economy, considering industrial production, changes in wage levels, global commodity chains, stock market fluctuations, and state debt. However, they are less inclined to recognize the kinds of work that happen within the family or household, but which are essential before any other economic activity can take place (Peterson 2005). In this sense, the reproductive economy is *prior* to the productive one. It is everything that makes the productive economy possible. Without shelter, nurture, basic education, and nutrition, there can be no adult labourers capable of working for a wage. Because reproductive labour goes unacknowledged, women are often argued to face a double burden of employment—paid and unpaid. Just as there are gendered aspects to the political state and to organized violence which are taken for granted, so too the economy turns on a fundamental form of gendered power.

Of course, any suggestion that all women carry out reproductive labour while all men enjoy the benefits of the productive economy will quickly falter. Some women—largely wealthy, educated, white, and located in the **Global North**—exert much greater influence in the global economy than do many men in less privileged positions, either in the same countries or in the Global South. Despite continuing wage disparities and low levels of representation in business and political elites, women collectively wield greater economic power than at any point in the past. Any generalization risks overlooking the considerable complexity and on-going change in the gender dynamics of the global economy. However, it is clear that there is a tendency for women to take on or be compelled into reproductive labour, and for that labour to receive less reward than would be the case in the productive economy. For example, women's unpaid contribution to global health care has been estimated as up to $1.5 trillion each year (Langer et al. 2015). A gender perspective alerts us both to the disparities within the visible network of jobs, trade, and development and to the less visible inequalities of work that occur in the 'private' sphere, and which are also laced with gender politics.

> ### Key Points
>
> - Gender structures economic behaviour, and gender ideologies support a sexual division of labour in which women's work tends to be lower-paid and more precarious.
> - The gendered character of the economy is about more than waged labour; it also includes hidden kinds of work in the 'reproductive economy'.
> - Flows of reproductive and care labour are a major element of the global economy today.
> - Despite multiple manifestations of the sexual division of labour, there is no single or simple way to characterize the disparity between women and men in the global economy. Some women wield extraordinary economic power, and many men face poverty and oppressive labour conditions.

Conclusion

There is no aspect of global politics in which gender is not present. At the same time, gender is not the determining cause for all global political phenomena. Instead, gender is a structure of power, a changeable dynamic, and a network of identity that interacts with other forms of power, political dynamics, and identities. Gender is not the same thing as primary sexual difference, but refers to the rich and multiple ways in which individuals identify themselves and societies deploy ideas of masculinity and femininity. There are a number of ways to study the interaction of such ideas, and there are on-going debates about the relative weight of gender norms in shaping or driving global politics.

While gender is not a synonym for women, there are a great many instances where women are negatively affected by gender structures. There are also gendered expectations which put men at increased risk, or which can lead to men losing power to women. In a further layer of complexity, there are situations that cannot easily be described as straightforwardly bad for 'men' or for

'women', but which nevertheless cannot be made sense of without considering the role of gender. Masculinity and femininity circulate as codes and ways of being that cannot be reduced to a male/female dichotomy. Gender is closely tied to—arguably subsumes—practices of sexuality, through which political power is also expressed.

The actual effects of gender norms will depend on the circumstances and on the influence of other factors. For this reason, gender is a topic for analysis in its own right, a contributing element to other global political processes, and an important matter for consideration by all theoretical perspectives in the discipline.

Questions

1. What is the difference between sex and gender?
2. Does the apparent ubiquity of gender suggest that we should investigate gender as it applies to every phenomenon in global politics, rather than considering it as a discrete topic of its own?
3. How does sexuality relate to gender? Is sexuality important for international relations scholars to consider? If so, in what ways?
4. Is war a masculine activity? Is war good for men?
5. Is globalization good for women? Which women and how? If not, why not?
6. Does the proper study of gender imply concentrating as much on men as on women?
7. Consider the last topic you studied. How was gender present, and what was its impact?
8. What are the prospects for greater gender equality through intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental activism?
9. Are global gender attitudes changing noticeably? In what ways?
10. What is the relationship between gender as a structure and feminism as a theory of international relations?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Daigle, M. (2015), *From Cuba With Love: Sex and Money in the 21st Century* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press). An innovative study of Cubans who establish romantic relationships with Westerners, partly in exchange for financial support.

Elshtain, J. B. (1995 [1987]), *Women and War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). The classic study of how the Western polity is gendered by the roles assigned to men and women within it.

Enloe, C. (2014), *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, 2nd edn (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). A wide-ranging introduction to feminist curiosity in international politics.

Goldstein, J. S. (2001), *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An impressively thorough and careful account of why organized violence has overwhelmingly been the domain of men throughout known history.

Kabeer, N. (2000), *The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market Decisions in London and Dhaka* (London: Verso). A counterintuitive examination of women's empowerment in a globalizing labour market.

Puar, J. K. (2008), *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). A provocative examination of how gay rights have become aligned with state power in the war on terror.

Towns, A. (2010), *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A rich historical examination of how ideas about women's political roles—from the vote to civilizational difference—have changed in the last century.

True, J. (2012), *The Political Economy of Violence Against Women* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A substantive introduction to the multiple connections between economic power and violence against women, and to debates about those connections.

Weber, C. (2016), *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Brings queer studies into International Relations to illuminate multiple sites of power and desire.

Zalewski, M., and Parpart, J. L. (eds) (1998), *The 'Man Question' in International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview). An early collection of essays on men and masculinity in IR that continues to offer compelling insights. It was followed in 2008 by J. L. Parpart, and M. Zalewski (eds), *Rethinking the Man Question* (London: Zed Books).

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Race in world politics

ROBBIE SHILLIAM

Framing Questions

- How are the histories of European imperialism and colonialism crucial for understanding the global impact of race?

- What is the relationship between race, biology, and culture?

- Is contemporary world politics less racist than it was in the past?

Reader's Guide

This chapter introduces students to the various ways in which race can been understood as a fundamental ordering principle of world politics, in that it divides humanity into a hierarchy of distinct groups. The first section explores the historical processes that gave rise to race, especially European imperial expansion and colonization. The second section goes on to engage with some key debates around the conceptualization of race. Finally, the third section builds on these historical and conceptual discussions to explore new ways in which race continues to order world politics.

Introduction

Race has always been a fundamental concern of International Relations (IR). Indeed, in the early years of the field's formation, race was discussed as a mainstream issue, not a marginal one. In the aftermath of the First World War, W. E. B. Du Bois, a noted African-American intellectual, published an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* entitled 'Worlds of Color' (Du Bois 1925), in which he repeated a prognosis he had made over 20 years earlier: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea' (Du Bois 1961: 23).

Foreign Affairs was—and remains—one of the pre-eminent journals of foreign policy analysis. But as Robert Vitalis (2010) notes, it started life as the *Journal of Race Development*. Indeed, a number of scholars now argue that imperial administration was one the foremost concerns of early twentieth-century intellectuals studying world politics—perhaps even more so than inter-state relations. And race was key to the ordering and administration of empire. Nonetheless, mainstream IR theorists have ignored Du Bois's explanation of the racial causes of the First World War, even though this African-American intellectual wrote in the pre-eminent IR journal of its time.

But what is 'race'? This question has no easy answers. Usually racism conjures an idea of prejudice based on biological divisions that order humanity into group hierarchies—the 'whites', the 'Blacks', the 'Arabs', the 'Jews', etc. However, as an ordering principle of world politics, race references far more than skin colour, facial features, and hair texture. Some brief notes on the origins of the term will help to expand the canvas on which we view race.

Before the era of Columbus, when Europeans 'discovered' and conquered the 'new' world of the Americas, race—or, in the romance languages, *raza*—possessed a curious collection of meanings. These included a defect or a coarseness in fine cloth, or a defect in poetic speech. By the early seventeenth century *raza* also referred to the branding of purebred horses, as well as to a human lineage defined especially by Jewish or Moorish (North West African Muslim) ancestry. As time went by, these diverse references started to share common coordinates: a sense of defectiveness as well as reference to a non-Christian and/or non-European ('heathen') heritage.

This latter point is important because in fifteenth-century Christian Europe the religious group to which one professed affiliation was linked intimately with perceptions of one's humanity. Therefore it can be said that by the time of the European conquest of the Americas, race had begun to crystallize as a way to reference defects in humanity. The adjudication of these defects through European imperial expansion and colonization became a key ordering principle of world politics.

This chapter interrogates race as an ordering principle of world politics, intimately connected to imperial expansion, colonial rule, and their afterlives in the contemporary era. The chapter is guided by the following working definition of race: the hierarchical adjudication of human competencies through the categorizing of group attributes, wherein groups are delineated by some kind of shared heritage that is deemed visually identifiable through visual or other sensate cues. Additionally, the chapter explores two different but interconnected methods by which human competencies are adjudicated through race: a biological calculus and a cultural calculus.

Histories of race in world politics

This section traces the emergence of race as an ordering principle of world politics through the making of the Atlantic world and subsequent European imperial expansion across the rest of the globe. The section then considers the ways in which race was implicated in the two world wars of the twentieth century and the subsequent cold war era.

The making of the Atlantic World

The connecting of Europe, Africa, and the Americas to form what has been called the 'Atlantic world' resulted from the European colonial project that began in earnest in 1492. Two violent processes were central to this project: (1) dispossessing indigenous peoples of their lands in the Americas; and (2) dehumanizing Africans

trafficked across the Atlantic to labour on plantations as 'slaves'. Both processes questioned the humanity of those colonized and enslaved under European colonialism; it is this questioning that gave rise to race as an ordering principle of world politics.

As conquerors from Spain laid claim to the Americas, one key issue confronted Spanish theologians in the early 1500s: the inhabitants of the Americas did not appear in the Bible, and their appearance—especially their nakedness—suggested that they should be incorporated into the Christian world as animals, or at least as less-than-human. Such incorporation was subsequently used to justify dispossessing indigenous peoples of their land and compelling them to work for the conquistadors, the Spanish conquerors. But defenders of indigenous peoples, such as Bartolomé de las Casas, argued in favour of their humanity, claiming that their living practices demonstrated an ability to reason—taken to be a key competency of humanity. If this was the case then indigenous people could not be enslaved.

Although las Casas argued successfully that indigenous peoples could not be enslaved, he initially claimed that 'Negroes' could legitimately replace their slave labour. In fact the human trafficking of Africans across the Atlantic had already begun just before these theological debates but had not yet reached its apex, which was between the late seventeenth century and mid-nineteenth century. Overall, approximately 12 million Africans were trafficked, with at least 15 per cent dying during the passage. On arrival, captive Africans were sold to plantations and put to work farming export crops such as sugar, cotton, and tobacco. This horrific 'slave trade' in living peoples is another practice made possible through racialization, described in more detail later in the chapter.

In 1672 the Royal African Company received a monopoly over English trade with West Africa in 'redwood, elephants teeth, negroes, slaves, hides, wax, guinea grains, or other commodities' (Mtubani 1983: 71). This legal instrument demonstrates the process whereby Africans were dehumanized to become chattel commodities akin to livestock. As merely property, enslaved peoples had hardly any recourse to natural justice, while their predominantly European owners effectively exercised the sovereign power of life or death over them.

Unlike other forms of slavery known at the time, in Atlantic slavery Africans alone were turned into less-than-human chattels, with this status being passed down to their descendants, to be recognized by skin colour. And so out of many diverse African peoples the 'negro'—or

Black race—was born. Moreover, in this same process, diverse Europeans became 'white'—humanity perfected. Here, one's humanity was judged on a biological basis.

And so, in the colonization of the Americas, race emerged as a way to calculate the competency of a group's humanity, either culturally (the cultural calculus) or biologically (the biological calculus). The cultural calculus came out of the theological debate over indigenous peoples. It was used to adjudicate the cultural competencies of a group whose heritage lay outside of the 'old' Biblical world, and the degree to which these competencies—especially the ability to reason—allowed them to enjoy basic protections as human beings. The biological calculus of race emerged out of the enslavement of Africans and adjudicated the humanity of groups by reference to gradations of skin colour, hair type, and physiognomy (facial features).

Both modes of calculation sought to judge the (lack of) humanity of a group (either by cultural or biological attributes, or a combination of both) so as to determine the degree to which that group could be enslaved, dispossessed, excluded, or exploited in the colonial project. Colonial agents considered only their own white race to be competent to judge the humanity of others. Hence, the ordering principle of race was consistently hierarchical and exclusionary.

Sexual relations (often coerced) between Europeans and indigenous peoples and/or Africans that bore offspring were a fundamental challenge to race. Were the children of white fathers and Black mothers to be considered half-human? And could and should they be made property? In what ways might intimate relations with indigenous peoples corrupt and damage the cultural competencies—and superior humanity—of Europeans? In these respects, relations of gender and sex were seminal to the construction of race as an ordering principle of world politics (**see Box 18.1**).

Box 18.1 Official colour hierarchies in the French Caribbean colony of St Domingue

Mulatto: cross between white and negro

Mestiço: cross between white and mulatto

Quadroon: cross between white and mestiço

Le capre: cross between mulatto and negro

Griffe: cross between le capre and negro

Mestif: cross between white and le capre

Quateron: cross between white and mestif

An even greater threat was the resistance of indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans to colonial rule and its race logics of hierarchy and exclusion. In this respect the Haitian Revolution deserves special attention. Between 1791 and 1804, enslaved Africans mounted a successful insurgence against European slaving powers on the French island of St Domingue. In 1805 the Haitian constitution, authored by the leaders of the revolution, was ratified.

By the late eighteenth century, European abolitionists (those campaigning for an end to the slave trade) argued that 'negroes' were indeed biologically human but, degraded so deeply by slavery, lacked the cultural competencies to be treated as fully human (**see Opposing Opinions 18.1**). In short, they would need to be civilized by Europeans over generations. But the content of the Haitian Revolution fundamentally undermined Europeans' assumptions of their racial supremacy—even the paternalism of abolitionists.

Article 2 of the Haitian Revolution declared that 'slavery is forever abolished'. However, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,

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Opposing Opinions 18.1 Racism emerged as a consequence of the slave trade

For

Racism was born out of capitalism. When Karl Marx recounted the history of exploitation and expropriation that gave rise to global capitalism he mentioned the 'turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins'. Similarly, Marxist-influenced political economists, most famously Trinidadian Eric Williams, argued that 'slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery' (E. Williams 1944: 7).

The capitalist profit motive determined that Africans would be enslaved. Initially non-Africans were enslaved. Indigenous and even European labourers were enslaved or indentured by European capitalists to work in the mines and plantations of the Americas. Only when these labour supplies proved inadequate for various demographic and political reasons did European capitalists turn to African labour as the key source to exploit in order to gain super-profits from the colonies. The emergence of race as an ordering principle of the global capitalist division of labour was therefore driven by the profit motive.

Anti-Black racism became naturalized. The peculiar position of Africans in the 'global division of labour' as enslaved labourers became naturalized over time, so it appeared as if Africans had always been destined for slavery.

Against

Racism was born out of religious disputes. Historians and cultural theorists such as James Sweet (1997), Sylvia Wynter (2003), and Walter Mignolo (2008) situate the emergence of race in the theological doctrines that European Christians developed before 1492 as part of a campaign to cleanse the Iberian peninsula of Muslim and Jewish influence.

Anti-Semitism played an important part in the creation of race. During the fifteenth century, Jews in Iberia were either expelled or compelled to convert to Christianity. However, many Jews who did convert continued to practise their faith in private. Over time, the fidelity of Jewish converts was questioned, with the belief that Judaism could not be sanitized by Christian baptism but rather was a 'stain' that was inherited in the blood. Purity of one's blood lineage was therefore a key factor in determining one's humanity.

Anti-African prejudice was propagated by some Muslim scholars. Iberian Christians learned a great deal from their Muslim contemporaries. However, a belief propagated by some—but not all—Muslim scholars was that Africans held more in common with animals than with humanity, hence predisposing them to a 'natural' enslavement.

Theological disputes and religious prejudices become racialized. Initially the conquistadors travelled to the Americas having been versed in the theological conflicts between Christians, Jews, and Muslims. But there, religious fault-lines were secularized and racialized to become the colonizers versus the colonized, or Spaniards and Portuguese versus 'Indians' and 'Negroes'. The 'black' skin of Africans became proof of a stain on the blood that marked a less-than-human and thus enslavable status.

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1. How was racism made necessary through the pursuit of profit?

2. In what ways did religious controversies contribute to justifications for African enslavement?

3. 'Only with the end of global capitalism will racism be defeated.' How would you argue for and against this statement?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

penned in 1789 at the beginning of the French Revolution and just a few years before the Haitian Revolution began, said nothing of the kind. Haitians had therefore proved themselves more competent in the human spirit than 'enlightened' Europeans! What is more, the Haitian constitution defined the free peoples of Haiti as, collectively, Black (*noir*), thus revaluing Blackness as a quality that was exemplary of humanity rather than a sign of sub-humanity. In these two ways, the Haitian constitution confounded and refuted the received cultural and biological hierarchies of race that were fundamental ordering principles of the colonial project.

European imperialism

By the mid-nineteenth century, race no longer relied on religious doctrine and salvation. Instead, race fundamentally informed secular understandings of human progress. Reaching back to Enlightenment thinkers such as Baron de Montesquieu, European intellectuals proposed a set of hierarchical stages that humanity travelled through from the dawn of its history, starting with savagery, leading to barbarism, and finally achieving civilization.

In this hierarchy, the state of savagery connoted basic incompetencies in self-rule—a lack of reason, law, property, and justice. Savages therefore threatened the political order of the civilized with anarchy. Barbarians, meanwhile, practised basic forms of law and order, but forms that were despotic and opposed to civilized orders. Facing savagery and barbarianism were the civilized Europeans who enjoyed the competencies of self-rule—a mastery of reason, the rule of law, respect for property, and democratic rights.

Nineteenth-century anthropologists considered the peoples who occupied this hierarchy of civilization as groups of different races differentiated by the relative simplicity or complexity of their cultures. Therefore the cultural calculus of race, previously used to differentiate Jews, Muslims, heathens, and Christians, now became a secular 'standard of civilization'. This standard was used to judge the cultural competencies of the peoples swept up in Europe's imperial expansion. It was applied globally. For instance, French naval officer and botanist Dumont d'Urville divided the Pacific into three racial zones: Polynesia, the least barbaric, followed by Micronesia, and then Melanesia, the most savage.

Thus the standard of civilization became the new ordering principle of race. Moreover, 'civilized'

Europeans believed that they could 'improve' the savage and barbaric races through colonization. This ideology came to be known as *la mission civilisatrice*—the 'civilizing mission'.

In 1848 Algeria ceased to be a colony as such and became, according to the French government, a *département* of the republic. It is here that the contradictions of the civilizing mission became apparent. While the French republic proposed equality among *all* citizens, the culture of Algeria's *indigènes* (indigenous peoples) was deemed too barbaric to practise this equality. And while French authorities presumed that the *indigènes* would embrace the civilizing process that could turn them into true citizens, they regularly rebelled because 'civilization' brought with it the taking of their lands. Colonial administrators therefore started to question whether the savage and barbaric races *could* be civilized.

Such a pessimistic attitude is evident in the remark of Jules Ferry, President of the Council of Ministers in France, who in 1884 argued that 'the superior races have a right because they have a duty: it is their duty to civilize the inferior races' (Ferry 1884). Similar pessimism underwrites Rudyard Kipling's famous narration of the civilizing mission as the 'white man's burden'.

Consequently, as European imperialism reached its high point in the late nineteenth century, the assimilation of subject races was no longer deemed entirely possible or even desirable. Colonial policies shifted to encompass the new pessimism. For instance, at the Berlin Conference (1884–5), where European powers carved out their spheres of influence on the African continent, they made a paradoxical promise to 'preserve' tribal life even as they reaffirmed the desirability of civilizing the savages. Henceforth colonial authorities often deemed full civic rights to be undesirable for native peoples, who would be governed instead 'indirectly' through their own 'custom'.

But often, in reality, it was colonial administrators and anthropologists who defined 'custom' and they used racial caricatures to simplify complex and multifaceted cultures. In India, those groups whom the British administration decided were naturally hardy and aggressive were categorized as 'martial races', with their men recruited heavily into the British army to deter further rebellions. Alternatively, a violent response often awaited those 'savages' that rebelled and could not learn the first lesson of civilization—order and obedience to the superior race.

Race and anti-racism in twentieth-century world politics

In 1919 the victors of the First World War met at Versailles to divide up the remainder of the Ottoman Empire and German colonies among themselves. They did so by creating a series of 'mandates' that determined the depth and directness of each colonial power's dominion over its new trusteeships. For this task, the victors utilized the standard of civilization. 'A' mandates encompassed barbarous races, principally in the Middle East; 'B' and 'C' mandates encompassed savage races in West and East Africa, and Southwest Africa and the Pacific, respectively.

The racial hierarchies of the mandate system were incorporated into the governance structure of the League of Nations. Moreover, white members of the League often used these hierarchies to judge whether non-white members of the League, especially Ethiopia, were competent to self-rule despite being de facto sovereign entities. In all these ways, the cultural calculus of race deeply informed the governance structures and practices of the first international organization of the twentieth century.

But what of the biological calculus of race? Instead of disappearing after the abolition of the slave trade and emancipation of enslaved Africans, this calculus returned in a new guise at the end of the nineteenth century. 'Scientific racism' proposed that each race contained naturally unchangeable characteristics and propensities such that the struggle for civilization should be understood less as a struggle over culture and more as a biological struggle of reproduction between the white and darker races.

Francis Galton, the originator of eugenics (meaning, in ancient Greek, 'good stock'), proposed that intelligence was inherited. Galton therefore advised that reproduction should be scientifically controlled so as to perfect humanity by ensuring that defects and deficiencies were not passed on. Alfred Ploetz, a German scientist who coined the term 'racial hygiene', advocated for eugenicist policies at the level of race rather than the individual. Here, the danger of miscegenation (the interbreeding of people considered to be of different racial types) was once more articulated: human perfection was possible, Ploetz argued, only through preservation and perpetuation of the Aryan race.

Just over 30 years later, the Nazi Party implemented the policy of racial hygiene in Germany. This domestic policy also interacted with an expansionist foreign policy of creating 'living space' (*Lebensraum*) for the Aryan race. In fact, this combination had at least in part already been undertaken in the genocidal war waged by the Imperial German army against the Herero and Nama peoples in Southwest Africa. During the Second World War, these conjoined policies targeted a number of so-called 'defective' groups. Central to the Nazi project, however, was the systematic slaughter between 1941 and 1945 of almost 6 million Jewish people who lived inside Germany and in neighbouring European countries.

As a result of the Shoah (Holocaust) and the victory over fascism in 1945, scientific racism was roundly and categorically refuted in a landmark statement on race issued in 1950 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 1950). However, this did not mean that race disappeared as a key—albeit contested—ordering principle of world politics in the cold war era.

In 1948 the South African government formalized a mode of governance called '**apartheid**', which was based on the separate development of the races and which considered Africans to be racially inferior to whites. Condemnation of apartheid was a persistent feature of discussions in the UN's General Assembly throughout the cold war. In addition, a group of independent African and Asian states convened a historically unprecedented conference at **Bandung**, Indonesia, in 1955 in order to propose a governance structure for the emerging **postcolonial** era that expressly outlawed 'racialism'.

Race in twentieth-century world politics was contested not only through diplomatic relations but also by social movements. During the inter-war period, the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League made a striking attempt to confront the racial hierarchies and exclusions of world politics (**see Case Study 18.1**). In the cold war period, the Black Power movement in the United States confronted the visceral and institutional racism of American society. Promoting the self-empowerment of Black communities, the movement also (as had the Haitian constitution) re-valued 'blackness' as representing beauty and the best of humanity instead of ugliness and inferiority. Black Power in the 1960s influenced a number of social movements worldwide

that struggled against racism, including Māori and Pasifika peoples in New Zealand and Dalits in India (**see Case Study 18.2**).

In 2016 the singer Beyoncé performed at the American Super Bowl sports event with a troupe of dancers whose dress (leather, Afro hairstyles, and berets) invoked images of Black Power. Allusions have been made to connections between the performance and the contemporary #BlackLivesMatter movement which confronts police brutality against Black peoples. This movement has also gained some popularity across the globe.

Case Study 18.1 The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL)

Circa 1920: Jamaican-born Pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey (1887–1940): the founder along with Amy Ashwood Garvey, of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL)

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In 1914 Marcus Garvey and Amy Ashwood Garvey set up the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL) in colonial Jamaica. The organization exploded in size and influence after the Garveys established a branch in New York City in 1917. At the peak of its operations in the mid-1920s, the UNIA-ACL had approximately one million members with perhaps three times as many active participants. And while much of this membership was concentrated in the US, UNIA-ACL branches existed across the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and even Australia. At its peak, the newspaper of the UNIA-ACL, *The Negro World*, had a circulation in the hundreds of thousands and was printed in three language editions: English, French, and Spanish.

The UNIA-ACL was in many ways an early manifestation of Black Power. Responding directly to the legacies of slavery, colonialism, and racism, the Garveys envisaged the UNIA-ACL to be a vehicle for the self-determination of African peoples worldwide. Especially important for this aim was the liberation of the continent of Africa from European rule, as expressed in the motto, 'Africa for the Africans at home and abroad'. Marcus Garvey developed a 'race first' ideology to support these aims, which took the form of pan-African nationalism.

In this respect, the UNIA-ACL took on all the outward trappings of a state, but one that organized its peoples within, above, and across state borders and national citizenships. The UNIA-ACL possessed paramilitary units such as the African Legion and auxiliary units such as the Black Cross Nurses. Its civil service administered its own exams. Disputes between members were adjudicated in a parallel court system. The UNIA-ACL even issued passports to its members in the US to be used when they migrated between cities. The UNIA-ACL also flew its own flag, 'the red, black and green', and members sang their own national anthem—*Ethiopia, Thou Land of Our Fathers*. Furthermore, the UNIA owned its own shipping company, the Black Star Line, and ran a cooperative, the Negro Factories Corporation, all owned by, staffed by, and servicing its members.

The first international convention of the UNIA-ACL took place in August 1920 at Madison Square Garden, New York City, and was attended by 20,000 international delegates. Held just half a year after the inauguration of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference, the UNIA-ACL conference produced the *Declaration of Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World*. Article 1 announced the following:

we, the duly elected representatives of the Negro peoples of the world, invoking the aid of the just and Almighty God, do declare all men, women and children of our blood throughout the world free denizens, and do claim them as free citizens of Africa, the Motherland of all Negroes.

Question 1: What was 'Pan-African' about the aims of the UNIA-ACL?

Question 2: Although the UNIA-ACL ruled no territory, what elements of sovereignty did it exhibit?

Key Points

- The making of the Atlantic world was crucial to the emergence of the West as the dominant regional force in world politics. And race was fundamental to this endeavour. Similarly, race was fundamental to the subsequent expansion of European empires across the globe.

- Race cannot, therefore, be understood as separate from, adjunctive to, or derivative of the making of contemporary world politics. Rather, race is a fundamental ordering principle *of* world politics.

- Race orders world politics by adjudicating which groups have competencies to be fully human. This adjudication relies on two calculi: the cultural calculus of race and the biological calculus of race. Each calculus determines the hierarchies and exclusions among peoples. Yet it is just as important to note that both calculi render the 'darker races' threats to the civilized race of white Europeans. And it is also important to note that each calculus took on new forms over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

- Even if race has been used to categorize and subjugate peoples, these same peoples have utilized racial ascriptions to resist their subjugation. While this dual usage of race might appear paradoxical, it is important to keep in mind that race is not something that simply happens to peoples considered 'lesser races'. Rather, these peoples have always been actively involved in contesting the ordering principles of race, especially its hierarchies and exclusions that determine who is competently human.

Thinking through race

This section engages several debates over race that draw especially from the fields of philosophy and sociology, but which are increasingly being discussed in International Relations. These debates help to deepen conceptual understandings of the cultural calculus and biological calculus of race discussed in the previous section. This exercise also provides a basis for understanding the struggles over race that exist in contemporary world politics, considered in the following section.

The genetic/social construction of race

The key purpose of the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race was to separate the 'biological fact' of race from the 'social myth' of race which had been propounded by the advocates of scientific racism. The statement made it very clear that genetic inheritance—marked by visible characteristics—has no bearing whatsoever on mental competencies or cultural practices. In this respect, the statement refuted the validity of eugenics and the pursuit of racial hygiene.

More recently the 'biological fact' of race itself has been questioned by the successful mapping of the genetic material that constitutes human beings. Scientists now know that just 0.01 per cent of DNA accounts for physical appearance, and 99.9 per cent of the DNA of every human being is identical. Despite these facts, some psychologists and bio-scientists still argue that intelligence is partially inherited and unevenly distributed by race. In opposition, some sociologists such as Troy Duster (2006) argue that race is not a genetic condition *at all*—there is no race 'gene'.

The term 'racialization' has been increasingly used to address the socially constructed nature of race. While racialization has a long conceptual history, its contemporary usage owes much to the writings of Martiniquan psychiatrist Frantz Fanon in the 1950s and 1960s, which were imported into sociological debates in the 1970s. These debates can be seen as part of the 'constructivist' turn in sociology, which ultimately influenced IR theory. Nonetheless, constructivist theory in IR has yet to engage seriously with debates over racialization.

These debates challenge the assumption that persons, objects, processes, and issues are naturally comprised of race. Instead, they claim that social conventions impute racial characteristics to particular persons, objects, processes, and issues such that, over time, their very meaning and significance change to become inseparable from the racial trait they have been accorded. For instance, people are not naturally 'black'; they are racialized to become Black, and must thus struggle with social conventions that impute deficiency and incompetency to blackness. Yet even if race is socially constructed, racialization has real effects (**see Box 18.2**).

Race and culture

What effect did the 1950 UNESCO statement have on the cultural calculus of race? As mentioned in a previous section (**see 'European imperialism'**), nineteenth-century anthropologists argued that cultures could be distinguished as simple and complex—the former belonging to (dark) savages and barbarians, the latter enjoyed by

Box 18.2 The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes

Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by London police in 2005. Menezes, a Brazilian man, lived in a block of flats that police believed was being used by suspected suicide bombers. Police followed Menezes as he left the building. Officers later claimed that they were satisfied that Menezes was one of the suspect bombers due to his 'Mongolian eyes'. As he boarded a train at Stockwell tube station, armed officers shot him at close range. Menezes, an innocent Brazilian, had been racialized by police into a Muslim terrorist and was consequently shot dead.

(white) civilized peoples. In the decades leading up to the Shoah, culture had been used to 'racialize' the undeniable diversity of human experiences and practices such that this difference could then be organized hierarchically, often for discriminatory and exclusionary purposes.

The problem facing the scholars who wrote the 1950 UNESCO statement was to find a way to represent human difference through a non-racial and non-hierarchical lens. For this purpose, as Alana Lentin (2005) demonstrates, 'ethnicity' was chosen to replace race, so that culture now referenced simple ethnic difference rather than racial hierarchies (**see Box 18.3**).

Nevertheless, a number of scholars argue that despite the swapping of overtly racial terminology for that of ethnicity, the cultural calculus of race has not disappeared. A useful argument by which to understand this complex shift in the race/culture relationship is provided by Martin Barker (1982) and Étienne Balibar (1991), who suggest that a 'new racism' has emerged in Europe.

Responding to an increase in peoples migrating to Europe from old colonies, European ideologues and politicians often claim that the cultures that 'ethnic minorities' bring with them lack the institutional and moral sophistication to integrate into advanced liberal-democratic societies. Critiques of this 'new racism' argue that while 'race talk' is not evident in such

Box 18.3 UNESCO Statement on Race, Point 6

National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups: and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term 'race' is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term 'race' altogether and speak of ethnic groups.

(UNESCO 1950: 6)

discourse, the hierarchical and exclusionary ordering principles of race *are*.

For instance, there is an assumption that the 'traditional' cultures of non-European ethnic groups are immutably different from and necessarily conflicting with 'modern', 'developed', or 'progressive' Western society. According to this way of thinking, ethnic minorities must *learn* to be modern in Europe: they cannot become modern without advanced tuition. In this process, however, their 'traditional' attitudes towards issues such as gender relations and religion are viewed as threatening the integrity of modern liberal democracy itself. More recently, these ideas and assumptions have informed a resurgent 'white nationalism', buoyed by some supporters of President Donald Trump and by various far-right parties in Europe.

Despite defining groups in terms of ethnic rather than racial heritage, the starting *premise* of this way of thinking is in agreement with the nineteenth-century cultural calculus of race: the white races must civilize the savage and barbaric races, lest the latter destroy civilization itself. In this respect, the adjudication of cultural competency that is fundamental to race remains key to the ordering of world politics, even in the post-Holocaust, postcolonial era. In short, the ordering principles of race are still central to world politics even in the absence of explicitly racial language.

Whiteness and privilege

Historically, the biological calculus of race posited only the white body as quintessentially human. Additionally, the cultural calculus of race posited only European societies as the standard of civilization, against which the competencies of all other races were measured and found variously deficient. Some theorists of race argue that, due to this history, persons racialized as white enjoy 'transparency', meaning that their cultural competencies and full humanity are presumed to be self-evident. Alternatively, persons racialized as non-white provoke an implicit or explicit questioning of their cultural competencies based on socially prevalent racial stereotypes.

The concept of 'white privilege' refers to this differential treatment and the social advantages that accrue to white persons due to their transparent and fundamentally unquestioned competence and humanity. Scholars argue, especially with regard to Western societies, that white persons rarely have to consider that their social advantages are accrued not simply by individual effort or intelligence but by racial hierarchies and exclusions. Whether these advantages accrue to poor white people

is a question of some controversy. Some campaigners in the 2016 UK European Union membership referendum claimed that Brexit would provide redress to a white working class who had been 'left behind' by globalization. However, it is important to note that in some ways whiteness is contextual and can shift in light of different colonial histories, divisions of labour, and social conventions. For example, Irish peoples, the first to be colonized under English imperial expansion, obtained the privilege of whiteness only after immigrating to North America in the nineteenth century. Even in 1960s Britain, it was still possible to see occasional signs on boarding houses warning: 'no Irish, no Coloureds'.

Moreover, similar privileges to whiteness are also garnered from gender hierarchies that posit maleness as the norm (especially in politics). In fact, scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) argue that race and gender 'intersect' to form a matrix of transparency, privilege, and domination. In this respect, the reader will find it useful to read **Chapter 17** alongside this present chapter.

Theorists of race describe the structural conditions that uphold white privilege as 'white supremacy'. Paradoxically, as philosopher Charles Mills argues, due to its transparency, white supremacy is often 'not seen as a political system at all' (Mills 1997: 2). White supremacy often becomes visible only when its privileges are exposed and challenged. This was the case, for example, in the Black Power movement when some white civil rights activists started to question their own privileges in the struggle.

'Whiteness studies' now seek to explain how the (often unspoken) privileges enjoyed by white persons depend on (often violent) processes of exclusion and discrimination that are justified by the assumption that it is always other races and cultures that are deviant, incompetent, the 'problem', and in need of 'saving'. As shall soon be discussed, this critique is instructive when it comes to understanding the dynamics of contemporary humanitarian discourses.

Key Points

- There are no 'race genes': race is not natural but rather socially constructed. Race might even be mutable for at least some people, some of the time. Nonetheless, the effects of racialization are no less real for being constructed; indeed, they can be deadly.

- The modern concept of culture and its associated logics of ethnic categorization are inescapably entangled with the production and practice of race. The contemporary critique of 'new racism' speaks to this crucial issue.

- Through the critique of 'white privilege' it is possible to understand how a white person might be anti-racist in principle yet still reproduce—and even benefit from—the hierarchical and exclusionary ordering principle of race. White supremacy is a structural condition, not an individual prejudice.

- Thus, while explicitly 'racist' discourse and practice might nowadays be rare in world politics, race remains a key ordering principle.

Contemporary manifestations of race in world politics

This section details the ways in which race remains a key ordering principle in contemporary world politics. It begins by applying the critique of 'new racism' to security and development issues in the context of the global war on terror (GWOT). It then goes on to assess the continued influence of struggles against race at the highest levels of world politics by reference to the UN World Conference against Racism convened in 2001 and reviewed in 2009 and 2011.

Security, development, and the global war on terror

There is strong evidence to suggest that the premises of 'new racism' have increasingly framed development and security in the era of the GWOT. This framework is evident in Samuel Huntington's famous thesis on the 'clash of civilizations', first published in 1993 and, after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, taken by some to be a prophetic explanation of the war against 'Islamic terrorists'. Huntington (1993) argued that in the post-cold war era cultural differences rather than ideological differences or economic interests would become the root cause of global conflict. Among other fault-lines, Huntington pitted 'Western' against 'Islamic' culture.

In constructing his thesis Huntington drew on the work of Bernard Lewis, an influential historian of the Middle East. In a 1990 article entitled *The Roots of Muslim Rage* Lewis argued that Islamic jurisprudence recognized only two domains: Dar al-Islam—the 'house of Islam', where Islamic rule of law prevailed—and Dar al-Harb—'the house of war', where the rule of 'infidels' prevailed. Moreover, Lewis stated that Islamic culture did not possess the ability to reform its traditional

societies so as to compete, first, with European imperial expansion, and subsequently, with Western economic and military might (Lewis 1990). Controversially, Lewis argued that Islamic politics could only pursue 'a perpetual state of war until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state'.

Lewis's argument articulates the key premises of 'new racism': that traditional cultures are at fundamental odds with modern society, and that the former cannot reform without the guidance—or dominion—of the latter. Hence Lewis's argument reproduces the key premises of the civilizing mission, including its pessimistic prescription that if uncooperative races cannot be civilized they must, at least, be pacified.

Crucially, Lewis does not acknowledge the importance for Islamic jurisprudence of Dar al-Ahd, the 'house of treatises' between non-Muslim and Muslim polities, and Dar al-Amn, the 'house of safety' wherein Muslims living in non-Muslim polities are allowed to practise their religion peaceably. In other words, contrary to the premises of 'new racism', Islam does possess its own resources for practising coexistence with and toleration of other ways of living. And given the many different peoples that compose the Muslim world, these resources might be applied in very diverse ways. Nonetheless, key Western politicians and commentators have largely accepted Lewis's and Huntington's depiction of Islam in their pursuit of the GWOT.

In fact, the focus on culture proposed in 'new racism' elides an engagement with the political consequences of consistent Western intervention in the domestic arrangements of an extremely diverse Muslim world. Some scholars even argue that the rise of terrorist jihadis is due in part to the US support of local groups in Afghanistan during the cold war battle against the presence of the Soviet Union in the country (Mamdani 2002).

The premises of 'new racism' have also influenced development projects that, in the era of the GWOT, have become increasingly tied to the security objectives of powerful states. Proponents of the 'liberal peace' thesis argue that societies of the Global South can avoid poverty and conflict only by adopting Western systems of governance based on liberal rule of law and the free market. Implicit in this argument is an assumption that poverty and conflict are primarily the result of incompetent domestic governance practices rather than also being a product of colonial and postcolonial interventions by Western states.

Despite using abstract and race-neutral terminologies that contrast '**failed states**' with 'developed states', the liberal peace thesis can be said to reproduce hierarchical assumptions about the 'natural' cultural (in)competency of non-white peoples for democratic self-governance, which were so crucial to the old 'civilizing mission'. In this sense, one might argue that the politics and power-projections of contemporary peacekeeping and state-building in service of the liberal peace are a twenty-first-century version of the 'white man's burden'.

The interlocking of development and security concerns has also provided a marked increase in the popularity of humanitarian work, especially among civil society actors from the Global North. In this regard, it is important to recall Giyatri Spivak's intersectional exposition of the moral justification for European colonialism, which she summarizes as 'white men saving brown women from brown men' (Spivak 1988). As Makau Mutua (2001) argues, this moral relationship holds between three core characters—saviours (white men), victims (brown women and children), and savages (brown men).

Some scholars argue that this colonial justification is now being mobilized to support the humanitarian agenda. For instance, Teju Cole (2012) has coined the term 'white-saviour industrial complex' to refer to the increasingly high-profile nature of white celebrities (the civilized) signing up to various civil society initiatives in order to save the women and children of Africa and Asia (the victims) from male warlords and terrorists (the savages). In addition to celebrities, many young white people from the Global North also tend to sign up to support humanitarian projects in the Global South.

But what is it that makes such non-experts qualified to intervene in the complex issues that surround poverty and violence? Are all women of the Global South victims and thus unable to address the humanitarian issues that they themselves face? And are all the men unqualified savages? The previous section considered how white privilege enables people racialized as white to claim moral leadership while not addressing their personal complicity and accountability in the reproduction of racial hierarchies. Some voices from the Global South now ask why these young humanitarians do not address the poverty and violence in their own societies first. Is contemporary humanitarianism, then, a global manifestation of 'white supremacy'?

Finally it is important to note that the interlocking of development and security concerns in the GWOT also influences politics within and among the societies of the Global North. This is especially the case in Europe, where the perception is now commonplace that ethnic minorities pose an existential threat to the European 'way of life'. The desirability of multicultural policies—the belief that different cultures can coexist within one national space—have now been challenged by a number

Box 18.4 British Prime Minister David Cameron on terrorism, tolerance, and Islam

In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practised at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values. So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist views for instance, we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices come from someone who isn't white, we've been too cautious frankly—frankly, even fearful—to stand up to them. The failure, for instance, of some to confront the horrors of forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone when they don't want to, is a case in point.

(Cameron, Speech at Munich Security Conference, 2011)

of European politicians who blame these policies for a loss of 'social cohesion'. Europe has been too 'tolerant' of the cultural practices of Muslim peoples in particular, they argue, and what is required now is a forceful reassertion of 'European values' (**see Box 18.4**).

However, some scholars argue that, as governments cut back on public services in response to the global economic crisis, it is all too convenient for politicians to blame Muslims for the diminution of 'social cohesion' rather than their own neoliberal austerity policies. Moreover, the current buoyancy of 'new racism' holds serious ramifications for the human rights of many vulnerable peoples fleeing from war and persecution. During the 2018 mid-term elections, President Donald Trump tweeted, without evidence, and in a clear effort to rouse his Republican base, that 'criminals and unknown Middle Easterners' had 'mixed' into the migrant 'caravan' that was slowly making its way across Mexico (Trump 2018). Implying that Islamic fundamentalists were making their way into the United States, the White House administration issued an order effectively prohibiting migrants from seeking asylum at the southern border, contra federal law and international convention.

The UN World Conference against Racism

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969) was followed by two UN-sponsored conferences on racism in 1978 and 1983. After a long hiatus, the UN convened the third such meeting, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), in Durban, South Africa, from 31 August to 8 September 2001. WCAR featured many innovations in the engagement with race at the UN level, including a pronounced focus on 'intersectionality', specifically the multiple discriminations that many indigenous women and women of African heritage face.

However, the Durban meeting was extremely contentious, demonstrating the degree to which long-standing issues concerning race still influence world politics at the highest level. Two issues deserve special attention: the question of the racist nature of Zionism, and the demand for reparations for slavery and the slave trade.

In 1975 the USSR, seeking to counter US influence in the Middle East, successfully pushed for the adoption of Resolution 3379 in the UN General Assembly. The resolution observed that Israel, now occupying Palestinian lands, shared the same 'racist structure' as apartheid South Africa. Zionism, therefore, had to be understood as 'a form of racism and racial discrimination'. In 1991, with the imminent dissolution of the USSR, the United States was able to orchestrate a repeal of this resolution.

However, in the Asian regional preparatory meeting of the WCAR convened in Tehran in early 2001, the argument was made again that, by embarking on an 'ethnic cleansing of the Arab population of historic Palestine', the Israeli state had manufactured a 'new kind of apartheid'. Ultimately, Israeli and United States representatives responded to this claim by withdrawing from the conference, subsequently arguing that anti-Semitism had infiltrated the WCAR in so far as Israel was being singled out and charged with racist policies.

The 9/11 attacks occurred just days after the close of the WCAR, and the subsequent conduct of the GWOT heightened existing tensions over the role of the United States in the Middle East. This was manifest in the review conference of the WCAR in 2009, which the United States and many other Western states boycotted after the address by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted in no uncertain terms the racist nature of the Israeli state. The United States and other Western states also refused to participate in the 2011 one-day conference in New York to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the WCAR.

Some critics have argued that the Israel/Palestine issue was used as pretence, especially by the United States, to limit involvement in the extremely expansive agenda of the WCAR. Intimate domestic issues on the agenda for

United States representatives included reparations for the violent dispossession of indigenous peoples and the enslavement of Africans in their country's colonial past.

During the 2001 conference, representatives of the United States, Canada, and the European Union made it clear that they were not prepared to discuss reparations, an issue with significant political and financial ramifications. They were, however, willing to recognize the damage done to peoples of African descent through the slave trade, slavery, and colonialism. Ultimately the final declaration of the WCAR acknowledged the 'appalling tragedies' of slavery and the slave trade but stopped short of making an apology. Instead, the text claimed that slavery and the slave trade 'should always

have been'—rather than definitively *was*—a crime against humanity, thus avoiding a route to legal redress.

Meanwhile, despite the official withdrawal of the United States government, members of its Black Congressional Caucus remained at the 2001 conference. Danny Glover, famous African-American actor and UN Goodwill Ambassador, helped to promote a notion of reparation that went beyond financial compensation to target the iniquitous structures of white supremacy. This focus on structural transformation resonates with demands consistently made by various activists and organizations of the African **diaspora**, and they were repeated at the tenth anniversary of the WCAR. More recently, the Caribbean Community and

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Case Study 18.2 Race, caste, and Dalits

Thousands of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, and Indian Railway Employees Association take part in a rally in New Delhi on 22 August 2012

© RAVEENDRAN/AFP/GettyImages

In India, caste has historically been composed of two different aspects. 'Jati' in the Sanskrit language denotes birth and is associated with specific occupations. 'Varna', however, refers to a larger hierarchy of different peoples defined by hereditary positions in the social order—Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras. Outside of this hierarchy are, among others, the 'untouchables', who have suffered and continue to suffer great oppression and stigmatization in India especially, but also elsewhere. Scholars and activists still debate the degree to which 'caste' can be considered another word for 'race'. The connections are suggestive. In fifteenth-century romance languages, the word '*casta*' (caste) was intimately associated with *raza* (race) and *linaje* (lineage); moreover, Varna is also Sanskrit for 'colour'.

Similarities between the racism suffered by enslaved Africans in the West and caste prejudice suffered by untouchables in India have always generated comparisons. Such associations were being made as early as the 1920s by important Indian figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who founded the Scheduled Castes Federation in 1942. But as Nico Slate (2012) has argued, the relationship took on new meaning in

the cold war context wherein civil rights struggles, Black Power, and **decolonization** agendas combined to produce a global network of anti-racist movements. Indeed, in this context, comparisons sometimes led to invocations of solidarity across caste and race. Such was the case when Martin Luther King Jr, visiting a school for untouchables, was introduced to students as 'a fellow untouchable from the United States of America'.

This process of mutual identification was clearly expressed in the Dalit Panthers movement of the early 1970s. 'Dalit', meaning 'broken', was a term of self-identification popularized by Ambedkar that replaced the imposed label of 'untouchables'; 'Panthers' referenced the Black Panther movement of the United States. The Dalit Panthers' manifesto, while identifying the origins of the caste system in 'Hindu feudalism' rather than European colonialism, nonetheless analogized the African-American context by describing caste as a modern form of 'slavery'. In 1979, the Dalit Action Committee published a book entitled *Apartheid in India*, thus connecting to the broader debate in the UN about South African apartheid and the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Dalit organizations were extremely active in the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in 2001. They argued that caste might not equal race, yet it should nevertheless be included on the basis that caste, like race, was a system of group discrimination and exclusion based on descent. However, caste was kept off the agenda of the Durban Review Conference in 2009 due to pressure by the Indian government. 'Castism', argued the government's representatives, was not racism and, indeed, was a domestic rather than international matter. In this respect, as Sankaran Krishna (2014) argues, India made common cause with the United States and Israel in seeking to keep 'domestic' matters of race off the agenda of the UN conference.

Question 1: Is race the same as caste? Does it matter?

Question 2: In this case study the 'white man' is not the key protagonist. What significance does this fact hold for a global understanding of race?

Common Market (CARICOM), a regional organization of Caribbean states, has begun to inquire into the prospect of seeking reparations for slavery and the slave trade from culpable European states.

The politics that surround the WCAR confirm that struggles over race remain a significant force in world politics at both diplomatic and grassroots levels. The historical impact of the Shoah and the responses to this genocide still provide an important—and contentious—framing of race. Meanwhile, the interpretation of Israeli occupation as a form of apartheid, as well as debates over the inclusion of caste discrimination into the WCAR (**see Case Study 18.2**), show that race is not a static concept but rather consistently evolving in its meanings and applications. Finally, the reparations debate demonstrates that the racial ordering principles created in the making of the Atlantic world over 400 years ago still influence world politics and demands for global justice.

> ### Key Points
>
> - The cultural calculus of race remains influential in world politics in so far as it provides the core premises informing 'new racism'. Practices of racialization now tend to proceed mainly through cultural rather than biological referents.
> - For Western states, the premises of 'new racism' have helped to frame foreign policy concerns over the global war on terror as well as domestic concerns over multiculturalism and immigration.
> - The description of Israel as an apartheid state is contentious. Nonetheless, racialized policies associated with apartheid—population segregation, land occupation, granting of differential rights, and violent policing of divisions—continue in the present, and not only in Israel.
> - The violence, dispossessions, and injustices through which the Atlantic world was formed have enduring legacies in world politics. They constitute a living past through which claims on global justice are made.

Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with race as a key ordering principle of world politics. The kind of order produced by race has been presented as a hierarchical adjudication of human competencies through the categorizing of group attributes. This categorization is a process of racialization—that is, group attributes are delineated by some kind of shared heritage that is identified by visual and other sensate markers. The chapter explored two different ways in which this adjudication proceeded: a biological calculus of race and a cultural calculus of race. Differing in the basis of their calculations of human competency, both calculi serve to hierarchically order humanity with inequitable consequences.

The first section of the chapter explored how the biological calculus and cultural calculus emerged in the making of the Atlantic world to form the ordering principle of race. This ordering principle evolved as European countries violently expanded their empires across the rest of the globe. The section also showed how race was mobilized by the enslaved and colonized to paradoxically subvert the ordering principle of race, especially its hierarchies and exclusions when it comes to identifying who is competently 'human'.

The next section examined some key debates surrounding the conceptualization of race. These debates reveal that while the biological calculus of race has been refuted in an age that denies any support for explicit racism, culture has increasingly come to do the work of racial ordering, although those who use this calculus never speak the language of race directly. This section also suggested how white supremacy should be understood as a structure of privilege and not primarily as individual prejudice.

The final section applied these issues to contemporary world politics. Specifically, it examined the global war on terror, the development/security nexus, humanitarianism, and multiculturalism through the critique of 'new racism', and also 'white privilege'. Finally, the World Conference against Racism was used to demonstrate that, despite the contemporary lack of explicit reference to race, global social movements and diplomats alike still struggle over race as an ordering principle of world politics.

In closing, it is useful to return to the way in which W. E. B. Du Bois's early explanation of the racial origins of the First World War has been ignored by IR theorists. In part this might be due to the fact that Du Bois was an African-American and that the key thinkers in IR theory tend to be white. Perhaps, also, this ignorance might relate to the fact that IR theories find it hard to accommodate race. The hierarchical nature of racial order is made invisible in the realist image of world politics as a collection of anarchically ordered states. So, too, do the hierarchical and group attributes of race

vanish in the liberal image of a world composed of like individuals.

But not all IR theories have made—or need to make—race invisible. Marxist theories understand global hierarchy principally in terms of class and not race, although, as has been shown, some scholars have tried to link the two. Constructivism could in principle engage with 'racialization' as a key process of identity formation. However, most constructivists have yet to do so. Historically, feminist theory spoke to the experiences of middle-class white women. More recent engagements with 'intersectional' analysis by feminist theorists in IR hold the potential to advance understandings of race in world politics. Finally, because colonial rule is so crucial in the historical formation of race, there is much that **postcolonial** theory can contribute to an understanding of race, even though many postcolonial theorists do not address race directly.

Questions

1. How did the Haitian Revolution fundamentally challenge the racial ordering of world politics?
2. How is the biological calculus of race distinct from the cultural calculus of race?
3. Why is the UNESCO 1950 statement on race such an important document?
4. 'I'm not racist: I'm talking about their culture, not their skin.' Discuss.
5. How might the 'new racism' connect concerns over multiculturalism in liberal democratic polities with the waging of the global war on terror?
6. Is humanitarianism a racist pursuit?
7. In what ways have gender issues intersected with race?
8. Detail the different ways in which ascriptions of group 'competency' have been central to the making of world politics.
9. Does race only oppress?
10. To what extent can IR theories account for race as an ordering principle of world politics?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Anievas, A., Manchanda, N., and Shilliam, R. (eds.) (2014), *Confronting the Global Colour Line: Race and Racism in International Relations* (New York: Routledge). Presents a collection of diverse theoretical and empirical investigations that explicitly draw out the significance of race for understanding world politics.

Bhattacharyya, G. (2008), *Dangerous Brown Men* (London: Zed Books). This challenging and provocative book explores the construction of the Muslim man in the global war on terror through the notion of 'sexualized racism'.

Biko, S. (1978), *I Write What I Like* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Famous anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko explains the meaning and politics of Black Consciousness. While the context that Biko speaks to is 1970s South Africa, his writings are informed by and still help to illuminate struggles over race in world politics more generally.

'Critiquing "race" and racism in development studies' (2006), special issue of *Progress in Development Studies*, 6(1). This special issue is themed around the formative influence of race on development scholarship and practice. It includes articles on the intersection of gender and race in development, as well as race in migration and development.

Fanon, F. (1952), *Black Skin, White Masks* (Paris: Editions de Seuil). The classic text by a psychiatrist and anti-colonial activist documents his attempt as a Black man from the French Caribbean to 'rehumanize' himself and French society from the effects of racism.

Hobson, J. (2012), *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This book explores the shifting nature of race thinking throughout the twentieth century, as well as its internal differences, and shows how these shifts and differences have influenced international relations theory.

Mani, L. (1987), 'Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India', *Cultural Critique*, 7: 119–56. By investigating the tradition of widows immolating themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres, this article examines the colonial response that has been famously described as 'white men saving brown women from brown men'.

Morrison, T. (1988), 'Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature' (delivered at the Tanner Lectures on Human Rights, University of Michigan), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/m/morrison90.pdf. This lecture asks the question: Why is it so hard to focus on race in academic debate? While Morrison is speaking to debates in literature, her arguments and insights are also relevant to International Relations.

Quijano, A. (2000), 'Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America', *Nepantla: Views from South*, 1(3): 533–80. An important text that uses a 'decolonial' approach to explain that the 'rules' created through European colonialism still have effects in the postcolonial era, and that central to these rules was—and is—race.

Vitalis, R. (2015), *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A rereading of the history of International Relations in the US as a discipline fundamentally concerned with race and imperialism. Vitalis demonstrates the crucial importance of Black scholars from Howard University in the development of the discipline.

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International law

CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT

Framing Questions

- Why, in an anarchic international system with no central authority, would sovereign states create a system of international law?

- Why does international law take the form it does, and how has it changed over the past five centuries?

- What impact does international law have on the nature and conduct of international relations, and what explains this impact?

Reader's Guide

This chapter introduces students to the practice of modern international law and to debates surrounding its nature and efficacy. It begins by exploring the reasons why international societies construct institutions, and why different sorts of institutions have emerged in different historical contexts. It then considers the nature and origins of the modern institution of international law, its close connection with the practice of multilateralism, and the recent cosmopolitanization of the global legal order. After a brief discussion of the laws of war, it concludes with a survey of different theoretical approaches to international law.

Introduction

As students of International Relations, our default position is to assume that international law matters little to international politics. The power and interests of states are what matters, and law is either a servant of the powerful or an irrelevant curiosity. Widespread as this scepticism is, it is confounded by much state behaviour. If international law does not matter, why do states and other actors devote so much effort to negotiating new legal regimes, augmenting existing ones, and, conversely, avoiding legal commitments? Why does so much international debate centre on the legality of state behaviour, the applicability of legal rules, and the legal obligations incumbent on states? And why is compliance with international law so high, even by domestic standards?

This chapter introduces students to the practice of modern international law and to debates surrounding its nature and efficacy. It is written primarily for students of International Relations, but should also be of interest to law students curious about the political foundations of international law. Its starting point is the idea that international law is best understood as a core international institution: a set of norms, rules, and practices created by states and other actors to facilitate diverse social goals, from order and coexistence to justice and human development. However, it is an institution with distinctive historical roots, and understanding these roots is essential to grasping its unique institutional features.

Order and institutions

Realists portray international relations as a struggle for power, a realm in which states are 'continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war' (Morgenthau 1985: 52). While war has certainly been a recurrent feature of international life, it is a crude and deeply dysfunctional way for states to ensure their security or realize their interests. Because of this, states have devoted as much, if not more, effort to liberating themselves from the condition of war as they have to embroiling themselves in violent conflict. Creating some modicum of international order has been an abiding common interest of most states, most of the time (Bull 1977: 8).

To achieve international order, states have created international institutions. People often confuse institutions and organizations, incorrectly using the two terms interchangeably. International institutions are commonly defined as complexes of norms, rules, and practices that 'prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane 1989: 3). International organizations, such as the United Nations, are physical entities that have staff, head offices, and letterheads. International institutions can exist without any organizational structure—the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an institution, but it has no head office. However, many institutions have organizational dimensions. The World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade) is an institution with a very strong organizational structure. And while institutions can exist without an organizational dimension, international organizations cannot exist without an institutional framework, as their very existence presupposes a prior set of norms, rules, and principles that empower them to act and which they are charged to uphold. If states had never negotiated the Charter of the United Nations, the organization simply could not exist, let alone function.

In modern **international society**, states have created three levels of institutions (**see Box 19.1**). There are deep constitutional institutions, such as the principle of **sovereignty**, which define the terms of legitimate statehood. Without the institution of sovereignty, the world of independent states and the international politics it engenders would simply not exist. States have also created fundamental institutions, such as international law and multilateralism, which provide the basic rules and practices that shape how states solve cooperation and coordination problems (Reus-Smit 1999: 14). These are the institutional norms, techniques, and structures that states and other actors invoke and employ when they have common ends they want to achieve or clashing interests they want to contain. Lastly, states have developed issue-specific institutions or regimes, such as the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which enact fundamental institutional practices in particular realms of inter-state relations.

Box 19.1 Levels of international institutions

Constitutional institutions

Constitutional institutions comprise the primary rules and norms of international society, without which society among sovereign states could not exist. The most commonly recognized of these is the norm of sovereignty, which holds that within the state, power and authority are centralized and hierarchical, and outside the state no higher authority exists. The norm of sovereignty is supported by a range of auxiliary norms, such as the right to self-determination and the norm of non-intervention.

Fundamental institutions

Fundamental institutions rest on the foundation provided by constitutional institutions. They represent the basic norms and practices that sovereign states employ to facilitate coexistence and cooperation under conditions of international anarchy. They are the rudimentary practices states reach for when seeking to collaborate or coordinate their behaviour. Fundamental institutions have varied from one historical system of states to another,

but in the modern international system the fundamental institutional practices of contractual international law and multilateralism have been the most important.

Issue-specific institutions or 'regimes'

Issue-specific institutions or 'regimes' are the most visible or palpable of all international institutions. They are the sets of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that states formulate to define who constitute legitimate actors and what constitutes legitimate action in a given domain of international life. Examples of regimes are the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Importantly, issue-specific institutions or regimes are concrete enactments in specific issue-areas of fundamental institutional practices, such as international law and multilateralism.

The NPT is a concrete expression of the practices of international law and multilateralism in the field of arms control.

This chapter is concerned with the middle stratum of fundamental institutions. In modern international society, a range of such institutions exists, including international law, multilateralism, bilateralism, diplomacy, and management by the great powers (Bull 1977). Since the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the first two of these—international law and multilateralism—have provided the basic framework for international cooperation and the pursuit of order.

Key Points

- States have strong incentives to free themselves from the insecurities of international anarchy.

- States face common coordination and collaboration problems, yet cooperation remains difficult under anarchy.

- To facilitate cooperation, states create international institutions, of which three levels exist in modern international society: constitutional institutions, fundamental institutions, and issue-specific institutions or 'regimes'.

- Of existing fundamental institutions, international law is one of the most important for understanding cooperation and order among states.

The modern institution of international law

Historical roots

The contemporary international legal system is a historical artefact. Like most present-day institutions, it bears the imprint of the revolutions in social thought and practice that from the eighteenth century onwards transformed the political landscape of Europe and then much of the world. Great thinkers such as Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Emer de Vattel (1714–67) are often cast as the 'fathers' of international law, and the Treaties of Augsburg (1555), Westphalia (1648), and Utrecht (1713) are seen as landmarks in the development of

international public law. Yet, despite the importance of these historical figures and moments, the modern international legal system acquired many of its distinctive characteristics as late as the nineteenth century (**see Box 19.2**).

The present international system has its roots in Europe, and before the nineteenth century the vast majority of European states were monarchies. The kings and queens who ruled these states justified their power by appealing to the doctrine of divine right: the idea that monarchs gained their authority directly from

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Box 19.2 Key constitutive legal treaties

Over the past five centuries, the nature and scope of international society has been conditioned by a series of international legal instruments that have defined the nature of legitimate statehood, the scope of sovereign authority, and the bounds of rightful state action, international and domestic. The following are some of the more important.

The Treaties of Westphalia, 1648
The Treaties of Osnabruck and Münster, which together form the 'Peace of Westphalia', ended the Thirty Years' War and were crucial in delimiting the political rights and authority of European monarchs. Among other things, the Treaties granted monarchs rights to maintain standing armies, build fortifications, and levy taxes.

The Treaties of Utrecht, 1713
The Treaties of Utrecht, which ended the Wars of Spanish Succession, consolidated the move to territorial sovereignty in Europe. The Treaties of Westphalia did little to define the territorial scope of sovereign rights, the geographical domain over which such rights could extend. By establishing that fixed territorial boundaries, rather than the reach of family ties, should define the reach of sovereign authority, the Treaties of Utrecht were crucial in establishing the present link between sovereign authority and territorial boundaries.

The Treaty of Paris, 1814
The Treaty of Paris ended the Napoleonic Wars and paved the way for the Congress of Vienna (1814–15). The Congress of Vienna, in turn, defined the nature of the post-Napoleonic War settlement, and ultimately led to the Concert of Europe.

The Concert has often been credited with successfully limiting great power warfare for much of the nineteenth century, but it is also noteworthy as an institution for upholding monarchical authority and combating liberal and nationalist movements in Europe.

The Peace Treaty of Versailles, 1919
The Treaty of Versailles formally ended the First World War (1914–18). The Treaty established the League of Nations, specified the rights and obligations of the victorious and defeated powers (including the notorious regime of reparations on Germany), and created the 'Mandatories' system under which 'advanced nations' were given legal tutelage over colonial peoples.

The Charter of the United Nations, 1945
The Charter of the United Nations is the legal regime that created the United Nations as the only global 'supranational' organization. The Charter defines the structure of the United Nations, the powers of its constitutive agencies, and the rights and obligations of sovereign states that are party to the Charter. The Charter is the key legal document limiting the use of force to instances of self-defence and collective peace enforcement endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.

The Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960
Though not a legally binding document, General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) signalled the normative delegitimation of European colonialism and was critical in establishing the right to self-determination, which in turn facilitated the wholesale decolonization of the European empires.

God (Bodin 1967: 40). At this time, law was understood as the command of a legitimate superior—humanity in general, including monarchs, was subject to God's law and to natural law, both of which embodied the command of God. The subjects of particular states were also ruled by municipal law, which was the command of monarchs, who stood above such law. These ideas about divinity, authority, and law profoundly influenced early international law. Derived from the law of nature, international law was understood as a set of divinely ordained principles of state conduct, accessible to all endowed with right reason. European monarchs were obliged to observe international law not because they had reached a contractual agreement with one another, or at least not primarily, but because of fealty to God (Grotius 1925: 121).

In the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth, the principles of liberalism and nationalism challenged the legitimacy of the absolutist state. By the second half of the nineteenth century, European states

were undergoing dramatic internal transformations as the principles of constitutionalism and popular sovereignty weakened monarchs' authority, empowered parliamentary institutions, and extended the franchise. With this transformation came a new conception of law—law as reciprocal accord. Law was deemed legitimate to the extent that it was authored by those who were subject to the law, or their representatives, and it applied equally to all citizens in all like circumstances. Once this ideal was firmly established in the major European states, it started to filter into relations among states, leading to the rise of contractual international law, or what is often termed 'positive' law. International law was now seen as the product of negotiations among sovereign states, not the command of God, and states were obliged to observe such law, not because of fealty, but because they had entered into reciprocally binding agreements with other states—because international law represents the 'mutual will of the nations concerned' (von Martens 1795: 47–8).

Case Study 19.1 Is international law an expression of Western dominance?

International Criminal Court in The Hague, The Netherlands
© Jan Kranendonk/123RF

International law is easily cast as a Western, even imperial, institution. Its roots lie in the European intellectual movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Ideas propagated at that time not only drew on ideas of natural law, which could be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman thought; they also distinguished clearly between international laws that were appropriate among Christian peoples and those that should govern how Christians related to peoples in the Muslim world, the Americas, and later Asia. The former were based on assumptions of the inherent equality of Christian peoples, the latter on the inherent superiority of Christians over non-Christians.

Further evidence of this Western bias can be found in the 'standard of civilization' that European powers codified in international law during the nineteenth century (Gong 1984). Non-Western polities were granted sovereign recognition only if they exhibited certain domestic political characteristics, and only if they were willing and able to participate in the prevailing diplomatic practices. The standard was heavily biased towards Western political and legal institutions as the accepted model. On the basis of this standard, European powers divided the world's peoples into 'civilized', 'barbarian', and 'savage' societies, a division they used to justify various degrees of Western rule.

Many claim that Western bias still characterizes the international legal order. They cite the Anglo-European dominance of peak legal institutions and international human rights law, which is said to impose a set of Western values about individual rights on non-Western societies where such ideas are alien. These biases are seen as coming together in the issue of humanitarian intervention. Western powers are accused of using their privileged position on the Security Council, and of brandishing human rights norms, to intervene in the domestic politics of developing countries.

All these criticisms have validity. However, the nature and role of international law in contemporary world politics is more complex than it first appears. The modern international legal system rests on a set of customary norms that uphold the legal equality of all sovereign states, as well as their rights to self-determination and non-intervention. Non-Western states have been the most vigorous proponents and defenders of these cardinal legal norms. Second, non-Western peoples were centrally involved in the development of the international human rights regime. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the product of a deliberate and systematic process of intercultural dialogue (Glendon 2002). And the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was shaped in critical ways by newly independent postcolonial states (Reus-Smit 2001, 2013).

Question 1: When assessing the moral and political value of contemporary international law, what is more important: its European cultural origins and legacies, or its role in helping states and peoples address global challenges?

Question 2: Has contemporary international law transcended its European origins, as non-Western states have become the most vigorous defenders of cardinal legal principles, like sovereignty and non-intervention, and played important roles in things like the human rights regime?

Conditioned by these historical forces (**see Case Study 19.1**), the modern institution of international law has developed four distinctive characteristics: a multilateral form of legislation; a consent-based form of legal obligation; a peculiar language of reasoning and argument; and a strong discourse of institutional autonomy (**see Box 19.3**).

Multilateral legislation

If legislation is defined broadly as the formulation and enactment of legally binding norms or rules, then the legislation of international law takes place both formally and informally. New norms and rules evolve constantly through the informal arguments, social learning, and repeated practices of states and non-state actors. For instance, since the 1990s there has been considerable debate about whether a new norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P) is evolving to qualify state sovereignty and justify humanitarian intervention. If such norms are evolving, these processes are far from complete. If they do consolidate, however, it will have been less the result of formal legal codification than of persistent normative debate and the reinterpretation of existing legal norms. Informal processes such as these are crucially important, because they are one of the principal means by which customary norms of international law evolve. Customary norms are a

special category of international law; they have such high normative standing in the community of states that they are considered binding on all states, irrespective of whether they have consented. Many of the rules governing territorial jurisdiction, freedom of the seas, and the diplomatic immunities of states are customary, and most of these evolved through informal processes (Byers 1999: 3).

In addition to these informal modes of law-making, states have also developed more formal methods of legislation, the most distinctive being the practice of multilateralism. Before the Napoleonic Wars, multilateralism was a relatively marginal institutional practice. States certainly engaged in cooperative practices involving three or more states, but these were often aggregations of bilateral arrangements (such as the Peaces of Westphalia and Utrecht), and were seldom based on reciprocally binding rules of conduct (a mark of true multilateralism) (Ruggie 1993). It was only in the nineteenth century, as liberalism began transforming the internal constitutions of leading European powers, that multilateralism became the preferred mode of international legislation. If law was legitimate only if those subject to it authored it, and only if it applied equally to all subjects in all like circumstances, then an international means of legislation had to be found that could meet these standards. It was in this context that multilateralism rose to prominence.

Consent and legal obligation

Grotius wrote that states are obliged to obey the **law of nations**—along with the laws of nature and God—'even though they have made no promise' (Grotius 1925: 121). Fealty to God was the ultimate root of all legal obligations in the Age of Absolutism, and consent constituted a secondary, if still important, source of obligation. This contrasts dramatically with the situation today, in which consent is treated as the primary source of international legal obligation (Henkin 1995: 27). This emphasis on consent is integral to much contemporary discourse on international law. Leaders of states will often use the fact of their consent, or the lack of it, to display their sovereign rights. And critics use evidence of state consent to criticize governments for failing to live up to their obligations under international law.

However, two things complicate the status of consent as the principal source of modern international legal obligation. To begin with, we have already noted that states are, in reality, bound by rules to which they have not formally consented, principally those of customary international law. In determining whether a norm constitutes customary law, scholars and jurists look for general observance of the norm and something they call '*opinio juris*', the recognition by states that they are observing the norm because it constitutes law (Price 2004: 107). Both of these are thought to be indicators of tacit consent, but as critics of liberalism have long argued, tacit consent is not the same as actual consent, and extrapolating tacit consent from norm-consistent behaviour is fraught with difficulties. Second, the idea that consent is the principal source of international legal obligation is philosophically highly problematic (Reus-Smit 2003). As the celebrated legal theorist H. L. A. Hart observed, consent can only be obligating if there exists a prior rule that specifies that promises to observe legal rules are binding. But because this rule would be what gives consent its normative standing, consent cannot be the source of that prior rule's obligatory force (Hart 1994: 225).

Language and practice of justification

In addition to its distinctive forms of legislation and legal obligation, a peculiar language and practice of justification characterizes the modern institution of international law. Consideration of the role that international law plays in global life demonstrates that it operates as more than just a pristine set of rules calmly and logically applied to clear-cut situations by authoritative juridical interpreters. International law is alive in the central political debates of international society; it structures arguments about right and wrong, about the bounds of legitimate action, about authority and membership, and about the full spectrum of international issues, from the management of fisheries to the use of force. However, close inspection shows that both legal argument and these political debates take a distinctive form.

First, international legal argument is rhetorical. It is tempting to believe that legal argument is strictly logical, that it is concerned with the straightforward, objective application of a rule to a situation. But this ignores the central and inevitable role that interpretation plays in determining which rules apply, their meaning, and the nature of the case at hand. In reality, legal argument appears as rhetorical as it is logical. As Friedrich Kratochwil argues:

> Legal arguments deal with the finding and interpretation of the applicable norms and procedures, and with the presentation of the relevant facts and their evaluations. Both questions turn on the issue of whether a particular interpretation of a fact-pattern is acceptable rather than 'true'; consequently strict logic plays a minor role in this process of finding the law.
>
> *(Kratochwil 1989: 42)*

Second, international legal argument is analogical: it is concerned 'to establish similarities among different cases or objects in the face of (striking) dissimilarities' (Kratochwil 1989: 223). International actors reason with analogies in three different ways. They use them to interpret a given rule (rule A was interpreted in a particular way, and given the logic applied, rule B should be interpreted the same way). They draw similarities between one class of action and another to claim that the former is, or is not, rule-governed (case C was rule-governed, and given the similarities with case D, case D should be rule-governed as well). And they invoke analogies to establish the status of one rule with reference to other rules (rule E has customary status, and since the same levels of assent and dissent are evident in the case of rule F, rule F should be accorded customary status as well).

The discourse of institutional autonomy

The strong discourse of institutional autonomy is the final distinctive characteristic of the modern institution of international law. As students of International Relations, we are accustomed to think of politics and law as separate social domains, as realms of human action with distinct logics and practices. One of the most interesting insights of recent studies is that political actors regularly speak and act as if at some point in a negotiation, at some stage in a crisis, action moved from the political to the legal realm, a realm in which different types of argument and practice prevail. In the political realm, claims of self-interest and barely veiled coercive practices are considered legitimate, if distasteful, but in the legal realm legal reasoning and argument become the legitimate form of action. For instance, compare US attempts to justify war with Iraq within the confines of the UN Security Council in 2003, where Washington's arguments were constrained by available legal justifications, with its practices outside the Council, where its claims were more self-interested and its practices more openly coercive.

Two things should be noted about this discourse of institutional autonomy. First, imagining the political and legal realms as separate and distinct is a modern phenomenon. In the age of absolute monarchies in Europe, politics and law were joined in the figure of the sovereign. One of the features of modern, particularly liberal, thought is the idea that political and legal powers need to be separated by quarantining politics to the executive and legislative realms, and legal interpretation and application to the judicial realm. This is what lies behind the modern constitutional idea of a 'separation of powers'. Second, imagining separate political and legal realms in international relations contributes to international order, and is thus politically functional for states. Perception of a legal realm, recognition that a spectrum of issues, practices, and processes are governed by legal rules and procedures, and mutual understanding that certain forms of action are empowered or foreclosed within the legal realm, bring a certain discipline, structure, and predictability to international relations.

From international to supranational law?

So long as international law was designed primarily to facilitate international order—to protect the negative liberties of sovereign states—it remained a relatively circumscribed, if essential, institution. This was apparent in four characteristics of international law, at least until the developments of the last three decades. First, states were the primary *subjects* of international law, the principal bearers of rights and obligations (Higgins 1994: 40). The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States established the 'state as a person of international law', defined what constitutes a state, and laid down states' principal rights and obligations (Weston, Falk, and D'Amato 1990: 12). Second, states were the primary *agents* of international law, the only actors empowered to formulate, enact, and enforce international law. Third, international law was concerned with the regulation of inter-state relations. How states interacted with one another fell within the purview of international law; how they operated within their territorial boundaries did not—a distinction enshrined in the twin international norms of self-determination and non-intervention. Finally, the scope of international law was confined—or attempts were made to confine it—to questions of order not justice. The principal objective of international law was the maintenance of peace and stability based on mutual respect for each state's territorial integrity and domestic jurisdiction.

In recent decades states have sought to move beyond the simple pursuit of international order towards the ambitious yet amorphous objective of global governance, and international law has begun to change in fascinating ways. First, although states remain central (Higgins 1994: 39), individuals, groups, and organizations are increasingly becoming recognized subjects of international law. The development of an expansive body of international human rights law, supported by evolving mechanisms of enforcement, has given individuals, as well as some collectivities such as minority groups and indigenous peoples, clear rights under international law. And recent moves to hold individuals criminally responsible for violations of those rights—evident in the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and in the permanent International Criminal Court—indicate the clear obligations individuals bear to observe basic human rights.

Second, non-state actors are becoming important agents in the international legal process. While such actors cannot formally enact international law, and their practices do not contribute to the development of customary international law, they often play a crucial role in shaping the normative environment in which states are moved to codify specific legal rules; in providing information to national governments that encourages the redefinition of state interests and the convergence of policies across different states; and in actually drafting international treaties and conventions. This last role was first seen in the way the International Committee of the Red Cross drafted the 1864 Geneva Convention (Finnemore 1996: 69–88), and more recently in the role that multinational corporations played in shaping the investor protections in the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Third, international law is increasingly concerned with global, not merely international, regulation. Where the principles of self-determination and

non-intervention once erected a fundamental boundary between the international and domestic legal realms, this boundary is now being breached by the development of international rules that regulate how states should behave within their territories. Notable here is international trade law and the growing corpus of international environmental law, as well as the previously mentioned body of international human rights law. These laws' penetration through the boundaries of the sovereign state is facilitated by the willingness of some national courts to draw on precepts of international law in their rulings.

Finally, the rules, norms, and principles of international law are no longer confined to maintaining international order, narrowly defined. Not only does the development of international humanitarian law indicate a broadening of international law to address questions of global justice, but notable decisions by the United Nations Security Council, which warranted international interventions in such places as Libya, have seen gross violations of human rights by sovereign states treated as threats to international peace and security, thus legitimating action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (**see Ch. 32**). In such cases, the Security Council has drawn a link between international order and the maintenance of at least minimum standards of global justice.

> ### Key Points
>
> - So long as international law was designed to facilitate international order, it was circumscribed in key ways: states were its principal subjects and agents; it was concerned with the regulation of inter-state relations; and its scope was confined to questions of order.
>
> - The quest for global governance is pushing international law into new areas, raising questions about whether international law is transforming into a form of supranational law.
>
> - Individuals, and to some extent collectivities, are gradually acquiring rights and responsibilities under international law, establishing their status as both subjects and agents under international law.
>
> - Non-governmental actors are becoming important in the development and codification of international legal norms.
>
> - International law is affecting domestic legal regimes and practices, and the rules of the international legal system are no longer confined to issues of order. As international humanitarian law evolves, issues of global justice are permeating the international legal order.

The laws of war

International law governing the use of force is rightly considered the core of the modern international legal system. Traditionally, such law has divided into two types: *jus ad bellum*, the law governing when states may use force or wage war, and *jus in bello*, the law governing the conduct of war once launched (**see Ch. 14**). Two things should be noted about these dimensions of the laws of war. First, from their earliest articulations, they have always been entwined. Second, the content of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* has undergone significant change, and what were once cardinal norms have, in some cases, been completely reversed. The laws of war have thus been an evolving project, responding over time to the profound social and technological changes that have transformed the international system over the last five centuries.

The most dramatic change has occurred in the central precepts of *jus ad bellum*. Early writings on just war stressed the importance of 'just cause'—the idea that waging war was justified, morally as well as legally, if a state was responding to an unwarranted attack or seeking reparations for damages. This was greatly complicated, however, by norms that appeared to cut in the opposite direction. For instance, it was widely believed that sovereign rights could be secured through conquest. In others words, if a ruler succeeded in establishing control over a territory and its people, he or she was the sovereign authority. During the nineteenth century, the idea that just cause established just war gave way to the much more permissive notion that war was justified if it served a state's vital national interests, interests that the state itself had the sole right to define. This was the heyday of the principle that the right to wage war was a fundamental sovereign right, a privilege that defined the very essence of sovereignty. The dire consequences of this principle were evident in the First and Second World Wars, and after 1945 the scope of legally justifiable war was dramatically circumscribed.

The Charter of the United Nations confines the legitimate use of force to two situations: the use of force in self-defence (Chapter 7, Article 51), which remained an unqualified sovereign right, and the use of force as part of a peace enforcement action sanctioned by the UN Security Council (Chapter 7, Article 42).

Paralleling these changes, the precepts of *jus in bello* have also evolved. Here the trend has been less one of radical change in core principles than a gradual expansion of the scope of international legal constraints on permissible conduct in war. Three areas of constraint are particularly noteworthy. The first relates to the kind of weaponry that is legally permitted. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were landmarks in this regard, establishing conventions prohibiting the use of expanding bullets, the dropping of bombs from balloons, and the use of projectiles that diffused gases. Since then, legally binding treaties have come into force prohibiting a range of weaponry, including the use and deployment of landmines and the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, and campaigns are now under way to place legal limits on the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (killer robots). The second area of constraint relates to how military combatants must be treated. Of central importance here are the four Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, along with their three additional protocols of 1977 (the first two) and 2005 (the third). The third area concerns the treatment of non-combatants, for which the Geneva Conventions were also crucially important. The deliberate targeting of non-combatants has long been prohibited, but in recent years attempts have been made to tighten these prohibitions further. This is crucial, as the disturbing trend of contemporary warfare is that more non-combatants are being killed than combatants. Important moves have also been made to codify rape as an international crime.

The evolution of the laws of war is one of the clearest examples of the aforementioned shift from international to supranational law. This is particularly apparent in the development since the end of the cold war of, first, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) and, second, the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is the most ambitious international judicial experiment since the end of the Second World War, established to prosecute the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (**see Case Study 19.2**).

Since 2001 the laws of war have come under sustained challenge, as US conduct in the 'war on terror' has pushed the limits of both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. The Bush administration's invasion of Afghanistan was widely seen as a legitimate act of self-defence, the Taliban government having openly harboured the Al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. However, the subsequent invasion of Iraq was roundly criticized as a violation of international law. The administration's attempt to establish a new right of 'preventive' self-defence was unsuccessful, and it was unable to persuade a majority of Security Council members that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was sufficient to justify an international peace enforcement action. A persistent aura of illegality has thus surrounded the Iraq conflict, an aura exacerbated by perceived abuses of *jus in bello* during the war on terror. Most notable here has been the treatment of suspected terrorist combatants. The Bush administration drew major international criticism for its imprisonment of suspects at Guantanamo Bay without the protections of the 1949 Geneva Convention or normal judicial processes in the US. It was also widely criticized for its practice of 'extraordinary rendition', the CIA's abduction of suspects overseas and their purported transfer to third countries known to practise torture.

Fears have grown that the established framework of international law is crumbling, unable to deal with the 'revisionist' practices of a unilateralist lone superpower (for an excellent overview, see Steiner, Alston, and Goodman 2008). President Barack Obama moved quickly to bring American practice closer in line with established precepts of international law: issuing an Executive Order to close the Guantanamo detention centre (a move he later retreated from); banning rendition for purposes of torture; mandating that the Red Cross be given access to anyone detained in conflict; and re-engaging multilateral processes on the use of force. However, the perception that international law is in a period of crisis has if anything intensified (Clark et al. 2018). While the US has gone to great lengths to make many of its military practices legally compliant (Dill 2015; McLeod 2015), many of its other practices—such as the increased use of drone attacks and the extrajudicial killing of suspected terrorists—are challenging the capacity of international law to constrain contemporary warfare. This situation has been compounded by the Trump administration's open disdain for international legal constraints on US military activities (note here its decision to terminate the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia). For its part, Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea flaunted established principles of *jus ad bellum*. Finally, the violence of transnational insurgents such as the so-called Islamic State not only challenges cardinal laws of war, but does so in a deliberate strategy of highly choreographed provocation.

Case Study 19.2 Individual criminal accountability and the non-Western world

Former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre

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Until recently it was unimaginable that individual state leaders who commit gross violations of human rights could be prosecuted for their actions. It was long assumed that such figures were protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This coincided with the widespread practice of turning a blind eye to even the most flagrant human rights abuses. Post-authoritarian regimes were often unwilling to pursue former leaders closely associated with security forces; neighbouring countries frequently offered asylum to exiled dictators, and there were few if any international legal mechanisms to hold these figures to account.

However, this situation has changed dramatically. The creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the subsequent establishment of the ICC, have greatly enhanced the international mechanisms for ensuring individual criminal accountability. Furthermore, a growing number of post-authoritarian states have launched their own domestic prosecutions of former leaders, including heads of state. And in several cases, courts in other countries have sought to prosecute the leaders of other states, invoking the principle of universal jurisdiction in cases of gross human rights violations (the most famous example being the attempt by a Spanish court to have the ex-Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, extradited from the United Kingdom). So marked is this proliferation of judicial processes that Kathryn Sikkink has termed it 'The Justice Cascade' (Sikkink 2011).

However, some have criticized these developments. Pursuing prosecutions of sitting heads of state may undermine efforts to end civil conflicts and ensure transitions to democracy (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2004). International tribunals have been criticized for their slowness and questioned on the procedural fairness of their decisions, and they have also been cast as quasi-imperial tools of the West, institutions sponsored by Western governments and NGOs but focused squarely on crimes committed in weak, often non-Western, countries. For example, South Africa has pushed vigorously for African signatories of the Rome Statute that created the ICC to leave the court, claiming that it has unfairly targeted African states. Yet the truth of the situation is more complicated. Some of the most prominent figures in the struggle to have individual accountability codified in international criminal law came from the Global South, most notably the Egyptian legal scholar and activist Cherif Bassiouni. In the negotiation of the Rome Statute of the ICC, African states were among the most enthusiastic supporters. And while critics point out that the majority of the ICC's first cases have come from Africa, several of these were referred to the court by the African governments themselves.

Question 1: If the ICC's procedures are slow, and great powers such as China, Russia, and the US are not members, is the Court's value seriously undermined?

Question 2: Should accused leaders be detained and prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of human rights if this makes it harder to resolve national or international conflicts?

Key Points

- Placing limits on the legitimate use of force is one of the key challenges of the international community, and the laws of war have evolved to meet this challenge.

- The laws of war have traditionally been divided into those governing when the use of force is legitimate, *jus ad bellum*, and how war may be conducted, *jus in bello*.

- Laws governing when war is legally permitted have changed dramatically over the history of the international system, the most notable difference being between the nineteenth-century view that to wage war was a sovereign right and the post-1945 view that war was justified only in self-defence or as part of a UN-mandated international peace enforcement action.

- Laws governing how war may be conducted divide, broadly, into three categories: those governing weaponry, combatants, and non-combatants.

- Since 2001 both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* have come under challenge, as successive US administrations have pushed the limits of international law in their conduct of the war on terror, transnational insurgents have openly flouted established legal principles, and Russia has undermined the territorial integrity of neighbouring states.

Theoretical approaches to international law

Several theoretical perspectives have been formulated to explain the nature, function, and salience of international law. What follows is a brief survey of the most prominent of these perspectives, focusing on those that together constitute the principal axes of contemporary debate.

Realism

Realists are great sceptics about international law, and they are deeply hostile to the liberal–idealist notion of 'peace through law'. George Kennan, the renowned realist diplomat-scholar, argued that this 'undoubtedly represents in part an attempt to transpose the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual law into the international field and to make it applicable to governments as it is applicable here at home to individuals' (Kennan 1996: 102). The absence of a central authority to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce international law leads realists to doubt whether international law is really law at all. At best, Morgenthau (1985: 295) claimed, it is a form of 'primitive law', akin to that of 'preliterate societies, such as the Australian aborigines and the Yurok of northern California'. For realists, international legal obligation is weak at best. Within the state, citizens are obliged to obey the law because sanctions exist to punish illegal behaviour. Yet sanctions have been few in international relations, and enforcement mechanisms are rudimentary. (For a more detailed discussion of realism, **see Ch. 8**.)

Neoliberal institutionalism

Neoliberals initially shied away from directly discussing international law, even though their concept of 'regimes' bore a close affinity with it (**see Chs 6 and 20**). This was partly because much of their inspiration came from economic theory rather than from law, and partly because in the realist-dominated field of cold war international relations it was less provocative to speak the language of regimes and institutions than that of international law. After the end of the cold war, however, neoliberals were at the forefront of calls for a more productive dialogue between International Relations and international law. Not surprisingly, though, their understanding of this dialogue, and the initiatives they have taken to foster it, have been heavily influenced by their rationalist theoretical commitments (**see Chs 11 and 12** for criticisms). States are treated as rational egoists, law is seen as an intervening variable between the goals of states and political outcomes, and law is seen as a regulatory institution, not a constitutive one that conditions states' identities and interests (Goldstein et al. 2000).

Constructivism

Constructivists argue that normative and ideational structures are as important as, if not more important than, material structures; they hold that understanding how actors' identities shape their interests and strategies is essential to understanding their behaviour; and they believe that social structures are sustained only through routinized human practices (**see Ch. 12**). These ideas provide clear openings for the study of international law, and it is not surprising that constructivists have found considerable common ground with legal theorists. By broadening our understanding of politics to include issues of identity and purpose as well as strategy, by treating rules, norms, and ideas as constitutive, not just constraining, and by stressing the importance of discourse, communication, and socialization in framing actors' behaviour, constructivists offer resources for understanding the politics of international law that are lacking in realist and neoliberal thought (Reus-Smit 2004; Brunnée and Toope 2010).

Critical legal studies

During the 1980s a body of critical international legal theory, often termed 'critical legal studies' or the 'new stream', emerged to challenge what was seen as the inherent liberalism of modern international legal thought and practice. Its proponents argue that liberalism is stultifying international legal theory, pushing it between the equally barren extremes of 'apology'—the rationalization of the established sovereign order—and 'utopia'—the naive belief that international law can civilize the world of states (Koskenniemi 1989).

Their critique of liberalism in international law incorporates four propositions (Purvis 1991). First, they argue that the underlying logic of liberalism in

international law is incoherent. Such liberalism denies that there can be any objective values beyond the particularistic values of individual states, and yet it imagines that international conflicts can be resolved on the basis of objective and neutral rules. Second, critical legal scholars claim that international legal thought operates within a confined intellectual structure. The twin pillars of this structure are liberal ideology and public international legal argument. The former works to naturalize the sovereign order, to place beyond critical reflection the principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality, while the latter constrains legitimate legal argument within certain confines. '[T]raditional international legal argument', Nigel Purvis contends, 'must be understood as a recurring self-referential search for origins, authority, and coherence' (Purvis 1991: 105). Third, critical legal scholars challenge the purported determinacy of international legal rules. Legal positivism holds that a rule has a singular and objective meaning—hence the idea of 'finding the law'. For its critics, this is patently false: 'any international legal doctrine can justify multiple and competing outcomes in any legal debate' (Purvis 1991: 108). Finally, critical legal scholars argue that the authority of international law can only ever be self-validating; it is only through its own internal rituals that it can attain the legitimacy needed to attract state compliance and engagement (Purvis 1991: 109–13).

The practice turn

Echoing developments in international relations theory, the most recent theoretical approach to international law emphasizes the nature and importance of knowledgeable social practices (Adler and Pouliot 2011*b*; Pouliot 2010). Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope set out to understand the sources of international legal obligation: why under certain circumstances states feel duty-bound to observe international law (Brunnée and Toope 2010; also see *Symposium on Legitimacy and Legality in International Law* 2011). This has been one of the most vexed questions surrounding international

law, with realists attributing obligation to fear of coercion, liberal-positivists to state consent, and others to the perceived legitimacy or fairness of legal rules and procedures. Brunnée and Toope argue instead that feelings of legal obligation derive from engagement in legal practices. Legal obligation, they argue, is an 'internalized commitment', a 'feeling' actors have about the legitimacy of a legal order and its attendant rules (Brunnée and Toope 2010: 45). Such feelings are not internally generated; they are socially constructed. Only through social interaction, by participating in international legal practices, do actors develop an internal commitment to observe the law. However, not all norm-governed practices generate feelings of 'legal' obligation. The practices concerned must meet certain 'criteria of legality'. For practices to be 'legal' they must be general, officially promulgated, prospective, clear, non-contradictory, realistic, constant, and congruent (Brunnée and Toope 2010: 26). 'Only when the conditions of legality are met, and embraced by a community of practice, can we imagine agents feeling obliged to shape their behavior in the light of the promulgated rules' (Brunnée and Toope 2010: 41).

> ### Key Points
>
> - Realists argue that international law is only important when it serves the interests of powerful states.
> - Neoliberals explain how self-interested states come to construct dense networks of international legal regimes.
> - Constructivists treat international law as part of the normative structures that condition state and non-state agency in international relations. They emphasize the way in which law, like other social norms, constitutes actors' identities, interests, and strategies.
> - Critical legal studies concentrates on the way in which the inherent liberalism of international law seriously curtails its radical potential.
> - Practice theorists challenge claims that legal obligation derives from coercion, consent, or legitimacy, claiming instead that it is a product of participating in the practice of international law.

Conclusion

This chapter opened by noting the 'paradox' of international law—the fact that while scholars often downplay the value and efficacy of international law, sovereign states devote enormous amounts of time and energy

to constructing ever more elaborate legal regimes. It then considered the role that institutions play in facilitating coexistence and cooperation among states, and how the modern institution of international law arose

historically. It was argued that international law was both functional to the needs of an increasingly complex international system, but also deeply grounded in ideas about legitimate rule that accompanied the rise of political liberalism. After considering trends that may be transforming international law into a form of supranational or transnational law, the chapter concluded by surveying the principal theories about the nature and efficacy of international law (**see Opposing Opinions**

19.1), each of which presents a different set of viewpoints on the 'paradox' of international law.

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Opposing Opinions 19.1   International law has no real effect on the nature and conduct of international relations

For

International law is not real law, and cannot therefore have the same regulatory effects. Real law is created by a central authority—most commonly, a state—and it is enforced by centralized agencies, backed ultimately by the legitimate exercise of force. International law has none of these properties.

International law exists only because it serves the interests of the powerful. The existence of extensive and complex bodies of international law is not evidence of law's importance or power. Rather, it reflects their value for powerful states. If such states can create laws that codify their interests, and if the law's legitimacy can generate compliance by weaker states, then the medium- to long-term interests of powerful states is served.

The complexity of international law means that almost any actions can be justified. International law is complex and fragmented: multiple, overlapping legal regimes have emerged, often in the same issue-area, and states often encounter conflicting, or at least confusing, global and regional legal norms. This complexity means that states can choose from a menu of international legal norms so varied as to justify almost any conduct.

International law cannot keep pace with rapid changes in world politics. For example, the laws of war are designed to regulate a particular kind of warfare: between sovereign states, where combatants and non-combatants can be distinguished, and using a particular range of military technologies. Today's wars challenge each of these aspects and profoundly undermine international law's regulatory power.

Against

International law creates states as primary actors in world politics. Sovereign states don't just exist as self-created entities; they are creations of international society. To have sovereignty is to have certain rights as a legitimate actor, and these rights (as well as responsibilities) are embedded in international norms and practices, and recognized by other sovereign states. International law is the principal site in which the rights that come with sovereignty are codified.

Legitimacy is crucially important to states, and international law is one of its principal sources. If states can present themselves as legitimate actors, with legitimate interests, acting in legitimate ways, then others will step out of their way, or even cooperate with them. States are thus always seeking to bolster their legitimacy, and casting their goals and actions as consistent with international law is a common and robust means of doing this.

Levels of compliance with international law are high, even by domestic standards. This is not entirely because states often negotiate international laws that suit their interests. Some of the most important international laws involve states limiting their power to further order or justice. For example, the United Nations Charter places legal restraints on the use of force that can be against the immediate interests of particular states but serve the wider interests of international society.

When states break international law, they almost always reference it, thus reinforcing its status as a legitimate standard of international conduct. Few law-breaking states claim that international law is irrelevant or invalid. Instead, they deny that they broke the law, they insist that what they did wasn't covered by any law, or they claim that their actions were a defence of the law.

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1. If international law does not matter, why do states bother creating it?

2. Why are states so particular about what the law is and which laws they will accept if it is ineffectual?

3. If international law did not exist, could a system of materially unequal sovereign states survive?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Questions

1. Can you think of other factors, in addition to those listed in the chapter, that contributed to the rise of modern international law in the last two centuries?
2. Is the 'paradox of international law' really a paradox?
3. Do you find persuasive the argument that states create institutions to sustain international order?
4. Can you think of other distinctive characteristics of the modern institution of international law not raised in the chapter?
5. Which of the theories of international law surveyed do you find most persuasive, and why?
6. If you were asked to predict the future of international law, how would you use the theories surveyed to construct an answer?
7. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the international legal system?
8. What evidence do you see that international law is transforming into a form of supranational law?
9. Are the various challenges facing contemporary international law pushing the law into a crisis?
10. How should we think about the relationship between international law and justice and ethics in international relations?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Armstrong, D., Farrell, T., and Lambert, H. (2012), *International Law and International Relations*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An excellent introduction to international law written for students of International Relations.

Byers, M. (2000), *The Role of Law in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive collection of advanced essays on the politics of international law.

Cassese, A. (2005), *International Law*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). An outstanding international legal text by a leading scholar and jurist.

Clark, I., Kaempf, S., Reus-Smit, C., and Tannock, E. (2018), 'Crisis in the Laws of War? Beyond Compliance and Effectiveness', *European Journal of International Relations*, 24(2): 319–43. Provides a framework for assessing whether the laws of war are currently in crisis, building on a broad-ranging consideration of possible criteria.

Goldsmith, J. L., and Posner, E. A. (2006), *The Limits of International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press). A vigorous critique of the institution of international law and its capacity to produce substantial goods for international society.

Guzman, A. (2008), *How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). One of the clearest statements of a rational choice theory of international law, which may be fruitfully compared with Kratochwil (2014) and Reus-Smit (2004).

Kratochwil, F. (2014), *The Status of Law in World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). The most sustained and advanced constructivist work on the nature and place of international law. Compare with Guzman (2008).

Reus-Smit, C. (ed.) (2004), *The Politics of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An edited collection that presents a constructivist perspective on international law, illustrated by a range of contemporary case studies. Compare with Guzman (2008).

Shaw, M. (2017), *International Law*, 8th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). One of the most popular textbooks on international law.

Simmons, B., and Steinberg, R. H. (eds.) (2007), *International Law and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A collection of advanced essays on the politics of international law, drawn from the premier journal *International Organization*.

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International organizations in world politics

SUSAN PARK

Framing Questions

- **What are international organizations?**
- **Do we need international organizations in international relations?**
- **What constraints and opportunities are there for international organizations to achieve their mandates?**

Reader's Guide

International organizations (IOs) are now well established as part of the international system. They are increasingly examined by those wishing to understand how they influence world politics, and whether they are independent actors in their own right or serve the interests of the powerful states that established them. IOs proliferated after the Second World War, and new ones continue to be created as the world becomes more integrated. From the outset, IOs have been studied from either liberal or realist traditions, with the aim of analysing how they support individual well-being or states' foreign policy aims. During the **cold war** when realism was pre-eminent, it was commonly assumed that international organizations had little effect on international politics: they were merely tools to achieve states' interests. While this can explain why states choose to establish IOs, it does not explain all of the activities IOs undertake. Probing the behaviour of IOs at the end of the cold war showed that IOs can be powerful in framing global problems to be addressed, setting the international agenda, and classifying actors' behaviour (for example devising metrics to label states as 'fragile' or as a 'highly indebted poor country'). Yet IOs remain constrained by the mandate, structure, and resources provided by their member states. This chapter looks at multiple theoretical accounts, including constructivist and Marxist approaches, which assess what motivates IO behaviour and whether IOs are capable of change. This provides greater insight into the workings of IOs in tackling a range of issues in the twenty-first century, as well as the limitations of this form of international **cooperation**, including whether multilateralism is possible given increasing nationalism and populism globally. While IOs are central to the conception of **global governance**, they also work with others to address problems at the global level through networks and public–private partnerships, to constitute multi-actor, multilevel governance.

Introduction

International organizations (IOs), bodies comprised of three or more governments, frequently top international headlines. The United Nations (UN) has been unable to mediate great power involvement to address the conflict in Syria. The **European Union** (EU) negotiates the withdrawal of the United Kingdom while grappling with the largest European migration crisis since the end of the Second World War and ensuring the sustainability of members' debt levels since the 2009 **eurozone debt crisis,** which is still affecting Italy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was reinvigorated to bail out states during the **Great Recession** of the late 2000s, while the **World Trade Organization** (WTO) remains mired in gridlock and unable to progress its free trade agenda. While many of these issues cannot be addressed by any one state operating in isolation, others could be advanced by a single powerful state or a group of small states without necessarily creating IOs. Despite US President Trump threatening to withdraw from a range of IOs, including NATO, the WTO, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and even the Universal Postal Union, **sovereign** states continue to choose to cooperate on a broad range of issues by establishing formal organizations. Each of these formal IOs has a constitution, a permanent location, bureaucracy, staff, funding, and a logo. IOs have been established to cover everything from the movement of people, goods, and services across borders; to creating rules for war,

peace, and technology, ranging from nuclear weapons to the internet; to devising immediate responses to the international spread of pandemics and tackling the ultimate problem of global climate change. IOs can be classified in a number of ways, including their issue-area, their mandate, the geographical representation of their members, whether membership is limited, and whether they are merely forums for inter-state decision-making or relatively autonomous service organizations that can act independently to meet member states' directives.

This chapter defines international organizations and examines their rise in the international system. It then unpacks states' motivations for cooperating through formal **multilateralism**. As IOs have continued to proliferate, different theoretical approaches have been devised to explain their activities. The main International Relations theoretical approaches for understanding IOs—liberalism, realism, social **constructivism**, and Marxism—offer detailed ways to analyse IOs' behaviour and their ability to change. States have become increasingly reliant on IOs to provide them with the means for addressing problems at the international level, and there is an important debate as to why this is so. Moreover, the functioning of IOs is not without difficulty. Multilateral efforts may become gridlocked by power politics, or an IO may become **dysfunctional**, leading to **organized hypocrisy** (gaps between an IO's talk, decisions, and actions) and ineffective action (Weaver 2008).

What are international organizations?

International organization is often a catch-all term to include any organization operating at the international level and comprised of actors from three or more states. While many scholars use the term to include both organizations established by states and **non-state** actors such as corporations and **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs), here IOs are understood to be inter*governmental* organizations (on NGOs **see Ch. 22**). States see membership in IOs as a sovereign right, one that enhances their recognition and legitimacy. Many states that become recognized as sovereign after decolonization, war, or peaceful dissolution immediately join IOs. In 2011 the UN accepted its 193rd member, the newly independent South Sudan.

An IO is therefore defined as 'an organization that has representatives from three or more states supporting a permanent secretariat to perform on-going tasks related to a common purpose' (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 177). An IO is established by an international agreement or treaty among states, which establishes the organization's mandate, structure, function, and resources. States sign a treaty to create the IO, which is then ratified by states through their domestic political processes. Once enough states ratify the treaty, the IO is 'born'. In 2018 there were 7,726 IOs in existence, a dramatic increase from the 37 operating in 1909 (Union of International Associations 2018; **see Fig. 20.1**). The first modern IO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, was established in 1815 to

Figure 20.1 Number of international organizations, 1909–2018
Source: Data from the Union of International Associations (2018) *Yearbook of International Organizations 2018* (Brussels: UIA).

facilitate states' riparian relations (between land and water) (Jacobson 1984: 30). At the time of writing (December 2018), the most recent IO to be established is the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); 57 members signed and ratified its establishment, leading the IO to open for business on 16 January 2016. The AIIB is a direct competitor and collaborator with the World Bank, which provides loans for infrastructure to its member states (on the AIIB **see Case Study 20.1**).

Of course, international treaties are not the only way to create an IO. It is now more common for IOs to be established by approval of the members of a pre-existing IO through a process known as **emanation**. Members of a pre-existing IO such as the United Nations may approve the creation of a 'spin-off' IO to undertake more detailed work in a particular area. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was created this way. Emanation IOs are easier to establish compared with getting agreement from states through the treaty-making process; they simply require enough states to vote in favour of establishing the new IO through the parent IO. For this reason, the number of emanation IOs has increased to 930 compared with 285 traditional (treaty-based) IOs in

2018 (Union of International Associations 2018). The increasing number of emanation IOs demonstrates the complexity of issues being tackled at the international level. Compared to traditional IOs, emanation IOs also tend to be easier to dissolve once they no longer serve their purpose (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996: 599).

While the focus here is on IOs comprised of member states, the reality is that some IOs do also include non-state actors in their decision-making structure. The clearest example of this is the International Labour Organization (ILO), which has a tripartite decision-making process that gives equal voice to states, workers, and employers at its labour conference, in its governing council, and in its office. It was originally conceived by civil society groups as the International Association of the Legal Protection of Labour; states then chose to take this idea and formalize it as the ILO in 1919. The ILO is unique as a traditional IO for allowing the participation of trade unions and employers in setting standards for labour conditions, devising and creating conventions and recommendations on labour, and providing technical assistance and policy advice.

Other **hybrid international organizations** are even more complex. For example, the International

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Case Study 20.1 Challenging or upholding the international order? The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

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Established in 2016, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has aroused heated discussion over what it portends for the liberal international order established after the Second World War. The AIIB is a multilateral development bank (MDB) modelled on the World Bank. It was created to fill what is often considered to be a multi-trillion dollar financing gap for infrastructure for developing countries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, which current MDBs cannot fill. The AIIB's mandate is to 'foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure and other productive sectors; and promote regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions' (AIIB 2016).

What, then, is the problem? The AIIB was established by China, but opposed by the United States. The US saw the new MDB as a direct threat to its hegemony of the international system. This is not the first Asian IO the US has rejected. After the **Asian financial crisis** in 1997, Japan proposed the Asian Monetary Fund in opposition to the Western-dominated International Monetary Fund, but the idea was dropped in light of US dissent. Rising powers, including China, pushed for changes to the IMF to better align their voting rights with their economic weight, but the US blocked it for five years, only agreeing to the changes in 2015. The AIIB is the latest challenge to US control over key IOs.

While China invited the US to join, the US argued that the AIIB would not have the stringent anti-corruption standards or environmental and social standards that the current MDBs have. More importantly, it views China's AIIB as a direct rival to the Asian Development Bank, which the US dominates with Japan, and is concerned that it extends China's influence across the region. The US was so opposed to the idea of the AIIB that it and Japan tried to convince their allies, including Australia and South Korea, to oppose it. This failed. The United Kingdom was one of the first developed states to sign on, in order to benefit from becoming the financial clearing house for the Chinese yuan.

In 2017, the AIIB lent $1.9 billion dollars for 15 new projects, and by late 2018 it had 87 member states. The Bank declared its intention to be 'lean, green, and clean' to mollify the US. It is now recognized that the AIIB does not challenge the liberal international order, but rather strengthens it. It has a similar structure, function, and operations to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and has hired experts from them both. Although the AIIB has focused on squeaky clean operations, it complements China's massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013, which is quickly garnering opposition for contributing to the indebtedness of borrower countries, and for coercion, while furthering China's strategic interests across the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia.

Question 1: Does the AIIB uphold or undermine the international order?

Question 2: Is the AIIB furthering China's bid for hegemony?

Organization for Standardization (ISO), which devises international standards for technical processes that affect up to 80 per cent of world commodity trade (ISO 2015), is technically an NGO but is comprised of national standards bodies, which may be either public or private. Moreover the ISO has three different membership levels, which accord different levels of participation. This is important because the standards established by the ISO have become de facto standards for the WTO, thus affecting global trade standards (Clapp 1998). So while the ISO is an NGO, it does have states as members and has the imprimatur of states and the WTO for devising international standards. This speaks to the complexity of public–private, multi-actor governance at the global level.

Modern IOs were created in the middle of the nineteenth century to advance cross-border relations among European states. As states increasingly engaged in trade and commerce with one another, they had to agree common methods of interacting and common standards. For example, states created the International Bureau of Weights and Measures for agreeing a common weight for a pound and for a kilogramme. In order for such organizations to be established, preconditions for inter-state agreement had to exist. These included the existence of sovereign states; substantial contact among them; awareness of problems resulting from their coexistence; and agreement on the need to regulate inter-state relations by establishing IOs (Claude 1964: 17). While there are isolated examples

of the existence of IOs in the pre-modern period, such as the Hanseatic League among North German towns between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries, the earliest modern IO was created in 1815. From then IOs began to flourish, covering new areas of international relations in response to the Industrial Revolution, and enabling states to manage scientific breakthroughs, cross-border transit, and new technology (for further discussion of the significance of the nineteenth century on modern international relations **see Ch. 2**). As globalization accelerated in the post-Second World War period, so too did the demand for IOs (**see Fig. 20.1**).

Many of the IOs in the nineteenth century were 'apolitical' technical organizations created to devise solutions to the differing standards among states, known as **Public International Unions** (PIUs). Examples include the International Telegraph Union (1865), which is now the International Telecommunications Union, and the Universal Postal Union (1874). These two IOs are the oldest in existence and are now part of the United Nations (UN) system (**see Ch. 21**). Many were established to address specific issues including tariffs, maritime trade and shipping routes, rules for aviation, roads, and railways, postal services, telecommunications, patents and copyrights, and information technology. Social problems with increasingly international dimensions led to the creation of IOs for public health, labour, and humanitarian issues (Murphy 1994: 83). The PIUs established the form of modern IOs with the creation of secretariats with permanent staff to carry out specific functions. The PIUs also introduced the process of member states meeting at conferences to agree on the direction of the IO's work, with a smaller delegated council or governing body that could enact the wishes of the members in between conferences (Claude 1964: 30–2).

The emergence of political IOs took longer and was propelled by international instability. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, the great powers of Europe created **multilateral** political conferences to restore international order. Multilateralism is the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states (Keohane 1990: 565). Beginning with the **Congress of Vienna** in 1815, states met to agree on the rules of diplomacy, with the intention of preventing imperialism inside Europe and shoring up the political status quo. Regular meetings became part of diplomatic life, with states meeting 30 times over the following century. This became known as the **Concert of Europe**. To further their economic and political interests, including in

their empires, European states began to use multilateralism, as opposed to bilateralism (between two states). Nevertheless, states continued to engage in **balance of power** politics, imperialism, and alliances to cooperate internationally.

In two separate peace conferences in 1899 and 1907, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia invited states to come together to devise new rules for the conduct of warfare. These were called the **Hague Convention** or the **Hague System**. The Hague System was innovative for its departure from the great power hegemony of the Concert of Europe. All recognized states were invited—not just the great powers. This established the idea that all recognized states were legally equal and had rights, which of course did not apply to those people subjected to colonial rule (on other historical and contemporary manifestations of colonialism and racism in world politics **see Chs 10 and 18**). The Hague System also advanced the procedural aspects of international meetings: that chairs be elected, committees be organized, and roll calls held (Claude 1964: 25, 27). Moreover, the Hague System attempted to establish a permanent means to address conflict among recognized actors in the international system by creating the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which still exists today.

Many of the ideas about how to maintain international order developed in the Hague System were then taken up in the aftermath of the First World War. The League of Nations, the first overtly political IO, was created as an arena for states to resolve international disputes rather than engage in warfare. This was a direct response to the failure of balance of power politics in Europe. While it was ultimately balance of power politics that killed the League of Nations, states were adamant in the dying days of the Second World War that lasting international machinery was needed to prevent another devastating world war. Lessons from the failure of the League directly influenced the founders of the United Nations and their vision (**see Ch. 21**). Moreover, the legal means of settling disputes led to the creation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), though it would take over 50 years before the International Criminal Court was established.

In sum, in the middle of the nineteenth century, European states began to create IOs to regulate and improve the increasing volume of transboundary interactions among them, and to devise a political organization once the costs of great power war became too high. Increasingly under colonial tutelage, most of the rest of the world was excluded from these organizations.

Key Points

- International organizations (IOs) have representatives from three or more states supporting a permanent secretariat to perform on-going tasks related to a common purpose.

- IOs were first created by European states to smooth their inter-state relations across a range of new activities resulting from industrial revolutions and technological breakthroughs.

- The basis for IOs emerged with multilateral fora such as the Concert of Europe and the Hague System in the nineteenth century.

- States increasingly turned to multilateralism and then formal IOs after the First World War to prevent international conflict.

- Formal treaty-based IOs continue to be established, but these are now outstripped by emanation IOs that work on increasingly specialized issues.

Why are international organizations important?

IOs are considered to be important for three reasons: once established, they tend to endure; IOs affect how states respond to complex issues that in turn affect regional and international stability; and the activities of IOs increasingly affect countless aspects of individuals' lives, reaching down into domestic political processes in ways they never have before.

First, IOs are important because they tend to endure in the international system. For example, 15 of the PIUs created in 1865 lasted for 100 years. However, the average is less than that: IOs created after 1945 have tended to last between 15 and 20 years. While there was a proliferation of IOs in the period after the Second World War, major shifts in the international system can also kill off IOs: 25 per cent of PIUs were abolished after the Second World War, and IOs such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization for communist states were dissolved at the end of the cold war (Cupitt, Witlock, and Witlock 2001). While the growth rate for treaty-based IOs slowed from the 1970s, IOs are still being created—for example the AIIB in 2016—while emanation IOs are far outstripping treaty-based IOs (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996: 599).

Second, IOs are important because they affect how states respond to complex issues including regional and international stability. IOs are given authority by their member states to enact their demands. The basis of that authority may be **technical expertise**, as seen in the number of economists at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or doctors at the World Health Organization (WHO). Authority may also be moral, demonstrating a willingness to do the right thing even if it is not in states' interests. For example, in 1951 states created the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to aid states in meeting their obligations under the Refugee Convention. The UNHCR was imbued with moral authority 'derived from its mission to help protect refugees and

from its standing as a humanitarian agency that acted in an impartial manner' (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 73). Despite its limited mandate, resources, and time frame, the UNHCR was nonetheless able to expand the conceptualization of 'refugee' (who to protect) as well as the types of assistance that it could provide (how to protect) (A. Betts 2012: 118). The UNHCR is now the leading global authority on these issues. It has expanded its funding, staffing, and operations despite powerful member state opposition and even though determining who should enter a state is a fundamental component of a state's sovereign powers. The UNHCR created a new category of people to assist called 'internally displaced people' (IDP) to aid those fleeing war, persecution, and famine even if they do not cross international borders. IOs' technical expertise and moral authority can help drive change in the international system, although they remain dependent on states' willingness to accept their proposals.

Third, decisions made by IOs can affect every aspect of our lives. There are IOs for every issue imaginable: from health to trade, finance, security, and social and cultural relations. As states have become more interdependent through **globalization**, there has been an increase in the number of formal IOs. Given the interconnections among problems (for example health, development, climate change, and finance), the need for cooperation has become greater. Moreover, IOs can help supply global **public goods** that are available for all to share. Examples of global public goods include international peace, a stable international economic system, and a stable climatic system. IOs can support global public goods in two ways. First, they are forums in which states come to international agreement on cooperating to provide those goods. Second, IOs can help provide global public goods through their operations, enacting states' demands by establishing policies and procedures for all actors to follow to realize those goods.

Even if a government is not a member of a particular IO, and has not voted or deliberated on its actions or rulings, the decisions of that IO can have a profound effect on its people's lives. For example, only 44 states were present at **Bretton Woods** creating the IMF and the World Bank after the Second World War. Yet there is an extremely heated debate about the positive and negative influences of IMF and World Bank decisions on now independent, formerly colonized states. At the same time, the actions of IOs have become ever more intrusive in relation to state sovereignty. This occurs whether through the WHO's warnings to travellers about the safety of a destination to tackle the spread of a pandemic, or the IMF's determining how a state should reform its economic policies including reducing public expenditures, or the WTO's rulings as to what constitutes a protectionist measure in determining what goods can and cannot come into a country. One of the most 'intrusive' IOs created to date is the European Union, whose rules cut across myriad aspects of individuals' lives in its 27 member states (**see Ch. 23**). It is important for us all to understand IOs precisely because of their spread, their role in shaping states' responses to complex international problems, their provision or possible withholding of global public goods, and their intrusion into states' domestic activities.

Key Points

- IOs are important because they survive and have endured in the international system.
- They shape how states respond to international problems.
- They increasingly affect the lives of individuals everywhere by shaping the distribution of power and making policies that were previously left to states.

- IOs can help states create global public goods by being forums for international cooperation and then helping to enact and enforce the provision of those goods.

Why do states create IOs?

IOs are a formal example of multilateralism. Informal multilateralism is when states meet as groups rather than creating a permanent structure, such as the UN, in which they establish rules and procedures for their interactions. Examples of informal multilateralism are the Group of Seven (**G7**) and the Group of Twenty (**G20**). At G7 and G20 meetings, states agree on common policy goals for managing the global economy (and increasingly everything else). These 'Gs' were not established by an international treaty; they do not have a permanent secretariat to perform on-going tasks; nor do they have headquarters. They nevertheless provide forums for powerful states to make decisions, and each has a loose structure, regularized meetings, a logo, and a website. Although the G7 and the G20 meetings are annual, much of the work is undertaken by states themselves in preparation for the meetings, and the headships of the G7 and G20 rotate through their memberships.

Why do states choose to create IOs when they could use more informal groupings that do not tie them to fixed rules, procedures, and financing? Scholars argue that if we look at the functions of IOs, then there is 'never an absolute need for IOs' (L. Martin 1992: 791). Indeed, there are benefits to informal multilateralism, including the ability to make decisions quickly, change direction as circumstances warrant, avoid being bound by international pledges, and not having to ratify agreements domestically (Lipson 1991: 501). And yet states continue to create and join IOs (**see Opposing Opinions 20.1**).

There are four primary theoretical approaches that seek to explain the motivations for states to create formal IOs: liberalism, realism, constructivism, and Marxism (**see Chs 6**, **8, 12, and 7**, respectively). First is the liberal approach, which contends that it is in the interests of people within states to have IOs to advance their interests internationally. An updated version of liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, sees IOs as a means of providing collective goods for the benefit of all states. International cooperation therefore leads to absolute gains. Second, there is the realist argument that states use IOs as one of the tools in their diplomatic tool-box (including as a means to hide states' overt interests, and thus make them less likely to be rejected). An updated realist variant, neorealism, makes the case that states create IOs in order to determine the rules that others must then follow. Social constructivism has been used to understand how IOs behave, and why.

Opposing Opinions 20.1   Multilateralism is in crisis

For

Changes in the international balance of power mean increasing conflict in inter-state negotiations. From climate change to refugees, to trade negotiations, to conflict in the Middle East, states are unable to come to agreement over how to address critical problems in the world because there is no consensus between the hegemon and rising powers. Assuming IOs can create agreement when there is none is wishful thinking.

States are retreating to nationalist and populist politics, rather than using IOs to solve global problems. States are increasingly turning away from IOs to address critical issues: the UK is exiting from the EU, and the US has declared its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the Universal Postal Union, while challenging NATO, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the WTO, and the role of the International Criminal Court.

IOs like the UN reflect decades of division between North and South. Many UN bodies are stuck after decades of deadlock between different state groupings, most notably between the Global North and the Global South, leaving an ineffective global body unable to make decisions.

Against

Inter-state negotiations ebb and flow, but once established IOs continue to work for the greater good. IOs were established by states and are responsive to them. Once created, IOs continue to try to meet their mandates, even to the point of relying on non-state financing to achieve their goals when state contributions fall short. To change this, states would have to agree to change the IO's constitution or charter—thus requiring further cooperation.

IOs cannot force states to agree, but they can provide prompts that enable states to cooperate. Secretariats for multilateral agreements are vital for helping states overcome logjams in negotiations by providing information and technical expertise, and devising means to overcome political impasses. Populist and nationalist governments may not oppose all multilateral negotiations and IOs, so we need to look more carefully at where there are current political deadlocks and what is impeding action.

Despite being political, IOs continue to advance new ideas. Political divisions within international bodies are not new, nor do they wholly undermine how IOs operate. IOs like the UN have also been key sites for new ideas about how to rethink the problems we face today, like establishing the Sustainable Development Goals to galvanize action across human rights, development, and the environment.

1. Can IOs advance the greater good when states disagree about what that is?

2. What role can secretariats play in international negotiations?

3. How do IOs advance new ideas?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Aiming to provide greater insight into the operations of IOs, social constructivists have sought to identify when and how IOs take up international norms and spread them throughout the international system, and when the organizational culture of the IO prevents them from operating as they were intended. Marxist and Gramscian explanations of IO actions seek to demonstrate how powerful states and elites use IOs to maintain their privileged position in the international order. Each takes a different starting point in analysing the benefits of creating IOs, and is addressed in turn below.

Liberalism

Liberal theoretical approaches were first used to articulate the purpose of IOs: as a means to ensure individual prosperity and freedom (Mitrany 1943; Claude 1964:

11–13). Liberals viewed international organizations as functional bodies that could help enhance prosperity by making trade and commerce across states easier through instituting common procedures and standards, for example as the PIUs did. More importantly, liberal internationalists viewed IOs as a means of advancing international peace. Creating permanent bodies for international cooperation would enable states to advance their common interests. Over time it was hoped that states would become enmeshed in a 'working peace' with each other, which would restrain them from engaging in warfare (Mitrany 1943; Jacobson 1984: 21–9). As low-level bureaucratic cooperation was enabled (for example, through the Universal Postal Union), it was hoped that states would see the benefits of working together rather than being in conflict. While functional apolitical IOs remained after the Second

World War, the fallout from both world wars fundamentally undermined the liberal arguments that states' enmeshment within IOs would restrain them from war. Liberals were labelled '**idealists**' for thinking that cooperation in unimportant matters could influence the high politics of state diplomacy and strategic concerns, and realism became ascendant. In response, there was a significant retreat by liberal scholars on the importance of IOs in the period immediately following the Second World War, when much of the focus became concentrated on voting patterns in new organizations such as the UN, and with many questioning their relevance.

Despite realism's overall dominance for explaining the role and importance of IOs (**see 'Realism'**), from the 1950s liberal scholars began to look at the European experiment in order to see whether increasing cooperation could lead to greater interdependence and **integration**. Earlier functionalist theories on the importance of low-level interactions among states were later revived as neofunctionalism (E. Haas 1958, 1964). Neofunctionalists argued that international cooperation among states could still lead to political integration if pushed along by international bureaucrats who were fully attuned to political dynamics. Faith was therefore placed in the role of international civil servants being able to chart a shared policy approach for states to enact.

For example, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created to regulate coal and steel production in Europe after the Second World War (thus regulating vital war-making materials). Neofunctionalists also predicted there would then be a **spillover** of cooperation into other policy areas. It was hoped that this could be replicated in other areas such as Latin America, but this has been even more limited than in Europe (**see Box 20.1**).

Many neofunctionalists supported integration among states because they believed it would lead to a reduction in conflict. But neofunctionalism was abandoned as a predictive theory in the 1970s once it became clear that regional integration and a world government were not advancing as the theory predicted.

Neoliberal institutionalism, which emerged in the 1980s, took a different tack. Neoliberals took the state as the primary unit, contending that states used IOs to advance their interests. Advocated primarily by Robert O. Keohane (1984), neoliberalism argued that all states could benefit from international cooperation through **collective action**. Neoliberal theory is focused 'on the problems of whether and how states might cooperate for mutual advantage despite the absence of supranational government (**anarchy**)' (Fearon 1998: 269). According to this view, cooperation is mutually beneficial for states but different preferences mean that states have to

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Box 20.1 Chronology of the Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South or MERCOSUR)

1991—Treaty of Asunción signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It creates a common market by removing trade barriers and fostering cross-border investment.

1994—Protocol of Ouro Preto signed, establishing a common external tariff (CET) to deepen integration from a free trade area to a customs union. Only 10 per cent of imports come under the CET.

1995—MERCOSUR signs an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement to establish a free trade agreement with the EU. After nine rounds of negotiation there is still no agreement.

1996–2004—Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela become associates of MERCOSUR.

1998—MERCOSUR becomes the third largest regional trade bloc after the North American Free Trade Agreement and the EU (it is later overtaken by ASEAN).

1998–2002—MERCOSUR states experience economic crisis and stagnation.

2000—Members agree to set common debt, deficit, and inflation goals.

2002—Olivos Protocol establishes a Permanent Court of Appeal to review trade disputes.

2005—Attempts to negotiate a Free Trade of the Americas with the United States fail.

2006—MERCOSUR Parliament (Parlasul) is created with direct representation from citizens. This a consultative organ of MERCOSUR; decision-making remains with member states.

2012—Paraguay's membership is suspended after President Lugo is removed from office; Paraguay is reinstated in 2013.

2012—Venezuela becomes a fully fledged member.

2013—Guyana and Suriname become associate members.

2015—Bolivia becomes a fully fledged member.

2016—Venezuelan membership is suspended indefinitely based on flouting trade rules and human rights violations.

2017—Talks resume with the European Commission but political and economic difficulties facing Brazil and Argentina impede their ability to conclude a deal. MERCOSUR remains an incomplete customs union with decision-making retained by member states and not MERCOSUR institutions.

negotiate to achieve an outcome that is agreeable to all. Of course, states may choose to abandon cooperation if there are immediate gains from doing so. But neo-liberals see IOs and **institutions** as effective if they can prevent states from defecting from cooperation so that all mutually benefit (Martin and Simmons 1999: 104). IOs provide functional benefits to states for international cooperation by helping to reduce transaction costs, provide information, maximize utility pay-offs, and promote issue linkage among states (Lipson 1993).

Realism

In contrast, realism rejects much of the optimism of liberal theorizing about the prospects of IOs (**see Box 20.2**). From the beginning, realists argued that IOs were merely 'new arrangements' that states could use to achieve their material and security interests.

Despite the existence of IOs, realists believe that states retain their propensity to engage in conflict to obtain power and advantage. IOs in the realist framework are merely the means through which states conduct their diplomacy. Although classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau recognized that IOs and international institutions could provide a platform for inter-state negotiations and bargaining that could help change the international order (Morgenthau 1958: 75–6), later realists dismissed the ability of IOs to influence international politics in any profound way.

Beginning with Kenneth Waltz's neorealism, contemporary realists have viewed IOs as 'epiphenomenal' to the structure of the international system. Put simply, IOs 'have no independent effect on state behaviour' (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 7). Where neorealists recognized IOs, they saw them as merely reflecting powerful states' interests. IOs thus embody the rules of the game within which power politics is played (Schweller and Priess 1997: 6, 13). One possible example of this would be in the membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC). All five permanent members were the most powerful and victorious states in 1945. IOs could be used as tools to achieve states' interests, but cooperation would only take place if states perceived that they gained more

from it relative to others (Grieco 1990). The benefits states receive from international cooperation in IOs varies because powerful states 'lock in' institutional rules from which they gain most compared to the less powerful. The plethora of IOs created in the period after the Second World War demonstrates this lock-in effect: from the UN Security Council to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to the structure of the IMF and the World Bank.

In terms of the balance of power, hegemons could create IOs, but so too could weak states, either to balance against the hegemon or bandwagon with it (Gruber 2000). This is one way of viewing the recently established China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Thus IO actions or inaction reflect the balance of power among great powers, and a lack of consensus among them leads to IO ineffectiveness. A significant degree of UN Security Council ineffectiveness has stemmed precisely from the inability of the superpowers to agree on concerted action during the cold war. More recently, this has been the case with UNSC votes in relation to the war in Syria and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Despite the disadvantages, realists recognize that weak states may nevertheless 'bind' themselves to an IO in order to achieve a 'greater voice within it' (Rosecrance 2001: 140).

Social constructivism

Since the 2000s, one of the leading approaches to understanding IOs has come from social constructivism. Its challenge was not only to uncover the influential work IOs were actually doing, but also to attempt to seek out how and why IOs operate the way they do and not otherwise. The first move social constructivists made was to challenge the passive conception of IOs as merely arenas in which states act. While some IOs are forum organizations where states deliberate, for example the UNSC or the WTO, a significant number of IOs are service IOs that enact the mandates, policies, and operations that states have agreed on. In this respect, many IOs are autonomous bureaucracies that have been given discretion in terms of how they undertake their operations. Social constructivists were therefore interested in how IOs make sense of the world, help to frame issues, set the international agenda, and construct new categories of actors (such as the UNHCR's distinction between IDPs and refugees).

IOs have to find ways to enact their mandate given the resources provided to them by their member states. Many IOs become experts in their field to

> **Box 20.2** Realist views of IOs
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> [R]ealists believe that international institutions are shaped and limited by the states that found and sustain them and have little independent effect.
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> *(Waltz 2000: 18)*

Box 20.3 The social influence of IOs

IOs are engaged in 'classifying the world, creating categories of actors and action, fixing meanings in the social world, and articulating and diffusing new norms, principles, and actors around the globe'.

(Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 710)

which states turn for assistance, such as the UNHCR. IOs can therefore be powerful actors in changing how states view a problem, and they can devise new ways to take action.

For this reason, social constructivists sought to identify how and why these bureaucracies behave in the particular ways they do (**see Box 20.3**). They have examined how IOs spread new norms that become accepted practice among states in the international system. This may range from defining 'refugees', as was done by the UNHCR, to articulating a framework to determine states' balance of payments (when a state needs a loan from the IMF), to determining the basis for UN intervention in a civil conflict to prevent genocide (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Social constructivists have shown not only how IOs can change how we see and understand the world, but also how its decisions are influenced by an IO's culture, that is, the 'internal system of meaning that governs staff expectations and behavior' (Chwieroth 2008: 133). Internal rules and ways of thinking can prevent action on issues that fall outside standard ways of doing business, as was the case with the UN and the Rwandan genocide (M. Barnett 2002). The organization's culture may also lead to the establishment of new norms by and among staff, rather than the introduction of norms from member states or management. An example of this is the IMF's failed attempt to make capital account liberalization (or the free movement of capital) a requirement for all member states of the IMF. Organizational culture may also prevent IOs from taking up new norms that threaten established ways of doing things (Barnett and Coleman 2005). Organized hypocrisy can result from states forcing IOs to change in ways that do not fit their culture, or when an IO attempts to enact new mandates but fails (Weaver 2008).

Marxist and Gramscian approaches

Marxist approaches begin from the perspective that material economic power is fundamental to the structure of all societies and to international relations (**see Ch. 7**). Unequal relations between those who own the

means of production and those who provide their labour are inherent within a capitalist system. Such **class** conflict is a driving force in history, and competition and the changing means of production have propelled the creation of a global capitalist system (Cammack 2014). Marxists and Gramscian scholars have examined how IOs such as the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank have helped construct and reproduce the global capitalist system through their programmes, policies, and loans. Marxist scholars begin with the supposition that IOs advance the interests of capital through their work, creating a global market through advocating free trade, opening states up for direct foreign investment, and freeing capital to move across borders unimpeded. In doing so, capitalist and investor rights are increasingly 'insulated from democratic rule and popular accountability' and are thus able to generate enormous profits from the workers and from natural resources (S. Gill 2005: 174).

Marxists have demonstrated that the policies advocated by these IOs have a disciplining effect: the IMF and World Bank will only lend to states if they accept the policy programmes these IOs have devised for them, which signal to capital and investors that their interests will be protected. Developing states frequently have no choice but to accept IMF and World Bank policy prescriptions because these IOs were designed to provide loans and programmes to states that cannot obtain funding from anywhere else, such as a great power patron. For example, if a state is in the midst of an economic crisis, famine, or war, it is unlikely to be able to secure international loans from anywhere except the IMF and the World Bank. But this has huge negative consequences in terms of the living standards of ordinary people in those countries. For many, this means that states are powerless to resist the market, and that 'there is no alternative' (this phrase was repeatedly used by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher). From 1964, developing countries articulated challenges to the dominant capitalist system of IOs through UNCTAD. The goal was to challenge the entrenched interests of capitalist states regarding the international terms for trade and development, as institutionalized in IOs, but they were unsuccessful (**see Case Study 20.2**). Recognizing this, UNCTAD no longer resists the globalization of capitalism but embraces it.

Following the writings of the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci, Gramscian approaches argue that IOs operate on behalf of a hegemonic bloc of global elites in powerful industrialized states to construct dominant ideas that reinforce their material interests (Bøås and

Case Study 20.2 The limits to IO action: UNCTAD and the Group of 77 (G77)

In the aftermath of the Second World War, when the United Nations had just begun operations, the United States was able to garner support through the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for its foreign policy objectives. By 1960 this changed, as more and more colonized nations became independent. Newly sovereign states joined the UN, tipping the balance to become more numerous than advanced industrialized states. From the 1960s, leaders in new states from the 'Third World' or the 'Global South' articulated that they shared a common experience and had specific needs beyond the cold war rivalry between the superpowers (I. Taylor 2014: 281). Elites from the Global South began to push for a more equitable world.

UNCTAD was created in 1964 by UN General Assembly Resolution XIX to promote international trade and to 'formulate principles and policies on international trade and related problems of economic development' (UNCTAD 1995). UNCTAD was seen by developing countries as a challenge to the dominance of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the primary institution for free trade negotiations and precursor to the WTO. An informal grouping comprised of an African–Asian bloc of states operating in the UNGA were joined by Latin American states in favour of creating a conference on trade and development. Once the US accepted it, other developed states also did. At the end of the first conference of UNCTAD, the African–Asian bloc and Latin American states 'pledged mutual cooperation in the common cause for a new world order' (Toye 2014: 1762). The G77 was born. The G77 would work through UNCTAD and independently to demand changes to international terms of trade.

UNCTAD's first secretary-general, Raul Prebisch, helped advance an agenda for change that included demands for stability in international commodity prices through an international agreement, additional supplementary financing for developing states through the IMF, and a generalized system of trade preferences within the GATT just for developing countries (as opposed to the GATT's rule of non-discrimination in trade).

UNCTAD was meant to be a 'one state, one vote' process as per the UNGA, but developed states opposed this because they were outnumbered. Instead they pushed for consensus decision-making, to which developing states conceded. UNCTAD became increasingly divisive, with the numerically superior developing states confronting developed states and demanding the provision of resources and concessions to address a highly unequal international trade system. This became known as the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Developed states agreed to minor changes but opposed real change. By the late 1970s, it was clear that UNCTAD was not operating as the G77 had hoped and its efforts for a NIEO were dashed. The push for trade liberalization continued unopposed within the GATT, and in the 1990s UNCTAD reversed its position opposing unfettered trade liberalization to embrace capitalist globalization.

Question 1: Why did developing countries want UNCTAD?

Question 2: Is UNCTAD still useful?

McNeill 2004). Gramscian accounts are more nuanced than Marxist work on IOs because they recognize the way in which combinations of coercion and 'consent' work to cement the hegemony of organized capitalism (R. Cox 1987; S. Gill 1990). Thus the World Bank's annual *World Development Report* is one of the most widely read publications among state elites in the developing world, creating a model of economic development to be emulated. The IMF, the World Bank, and finance ministers of developing states are thus frequently 'on the same page' as to what policy prescriptions are required for a state's economic growth (Mueller 2011). For Gramscians the aim is to reveal the process by which this kind of 'consent' is achieved through multilateralism and IOs while drawing attention to how global inequality is maintained by them (Carroll 2010; Engel 2010).

Key Points

- Classical liberal theories advanced the idea that IOs can contribute to individual prosperity and peace. Neofunctionalist liberals examined the European experiment to predict the likelihood of increased integration among states leading to a world government, while neoliberal institutionalists argued that states can use IOs as a means of international cooperation that benefits all states.

- Realists view IOs as tools for states to achieve their interests. Neorealism argues that IOs have no independent effect on world politics. Neorealists see cooperation occurring when states perceive that they will gain more from it than the states they are cooperating with, and they

believe that states controlling IOs can lock in rules that others must follow.

- Social constructivists demonstrated that IOs can be autonomous and shape world politics by framing issues, setting international agendas, and classifying states' behaviour. IOs thus help shape what is possible and socially accepted at the international level.

- Marxist and Gramscian approaches examine how IOs extend capitalism globally through their programmes and policies in order to reinforce the power of capitalist states and elites. They seek to demonstrate how consensus is constructed over the global capitalist system through the operations of IOs.

How can we analyse IO behaviour?

The different theoretical approaches outlined in the previous section explain why states may choose to create and use IOs. In the late 1990s it was recognized that the dominant theories of neorealism and neoliberalism lacked the means to explain IO behaviour. This was particularly important for IOs such as the UN, which had come under fire for failing to recognize and respond to the genocide in Rwanda. Assuming that IOs are epiphenomenal 'left realism without a well-developed model of institutional origins and effectiveness' (Schweller and Priess 1997: 23). This meant that neorealism could not account for IO behaviour. While neoliberals recognized that IOs could lead states to follow IO rules, and even that IOs could influence states' preferences during negotiations, they too did not seek to analyse what IOs did with the autonomy that states granted them. The dominant rationalist international relations theories did not have an adequate understanding of institutions and IOs (Keohane 1993: 293). More recent empirical researchers, including those based on Bourdieu (Eagleton-Pierce 2013), have argued that Marxist and Gramscian accounts are right: that privileged, materially powerful actors are able to shape IO policies in ways that suit their own interests, and not just by establishing the rules of IOs. Critical scholars are increasingly turning their attention to how economic ideas are formulated in IOs and how this shapes the internal IO policy-making process (Wilkinson 2014).

Rationalist scholars seeking to extend neoliberalism's insights have adopted the principal–agent (P–A) model to ascertain when and how states' interests are being met by IOs. This model recognizes a relationship between member states (the principal) and the IO (the agent), in which the 'latter has been empowered to act on behalf of the former' (Hawkins et al. 2006: 7). Principals provide the IO with a mandate, resources, location, and staffing, and the IO is given autonomy to undertake tasks on the states' behalf. However, giving the IO discretion as to how to enact those tasks may lead to agency 'slack', in which the IO may shirk its activities. There may also be 'slippage', in which the IO redirects its efforts to its own preferred activities rather than meet the preferences of its principals. A greater number of member-state principals increases the prospect of agency slack because it is harder to get agreement among a greater number of states on what the IO should do, allowing greater leeway for the IO to operate as it chooses (Hawkins et al. 2006). Scholars have used this approach to delve into whether or not IOs have performance gaps between what they are tasked with doing and what they are able to achieve.

The P–A model provides scholars with the means to trace how and why IOs behave in accordance with the directives given to them by their member states. However, it tends to overlook the moral drivers of the behaviour of staff and management, instead making assumptions about bureaucracies being driven by aims to expand their power and increase their autonomy and resources (Park 2018). In response, social constructivists have traced how organizational culture may shape IOs' behaviour, including when they choose to adopt new norms and when they fail to do so (Park and Vetterlein 2010). For example, the IMF staff were strong proponents of pushing member states to agree that capital account **liberalization** was fundamental to economic growth, despite this not being in the IMF's Articles of Agreement (indeed, John Maynard Keynes, one of the primary architects of the IMF, believed the exact opposite). This belief stemmed from the professional culture of the organization, which was dominated by neoclassical economists trained primarily at elite universities in the United States and the United Kingdom. Despite the **Asian financial crisis** of 1997 and the Great Recession of 2009, both of which demonstrated the dangers of the free mobility of capital, many IMF staff hold to their belief in the benefits of capital account liberalization. In contrast, Interpol is an example of an IO that chose not to adopt a new mandate with regard to terrorism in the 1960s, despite member states' interest in Interpol doing so and the prospect of increased power and resources that would flow from taking up this new mandate. Interpol chose not to do so because this new mandate did not fit the organization's culture and threatened its autonomy (Barnett and Coleman 2005).

Key Points

- The Principal–Agent model extends the insights of neoliberal institutionalism by looking at how member state principals negotiate to give IOs, as agents, autonomy to undertake tasks on their behalf.

- The P–A model examines when IOs are likely to be slack or engage in slippage, for example when member states cannot agree on a concerted agenda for IOs to enact.

- Social constructivists have challenged the P–A model's assumption that IOs will use their autonomy to advance their own power, autonomy, and resources.

- Social constructivism looks at how organizational culture shapes whether new ideas are promoted, accepted, or rejected by IOs.

- Marxist and Gramscian accounts require further empirical investigation to explicitly trace how powerful elites shape IO programmes, policies, and operations.

Conclusion

International organizations have grown over time, flourishing from the middle of the nineteenth century. States continue to establish IOs for a variety of reasons across the whole range of human endeavours. IOs are a specific form of multilateralism, reflecting the choice to create permanent institutional machinery for enacting states' wishes compared with the informal multilateralism of the 'G' groupings. IOs may be limited by region, such as the new AIIB, or universal, such as the UN. States view membership in IOs as their sovereign prerogative, joining IOs even if they may not be the primary beneficiaries. However, recognizing that all states are equal in choosing to become members of an IO does not necessarily translate into their equal power within the IO. Some IOs, such as the UNGA, provide equal votes for each state, while others such as the IMF and World Bank do not, instead linking representation with states' material contributions.

Different theories seek to ascertain why states choose to create and work within IOs. Early liberal writings argued that IOs could help facilitate peace and prosperity for individuals. Functionalists contended that states could operate together through bureaucracies to achieve international cooperation that over time could extend to matters of high-level diplomacy. Classical realists rejected viewing IOs as important and argued that they were tools in the diplomat's tool-box, to be used as needed. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalists agreed that international institutions and IOs were useful for states operating under conditions of anarchy, but they disagreed as to who would benefit more from cooperation, when it was likely to occur, and for how long. The current Principal–Agent model and social constructivist accounts seek to unpack what management and staff of IOs aim to achieve, and when and why this departs from member states' interests. Marxist and Gramscian accounts see IOs as advancing the interests of economic elites during the spread of a global capitalist system.

As the case of UNCTAD makes clear, decision-making procedures in international organizations at the global level are incredibly important for developed and developing countries alike.

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Questions

1. How do you define international organizations?
2. What explains the increasing growth of IOs since 1945?
3. Why are IOs important?
4. Are IOs powerful actors in the international system? Why or why not?
5. Why do states create IOs?
6. What tools do IOs have to influence international relations?
7. What are the major constraints to IOs' ability to address international problems?
8. How should we evaluate IO operations?
9. Are some issues best addressed by IOs rather than by informal multilateral groupings?
10. What can IOs do in the face of increasing gridlock and opposition to multilateralism?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Barnett, M., and Finnemore, M. (2004), *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press). An excellent account of how IOs create new meanings and social action through their operations. An essential constructivist text on IOs.

Hawkins, D., Lake, D., Nielson, D., and Tierney, M. (2006), *Delegation to International Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A collection of works examining the operations of IOs through the Principal–Agent model. The introductory chapter is essential reading.

Keohane, R. O. (1988), 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4): 379–96. This seminal article identifies the division of international relations theories on institutions (and IOs) based on whether they adhere to rationalist or reflectivist tenets.

Martin, L. (1992), 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', *International Organization*, 46(4): 765–92. A thorough account of how and why states choose to create international organizations according to rationalist, interest-based accounts.

Mearsheimer, J. (1994/5), 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19(3): 5–49. Gives the realist argument that IOs are not important actors in international relations.

Mitrany, D. (1975 [1943]), 'A Working Peace System', in D. Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, Martin Robertson). The basis for much liberal theorizing, this chapter presents the functionalist central argument: that states can learn to work together and peace may result.

Murphy, C. (1994), *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A Gramscian account of how IOs have grown to advance the international capitalist system.

Narlikar, A. (ed.) (2010), *Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A fantastic resource for thinking through the main challenges to international cooperation and how IOs can operate in light of the changing balance of power.

Schweller, R. L., and Priess, D. (1997), 'A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1): 1–32. An essential critique of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalist accounts of international institutions (and IOs).

Websites

www.un.org The official UN site.

www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/ Find topical papers here on the cutting edge of research on global development and finance at Oxford University.

https://foreignpolicy.com/category/the-multilateralist/ David Boscoe's blog 'The Multilateralist', covering global governance for *Foreign Policy*.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

The United Nations

DEVON E. A. CURTIS · PAUL TAYLOR

Framing Questions

- **Does the United Nations succeed in reconciling traditions of great power politics and traditions of universalism?**

- **Why has the United Nations become more involved in matters within states and what are the limits to this involvement?**

- **What are the United Nations' biggest successes and challenges in its efforts to prevent and resolve conflict and to promote sustainable development?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter focuses on the development of the United Nations (UN) and the changes and challenges that it has faced since its establishment in 1945. The UN is a grouping of states, and is therefore premised on the notion that states are the primary units in the international system. The institutions of the UN reflect an uneasy hybrid between traditions of great power consensus and traditions of universalism that stress the equality of states. Furthermore, while the UN was established as a grouping of sovereign states, this chapter argues that UN institutions have taken on an increasing range of functions, and have become much more involved within states. Justice for individuals is increasingly seen as a concomitant of international order. Serious deficiencies in human rights, or in economic welfare, can lead to international tensions. These developments have challenged traditional views about intervention within states. It has also prompted the expansion of UN institutions to address an increased number of economic and social questions, and a search for better ways to coordinate these activities. More recently, in the context of new threats to global security, changes in the global balance of power, and increased criticism of multilateralism, there has been renewed debate about the UN's role and effectiveness.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) is made up of a group of international **institutions**, which include the central system located in New York, the **specialized agencies**, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the **Funds and Programmes**, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). When created more than 70 years ago in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations reflected the hope for a just and peaceful global **community**. It is the only global institution with the legitimacy that derives from universal membership, and a mandate that encompasses security, economic and social development, the protection of human rights, and the protection of the environment. Yet the UN was created by **states** for states, and the relationship between **state sovereignty** and the protection of the needs and interests of people has not been fully resolved. Questions about the meaning of sovereignty and the limits of UN action have remained key issues.

Since the founding of the UN, there has been an expansion of UN activities to address conditions within states, an improvement in UN capacity in its economic and social work, and an increased tendency to accord the UN a moral status. Threats to global security addressed by the UN now include inter-state conflict and threats by **non-state actors**, as well as political, economic, and social conditions within states. Despite the growth in UN activities, however, there are questions about the relevance and effectiveness of the UN. The failure by the US and the UK to get clear UN Security Council authorization for the war in Iraq in 2003 led to well-publicized criticism of the UN and a crisis in international relations. The controversies surrounding the intervention in Libya in 2011 mandated by the UN Security Council and the difficulties faced by the UN Security Council in reaching agreement on how to respond to the Syrian conflict since 2011 have given rise to further criticism and debate.

After briefly outlining the history and the main organs of the UN, this chapter will look at its changing role in addressing matters of peace and security, and then issues of economic and social development. It will focus on how the UN's role has evolved in response to changes in the global political context, and on some of the problems that it still faces.

A brief history of the United Nations and its principal organs

The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries, as a result of initiatives taken by the governments of the states that had led the war against Germany and Japan. By 2019, 193 countries were members of the United Nations, with South Sudan the UN's newest member following its independence from the rest of Sudan in 2011. When joining, member states agree to accept the obligations of the **United Nations Charter**, an international treaty that sets out basic principles of international relations. According to the Charter, the UN has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. At the UN, all the member states—large and small, rich and poor, with differing political views and social systems—have a voice and a vote in this process. Interestingly, while the United Nations was clearly created as a grouping of states, the Charter refers to the needs and interests of peoples as well as those of states (**see Box 21.1**).

In many ways, the United Nations was set up to correct the problems of its predecessor, the League of Nations. The League of Nations had been established after the First World War, and was intended to make future wars impossible, but a major problem was its lack of effective power. There was no clear division of responsibility between the main executive committee (the League Council) and the League Assembly, which included all member states. Both the League Assembly and the League Council could only make recommendations, not binding resolutions, and these recommendations had to be unanimous. Any government was free to reject any recommendation. Furthermore, in the League, there was no mechanism for coordinating military or economic actions against miscreant states, which further contributed to its weakness. Also key states, such as the United States, were not members of the League. By the Second World War, the

Box 21.1   Selected articles of the UN Charter

The UN Charter contains references to both the rights of states and the rights of people.

The Preamble of the UN Charter asserts that 'We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small'.

Article 1(2) states that the purpose of the UN is to develop 'friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace'.

Article 2(7) states that 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.

Chapter VI deals with the 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes'.

Article 33 states that 'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice'.

Chapter VII deals with 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'.

Article 42 states that the Security Council 'may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'.

Article 99 authorizes the secretary-general to 'bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'.

League had already failed to address a number of acts of aggression.

The structure of the United Nations (**see Box 21.2**) was intended to avoid some of the problems faced by the League of Nations. The UN Security Council was given the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In contrast to the League of Nations, the United Nations recognized great power prerogatives in the Security Council. It includes five permanent members, namely the US, the UK, France, Russia (previously the Soviet Union), and China, as well as ten non-permanent members. Unlike the decisions of the League, those of the Security Council are binding, and must be passed by a majority of nine out of the 15 members, including each of the five permanent members. These five permanent members were seen as the major powers at the time of the founding of the United Nations. Tension between the recognition of power politics through the Security Council veto, and the universal ideals underlying the United Nations, is a defining feature of the organization. The recognition of power politics through veto power in the Security Council can be contrasted with the universalist principles underlying the other principal organs of the United Nations.

Box 21.2   Principal organs of the United Nations

The structure of the United Nations is shown in **Figure 21.1**.

The Security Council was made up initially of 11 states, and then, after 1965, of 15 states, including the five veto-wielding permanent members. When the Security Council considers a threat to international peace, it first explores ways to settle the dispute peacefully under the terms of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In the event of fighting, the Security Council tries to secure a ceasefire and may send a peacekeeping mission. The Council can also take measures to enforce its decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter, for instance through the imposition of economic sanctions, arms embargoes, or collective military action. The Council also makes recommendations to the General Assembly on the appointment of a new secretary-general and on the admission of new members to the UN.

The General Assembly is made up of all UN member states, with one vote each. A two-thirds majority in the General Assembly is required for decisions on key issues such as international peace and security, the admission of new members, and the UN budget. A simple majority is required for other matters. The decisions reached by the General Assembly have the status of recommendations, rather than binding decisions, so they cannot force action by any state. One of the few exceptions is the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, which makes decisions on the budget that are binding on members. The General Assembly can consider any matter within the scope of the UN Charter.

The Secretariat carries out the substantive and administrative work of the UN. It is led by the secretary-general, who provides overall administrative guidance. António Guterres from Portugal was sworn in as the ninth secretary-general in January 2017. The Secretariat consists of departments and offices with a total staff of approximately 40,000 around the world. On the recommendation of the other bodies, the Secretariat also carries out a number of research functions and some quasi-management functions. Yet the role of the Secretariat remains primarily bureaucratic, with the exception of the power of the secretary-general, under Article 99 of the Charter, to bring situations that are likely to lead to a breakdown of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council (**see Box 21.1**). This article was the legal basis for the remarkable expansion of the diplomatic role of the secretary-general, compared with its League predecessor.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), under the overall authority of the General Assembly, coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and the UN family of organizations. It also consults with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), thereby maintaining a vital link between the

The United Nations System

UN Principal Organs

General Assembly

Security Council

Economic and Social Council

Secretariat

International Court of Justice

Trusteeship Council[5]

Subsidiary Bodies

Main and other sessional committees
Disarmament Commission
Human Rights Council
International Law Commission
Standing committees and ad hoc bodies

Subsidiary Bodies

Counter-terrorism committees
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Military Staff Committee
Peacekeeping operations and political missions
Sanctions committees (ad hoc)
Standing committees and ad hoc bodies

Advisory Subsidiary Body

United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

Programmes and Funds

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
- **ITC** International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO)

UNDP United Nations Development Programme
- **UNCDF** United Nations Capital Development Fund
- **UNV** United Nations Volunteers

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA[1] United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UN-Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
WFP World Food Programme

Research and Training Institutes

UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNIDIR[1] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNSSC United Nations System Staff College
UNU United Nations University

Other Entities

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

Related Organizations

CTBTO PrepCom Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
IAEA[2] International Atomic Energy Agency
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
WTO[3] World Trade Organization

Specialized Agencies[4]

ILO International Labour Organization
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WHO World Health Organization
World Bank Group
- **IBRD** International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- **IDA** International Development Association
- **IFC** International Finance Corporation
- **MIGA** Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
- **ICSID** International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

IMF International Monetary Fund
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO International Maritime Organization
ITU International Telecommunication Union
UPU Universal Postal Union
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNWTO World Tourism Organization

Functional Commissions

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Narcotic Drugs
Population and Development
Science and Technology for Development
Social Development
Statistics
Status of Women
Sustainable Development
United Nations Forum on Forests

Regional Commissions

ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ECE Economic Commission for Europe
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

Other Bodies

Committee for Development Policy
Committee of Experts on Public Administration
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names
Other sessional and standing committees and expert, ad hoc and related bodies

Departments and offices

EOSG Executive Office of the Secretary-General
DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DFS Department of Field Support
DGACM Department for General Assembly and Conference Management
DM Department of Management
DPA Department of Political Affairs

DPI Department of Public Information
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS Department of Safety and Security
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLA Office of Legal Affairs
OSAA Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

OSRSG/CAAC Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
UNODA Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNOG United Nations Office at Geneva
UN-OHRLLS Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States
UNON United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNOV United Nations Office at Vienna

NOTES:

[1] UNRWA and UNIDIR report only to the General Assembly.

[2] IAEA reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

[3] WTO has no reporting obligation to the General Assembly (GA) but contributes on an ad-hoc basis to GA and ECOSOC work inter alia on finance and developmental issues.

[4] Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations working with the UN and each other through the coordinating machinery of ECOSOC at the intergovernmental level, and through the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) at the inter-secretariat level. This section is listed in order of establishment of these organizations as specialized agencies of the United Nations.

[5] The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994 with the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations Trust Territory, on 1 October 1994.

This is not an official document of the United Nations, nor is it intended to be all-inclusive.

United Nations and civil society. ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies include Functional Commissions, such as the Commission on the Status of Women; Regional Commissions, such as the Economic Commission for Africa; and other bodies (**see Fig. 21.1**).

The Trusteeship Council was established to provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories administered by seven member states, and to ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the territories for self-government or independence. By 1994, all the Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence, either as separate states or by joining neighbouring independent countries. The last to do so was the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Palau, which had previously been administered by the United States.

The International Court of Justice is the main judicial organ of the UN. Consisting of 15 judges elected jointly by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Court decides disputes between countries. Participation by states in a proceeding is voluntary, but if a state agrees to participate, it is obligated to comply with the Court's decision. The Court also provides advisory opinions to other UN organs and specialized agencies on request.

The UN Charter placed more emphasis than the League Covenant on the promotion of social and economic advancement as a central goal, in part because many believed that the global economic depression of the 1930s was one of the causes of the nationalism and aggression that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. Whereas the League of Nations attributed responsibility for economic and social questions to the League Assembly, the Charter of the United Nations established ECOSOC to oversee economic and social institutions. Along with the Secretariat and the General Assembly, ECOSOC is responsible for overseeing the activities of a large number of other institutions known as the United Nations system. This includes the specialized agencies and the funds and programmes (**see Fig. 21.1**). The specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), have their own constitutions, regularly assessed budgets, executive heads, and assemblies of state representatives. They are self-contained constitutionally, financially, and politically, and they are not subject to the management of the central system.

The Funds and Programmes are much closer to the central system in the sense that their management arrangements are subject to direct General Assembly supervision, can be modified by Assembly resolution, and are largely funded on a voluntary basis. Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, a number of new issues have come onto the international agenda, such as the rights and interests of women, climate change, resource depletion, population growth, **terrorism**, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Frequently, those issues have led to a new organization being created in the Funds and Programmes. Examples include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

In the early years of the United Nations, there were serious disagreements about many aspects of its work, including the question of membership. There were no new members between 1950 and 1955, because the US and USSR could not agree. In 1955 there was a deal in which members of the Soviet bloc such as Bulgaria and Hungary were admitted alongside Western countries such as Italy and Spain. The biggest jump in UN

Box 21.3 The reform of the Security Council

Since the Security Council is the main executive body in the United Nations with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, it is not surprising that many discussions of UN reform have focused on the Security Council.

The founders of the UN deliberately established a universal General Assembly and a restricted Security Council that required unanimity among the great powers. Granting permanent seats and the right to a veto to the great powers of the time—the US, the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, the United Kingdom, and China—was an essential feature of the deal.

The composition and decision-making procedures of the Security Council were increasingly challenged as membership of the United Nations grew, particularly after decolonization. Yet the only significant reform of the Security Council occurred in 1965, when the Council was enlarged from 11 to 15 members and the required majority from seven to nine votes. Nonetheless, the veto power of the permanent five (P-5) members was left intact.

The Security Council does not reflect today's distribution of military or economic power, and it does not reflect a geographic balance. Germany and Japan have made strong cases for permanent membership. Developing countries have demanded more representation on the Security Council, with countries such as South Africa, India, Egypt, Brazil, and Nigeria making particular claims. However, it has proved to be impossible to reach agreement on new permanent members. How would Pakistan view India's candidacy? How would South Africa react to a Nigerian seat? What about representation by an Islamic country? Should the European Union (EU) be represented instead of individual EU member states? Should there be a permanent rotating African seat? These issues are not easy to resolve and it is very unlikely that the P-5 countries will want to relinquish their veto.

Nonetheless, while large-scale reform has proved impossible, there have been changes in Security Council working procedures that have made it more transparent and accountable.

membership occurred with decolonization. By 1975 there were 144 members, up from the original group of 51 members in 1945. The controversy over the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) request to join severely hurt the UN's credibility in the 1950s and 1960s. The PRC claimed that it was the rightful representative of all Chinese people, but it was the Republic of China (Taiwan) that represented China in the UN and on the Security Council, with American support. This changed in 1971, as relations improved between the US and the PRC. General Assembly Resolution 2758 (October 1971) recognized the PRC as the legitimate representative of China to the UN.

There are still some debates over membership. For instance, Taiwan applied for membership in 2007 but this application was denied. There are two permanent non-member observer states at the UN: the Holy See (1964) and Palestine (2012). There are also non-state observers, including intergovernmental organizations and other entities. There have been widespread and frequent calls for reform and changes in the membership of the UN Security Council, but this is very difficult (**see Box 21.3**).

> ### Key Points
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> - The United Nations was established to preserve peace among states after the Second World War.
> - In a number of ways, the institutions of the United Nations reflected lessons learned from its predecessor, the League of Nations.
> - The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations reflect both the demands of great power politics (i.e. Security Council veto) and universalism. They also reflect demands to address the needs and interests of people, as well as the needs and interests of states. The tensions between these various demands are a key feature of UN development.
> - There have been a number of disagreements over UN membership, and over the composition of the UN Security Council.

The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security

The global political context has shaped the performance of the United Nations in maintaining peace and security. The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union hampered the functioning of the UN Security Council, since the United States or the Soviet Union could use the veto whenever its major interests were threatened. From 1945 to 1990, 193 substantive vetoes were invoked in the Security Council, compared to 42 substantive vetoes from 1990 to 2018. Furthermore, while the UN Charter provided for the establishment of a multilateral force under the command of a Military Staff Committee (Articles 43 and 47), to be set up by agreement between the Security Council and consenting states, cold war rivalries made this impossible to implement. The end result was that the UN Security Council could not function in the way the UN founders had expected.

Because member states could not agree on the arrangements laid out in Chapter VII of the Charter, especially with regard to setting up a UN army, there were a series of improvisations to address matters of peace and security. First, a procedure was established under which the Security Council agreed to a mandate for an agent to act on its behalf. This occurred in the Korean conflict in 1950, and the Gulf War in 1990, when action was undertaken principally by the US and its allies.

Second, there have been many instances of peacekeeping. No reference to peacekeeping exists in the UN Charter, but classical peacekeeping mandates and mechanisms are based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter (**see Box 21.1**). Classical peacekeeping involves the establishment of a UN force, under UN command, to be placed between the parties to a dispute after a ceasefire. Such a force uses its weapons only in self-defence, is established with the consent of the host state, and does not include forces from the major powers. This mechanism was first used in 1956, when a UN force was sent to Egypt to facilitate the exodus of the British and French forces from the Suez Canal area, and then to stand between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Since the Suez crisis, there have been a number of classical peacekeeping missions, for instance monitoring the Green Line in Cyprus, and in the Golan Heights. The classical peacekeeping that was prevalent during the cold war was very different from the more robust peacekeeping missions that became increasingly common after the end of the cold war. One notable exception was the 1960–4 United Nations Operation in the Congo, which was an early example of more robust UN peacekeeping (**see Case Study 21.1**).

Case Study 21.1 UN peacekeeping in the Congo

Six members of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

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There have been two UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo: the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964 and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) from 1999 to 2010, renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) from 2010 to present. These missions have had some successes, but they also highlight the challenges faced by robust UN peacekeeping (**see Case Study 15.1**).

Congo became independent on 30 June 1960. However, colonial rule by the Belgians had left the vast country severely underdeveloped and politically fractured, despite its significant mineral wealth. Soon after independence, the mineral-rich area of Katanga declared itself to be independent, with support and encouragement by Belgian mining interests and Belgian troops. Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba appealed to the UN for help against the secessionists in Katanga. Invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld took the matter to the Security Council, which authorized the deployment of ONUC to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign troops and to support the Congolese government to restore law and order in the country.

At its height, ONUC deployed just under 20,000 troops. The mission was successful in that Congo's territorial integrity was maintained and foreign troops withdrew, but at immense political, human, and financial costs. In the context of the cold war, the mission was accused of being a tool of US foreign policy. It only took a harder line against the secessionists after Lumumba, who was suspected of being pro-Soviet, was assassinated in January 1961. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash while trying to negotiate a ceasefire in September 1961. The mission was hugely expensive and generated a financial crisis at the UN. It was not until after the end of the cold war that the UN again embarked on another ambitious peace enforcement mission.

MONUC and MONUSCO were also large, expensive peacekeeping missions. MONUC was established in 1999 following the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and five regional countries. Initially, its mandate was to observe the ceasefire, but subsequent Security Council mandates extended its activities. In 2010, the mission was renamed MONUSCO and authorized to use all necessary means to protect civilians and to support the government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. As of 2018, MONUSCO had just over 18,000 uniformed personnel in the country.

These missions have had some accomplishments—for example, in 2006 MONUC supported the largest, most complex electoral process ever supported by a UN mission—but they have also been criticized. The eastern part of Congo continues to experience waves of conflict and human rights violations. The UN has drawn attention to the issue of gender-based violence, yet sexual violence continues, including allegations of sexual abuse by UN troops. There have been significant disagreements between the UN and the government, and national elections that were supposed to have been held in 2016 were delayed by two years. Furthermore, the UN has been criticized for supporting the Congolese army in its operations, even though elements of the army were responsible for human rights abuses against the Congolese population. The UN's experiences in the Congo show how difficult it is for peace operations to achieve state-building objectives.

Question 1: Do you think that it was a mistake for the UN to deploy ONUC in response to the Congo crisis?

Question 2: Do you think that UN peace operations should include state-building objectives?

Increased attention to conditions within states

At the time of its founding and during the cold war, the UN had helped promote the view of the primacy of international order among states over justice for individuals. Many people thought that diplomats should ignore the internal affairs of states in order to preserve international stability. By the 1990s, an increasing number of people believed that the UN should address individual political and civil rights, as well as the right to basic provisions such as food, water, health care, and accommodation. Under this view, violations of individuals' rights were a cause of disturbances in relations among states: a lack of internal justice risked international disorder. The UN reinforced the view that pursuing justice for individuals was an aspect of **national interest**.

There are several reasons for this change. First, the international environment had changed. The cold war

stand-off between the East and the West had meant that member states did not want to question the conditions of the sovereignty of states. Jean Kirkpatrick's (1979) notorious essay, which recommended tolerating abhorrent dictatorships in Latin America in order to fight communism, was a reasonable report of the situation at that time: unsavoury right-wing regimes in Latin America were tolerated because they were anti-Soviet, and interfering in the other's sphere risked escalation of conflict (Forsythe 1988: 259–60).

Second, the process of decolonization had privileged statehood over justice. The UN had elevated the right to statehood above any tests of viability, such as the existence of a nation, adequate economic performance, defensibility, or a prospect for achieving justice for citizens. This unconditional right to independence was enunciated in the General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. There emerged a convention that the claims of elites in the putative states could be a sufficient indication of popular enthusiasm, even when the elites were unrepresentative.

Charles Beitz was one of the first to question this when he concluded that statehood should not be unconditional: attention had to be given to the situation of individuals after independence (Beitz 1979). Michael Walzer and Terry Nardin produced arguments leading to a similar conclusion: states were conditional entities in that their right to exist should be dependent on a criterion of performance with regard to the interests of their citizens (Walzer 1977; Nardin 1983). Such writings helped to alter the moral content of **diplomacy**.

The new relationship between order and justice was thus a product of particular circumstances. After the cold war, it was felt that threats to international peace and security did not emanate only from aggression between states. Rather, global peace was threatened by civil conflict (including refugee flows and regional instability), humanitarian emergencies, violations of global standards of human rights, and problems such as poverty and inequality.

This led to changes in the nature of UN peacekeeping and to its rapid expansion. In 1994, UN peacekeeping operations involved nearly 80,000 military personnel around the world, seven times the figure for 1990 (Pugh 2001: 115). Post-cold war missions addressed civil wars as well as international conflicts. They were more likely to use force and to be based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter (**see Box 21.1**). In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out a new, ambitious UN agenda for peace and security in a report called *An Agenda for Peace*, where he outlined interconnected roles for the UN, including **peace enforcement** (**see Box 21.4**). A key problem has been that UN peacekeepers have been targeted by belligerents. Examples include the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s, the intervention in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, and the mission in South Sudan today. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2009, UN peacekeepers assisted the Congolese national army in a military offensive against rebels, prompting violent reprisals (**see Case Study 21.1**). The UN continues to play a prominent role in peacekeeping. In late 2018, the total number of uniformed peacekeeping personnel (military and police) in the UN's 14 on-going peacekeeping operations was approximately 90,000.

As issues of peace and security were increasingly understood to include **human security** and justice, there were concerns that these new activities could go against the doctrine of non-intervention. Intervention was traditionally defined as a deliberate incursion into a state without its consent by some outside agency, in order to change the functioning, policies, and goals of its government and achieve effects that favour the interests of the intervenor (Vincent 1974) (**see Ch. 32**).

Box 21.4 An agenda for peace

In the early 1990s, after the end of the cold war, the UN agenda for peace and security expanded quickly. The UN secretary-general at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outlined a more ambitious role for the UN in his seminal report *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). The report described interconnected roles for the UN to maintain peace and security. These included:

- Preventive diplomacy: involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, and preventive deployment of UN authorized forces.
- Peacemaking: designed to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means.

- Peace enforcement: authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, and permitted to occur without the consent of the parties.
- Peacekeeping: the deployment of a UN presence in the field with the consent of all parties (this refers to classical peacekeeping).
- Post-conflict peacebuilding: to develop the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent further violence and to consolidate peace.

At the founding of the UN, sovereignty was regarded as central to the system of states. States were equal members of international society and were equal with regard to international law. Sovereignty also implied that states recognized no higher authority than themselves, and that there was no superior jurisdiction. The governments of states had exclusive jurisdiction within their own borders, a principle enshrined in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter (**see Box 21.1**).

In earlier periods, however, states had intervened in each other's affairs. The United States refused to accept any curtailment of its right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states in its hemisphere until 1933, when it conceded the point at the 7th International Conference of American States. The US position was very similar to the **Brezhnev doctrine** of the 1970s, which held that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in the member states of the socialist commonwealth to protect the principles of socialism.

Much earlier, the British had insisted on the abolition of slavery in their relations with other states. They stopped ships on the high seas and imposed the abolition of slavery as a condition in treaties (Bethell 1970). There were also occasions when states tried to bind other states to respect certain principles in their internal affairs. A number of states in Eastern Europe, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, were bound to respect the rights of minorities within their frontiers, based on agreements made at the Berlin Conference of 1878 by the great powers. In practice, then, intervention was a common feature of international politics.

By the 1990s, some people pointed out that the UN Charter did not assert merely the rights of states, but also the rights of peoples: statehood could be interpreted as conditional on respect for such rights. Others, however, were concerned that any change in the principle of non-intervention would be used as a tool by richer and more powerful states to impose their interests and views on poorer and weaker ones.

The major pronouncements of the UN General Assembly referred to the primary responsibility of states for dealing with complex crises within their borders. A 1991 General Assembly resolution implied some relaxation of this principle when it held that 'The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country' (A/RES/46/182). The

use of the phrase 'in principle', and the term 'should', implied that there could be occasions where intervention was necessary even when consent from the target state was not possible. In the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, the General Assembly said that if national authorities are 'manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity', and if peaceful means are inadequate, the international community could take collective action through the UN Security Council according to Chapter VII of the Charter (A/RES/60/1, paras 138 and 139). This document echoes recommendations from *The Responsibility to Protect*, the 2001 final report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (**see Ch. 32**).

Yet the number of occasions in which a UN resolution has justified intervention due to gross infringements of the rights of individuals has remained limited. Kosovo was arguably the first occasion in which international forces were used in defiance of a sovereign state in order to protect humanitarian standards. NATO launched the air campaign in March 1999 in Kosovo against the Republic of Yugoslavia without a mandate from the Security Council, since Russia had declared that it would veto such action. Nonetheless, NATO states noted that by intervening to stop ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in Kosovo they were acting in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The intervention in Libya in 2011 was another case. A Security Council resolution approved a no-fly zone over Libya and called for 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians (S/Res/1973). A multi-state coalition intervened to implement the resolution. NATO later assumed command of the Libya mission.

The Iraq War in 2003 was questionably another case of intervention to protect the rights of individuals without host country consent, although the legality of intervention under existing Security Council resolutions is contested and the motives for intervention are disputed (**see Case Study 21.2**). The US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 is an exceptional case in which the UN Security Council acknowledged the right of a state which had been attacked—referring to the events of 11 September 2001 in the US—to respond in its own defence.

The difficulty in relaxing the principle of non-intervention should not be underestimated. For instance, the UN was reluctant to send peacekeepers to Darfur without the consent of the Sudanese government. After intensive international diplomacy and negotiations about the nature of the force, Sudan consented

Case Study 21.2 The 2003 intervention in Iraq

A Security Council vote at the United Nations, 2003

© Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images

In March 2003, a US-led coalition launched a highly controversial war in Iraq, which removed Saddam Hussein from power. The justification for war stressed Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, in defiance of earlier UN resolutions. Unlike in Kosovo, the gross violation of human rights was not given as a main justification for the invasion until later. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as well as the subsequent civil war, fuelled critics' claims that the war was unjustified.

There was no agreement over whether the UN Security Council authorized military action in Iraq. American and British diplomats pointed to UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991,

which required the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction under UN supervision, and UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of 2002, which threatened 'serious consequences' if this were not done. Yet efforts to reach a Security Council resolution in the winter of 2003 that would clearly authorize the use of force against Iraq were unsuccessful. France and Russia threatened to veto a second Security Council resolution authorizing force.

The credibility of the UN was damaged by the failure to agree on a second Security Council resolution, and by the decision of the US and British administrations, along with a small number of allies, to use force against Iraq without clear UN authorization. There were fears of an increased tendency for the US to act without UN authorization. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy of September 2002 stated that '[W]e will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require' (NSS 2002: 31).

Nonetheless, the aftermath of the invasion and the continued difficulties in establishing security in Iraq and elsewhere in the region have highlighted the need for international cooperation. Some people argue that the UN enhances the legitimacy of military action, and can help share in global risks, burdens, and strategies for post-conflict rebuilding.

Question 1: Do you think that the 2003 intervention in Iraq and its aftermath shows the importance of the UN or its limitations?

Question 2: Do you think that there are lessons from the UN experience in Iraq that are relevant to more recent conflicts, such as those in Syria and Yemen?

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and the force was established in July 2007 (S/Res/1769). In 2012, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution proposing further sanctions on Syria (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), arguing that this could open a path to external military involvement in Syrian internal affairs, and in 2014 they again vetoed a Security Council resolution to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court. Between 2016 and 2018, Russia vetoed eight Security Council resolutions on Syria. There is some concern that a relaxation of the non-intervention principle by the UN will lead to military action by individual states without UN approval (**see Case Study 21.2**). More generally, relations between the US and Russia and China have deteriorated, and there is the fear of great power unilateralism, especially as US President Trump has frequently expressed criticism of the UN.

An increasing readiness by the UN to intervene within states to promote justice for individuals would indicate a movement towards **global governance** and away from unconditional sovereignty. There have been some signs of movement in this direction, but

principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention remain important.

From peacekeeping to peacebuilding

Partly due to the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 as well as the impasse reached in the UN Security Council over Iraq in 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan named a high-level panel to examine the major threats and challenges to global peace. The 2004 final report emphasized the interconnected nature of security threats, and presented development, security, and human rights as mutually reinforcing. Many of the report's recommendations were not implemented, but some were, notably the establishment of a new UN Peacebuilding Commission (**see Box 21.5**).

Since then, there have been a number of efforts to review and reform the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding architecture. Three peace and security reviews in 2015 expressed concern that changes in the drivers of violence in some parts of the world may be outpacing the ability of

Box 21.5 The UN Peacebuilding Commission

The UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in December 2005 as an intergovernmental advisory subsidiary body of the General Assembly and the Security Council. It was first proposed by the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in December 2004, and again in the Secretary-General's Report *In Larger Freedom* in March 2005 (UN 2005). Existing mechanisms at the UN were thought to be insufficient in responding to the particular needs of countries emerging from conflict. Many countries, such as Liberia, Haiti, and Somalia in the 1990s, had signed peace agreements and hosted UN peacekeeping missions, but later reverted to violent conflict. The Peacebuilding Commission proposes integrated strategies and priorities for post-conflict recovery. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission is indicative of a growing trend at the UN to coordinate security and development programming.

The organizational committee of the Peacebuilding Commission is made up of 31 member states. There are also country-specific meetings to look at the post-conflict strategies, priorities, and programming for particular countries. So far, all of the countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission have been in Africa: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Central African Republic. The Peacebuilding Support Fund is designed to provide support during the early stages of recovery for countries on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda as well as countries in similar circumstances designated by the secretary-general.

UN peace operations to respond effectively. The reports contain broad agreement on the need for improved intergovernmental coherence, greater focus on political solutions, more predictable financing, gender inclusivity, and more flexible peace operations. In 2019, Secretary-General Guterres reorganized the peace and security units at UN headquarters to help deliver more regionally integrated political strategies and to make transitions out of peace operations less disruptive. Nonetheless, there is no consensus among member states on issues such as the use of force and support to counterterrorism operations.

The UN's record on the maintenance of international peace and security has been mixed. On the one hand, there has been a stronger assertion of international responsibility for gross offences against populations. Nonetheless, intimations of a new world order in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 quickly gave way to despondency with what were seen as failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, and increasing disagreement about the proper role of the UN. Compared to the enthusiasm about the potential for the UN in the early 1990s, the disagreements over the war in Iraq in 2003 and over Syria since 2011 are striking. Debates about which institutions and actors are most effective in conducting peace operations have been reinvigorated, and a variety of non-UN actors, including regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions, have been involved in recent military operations. Likewise, there is no consensus on how best to confront non-state-based threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of small arms. There are also concerns over the increased use of the Security Council veto in recent years, and the criticisms of multilateralism expressed by US President Trump and some other populist leaders.

Key Points

- The cold war and the decolonization process discouraged more active involvement by the United Nations within states.

- By the mid-1990s the UN had become involved in maintaining international peace and security by resisting aggression between states, attempting to resolve disputes within states (civil wars), and focusing on economic, social, and political conditions within states.

- The United Nations does not have a monopoly on peace operations. While the UN often provides legitimation, operations are sometimes conducted by regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, or hybrid arrangements involving UN and non-UN actors, such as the African Union.

- The UN has paid increasing attention to peacebuilding and the gendered dimensions of peace and security, with a number of important reports and initiatives in these areas. Critics, however, point to severe shortcomings such as allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by some UN peacekeeping personnel.

The United Nations and economic and social questions

Promoting social and economic development is an important UN goal. The preamble to the UN Charter talks of promoting 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom', and the need to 'employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples'.

The North–South divide along with cold war rivalries profoundly shaped the UN's efforts in these areas. The US and the USSR had very different ideas about how to promote economic and social progress. The UN's economic agenda was originally dominated by the Bretton Woods institutions, which promoted a free-market ideological

agenda. Voting rights and decision-making in these institutions were skewed towards rich Western countries, and their early focus was on post-war rebuilding (**see Ch. 16**).

The increase in UN membership through decolonization in the late 1950s and 1960s prompted an increasing focus on global economic inequalities, and a push to find alternative ways to promote development within the UN system. The number of institutions in the UN system addressing economic and social issues increased significantly. In the 1960s UNCTAD was a key forum for dialogue between developed and developing countries, and this led to the creation of the Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries to promote their collective economic interests at the UN. The UNDP was established in 1965 as a Fund and Programme (**see Fig. 21.1**) and became a key actor in the UN's efforts to reduce global poverty. The UNDP was important in promoting the idea of human development, and since 1990 it has published the influential annual Human Development Report, which links security and development concerns.

Even as economic and social issues became increasingly important at the UN, the main contributor states reduced their funding. By the mid-1990s, there was a crippling financial crisis in the regular Assessed Budget for the UN and in the budget for peacekeeping operations. This was mitigated only when the US agreed, under certain conditions, to repay what it owed the UN and when it returned to full funding in December 2002 (**see Box 21.6**).

Paradoxically, despite the shortage of funds, the UN acquired new skills with regard to key economic and social problems. During the 1990s, a number of new issues were brought onto the international agenda. Several global conferences were convened to discuss pressing problems, such as environmental issues at a conference in Rio de Janeiro (1992), human rights at a conference in Vienna (1993), population questions at a conference in Cairo (1994), and women's issues at a conference in Beijing (1995). These conferences each spawned a commission to carry forward the programme. Such conferences represented a growing sense of interdependence and the globalization of human concerns. They also translated broad socio-economic concerns into more specific manageable programmes (**see Box 21.7**). Follow-up conferences were held to take stock of progress.

Alongside growing UN involvement in development issues in the 1990s, the UN economic and social arrangements underwent reform at the country (field) level and at headquarters level. A key feature of the reforms at the country level was the adoption of Country Strategy Notes, written on the basis of discussions between the specialized agencies, funds and programmes, donors, and the

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Box 21.6 Assessed contributions to the UN Regular Budget

Contributions to the UN Regular Budget are set by the General Assembly. The assessed contributions are based on the size of a member state's national economy as a proportion of the global economy, to a ceiling of 22 per cent. For 2018–9, the General Assembly approved a budget of $5.39 billion (GA/11997), down from $5.8 billion for 2014–5. The member states with the six highest assessed contributions for the 2018–9 Regular Budget are as follows:

1.	United States	22.00 per cent
2.	Japan	9.68 per cent
3.	China	7.92 per cent
4.	Germany	6.39 per cent
5.	France	4.86 per cent
6.	United Kingdom	4.46 per cent

The Funds and Programmes, such as UNDP and UNICEF, are not included in the regular budget and are financed through voluntary contributions by member states. In recent years the proportion of voluntary funding in overall budgets has significantly increased.

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host country. These described the plans of the various institutions and donors in a particular country, clearly setting out targets, roles, and priorities. Another reform at the country level was the strengthening of the Resident Coordinator, usually an employee of the UNDP. He or she became the responsible officer at the country level. At headquarters level, the 1990s reform focused on the reorganization and rationalization of ECOSOC, allowing it to become more assertive and to take a leading role in the coordination of the UN system (A/50/227, para. 37).

By the end of the 1990s it was clear that development was still very unequal around the world. In 2000 the UN convened a Millennium Summit, where heads of state committed themselves to a series of measurable goals and targets known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals included reducing by half the number of people living on less than a dollar a day, achieving universal primary education, and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria (A/55/L.2). At the time of the MDG deadline in 2015, there had been significant accomplishments, but progress had been uneven across regions and countries.

In September 2015, the UN Summit agreed on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which provide a vision for the world by 2030. There are 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets, ranging from

Box 21.7 The United Nations climate change conferences

The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015 (COP21) was one of a series of UN Global Conferences focusing on environmental issues. The first UN Conference on the Human Environment, which took place in Stockholm in 1972, stimulated the creation of national environment ministries around the world and established the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Twenty years later, the UN Conference on Environment and Development, the Earth Summit, was held in Rio de Janeiro. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was one of three conventions signed by many governments at the 1992 Earth Summit. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was an addition to the UNFCCC, which set binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The UNFCCC has guided future climate diplomacy and established the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, meaning that all countries have a role to play in protecting the environment but that highly developed countries have the most responsibility.

There have been annual intergovernmental meetings to discuss progress on the limitation of greenhouse gases and to agree a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. It has been difficult for representatives to agree on a legally binding set of targets for the reduction of gas emissions, due to their different interests. For instance, small island states pushed for zero global emissions, whereas oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela were more sceptical of decarbonization language. There were also disagreements about which countries should pay. Developed countries that had been the largest polluters in the past often disagreed with large emerging economies such as India, China, Brazil, and South Africa over compensation, legal liability, and verification procedures.

The Paris conference of 2015 was referred to as COP21 since it was the twenty-first meeting of the Committee of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement was historic because countries adopted the first ever legally-binding global climate deal. The 195 countries at the meeting agreed to the goal of keeping the increase in the global average temperature to 'well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels' (Art 2, section 1). They also agreed to a goal of zero net emissions by the second half of the century. Countries can choose their own targets, thereby overcoming an obstacle that had plagued earlier conferences, but these will be reviewed regularly and transparently. By the end of the Paris conference, there were pledges by 187 countries to make 'intended nationally determined contributions', but critics pointed out that these pledges do not go far enough and that many details were moved out of the legally binding agreement and into more flexible decisions. The parties directed the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to draw up a report, which was published in October 2018. The report concluded that urgent and unprecedented changes and shifts in energy systems and transport would be needed to reach targets of 1.5–2°C goals. Some countries have expressed reservations; for instance, US President Donald Trump and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro have threatened to withdraw from the accord.

Despite their limitations, the climate conferences make clear that environmental issues remain prominent on the UN agenda, and demonstrate the importance of the United Nations as a framework for moving towards global agreement.

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eradicating extreme poverty, to combatting inequalities within and between countries, to empowering women, to improving energy efficiency. Compared to the MDGs, which consisted of narrower goals focused mainly on developing countries, the SDGs are universally applicable to all countries. The process leading to the SDGs was much more inclusive than the one for the MDGs, involving a large consultation programme and an open working group with representatives from 70 countries. The ambitious breadth and inclusive nature of the agenda have been praised by some but criticized by others for not being achievable and for making it difficult to prioritize. In 2018, Secretary-General Guterres launched a number of institutional reforms to help achieve the SDGs, including strengthening the role of the Resident Coordinators in the field.

Since the founding of the UN there has been growing activity in areas of social and economic development. Various reforms have meant that the two poles of the system were better coordinated: the pole where intentions are defined through global conferences and agendas, and the pole where programmes are implemented. The reform of ECOSOC sharpened its capacity to shape broad agreements into cross-sectoral programmes with well-defined objectives. The adoption of the MDGs and SDGs has provided a focus to the UN's work in these areas, although progress remains uneven.

Key Points

- The cold war and the North–South divide led to differences in opinions over how best to address economic and social development.

- The number of institutions in the UN system that address economic and social issues has increased significantly. Several Programmes and Funds have been created in response to global conferences.

- Reform of the economic and social arrangements of the UN in the late 1990s aimed at improving coordination and clarifying spheres of responsibility.

- The MDGs consisted of measurable socio-economic targets and further integrated the work of the UN at the country level. They have been replaced by the SDGs, which are universally applicable to all countries.

Conclusion

Over the past 70 years, the rules governing the **international system** have become increasingly numerous and specific, covering a large range of the activities of relations among states. With its extensive accomplishments and continued challenges, the UN is an indispensable part of the global system. Disagreements remain over the conditions in which, and extent to which, the UN should concern itself with the internal affairs of states, and there are tensions between power and equality, but the mere fact that the UN continues to exist shows that it serves important functions in the world.

Participation in the United Nations gives governments status in the international system. Membership and success in the UN has come to be regarded as legitimizing **state autonomy**. Hence, holding office, taking initiatives, providing personnel, and policing norms are seen to have value because they add to the self-esteem as well as to the power of the state. The UN has become the essential club for states. The capacity of the UN in its economic and social work and its management of peacekeeping and peacebuilding have expanded since the 1990s. Nonetheless, global great power rivalries, the possibility of US unilateralism, the heightened concern over terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the inability to respond effectively to many crises, for instance in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, Myanmar and Syria, and the pervasiveness of inequality and injustice across the world, signal that further changes in the UN system will be necessary (**see Opposing Opinions 21.1**).

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Opposing Opinions 21.1 The United Nations is the best-placed actor to maintain international peace and security

For

There has not been a Third World War since the creation of the UN. Despite the fact that many countries have disagreements and possess large weapons arsenals, these conflicts have not escalated into another world war.

There is no other organization with the legitimacy of universal membership. Only the UN has the legitimacy that comes with universal membership. Even when military action is carried out by regional organizations, there is an attempt to get UN Security Council authorization.

The UN has succeeded in ending many conflicts and mitigating tensions, and in improving development in many parts of the world. The work of the UN has been critical in resolving conflicts and preventing their recurrence. The UN has been flexible enough to respond to new kinds of threats (e.g. civil wars). Development programmes have improved the lives of millions around the world, making it less likely that they will resort to violence to resolve disputes.

Against

The UN no longer reflects the global balance of power. The current composition of the Security Council does not represent today's balance of power, showing that it is an outdated institution in need of reform.

The UN is unable to act effectively in areas of interest to the permanent members of the Security Council. Due to the use of the veto, it is not possible for the UN to respond effectively to certain conflicts, such as the conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and Israel/Palestine.

The UN is ill-equipped to deal with new international security threats. The UN was designed to respond to interstate conflict and has difficulty dealing with new threats from non-state actors. It is ill-equipped to take on counter-insurgency roles.

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1. If the UN did not exist, how would countries respond to threats to international peace and security?

2. Do you think that new sources of security threats and changes in the global balance of power mean that the UN is becoming less relevant?

3. How can the UN be reformed to better address global threats and challenges?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Questions

1. How does the United Nations try to maintain international order?
2. Does the UN primarily reflect the interests of the most powerful states?
3. What are some of the barriers to UN Security Council reform?
4. Does increased UN activity undermine the sovereignty of states?
5. How far have traditional restraints been relaxed with regard to UN intervention within states?
6. How have UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding evolved?
7. Is the UN equipped to respond to new threats to global security?
8. Has reform of the economic and social arrangements of the UN been effective?
9. Are the Sustainable Development Goals an improvement over the Millennium Development Goals?
10. Has the UN outlived its usefulness?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Adebajo, A. (ed.) (2009), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (Scottsville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press). A collection of views from African scholars and practitioners on the UN in Africa.

Brown, S. (2017), *Sustainable Development Goals and UN Goal-Setting* (Abingdon: Routledge). Focuses on the UN development system from the first UN Development Decade to the SDGs.

Claude, I. L., Jr (1984, 1971, 1964), *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York: Random House). A classic text on the history of international institutions, particularly concerned with their role in war and peace.

Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2009), *UN Ideas that Changed the World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). Presenting the findings of the UN Intellectual History Project, this book discusses the implementation of UN ideas regarding development and security.

Karlsrud, J. (2018), *The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan). A political and institutional reflection on UN peace operations and how they can respond to new peace and security challenges.

Karns, M. P., and Mingst, K. A. (2010, 2004), *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). A comprehensive overview of the main actors and processes of global governance.

Mazower, M. (2009), *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Traces the origins and early development of the United Nations.

Williams, S. (2011), *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?: The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (London: Hurst & Co.). Examines the mystery of UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's death and UN politics during the cold war.

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NGOs in world politics

JUTTA JOACHIM

Framing Questions

- **What distinguishes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from other actors in international politics? How do recent trends make it potentially more difficult to define their boundaries?**

- **What types of influence do NGOs exert in international relations and what are their limits?**

- **Do NGOs contribute to more democratic policy-making at the international level as some suggest, or to lack of transparency as others argue?**

Reader's Guide

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have moved from the margins to the centre of international relations. After the cold war, a wave of democratization, new communication technologies, and international developments dramatically increased the number of NGOs. This chapter first examines what distinguishes this type of international actor from others. While in theory there are clear characteristics that define an NGO, in practice their relationships with states, international governmental organizations (IGOs), **transnational corporations** (TNCs), and/or transnational social movements (TSMOs) make it difficult to separate these actors. Second, the chapter will consider their influence. Due to the dominance of realism in the study of International Relations, for a long time the field has treated NGOs as inconsequential. However, they are increasingly viewed as important actors in international politics. The two case studies in this chapter illustrate how NGOs have contributed to the (re-)formulation of agendas, changes in rules and procedures, and the emergence of new norms through their engagement with IGOs. At the same time, these examples highlight that power asymmetries exist among NGOs and that the sovereignty-based international system limits their impact. The final section of the chapter considers the debate about whether and to what extent NGOs promote more democratic policy-making at the international level. While proponents view them as an important counterweight to states and TNCs, opponents remain sceptical about their influence and utility, for example pointing to their lack of a mandate and the widening gap between the organizations and their constituents.

Introduction

International relations today is unthinkable without NGOs. They have played a vital role in the development of international law and many international norms, such as those prohibiting torture, slavery, and chemical weapons. Together with states and IGOs, they participate in the governance of transboundary problems. While Amnesty International (AI), Greenpeace, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) are some of the most prominent examples, the overall international presence of NGOs has steadily increased from 176 in 1909 (Union of International Associations 2014: 33) to 59,383 in 2014 (Union of International Associations 2014: 35). As **Table 22.1** illustrates, their growth has exceeded even that of IGOs founded by states; in 2014, there were nearly eight times more **international NGOs** (INGOs) than IGOs. Their presence is also increasingly noticeable at United Nations (UN) special conferences related to climate change and other pressing issues, where NGO representatives often stage visible protests to express their dissent with official policies and lobby governmental delegates with alternative proposals (**see Ch. 24**). In addition, governments increasingly enlist the support of NGOs when implementing policies. According to the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 13 per cent (US $20 billion) of all development assistance was channelled through NGOs in 2011 (OECD 2014: 115). The *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015* estimates that 72 per cent (US $40.4 million) of emergency relief funding in 2014 was distributed through international NGOs to victims of conflict or natural disasters (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2015: 75).

While the growth in the number of NGOs has been propelled by international developments, especially since the end of the cold war, the dominance of realism as a theoretical paradigm in International Relations impeded their study until well into the 1980s. The emergence of competing approaches, such as liberalism and constructivism, paved the way for NGOs to emerge as a widely accepted subject of research. Nevertheless, controversies remain over what constitutes an NGO. IGOs such as the UN or the European Union (EU), which maintain regular relationships with these organizations, tend to define NGOs as including entities such as businesses or trade unions. But the scholarly literature prefers a much narrower conceptualization. Specifically, it highlights NGOs' independence from states and their aspirations to work for the common good rather than for profit as defining characteristics. Scholars do recognize, however, that NGOs are heterogeneous and that these attributes are not universal. At the same time, the line between NGOs and other international actors is becoming increasingly blurred in practice. Second, while scholars have debated the impact of NGOs, research from the 1990s onward suggests that these organizations have contributed noticeably to the emergence of new international norms and played a crucial role in raising awareness about transboundary problems such as trafficking in small weapons or the spread of HIV/AIDS. Yet studies also show that their influence varies depending on the **policy domain** and the stage of the policy cycle. Finally, scholars disagree as to whether NGOs promote democratization at the international level and in particular with respect to decision-making in international institutions. Proponents value NGOs' capacity to represent the voices of civil society as opposed to states; underscore their ability to criticize or offer alternative viewpoints; and contend that they contribute to the legalization of international politics. Opponents are sceptical about the potentially undemocratic nature of NGOs' internal decision-making; their lack of an official mandate; the heightened opacity of political processes given their involvement in international policy-making; and the tendency of some NGOs to pursue their own interests over those of their constituents.

Table 22.1 Number of IGOs and international NGOs, 1909–2016

	1909	1951	1960	1970	1981	1990	2000	2009	2014	2016
IGOs	37	123	154	242	1,039	4,322	6,556	7,491	7,756	7,658
INGOs	176	832	1,268	3,379	13,232	22,334	45,674	54,977	59,383	61,682

Source: Götz 2011: 191 and Union of International Associations 2017: 25

What are NGOs?

Today, the term NGO is part of our common vocabulary and knowledge. You can probably think of at least one such organization. Perhaps you may associate NGOs with the critical voices in society, standing up for the rights of individuals or protesting against oil spills or against working conditions in the global garment industry. You may even have a concrete image in mind, such as a few people in a small rubber boat attempting to stop a large fishing vessel from killing whales. Defining NGOs would thus seem to be a straightforward exercise. As the name suggests, they are non-state. However, this attribute also applies to a broad range of actors, from TNCs such as Nestlé or Microsoft to terrorist groups to the anti-nuclear movement. This heterogeneity requires a closer look at what differentiates NGOs and what they have in common with these other actors.

Transnational NGOs vs other international actors

'NGO' (**see Box 22.1**) is an umbrella term applied to a broad range of organizations that differ in size, scope, motives, and functions. For example, it extends to Friends of the Earth (2015), which strives to 'ensure environmental and social justice, human dignity, and respect for human rights and peoples', and Priests for Life (2015), which works for the rights of the unborn child. It includes organizations concerned with a specific issue only, such as Disability Rights International (2015), which 'promot[es] the human rights and full participation in society of children and adults with disabilities worldwide'. Others have a more general mandate devoted to a host of different concerns, for example Rotary International (2015), whose members

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Box 22.1 The origins of 'non-governmental organization'

The term 'nongovernmental organization' was first used by Dwight W. Morrow, a US politician and diplomat. In his book on international cooperation published in 1919, Morrow distinguished them from organizations made up of sovereign states (Charnovitz 2006: 351). Prior to the term's official mention in Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, alternative terms such as 'international associations', 'private international organizations', and 'voluntary agencies' were in circulation, some of which are still in use today (Götz 2011: 188).

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are business and community leaders working for what they see as the common good. Still others are linked with a specific religion, for example Islamic Relief, or represent businesses, such as the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), comprised of private military and security companies, whose activities include protection of buildings or people. The term also pertains to organizations of varying sizes. At one end of the spectrum are the world's largest and most well-known humanitarian NGOs, such as World Vision, with its overseas expenditures of US $2.57 billion in 2010 exceeding the official development assistance of countries including Finland, Austria, and New Zealand (OECD 2014: 111). The other end of the spectrum includes local organizations that are run by volunteers with small operating budgets.

While some so-called delivery organizations provide only services, such as humanitarian or development assistance, advocacy NGOs are committed to raising awareness and campaigning; still others do some of both. A distinction is often made between 'national' NGOs concerned with domestic issues and located in a single country, and 'international' NGOs with a primary focus on cross-boundary problems, headquartered in one country with branches in at least two countries. However, the term 'transnational NGO' (TNGO) is given preference here. It accounts for the fact that national NGOs increasingly mobilize at the international level, while international NGOs regularly get involved in the domestic politics of individual countries.

TNGOs exhibit qualities different from states and TNCs or TSMOs. These characteristics vary, however, according to the relationships TNGOs maintain with these actors and therefore make them difficult to separate. This blurring of boundaries highlights that TNGOs' identities are not fixed; they are socially constructed and shaped both by the organizations themselves and their environment.

TNGOs and states

TNGOs are 'somewhat of an anomaly' in international law, which is a system created by states for states with the principle of sovereignty as one of its cornerstones (Lindblom 2011: 147). Established voluntarily by individuals and governed by the laws of the country in which they reside, TNGOs officially enjoy no international legal personality. Yet this appears paradoxical given

their large population at the international level and in light of the functions they perform. Documents such as the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations can therefore be interpreted as an attempt by individual governments to redress this omission (Charnovitz 2006: 356). This convention was adopted in 1986 and calls for general recognition of the legal personality acquired by an NGO in any state party to the convention (Council of Europe 1986).

In theory, TNGOs are independent from states. This applies both to their sources of funding, primarily from private contributions as in the case of Amnesty International (**see Fig. 22.1**), and to their constituents. TNGOs claim to represent the interests of civil society vis-à-vis the state and, as we will see later, the market. They are guided by principled ideas, not national interests or profit motives, which is why their authority is often referred to as being of a moral rather than a legal kind. This is an ideal characterization of TNGOs, however, which is quite frequently compromised in practice.

While one can find attributes that set TNGOs apart from states, they also relate to states in ways that contribute to a withering of boundaries between them. Some NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have been established by states rather than by individuals. This is why the ICRC is frequently referred to as a hybrid organization and is often listed separately in international statistics (Götz 2011: 189). Although the idea for such an organization dates back to Henry Dunant, who had witnessed the death of thousands of soldiers in the Battle of Solferino (1859) during the Franco-Austrian War, the governmental signatories of the Geneva Convention paved the way by calling for the establishment of national relief societies for wounded soldiers—the predecessors of the ICRC (Forsythe 1977; Hutchinson 1996). In other cases, the involvement of states in such organizations is even greater and of longer duration. This has given rise to 'polemic extensions' (Götz 2011: 192) of the NGO acronym, such as GONGO (government-organized NGO) or QUANGO (quasi-NGO). In any case, it is increasingly common for states to rely on TNGOs in policy implementation or to delegate tasks to them that they can no longer afford or no longer want to perform. The reasons for this shift derive from what can be considered the strengths of these organizations.

First, given their concern for the global commons, such as our habitat, TNGOs often possess exclusive and valued expertise about likely sources of problems or what might be feasible solutions. Many of them conduct

Figure 22.1 Revenue sources and operating expenses of Amnesty International

Source: Reproduced with permission from Amnesty International. 2017 Global Financial Report. Copyright © 2017, Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/2017-global-financial-report/.

their own research and issue reports with detailed analysis as well as policy recommendations, for example on climate change. Second, compared to governments, TNGOs are closer to people, acutely aware of their needs, and frequently enjoy more acceptance and trust than states. This places them in a unique position to assist victims of armed conflicts or natural catastrophes or to obtain information that governments either have trouble accessing or may want to hide—for example, in the case of human rights violations. Third, as 'private' non-state organizations less hampered by obvious national interests or protracted parliamentary processes, they are often able to respond in a more timely and flexible manner, a quality particularly valued in emergencies. Finally, cooperating with TNGOs can enhance the perception of the legitimacy of states or IGOs, which is why a growing number consult and maintain relationships with them. However, at the same time that states or IGOs actively enlist the support of TNGOs, the relationship is not unidirectional.

Interdependencies among these actors also result from TNGOs relying on states for services. For example, in light of mounting security problems in conflict zones, humanitarian TNGOs increasingly depend on state militaries for protection of their field officers (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico 2008). The evolving relationships among TNGOs, states, and IGOs have prompted scholars to conclude that these organizations 'should not be seen as necessarily in opposition to the inter-state system. Rather, their work often conforms to the interests of states and international organizations' (T. Risse 2002: 260). Some put it in even stronger language, pointing to the risks of co-optation or instrumentalization of TNGOs. For those adopting this viewpoint, organizations can lose touch with their constituents by becoming too preoccupied with the needs of the funders whose projects they implement (Schmitz, Raggo, and van Vijfeijken 2011; Piewitt, Rodekam, and Steffek 2010); or, as in the case of humanitarian NGOs, organizations may be associated with the agendas of (Western) states (ALNAP 2012: 23). They can also release governments from what would otherwise be their responsibilities (DeMars 2005; Jaeger 2007). According to Mary Kaldor (2003: 92), '[i]n some cases, they [the TNGOs] have [even] become substitutes for the state' and 'reduce rather than enhance the power of citizens' because 'they can bypass formal mechanisms of democratic accountability'. Unlike governmental officials, the representatives of TNGOs are not publicly elected and therefore cannot be voted out of office in cases where their actions are opposed (**see Opposing Opinions 22.1**). Confronted with such criticism, in recent years growing numbers of organizations have begun to issue accountability reports about how they spend their funds or to appoint independent experts to evaluate their operations. This also accords with rising government expectations that TNGOs involved in the delivery of services must provide proof of their efficiency and effectiveness (Gugerty and Prakash 2010; Jordan and van Tuijl 2006).

TNGOs and TNCs

As in our comparison of TNGOs with states, we can theoretically distinguish TNGOs from TNCs on the basis of their main characteristics. First and foremost, TNGOs do not work for profit. As the case of AI illustrates (**see Fig. 22.1**), the majority of funding that TNGOs receive is devoted to either programming or advocacy and a small amount to the overall maintenance of the organization. Nevertheless, their relationship with TNCs is also marked by both 'conflict and collaboration' (Yaziji and Doh 2009). On the one hand, TNGOs have moved away from targeting states exclusively and towards exposing and opposing the wrongdoings of corporations, be it the use of palm oil in production or other questionable environmental and employment practices.

On the other hand, the engagement with business also increasingly takes the form of cooperation. Together with representatives of TNCs and states, TNGOs participate in so-called multi-stakeholder dialogues (MSDs) aimed at, for example, establishing rules for more sustainable production. TNGOs also engage with these actors in public–private partnerships (PPPs), governance arrangements intended for mutual benefit and to ensure adherence to agreed rules. Examples include the forest or maritime stewardship councils initiated by TNGOs and which, together with an independent board of experts, monitor the harvesting practices of businesses (Pattberg 2005; Ponte 2012). Others include partnerships of the kind that Oxfam maintains with the British department store Marks and Spencer (M&S). The organization encourages people to 'shwopp' clothes bought previously at M&S by donating them to one of the second-hand shops that it has established throughout Europe, in return for a £5.00 voucher (Oxfam 2015). Because of their potential positive reputational effects, recent surveys suggest that PPPs are increasingly appealing for corporations, especially when they partner with bigger and more

Opposing Opinions 22.1 TNGOs contribute to more democracy at the international level

For

TNGOs give voice to the voiceless and powerless who are underrepresented in IGOs. By advocating for victims of human rights violations, or for the global commons, TNGOs draw attention to issues and alternative viewpoints that tend to be otherwise disregarded by states.

TNGOs contribute to more transparency in international relations. Because they observe international negotiations and closely monitor the actions of states as well as TNCs, TNGOs obtain information that they can make accessible to a wider public which might otherwise be precluded from it, and which they can use to hold governments and corporations accountable to their international commitments.

TNGOs introduce ethics into a state-based system. Instead of making claims based on state sovereignty, TNGOs focus on principled beliefs and individual well-being. Rather than material or national interests, they are guided by moral values including voluntarism, solidarity, or non-violence, which help create a global civil society.

Against

TNGOs are increasingly co-opted by governments and corporations. When assisting states in the delivery of humanitarian or development assistance and cooperating with TNCs, TNGOs are forced to abide by their rules and are less likely to outright criticize their actions. They become fig leaves for governments, IGOs, and TNCs that help to legitimize their actions and policies.

TNGOs cannot be held accountable and are not representative. Unlike democratic governments, which have been elected and can be voted out of office, TNGOs are self-appointed. There are no selection mechanisms in place in IGOs that ensure which organizations will speak on behalf of civil society. This is why representation is skewed towards well-resourced TNGOs from the Global North.

TNGOs themselves are far from democratically structured. Many TNGOs exhibit centralistic structures, and through their work in IGOs have become estranged from their constituents at the national or local levels. Hence, rather than enhancing citizen power, they reduce it.

1. To what extent may TNGOs be indicative of an emerging global civil society?

2. Evaluate the claim that TNGOs cannot be held accountable.

3. To what extent are claims about the centralistic structures of TNGOs (in)compatible with the assertion that these organizations guarantee the recognition of alternative viewpoints in IGOs?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

well-known TNGOs (**see Fig. 22.2**) (C&E Advisory Services 2015: 23). MSDs and PPPs have in part contributed to what seems now a rather common practice among TNCs, 'corporate social responsibility', which is understood as corporate regard for the global climate, human rights, or the well-being of the communities in which they work. Yet, similar to TNGOs' relationships with states, cooperation with TNCs can be costly in terms of their independence and a potential loss of credibility (Baur and Schmitz 2012). For example, due to its various partnerships with corporations such as Monsanto, Coca Cola, and GAP, the World Wide Fund for Nature/World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has been criticized as being too close to business and helping companies 'whitewash' their images (Huismann 2014).

However, the same blurring of lines between non-profit and for-profit that might result from partnerships between TNGOs and TNCs is also spurred by developments within organizations themselves, culminating in TNGOs becoming more business-like. One such trend is

on-going professionalization (Eberwein and Saurugger 2013; Martens 2005), characterized by the shift from organizations run by volunteers to increasing hiring of permanent staff with university degrees and specialized expertise, such as lawyers, biologists, or media professionals. Another development is commercialization, defined as the appropriation of practices otherwise used by businesses, such as branding or selling merchandise to generate income (Greenberg, Knight, and Westersund 2011; Joachim and Schneiker 2017). While often attributed to the growing competition for funding among the ever-larger number of TNGOs, these activities may provoke a change in identity from a non-profit organization to a for-profit TNGO. This also applies to TNGOs established by TNCs (Haigh et al. 2015) such as the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI) Platform. Founded in 2002 by Nestlé, Unilever, and Danone, the platform aims at supporting the development and implementation of sustainable agriculture practices through the exchange of knowledge (SAI Platform 2015).

Figure 22.2 TNGO and TNC partnerships
Source: C&E Advisory Services 2015: 28. Reproduced with permission from C&E Advisory Services. *Corporate–NGO Partnerships Barometer Consortia-based 2015: Consortia-based Partnerships: A new Paradigm?* Copyright © 2015, C&E Advisory Services Limited. https://www.candeadvisory.com/sites/candeadvisory.com/files/barometer_2015_final_3.pdf.

TNGOs, transnational social movements, and transnational advocacy networks

Finally, TNGOs are distinct from as well as related to and sometimes part of TSMOs, such as peace or environmental movements (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997). In comparison to these rather 'informal coalitions of mass publics, individuals and organizations dedicated to social change' (Karns and Mingst 2010: 222), TNGOs exhibit a formal structure: they have regularly scheduled meetings, specified decision-making procedures, and a permanent staff (Jacobson 1984). On the other hand, TNGOs are often closely linked with TSMOs. In many cases, they have grown out of and represent the institutionalized forms of social movements. For example, national women's suffrage movements during the nineteenth century gave rise

to the first international women's TNGOs, such as the International Alliance for Women, founded in 1904, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, created in 1915.

Many organizations also join or are the instigators of so-called transnational advocacy networks (TANs). They may be comprised of NGOs exclusively, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines or the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, which contributed significantly to the establishment of the court and continues to pressure countries to ratify the founding treaty (Deitelhoff 2009; Price 1998). In addition to amplifying the voices of weaker organizations, TANs of this kind also enable TNGOs to engage in a division of labour, with some focusing more on institutional lobbying and others on protest. Beyond TNGOs,

TANs may also attract other actors. In the case of the former apartheid regime in South Africa, TNGOs worked to end apartheid side-by-side with states and IGOs as well as TNCs (Klotz 1995).

Despite their definite advantages, TANs too pose challenges and exemplify problems in the TNGO community more generally. Given the diversity of organizations, participants often disagree over strategy, for example, with the so-called 'insiders' preferring to work through and with state institutions and 'outsiders' favouring to keep their distance, either because of ideological reasons or based on fears of being co-opted. Moreover, TANs frequently exhibit and reinforce power asymmetries between powerful 'gatekeeper NGOs'— often '[r]esource-rich NGOs [that] tend to congregate in the Global North', with agenda-setting authority— and 'follower NGOs', mostly from the Global South

(Bob 2005). This lopsidedness also 'can create problems [of] economic dependence that [in turn] create incentives for Southern movements to "soften" or alter their claims in order to better fit in with the mainstream political agenda of dominant NGOs' (Wong 2012: 37; Bob 2005; Carpenter 2011). However, as **Case Study 22.1** illustrates, there are exceptions to this pattern, with emancipated Southern NGOs asserting their voices at the international level.

Perhaps because of the multitude of existing organizations and the ambivalent relationships that TNGOs maintain with other types of actors, it is not surprising that their identity has become a subject of recent debate. In particular, questions have been raised about which and whether TNGOs are working for the good of society or what distinguishes these organizations from other actors.

Key Points

- TNGOs are in theory voluntary organizations aspiring to work for the common good. Nevertheless, these organizations vary greatly with respect to their mandates (general vs issue-specific; religious vs secular); their functions (delivery vs advocacy); their size; and the relationships they maintain with other actors.

- TNGOs differ from states insofar as they are representatives of civil society and do not possess an international legal personality. Their relationships with states range from strict independence to dependence as a result of the funding they receive or the services they perform for governments.

- Most TNGOs, in contrast to TNCs, are non-profit. However, TNGOs have recently begun exhibiting trends generally associated with corporations, such as professionalization or commercialization. Apart from opposition, their strategies with respect to TNCs increasingly also include cooperation in the form of participation in MSDs or PPPs.

- While frequently emerging from and being part of TSMOs, TNGOs have more formal structures compared to these rather amorphous networks. Together with other TNGOs, states, IGOs, or TNCs, they often participate in TANs to amplify their own strength as well as the effects of their campaigns.

The growing importance of TNGOs

From the margins to the centre

The growth of TNGOs has waxed and waned since the first organizations were established, such as the Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in 1839. According to Charnovitz (1997) and others (T. Davies 2013), the development of TNGOs' international relationships is characterized by several phases (**see Table 22.2**). Following the establishment of the first TNGOs in the eighteenth century ('emergence') and subsequent activism for issues including peace, women's suffrage, and nationality rights, primarily within the framework of the League of Nations, their 'engagement' with international institutions came to an abrupt halt during the Second World War ('disengagement'). The establishment of the UN and its recognition of TNGOs reinvigorated their

development at the international level; this contributed to enhanced 'formalization' of already existing TNGOs and to the establishment of new ones. Nevertheless, like

Table 22.2 Phases of INGO engagement at the international level

Emergence	1775–1918
Engagement	1919–34
Disengagement	1935–44
Formalization	1945–9
Underachievement	1950–71
Intensification	1972–91
Empowerment	1992–?

Source: Charnovitz 1997: 190

states, TNGOs were constrained by the ensuing cold war, marking a period which Charnovitz (1997) refers to as 'underachievement'. However, this did not mean paralysis. Important humanitarian organizations were founded during that time, including MSF International, which was created in the wake of war and famine in Biafra in 1971 (MSF International 2015). On the whole, however, TNGOs only experienced rejuvenation during East–West rapprochement and when arms control and environmental problems began to receive increasing attention ('intensification'; **see Case Study 22.1**). From the 1990s to the present is a special period in the history of TNGOs. Not only have they been subject to 'empowerment' in an unprecedented fashion, in particular in international institutions, but also related historical and theoretical developments have played a catalytic role.

Explanations for TNGO empowerment

The end of the cold war set in motion and was accompanied by multiple developments that positively affected TNGOs, including a wave of democratization at the

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Case Study 22.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 'Women, Peace and Security' and NGOs

Julienne Lusenge, NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, addresses the Security Council open debate on Women, Peace and Security at the UN

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On 31 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 'Women, Peace and Security' (hereafter UNSCR 1325). Particularly among women's activists, it was celebrated as 'a landmark resolution because it represents the first time the Security Council directly addressed the subject of women and armed conflict beyond a few passing references to women as victims, or women as a "vulnerable group"' (Cohn 2003/4: 2). It recognizes women as active agents and calls on states to acknowledge their right to participate as decision-makers in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding processes. Furthermore, given that women are disproportionately affected by armed conflicts, the resolution not only urges that special measures be taken to protect them from gender-based violence, but also that military personnel taking part in peacekeeping missions and prior to their deployment obtain gender training (UNSCR 1325).

That this resolution was passed can largely be attributed to the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security comprised of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Amnesty International, International Alert, the Hague Appeal for Peace, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (Cohn 2003/4: 4), which were united in their belief that something had to be done about the situation of women during armed conflicts (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003: 1258). The campaign of the NGO Working Group leading up to UNSCR 1325 is in many respects exemplary of NGO campaigns more generally. First, the Group made use of 'information politics' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 18). As one participant recalled, its members 'worked to educate the [Security] Council' with respect to the topic by supplying them with relevant information, 'finding as much high quality literature as they could, and presenting it, along with summaries to the Council delegations' (Cohn 2003/4: 4; see also Poehlman-Doumbouya and Hill 2001). In addition, the Group engaged in 'symbolic politics' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 22). Its members staged effective media events and raised awareness among Council members in a very concrete and personal manner by having women from conflict zones testify about their victimization as well as their agency in armed conflicts (Cohn 2003/4: 5). Finally, the campaign also exhibited aspects of 'leverage politics' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 23). The Group was supported by, on the one hand, a growing network of women's organizations outside the UN which exerted pressure on governments at the local and national levels, and, on the other hand, allies inside the UN, including UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM—now UN Women), individual member states (e.g. Namibia, Jamaica, and Canada), and the then President of the Security Council, Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh, who urged the Security Council 'to examine the relationship between gender, peace and security' (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003: 1257).

Question 1: Realists claim that only material resources matter in international politics. Discuss this proposition in light of the Working Group's campaign related to UNSCR 1325.

Question 2: The resolution has been criticized for conceiving of women in armed conflicts more as victims than as agents. To what extent is this critique justified and what are the pros and cons of such a victim frame?

national level. Particularly in Eastern Europe but also in Latin America, the retreat of authoritarian regimes opened up spaces for the formation of civil society organizations, highlighting the link between TNGOs and TSMOs. The members of these newly established organizations had often already been 'citizen activists' in opposition movements, where they had formed 'networks across borders, established sister-city relationships, and engaged in "track-two-diplomacy" as an alternative to the official negotiations of government diplomats' (Evangelista 1999: 6; Warner and Shuman 1987). At the international level, a series of UN special conferences, such as the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1992, the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (Egypt) in 1994, and the World Conference on Women in Beijing (China) in 1995, has engendered TNGO growth as well as activism. Organized with the intention of identifying new and pressing issues that needed attention, the conferences provided a formidable platform for these organizations to lobby for their concerns and submit alternative proposals, as well as to establish transnational networks (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998). To make their presence known and to coordinate their actions, it became and still is a common practice to organize parallel TNGO conferences around the same time at a location near intergovernmental meetings (Joachim 2007: 25; Pianta and Silvo 2003). These conferences have also benefited from a further impetus for the empowerment of TNGOs: new communication technologies.

As the Arab Spring and recent citizen protests attest, the internet and social media have made it easier for civil society groups to exchange and receive information more quickly and to mobilize people across state boundaries (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer 2013). According to Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst, 'the nature and possibilities of the world wide web combined with those of an emergent global civil society . . . create a new international environment, one in which state sovereignty was constrained and NGOs—as key actors in civil society—were able to work in novel and effective ways' (Warkentin and Mingst 2000: 1; Deibert 2000). Related to the greater accessibility of communication technology is a further explanation for TNGO growth and presence: globalization, and more precisely economic liberalization and privatization, trends which many organizations either resist as part of the anti-globalization movement or whose negative effects they have tried to mitigate by providing services previously considered the responsibility of states (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 7).

In light of these developments, IR scholars could no longer ignore the prevalence of TNGOs. Previously their consideration of TNGOs had been hampered by realism, which was the predominant IR paradigm until the mid-1970s and which deemed the influence of non-state actors inconsequential. Now, due to the emergence of new theoretical approaches, IR scholars had more adequate heuristic tools to study these organizations. The emergence of liberal approaches in the late 1970s and 1980s provided a first opening in this respect. Rather than perceiving states as the exclusive actors at the international level, proponents of this school of thought considered societal groups to contribute to 'complex interdependencies', to growing and overlapping relationships involving state as well as non-state actors spanning geographical boundaries, and to transnational relations (Keohane and Nye 1971; T. Risse 2002).

Following a revival of realism and state-centric approaches in the 1980s, the so-called 'constructivist turn' brought 'transnational relations back in' during the early 1990s and directed the focus of scholars embracing this perspective almost inevitably to TNGOs' activities (Risse-Kappen 1995). Assuming that these organizations were actors in their own right and played a catalytic role in the emergence of international norms, scholars began to empirically document and explain their influence in international politics. Parallel to the 'constructivist turn', the so-called '(global) governance turn' in International Relations further stimulated research related to TNGOs, since non-state actors play an important role in the regulation of transboundary problems, with which governance scholars are particularly concerned. As noted earlier, TNGOs contribute to the formulation of new rules based on their specialized expertise, or to the provision of collective goods (T. Risse 2002).

The role and power of TNGOs in IGOs

TNGOs have had visible successes over the past decades. They have been instigators of and lobbied for the UN anti-torture convention adopted in 1984 (Clark 2001); the ban of landmines agreed on in 1997 (Price 1998); the UN Declaration against All Forms of Violence against Women issued in 1993 (Joachim 2007); and the Arms Trade Treaty related to conventional weapons established in 2013 (see Stavrianakis 2010 for a history).

In light of their scarce resources compared to those of states or TNCs, TNGOs' achievements seem to exceed expectations and are sometimes difficult to trace, because the organizations involved, work frequently in tandem with other actors and rely on persuasion rather than material power.

One piece of this analytical puzzle is the so-called opportunity structure (Tarrow 2011) provided by IGOs. The institutional rules or practices that prevail in a given IGO constitute either an enabling or a disabling environment for TNGOs. The UN is an example. Because of its universal membership and broad scope, it offers a favoured platform for many TNGOs with a variety of focuses. Moreover, from the very beginning, UN members have laid the ground for regularized interactions with TNGOs through formal rules of engagement. To this day, the UN is the only IGO that grants TNGOs consultative status, for which they can apply and which gives them 'a legitimate place within the political system' (Willetts 1996: 43; **see Case Study 22.2**). While Article 71 of the UN Charter provides the basis for this arrangement, Resolution 1996/31 of the Economic

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Case Study 22.2 Migrants and NGO search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean Sea

The *Aquarius* during a rescue mission of refugees in the Mediterranean

© Laurin Schmid/SOS Méditerranée

In 2015, at the height of the European refugee crisis, of the more than a million migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean to reach the European continent, 3,771 were officially declared dead or missing. In 2016, the death toll increased even more dramatically to 5,076 casualties (Cusumano 2018: 387). In light of this unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, several NGOs began to conduct 'Search and Rescue' (SAR) operations at sea to save the lives of migrants. These initially included the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), established by the millionaires Christopher and Regina Catrambone, owners of a company which provided evacuations and intelligence for firms operating in dangerous environments; the operational branches in Barcelona and Brussels of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF); and SOS Méditerranée (SoS-med). The three NGOs soon became models for smaller NGOs that followed in their footsteps, such as the German NGOs Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, and Jugend Rettet; the Spanish organization Pro-Activa; and the Dutch NGO Boat Refugee Foundation (Cusumano 2017: 91).

The operations of these organizations, which taken together saved the lives of over 25,000 migrants, are illustrative of more general patterns concerning NGO involvement in service delivery (Cusumano 2017: 97). First, although the NGOs emulated each other's approaches, they are not a homogeneous group. Instead, important differences exist between them. Unlike MOAS, the MSF branches, and SoS-med, which conducted fully fledged SAR operations by taking migrants on board their ships and disembarking them in an official port, Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, and Pro-Activa only assisted migrants in distress at sea without taking them on board, much less ashore (Cusumano 2017: 97). While the more limited resources of the smaller organizations partly account for these differences, they also mirror political differences (Cuttitta 2017). In contrast to the larger organizations, which were less apprehensive about cooperating with governments, NGOs like Sea-Watch wanted to maintain their critical edge by refusing to release states from their responsibility, i.e. rescuing people in distress at sea (Cusumano 2017: 98).

The SAR operations are also exemplary of the 'sovereign limits' of NGO influence (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998). Without more proactive policy solutions from European governments, the work of NGOs can be likened to 'emptying the Mediterranean with a spoon' (Cusumano 2017). Moreover, the operations also had unintended effects. In contrast to the beginning, when the NGOs were still positively received, these 'Mediterranean angels', as they were dubbed, 'lost their wings' as time went on (Barretta, Milazzo, and Pascali 2017: 5, cited in Cusumano 2019). Rather than seen as contributing to the solution, they became the subjects of blame, accused of being a pull factor for migration and leading to the growing number of casualties (Cusumano 2018: 393). Eventually, the NGOs' room for manoeuvre became more circumscribed. Lacking solidarity and support from other European governments, the Italian government first issued a code of conduct to be signed by NGOs conducting SAR operations, and following the election victory of a populist party, together with Malta, it closed off its ports entirely (Cusumano 2019). Since then, almost all NGOs have suspended their SAR operations.

Question 1: Based on Keck and Sikkink's assumption that issue characteristics matter, how does the migrant case differ from that of women in armed conflicts?

Question 2: How are the cases of migrants and of women in armed conflicts illustrative of existing power asymmetries between NGOs, and what are some likely effects of these power differences?

and Social Council (ECOSOC) stipulates the eligibility requirements for consultative status, 'rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status, procedures for the withdrawal or suspension of consultative status . . . and the responsibilities of the UN Secretariat in supporting the consultative relationship' (UN, ECOSOC n.d.). To be eligible,

> an NGO must have been in existence (officially recognized by a government) for at least two years, must have an established headquarters, a democratically-adopted constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate mechanisms of accountability and democratic and transparent decision-making processes. The basic resources of the organization must be derived mainly from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members.
>
> *(UN, ECOSOC n.d.)*

However, '[o]rganizations established by governments or intergovernmental agreements are not considered NGOs' (UN, ECOSOC n.d.). Depending on their scope, NGOs with consultative status are divided into different categories (general, special, or roster) and respectively enjoy different rights, ranging from attending and being able to make statements during meetings to circulating and receiving documents (for a more detailed discussion, see Willetts 1996; Vabulas 2013). These stipulations regarding consultative status highlight once again the ways in which the identity of TNGOs is constitutive. Who and what defines such an entity is shaped not only by the respective organizations themselves, but also by actors they engage with, such as the UN (**see Box 22.2**).

Other IGOs have not yet matched the provisions made by the UN related to NGO consultative status. With the exception of the EU, which only recently

introduced an NGO registry, there are no comparable frameworks currently in place. While the reasons for this have not yet been explored systematically, these differences do point to why TNGOs have made far less inroads in, for example, financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and why they have only recently received concessions in terms of transparency, such as information disclosure, from these IGOs (Nelson 2009; O'Brien et al. 2000). Although some conceive of TNGO participation as resembling something close to a norm in the UN, the consultative status that TNGOs enjoy has to be treated with care (Reimann 2006).

First, such consultative status has at various times been subject to politicization, particularly during the cold war period when much of what happened in the UN was overshadowed by the East–West conflict. For example, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers and the International Organization of Journalists lost their consultative status in July 1950, when 'the Soviet Union boycotted ECOSOC over the question of Chinese representation in the UN' (Willetts 1996: 34). In 2011, following a ten-year waiting period, the application of the International Lesbian and Gay Association was rejected in a close vote with seven votes in favour, eight against, and three abstentions in the responsible Committee on NGOs of ECOSOC (United Nations 2011).

Second, rules of access have been moulded and augmented by informal practices, many of which have evolved because of the relentless pressure by TNGOs with consultative status at the UN. To begin with, accreditation is no longer limited to international NGOs exclusively. Instead, over the past two decades and during the UN specialized conferences, accreditation has been extended to grassroots, local, and national NGOs. This explains the jump in the number of organizations holding consultative status from 1,041 in 1997 up to 3,050 in 2007 and the steady growth since then (**see Fig. 22.3**). Moreover, since the 1990s, representatives of TNGOs have been able to move more freely in UN buildings. While previously these actors were limited to visitor balconies, they are now allowed onto the negotiation floors during meetings to which they have access. It has also become a common practice on the part of so-called 'friendly governments' to include them as advisers in their delegations, offering TNGOs a unique opportunity to shape policies directly (Joachim 2007: 26).

Box 22.2 UN granting of NGO consultative status

Chapter X, Article 71 of the UN Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council 'may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.'

(United Nations 2015a)

Figure 22.3 Consultative status of NGOs across time
Source: Reproduced with permission from Willetts, Peter (2018) *The Growth of the Number of ECOSOC NGOs*.
URL: http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-GRPH.HTM#graph (accessed 05.12.2018).

Third, these rules do not apply equally to all UN bodies, nor do they guarantee access across the policy cycle or for all TNGOs. While their presence in General Assembly sessions has become close to a normalcy and resembles at times something akin to a 'partnership' (Alger 2002), relations with the Security Council are a fairly recent development and are limited to 35 mostly humanitarian and human rights TNGOs, such as Oxfam, Pax Christi International, and Care International (NGO Working Group on the Security Council 2015). TNGO participation is generally regarded as higher in the agenda-setting phase where problems are identified, but less likely in the decision-making phase where governments tend to close off the rooms. Lastly, not all TNGOs are capable of maintaining a continuous presence at the UN. The majority of organizations are located in North America and Europe while Asian, Latin American, Caribbean, or African ones still constitute the minority.

The rules and practices in IGOs may provide opportunities for access, but they do not guarantee influence. Instead, it takes active lobbying by TNGOs to make their voices heard. For this purpose, these organizations have developed a repertoire of strategies over time that they apply either individually or in combination. These include 'information politics' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 18–22), through which TNGOs draw attention to and raise awareness about unacceptable environmental, human rights, or social conditions by providing 'alternative sources of information' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 19). These may be testimonies of victims or information that is more technical in nature, such as scientific studies or statistics, or both. This strategy is often applied in tandem with 'symbolic politics' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 22–3). Here TNGOs make use of events, such as governmental conferences or historical anniversaries, to give weight to their arguments by staging their protests in a theatrical and media-attracting manner. For example, every year the anti-nuclear movement calls for actions to commemorate the catastrophic accidents at the nuclear power plants in Chernobyl, Ukraine, on 26 April 1986 and in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011. These range from vigils to protests with participants lying 'frozen' on the ground to illustrate the deadly effects of atomic energy.

Most organizations could not engage in such activities without their dedicated supporters and

their often charismatic, visionary leaders. Because the latter are quite well-connected individuals, the relationships they maintain with often more powerful international actors, including states, IGOs, or TNCs, are an important asset when TNGOs engage in 'leverage politics' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 23–4). In this case, they benefit from the material resources of their allies who can use economic or military aid as bargaining chips to pressure states, for example to stop human rights violations and to pursue a course of democratization, as has happened in Chile and Argentina (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). In addition, TNGOs may also profit from the offices their allies hold, such as that of the UN secretary-general, or the reputations of celebrities who support their cause. Or rather than using material leverage, TNGOs can bring their moral authority to bear by 'naming and shaming' states or TNCs for their wrongdoings. This strategy is closely related to 'accountability politics', whereby NGOs ensure that governments hold true to their international commitments through close monitoring and reporting of their actions (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 24–5).

Neither of these strategies guarantees success, and there are 'sovereign limits' to TNGOs' influence, as found by a study of UN specialized conferences (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998). After all, states can ultimately still close the doors and resist their pressure. There are different reasons why organizations may not achieve what they set out to do, some of which may relate to their targets, and some to the issue or to the organization itself. With respect to the former, some states or TNCs might simply not be sufficiently susceptible to the words and deeds of TNGOs, either because they can draw on alternative resources, in the case of material leverage, or because they can deflect responsibility, in the case of moral leverage (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 28–9). As far as the organizations or the issues they address are concerned, TNGOs may be divided over questions related to strategy or may address problems that are too complex and ill-suited for campaigns. According to Keck and Sikkink, it is far easier for TNGOs to mobilize people around issues involving, first, 'bodily harm to vulnerable individuals' and where the responsible parties can be clearly identified (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 27) and, second, 'legal equality of opportunity', as was the case with slavery or women's suffrage (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 28).

Moreover, successes are accomplished at a price. They force NGOs to develop a 'take-home message' (M. Hoffmann 2009: 36) which often reflects the demands of a few organizations, but excludes the diverse views within a given community (Dany 2014: 419). The campaign regarding women's reproductive rights and health speaks to this point. While the issue was accepted by UN member states as being of great concern, many Southern women's NGOs were greatly frustrated by the campaign's outcome. In their eyes, official documents privileged the rights-perspective and viewpoints of Northern women and marginalized Southern women's concerns related to development (Joachim 2007: 159). Ultimately, successes hide the fierce struggles associated with accomplishing them: 'Despite its promise, today's global civil society is for many a Darwinian arena in which the successful prosper but the weak wither. At any one time, there is room for only a few challengers on any issue' (Bob 2005: 8).

Key Points

- The growth of TNGOs has been encouraged by related international occurrences, including globalization, the end of the cold war, a wave of democratization at the national level, a series of UN special conferences at the outset of the 1990s, and advances in communication technologies.

- While the study of TNGOs in IR has been hampered by realism, whose proponents perceive non-state actors and their actions as inconsequential, the growing influence of liberal approaches followed by the constructivist and governance turns have all contributed to heightened interest in these organizations.

- Depending on their rules and practices, IGOs provide more or less favourable opportunity structures through which TNGOs may gain access to policy-making processes. However, access is far from even; it differs across IGOs, policy fields, the policy cycle, and across TNGOs, and does not guarantee influence.

- TNGOs possess issue-specific expertise and moral authority through which they can engage in information and symbolic politics; they also exert material as well as moral leverage in efforts to hold states or TNCs accountable.

Conclusion

TNGOs are actors that must be reckoned with both in global politics and by IR scholars. While TNGOs are commonly defined as voluntary associations with principled beliefs and as representatives of civil society, this chapter has highlighted that the identity of these organizations is not fixed. It is constituted both by the organizations themselves and by the relationships they maintain with other actors: states, IGOs, TNCs, and the social movements and transnational networks in which they frequently take part. Although TNGOs may exhibit unique qualities such as independence or a non-profit nature, they may over time become more state- or business-like because of the funding they receive and the partnerships they enter into. There is also debate about the accountability of TNGOs and the extent to which they contribute to democracy (**see Opposing Opinions 22.1**).

While this might be somewhat disillusioning, it is not too surprising. TNGOs are constituted by and reproduce to some extent the state-based structures in which they are embedded. Nevertheless, this does not paralyse them. TNGOs have been and continue to be catalysts of normative change at the international level; it is questionable whether international relations would have moved in the direction of increased legalization without their entrepreneurial work. Although

their activities were for a long time underappreciated by IR scholars, their exponential growth and accomplishments since the end of the cold war have propelled TNGOs from the margins towards the centre of the discipline.

Constructivist as well as global governance approaches have contributed to what can now be regarded as a burgeoning literature about TNGOs, given their respective interests in ideas and norms as opposed to material resources, and their concern with the role private actors play in the regulation of transboundary problems. Thanks to numerous case studies in policy fields ranging from human rights to security, today we have a solid understanding about how these organizations compare to and relate to other international actors, and how and to what extent they can exert influence. While there are limits to what TNGOs can do, and it remains a topic of debate whether their presence is democracy-enhancing, it is safe to say that they have pushed the boundaries of the global agenda in many areas. Based on their own expertise and by at times enlisting support from more well-resourced actors, they have contributed to greater awareness about existing problems and changed our understanding of what seems feasible to address them.

Questions

1. What distinguishes TNGOs theoretically from other international actors?
2. What explains the exponential growth of TNGOs over the past two decades?
3. What contributes to the blurring of lines among TNGOs, states, and TNCs?
4. What consequences, both positive and negative, might follow from TNGOs' cooperation with states, or with TNCs?
5. How may the increasing number of TNGOs affect their work as well as their relations with others?
6. What are the necessary institutional prerequisites for TNGOs to potentially exert influence in IGOs?
7. What are TNGOs' likely strategies and what might determine how and when they are used?
8. What factors might contribute to the unequal representation of Northern- and Southern-based NGOs in IGOs?
9. Why do issues involving bodily harm or questions of equality lend themselves more to TNGO campaigns compared to other concerns?
10. To what extent is TNGO involvement in international politics desirable?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Ahmed, S., and Potter, D. (2006), *NGOs in International Politics* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press). A useful introduction to TNGOs that pays particular attention to the relationships among TNGOs, states, and IGOs.

Davies, T. (2013), *NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society* (London: C. Hurst and Co). Places NGOs' transnational activism in historical perspective, tracing it from the French Revolution to the present. Rather than being limited to particular issue-areas, it highlights the substantive breadth and regional diversity of NGOs.

DeMars, W., and Dijkzeul, D. (eds) (2015), *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory* (London and New York: Routledge). The contributors to this volume address questions about the accountability and history of NGOs from different theoretical angles.

Florini, A. M. (ed.) (2000), *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). A valuable reader highlighting the role of TNGOs and their networks in different issue-areas.

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Joachim, J., and Schneiker, A. (2017), 'Humanitarian NGOs as Businesses and Managers: Theoretical Reflection on an Under-Explored Phenomenon', *International Studies Perspectives* 19(2): 170–87.

Keck, M. E., and Sikkink, K. (1998), *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A classic in the NGO literature that explains the influence of transnational advocacy networks, drawing on both constructivist and rationalist approaches.

Lindblom, A.-K. (2006), *Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An in-depth treatment of the status of NGOs in international law, with particular emphasis on their rights and obligations as well as consultative status.

Stroup, S. (2012), *Borders among Activists: International NGOs in the United States, Britain and France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A detailed account of the influence of national patterns on TNGO practices such as advocacy, fund-raising, and professionalization.

Willetts, P. (2010), *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics* (London and New York: Routledge). An accessible textbook that examines the role of TNGOs in international policy-making and global governance.

Websites

www.un.org/civilsociety The official UN ECOSOC site on the consultative status of NGOs in the UN.
www.ngocongo.org The official site of the NGOs in consultative status with the UN.
www.ngo-monitor.org Contains critical analysis and reports about NGO accountability.
www.wango.org The World Association of NGOs offers a worldwide NGO directory.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Regionalism in international affairs

EDWARD BEST · THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN

Framing Questions

- **Has there been a uniform process of regional cooperation and integration across all continents?**

- **What have been the driving forces in the establishment of various forms of regional cooperation?**

- **To what extent does cooperation at the regional level change the nature of international politics?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter provides an overview of the different regional arrangements that have emerged around the globe. It begins by clarifying the various concepts and definitions associated with this phenomenon. It then outlines the main driving forces for the rise of regionalism in recent decades and examines relevant developments in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe. It highlights both the similarities and the differences among the various regional arrangements, drawing attention to the unique circumstances that shaped the emergence of the European Union. The chapter charts the global trend towards the establishment of regional mechanisms of cooperation and integration since 1945 while also highlighting the challenges facing such developments. It demonstrates that the real significance of these mechanisms is determined by specific intra-regional dynamics and the relationships among global powers, as much as by the nature of their interaction with international organizations and other aspects of global politics.

Introduction

Regionalism has become a pervasive feature of international affairs. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 287 regional trade agreements were in force as of 1 May 2018 (WTO 2018*b*). Regional peacekeeping forces have become active in multiple parts of the world. In the last several decades regionalism has become one of the forces challenging the traditional centrality of states in international relations.

The word 'region' and its derivatives denote one distinguishable part of some larger geographical area. Yet these terms are used in different ways. On the one hand, regions are territories within a state, occasionally crossing state borders. On the other, regions are particular areas of the world, comprising a number of different sovereign states. The issues that both usages raise for international relations have some elements in common. However, this chapter looks only at regionalism in the international context: the range of special relationships among neighbouring countries that represent more than normal diplomatic relations but in which the component parts retain legal personality under international law (**see Box 23.1**).

The first section of this chapter presents some basic concepts, dimensions, and debates. The second section places regional cooperation in a global context and reviews selected developments in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. The final section looks at the European Union (EU), where integration has, so far uniquely, gone beyond a regional organization to produce a new form of regional governance.

Regional cooperation and regional integration

Regionalism's various dimensions necessitate a clarification of terms. The term regionalization is often used to refer to 'the growth of societal integration within a region and . . . the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction' (Hurrell 1995: 39). Such processes produce interdependence and may also constitute deepening perceptions of common interests and identity, including self-awareness as a region. Yet the very nature and membership of regions may be contested, and different forms of interaction exist among the various dimensions and dynamics of regionalism. Regional agreements cover different mixtures of economic, social, political, and security concerns. Moreover, there are different forms of interaction between 'regionalization' and the various ways in which states may promote regional cohesion. In some cases, state-led actions have been responsible for an increase in 'real' interaction. In others, the development of ties has been more one of 'market-led integration'.

A distinction is often made between 'cooperation' and 'integration' when considering the different kinds of arrangements that may be agreed among countries. Regional cooperation has various forms. Functional cooperation refers to limited arrangements that are agreed among states in order to work together in particular areas, for example in transport, energy, or health. Economic cooperation refers to agreements that foresee some degree of commercial preferentialism, but with no harmonization of domestic rules nor any obligation for common action in international affairs. Political cooperation entails mutual support and commitment regarding the implementation of certain values and practices within the countries. Cooperation in foreign and security policy means that governments systematically inform and consult each other, try to adopt common positions in international organizations, and may even implement joint actions elsewhere. There are no necessary connections among these different areas of cooperation. And none of this has any consequence for the international status of participating countries beyond normal obligations under international law.

Formal regional integration refers to processes by which states go beyond the removal of obstacles to interaction among their countries to create a regional space subject to some distinct common rules. With regard to economic integration, several degrees of ambition are usually distinguished: free trade area, customs union, common market, and economic and monetary union. From a customs union 'up', in addition to removing barriers to trade among themselves, the countries must not only adopt some measures of positive integration (i.e. harmonization of rules), but must also act with a single voice internationally, at the very least in tariff policy. Such processes may result in a new level of governance above the nation-states, although this does not mean creation of a new 'super-state'.

Box 23.1 Around the world in regional organizations, 2018 (an illustrative and non-exhaustive list)

AMERICAS	Organization of American States	OAS
	North American Free Trade Agreement	NAFTA
	United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement	USMCA
	(signed 2018, to be ratified)	
	Central American Integration System	SICA
	Central American Common Market	CACM
	Caribbean Community	CARICOM
	Andean Community [of Nations]	CAN
	Pacific Alliance	PA
	Common Market of the South	MERCOSUR
	Union of South American Nations	UNASUR
	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States	CELAC
	Latin American Integration Association	LAIA
AFRICA	African Union	AU
	Arab Maghreb Union	UMA
	Community of Sahel–Saharan States	CEN–SAD
	Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS
	West African Economic and Monetary Union	WAEMU
	Central African Monetary and Economic Community	CEMAC
	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries	CEPGL
	Economic Community of Central African States	ECCAS
	East African Community	EAC
	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	COMESA
	Intergovernmental Authority for Development	IGAD
	Southern African Customs Union	SACU
	Southern African Development Community	SADC
ASIA	Gulf Cooperation Council	GCC
	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	ASEAN
	ASEAN Regional Forum	ARF
	East Asian Summit	EAS
	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	SAARC
	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	SCO
	Economic Cooperation Organization	ECO
ASIA-PACIFIC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	APEC
	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council	PECC
	Pacific Islands Forum	
EURASIA	Commonwealth of Independent States	CIS
	Eurasian Economic Union	EAEU
	Black Sea Economic Cooperation	BSEC
EUROPE	European Union	EU
	Council of Europe	CoE
	Nordic Council/Council of Ministers	
	Benelux Economic Union	Benelux
	European Free Trade Association	EFTA
	Visegrad Group	V4
EURO-ATLANTIC	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSCE

While the distinction between cooperation and integration does involve some clear and fundamental choices, it should be treated with caution. Cooperation and integration are not mutually exclusive general approaches for regional governance, but rather options that may be pursued for different sectors and dimensions of regional relations. All regional systems, including the EU today, contain a mixture of both cooperation and integration.

The formal institutional arrangements of a regional system are not necessarily a measure of the real depth or dynamics of a regional integration process. If regional goals are complex and long-term (e.g. to create a full common market), states may set up 'commitment institutions' to increase the prospects of effective compliance over time (Mattli 1999). States thus accept some pooling of **sovereignty** (i.e. the renunciation of autonomous action and/or the veto), delegation of powers to supranational bodies, and/or 'legalization' (Moravcsik 1998; Abbott et al. 2000).

This may result in a multilevel system of governance in which the regional union does replace nation-states in some functions and a regional polity starts to emerge, albeit unevenly and subject to contestation. This has been the case in post-war **Europe**, due to a unique combination of factors. Europe has historically been characterized by a particularly high degree of both conflict and cooperation among polities in a densely populated continent. Revulsion at the appalling consequences of national rivalries could still be accompanied by a sense of underlying shared heritage, as well as by strong economic interdependence and social interactions. Nationalist sentiment fell to a historic low after the Second World War, while superpower interventions in 1956 in Hungary and in the Suez crisis made evident the limits to the international influence of even the largest European countries. All this made integration not only more urgent than in other regions (to prevent further internecine conflicts) but also more easily rooted in concrete achievements. Moreover, the Communist bloc continued to provide the sense of common external threat that has historically shaped European identity, while a shared strong social norm of obeying 'the law' could be extended to European Community rules. The early consolidation of a hard core of supranational law made it easier for European regionalism to survive later crises, and to respond to new realities through more flexible forms of regional cooperation without fatally weakening the heart of the integration process.

The institutional **structure** of the European Community has often been imitated in other circumstances that do not favour sustainable deepening of integration. In some cases, formally supranational bodies exist with little real connection to national or transnational life. Conversely, strong formal commitments may not be required to achieve important results in particular fields under certain conditions. For example, the Nordic countries established both a passport union and a common labour market in the 1950s without any supranational arrangements (Best 2006).

Why do states decide to pursue regional integration, and what dynamics may explain the evolution of regional arrangements? A first theme historically has been the 'management of independence': the need for newly independent states to settle down in their relations (1) among themselves, (2) with the former colonial power, and (3) with other, often rival, powers. This may be summarized as the process of consolidating international **identity** and 'actorness': how do particular sets of societies want to participate in international affairs? Federal union has been the result in some cases. In others, regional organizations of one sort or another have been an important instrument for managing this often conflictual process (**see Box 23.2 and Opposing Opinions 23.1**).

Box 23.2 Dynamics of regionalism

Management of independence	Settling down by newly independent states in their relations among themselves, with the former colonial power, and with other powers.
Management of interdependence	Regional mechanisms to guarantee peace and security; responses to 'regionalization'; promotion of cooperation and/or state-led integration.
Management of internationalization	Regional negotiations in the multilateral system; regional/UN peacekeeping; regional responses to globalization.
Pursuit of spheres of interest or influence	Sponsorship of regional frameworks by major powers.

Opposing Opinions 23.1 Regional cooperation strengthens the state

For

States set up regional organizations to pursue their national interests. Most regional organizations operate on the basis of unanimity, meaning that key decisions require the approval of all member states. Therefore, by definition, whatever a regional organization does reflects the will of all its member states. Day-to-day running of the organization may be delegated to agencies, and routine decisions taken by some form of majority vote, but constitutional-level decisions require all states to agree, even in advanced institutions such as the EU.

Regional cooperation arrangements aid small states, and vice versa. Regional organizations serve the interests of small states in particular, because they provide a greater degree of stability and security compared to a web of bilateral relations in which differences in state size and power are more pronounced. Both the EU and **ASEAN** also demonstrate that regional cooperation is most effective if a number of smaller and medium-sized states also play a role in the cooperative arrangement.

States can better regulate their economies and societies through regional cooperation. On their own, states are increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of international trade and globalized markets. Regional cooperation provides a mechanism for states to regain an element of control over markets, allowing them to regulate cross-border trade and investments more effectively.

Against

Regional institutions develop autonomous powers that states find difficult to control. Advanced forms of regional cooperation involve the creation of regional institutions and the delegation of powers to them. Member states may set up such institutions in order to achieve more effective cooperation, while limiting their power through various oversight mechanisms. However, over time these institutions have the capacity to develop expertise, legitimacy, and eventually a degree of actorness that makes them independent actors vis-à-vis state governments.

Regional cooperation deepens the web of international norms that constrain states. By cooperating within regional frameworks, states facilitate a normative process that adds another layer of rules and norms limiting their power. These may be informal rules—ways of doing things—that governments have to abide by in order to achieve their aims, or formal rules and even binding laws (as in the EU) which require state compliance and are enforced through regional courts.

Regional cooperation enables international cooperation among civil society actors, limiting states' special status as diplomatic actors. Even though most regional organizations are initially intergovernmental creations, other forms of cooperation often develop around that of governments: among parliaments, business associations, trade unions, NGOs, and social movements. Such civil society cooperation provides the foundation for the creation of transnational alliances, networks, and communities that challenge states' traditional monopoly over external representation.

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1. To what extent do regional organizations strengthen or weaken the capacity of states to achieve their goals in global politics?

2. What does regionalism mean for national sovereignty?

3. Can states' participation in regional organizations have negative as well as positive consequences for democratic governance in the countries concerned?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

A second set of **issues** may be grouped as the 'management of interdependence'. This partly refers to economic and social interaction—whether the adoption of state-led integration schemes intended to increase such interaction, or of measures to ensure stability where there is market-led integration—but also to issues of peace and security. Regional organizations can foster 'security communities' (transnational communities in which peoples have dependable expectations of peaceful change) by promoting cooperation, establishing norms of behaviour, and serving as sites of socialization and learning (Adler and Barnett 1998).

A third theme may be summed up as the 'management of **internationalization**'—the interrelationship between regional arrangements and the rest of the world. The debate about the implications of regionalism for multilateral processes of liberalization was termed the 'building-blocks-or-stumbling-blocks' question by Bhagwati (1991). Proponents of regionalism as building blocks argue that (1) such arrangements promote internal and international dynamics that enhance the prospects for **multilateralism**; (2) regionalism can have important demonstration effects in accustoming actors to the effects of liberalization; (3) increased numbers of regional arrangements can help

erode opposition to multilateral liberalization because sectoral vested interests will enjoy less and less protection with each new preferential arrangement; (4) regional agreements are often more to do with strategic or political alliances than trade liberalization; and (5) regionalism has more positive than negative political effects.

Opponents of regionalism are concerned that (1) the net result of preferential regional agreements may be trade diversion; (2) there may be 'attention diversion', with participating countries losing interest in the multilateral system, or simply an absorption of available negotiating resources; (3) competing arrangements may lock in incompatible regulatory structures and standards; (4) the creation of multiple legal frameworks and dispute settlement mechanisms may weaken discipline and efficiency; and (5) regionalism may contribute to international frictions among competing blocs (Bergsten 1997; World Bank 2005).

This final concern overlaps with a fourth, more geopolitical, dimension of regionalism that has been resurgent in recent years: major powers' promotion of regional frameworks to pursue spheres of interest or influence. The prolonged stalemate in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations has not only seen continued growth in the number of regional free trade agreements (FTAs); it has also been accompanied by a new trend towards 'mega-FTAs' that cut across geographical regions. Some see this as offering a new pattern of plurilateral governance of world trade that may still contribute to multilateralization. At the same time, these new frameworks may also be seen as a new form of organizing rivalries among global powers. In fact, developments such as the UK's proposed withdrawal from the European Union and the Trump administration's opposition to regional trade agreements in North America and the Asia-Pacific (**see Box 23.3**, **'Regionalism in the Americas', and 'Regionalism in Asia'**) can be seen as evidence of a trend towards states seeking to 'go it alone' rather than work through regional arrangements with their neighbours.

Key Points

- Regional cooperation is not an isolated, but rather a global phenomenon, though with a high degree of diversity regarding the drivers, modes, and outcomes of such cooperation.

- Regionalism has various dimensions—economic, social, political, and security—and takes different forms across the world.

- Some regional integration processes are more state-led, while others are more market-led.

- There is a basic difference between cooperation arrangements and integration processes, but both approaches may coexist within a regional system.

Regional cooperation in a global context

Regionalism in the Americas

The American continent has been characterized by multiple, and often competing, levels of regionalism. Latin American regionalism has developed against the background of the conflictual consolidation of current states, in which national sovereignty became a dominant feature of actorhood, and a love–hate relationship with the US (**see Case Study 23.1**). There has been partial acceptance of a continental identity as 'America', but also a widespread perception of an identity as 'Latin America', often in opposition to the US.

Hemispheric regionalism began with the first Pan-American Conference in Washington in 1889–90. Nine such conferences took place and, after decades of US interventionism, produced several agreements on peace and security in the 1930s and 1940s. The Pan-American Union became the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. An Inter-American System grew up, including the Inter-American Development Bank and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. During the cold war, however, much of the Americas viewed this system with suspicion as an instrument of US foreign policy.

The US policy on regional agreements changed in the mid-1980s. The US began in 1986 to negotiate a free trade agreement with Canada. Negotiations then began between the US, Canada, and Mexico, leading to the establishment in 1994 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA was broader

Case Study 23.1 Central America: a perpetual pursuit of union?

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Central America appears to present a paradox. Despite its few and small countries, with a shared colonial history, a relatively high degree of common identity, and apparently everything to gain from integration, Central America has consistently failed, so far, to achieve the ambitious regional goals it has proclaimed.

Following independence, the Captaincy-General of Guatemala became the Federal Republic of Central America (1823–39), before splitting into Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Restoration of this union has been a constant theme in integrationist discourse. Yet Central America was more a collection of communities than a clearly defined overarching entity. Local elites resisted leadership by Guatemala, and Costa Rica early on showed a tendency to isolationism. Nationalism grew, unionism was undermined by conflict, and outside involvement was often unhelpful. A powerful mythology of regional union thus coexisted with various sources of division.

A Central American Peace Conference in Washington, convened in 1907 to help end local conflicts, produced a short-lived Central American Court of Justice (1908–18). The Organization of Central American States (ODECA) was created in 1951, and the first organizations of functional cooperation emerged around this time. Some 25 such bodies now exist, covering everything from water to electrical energy and creating a complex web of regional interactions. Formal economic integration began in 1960 with the creation of the Central American Common Market

(CACM). Intra-regional trade grew, but the system entered crisis at the end of the 1960s. Efforts at reform in the 1970s were overtaken by political crisis and conflicts. In the 1980s, integration became associated with the Central American peace process, and in this context, a Central American Parliament was created as a forum for regional dialogue. In the early 1990s, as internal conflicts ended, with the cold war over and a new wave of regional integration across the world, a new period began with the establishment of the Central American Integration System (SICA). This aimed to provide a comprehensive approach to integration, with four subsystems—political, economic, social, and cultural. Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic have also become members.

SICA's institutional system is concentrated on presidential summits, while the Central American Parliament is directly elected but has no powers. Costa Rica has not joined. As of 2018, only El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua participated in the Central American Court of Justice. There have been repeated discussions of institutional reform. By 2017, intra-regional trade represented around 31 per cent of exports and 15 per cent of imports (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana 2018). Most goods originating in Central American countries enjoy free circulation within the region. By 2018, a customs union was formally in place between the three countries of the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador). The regional

agenda has increasingly focused on problems of citizen security, while political cooperation was again undermined by the crisis in Nicaragua in 2018. International support for Central American integration is still strong, especially from the EU, but underlying conditions remain challenging. The pursuit of union continues.

Question 1: What does this case suggest about the limitations of formal regional bodies in promoting integration?

Question 2: How have political differences affected the process of regional integration and cooperation in Central America?

in scope than most regional free trade agreements. The treaty covered agriculture and was accompanied by supplementary agreements on labour and the environment, although it contained no supranational elements. In October 2018, as US policy changed dramatically under Donald Trump, a new United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed to replace NAFTA, but US ratification seemed uncertain.

A first 'Summit of the Americas' was held in Miami in 1994, with the aim of achieving a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as well as deepening cooperation on drugs, corruption, **terrorism**, hemispheric security, **sustainable development**, and the environment. By the fourth Summit of the Americas in Argentina in 2005, however, the political context of Inter-Americanism had significantly changed.

Latin American regionalism in the post-war decades was shaped by the model of state-led, import-substituting industrialization. To overcome dependence on exports of primary commodities, many governments in the region believed that a combination of industrial protection and planning would make it possible to reduce manufactured imports. Regional integration was a response to the limitations of this approach at the national level. The first wave of such regional integration produced the Central American Common Market (CACM, 1960), the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA, 1961), and the Andean Pact (1969), all of which had limited success.

A second wave of 'new regionalism' began in the 1980s and took off in the 1990s. The Central American Integration System (SICA) was created in 1991. The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) was created in 1991 by Argentina and Brazil, together with Paraguay and Uruguay. A common market was proclaimed in 1994, although there remain exceptions. MERCOSUR has not adopted a supranational institutional system but it has comprised important political dimensions. In its early phases this included mutual support for the consolidation of democracy and the ending of rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.

In 1990, the Andean presidents also re-launched their integration process. A Common External Tariff was announced in 1994. The group was renamed the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) in 1997, with the aim of consolidating a common market by 2005. Its institutional system is modelled on the European Community, with elements of formal **supranationalism**. The 'new' forms of integration in the Americas were seen as fundamentally different, part of broad-based structural reforms aimed at locking in policy commitments in a context of unilateral and multilateral liberalization. It also seemed that there might be a new convergence of hemispheric and Latin American initiatives.

But developments in the 2000s made this prospect seem doubtful. The creation of a 'South American Community of Nations' was announced in 2004, becoming the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. As progress halted towards consolidating a Free Trade Area of the Americas excluding Cuba, a Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was created in 2010 among 33 countries excluding the US and Canada.

For nearly a decade this seemed to be coloured by a 'pink tide' of leftist regimes in the region, as well as by the influence of 'twenty-first-century socialist' Venezuela which, together with Cuba, created a radical Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) in 2004. However, ALBA was weakened by the blow to Venezuelan influence resulting from the drop in global oil prices, and then by the economic, political, and migration crisis that engulfed the country. Venezuela's membership in MERCOSUR was suspended in 2017. This situation also led in 2018 to a severe weakening of UNASUR as a result of its inaction regarding the Venezuelan crisis. Meanwhile, conservative governments took over in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

Renewed moves towards broader and deeper Latin American integration came to be driven less by political radicalism than by common reaction against Trump's protectionism. In 2011, Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Colombia had established a

strongly business-oriented Pacific Alliance. A process of convergence between the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR began in 2014, leading to a joint summit in July 2018 at which the eight presidents confirmed their intention to deepen cooperation and to create a free trade zone among the countries, representing some 90 per cent of Latin American GDP. These shifts also affected the pattern of transcontinental agreements. In 2017, President Trump pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but this was signed in March 2018 by the other 11 countries involved, including Mexico, Peru, and Chile.

Regionalism in Africa

Contemporary regionalism in Africa emerged with the politics of anti-colonialism, but often on the basis of pre-existing colonial arrangements. French West Africa was a federation between 1904 and 1958, and a common currency known as the CFA franc was created in 1945. After several organizational transformations, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo have become members of the present West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).

In Central Africa, a monetary union guaranteed by France and a formal customs union were created in 1964. These were transformed into the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), which took over fully in 1999. This is a monetary union using the CFA franc (now pegged to the euro) with a common monetary policy.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was originally created in 1910. An agreement was signed in 1969 with the independent countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa, with Namibia joining in 1990. This has included a common external tariff and a revenue-sharing mechanism, as well as a Common Monetary Area (except for Botswana) with currencies pegged to the South African rand. A new treaty came into force in 2004.

Colonial Kenya and Uganda formed a customs union in 1917, which Tanzania (then Tanganyika) joined in 1927. After independence, cooperation continued under the East African Common Services Organization. An East African Community was created in 1967, but it collapsed in 1977 as a result of political differences. Following efforts at re-integration in the 1990s, the present East African Community (EAC) was established in 2000. A customs union formally came

into effect in 2005, and a Common Market Protocol came into force in 2010.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of other regional organizations emerged, often cutting across the previous arrangements. With Nigerian leadership, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created in 1975 between the francophone countries that are also members of WAEMU and the anglophone countries of West Africa. A Preferential Trade Area, cutting across eastern and southern Africa, was created in 1981. This was succeeded in 1994 by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which in 2015 had 19 member states stretching from Libya to Madagascar. In 1983, the French Central African countries, together with the members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (created in 1976), as well as São Tomé and Principe, established the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Finally, straddling the continent from Senegal to Eritrea is the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), established in 1998.

Some regional organizations in Africa had particular political aspects to their founding. For example, the aim of the Frontline States (a group of southern African states that opposed South Africa's apartheid regime) to reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa prompted the creation in 1980 of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). This was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, of which post-apartheid South Africa became a member.

Other regional organizations were founded with a particular special mandate that was later extended. For instance, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa was founded in 1986 to deal with drought and desertification, but in 1996 it was given a broader mandate covering conflict prevention and management.

Sub-regional cultural identity has played a particular role in the development of African regional organizations, for example in the case of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which came into being in 1989.

The first stage of pan-African organization was primarily political in nature. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), created in 1963, was dedicated to ending colonialism and achieving political liberation. The continental agenda has subsequently broadened. The 1991 Treaty of Abuja, which came into force in 1994, established the African Economic Community (AEC). In 2002, the OAU and AEC

became the African Union (AU), formally modelled on the European Union. The eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the various organizations mentioned above, are seen as building blocks of the AU and have had some success in functional cooperation. Proposals to reform the AU were adopted in 2017, and an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement was signed by 44 of the AU's 55 members in March 2018. However, many obstacles remain. There is little complementarity in economic structures; formal institutional structures often do not serve their stated functions; and ambitious commitments are not matched by implementation capabilities, while there is weak private sector engagement (Vanheukelom et al. 2016).

Some mechanisms for supranational monitoring have emerged, notably the creation in 2001 of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (to be transformed into the African Union Development Agency (AUDA) by a decision of 2018) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), intended to promote Africa's self-assessment for good governance.

Regional organizations have also become active in conflict management, most notably ECOWAS. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s. ECOWAS deployed missions in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, Liberia in 2003, and Mali in 2013. In addition, an African Union Peace and Security Council was created in 2003. The AU has since deployed missions in Burundi, the Sudan, Somalia, the Comoros, and the Central African Republic.

Regionalism in Asia

Regionalism in Asia has followed quite different patterns, driven by market forces as much as by international security concerns. It has been strongly shaped by relations among major Asian powers as well as by these powers' relations with the United States and Russia.

In the south, rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to limit the prospects of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which also includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Indeed, since 2014 India has sought to reinvigorate an overlapping regional body that does not include Pakistan—the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)—composed of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Most regionalist activity has taken place in the east.

The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 between Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand was motivated less by a sense of common identity than by a realization that failure to prevent conflicts in the region would invite external intervention, which would in turn exacerbate intra-regional tensions. No supranational elements were foreseen. Regional cooperation was to be built by an 'ASEAN Way' based on consultation, consensual decision-making, and flexibility (**see Case Study 23.2**). On the security front, in the context of Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia and the end of the cold war, a succession of proposals culminated in the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This came into effect in 1994, with the aim of pursuing confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and eventually conflict resolution. Other steps were taken in response to the creation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which had been formed in 1989 on the principle of 'open regionalism'. APEC was not to involve any discrimination vis-à-vis other countries. Nor did it reflect any distinctive regional identity so much as 'the desire of the "non-Asian states" of the region to consolidate links with the "open market-oriented economies" of East Asia' (Higgott 1995: 377).

Asian regionalism is thus evolving on two planes. On the one hand, ASEAN has continued to move towards some institutional deepening as a means to preserve its own position (**see Case Study 23.2**), while on the other hand, regional agreements reflect rivalries among the major powers and have cut across ASEAN.

Competition between China and Japan initially shaped discussion of the nature and membership of regional agreements. By the mid-2000s, China was proposing an East Asia Free Trade Agreement based on 'ASEAN + 3' (China, Japan, and South Korea), while Japan preferred a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia based on 'ASEAN + 6' (including China, Japan, and South Korea as well as India, Australia, and New Zealand). The result was the launch of negotiations in 2012 between ASEAN and its FTA partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand) for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The US was not included.

However, the United States came to lead a new trans-Pacific initiative in which China did not participate. In 2008, the US—followed by Australia, Peru, and Vietnam—began talks on the basis of the Trans-Pacific

Case Study 23.2 Regionalism in Southeast Asia—beyond intergovernmentalism?

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Outside Europe, Southeast Asia has been the region that arguably has witnessed the most far-reaching developments in building up cooperative arrangements. ASEAN has a long history going back to the 1960s, but from the mid-1990s there has been a marked push to develop stronger common institutions and agree ambitious aims. In 2003, the ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) agreed to establish three communities for security, socio-cultural, and economic cooperation by 2020. Achievements such as the agreement on visa-free travel within ASEAN are noteworthy, but the most ambitious initiative so far has been the commitment to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the end of 2015. Some advances have been made, these ambitions have also demonstrated the limitations of ASEAN's commitment to consensus and informality. Most observers agree that the member states missed the 2015 deadline and that the project remains a 'work in progress'.

Some of the language of the AEC is reminiscent of the EU's blueprint for a single market—the '1992 programme'. The ASEAN Secretariat has begun to monitor progress via 'scoreboards' of deregulation efforts, approximating the role the European Commission has played in the so-called Open Method of Co-ordination. However, fundamental differences remain: no legally binding instruments are being used in ASEAN, and

consequently there is no judicial system. The monitoring role of the Secretariat also does not involve 'naming and shaming' of laggards, but is limited to communications about aggregate progress towards the AEC's declared aims. Overall, the member states in ASEAN have set up a system which facilitates a high degree of cooperation and common action while at the same time ensuring that each member state's national interests are safeguarded and cannot be overruled by supranational institutions.

Nevertheless, ASEAN has maintained, at least at the symbolic and declaratory level, a high degree of ambition. The ASEAN Charter, adopted at the 2007 summit, formalized further the existing institutional arrangements, set out a number of key **principles**, and included symbols of an 'ASEAN identity' such as an anthem, a flag, a motto, and the designation of 8 August as ASEAN Day.

Overall, there has been a remarkable increase in the aspirations of the Southeast Asian countries to develop closer ties, strengthen their common institutions, and open their markets towards each other. Difficulties in making progress towards such aims are unsurprising, given the high degree of diversity among ASEAN members in terms of size, wealth, and political systems. With regard to the latter, the repression of opposition parties by the military junta in Myanmar had been a constant problem for ASEAN, until the internal reforms leading to free elections and a civilian government in 2015 were seen by ASEAN members as confirmation that their 'soft approach' had succeeded.

Despite these advances, ASEAN's limitations in addressing regional challenges have been evident in the face of crises such as the Rohingya conflict and territorial disputes in the South China Sea—instances in which ASEAN members were unable to act collectively. This mixed picture of remarkable achievements and significant limitations shows that ASEAN has developed its own distinctive model of regional cooperation.

Question 1: To what extent is the emphasis on consensual decision-making in ASEAN compatible with the achievement of its far-reaching objectives?

Question 2: How effective has ASEAN been in responding to challenges from external powers?

Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement concluded by New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei. Negotiations began in 2010 for a new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was finally signed in October 2015 among 12 countries (Brunei, Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, US, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan). Although President Trump withdrew the US from the TPP in January 2017, continuing support from the remaining signatories ensured that the TPP came into force at the end of 2018.

Eurasia and the post-Soviet states

A shifting pattern of regional agreements in Eurasia has resulted from the efforts of former Soviet Union republics to settle down in a zone of cooperation and from competition for influence between Russia, China, and the EU (quite apart from the United States).

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991 among all the former Soviet republics except the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Georgia (which joined in 1993 but

withdrew following the 2008 conflict with Russia). A series of economic agreements with different memberships and names resulted in the establishment in 2015 of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) among Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, based on a customs union and aiming at creation of a single market. A Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992. In 2002 this became the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), comprising Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

The evolution of these regional organizations reflects not only relations between the newly independent states and Russia, the former dominant power, but also relations between Russia and other major powers.

To the east, they must be understood against the background of rivalries between Russia and China, as well as partially shared concerns between those two powers as to the role of the US. The 'Shanghai Five' mechanism was created by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 1996. This was transformed in 2002 (with the participation of Uzbekistan) into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India and Pakistan became full members in 2017, while Iran and Mongolia are observers. In late 2013, China unveiled its Belt and Road Initiative, a massive programme of infrastructure investments crossing Asia and reaching into Europe and Africa that would promote China's regional leadership to its west. Discussion of links between this initiative and the EAEU in the framework of the SCO began in 2014. As tensions rose after 2014 with the US and the EU, President Putin intensified his own efforts to strengthen Russia's role to its east. In June 2016, he called for the establishment of a 'Greater Eurasian Partnership' among the EAEU, China, India, and other countries. This new Eurasian cooperation brought the signature of a free trade agreement between China and the EAEU in May 2018, and saw the participation of Chinese troops in massive military exercises conducted by Russia in September 2018.

To the west, the evolution of sub-regional agreements has occurred in the context of economic and political competition between Russia and the EU, particularly in the 'shared neighbourhood': that is, the six countries which were once part of the former Soviet Union and which now participate in the EU's eastern neighbourhood policy instruments (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia).

The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development was set up in 1997 as a forum for cooperation without Russia, and was consolidated with a new Charter in 2006, bringing together Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (whereas Belarus and Armenia were participating in deeper cooperation with Russia). Russia became increasingly sensitive to the challenges that seemed to be posed by the NATO enlargements in 1999 and 2004 (the latter including three former Soviet republics), NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 despite Russian opposition, and the 2004 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine. Georgia and Ukraine seemed to seek membership of both the EU and NATO, while the deployment of EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Moldova and Georgia reinforced the Russian tendency to conflate NATO and the EU.

The EU launched its Eastern Partnership in 2009 with all six countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia), in the wake of the Russia–Georgia conflict, amid growing Russian criticism. Tensions came to a head in Ukraine in 2013. The EU had offered Ukraine an Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Russia placed high importance on Ukrainian participation in the Eurasian Customs Union, and the two were not compatible. The Ukrainian government had tried to maintain a balancing act between the two sides (also reflecting the cultural and linguistic divisions within Ukraine). Under pressure from both the EU and Russia, in November 2013 Ukraine chose not to sign the agreement with the EU, nor to enter the Eurasian Customs Union. Subsequent events included civil unrest, armed conflict, and Russian annexation of the Crimea.

This situation is far more complex than simple opposition between the EU and Russia, or between 'pro-EU' and 'pro-Russian' elements in Ukraine. It shows how frictions between regional cooperation frameworks may escalate and become distorted in areas of historical sensitivity and international rivalry. Moreover, it illustrates some new dilemmas in European integration. The competition in Ukraine looks uncomfortably like old-fashioned rivalry between power blocs (or even 'alliances') on the European continent. 'One of the noble aims behind the European Community was to supersede inter-state rivalries, not to replicate them at a higher level. Since the end of the cold war, the EU has groped its way towards a security and defence policy, while still maintaining its own international vocation and its own internal reality as a method of transnational governance conceived as an alternative to power politics. The two dimensions do not sit easily together' (Best 2016).

Key Points

- Regionalism in the Americas has developed at multiple levels, with some tension between Inter-Americanism and Latin American integration reflecting mixed attitudes towards the role of the United States.

- An African Union has been established, based on eight Regional Economic Communities that have achieved significant results in functional cooperation, but deep integration remains elusive.

- Asian regionalism has been shaped by security concerns as well as market forces, but it has also been limited by rivalries between Asian powers. It is now being cut across by transcontinental agreements, but these have been weakened by the withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

- The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to new regional arrangements in Eurasia as post-Soviet states evolved in zones of competing influence between Russia and the EU, or between Russia and China. Eurasian cooperation including China became stronger in the context of tensions with the US under President Trump.

The process of European integration

In Europe, regionalism after 1945 has taken the form of a gradual process of integration leading to the emergence of the European Union. In what was initially a purely West European creation born of the desire for reconciliation between France and Germany after the Second World War, agreement among the 'original Six' member states in the 1950s involved conferral of Community competence in various areas—the supranational management of coal and steel production, the creation and regulation of an internal market, and common policies in trade, competition, agriculture, and transport. Over time, powers have been extended to include new legislative competences in fields such as environmental policy and justice and internal security. Since the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, in force from 1993), the integration process has also involved new common policies, notably monetary union, as well as other forms of cooperation such as non-binding coordination in economic and employment policy, and more intergovernmental cooperation in foreign and security policy.

From very limited beginnings, in terms of both membership and scope, the EU has therefore gradually developed to become an important political and economic actor whose presence has had a significant impact, both internationally and domestically. This process of European integration involves developments at multiple levels. The first, quasi-constitutional level is the agreement on the underlying foundations of European integration through the signing and occasional revision of the basic treaties. These are the result of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), where representatives of national governments negotiate the legal framework within which the EU institutions operate. Such treaty changes require ratification in each member state and can be seen as the 'grand bargains' in the evolution of the EU.

Within this framework, EU institutions (**see Table 23.1**) have been given considerable powers to adopt decisions and manage policies, although the dynamics of decision-making differ significantly across various issue-areas. Important differences exist between the more integrated aspects of economic regulation and the more 'intergovernmental' areas such as foreign and defence policy and internal security cooperation. In some cases, depending on the decision-making procedure laid out in the treaty, a country may have to accept potentially being overruled by majority decisions taken among the member states in agreement with the European Parliament. In other areas, unanimity is required, giving each state the power to block decisions.

Recognizing the role played both by member states and by supranational institutions is essential to understanding the nature of European integration. Furthermore, it should be noted that member states are not just represented by national governments, since a host of state, non-state, and **transnational actors** also participate in the processes of domestic preference formation or direct representation of interests in Brussels. The relative openness of the European policy process means that political groups or economic interests will try to influence EU decision-making if they feel that their position is not sufficiently represented by national governments. This is one reason why the EU, initially an intergovernmental agreement among states, is increasingly seen as a system of multilevel governance, involving a plurality of actors on different territorial levels: supranational, national, and sub-state.

The prospect of an ever wider European Union has raised serious questions about the nature and direction of the integration process. The 2004/2007 enlargements, bringing in 12 Central, East, and South European

Table 23.1 Institutions of the EU

EU institution	Responsibilities	Location
European Parliament (EP)	Directly elected representatives of EU citizens, scrutinizing the operation of the other institutions, and, in many areas, sharing with the Council of the EU the power to adopt EU legislation	Strasbourg (plenary sessions); Brussels (MEP offices, committee meetings, and some plenary sessions); Luxembourg (administration)
European Council	Regular summits of the leaders of the member states and the Commission, chaired by an elected president, setting the EU's broad agenda and a forum of last resort to find agreement on divisive issues (NB: distinct from the Council of Europe)	Brussels
Council of the EU	Representing the views of national governments and adopting, in many areas jointly with the EP, the ultimate shape of EU legislation	Brussels (some meetings in Luxembourg)
European Commission	Initiating, administering, and overseeing the implementation of EU policies and legislation	Brussels and Luxembourg
Court of Justice of the EU	The EU's highest court, supported by a General Court: main competences include actions for annulment of EU acts, infringement procedures against member states for failing to comply with obligations, and preliminary rulings on the validity or interpretation of EU law on request from national courts	Luxembourg
European Central Bank	Central bank responsible for setting the interest rates and controlling the money supply of the single European currency, the euro	Frankfurt am Main
Court of Auditors	The EU's audit office, responsible for auditing revenues and expenditure under the EU budget	Luxembourg

countries as new members, have generally been seen as a qualitative leap for the EU, which has been further enhanced by the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

Despite these far-reaching reforms, the EU has subsequently confronted a series of crises that have challenged its institutional framework and exposed limitations in the political will of governments and populations to support deeper integration. In addition to the security situation around Ukraine mentioned above, four particular challenges are worth noting. First, the eurozone group of countries that have adopted the euro as a single currency—a subset of 19 EU member states—has been suffering since 2009 with the calamitous prospect of sovereign debt default of several of its members. Countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece faced serious economic

problems in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and required significant financial assistance to prevent them from defaulting and causing even greater problems for the financial system in Europe. In a situation in which the EU itself had neither the legal authority nor the financial means to assist, these bailouts had to be arranged through complex new mechanisms involving other eurozone members as well as the IMF. With the immediate danger of default averted, the more long-term response to the crisis has also involved new powers for banking supervision through the European Central Bank, greater oversight of national budgets, and the creation of a new investment plan by the European Commission. The eurozone crisis exposed the risks inherent in the decision taken in the Maastricht Treaty to unify monetary policy without corresponding integration of national fiscal

policy. Hostile public reactions to the way the crisis was managed resulted in large-scale protests and the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties in both creditor and debtor countries. This has demonstrated a lack of transnational solidarity that many consider essential to legitimize significant fiscal transfers and supranational oversight of reforms.

A second crisis confronting the EU has been the refugee crisis beginning in 2015. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing civil war in Syria and Afghanistan have headed through Turkey and the Balkans for the safety of Western Europe. Even though Europe had been the destination of migrants arriving across the Mediterranean for many years, European states were both logistically and politically unprepared for the sudden increase in numbers. The response has been the re-introduction of national border controls and the temporary suspension of key parts of the European asylum regime, raising serious questions about the future of open borders and free movement inside the Schengen area comprising the majority of EU member states.

Third, tensions in relations between the United Kingdom and the EU came to a head in 2016 when Prime Minister David Cameron called a referendum in the UK resulting in a majority vote in favour of leaving the EU. For an organization that had gone through several rounds of enlargement but never witnessed the withdrawal of a member state, this development not only came as a shock but also had wide-ranging political and economic implications (**see Box 23.3**).

Finally, the EU has also had to deal with a growing threat to liberal values that are, for some, at the heart of the European project. Governments in Hungary and Poland, government parties in Austria (FPÖ) and Italy (La Lega), and important political movements in other member states have not only intensified their attacks on the European Union and its 'interference' in the domestic affairs of individual states, but also championed a populist assault on civil rights in the name of advancing 'illiberal democracy'. While EU institutions have responded to these developments both politically and judicially, a decisive response was hampered by the need for consensus in the Council in which these very governments are also represented.

The confluence of these crises from the mid-2010s onwards constituted a 'perfect storm' for the European

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Box 23.3 'Brexit'—the UK votes to leave the European Union

On 23 June 2016, the British electorate voted with a 51.9 per cent majority to leave the European Union. In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron had promised an 'in/out referendum' on the UK's membership of the EU in response to the deep divisions in his own Conservative Party on the European issue and the rise of the single-issue UK Independence Party, which had long campaigned for the UK to leave the EU. When the Conservatives won the 2015 elections to the House of Commons, the question of when and how this referendum would be held quickly rose to the top of the British government's agenda. Cameron engaged with his European partners in an attempt at re-negotiating the relationship between the UK and the EU, but the number of limited concessions agreed as part of a 'deal' in February 2016 hardly featured in the subsequent campaign.

Advocates of leaving the EU focused largely on three issues: the cost of EU membership to the British taxpayer, migration from other EU countries to the UK, and the more diffuse sense of Britain having lost its sovereignty (or independence, or control over its destiny) due to membership in the EU. Those wanting Britain to remain in turn emphasized the economic risks that would come with leaving the EU: less trade with the UK's largest export market, reduced growth, and rising unemployment. Those concerns were confirmed almost instantly after the 'Leave' vote when the British pound lost some 10 per cent against the dollar, and stock markets around the world fell significantly.

Article 50 of the EU Treaty lays down the procedures for negotiating exit from the EU, including a two-year time limit within which complex legal and institutional issues need to be resolved. After the popular vote, British leaders first hesitated to 'trigger' this official process, which led to prolonged uncertainty about the shape of post-Brexit arrangements, and once the notice had been submitted to Brussels, progress in the negotiations was sluggish. The process was characterized by a stark difference in positions across the English Channel. Whereas the remaining EU member states (the so-called EU27) demonstrated a remarkable unity in defending their common interests, there were persistent divisions in the British cabinet, in the governing Conservative Party, in the UK Parliament, and in the population in general—divisions which became more stark as the end of the two-year deadline approached. Even after an agreement on the terms of the withdrawal and a political declaration on the aims for future cooperation was reached between the British government and the European Union, Prime Minister Theresa May was unable to gain support for the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK Parliament in time for the envisaged 'Brexit day' of 29 March 2019, forcing an extension of the UK's EU membership until 31 October 2019. This delay (and a further one until the end of January 2020) had the ironic effect that the UK was after all obliged to participate in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019, and more broadly demonstrated the serious challenges a member state faces—politically, economically, and culturally—when seeking to leave the European Union.

Union and it has prompted some observers to openly discuss the prospect of regional disintegration in Europe. These events have demonstrated clearly the limitations of what has been a largely elite-driven process of institutional integration and have shown the potential for centrifugal forces to undo past advances in integration. However, the EU not only survived these crises intact, but in some ways was actually energized to further expand the scope of common policies (e.g. establishment of a banking union and a fiscal surveillance mechanism) and to strengthen EU institutions (e.g. creation of a European Border and Coast Guard and a European Defence Fund). The EU also demonstrated remarkable unity of purpose in the context of Brexit, vis-à-vis Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea, and in dealing with the threat of a trade war with the United States. As a matter of fact, by the time of the European Parliament elections in the spring of 2019, regular surveys of public opinion recorded rising support for the European Union across most member states.

> ### Key Points
>
> - The process of integration in post-war Europe was launched in the context of long debates about the creation of a federal system, but ultimately the choice was made in favour of a gradual path towards an 'ever closer union'.
> - Integration has proceeded by conferring competence for many economic sectors to supranational institutions that can take decisions that are binding on the member states.
> - Over time, more politically sensitive areas, such as monetary policy and internal and external security, have also become the domain of the European Union.
> - Successive reforms of the EU treaties have sought to maintain and enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of a Union that has grown to 28 member states, the latest being the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009.
> - Since 2009, the EU has had to confront a number of existential crises that challenged the viability of existing institutional arrangements and raised questions about the limited popular support for further integration, yet also saw the deepening and strengthening of certain aspects of European integration.

Conclusion

Three observations can conclude this overview of the development of mechanisms of regional cooperation and integration. First, regionalism is a truly global phenomenon. It is not the case that the entire world is engulfed in a single process of globalization, or that the world is being divided along simple ideological or civilizational fault-lines. Rather, different parts of the globe are looking for different ways to accommodate themselves in the globalized world order, and regional arrangements are one important way of doing so. There is thus no paradox, and even less a contradiction, between regionalism and globalization. Instead, regionalism is one aspect of the process of globalization, and developments in one region inform and affect developments in others. Second, within the global trend towards regionalism there are important differences in the types of organizations that are being

set up, ranging from rather loose and non-binding agreements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to the complex institutional architecture set up by the European Union, depending on the scope and depth with which members are seeking to address issues of transnational governance. Third, there is no single or simple path of regionalism. The ways in which different regional mechanisms develop are contingent on a multitude of factors, both internal and external to the region. Both the driving forces for more regional integration and cooperation, and the obstacles that may limit those aspirations, vary across the different continents. Even as multilateralism in global politics is being challenged, regionalism remains as a global phenomenon, but so do the differences among the kinds of regional arrangements that are being developed in different parts of the globe.

Questions

1. What have been the driving forces behind processes of regional integration and cooperation?
2. What is the relative weight of economic and political factors in explaining the emergence of regional institutions?
3. How have the dynamics of regionalism changed since the 1990s?

4. What role can regional organizations play in maintaining peace and security?
5. What impact have processes of regional integration and cooperation had on the Westphalian state?
6. Compare and contrast European integration with the process of regional cooperation in at least one other continent.
7. What are the main differences between supranationalist and intergovernmentalist approaches to the study of the European Union?
8. How important has the legal dimension been to the evolution of the European Union?
9. What role do supranational institutions play in the European policy process?
10. Has the European Union been able to respond effectively to the changed circumstances of global politics?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Börzel, T., and Risse, T. (eds) (2016), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive guide to regional orders, providing comparative analysis of the sectoral and institutional aspects of regional governance arrangements across the globe.

Christiansen, T., **Jørgensen, K. K., and Wiener, A.** (eds) (2001), *The Social Construction of Europe* (London: Sage). Applies insights from social constructivism to discuss different aspects of European integration and also includes critiques of this approach.

De Lombaerde, P. (ed.) (2006), *Assessment and Measurement of Regional Integration* (London and New York: Routledge). An informative and innovative collection that employs different perspectives to consider the challenge of evaluating the actual impact of regional arrangements.

Fioramonti, L. (ed.) (2012), *Regionalism in a Changing World: Comparative Perspectives in the New Global Order* (London: Routledge). A recent set of theoretical as well as regional perspectives.

Hix, S., and Høyland, B. (2011), *The Political System of the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). This advanced textbook approaches European regionalism from a comparative politics angle, looking in detail at executive, legislative, and judicial politics as well as at developments in various policy areas.

Tavares, R. (2010), *Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations* (London and New York: Routledge). An overview and comparative evaluation of the experience of regional organizations across the world in maintaining peace and security.

Telò, M. (ed.) (2016), *European Union and New Regionalism: Competing Regionalism and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era*, 3rd edn (Abingdon: Routledge). Offers a good set of theoretical perspectives on regionalism in the global context, as well as examining alternative models of cooperation and the role of the EU as an international actor.

Wallace, H., **Pollack, M., and Young, A.** (eds) (2015), *Policy-making in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A wide-ranging textbook that covers all major policies and also examines ways of studying the institutional setting and the dynamics of governance in the EU.

World Bank (2005), *Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank). A thorough discussion of regionalism from an economic perspective, looking both at the rationales and the results of regional arrangements around the world, as well as their implications for multilateralism.

Journals in the field of regional cooperation

Asia Europe Journal Journal published by the Asia-Europe Foundation in Singapore, publishing articles by both academics and practitioners on relations between the European Union and Asia. Editor: Yeo Lay Hwee and Ulrich Volz (https://link.springer.com/journal/10308)

Journal of Common Market Studies The first journal devoted to interdisciplinary research on regional cooperation in Europe, with occasional articles also on other parts of the world. Editors: Toni Haastrup and Richard Whitman (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-5965)

Journal of European Integration An interdisciplinary journal publishing articles on various aspects of the integration process in Europe. Editors: Thomas Christiansen, Olivier Costa, Mai'a Cross, and Ana Juncos (http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/geui20/current)

Journal of European Public Policy A leading journal focused mainly on public policy-making and public administration in the context of the European Union. Editors: Jeremy Richardson and Berthold Rittberger (http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rjpp20/current)

Websites

http://www.cris.unu.edu United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies. This is the most comprehensive reference site on regionalism.
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en The central website of the European Union, providing links to all EU institutions, bodies, and agencies, as well as access to news, publications, official documents, and social media accounts.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Part Five

International issues

In this final part of the book we want to give you an overview of the main issues in contemporary world politics. The previous four parts have been designed to give you a comprehensive foundation for the study of contemporary international issues. As with the other sections, this one also has two aims.

Our first aim is to give you an understanding of some of the more important problems that appear every day in the media headlines and that, directly and indirectly, affect the lives of each of us. These issues are the stuff of globalization, and they take a number of different forms. Some, such as the environment and nuclear proliferation, pose dangers of global catastrophe. Others, such as nationalism and humanitarian intervention, raise important questions and dilemmas about the twin processes of fragmentation and unification that characterize the world in which we live. Yet other issues, such as refugees and forced migration, terrorism, global trade and global finance, human rights, human security, poverty, development, and hunger, are fundamentally intertwined with globalization.

Our second aim, of course, is that by providing overviews of these issues we are posing questions about the nature of globalization. Is it new? Is it beneficial? Is it unavoidable? Does it serve specific interests? Does it make it more or less easy to deal with the problems covered in this part of the book? The picture that emerges from these chapters is that the process of globalization is a highly complex one, and there are major disagreements about its significance and its impact. Some contributors see opportunities for greater cooperation because of globalization, while others see dangers of increased levels of conflict in the early twenty-first century. What do you think?

Environmental issues

JOHN VOGLER

Framing Questions

- **Must globalization and development come at the expense of the physical environment?**

- **Can state governments cooperate to protect the planet?**

- **Is climate justice possible?**

Reader's Guide

As environmental problems transcend national boundaries they become a feature of international politics. This chapter indicates that environmental issues have become increasingly prominent on the international agenda over the last 50 years, assisted by the effects of globalization. It shows how this has prompted attempts to arrange cooperation among states, and it surveys the form and function of such activity with reference to some of the main international environmental regimes. Because climate change has become a problem of such enormous significance, a separate section is devoted to the efforts to create an international climate regime. This is followed by a brief consideration of how some of the theoretical parts of this book relate to international environmental politics.

Introduction

Although humankind as a whole now appears to be living well above the earth's carrying capacity, the **ecological footprints** of individual states vary to an extraordinary extent. See, for example, the unusual map of the world (**see Fig. 24.1**), where the size of countries is proportionate to their carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, if everyone were to enjoy the current lifestyle of those in the developed countries, more than three additional planets would be required.

This situation is rendered all the more unsustainable by the process of **globalization**, even though the precise relationship between environmental degradation and the over-use of resources is complex and sometimes contradictory. Globalization has stimulated the relocation of industry, population movement away from the land, and ever rising levels of consumption, along with associated emissions of effluents and waste gases. While ever freer trade often generates greater income for poorer countries exporting basic goods to developed country markets, it can also have adverse environmental consequences by disrupting local ecologies and livelihoods.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that globalization has stimulated a 'race to the bottom' in environmental standards, and it has even been argued that increasing levels of affluence have brought about local

environmental improvements, just as birth rates tend to fall as populations become wealthier. Economists claim that globalization's opening up of markets can increase efficiency and reduce pollution, provided that the environmental and social damage associated with production of a good is properly factored into its market price. Similarly, globalization has promoted the sharing of knowledge and the influential presence of **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs) in global environmental politics. But whatever the ecological balance sheet of globalization, the resources on which human beings depend for survival—such as fresh water, a clean atmosphere, and a stable climate—are now under serious threat.

Global problems may need global solutions and pose a fundamental requirement for **global environmental governance**, yet local or regional action remains a vital aspect of responses to many problems; one of the defining characteristics of environmental politics is the awareness of such interconnections and of the need to 'think globally—act locally'. NGOs have been very active in this respect (**see Ch. 22**). Despite the global dimensions of environmental change, an effective response still depends on a fragmented international political system of over 190 sovereign **states**. Global

Figure 24.1 Map of world in proportion to carbon dioxide emissions (World Bank Data 2015)
Source: © Copyright: www.worldmapper.org

environmental governance consequently involves bringing to bear inter-state relations, international law, and international organizations in addressing shared environmental problems. Using the term 'governance'—as distinct from government—implies that regulation and control have to be exercised in the absence of central government, delivering the kinds of service that a world government would provide if it were to exist.

Environmental issues on the international agenda: a brief history

Box 24.1 gives a chronology of events in the development of an international environmental agenda. Before the era of globalization there were two traditional environmental concerns: conservation of natural resources and the damage caused by pollution. Neither pollution nor wildlife respect international boundaries, and action to mitigate or conserve sometimes had to involve more than one state. There were also some (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to regulate exploitation of maritime resources lying beyond national jurisdiction, including several multilateral fisheries commissions and the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.

Post-Second World War global economic recovery brought with it evidence of new pollution, leading to international agreements in the 1950s and 1960s covering such matters as discharges from oil tankers. This was, however, hardly the stuff of great power politics. Such 'apolitical' matters were the domain of new United Nations specialized agencies, for example the Food and Agriculture Organization, but were hardly central to diplomacy at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

However, in 1968 the UNGA agreed to convene what became the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 'to focus governments' attention and public opinion on the importance and urgency of the question'. This conference led to the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the establishment of environment departments by many governments. Yet it was already clear that, for the countries of the Global South—constituting the majority in the UNGA—environmental questions could not be separated from their demands for development, aid, and the restructuring of international economic relations. This provided the political basis for the concept of sustainable development (**see Box 24.2**; **also see Ch. 26**). Before the Brundtland Commission formulated this concept in 1987 (WCED 1987), the environment had been edged off the international agenda by the global economic downturn of the 1970s and then by the onset of the second cold war (**see Ch. 3**).

Since the 1970s new forms of transnational pollution such as 'acid rain' had been causing concern alongside dawning scientific realization that some environmental problems—the thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer and the possibility of climate change—were truly global in scale. The relaxation of East–West tension created the opportunity for a second great UN conference in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Its title, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), reflected the idea of sustainable development and an accommodation between the environmental concerns of developed states and the economic demands of the Global South. The 1992 UNCED or 'Earth Summit' was at the time the largest international conference ever held. It raised the profile of the environment as an international issue, while providing a platform for *Agenda 21* (a substantial document issued by the conference), international conventions on climate change, and the preservation of biodiversity. The most serious arguments at UNCED were over aid pledges to finance the environmental improvements under discussion. On UNCED's tenth anniversary in 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) met at Johannesburg. The change of wording indicated how conceptions of environment and development had shifted since the 1970s. Now discussion was embedded in recognition of the importance of globalization and of the dire state of the African continent. The eradication of poverty was clearly emphasized, along with practical progress in providing clean water, sanitation, and agricultural improvements. Ten years later, and in the shadow of a major downturn in the global economy, Rio + 20 met in Brazil. It attracted little public attention, but it did resolve to set 'sustainable development goals for the future' (SDGs).

While these UN conferences marked the stages by which the environment entered the international political mainstream, they also reflected underlying changes in the scope and perception of environmental problems. As scientific understanding expanded, it was becoming commonplace, by the 1980s, to speak in terms of global environmental change, as most graphically represented

Box 24.1 Chronology of events in international environmental involvement

1946	International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
1956	UK Clean Air Act to combat 'smog' in British cities
1958	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
1959	Antarctic Treaty
1962	Rachel Carson publishes *Silent Spring*
1967	Torrey Canyon oil tanker disaster
1969	Greenpeace founded
1971	At the Founex Meeting in Switzerland, Southern experts formulate a link between environment and development
1972	United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm
	Establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
1973	MARPOL Convention on oil pollution from ships
	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
1979	Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP)
1980	Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
1982	UN Law of the Sea Convention (enters into force in 1994)
1984	Bhopal chemical plant disaster
1985	Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
	Antarctic 'ozone hole' confirmed
1986	Chernobyl nuclear disaster
1987	Brundtland Commission Report
	Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
1988	Establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
1989	Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes
1991	Madrid Protocol (to the Antarctic Treaty) on Environmental Protection
1992	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held at Rio de Janeiro; publication of the Rio Declaration and *Agenda 21*; United Nations Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Biological Diversity (CBD) both signed
1995	World Trade Organization (WTO) founded
1997	Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
1998	Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides (PIC, prior informed consent)
	Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
2000	Cartagena Protocol to the CBD on Biosafety
	Millennium Development Goals set out
2001	US President George W. Bush revokes signature of the Kyoto Protocol
	Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Johannesburg
2005	Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and introduction of the first international emissions trading system by the European Union
2009	Copenhagen climate Conference of the Parties (COP) fails to provide a new international agreement
2010	Nagoya Protocol to the CBD on access and benefit sharing
2011	Durban climate COP aims to produce a new agreement by 2015
2012	Rio + 20 Conference
2013	Minimata Convention on mercury
2014	IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
2015	Paris Agreement at UNFCCC COP21
	UNGA adopts Sustainable Development Goals
2018	IPCC 1.5°C Report
	UNFCCC COP24 agrees 'rulebook' to implement the Paris Agreement

Box 24.2 Sustainable development

Over 50 separate definitions of sustainable development have been counted. The 1987 Brundtland Commission Report provided its classic statement:

> Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
>
> *(Brundtland et al. 1987: 43)*

Behind it lay an explicit recognition of limitations to future growth that were social, technological, and environmental. In addressing them, emphasis was placed on needs, and the highest priority was given to the needs experienced by the world's poor. Central to the concept was the idea of fairness between generations as well as between the rich and poor currently inhabiting the planet.

By the time of the 2002 World Summit the concept had been subtly altered:

> to ensure a balance between economic development, social development and environmental protection as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development.
>
> *(UNGA, A/57/532/add.1, 12 December 2002)*

Ensuring environmental sustainability, by integrating sustainable development principles into national decision-making, was the seventh of eight UN Millennium Development Goals agreed in 2000. By 2015, these had been replaced by a comprehensive set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals that integrate poverty reduction, development, gender equality, and environmental goals to be achieved by 2030 (UN 2017*b*).

destruction of nature, exemplified by Rachel Carson's influential book *Silent Spring* (1962). There was also a long series of marine oil spills and industrial accidents, which caused popular alarm. The failure of established political parties to embrace these issues effectively encouraged the birth of several new high-profile NGOs—Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the World Wide Fund for Nature/World Wildlife Fund—alongside more established pressure groups such as the US Sierra Club and the British Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. In the developed world, public attention waxed and waned, reviving in the early years of the twenty-first century as the spectre of climate change appeared. More recently, public attention has shifted to the rapid increase of plastic and microplastic waste in the oceans, with dire consequences for marine wildlife. Here, as elsewhere, there were calls for international action and effective environmental governance, but what exactly does this entail? The next section addresses this question by reviewing the functions of international environmental cooperation.

Key Points

- In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, international environmental politics was strictly limited, but from around 1960 its scope expanded as environmental problems acquired a transnational and then a global dimension.
- The process was reflected in and stimulated by conference diplomacy at the UN.
- These UN conferences made the connection between the international environmental and development agendas, as expressed in the important concept of sustainable development.
- Scientific investigation reveals extensive interconnections between what were once seen as separate aspects of the global ecosystem and its biodiversity and the need for appropriate governance.

by the discovery of the 'ozone hole' and the creeping realization that human activities might be endangering the global climate. Alongside actual environmental degradation and advances in scientific knowledge, the international politics of the environment has responded to the issue-attention cycle in developed countries and the emergence of green political movements. They were fed by public reactions to what was seen as the industrial

The functions of international environmental cooperation

International cooperation establishes governance regimes to regulate transboundary environmental problems and sustain the global commons. International environmental cooperation may be regarded as part of a wider liberal approach to global reform (**see Ch. 6**).

As realists (**see Ch. 8**) would assert, the pursuit of **power**, status, and wealth is rarely absent from international deliberations. Discussions of international environmental cooperation often neglect this, even

though many of the great international gatherings, and even some of the more mundane ones, clearly reflect struggles for national and organizational advantage. Organizations seek to maintain their financial and staff resources as well as their places within the UN system. For example, despite extensive debates over granting UNEP the higher and more autonomous status of a UN specialized agency, it remains a mere programme. Some suspect that much of the activity at international

environmental meetings is simply to issue declarations to persuade domestic publics that something is being done, even if environmental conditions continue to deteriorate.

Transboundary trade and pollution control

When animals, fish, water, or pollution cross national frontiers, the need for international cooperation arises; the regulation of transboundary environmental problems is the longest-established function of international cooperation, reflected in hundreds of multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements providing for joint efforts to manage resources and control pollution. Prominent examples of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) include the 1979 Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and its various protocols and conventions governing such things as the cross-border movement of hazardous waste and chemicals.

Controlling, taxing, and even promoting trade has always been one of the more important functions of the state, and trade restrictions can also be used as an instrument for nature conservation, as in the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The use of trade penalties and restrictions by MEAs has been a vexing issue when the objective of environmental protection has conflicted with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (**see Box 24.3 and Ch. 27**). Such a problem arose when the international community attempted to address the controversial question of the new biotechnology and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) by developing the 2000 Cartagena Protocol to the UN Convention on Biodiversity. Opponents argued that measures to regulate the movement of GMOs were an attempt to disguise protectionism rather than to safeguard the environment and human health. Whether the WTO trade rules should take precedence over the emerging biosafety rules was debated at length until the parties agreed to avoid the issue by providing that the two sets of rules should be 'mutually supportive'. The background to such arguments is a wider debate about the relationship between trade and the environment.

Norm creation

Over the last 30 years, the development of international environmental law and associated norms of acceptable behaviour has been both rapid and innovative. Some of these norms are in the form of quite technical

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Box 24.3 Trade and the environment

The issue of the relationship between trade and environmental degradation is much broader than disputes over the relationship between the WTO and particular multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Globalization is partly shaped by the efforts of the WTO to open protected markets and expand world trade. Many green activists argue that trade itself damages the environment by destroying local sustainable agriculture and by encouraging the environmentally damaging long-range transport of goods. The rearrangement of patterns of production and consumption has indeed been one of the hallmarks of globalization. Liberal economists and WTO advocates claim that if the 'externalities', such as the pollution caused, can be factored into the price of a product, then trade can be beneficial to the environment through allowing the most efficient allocation of resources. In this view, using trade restrictions as a weapon to promote good environmental behaviour would be unacceptable—and, indeed, the rules of the WTO allow only very limited restrictions to trade on environmental grounds (GATT Article XXg), and certainly not on the basis of 'process and production methods'. A number of trade dispute cases have largely confirmed that import controls cannot be used to promote more sustainable or ethical production abroad, including the famous 1991 tuna–dolphin case which upheld Mexican and EC complaints against US measures blocking imports of tuna caught with methods that kill dolphins as by-catch. Developing country governments remain resistant to green trade restrictions as a disguised form of protection for developed world markets.

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policy concepts that have been widely disseminated and adopted as a result of international discussion. For instance, the precautionary principle has gained increasing, but not uncritical, currency. Originally coined by German policy-makers, this principle states that where there is a likelihood of environmental damage, banning an activity should not require full and definitive scientific proof. (This was a critical issue in the discussions on GMOs mentioned above.) Another norm is that governments should give 'prior informed consent' to potentially damaging imports.

The UN Earth Summits were important in establishing environmental norms. The 1972 Stockholm Conference produced its 'Principle 21', which combines sovereignty over national resources with state responsibility for external pollution. This should not be confused with *Agenda 21*, issued by the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, a complex 40-chapter document of some 400 pages that took two years to negotiate in UNCED's Preparatory Committee. *Agenda 21* was frequently derided at first, not least because of its non-binding character, yet this internationally agreed compendium

of environmental 'best practice' subsequently had a wide impact and remains a point of reference supplemented by the SDGs.

Aid and capacity building

Frequent North–South arguments since Rio about the levels of aid and technology transfer that would allow developing countries to achieve sustainable development have been attended by many disappointments and unfulfilled pledges. In 1991, UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank created the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), an international mechanism dedicated to funding environmental projects in developing countries. Most environmental conventions now aim at **capacity building** through arrangements for the transfer of funds, technology, and expertise, because many of their member states simply lack the resources to participate fully in international agreements. Agreement in the UNFCCC has increasingly come to depend on the willingness of wealthy countries to fully fund adaptation activities and to provide compensation for poorer countries facing the most serious effects of climate change.

Scientific understanding

International environmental cooperation relies on shared scientific understanding, as reflected in the form of some important contemporary environmental regimes. An initial 'framework' **convention** signals concern and establishes mechanisms for developing and sharing new scientific data, thereby providing the basis for taking action through a 'control' protocol. Generating and sharing scientific information has long been a function of international cooperation in such public bodies as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Disseminating scientific information on an international basis makes sense, but it needs funding from governments because, except in areas such as pharmaceutical research, the private sector has no incentive to do the work. International environmental regimes usually have standing scientific committees and subsidiary bodies to support their work. Perhaps the greatest international effort to generate new and authoritative scientific knowledge has been in the area of climate change, through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (**see Box 24.4**).

Governing the commons

The global commons are usually understood as areas and resources that do not fall under sovereign jurisdiction—they are not owned by anybody. The high seas and

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> **Box 24.4** The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
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> Set up in 1988 under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) brings together the majority of the world's climate change scientists in three working groups: on climate science, impacts, and economic and social dimensions. They have produced five assessment reports, which are regarded as the authoritative scientific statements on climate change. The reports are carefully and cautiously drafted with the involvement of government representatives, and they represent a consensus view.
>
> The Fifth IPCC review (2013–14) concluded that 'Warming of the climate system is unequivocal and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and oceans have warmed, snow and ice have diminished and greenhouse gases have increased' (IPCC 2013: 4). For the IPCC the 'human influence' on all this change 'is clear' (IPCC 2013: 15).

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the deep ocean floor come into this category (beyond the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone), as does Antarctica (based on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty). Outer space is another highly important common, its use being vital to modern telecommunications, broadcasting, navigation, and surveillance. Finally, there is the global atmosphere.

The commons all have an environmental dimension, as resources but also as 'sinks' that have been increasingly degraded. The fish and whale stocks of the high seas have been relentlessly over-exploited, to the point where some species have been wiped out and long-term protein sources for human beings are imperilled. The ocean environment has been polluted by land-based effluent and oil, and other discharges from ships. International regulation is patchy and often avoids the 50 per cent of the world's oceans that lie beyond sovereign control. In 2018, the process of drafting a new treaty commenced (under the UNCLOS) to provide an overarching regime to protect marine biodiversity 'beyond national jurisdiction'.

It has also been a struggle to maintain the unique wilderness of the Antarctic in the face of increasing pressure from human beings, and even outer space now faces an environmental problem in the form of increasing amounts of orbital debris left by decades of satellite launches. Similarly, the global atmosphere has been degraded in a number of highly threatening ways, through damage to the stratospheric ozone layer and, most importantly, by the enhanced greenhouse effect

Box 24.5 The tragedy of the commons—local and global

Many writers, including Garrett Hardin (1968), who coined the term 'tragedy of the commons', have observed an inherent conflict between individual and collective interest and rationality in the use of property that is held in common. Hardin argued that individual actions in exploiting an 'open access' resource will often bring collective disaster as the pasture, fish stock (common pool), or river (common sink) concerned suffers ecological collapse through over-exploitation. Of course, no problem exists if the 'carrying capacity' of the commons is sufficient for all to take as much as they require, but this is rarely now the case due to the intensity of modern exploitation and production practices. At the same time, recent scientific advances have sharpened humankind's appreciation of the full extent of the damage imposed on the earth's ecosystems. Hardin's solution to the dilemma—enclosure of the commons through privatization or nationalization—has only limited applicability in the case of the global commons, for two main reasons: it is physically or politically impossible to enclose them, and there is no central world government to regulate their use.

now firmly associated with changes to the earth's climate. These developments are often characterized as a 'tragedy of the commons'. Where there is unrestricted access to a resource that is owned by no one, there will be an incentive for individuals to grab as much as they can and, if the resource is finite, there will come a time when it is ruined by over-exploitation as the short-term interests of individual users overwhelm the longer-run collective interest in sustaining the resource (**see Box 24.5**).

Within the jurisdiction of governments it may be possible to solve the problem by turning the common into private property or nationalizing it, but for the global commons such a solution is, by definition, unavailable. Therefore the function of international cooperation in this context is the very necessary one of providing a substitute for world government to ensure that global commons are not misused and subject to tragic collapse. This has been done through creating regimes for the governance of the global commons, which have enjoyed varying degrees of effectiveness. Many of the functions discussed above can be found in the global commons regimes, but their central contribution is a framework of rules to ensure mutual agreement among users about acceptable standards of behaviour and levels of exploitation, consistent with sustaining the ecology of the commons.

Enforcement poses difficult challenges due to the incentives for users to 'free ride' on these arrangements by taking more than a fair share, or refusing to be bound by the collective arrangements. This can potentially destroy regimes because other parties will then see no reason to restrain themselves either. In local commons regimes, inquisitive neighbours might deter rule-breaking; NGOs can perform a similar role at the international level. However, it is very difficult to enforce compliance with an agreement involving sovereign states, even when they have undertaken to comply. This is a fundamental difficulty for international law (**see Ch. 19**), and hardly unique to environmental regimes. Mechanisms have been developed to cope with this problem, but how effective they, and the environmental regimes to which they apply, can be is hard to judge, as this involves determining the extent to which governments are in legal and technical **compliance** with their international obligations. Moreover, it also involves estimating the extent to which a given international regime has actually changed state behaviour. Naturally, the ultimate and most demanding test of the effectiveness of global commons regimes is whether or not the resources or ecologies concerned are sustained or even improved.

For the Antarctic, a remarkably well-developed set of rules, designed to preserve the ecological integrity of this last great wilderness, has been devised in the framework of the 1959 Treaty. The Antarctic regime is a rather exclusive club: the Treaty's 'Consultative Parties' include the states that had originally claimed sovereignty over parts of the area, while new members of the club have to demonstrate their involvement in scientific research on the frozen continent. Antarctic science was crucial to the discovery of a problem that resulted in what is perhaps the best example of effective international action to govern the commons. In 1985, a British Antarctic Survey balloon provided definitive evidence of serious thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer. A diminishing stratospheric ozone layer is a global problem par excellence, because the ozone layer protects the earth and its inhabitants from the damaging effects of the sun's ultraviolet radiation. A framework convention was signed about the issue in 1985, followed in 1987 by the Montreal Protocol, imposing international controls over ozone-depleting chemicals. The further evolution of the ozone layer regime offers the paramount example of how international cooperation can achieve an effective solution to a global environmental problem. The problem's causes were isolated, international

Box 24.6 The Montreal Protocol and stratospheric ozone regime

The thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer arose from a previously unsuspected source—artificial chemicals containing fluorine, chlorine, and bromine—which were involved in chemical reaction with ozone molecules at high altitudes. Most significant were CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons), developed in the 1920s as 'safe' inert industrial gases and which had been blithely produced and used over the next 50 years for a whole variety of purposes, from refrigeration to air-conditioning and as propellants for hairspray. There was no universal agreement on the dangers posed by these chemicals and their production and use continued—except, significantly, when the US Congress decided to ban some non-essential uses in 1978. This meant that the US chemical industry found itself under a costly obligation to find alternatives. As evidence on the problem began to mount, UNEP convened an international conference in Vienna in 1985. It produced a 'framework convention' agreeing that international action might be required and that the parties should continue to communicate and to develop and exchange scientific findings. These proved to be very persuasive, particularly with the added public impetus provided by the dramatic discovery of the Antarctic 'ozone hole'.

Within two years the parties agreed to a protocol under which the production and trading of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances would be progressively phased out. The developed countries achieved this for CFCs by 1996 and Meetings of the Parties have continued to work on the elimination of other substances since that time. There was some initial resistance from European chemical producers, but the US side had a real incentive to ensure international agreement because otherwise its chemical industry would remain at a commercial disadvantage. The other problem faced by the negotiators involved developing countries, which themselves were manufacturing CFC products. They were compensated by a fund, set up in 1990, to finance the provision of alternative non-CFC technologies for the developing world.

The damage to the ozone layer will not be repaired until the latter part of the twenty-first century, given the long atmospheric lifetimes of the chemicals involved. However, human behaviour has been significantly altered to the extent that the scientific subsidiary body of the Montreal Protocol has been able to report a measurable reduction in the atmospheric concentration of CFCs.

support was mobilized, compensatory action was taken to ensure that developing countries participated, and a set of rules and procedures was developed that proved to be effective, at least in reducing the concentration of the offending chemicals in the atmosphere, if not yet in fully restoring the stratospheric ozone layer (**see Box 24.6**).

Key Points

- International environmental meetings serve political objectives alongside environmental aims.
- A key function of international cooperation is transboundary regulation, but attempts at environmental action may conflict with the rules of the world trade regime.
- International action is needed to promote environmental norms, develop scientific understanding, and assist the participation of developing countries.
- International cooperation is necessary to provide governance regimes for the global commons.

Climate change

Unlike the ozone layer problem, scientists have long debated climate change and the enhanced greenhouse effect, but only in the late 1980s did sufficient international consensus emerge to stimulate action. There were still serious disagreements over the likelihood that human-induced changes in mean temperatures were altering the global climate system. The greenhouse effect is essential to life on earth. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere insulate the earth's surface by trapping solar radiation (**see Fig. 24.2**). Before the Industrial Revolution, carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere were around 280 parts per million, and have since grown continuously (to a 2017 figure of

Figure 24.2 Greenhouse gas contributions to global warming
Source: IPCC 2007, 'Radiative Forcing Components': 16. Source data from Solomon, S., et al. (eds). *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Copyright © 2007, IPCC, Published by Cambridge University Press.

405ppm) due to burning of fossil fuels and reductions in some of the 'sinks' for carbon dioxide—notably forests. Methane emissions have also risen as agricultural production has increased. The best predictions of the IPCC are that, if nothing is done to curb intensive fossil fuel emissions, there will be a probable rise in mean temperatures of between 1.5°C and 4°C by 2099 (IPCC 2013: 20). By 2016 mean temperatures had already reached 1°C above the pre-industrial level.

The exact consequences of this are difficult to predict on the basis of current climate modelling, but sea level rises and turbulent weather are generally expected, while catastrophic alterations to the planetary biosphere are possible. According to international consensus, the avoidance of dangerous climate change requires that global mean temperature rises should be held well below 2°C and that limiting it to 1.5°C would be desirable (Paris Agreement: Art.2a). In the first decades of the twenty-first century, unusual weather patterns, storm events, and the melting of polar ice sheets have added increasing public alarm to the fears expressed by the scientific community.

Climate change is really not a 'normal' international environmental problem—it threatens huge changes in living conditions and challenges existing patterns of energy use and security. There is almost no dimension of international relations that it does not actually or potentially affect, and it has already been discussed at **G7** summits and in UN meetings at the highest political levels, although its urgency has sometimes been obscured by the persistent problems of the global economy.

To understand the magnitude of the climate problem, a comparison may be drawn with the stratospheric ozone issue discussed earlier. There are some similarities. CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) are in themselves greenhouse gases and the international legal texts on climate change make it clear that controlling them is the responsibility of the Montreal Protocol. Also, the experience with stratospheric ozone and other recent conventions has clearly influenced efforts to build a climate change regime based on a framework convention followed by a protocol.

The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) envisaged the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and their removal by sinks, hoping that a start could be made by including a commitment from the developed nations to cut their emissions back to 1990 levels by 2000. In a US election year this proved to be impossible, and the parties had to be content with a non-binding declaration that an attempt would be made. There was, however, a binding commitment for parties to draw up national inventories of sources and sinks. As this included the developing nations, many of whom were ill-equipped to fulfil this obligation, funding was also provided for capacity building. The Convention also locked the parties into holding a continuing series of annual conferences—the Conferences of the Parties (**COPs**)—to consider possible actions and review the adequacy of existing commitments, supported by regular inter-sessional meetings of the subsidiary scientific and implementation bodies and working groups. At the second COP in Kyoto in 1997, the parties agreed a 'control' measure—the Kyoto Protocol—involving emissions reductions by developed countries (an average of 5.2 per cent, by 2012) facilitated by 'flexibility mechanisms' including emissions trading.

The problem faced by the framers of the Kyoto Protocol was vastly more complex and demanding than the problem their counterparts at Montreal had confronted so successfully in 1987. Instead of controlling a single set of industrial gases for which substitutes were available, reducing greenhouse gas emissions would involve energy, transport, and agriculture—the fundamentals of life in modern societies. Whether this must involve real sacrifices in living standards and 'impossible' political choices is a tough question for governments, although there are potential economic benefits from cutting emissions through the development of alternative energy technologies.

A second difference from the ozone regime experience was that, despite the IPCC's unprecedented international scientific effort, there was no scientific consensus of the kind that had promoted agreement on CFCs. Disagreements over the significance of human activities and projections of future change have since narrowed dramatically, but there are still those who have an interest in denying or misrepresenting the science, and some nations even calculate that there might be benefits to them from climatic alterations. However, one generalization that can be made with certainty is that it is the developing nations, with limited infrastructure and major populations located at sea level, that are most vulnerable. In recognition of this, and on the understanding that a certain level of warming is now inevitable, international attention began to shift towards the problem of 'adaptation' to the occurring effects of climate change as well as 'mitigation' of its causes. Once again, the comparative simplicity and uniformity of the stratospheric ozone problem is evident—the effects of ozone depletion were spread across

the globe and affected North Europeans as well as those living in the southern hemisphere.

The structural divide between North and South is at the heart of the international politics of climate change as a global environmental problem (**see Chs 10 and 26**). For the Montreal Protocol there was a solution available at an acceptable price, delivered through the Multilateral Ozone Fund. Once again, climate change is different. One of the most significant principles set out in the UNFCCC was that of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (**see Case Study 24.1**). That is to say that, while climate change was the 'common concern' of all, it had been produced as a consequence of the development of the old industrialized nations and it was their responsibility to take the lead in cutting emissions.

The achievement at Kyoto was to bind most of the developed nations to a set of varied emissions cuts. However it was soon undercut by US refusal to participate, leaving the EU to lead the development of the Kyoto system. By 2007, it was clear that an arrangement without both the US and China would never be adequate. In fact it turned out that the Montreal Protocol, by removing CFCs, which were also powerful greenhouse gases, had been five times more effective than the Kyoto Protocol (World Meteorological Organization 2011)! Plans were made to negotiate a new agreement involving all parties in mitigation and adaptation activities. The intention was that this should be finalized at the 2009 Copenhagen COP, and the EU and other developed countries made pledges of future emissions reductions. Hopes were raised by the arrival

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Case Study 24.1 Common but differentiated responsibilities?

Severe fog and haze in the eastern Chinese city of Jiujiang

© humphery / Shutterstock.com

Written into the 1992 UNFCCC was the notion of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. This meant that although all nations had to accept responsibility for the world's changing climate, it was developed (Annex 1) nations that were immediately responsible because they had benefited from the industrialization which was generally regarded as the cause of the excess carbon dioxide emissions that had generated mean temperature increases (**see Fig. 24.1**).

In the 1990s, the US emitted around 25 per cent of the global total but had only 4.5 per cent of the global population. Chinese figures were 14 per cent but with over 20 per cent of the world's population, while the 35 least developed nations emitted less than 1 per cent. Under the Kyoto Protocol the developed countries were expected to make emissions cuts. However, by 2004 it was clear that an effective post-2012 regime would have to involve the fast-growing economies of the Global South because their 'respective capabilities' had changed. In 2011, the CO_2

emissions of six parties were responsible for over 70 per cent of the world total: China 29 per cent, US 16 per cent, EU 11 per cent, India 6 per cent, Russia 5 per cent, and Japan 4 per cent. It is important to remember that negotiation of a new climate agreement has occurred in the context of major structural change in the international system (**see Ch. 5**).

Finding a new basis for an equitable sharing of necessary emissions reductions is fraught with problems. (1) Because GHGs have long and variable atmospheric lifetimes, from 30 up to at least 100 years, past emissions must also be taken into account. Thus developing countries can argue that most of the allowable 'carbon space' has already been taken up by the historic emissions of the old industrialized economies, and that the latter should therefore continue to take the lead in reducing emissions. (2) Per capita emissions still vary widely between Northern and Southern economies. Treating them in the same way cannot be either just or politically acceptable. (3) A major part of current Chinese emissions is the direct result of the transfer of production of goods from the US and Europe. Who, therefore, bears the responsibility?

The 2015 Paris Agreement did not fully resolve these questions, but added the phrase 'in the light of different national circumstances' which indicated that the previous rigid distinction between Annex 1 countries and the rest was breaking down. The obligations placed on developed, developing, and least developed and small island states are subtly differentiated in the text of the agreement.

Question 1: Should the developed countries still make larger relative emissions reduction 'contributions' even if the emerging economies are now emitting the greatest proportion of GHGs?

Question 2: Would it be more just to design a future climate regime on the basis of *per capita* rather than *total* national emissions?

of President Obama and his commitment to climate action by the US, although not to a second period for the Kyoto Protocol.

The Copenhagen experience revealed the extent of international structural change reflected in the emergence of the BASIC group of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China as key players in climate diplomacy. They, along with other developing countries and the Alliance of Small Island States (**see Case Study 24.2**), continued to demand the retention of Kyoto and substantial development aid to assist with mitigation and adaptation. In the shadow of the 2007–8 global financial crisis, developed countries backed away from further commitment to Kyoto and the stalemate was reflected in a weak 'Copenhagen Accord'—which was very far from a new comprehensive and binding climate agreement, but in retrospect contained the seeds of the 2015 Paris Agreement (**see Box 24.7**).

Renewed attempts after Copenhagen to find a basis for a new climate agreement came to fruition in the 2011 Durban Platform. It appeared that the strict division between Annex 1 countries (**see Case Study 24.1**) and the rest of the world's states had begun to dissolve, and

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Box 24.7 The 2015 Paris Agreement

- Aims to limit global temperature increases to 'well below 2°C' and to pursue efforts to keep them under 1.5°C to achieve a peaking of emissions as soon as possible and carbon neutrality by 2050.

- Asks all Parties to publish and improve on their 'nationally determined' emission-reduction 'contributions'.

- Enhances adaptation and loss and damage provision for the victims of climate change.

- Obliges developed countries to provide finance, technology, and capacity building for developing countries.

- Includes a 'global stocktake' every five years (starting in 2023) to measure and stimulate progress.

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that there would now be a comprehensive agreement involving most of the world's governments and supported by a new understanding between China and the US. However, what was finally agreed in Paris at the end of 2015 (COP 21) was very different from the old Kyoto regime because it had an essentially 'bottom-up' character in which countries made 'nationally determined

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Case Study 24.2 The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

Sea water incursion onto Funafuti Atol, the main island of the Tuvalu nation

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A number of key coalitions operate in climate diplomacy, including the Umbrella Group of non-EU developed countries; the Environmental Integrity Group that includes Switzerland, South Korea, and Mexico; and the Group of 77/China which has long attempted to represent the South in global negotiations. Because of the widening differences between its members, the G77/China often fractures into the BASIC countries, the fossil fuel exporters, less developed mainly African countries, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).

AOSIS, set up in 1990, has played a disproportionately large role. Its 44 members may represent only about 5 per cent of world population, but they are driven by an awareness that their national survival is at stake. For members such as Nauru, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, the sea level rise associated with climate change threatens inundation within the foreseeable future. AOSIS is an 'ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice' co-ordinated through the UN missions of its members. It was influential in the initial decision to set up the Kyoto Protocol and has agitated consistently for a 1.5°C rather than a 2°C threshold plus compensatory arrangements for loss and damage caused by climate change. After the Copenhagen COP in 2009, AOSIS was involved with the EU, Australia, and a range of other progressive and less developed countries in setting up the Cartagena Dialogue. This provided a diplomatic basis for the Durban Platform agreed in 2011. At Paris in 2015 the position of small island states received wide international support, resulting in the inclusion of a reference to 1.5°C in the agreement.

Question 1: AOSIS has had an influence on international climate politics disproportionate to the populations of its member states. Which, if any, theories of world politics might explain this?

Question 2: Small island states are already suffering the ravages of climate change. How should they be compensated for disasters not of their making?

contributions' rather than emissions-reduction commitments. The pursuit of climate justice for developing countries also meant that the scale of the Green Climate Fund was highly significant for the success of the new regime, and developed countries made promises of additional money.

By the end of 2015 most countries had published their intended national contributions, which varied widely. It has been calculated that they remain very inadequate and, without further reduction, they would lead to a temperature increase of 3.2°C (Climate Transparency 2018: 6). The Parties to the Paris Agreement then spent

three years in intensive discussion of 'modalities, procedures and guidelines' required to make the Agreement operational. Meanwhile, the Trump administration in the US announced in mid-2017 that it intended to withdraw from the Agreement. It was not joined by other countries, which signalled the degree of international commitment, although both Russia and Turkey had failed to ratify or provide the required nationally determined contributions (**see Opposing Opinions 24.1**).

The critical mechanism, established in Paris, was a review process to encourage Parties to 'ratchet up' their mitigation and adaptation contributions once

Opposing Opinions 24.1 The failure—so far—of the Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) to arrest the rising level of atmospheric greenhouse gases means that a solution must be sought elsewhere

For

Transnational and local, rather than international, actors are the key. Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom (2009) called for 'polycentric governance' where local initiatives and voluntary climate action at all social levels flourish in the absence of a global agreement. For example, over a thousand US mayors have agreed to work on local ways to reduce GHGs, just as the 'Carbon Disclosure Project' has created new incentives for businesses to achieve the same result. The 'carbon divestment' campaign has forced universities and corporations to reconsider investments in fossil fuel industries.

UN conventions have proved more useful for political grandstanding than progress. In the 20 years since it entered into force, the UNFCCC with its multilateral approach has failed to curb GHG emissions. The Convention was structurally flawed in that it avoided treating many of the key drivers of climate change and was prone to political 'grandstanding' and activities that had little to do with its stated purposes.

Funding should support adaptation activities and real human development, not schemes like the Kyoto Protocol. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol did not meet expectations and neither will the Paris Agreement. There should be a concentration on local action to ensure that even the poorest people can have access to low-carbon sustainable energy.

Against

'The Paris Agreement establishes the enduring framework the world needs to solve the climate crisis' (President Obama, December 2015). This represents a near-consensus view among those involved at a high level in climate diplomacy, including the UN secretary-general and the Pope.

Leadership by state governments is essential for success. Only they can leverage the funds that will be required and commit their citizens to taking action to reduce GHGs. Moreover, state governments' key long-term business investment decisions will be influenced by international commitments to reduce the use of fossil fuels, to encourage renewable energy, and perhaps to establish a global carbon price. The UNFCCC and Kyoto may have already stimulated such changes (IPCC 2014). However, as the protestors involved in the Extinction Rebellion movement have forcefully argued, government action has been so inadequate that civil disobedience is now essential to shame them into taking their Paris obligations seriously.

Lack of central monitoring risks climate cheating. A critical issue is the effectiveness of governmental contributions to reductions under the Paris Agreement. In the short time available, the Paris Agreement provides an essential mechanism not only to encourage nations to raise their level of ambition, but also to ensure that when others take action they are not undercut by 'free riders'.

1. Is citizen action to promote divestment in fossil fuels likely to prove a more effective way of avoiding a climate tragedy than long-running discussions between governments?

2. The first 'global stocktake' of the Paris Agreement will come in 2023. Does the record of the UNFCCC suggest that this will be too late to achieve its objectives?

3. Is it possible to detect different theoretical positions underlying the debate about the utility of multilateral climate cooperation?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

the agreement enters into force in 2020. The major G20 economies, which account for nearly 80 per cent of global GHG emissions, would be required to cut these in half by 2030. There are hopeful signs in the continuing fall in the costs of renewable energy, but emissions are still rising and despite their promised 'contributions' many G20 countries are still subsidizing fossil fuels (Climate Transparency 2018: 6). The COP commissioned a special IPCC report on what it would take to stay below the 1.5°C threshold, which gave a stark warning that an urgent reduction in emissions was essential, before 2030, if the world was not to be locked into a future of dangerous temperature increases (IPCC 2018: 16). While Russia, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait refused to 'welcome' this report, the Katowice COP, held at the end of 2018, managed to flesh out the technical rulebook for implementing the Paris Agreement.

Key Points

- Because of its all-embracing nature and its roots in essential human activities, climate change poses an enormous challenge for international cooperation.

- A limited start was made with the Kyoto regime, but this was later undermined by the withdrawal of the US and other major emitters.

- Although the 2009 Copenhagen Conference was a disappointment to climate activists, subsequent meetings mapped out a new universal basis for international climate cooperation.

- The 2015 Paris Agreement involved 'bottom-up' national contributions by all parties, stressing the importance of adaptation and additional funding for developing countries. Its success will depend on the ratcheting up of ambition and the level of national efforts.

The environment and international relations theory

The neglect of environmental issues in traditional and realist IR theorizing is exemplified in Hans J. Morgenthau's famous text, *Politics among Nations* (1955), which mentions the natural environment only as a fixed contextual factor or a constituent of national power.

However, over the last 30 years the academic study of the international relations of the environment has developed through the attempt to understand the circumstances under which effective international cooperation, for example the ozone regime, can occur. (The preceding discussion of climate change shows that this question remains important.) Those, such as Oran Young (1994), who try to explain the record of environmental treaty making tend to adopt a liberal institutionalist stance, stressing as a key motivating factor the joint gains arising from cooperative solutions to the problem of providing public goods such as a clean atmosphere. One important contribution made by scholars of environmental politics reflects the importance of scientific knowledge and the roles of NGOs in this area. Whereas orthodox approaches assume that behaviour is based on the pursuit of power or interest by states, students of international environmental cooperation have noted the independent role played by changes in knowledge (particularly scientific understanding). This cognitive approach is reflected in studies of the ways in which transnationally organized groups of scientists and policy-makers—often referred to as **epistemic communities**—have influenced the development of environmental governance (P. Haas 1990).

Liberal institutionalist analysis makes the important, but often unspoken, assumption that the problem to be solved is how to obtain global governance in a fragmented system of sovereign states. Marxist and Gramscian writers (Paterson 2001; Newell 2012) would reject this formulation (**see Ch. 7**). For them, the **state system** is part of the problem rather than the solution, and the proper object of study is the way in which global **capitalism** reproduces relationships that are profoundly damaging to the environment. The global spread of neoliberal policies accelerates those features of globalization—consumerism, the relocation of production to the South, and the thoughtless squandering of resources—that are driving the global ecological crisis (**see Ch. 27**). Proponents of this view also highlight the state's incapacity to do anything other than assist these processes. It follows that the international

cooperation efforts described here at worst legitimize this state of affairs and at best provide some marginal improvements to the devastation wrought by global capitalism. For example, they would point to how free market concepts are now routinely embedded in discussions of sustainable development and how the WTO rules tend to subordinate attempts to provide environmental regulation of GMOs. This argument is part of a broader debate among political theorists concerning whether the state can ever be 'greened' (Eckersley 2004). The opposing view would be that, within any time frame that is relevant to coping with a threat of the immediacy and magnitude of climate change, international cooperation remains indispensable to providing the global governance necessary to address it, and that we shall simply have to do the best we can with existing state and international organizational structures (Vogler 2005).

The other theoretical connection that must be made is to the pre-eminent concern of orthodox IR—**security** (**see Ch. 15**). This link can be thought of in two ways. First, it is argued that environmental change contributes to the incidence of internal conflict and even inter-state war, even though the causal connections are complex and involve many factors. It is already evident that desertification and the degradation of other vital resources are intimately bound up with cycles of poverty, destitution, and war in Africa. However, if we consider such predicted consequences of climate change as mass migrations of populations across international boundaries and acute scarcity of water and other resources, the outlines of potential future conflicts come into sharper focus. The link between environmental change and armed conflict is essentially an extension of traditional thinking about security,

defined in terms of collective violence and attacks on the state (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994). A more intriguing question is whether the idea of security should now be redefined to encompass environmental threats as well as those stemming from terrorism and war (**see Ch. 15**). The UK Chief Scientist once did this by arguing that climate change represented a more significant threat than terrorism (D. King 2004). As the public becomes more keenly aware of the full magnitude of the climate problem, political discourse begins to 'securitize' the environment—to characterize changes in the environment as a security problem (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1997). Because governments usually prioritize security matters, people wishing to mobilize political attention and resources, and to encourage potentially painful societal adaptation, will be tempted to stretch established definitions of security.

Key Points

- IR scholars have been interested in identifying the conditions under which effective international cooperation can emerge.

- They attach varying importance to different explanatory factors in their analyses of international environmental governance, including crude calculations of the power and interests of key actors such as states; cognitive factors such as shared scientific knowledge; the impact of non-governmental actors; and even the extent to which the system of states is itself part of the problem.

- IR scholars are also interested in the extent to which the environment in general and particular environmental problems are now being seen as security issues in academic, political, and popular discourse.

- There is debate over whether the securitization of the environment is something to be welcomed.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how environmental issues have moved from the margins to an increasingly central place on the international agenda. Climate change is now widely perceived to be at least the equal of any other issue and arguably the most important faced by humankind. The rise to prominence of environmental issues is intimately associated with globalization due to the strain that it places on the earth's carrying capacity in terms of consumption levels, resource depletion, and rising greenhouse gas emissions. Globalization has also facilitated the growth of transnational green

politics and interventions by NGOs to raise public awareness, influence international conferences, and even monitor the implementation of agreements by states.

At every stage, two distinctive aspects of international environmental politics have played a central role. The first is the complex relationship between scientific understanding of the biosphere, politics, and policy, as exemplified by the interplay between the IPCC and the actions of governments building the climate regime. The second is the connection between the environment

and development, which has been expressed in the shifting meanings given to the concept of sustainable development; the acknowledgement of this connection has been a precondition for international action on a whole range of environmental issues. Nowhere is this more evident than in debates about the future direction of the climate regime.

The international response to environmental change has been in the form of attempts to arrange global environmental governance through extensive cooperation among governments. This chapter has given some insight into the range and functions of such activities, which provide a basis on which the international community is attempting to grapple with the climate problem. The academic community has generally followed this enterprise by concentrating on the question of how environmental treaties can be negotiated and sustained. More critical theorists take a different view of the meaning of international cooperation (**see Chs 11 and 12**). Furthermore, the challenges posed to international relations theory by the global environmental predicament will undoubtedly involve the need to think through the connections between security, climate change, and globalization.

Visit our **international relations simulations** and complete the 'Negotiating the Lisbon Protocol' simulation to help develop your negotiation and problem solving skills **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Questions

1. What are the possible connections, both negative and positive, between globalization and environmental change?
2. Why did environmental issues appear on the international agenda and what were the key turning points?
3. How would you interpret the meaning of sustainable development?
4. Can international trade and environmental protection ever be compatible?
5. Why did the framework convention/control protocol prove useful in the cases of stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change?
6. How does the 'tragedy of the commons' analogy help to illustrate the need for governance of the global commons?
7. Describe the 'free rider' problem in relation to reducing global GHG emissions.
8. How does the 2015 Paris climate agreement differ from the Kyoto Protocol?
9. Consider the possible security implications of the climate predictions made by IPCC.
10. Could a realist analysis provide a convincing account of international climate politics?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Barnett, J. (2001), *The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era* (London: Zed Books). This lively and critical book is recommended for readers who wish to explore the growing connections between environmental and security issues.

Barry, J., and Eckersley, R. (eds) (2005), *The State and the Global Ecological Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). A provocative set of essays on the continuing relevance of the state, long forsaken by green activists, but still the fundamental unit of global environmental governance.

Brenton, T. (1994), *The Greening of Machiavelli: The Evolution of International Environmental Politics* (London: Earthscan). A diplomatic participant's account of the international politics of the environment up to and including the Rio Earth Summit.

Dauvergne, P. (ed.) (2012), *Handbook of Global Environmental Politics*, 2nd edn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). This extensive collection of 30 essays covering states' governance and security, capitalism, trade and corporations, civil societies, knowledge, and ethics will provide the reader with a more 'advanced' view of current concerns and controversies in the field.

Elliott, L. (2004), *The Global Politics of the Environment* (Basingstoke: Palgrave). This comprehensive text provides detailed and wide-ranging coverage of the field and of the key international agreements.

Kütting, G., and Hermann, K. (eds.) (2018), *Global Environmental Politics: Concepts, Theories and Case Studies* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge). This collection pursues many of the themes in this chapter in greater depth.

Newell, P. (2012), *Globalization and the Environment: Capitalism, Ecology and Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press). Examines the relationship between globalization and the environment from historical materialist and political ecology viewpoints.

O'Neill, K. (2012), *The Environment and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). An excellent and comprehensive review of the theoretical literature in the field.

Vogler, J. (2016), *Climate Change in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Analyses the way in which the UNFCCC was initially framed and how the international system has shaped its development.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Refugees and forced migration

ARIADNA ESTÉVEZ

Framing Questions

- What are the main institutions and principal characteristics of the international regime governing refugees and forced migration?
- What are the political and policy implications of the shift from 'refugee' to 'forced migration' studies?
- What is the relationship between refugee law and racism?

Reader's Guide

This chapter introduces students to the international politics of refugees and forced migration, examining how forced migration and refugees are produced and managed in the context of contemporary **globalization**. It characterizes forced migration as the compulsory mobility of people due to existing and potential threats, mostly in the **Global South** and East. These threats are related to a variety of international **issues**, and there is debate concerning the underlying causes, including on-going colonial legacies and existing **power** relations. Forced migration can occur nationally (internal displacement) or internationally (asylum seekers and refugees who cross borders). Although both internal and international forced migration relate to global political forces, only refugees are protected by legally binding international humanitarian law.

In order to discuss forced migration, with an emphasis on the international politics of refugee legislation and law, this chapter first locates the subject within the field of International Relations (IR). It goes on to provide an overview of the conceptual debate, presenting a critical discussion of new ways of characterizing forced migration, along with their analytical and policy implications. It then examines how policy-makers classify various types of forced migration. Finally, it examines the institutions informing the **international regime** that governs refugees, their specific definitions of the term, and subsidiary categories.

Introduction

In legal terms, refugee is the status granted to forced migrants who cross borders seeking international protection in the event of political persecution. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugee status is declaratory. This means that any person who qualifies as a refugee is by that very fact a refugee, regardless of the formal recognition of the host country. However, in a world where state sovereignty is so crucial, as discussed elsewhere in this book, the reality is a far cry from the UN ideal. In reality, asylum seekers only become refugees, and acquire related rights in the host country, when they can prove to an asylum judge or official that political authorities in their own country are unable or unwilling to protect them from persecution based on race or ethnicity, nationality, religion, political opinion, or belonging to a specific social group. International forced migration due to political-economic crises, global development, criminal violence, or environmental degradation is not automatically protected by refugee law and international organizations, since these were issued and designed long before the appearance of widespread phenomena that now lead to a surge of massive forced displacement. This is not to say that violence or the political economy are new. Rather, it is that many of their contemporary expressions—generalized criminal violence, drug/human trafficking, and climate change—fall outside the parameters of core legal instruments and the mandate of specialized multilateral organizations. Furthermore, the forced migrant is not a legal category with related rights or international protection. 'Forced migrant' is increasingly used as a social and political term for people who leave their countries for reasons other than economic necessity or persecution; the former is often termed an 'economic migrant' and the latter an 'asylum seeker', who may apply for refugee status.

That international law related to contemporary forced migration seems outdated raises important questions for the study of international relations. Why has there been no change to international refugee law to include other causes of displacement beyond individual persecution? Should it be modified? This chapter draws attention to the relationship between the lack of legal protection for the vast majority of forced migrants and refugees and how forced migration is produced and managed in, and by, globalization. The global issues leading to forced migration are discussed elsewhere in this volume and include war (**see Ch. 14**), international and global security (**see Ch. 15**), global political economy (**see Ch. 16**), gender (**see Ch. 17**), race (**see Ch. 18**), environmental issues (**see Ch. 24**), **poverty**, hunger, and development (**see Ch. 26**), global trade and finance (**see Ch. 27**), **terrorism** (**see Ch. 28**), and human rights violations (**see Ch. 31**). These are all problems with root causes in colonial and postcolonial relations (**see Ch. 10**).

Moreover, the policies designed for the management of refugees and forced migration are defined by many of the core concepts and theories examined in other chapters in this book, such as **sovereignty**, security, international law (**see Ch. 19**), international organizations (**see Ch. 20**), and regions (**see Ch. 23**). The consequences of forced migration are globally managed through international law, and policy is designed and enforced by international institutions, particularly the United Nations (**see Ch. 21**), international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (**see Ch. 22**), and through humanitarian interventions, all discussed in this book.

The study of forced migration as such—and not just political asylum—emerged as a topic in the 1980s, when people started to flee their home countries for reasons other than political persecution, which is the cornerstone of the international refugee regime. Like the field of IR, forced migration has a multidisciplinary research agenda that incorporates the international or global dimensions of disciplines such as sociology, economics, and human geography. For instance, global sociology focuses on the **agent–structure problem**, North–South inequality, and transnational flows facilitating or impeding mobility (Stepputat and Sorensen 2014). Global political economy looks at how trade and investment practices create forced labour, and how multilateral and regional institutions rely on and process migrant labour and remittances. However, international law is the discipline most closely associated with Refugee Studies, establishing the categories and parameters used to define who is and who is not a refugee. According to Alexander Betts (2009), the field of IR came late to the study of refugees due to the lack of interest by the once dominant theories of realism and liberalism. It is the increasing influence of theories focusing on the role of subjects, institutions, and other non-state actors—such as constructivism, feminism, and postcolonialism—that has changed this.

Concept production and the politics of international protection

Determining who qualifies as a refugee—who is worthy of international protection—is an essentially political decision made by nation-states. Certain countries, especially hegemonic and even neo-colonial powers, have frequently used refugee status to punish, harass, or pressure their political and economic enemies. For example, from 1966 to 2017, as part of the Cuban Adjustment Act, the US famously granted immediate asylum to Cuban and Chinese citizens, mostly activists, in an effort to punish communist regimes (Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag 2008). The scope of this political decision has nevertheless been influenced by international law. The UN has argued that sovereignty should not be used as an excuse to refuse legal protection to people suffering from persecution and other threats, although in practice it often is. For example, in 2017 Donald Trump's administration abandoned negotiations for a Global Compact for Safe, Regular, and Orderly Migration. The American ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, claimed the global management of refugees and migration was a 'subversion of American sovereignty' (Wintour 2017). Then in 2018, during his annual address to the UN General Assembly, President Trump stated that global governance and trade were contrary to the interests of American sovereignty, especially with regard to such issues as migration and the environment (Terminski 2018).

Some scholars have argued that from the very beginning the term 'refugee' was enshrined in law and produced for policy purposes, without any critical content. Today, 'refugee' does not describe the social, political, and economic conditions of a subject seeking refuge, but rather prescribes a series of legal requirements—the burden of proof for someone claiming asylum (R. Black 2001). This is clear in the definition of refugees in the international regime, which refers exclusively to people who fled their countries before 1951; the time frame does not describe a condition—that of the refugee—but rather a time limit for legal and policy purposes. Others have argued that the lack of analytical content in the term 'refugee' makes people invisible and privileges the worldview of policy-makers, who are often guided by political agendas (Polzer 2008; Bakewell 2008).

Indian legal scholar B. S. Chimni (2009) has argued that the legal category of refugee has been used for political purposes throughout the four phases of its evolution. During the first phase (1914–45), when the international community witnessed the fall of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, the First World War, and the Armenian genocide, the incipient refugee regime was led by practical interests, such as attracting professional refugees, including medical doctors and scientists. The second phase (1945–82) was marked by the political interests of the West in the immediate post-Second World War period (the split between capitalist and socialist countries) and cold war politics (in support of dissidents in one bloc or the other). The third phase (1982–2000) was marked by the proliferation of countries producing refugees in the Third World due to military *coups d'état* and interventions sponsored by Western democracies (Chimni 1998, 2009: 13). For example, the civil war in Guatemala shows how Western military intervention led to an exodus of thousands of people. In 1954 the US helped the Guatemalan military overthrow democratically elected president Jacobo Arbenz to protect corporate interests and to prevent the spread of communism in Guatemala, where guerrilla groups fought the government. After a 20-year civil war, Guatemalan General Efraín Ríos Montt took power in 1982, and received military aid from the CIA for the enforcement of counter-insurgency operations to eliminate guerrillas. Ríos Montt infamously believed that the Maya indigenous groups were 'naturally' prone to communism, so counter-insurgency aimed to eliminate Mayans as a group. American president Ronald Reagan sponsored counter-insurgency operations with arms and expertise, actively contributing to the killing of over 200,000 indigenous peoples. One million indigenous people were internally displaced, while another 200,000 fled to Mexico. Only a quarter of these refugees were housed in UNHCR camps (Jonas 2013). In a trial, Ríos Montt was found guilty of genocide in 2012.

The fourth, and most recent, period in the evolution of the legal category of refugee corresponds to the current post-9/11 era. This period is marked by the threat of terrorism and criminal violence, as well as the intensification of climate change. Internal and international forced migration has continued to increase. Forced migration studies, and greater interest within IR, emerged during these last two periods (Chimni 1998, 2009: 13).

A focus on refugees as part of the wider topic of migration studies only emerged in the 1980s, in the context of increasing numbers of refugees. According to Zetter

(2007), by the late 1980s there was a 'fractioning' of the refugee label within forced migration studies—that is, the multiplication of related labels used to manage intense migration flows and increasingly exclude more people from the legal protection of refugee status. These labels are referred to in this chapter as 'types of forced migration' (**see 'Types of forced migration'**). Zetter (2007) regrets this shift from refugee studies to forced migration studies since it has negative consequences for policy, given that the refugee regime allowed for real protection from persecution. He claims that globalization is reshaping the refugee regime, and therefore the concept of the refugee itself, since the original objective of determining how humanitarian assistance is distributed and accessed is replaced by an interest in distinguishing who is and who is not a refugee (Zetter 2007: 174). This means that the politics of international protection is no longer focused on state obligation, but rather on restricting refugee status according to who is considered a desirable migrant and who is not (Squire 2009: 7).

Discussing voluntary/involuntary migration, or forced migration, is a form of fractioning the refugee label, and some scholars seek to ground these new labels in human rights law and rhetoric, for both analytical and policy objectives. Certain academics, some of them from the Global South, believe that forced migration should in fact become a legal category subsuming both internal and international displacement, while also including other types of forced mobility, such as deportation and qualified migration, which are often ignored (Riaño-Alcalá 2008; De Génova 2002; Gzesh 2012; Delgado-Wise 2014).

From a postcolonial perspective (**see Box 25.1**), Estévez (2018*c*) claims it is necessary to incorporate the reasons for forced migration and the policies and law designed to tackle it, in order to analyse it as an on-going process initiated both by the **international community** and private actors ranging from **multinational corporations** to organized crime groups. Estévez argues that forced migration is a process that starts with structural and accumulation projects—often facilitated by law enforcement or organized crime activities—that displace or ultimately kill people. The forcibly displaced are further exposed to gangs, organized crime, and sexual violence while on their way to a new home. The lives of those who survive the first two stages of the process are managed by legal and administrative apparatuses such as migration and asylum systems. From this perspective, the

Box 25.1 Colonial powers and forced migration

Today, people who are forced to leave their home countries are not necessarily threatened by political forces linked to international conflict. The situation has changed to such an extent that if forced migration was defined by this type of political conflict, it would not be such a pressing issue. Mainstream literature argues that forced migration is produced by problems of governance and the legitimacy of 'fragile states' (Stepputat and Sorensen 2014). In mainstream approaches, there is no assessment of the productive nature of these 'causes'. From a decolonial and postcolonial perspective, however, forced migration is not an innocent consequence of structural forces or evil tyrannies. For instance, war and conflict are frequently linked to colonial relations or sponsorship—such as mercenaries involved in Syria. Furthermore, transnational corporations involved in development projects are usually based in the West. Human traffickers exist because people cannot afford papers to migrate 'legally' or need to re-enter a Western country after deportation or denial of refugee status. Finally, the environment would not be a threat without global warming or devastation, which are generally the result of corporate activities.

From a geopolitical and non-Western perspective, forced migration is a desired outcome of a series of policies, laws, and omissions intended to create extreme deprivation, violence, and deadly forms of life in poor or middle-income countries subordinated to the hegemonic and colonial power of the West. For instance, Mexican scholar Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera (2017) has established empirically the link between killings, forced disappearances, femicides, displacement, and hydrocarbon extraction. Correa-Cabrera argues that in the case of north-eastern Mexico, violence has been produced by elites to force corporations to hire private security. She claims that there is a spatial coincidence between global fluxes (the global mobility of people, capital, and crime) and economic inequality. In this particular geographical area, she identifies at least four such global fluxes: the *maquila* industry (sweatshops), extraction and sale of hydrocarbons, migration, and transnational organized crime. The impact of these fluxes has led to increased income inequality in the region, since the internal dynamics broaden the gap between rich and poor, while reinforcing social inequality.

(Correa-Cabrera 2017)

production of forced migration is determined by three elements: 1) geographical specificity along the international lines of race, gender, and class; 2) a process starting with structural and accumulation projects that displace people, who are in turn further exposed to the threats represented by gangs, organized crime, and sexual violence; and 3) the management of people by legal and administrative apparatuses such as migration and asylum systems, which expel people to

places of extreme deprivation where they may eventually be killed by criminal gangs or forced to live on the streets.

Others believe that new categories are necessary in order to eliminate the arbitrary distinctions made between refugees and people fleeing generalized violence, environmental threats, and crime. Alexander Betts, for example, proposes the term 'survival migration' for 'persons who are outside their country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution' (A. Betts 2010: 362). In addition, Michel Foucault's idea of asylum as the right of the governed is little known, although it is fundamental for understanding the subjective impact of changing forms of political power. Foucault (1977), some of whose ideas are discussed in **Chapter 11**, believed that the right of asylum was essential for resisting oppression.

> ### Key Points
>
> - Determining who is and who is not a refugee—who is worthy of international protection—is an essentially political decision made by nation-states.
> - The scope of this political decision has been marked by the legal categories established in international human rights and humanitarian law.
> - There are two positions as to the meaning of the recent shift from 'refugee' to 'forced migrant' in law and policy: 1) a new humanitarianism that makes categories more inclusive (forced migration) while making borders stronger; and 2) the multiplication of categories for forced migrants to restrict their access to refugee status.
> - Certain scholars—including some in the Global South—are working to include human rights content in the category 'forced migration'; some see it as a process of production and management, while others believe new concepts are needed.

Types of forced migration

Policy and legal discourses of migration establish two basic types of migration: voluntary and forced. Voluntary migration implies a voluntary decision that is usually based on economic calculations—the subject seeking better opportunities abroad. In contrast, forced migration, also known as displacement, implies the subject's involuntary response to existing political, environmental, and violence-related threats (Reed, Ludwig, and Braslow 2016). However, Stephen Castles (2003) believes the line dividing these two types is increasingly blurred, since the decision to leave somewhere in search of better opportunities is usually linked to poverty, environmental hazards, generalized criminal violence, international or internal conflict, or failed development projects.

For policy purposes, forced migration is defined as 'migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes' (International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Reed, Ludwig, and Braslow 2016: 605). Forced migration has subsumed the definition and the policy of the so-called international refugee regime (S. Martin 2010) (**see Box 25.2**), which is part of the modern system of sovereign territorial states (Stepputat and Sorensen 2014). The core of the refugee regime is within the UNHCR and is ruled by its Statute and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

There are also regional refugee systems with wider mandates in accordance with their conventions. In the refugee regime, policy-makers classify forced migrants according to: 1) geographical boundaries and 2) the causes of displacement. This classification has implications for both policy and protection (**see Fig. 25.1**).

Classification according to geographical boundaries

Asylum seekers

These are individuals who cross international borders seeking protection, but whose claim for refugee status is still pending. Asylum seekers are often subjected to forms of detention, such as those arriving in Australia by boat, or people who claim asylum in the United States while not holding a valid visa.

Refugees

Asylum seekers who have proved before a judge or immigration officer (depending on the country) a well-founded fear of persecution receive refugee status under the terms of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the African Convention, and the UNHCR Statute (**see Box 25.2**). Even though states have no obligation to grant asylum or admit refugees, they do have the obligation not to

Box 25.2 Chronology of international law in the refugee regime	
1928	Havana Convention on Asylum
1933	Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum
1939	Montevideo Treaty on Political Asylum and Refuge
1948	United Nations **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** (Article 13 on freedom of movement and Article 14 on the human right to asylum)
1951	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
1966	Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees
1967	Protocol to Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (eliminating time restrictions)
1969	Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
1984	Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (in the context of the Organization of American States)
1991	Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women
1995	Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response
1998	UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
2000	UNHCR Position Paper on Gender-Related Persecution
2001	Global Consultations on Refugee International Protection (resulting in complementary protection)
2002	Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol
2015	New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants
2018	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration Global Compact on Refugees

■ Total forced migrants, comprising:

■ Refugees, persons in refugee-like situations, and returnees

■ Internally displaced persons and returnees

■ Asylum seekers

Figure 25.1   Number of forced migrants, 2017
Source: Migration Data Portal (2019). Reproduced with permission from Forced migration or displacement. Migration Data Portal. https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/forced-migration-or-displacement. © International Organization for Migration.

Opposing Opinions 25.1   The criteria used to define 'persecution' and establish refugee status should be expanded

For

The persecution criterion was devised to address a particular problem at a particular time. The persecution criterion was originally developed for the case of refugees from the Second World War in Europe. It was not meant to be normative or for general application (Gervase Coles).

Contemporary international politics is concerned with constraining refugee status rather than providing protection on a moral basis. However, the causes should be irrelevant vis-à-vis the moral obligation to protect (Joseph Carens).

Refugee status should be granted on the basis of a wide interpretation of serious harm. This is the underlying criterion in persecution.

A refugee should be any person whose basic rights are unprotected. When a person's home country fails to protect their rights to physical security and subsistence, that person has no choice but to seek international protection (Andrew Shacknove).

Generalized political, criminal, or gender violence are serious forms of harm. Therefore, they should be considered forms of persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention.

Today, asylum seekers are not only political activists, as in the past. They also include targets of genocide and victims of generalized violence, and policy and law should change accordingly (Aristide Zolberg).

Against

The persecution criterion is not arbitrary. Rather, it is a way to choose 'the most deserving among the deserving' in migratory flows, because they are unlikely to find protection in their home country due to political exclusion (James Hathaway).

Asylum seekers need a new political membership or citizenship. By contrast, other forced migrants could do with temporary protection when affected by disasters, generalized violence, or famine (Matthew Price).

Political asylum based on persecution is a way of morally condemning a repressive regime. Political persecution exposes a totalitarian or repressive government. Therefore, granting asylum to citizens of such states sends a strong message of rejection of human rights abuses.

Keeping persecution as the basis for an asylum claim does not prevent other refugees from receiving international protection. However, other categories should be used, such as temporary protection, military intervention, and resettlement programmes.

Persecution on the grounds of religion, nationality, ethnicity, political opinion, or membership in a special group makes an argument about the legitimate state use of the means of coercion. Granting asylum to people persecuted on these grounds shows that it is morally wrong to use force against minorities.

Addressing the rights to physical security and subsistence of all those seeking asylum is inefficient. There are too many people whose basic rights are systematically violated. Therefore, using the legal procedure of granting asylum would be an inefficient way to address an evidently larger and more complex problem.

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1. Is it fair to say that if violations of physical security and the threat to subsistence serve as the basis for refugee status, any migrant could be classed as a refugee?

2. Should the persecution criterion be eliminated from refugee status altogether?

3. Instead of debating who is more deserving of international protection, should policy-makers and academics encourage open borders for all?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

forcibly return asylum seekers to the countries where they are facing persecution. This is known as the right to non-refoulement. States may relocate people to countries where they are safe and states are willing to accept them. These are known as safe third countries. The Convention allows states to establish their own terms for admitting refugees.

Some countries have a very limited interpretation of the Convention, and grant asylum to people who have a well-founded fear of persecution based only on the five protected categories and if the state is unwilling or incapable of protecting them (**see Opposing Opinions 25.1**). Asylum seekers who are granted refugee status by a sovereign state according to the Convention

Case Study 25.1 Illegalizing refugees: the case of the Rohingya

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

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The Rohingya are currently believed to be the most persecuted ethnic group in the world. They are a Muslim minority in a Buddhist country, Myanmar, but only because the political boundaries imposed by a colonial understanding of the nation-state give that impression. This group speaks Bengali, like most of the population in Bangladesh, a largely Muslim country bordering their home state of Rakhine. Due to this cultural affinity, Myanmar considers them 'illegal immigrants' from Bangladesh, while Bangladesh does not recognize them as citizens since they have always inhabited territory in what is now Myanmar.

The Rohingya refugee crisis began in 2015 when the Myanmar government retaliated after an armed Muslim group allegedly raped a Buddhist girl. The Muslim Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was set up in 2012 as a response to increasing exclusion of the Rohingya from political participation and restrictions on their liberties—they had no representation during elections and interethnic marriages were prohibited. Since they were also excluded from the national census in 2014, in 2015 tension was at its height.

In 2017, the Myanmar government, headed by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, tacitly condoned the mass killings of the Rohingyas perpetrated by the army. As a consequence, over a million Rohingyas have since sought refuge in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand; over 7,000 of them have been killed in what some call a 'slow genocide', while almost all of their 200 villages in Rakhine have been destroyed. Refugee camps have been established in Bangladesh to host 932,204 of the 1,156,732 total Rohingya refugees.

Bangladesh is a very poor country and can barely cope with the burden of almost a million refugees. In late 2018, the government tried to 'voluntarily' return 2,000 refugees but the Rohingyas refused, fearing further massacres. In June 2018, the World Bank announced up to $480 million in grant-based support for health, education, water, sanitation, social protection, and disaster risk management. This support comes through a partnership between the Canadian government and the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). Even though the World Bank Group is behind forced displacement in Asia (**see 'Development-induced'**), this model is still the one the world is expected to accept as a means to prevent refugees reaching the West, in accordance with the recently approved Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees.

(*Source*: The Refugee Project 2019)

Question 1: Consider Zetter's (2007) claims about forced migration as a term 'fractioning' our idea of the refugee. Is this vague idea of forced migration actually 'illegalizing' Rohingya refugees?

Question 2: Who should help Bangladesh with the burden: poor neighbour countries (such as India and Nepal) or the international community and the West?

have several rights that other forced migrants do not, including the same civil rights and liberties as citizens, the right to work, and access to social services for themselves and their children (including education and health). In some countries, such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, refugees may become citizens.

People in refugee-like situations

These are 'groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained' (UNHCR 2013). These groups include stateless persons and those who have been denied protection in their own country, like the Bidoon in Kuwait and the Rohingya in Myanmar (**see Case Study 25.1**).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

In 1998, the UN issued the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which define IDPs as 'persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border' (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998). IDPs remain in their home country and have the same rights and duties as other citizens. For example, they enjoy the right to health but are also responsible before the law if they commit crimes. More importantly, IDPs, especially women, children, and the elderly, have the right to enjoy civil liberties and receive

humanitarian aid. The Guidelines recommend that governments ban 'arbitrary' displacement such as that caused by war, conflict, or forced displacement, and that affecting indigenous peoples. It should be noted that environmental and development-related displacements are not banned, although governments are called on to protect peasants and indigenous people in cases where development projects evict local communities.

Groups or people of concern

These include refugees and IDPs who have returned to their home countries spontaneously or in an 'organized fashion' that guarantees safety and dignity, with the help of the UNHCR (UNHCR 2018b). People who have been denied asylum and need humanitarian assistance are also included in these groups.

Classification according to the causes

There are at least four types of forced migration as determined by the causes of displacement.

Conflict-induced

This is the typical kind of forced migration, and the most studied in International Relations, since it is displacement (national or international) caused by international or civil war, or other political or social processes that lead to persecution under the categories protected by the 1951 Convention. Most UNHCR efforts concentrate on this type of displacement, which produces the type of refugee protected under the 1951 Convention. However, in new types of conflict such as drug and gang wars (that often entail widespread sexual violence against women), the terms of refugee status according to international law may be insufficient for individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution, either because they do not belong to any of the Convention's five protected categories or because conflict is assessed as 'generalized violence'.

An example of this type of conflict is in Mexico, where drug cartels and law enforcement officials sometimes collude in cases of forced disappearance, kidnapping, execution, torture, persecution, femicide, rape, and massacre. While the government claims criminal gangs are solely responsible for these brutalities and invests important resources in security, as well as in judicial and constitutional reform among other normative changes, it has failed to tackle impunity and corruption. Despite the fact that the Mexican government claims to have taken measures to combat these crimes,

they continue to occur. As a consequence, by 2018 there were 329,917 people internally displaced in 25 violence episodes, with 60 per cent of this number represented by women and 92 per cent by families (CMDPDH 2018). As for asylum seekers, from 2006–16 there were 98,547 claims (Estévez 2018b, 2018c).

In recent years, criminal, gang, and sexual violence (**see Case Study 25.2 and Box 25.3**) have become so serious and widespread in some regions that they have led to humanitarian crises and large-scale national and international displacement. Those who flee conflict or generalized violence could be 'specially' designated refugees by the UNHCR (S. Martin 2010), or as part of geographically specific legal instruments like the African Convention and the Cartagena Declaration (**see Box 25.2**). Policy for refugees recognized by the UNHCR in these terms is intended to address a temporary crisis since it is considered an emergency movement of people, who are placed in temporary camps. However, after years of displacement, these camps develop into cities, with economic activities dependent on international aid. One such example is the Kakuma camp in Kenya, which was established in 1992 for people fleeing the war in Sudan. By 2017, it was populated by over 164,000 people—a population slightly larger than that of Curacao Island (160,000). There is a local paper-based economy, since people live on vouchers that can be exchanged for access to schools and meals, among other things (Anzilotti 2017). When the crisis is resolved, people return to their homes, although sometimes the seriousness of the crisis leads to people being resettled. For example, Hartisheik camp, in eastern Ethiopia, closed in 2004 after its 230,000-strong refugee population returned to Somalia, where an on-going civil war had expelled thousands of people since 1988 (Healy and Bradbury 2010).

Environmental or natural disaster-induced

This type of displacement includes the forced mobility of people affected by natural or human-made disasters related to climate change, environmental degradation, and other natural forces such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and drought. By 2017, there were 18.8 million people internally displaced in 135 countries as a consequence of natural disasters. The most affected nations are in Asia, the Caribbean, and, more disproportionately, small Pacific islands (Small Island Developing States, or SIDS). There is no specific legal protection for people who cross international borders fleeing human-caused environmental problems

Case Study 25.2 Geographies rich in resources, and forced migration in Central America

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In October 2018, an estimated 3,500-strong migrant caravan from Honduras marched through Mexico towards the US. The group included entire families, single women with their children, gay and transgender men fleeing homophobia, and women escaping sexual violence and trying to save their male children from forced enrolment in gangs. US President Donald Trump threatened to further militarize the US–Mexico border if the Honduran migrants reached the frontier. Rancher militias also prepared their guns to receive the caravan. According to testimonies, the exodus was caused by a mixture of extreme poverty, violence, and even the legacy of cold war politics in the region. The Central American exodus is indeed multicausal, produced by different economic, social, and political forces converging in a specific territory that happens to be rich in natural resources.

Recent reports claim that gang- and drug-related violence is the major motivation behind forced displacement in the Americas region known as the Northern Triangle, which comprises Southern Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Belize, and Honduras. Indeed, homicide rates related to criminal violence and conflict in the region indicate that the Northern Triangle is the most violent place on Earth, with Honduras ranked second globally (only behind Syria). In addition, four of the most violent cities in the world are in Central America, and ten are in Mexico. Furthermore, the Honduran city of San Pedro Sula has the highest homicide rate in the world.

Although these reports do also consider natural disasters and development projects as displacing forces, the bulk of displacement is said to be related to drug cartels and gangs. As far as the reports are concerned, the 'bad guys' are to blame for this humanitarian crisis and regional tragedy. However, these reports overlook two important facts: this region is also very rich in bio-diversity, minerals, and other valuable natural resources, and it is plagued by other types of violence: femicide, killings of environmental activists, political murders, and forced disappearances.

The displacement pattern in Honduras suggests that criminal violence is not necessarily such a determining factor in forced displacement in Central America. According to a 2016 report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, while there were only 29,000 displaced persons in 2014, by 2015 the figure had increased by almost 600 per cent to 174,000. However, it was precisely in 2014 that homicide rates decreased, showing that criminal violence could hardly be the main displacing force. The report's explanation for this paradox is vague, saying the increase may be related to the worsening of economic conditions. However, there is a competing account, or at least hypothesis, for this: increasing repression of environmental activism.

Honduras is rich in natural resources, with 41.5 per cent of its territory covered with forests. However, it is also the third poorest country in the Americas, and the second poorest in Central America. The greatest poverty is in the rural areas, which are also the forested areas, where long-standing agricultural, logging, and livestock activities have intensified, leading to widespread deforestation, environmental degradation, water deterioration, and soil erosion. This environmental deterioration has negative consequences on local economies, but also makes communities prone to natural disasters, which is why in forested areas farmers and indigenous groups are organizing themselves against corporate interests.

(*Sources*: ACNUR 2018; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016; EU, Eurostat 2018; UNHCR 2018*a*)

Question 1: Corporations and American interests are involved in both Mexico and Central America, leading to forced migration in the area. In this case, is there justification for the Honduran migrant caravan trying to reach the US, and would this justification give them the right to enter the country?

Question 2: In your opinion, what are the key factors producing forced migration in the region?

(including climate change, disasters, or degradation). Protection for 'environmental refugees' depends on sovereign states, who have no binding obligations to take them in or to grant them basic rights. For example, in 2017 the Immigration and Protection Tribunal of New Zealand ruled against two families from Tuvalu, a 2.5-square kilometre SIDS in the Pacific, who claimed protection under the 1951 Convention because the island's exposure to rising sea levels and storms makes life unsustainable (Bonnett 2017).

Development-induced

According to Reed, Ludwig, and Braslow (2016), economic development projects are the most important cause of displacement in the contemporary world, even though the UNHCR focuses on conflict-displacement. Projects include population redistribution, urban development, mining, dams, irrigation schemes, transport, expansion of agricultural areas, and even conservation projects. These are often funded by the World Bank, but also by corporations. In this type of displacement,

Box 25.3   Gender-blindness in asylum systems

The original refugee convention did not include gender considerations, and women's experiences of violence were totally ignored. Although policy-makers have since addressed this shortcoming, there are still practical consequences for women. Although neither the US nor the UNHCR keep track of gender by nationality in their asylum statistics, the cross-referencing of displacement figures, qualitative information, and case litigation databases helps formulate an informed guess of the patterns of persecution for men and women. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reports that by 2013, 21,500 young people from the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) and Mexico had been forcibly displaced for reasons of rape, gender-based violence, and sexual trafficking; 18,800 of them were women, and 23 per cent of these women were girls aged 12–17. Women in the region are also victims of drug-related violence; they are targeted as a means of revenge against rival cartels or used as merchandise in the criminal sex market. Therefore, in the context of the drug wars, women are the victims of execution, torture, rape, forced disappearance, and trafficking, but also of a different kind of violence that specifically violates women's rights: gender violence.

The review of asylum cases in general and of specific gender-based persecution databases shows that Mexican women are persecuted for their activism against femicide or because they are the victims of drug-related and gender-based violence, frequently involving partners or relatives connected to the drug wars or law-enforcement officials. Gender-based violence claims include abuse from an intimate partner, including sexual violence; non-domestic sexual violence; repressive social norms; child abuse; and incest. Perpetrators are mostly husbands and fathers, who in some cases are also law-enforcement officials working for cartels or who are protected by corrupt or macho culture-driven civil servants. In all the reviewed cases, when women sought justice, they did not find it.

While the Convention did not cover specific forms of persecution suffered by women in their home country, and neither did US domestic law, in 1995 the UN corrected this omission by issuing gender guidelines for assessing sexual violence-based persecution. In the same year, the US responded by issuing its own guidelines. In line with these new standards, in 1996 the American Board of Immigration Appeals established that the threat of female genital mutilation constituted a form of persecution against women. Shortly after this, a judge applied the same rationale and granted asylum to Rody Alvarado, a Guatemalan woman who suffered extreme domestic violence at the hands of her husband (a gang member) in her home country. The attorney representing the US government filed an appeal, and the Board subsequently reversed its initial decision to grant asylum to Alvarado. It took 13 years to reinstate Alvarado's asylum status, in a process that involved the US Attorney General and other trials.

(Estévez 2018*a*)

forced mobility is the result of land and territory becoming contested spaces, leading to people being evicted, losing their property, jobs, shelter, and even their sense of community. Development projects are often justified in terms of economic progress (Terminski 2012). From 2004 to 2013, 3.4 million people were displaced by 7,200 World Bank projects, and 97 per cent of these are in Africa, Vietnam, China, and India (Chavkin et al. 2015). For example, in India, 388,794 people have been displaced by 24 projects alone; one of these projects is the coal-power Tata Mundra Ultra Mega Power Project in Gujarat state, where entire fishing communities have lost their main economic activity as a result of the plant's heated wastewater (Yeoman 2015). In Honduras, where thousands of people fled the country in late 2018 as an immediate consequence of rampant and widespread violence (**see Case Study 25.2**), **World Bank Group**-sponsored palm oil producer Dinant is suspected of ordering its private guards to kill a local activist and preacher, Gregorio Chávez, who complained against the corporation that was disputing land ownership with a farming community in Panama Village. Another 132 activists have been killed in a civil war between

farmers and corporations disputing ownership of land. The Honduras case shows that development-induced displacement also occurs in the form of conflict and violence generated by corporate interests (Chavkin 2015).

Human trafficking

According to the United Nations Trafficking in Persons Protocol (Article 3, Paragraph a), trafficking means

> the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

It is evident in the 'transfer' and use of 'force' for exploitation purposes. Victims of trafficking are not simply

displaced, and may claim asylum because they belong to a particular social group and face persecution for this reason (Andersen 2014). Sexual trafficking victimizes mostly women and children, who are exploited in developed countries where consumers are often males from the developed world (sex tourism). For example, Dubai is known as the capital of human trafficking since over 100,000 people are trafficked into the country every year. The victims are from Asia and Africa, and are lured from their home countries with the promise of jobs as domestic servants. Once they are in Dubai, criminals retain their passports and force them to work as prostitutes or domestic servants in conditions of slavery and sexual and physical abuse (Boycott UAE Team 2017).

Mixed migration

Mixed migration refers to the flux of voluntary and involuntary migrants who take the same routes to the same destinations (Mix Migration Hub 2018). A good example of mixed migration is the Honduran caravan that marched across Mexico to the US (**see Case Study 25.2**), but also migrants arriving in Europe every year from Africa and Asia. From 2015 to 2017, 68 per cent of the 1.5 million refugees and economic migrants arriving in Europe landed in Greece, another 29 per cent arrived in Italy, while the remaining 3 per cent arrived in Spain. Most of these refugees and migrants were from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Borton and Collinson 2017).

Key Points

- There are two types of migration: voluntary and forced migration. The former is what we usually refer to as economic migration. The latter refers to international and national displacement caused by existing or potential threats such as global warming, labour and sexual trafficking, and development projects, among others.

- Forced migrants are classified according to geographical boundaries and the causes of their displacement.

- Classification according to geographical boundaries includes asylum seekers, who become refugees if they are granted

that status by a national migration court or office. People who cannot comply with the legal requirements of refugee status are considered to be in a refugee-like situation. Those who stay in their country are internally displaced persons (IDPs), and those who are deported or return to their homes of their own will are returned refugees and IDPs.

- Classification by cause includes migration that is conflict-induced, environmental or natural disaster-induced, development-induced, human trafficking-induced, and mixed.

The international refugee regime and institutionalized racism

The refugee regime, as it is known, was established in the early twentieth century by the League of Nations, which founded the High Commission for Refugees, the first organization designed to address displacement, caused at that time by the Russian Revolution, the First World War, and the disintegration of the Ottoman and Habsburg **empires** (S. Martin 2010). The Commission was replaced by a number of other offices before the modern UNHCR was established in 1950 to deal with mass displacement from communist countries (S. Martin 2010). In 1951, the UN issued the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Neither the Convention nor its 1967 Protocol, which removed the Convention's temporal limitation, imposed on states the obligation to grant refugee status to every person claiming asylum. It provides the core international definition of the refugee, as a person who:

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1(A2)).

Note that the Convention lacks a gender perspective. It was not until 1995 that the UNHCR recognized that 'women's rights are human rights' and issued guidelines stating that sexual and gender violence were considered persecution. The 2002 Guidelines go beyond this, stating that while perpetrators of persecution are mostly state agents, in the case of discrimination and

sexual and gender violence, perpetrators could be non-state actors often tolerated by the state (**see Boxes 25.2 and 25.3**). Furthermore, only the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees consider generalized violence as a valid cause for seeking asylum; the 1951 Convention does not. However, the Convention did establish persecution as the main cause for asylum; eventually, persecution as the core criterion for granting refugee status became problematic because of the complexities of the phenomenon.

Almost 70 years after the regime was established, and with multiplying refugee crises around the world, international policy and law are failing to broaden the scope of protection for refugee status. Recent legal and policy changes seem to confirm the scholarly hypothesis that 'fractioning' the term refugee serves the racist objective of keeping Third World nationals out of rich countries, since nine out of ten refugees live in poor countries.

The European Union (EU) is a good—or terrible—example of this. For policy and legal purposes, the EU adopts the UN definition of a refugee as its regional instruments do not include the right to seek asylum. This failure to recognize asylum at the regional level has allowed anti-immigrant groups and parties to impose their views on the EU's approach to the issue. In 2004, the EU issued a directive establishing temporary 'subsidiary protection' for people who are not Convention refugees but would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to their country of origin. Nevertheless, the EU's response to ever increasing refugee crises in its areas of influence—Asia and Africa—is becoming increasingly repressive, with a series of measures intended to prevent third-country nationals from entering the Schengen Area. These measures include removing legal alternatives for reaching Europe (i.e. overseas embassies no longer accept asylum claims), preventing ships from setting sail for Europe, and imposing penalties on transport companies that allow people to travel without documents.

The EU's racist approach to migration and refugees became institutionalized (in other words, bureaucracies are used to enforce racist policies) with the Dublin III Regulation, which entered into force in 2014 and builds on the Dublin Convention of 1990, or Regulation I, and the Dublin II Regulation of 2003. The Dublin III Regulation requires asylum seekers to request asylum in the first European nation they arrive in, preventing them from choosing the country they wish to go to, which is often determined by colonial ties, previous migration, family networks, and cultural affinity.

In addition to placing most of the burden on border countries—usually Greece and Italy—the Regulation is inefficient since it clogs the asylum claim processing system. Sadly, racist institutional approaches to refugee crises help to determine European attitudes towards migrants and asylum seekers, with Brexit being a good example of this. European refugee policy has also generated a backlash from populist anti-immigrant and even neo-fascist political parties.

Institutionalized racism towards migrants and asylum seekers is becoming an international trend, taking over the UN system as shown by the process for the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, a process started in 2001. To mark the 50th anniversary of the refugee convention, and due to the increasing number of refugees and the multiplication of causes leading to national and international forced displacement, the UNHCR called for Global Consultations on International Refugee Protection (2001). This process led to the UNHCR issuing guidelines that recommended that governments define 'refugee' in a broader sense and use protection mechanisms in addition to those of the 1951 Convention, also known as 'complementary protection'. Complementary protection covers 'non-Convention refugees', who receive 'non-Convention protection'—this includes UN General Assembly resolutions and also regional declarations, conventions, and jurisprudence expanding the definition of the refugee and the scope of protection. Complementary protection also includes human rights and humanitarian law that helps to support non-refoulement measures.

While extending refugee protection to include core human rights treaties aided recognition of the complexities of contemporary forced migration, the process took a turn towards institutionalized racism with the 2015 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. As a result of the consultation process and adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration. In this Declaration, state parties 'invite the private sector and civil society, including refugee and migrant organizations, to participate in multi-stakeholder alliances to support efforts to implement the commitments we are making today' (Preamble, 15). The Declaration shifts the regime's focus from state responsibility to the cooperation of **non-state actors**. Also, while emphasizing the UN commitment to human rights, the Declaration calls for policy designed to prevent refugees from fleeing to or seeking asylum in rich countries. This can clearly be seen in calls to

'ease pressure on host countries; enhance refugee self-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; support conditions in countries of origin for return'. While the Declaration was supposedly intended to tackle the shortcomings of hard-core refugee laws, it called on governments and civil society to work together while trying to prevent refugees from reaching rich countries rather than doing anything to save lives.

This racist perspective was finally reinforced with the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, both adopted in December 2018. The goal of these non-binding instruments is to prevent asylum seekers and migrants from reaching the West. Third World countries are requested to receive asylum seekers; in exchange, rich countries and the private sector will invest in services and infrastructure. There is no indication of how this responsibility will be shared with regard to the economic, political, and ethnic roots of international displacement, such as climate change, development, and crime. Rich countries will only accept refugees and undocumented migrants through 'legal' and limited means such as family reunification, student scholarships, or humanitarian visas.

Key Points

- According to the UN definition, a refugee is a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution because of their political opinions, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or membership of a social group with specific characteristics.
- Africa, the Americas, and Europe have included indiscriminate violence and threats to life and security either as legitimate causes of persecution, or as the basis for granting subsidiary protection.
- While states have legally binding obligations when they become party to international and/or regional instruments of the regime, they are not obligated to grant refugee status to every individual claiming asylum; state sovereignty allows them to establish national institutions and criteria for processing asylum claims individually and for making decisions.
- Recent legal approaches, especially the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, are non-binding instruments intended to prevent asylum seekers and undocumented migrants from reaching the West, while transferring the responsibility for refugee crises to Third World countries and ensuring benefits for international business.

Conclusion

Mainstream discourse constructs migration as a phenomenon that is either voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary migration has been grounded on the legal category of the refugee, which describes people who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their political opinions, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or membership of a specific social group. Those who claim protection under international refugee law, in a given country other than their own, are asylum seekers.

Nevertheless, because the refugee definition is a response to the political context of specific international wars and conflicts, such as the First and Second World Wars, many now argue that the category has become insufficient to grasp the policy and legal needs of contemporary involuntary migration, the causes of which range from environmental and development phenomena to new types of conflict such as widespread criminal violence and sexual trafficking. Today, involuntary migration also includes internally displaced persons, people in refugee-like situations, and people receiving subsidiary protection.

This trend also has implications for how we study the phenomena, so there has been a recent shift from refugee studies to forced migration studies. However, there are different opinions regarding the extent to which it is convenient to replace a muscular legal category such as the refugee with a social and generic concept such as forced migration.

Questions

1. What is the political advantage of differentiating between voluntary and involuntary migration?
2. What are the policy and power implications of the shift from refugee studies to forced migration studies?
3. Who benefits from fractioning the refugee label?
4. How does the forced migration typology (asylum seekers, refugees, people in need of protection, mixed flows, people of concern, etc.) fail to protect people fleeing for their lives?

5. How are the causes of forced migration linked to economic interests?
6. How are the institutions informing the international refugee regime related to postcolonial power relations?
7. What are the most important international legal instruments addressing forced migration today and tackling its root causes?
8. How are the Global Consultations on International Refugee Protection institutionalizing racism at the international level?
9. Why are most refugees from Third World countries?
10. If nine out of ten refugees live in developing countries, why is the West so reluctant to take refugees at all?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Betts, A., and Loescher, G. (eds) (2010), *Refugees in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The most complete study of the refugee phenomenon from an IR viewpoint. It examines the phenomenon from the perspectives of IR theory, security, sovereignty, regions, and international cooperation.

Castles, S., and Miller, M. (2009), *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (New York: Guilford). Looks at the phenomenon from a global perspective and with a focus on causality; it addresses climate change, ethnic conflict, racism, and labour by region.

Cornelius, W. A., Tsuda, T., Martin, P. L., and Hollifield, J. F. (eds) (2004), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Looks at migration policy from an IR viewpoint. This comparative study of immigration policies in 15 industrialized countries offers a regional comparison and provides an important corrective to the tendency to consider immigration policy to be a domestic practice.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., **Loescher, G.**, **Long, K., and Sigona, N.** (2016), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugees and Forced Migration Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The most complete study on forced migration as such, this book provides an overview of how different disciplines have addressed the phenomenon. It looks at the different types of forced migrants, the problem of camps, institutional and legal responses, social issues (gender, race, children, health, religion, etc.), and possible solutions.

Gattrell, P. (2015), *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A historical view of the phenomenon from a social constructivist perspective, looking at the causes, consequences, and meanings of the phenomenon internationally.

Gibney, M. J. (2004), *The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A study of how liberal democracies should understand international obligations regarding human rights and towards people fleeing abuse and harm.

McAdam, J. (2007), *Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). An overview of international legal obligations that countries have towards people who do not meet the legal definition of the refugee, but are in similar situations.

Sassen, S. (2014), *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard). A critical approach to the causes of contemporary forced migration that helps us to locate international responsibility beyond political persecution.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Poverty, hunger, and development

TONY EVANS · CAROLINE THOMAS

Framing Questions

- **Is poverty a structural characteristic of the current capitalist world order?**
- **We live in a world of plenty, while so many remain hungry. Why?**
- **Is it wise to think of development as a singular, economic project?**

Reader's Guide

As a consequence of the processes of globalization, issues of global poverty, hunger, and development have achieved greater prominence on political, economic, and social agendas. However, ideas concerning how we understand these issues remain contested, as do ways for improving the lives of those who suffer poverty and hunger. This chapter looks at these contested ideas through the lenses of both orthodox and alternative approaches. It also illustrates the current dimensions of global poverty and hunger, and examines some of the development solutions that have been adopted to combat further suffering. This will also be done through orthodox and alternative approaches.

Introduction

Our social, economic, and political relations have undergone considerable change during the last few decades. Until quite recently, the discipline of International Relations focused almost exclusively on issues of inter-state conflict, military security, and war. Realists and liberals paid little attention to poverty, hunger, development, and issues concerned with human well-being. From the 1980s, it became clear that globalization represented a new set of issues and a shift from state-centric politics to people-focused politics. Interest turned to the environment, gender, refugees, poverty, hunger, and development. Most recently, the relationship between poverty and social unrest has been recognized.

While it was once useful to describe world order in terms of international relations, today that order is better described by the term globalization (**see Ch. 1**). These changes have generated enormous profits, with corporations now measuring their worth in trillions of US dollars (R. Davies 2018). The generation of wealth has not benefited everyone, however. In all countries, both rich and poor, the income gap continues to increase, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, and for women and girls in all parts of the world (UNU-Wider 2018). Globalization, it seems, enriches and impoverishes simultaneously.

Recognizing the rich–poor duality of globalization, the UN created the **Millennium Development Goals** (MDG). These set time-limited, quantifiable targets across eight areas, ranging from poverty to health, gender (**see Ch. 17**), education, environment (**see Ch. 24**), and development. The first goal was the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, with the target of halving the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day by 2015. The UN claims to have achieved success in reaching this target. Like most other international organizations, the UN and its members adopt what we will call here an orthodox approach to solving social and economic problems. This means accepting, unreflectively, the principles and values described by the globalized neoliberal world order—for example, the free market, individualism, consumerism, and the monetization of all aspects of our lives.

This approach is not without its critics. An alternative, critical approach argues that neoliberal ideas exclude important aspects of poverty by focusing on money and material wealth. Most of this chapter will be devoted to examining the differences between these two approaches in relation to the three related topics of poverty, hunger, and development. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether the desperate conditions in which so many of the world's citizens find themselves today have improved, and are likely to continue to do so in the future. Again, two contrasting approaches are outlined.

Poverty

In today's globalized world order, ideas of the global free market and the monetization of all goods and services act as a central guide for contemporary economic and social thought. The failure to gain waged labour, in order to have sufficient money to provide for basic needs, is defined as poverty. Those who provide for themselves, have no need for cash transactions or wage labour, and act cooperatively, like hunter-gatherer groups, do not fit the orthodox view. From the orthodox perspective, poverty eradication depends on engaging with global markets through cash transactions. The alleviation of poverty is dependent on development defined as economic growth, and measured as monetary value (**see Table 26.1**). As a consequence, significant numbers of people living in the developed world are defined as poor, even though they may have access to food, water, and the other necessities of life (Pogge 2005).

Critics reject the mainstream image of poverty and development defined in monetary terms. Instead, they argue that many communities have the ability to provide for their families and neighbours through the practice of cultural traditions, spiritual values, community ties, and the availability of common resources. Research by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, suggests that the poor fear the threat of globalization and its monetizing approach to all social issues. In a global survey of the poor's attitude towards poverty, the

Table 26.1 Percentage of population living on less than $1.90, $3.20, and $5.50 a day (**Purchasing Power Parity** (PPP)) for selected countries

Country	Population, 2017 (thousands)	Per cent living on less than $1.90 a day	Per cent living on less than $3.20 a day	Per cent living on less than $5.50 a day	Year of survey
Central African Republic	2,280	66.2	85.4	92.8	2008
Egypt	44,009	1.3	16.1	61.9	2015
Fiji	635	1.4	14.3	49.5	2013
Haiti	5,689	23.5	48.3	77.6	2012
India	696,784	21.2	60.4	86.8	2011
Mexico	69,361	2.5	11.2	34.8	2016
Philippines	47,397	8.3	33.7	63.2	2015
Samoa	156	0.6	7.9	35.9	2008
South Africa	29,750	18.9	37.6	57.1	2014
Uzbekistan	15,940	62.1	86.4	96.4	2003

Source: World Bank

IMF reported that a lack of voice, a weakened ability to preserve social norms, decreased opportunities to participate in community festivals, vulnerability to exploitation, a lack of power, and threats to cultural identity were stressed above material wealth. Dependence on an unpredictable market, and/or an unreliable government offering a free market approach to development, does not seem attractive. As one participant in the IMF survey argued, future happiness and freedom from poverty are 'found in peace and harmony, in the mind and in the community', none of which can be monetized (IMF 2000).

While the UN claims to have succeeded in reducing poverty through the MDG programme, some critics argue that the strength of this claim remains unclear. First, there is no agreement on a baseline figure for determining poverty. While some institutions continue to use $1.25 a day, the World Bank, for example, has moved to $1.90 a day. Second, even if some agreement could be found, any baseline would ignore those who are just above that figure, but who might still be considered poor. Adopting the World Bank's baseline of $1.90, rather than the UN's $1.25 figure, would add several million more to the ranks of the poor. Third, many countries do not have the skills or the funds to conduct a regular census. Even if funds are available, is it possible to include those living in shanty towns, nomadic peoples, and those in remote areas? Fourth, the focus on income and consumption misses important aspects of poverty, like the amount of labour needed to acquire sufficient calorific intake, environmental issues, availability of goods, time for leisure, labour exploitation, fear, and the feeling of powerlessness (Cimadamore, Koehler, and Pogge 2016). Fifth, the growing complexity brought about by globalization has caused the numbers of 'precarious workers' (those continually in and out of work) to increase, adding to the difficulties of assessing levels of poverty at any one time (R. Cox 1999). Critics add to this the tension between the state as administrator of poverty reduction schemes and the free market principle that demands a small, non-interventionist state.

Key Points

- The monetary-based conception of poverty has been universalized among governments and international organizations.
- The $1.25 poverty line includes people who do not have sufficient income to satisfy their basic material needs in the marketplace, leaving out non-material poverty.
- Developed countries see poverty as an issue that affects and defines the less developed: integration into the global economy is the solution to poverty.
- A critical alternative view of poverty places more emphasis on lack of access to community, resources, community ties, and spiritual and cultural values.

Hunger

Like poverty, there are many definitions of hunger, and therefore many ways to understand its extent. For example, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines hunger through an 'input/output' model, where food (calorific input) is sufficient to maintain body weight and a level of physical activity (output) consistent with long-term health. Other methods focus on household income and expenditure surveys, while still others take a more behavioural view, looking at perceptions of hunger (Gibson 2012). Each of these methods assesses different aspects of hunger (e.g. health, productive capacity, suffering), rather than providing a definitive assessment. **Figure 26.1** provides the most recent FAO estimates for hunger.

Although chronic hunger affects over 800 million people globally, food shortage is not a central cause. According to FAO estimates, food production, which has increased by 17 per cent since the mid-1980s, remains more than sufficient to support the growing world population of 7 billion. However, by 2050 it is estimated that food production will have to increase by 60 per cent to feed a population of 9.6 billion.

While most countries are expected to experience a population increase, the greatest increase is expected in just a few countries, including Nigeria, India, and Uganda (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). Although China is projected to have a 33 per cent decrease in its population numbers by 2100, this conceals an increase to 1.5 billion by 2050, before falling back. **Table 26.2** shows population by region. Proponents of the orthodox approach point to these figures to argue that less developed countries must adhere to strict family planning policies.

While famines may be exceptional phenomena, hunger is not. Why is this so? Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought with regard to hunger: the orthodox, nature-focused approach, which identifies the problem largely as one of overpopulation, and the entitlement, society-focused approach, which sees the problem more in terms of distribution.

Figure 26.1 The number of undernourished people in the world has been on the rise since 2014, reaching an estimated 821 million in 2017

Source: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 2017: 3. Reproduced with permission from FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2018. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018. Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition. Rome, FAO. http://www.fao.org/3/i9553en/i9553en.pdf

Table 26.2 Population by region and level of development (in billions)

Region	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2050	2100
More developed regions	1.08	1.14	1.19	1.23	1.26	1.29	1.29
Less developed regions (LDR)	3.37	4.18	4.95	5.72	6.52	8.47	9.89
LDR excluding China	2.35	2.98	3.64	4.33	5.06	7.07	8.85
High income countries	0.92	1.00	1.07	1.14	1.20	1.28	1.28
Middle income countries	3.27	4.00	4.64	5.46	5.85	7.06	7.37
Low income countries	0.25	0.32	0.42	0.56	0.73	1.41	2.51
World	4.45	5.33	6.14	6.95	7.79	9.77	11.18

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

The orthodox, nature-focused explanation of hunger

The orthodox explanation of hunger, first mapped out by Thomas Robert Malthus in his *Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1798, focuses on the relationship between human population growth and the food supply (Malthus 2015). Malthus asserts that population growth naturally outstrips the growth in food production, so that a decrease in the per capita availability of food is inevitable, until eventually a point is reached at which starvation, or some other disaster, drastically reduces the human population to a level that can be sustained by the available food supply. This approach therefore places great stress on human overpopulation as the cause of the problem, and seeks ways to reduce the fertility of the human race—or rather, that part of the human race that seems to breed faster than the rest: the poor of the less developed world. Supporters of this approach argue that there are natural limits to population growth—principally, the carrying capacity of the land—and that when these limits are exceeded disaster is inevitable.

The entitlement, society-focused explanation of hunger

Critics of the orthodox approach to hunger argue that it is too simplistic because it takes no account of the socio-economic context in which the hungry must live their lives—most importantly, the unequal distribution of wealth characteristic of the global capitalist order (Peet 1975; Pistor 2019). Critics note that there is more than enough food in the world to feed everyone, although 815 million people go hungry every day (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 2017). This suggests that the cause of hunger is found in the inequalities that are a functional component of the capitalist socio-economic

order. No matter how high the values expressed in programmes like the MDGs, no solution will be successful without reform of the structural conditions that generate poverty and hunger. Indeed, although the UN claims that the MDGs did, in fact, achieve their goal, the FAO accepts that hunger is on the rise again (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 2017). Furthermore, critics note, paradoxically, that the majority of the world's people live in less developed countries, which produce much of the world's food, while those who consume most of it are located in wealthy developed countries.

A well-known alternative approach to hunger and poverty is found in Amartya Sen's book *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Sen 1981, 1983). Noting that famine often occurs in years of plenty, or when there has been no significant reduction in food production, Sen argues that the cause of hunger cannot, therefore, be found in the orthodox, Malthusian approach. Instead, whether a person eats or starves depends on whether they can establish an entitlement to food, not on whether there is food available.

Globalization and hunger

It is possible to explain the contemporary occurrence of hunger by reference to the process of globalization (**see Ch. 1**). Globalization means that events occurring in one part of the world can affect, and are affected by, events occurring in other, distant parts of the world. Often, as individuals, we remain unaware of our role in this process and its ramifications. When in the developed countries we drink a cup of tea or coffee, or eat imported fruit and vegetables, we tend not to reflect on the changes experienced where these were grown. However, it is possible to look at the effects of establishing a global system of food production, as opposed to a local, national, or regional system. David Goodman

and Michael Redclift did precisely this in their book, *Refashioning Nature: Food, Ecology and Culture* (1991).

Goodman and Redclift argue that we are witnessing an increasingly global organization of food provision and access to food, with transnational corporations playing the major role. This is seen in the incorporation of local systems of food production into a global system of food production (Sandler 2015). In other words, local subsistence producers, who have traditionally produced to meet the needs of their families and communities, may now be involved in cash crop production for distant markets, leaving less food available for local consumption. The lure of industrialization also brings urbanization, as poor farmers move to the cities for paid work, leaving land unfarmed and reducing further the food available for local markets.

The United States has been the most important actor in the development and expansion of this global food regime. At the end of the Second World War, the US was producing large food surpluses. Many developing countries welcomed these surpluses, for the orthodox model of development depended on the creation of a pool of cheap wage labour to serve the industrialization process. Hence, to encourage people to leave the land and move away from subsistence production, the incentive to produce for oneself and one's family had to be removed. Cheap imported food provided this incentive, while the resulting low prices that were paid for domestic subsistence crops made them unattractive to grow; indeed, for those who continued to produce for the local market, such as in Sudan, the consequence has been the production of food at a loss (Bennett and George 1987: 78; Lang, Barling, and Caraher 2009). **Case Study 26.1** illustrates Haiti's enmeshment in globalization.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the production of subsistence crops for local consumption in the developing world has declined drastically in the post-war

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Case Study 26.1   Hunger in Haiti: food security and rice imports

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There was a time, over 30 years ago, when Haiti produced sufficient rice to feed the population. In the 1980s, faced with an acute economic crisis and sharp rises in food prices, Haitians took to the streets in rebellion against the dynastic president Jean Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier. Under pressure from US and Caribbean leaders, 'Baby Doc' left the country in 1986, taking with him what remained of the state's finances.

Forced into an economic corner, Haiti took loans from the International Monetary Fund. As a condition of receiving these loans, Haiti had to undertake structural adjustment measures, which included a reduction of tariffs on imports that had previously protected local agriculture, including the production of rice. The low tariffs, together with the heavy subsidies offered by the US government to their own rice growers, meant that imported rice was available in the Haitian market at a price below that of local growers. Forced out of the market, Haitian farmers abandoned their farms and moved to the cities in search of work, adding further to the legions of unemployed people.

The 2008 global economic crisis brought increases in the global price of rice (and many other staple foods), leaving many more short of the daily calorie intake recommended by the World Food Programme. In 2010, Haiti was struck by an earthquake, bringing further misery, killing an untold number of people, and displacing 1.5 million with limited access to food and shelter. October 2016 brought Category 4 Hurricane Matthew, which left 806,000 people in need of emergency food supplies. Food insecurity was further aggravated by a three-year drought, made worse by the El Niño effect of 2015–16, bringing a 50 per cent decline in local food production. According to the World Bank, today 58 per cent of the population suffer food insecurity, 50 per cent of women and children are anaemic (78 per cent of 6–24 month old children), 30 per cent of children are stunted, 19 per cent are underweight, 10 per cent are wasted, and 23 per cent of new-born babies are underweight.

The scale of these disasters, and the level of hunger Haitians currently suffer, leaves farmers in a 'catch 22' situation: mitigate some of the hunger by eating the grain that is in store now, or plant the grain in the hope that the drought will abate to produce a harvest next season.

(*Sources*: World Food Programme 2018; World Bank)

Question 1: Is the cause of this tragedy natural or a result of global capitalism?

Question 2: How should the world respond to this situation?

period. Domestic production of food staples in developing countries has declined, the availability of cheap imports has altered consumer tastes, and the introduction of agricultural technology has displaced millions of people from traditional lands. Furthermore, the creation of global agri-businesses has encouraged speculative investments, adding further to price volatility. For critics, the global organization of food production has turned the South into a 'world farm' to satisfy consumers in developed regions, at the expense of scarcity and permanent hunger in less developed regions.

The IMF and World Bank's involvement in globalizing the production of food is seen in structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which have encouraged the less developed to invest in agricultural production for export as a way of achieving rapid economic growth (**see Ch. 16**). This has meant that fertile land, previously used to grow food for local consumption, is moved to export crops to meet the demands of the wealthy. This is exacerbated by the increasing demand for meat from countries that have experienced rapid economic growth, notably China and India. This increased demand for meat has meant that one-third of the world's grain production is used to fatten animals, further reducing the supply of grains on which the poor depend. Furthermore, there has been a shift in land use from food production to crops for the biofuel industry

(UNCTAD 2009). Critics of the orthodox approach point to these issues as evidence for the need to take an alternative approach that includes the social, political, and economic factors that determine access to food.

The leaders of wealthy states often recognize the increasing number of people who suffer food insecurity. But it is these same leaders who also promote free market principles that create the contemporary context for hunger. However, as the 2009 World Summit on Food Security demonstrated, concern does not necessarily turn into action (FAO 2009).

> ### Key Points
>
> - In recent decades global food production has burgeoned, but, paradoxically, hunger and malnutrition remain widespread and the numbers are rising once again.
>
> - The orthodox explanation for the continued existence of hunger is that population growth outstrips food production.
>
> - An alternative explanation for the continuation of hunger focuses on lack of access or entitlement to available food. Access and entitlement are affected by factors such as the North–South global divide, particular national policies, rural–urban divides, class, gender, and globalization.
>
> - Globalization can simultaneously contribute to increased food production and to increased hunger.

Development

Now that both the mainstream and the alternative views on poverty and hunger have been discussed, this section examines ideas of development as solutions for these global problems. This will be done in three stages: (1) examination of the orthodox approach to development and its consequences for less developed countries; (2) the critical alternative approach to development, which looks beyond a singular economic dimension, taking a broader view that includes such factors as empowerment and democracy; and (3) consideration of the ways that the mainstream view of development has responded to criticisms. Before continuing, however, it is important to remind ourselves, first, that the term 'development' has no universally accepted definition (**see Box 26.1**) and, second, that all conceptions of development necessarily reflect a particular set of social and political principles, norms, and values. Put simply, all conceptions of development are constructed within an ideological framework.

Development: the orthodox, mainstream approach

In the decades following 1945, development orthodoxy played a central role in the international economy. During the Second World War, the Allied powers believed that the protectionist trade policies of the 1930s had contributed significantly to the outbreak of the war. The US and the UK drew up plans to create a stable post-war international order, with the United Nations (UN), its affiliates the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group, plus the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) providing its institutional spine. The latter three provided the foundations for a liberal international economic order based on the pursuit of free trade, but allowing an appropriate role for state intervention in the market in support of national security and national and global stability (Rapley 1996). This has been called '**embedded liberalism**'. Although the UN General Assembly is formally conducted through democratic processes,

Box 26.1   Development: a contested concept

	Orthodox view	Alternative view
Poverty	A situation suffered by people who do not have the money to buy food and satisfy other basic material needs.	A situation suffered by people who are not able to meet their material and non-material needs.
Solution	Transformation of traditional subsistence economies defined as 'backward' into industrial, commodified economies defined as 'modern'. Production for profit. Individuals sell their labour for money, rather than producing to meet their family's needs.	Creation of human well-being through sustainable societies in social, cultural, political, and economic terms.
Core idea and assumptions	The possibility of unlimited economic growth in a free market system. Economies eventually become self-sustaining ('take-off' point). All layers of society benefit through a 'trickle-down' mechanism.	Sufficiency. The inherent value of nature, cultural diversity, and the community-controlled commons. Human activity in balance with nature. Self-reliance and local control through democratic inclusion, participation, and giving a voice to marginalized groups such as women and indigenous groups.
Measurement	Economic growth; gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; industrialization, including agriculture.	Fulfilment of basic material and non-material human needs of all people; condition of the natural environment; political empowerment of the marginalized.
Process	Top-down; reliance on external 'expert knowledge', usually Western; large capital investments in large-scale projects; advanced technology; expansion of the private sphere.	Bottom-up; participatory; reliance on appropriate (often local) knowledge and technology; small investments in small-scale projects; protection of the commons.

the constitutions of the World Bank and the IMF establish decision-making powers that favour developed Western states (**see Ch. 3**).

As the cold war emerged, both East and West sought to gain allies among the less developed and recently decolonized states by offering economic support for development. For the US and its allies, this assumed a link between rapid economic development and integration within the emerging global liberal, free market, capitalist order, while for the USSR it meant support for a centrally planned, socialist order.

These opposing approaches, which recognized the important, if different, role for the state as the agent of development, suffered a major setback in the early 1980s. The developing countries had borrowed heavily in the 1970s in response to the rise in oil prices. The rich countries' strategy for dealing with the second oil price hike in 1979 resulted in massive rises in interest rates and steep falls in commodity prices in the early 1980s. As a result, the developing countries were unable to repay spiralling debts. The Group of Seven (G7) leading developed Western countries decided to deal with the debt problem on a country-by-country basis; their goal was to avoid the collapse of the international banking system by ensuring continued debt repayment. Towards this end, the IMF and the World Bank pursued a vigorous policy of structural adjustment lending throughout the developing world. They worked together in an unprecedented fashion to encourage developing countries to pursue market-oriented strategies, open their borders to foreign investment, and adopt a 'small state' culture that saw reductions in spending on such things as education, health, and welfare. Exports were promoted so that these countries would earn the foreign exchange necessary to keep up with their debt repayments.

Following the collapse of the socialist bloc in 1989, this neoliberal economic and political philosophy came to dominate development thinking across the globe (**see Ch. 16**). Neoliberalism, in both its economic theory and public policy forms, asserts that an unregulated, free market capitalist system not only delivers economic development, but also promotes important political and social values such as freedom of choice

and the rights of the individual. According to the neoliberal view, these values are best served by the state adopting non-interventionist policies in social and economic affairs and treating all calls for state support with suspicion. The role of the state should be to protect the existing order and to promote neoliberalism further through policies designed to dismantle any remaining regulatory structures. This includes the deregulation of business; the privatization of any remaining publicly owned services and industry; a reduction in or abolition of welfare programmes; and minimum taxation, particularly on businesses. These policies must also be promoted at the international level to support the free movement of capital around the world and the global reach of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005).

The championing of neoliberal economic values heralded a major ideological shift and played an important role in accelerating the globalization process. The 'embedded liberalism' of the early post-war decades gave way to unadulterated neoclassical economic policies that favoured a minimalist state and an enhanced role for the market: the so-called **Washington Consensus**. In the future, all economic planning would be directed at further enabling an economic environment for capital growth. Maximum welfare, it was argued, was best achieved through the liberalization of trade, finance, and investment. Such policies would also ensure the repayment of debt. The former Eastern bloc countries were understood to be in transition from centrally planned to market economies. The free market was now the major engine of growth and associated development, an approach reflected in the strategies of the IMF, the World Bank, and, through the Uruguay Round of trade discussions carried out under the auspices of GATT, the World Trade Organization (WTO).

By the end of the 1990s, the G7 (later the G8) and associated international financial institutions had begun to realize that in the new neoliberal order there were over a billion poor and hungry people. In response, they adopted a slightly modified version of the neoliberal economic orthodoxy, labelled the **post-Washington Consensus**, which stressed pro-poor growth and poverty reduction based on continued domestic policy reform that included more trade liberalization and further state withdrawal from economic and social policy. Henceforth, locally owned national poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) would be the focus for funding (Cammack 2002; IMF 2016). The purpose of PRSP was to encourage less developed states to orientate their domestic policies towards poverty reduction programmes, focusing on outcomes, the engagement of civil society, and partnerships with external investors and local stakeholders. These papers quickly became the litmus test for funding from an increasingly integrated line-up of global financial institutions and donors.

Developing countries have made significant gains during the post-war period, at least as measured by the orthodox criteria for economic growth: GDP per capita and industrialization. As we saw earlier, between 1990 and 2015, the UN claimed that the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day declined from nearly half of those living in the less developed world to 14 per cent; globally, the number has declined from 1.9 billion people to 836 million over this same time period (UN 2015*b*: 4). However, these gains have not been spread uniformly across all developing countries, with much of the reduction attributable to economic growth in China and India. Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and some parts of Latin America continue to record high levels of poverty, although these regions have also achieved small improvements.

Development: alternative approaches

An alternative view of development has emerged from a few governments, UN agencies, grassroots movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and some academics. Their concerns have centred broadly on entitlement and distribution, often expressed in the language of human rights (**see Ch. 31**). Poverty is not identified as the inability to provide for family members and one's own material needs through subsistence or cash transactions, but by the absence of an environment conducive to human well-being, broadly conceived in spiritual, social, and community terms. These voices of opposition have grown significantly louder as ideas polarize following neoliberalism's apparent universal triumph. The language of opposition is changing to incorporate matters of democracy, such as political empowerment, participation, meaningful self-determination for the majority, protection of the commons, the preservation of culture, and an emphasis on pro-poor growth.

Since the early 1970s, there have been numerous efforts to stimulate debate about development and to highlight its contested nature. Critical ideas have been put forward that can be synthesized into an alternative approach. These have originated with various NGOs, grassroots development organizations, individuals,

UN organizations, and private foundations. Disparate social movements not directly related to the development agenda have contributed to the flourishing of alternative viewpoints: for example, the women's movement, the peace movement, movements for democracy, green movements, and cooperative movements (Thomas 2000; **see Case Study 26.2**).

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's 1975 publication *What Now? Another Development?* was an early noteworthy event in this process. It advanced an alternative conception that development should be (1) need-oriented (material and non-material); (2) endogenous (coming from within a society); (3) self-reliant (in terms of human, natural, and cultural resources); (4) ecologically sound; and (5) based on structural transformations (of economy, society, gender, power relations) (Ekins 1992: 99).

Despite the pursuit of neoliberal policies, which saw developing countries post impressive rates of growth in GDP from the late 1970s, rates of poverty saw little change: the minority became richer while the majority remained poor. From the neoliberal perspective, economic and social polarization is not a problem, provided discontent does not turn to political action that threatens to derail the liberalization project itself. According to the orthodox view, discontent can be mitigated by offering what Robert W. Cox has termed 'famine relief' through aid and poverty reduction schemes. 'Riot control', the use of the police and the military, remains a second option when 'famine relief' fails to quell the threat of social unrest (R. Cox 1997). A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report recognized the risks associated with inequality, noting that between the 1990s and late 2000s inequality in developed countries increased by 9 per cent and in less developed countries by 11 per cent (UNDP 2014). The World Economic Forum's (Davos) annual risk report in 2014 cited 'severe income disparity' as a persistent threat to the global economy (World Economic Forum 2014). And in a 2014 report, the IMF questioned 'trickle-down'—the assumption that wealth created at the top of the social order will, over time, benefit those at the bottom—as the solution to poverty, focusing instead on the dangers that global inequality poses (IMF 2014).

The majority of those who pursue alternatives for poverty alleviation do so within the framework of the current neoliberal political economy. A more radical approach argues that poverty is an important, and necessary, characteristic of neoliberalism. To find alternative solutions for poverty within an order that accepts poverty as one of its defining characteristics is therefore

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Case Study 26.2 Multidimensional poverty alleviation in Himachal Pradesh

Himachal Pradesh is in the north of India, situated in the western Himalayas, some 355 km from Delhi. For some decades, the state has pursued policies intended to deliver strong economic growth that supports human development and poverty reduction. In contrast to many other northern states in India, Himachal Pradesh has a reputation as a 'stable, inclusive, cohesive and well-governed state'. Although 90 per cent of the population (6.8 million) live in rural areas, poverty has declined from 36.8 per cent to 8.5 per cent since the mid-1990s. This has been achieved through a multidimensional approach that promotes education for all, increasing the number of women in employment, an increase in public sector jobs, improvements in infrastructure, land reform, and attention to environmental concerns.

Education has been one of the key drivers of Himachal Pradesh's success. This is seen in the increasing level of primary education attainment and the low number of children who receive no education. In particular, so-called 'excluded groups'—Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (TC) that represent the lowest social status under the Indian caste system—make up 30 per cent of the population. Importantly, the education of women and girls enabled 63 per cent of rural women to report themselves as employed, adding to family income. To sustain existing progress, Himachal Pradesh must ensure an educated youth cohort with adequate skills to take jobs that will support an aging population over time.

Given the high numbers living in rural areas, land reform, which began in the 1950s, was an essential element in achieving poverty reduction. Today, 80 per cent of rural households possess some land on which to grow crops, with the distribution of land between different social groups more equally spread than in the rest of India. Key to this success has been consistent policy and a determination to pursue every possible avenue for poverty reduction, including inclusiveness and environmentally friendly development. Local accountability, changes in attitudes towards gender that enable the participation of women in development, attention to sustaining the historic heritage of the community, and transparency about providing equal benefits for all are essential.

(*Source*: M. B. Das et al. 2015)

Question 1: Is it possible to apply Himachal Pradesh's policy on poverty alleviation elsewhere in the world, or are the social and economic conditions unique to North India?

Question 2: Is the education of women and girls the key to fighting poverty and hunger?

futile. Put simply, if poverty is a necessary component of neoliberalism, then neoliberalism must be overturned. As evidence, radicals point to the growing gap between the richest and poorest that globalizing neoliberalism is creating. In all regions of the world, inequality has increased over the last three decades, with the richest 1 per cent now twice as wealthy as the poorest 50 per cent (World Inequality Lab 2018). The radicals remain unclear about just how the structures of neoliberalism might be dismantled and replaced by a new structure that favours the poor, although social solidarity, care of our planet, and a new ethical politics are central ideas (Cimadamore, Koehler, and Pogge 2016).

From the 1970s, various NGOs, such as the World Development Movement, have campaigned for a form of development that takes aspects of this alternative approach on board. Grassroots movements have grown up around specific issues, such as dams (Narmada in India) or access to common resources (the rubber tappers of the Brazilian Amazon). The worldwide growth of the Green movement in the 1980s gave a great impetus to such campaigns. The preparatory process before the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992 gave indigenous groups, women, children, and other previously voiceless groups a chance to express their views in a parallel NGO forum, a move that received wide approval (**see Ch. 24**). Today, most major UN conferences follow a similar strategy, the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference being a recent example.

The **global financial crisis**, which began in 2008, hit developing countries hard. In particular, the countries that were more closely enmeshed in the global economy were hit the hardest. While developed countries found the resources to mitigate some of the more critical consequences of the crisis, the less developed were not so fortunate. The shock of the crisis has meant that developed countries are somewhat reluctant to engage further in poverty reduction programmes. The steady rise in the price of staple foods added to the misery of many living in less developed countries (World Bank 2009). For some, the crisis exposes the increasing impotence of the nation-state to solve global problems that flow from the processes of globalization. In recognizing that, today, our lives are tied more closely to global rather than local markets, questions arise about the possibilities for the state to provide adequate regulation to protect the people. It seems clear that few, if any, were aware that financial markets represented a threat to global stability, including the potential to pitch many more millions into poverty and hunger. As noted earlier, if the organization of global capitalism requires a pool of 'precarious' and 'excluded' workers, and production and finance are organized globally, then what chance does the state have to implement meaningful regulation (R. Cox 1997)?

Resistance, empowerment, and development

Democracy, *as an instrument for the voice of the poor*, is at the heart of the alternative conception of development. Grassroots movements are playing an important role in challenging entrenched structures of power in formal democratic societies. In the face of increasing globalization, with the erosion of local community control over daily life and the extension of the power of transnational corporations in the global market, people express their resistance through the language of human rights (T. Evans 2005; Stammers 2009). They are making a case for local control and local empowerment as the core of development, rejecting the national and global. They are protecting what they identify as the immediate source of their survival—water, forest, and land. They are rejecting the dominant agenda of private and public spheres and setting an alternative one. Well-known examples include the Chiapas' uprising in Mexico and protests at the annual meetings of the WTO. More recently, the Occupy movement, which further highlighted the social and economic unfairness of power relations in society under the banner 'We are the 99 per cent', achieved a global reach, with protests in nearly 100 major cities located in every continent (Wolff and Barsamian 2012). Discontent over inequality also fuelled the 'Arab Spring', which swept across North Africa and parts of the Middle East (Dabashi 2012). Rather than placidly accepting the Western model of development and its associated values, these protests symbolize the struggle for identity and substantive democracy that communities across the world crave. This alternative conception of development therefore values diversity above universality, and is based on a different understanding of human rights from that promoted by the developed countries (T. Evans 2011).

The Alternative Declaration produced by the NGO Forum at the Copenhagen Summit enshrines principles of community participation, empowerment, equity, self-reliance, and sustainability (Alternative NGO Declaration 1995). It singles out the role of women and youth. The declaration rejects the neoliberal agenda

accepted by governments of Global North and South, seeing it as a path to aggravation rather than alleviation of the global social crisis. It calls for the immediate cancellation of all debt, improved terms of trade, greater transparency and accountability of the IMF and World Bank, and increased regulation of multinationals. An alternative view of democracy is central to its conception of development.

The orthodox response to criticisms

The relationship between economic growth and development was recognized as early as 1987, in the publication of the influential Brundtland Commission, which championed the concept of **sustainable development** (Brundtland et al. 1987). This was continued in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference, both of which stressed ideas of sustainable development. Central to this concept is the idea that the effort to achieve greater development in one generation should not be at the expense of future generations. In short, measures taken today to reduce poverty through economic development must not damage the environmental resources that will be needed equally by future generations. Exactly how economic growth—which demands ever more natural resources—can be achieved without depleting environmental resources is an issue that remains unclear.

This is the 'limits to growth' question that remains at the heart of development debates today (Meadows 2012). While organizations like the World Bank and the IMF have taken some measures to incorporate environmental issues in their development planning, critics argue that the policies of these organizations, and most states, continue to focus on market-based development as the tool for achieving sustainable development, with self-regulation for transnational corporations. The expansion of the global economy comes first and continues to consume the planet's scarce natural resources at the expense of protecting an environment in which future generations must live their lives, free from poverty and hunger.

More recently, the Millennium Development Goals, agreed at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, represent an attempt to answer earlier critics. The first of the eight goals had three objectives: (1) to halve the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day by 2015, as compared to 1990 numbers; (2) to achieve decent employment for women, men, and young people; and (3) to halve the proportion of people who suffer hunger by 2015,

as compared to 1990 numbers. The UN's *Millennium Development Goals Report 2015* claims that these targets have been largely met, with extreme poverty reduced by half and the number of people suffering malnutrition by nearly half (UN 2015*b*). Efforts to achieve these goals focused on debt relief and further support for poverty relief programmes throughout the world.

The process of incorporating ideas from critics into current policy continues (Sheppard and Leitner 2010). It is seen in the language of poverty reduction appearing in World Bank and IMF policies: 'participation' and 'empowerment' are the buzzwords (Cornwall and Brock 2005). Yet the underlying macroeconomic policy remains unchanged. An examination of the development orthodoxy's contribution to increasing global inequality is not on the agenda. The gendered outcomes of macroeconomic policies are largely ignored. Despite promises of new funding at the UN Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in 2002, new transfers of finance from developed to developing countries have been slow in coming. The UN expectation for developed countries to provide at least 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) has been followed by some but not by all. In addition to new finance, the Monterrey Conference saw commitments to write off $40 billion of debt owed by the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). However, the commitment was not implemented with immediate effect, did not cover all needy countries, and received a lukewarm reception in some G8 countries. **Table 26.3** gives recent figures for **official development assistance** (ODA), which for most states is considerably below the 0.7 per cent set by the United Nations.

Despite the aim of the Rio + 20 conference in 2012 (the follow-up to the first Rio conference) to continue

Table 26.3 Net official development assistance in 2015 as a percentage of gross national income

Country	Percent of GNI as ODA	Amount in USD (billions)
Spain	0.13	2.41
Korea	0.14	2.20
United States	0.17	35.26
Japan	0.22	11.48
Iceland	0.24	0.50
Canada	0.28	4.28
France	0.37	11.36
Germany	0.52	34.68
Denmark	0.85	2.40
Sweden	1.40	7.1

Source: Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance for Development

the struggle to reduce poverty without causing further environmental degradation, critics argued that pursuit of national interests had undermined this strategy. They suggested that the only people dancing in Rio following the conference were those who benefit from an economic model that puts profit ahead of people and the planet. For NGOs, the only outcome was justifiable anger that the scale of the problem remained unacknowledged, a failure that became more urgent in the post-2008 global economic downturn.

The UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), formulated in 2015 and intended to follow the MDG, are the most recent move that expresses concern for the alternative approach to development. Critics of the MDG observed that there was no consideration of the root causes of poverty, that gender inequality was not included, that human rights were not mentioned, and that the holistic nature of development was not understood. Of the 17 SDGs, the first and second (ending poverty and ending hunger) are of direct relevance here, while others can be seen as a response to the critical alternatives discussed earlier (for instance, ensuring health and well-being for all, gender equality, fresh water supply). Exactly how these new goals will be measured, promoted, and funded remains unclear. The Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) estimates that providing a social safety net that ensures the eradication of extreme poverty will cost $66 billion a year, while building the infrastructure for sustainable fresh water, agriculture, transport, and energy would require an annual investment of $7 trillion (ICESDF 2015). The 2017 UN *Sustainable Development Goals Report* expresses concern over progress so far, arguing that implementation may have begun but 'the clock is ticking', and that 'the rate of progress in many areas is far slower than needed to meet the targets by 2030' (UN 2017*b*).

An appraisal of the orthodox approach's responses to its critics

The large UN conference remains the central tool in international programmes for reducing global poverty. These are often followed by '+ 5' mini-conferences intended to assess progress and to further promote and refine agreements made earlier. However, whether these conferences provide a genuine opportunity for progress is often questioned. For example, the 2009 Copenhagen conference on climate change ended in disarray, producing only the weakest of accords as a political 'fix' rather than achieving the aim of a legally binding treaty. In addition, the fourth UN conference on women, held in Beijing in 1995, produced only limited steps by global financial institutions, like the World Bank, to integrate women into the prevailing economic order. Two central planks in the programme from this conference were to improve women's access to economic opportunities and to increase women's voice and agency in the household and society. The World Bank accepts that improvements in the lives of women are patchy. Most importantly, to achieve such goals within the existing economic order would require systematically mainstreaming gender in all development projects, rather than regarding it as an 'add-on', which critics argue does not achieve lasting results.

Critical voices are growing in number and range, even among supporters of the mainstream approach. This disquiet focuses on the maldistribution of the benefits of neoliberalism, which is increasingly seen as a threat to local, national, regional, and even global order (**see Opposing Opinions 26.1**). Moreover, some regard the social protest that accompanies economic globalization as a potential threat to the neoliberal project. Thus, supporters of globalization are keen to temper its most unpopular effects by modifying neoliberal policies. Small but nevertheless important changes are taking place. For example, the World Bank has issued guidelines on the treatment of indigenous peoples, resettlement, the environmental impact of its projects, gender, and disclosure of information. It is implementing social safety nets when pursuing structural adjustment policies, and it is promoting microcredit as a way to empower women, although the efficacy of this is now questioned (Roodman 2012). In addition, the IMF has developed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to reduce the debt burden of the poorest states. However, whether these guidelines and concerns really inform policy, and whether these new policies and facilities result in practical outcomes that impact the fundamental causes of poverty, particularly in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, remains unclear.

There is a tremendously long way to go for the core values of the alternative model of development to gain credence in the corridors of power, nationally and internationally. Nevertheless, the alternative view, marginal though it remains, has had some noteworthy successes in modifying orthodox development. These may not be insignificant for those whose destinies have up until now been largely determined by the attempted universal application of a selective set of local, essentially Western, values.

Opposing Opinions 26.1   The neoliberal world order will ultimately deliver on its promise of development and the abolition of poverty and hunger worldwide

For

Neoliberalism places human freedom at its centre. The values represented by neoliberalism underpin the core idea of universal human rights, understood as civil and political rights. This idea, expressed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has gained an authority through which people can express their discontent with authoritarian and totalitarian forms of government.

Neoliberalism promotes free market enterprise. The freedoms promoted by neoliberalism offer individuals an opportunity to engage unhindered in free market relations, to develop their creative business skills, and to create wealth for the good of the community.

Neoliberalism will eventually abolish poverty through 'trickle-down'. The term 'trickle-down' describes the benefits that all will eventually enjoy as wealth creators freely exercise their creative talents. While wealth may be generated at the top of the social order, the lives of the poor and hungry in the community will also be improved as wealth is invested to create jobs and improve wages.

Minimum government and taxation are an expression of human freedom. The state's activities should be minimized so that the individual can get on with the important business of making wealth. Taxation must be kept to the lowest possible level so that the maximum amount of capital is available for investment. Low taxation means low levels of social benefits, for example in state welfare, education, public housing, and health.

Neoliberalism's success can be shown empirically. The success of the neoliberal world order is demonstrated by wealth creation in all successful countries, including the less developed. As the success of the MDG shows, even in times of economic depression, the poor and hungry benefit from the existing neoliberal world order.

Against

The neoliberal definition of human freedom is limited. Civil and political rights comprise only part of the values we call universal human rights. Economic, social, cultural, and **group rights** are missing from the neoliberal order, although such rights are an essential part of what makes us human.

Wealth and the community. Enterprise and wealth creation require a stable social context. Since the vast majority of individuals contribute to this context, it is only fair that all should benefit through a redistribution of wealth.

'Trickle-down' does not work. The wealth of the rich does not 'trickle down' but rather amasses in sheltered tax havens to avoid taxation. The growing gap between the wealthiest and poorest over the last few decades, a decline in the real incomes of working people, and rising income inequality all point to the failure of 'trickle-down'.

Declining state social and welfare provision have damaging effects. Both developed and less developed states have reduced social and welfare provision under neoliberalism, including spending on education, health, social welfare, housing, and the environment. For less developed states in particular, a reduction in these forms of spending is a condition for acquiring development aid.

Claimed declines in global poverty and hunger have been artificially induced. The Millennium Development Goals pay little attention to the causes of poverty and how it can be addressed sustainably. What change has been achieved has relied on external innovation and funding, rather than community initiative driven by local culture and knowledge.

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1. Will the greater reach and intensity of neoliberalism reduce poverty and hunger?

2. Does the greater wealth generated by globalization accumulate at the top or trickle down to the bottom of the social order?

3. If there is a human right to food, who has the duty to fulfil it?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Key Points

- Development is a contested concept.
- Development policies since the mid-twentieth century have been dominated by the mainstream approach—embedded liberalism and, more recently, neoliberalism.
- The last two decades of the twentieth century saw some movement towards alternative conceptions of development—

  emphasizing participation, empowerment, and sustainability—with NGOs, grassroots movements, and some UN organizations taking the lead.
- Whether the mainstream approach's attempt to incorporate some of the language and ideas developed by the alternative approach will actually bring real change is questionable.

Conclusion

Considering the competing conceptions of poverty, hunger, and development explored in this chapter, it is clear that no consensus exists on definitions, causes, or solutions.

We are faced with an awesome development challenge. Although the UN claims success for the MDG, doubts remain about the appropriate way to measure poverty and hunger and about the accuracy of the statistics. Much of the claimed success can be attributed to the rapid growth of the Chinese and Indian economies during the last decade, while other developing countries seem to show little improvement. The consequences of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis continue to impact some populations now facing high levels of unemployment and rising commodity prices. Recognizing this prospect, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, writing in the 2012 *MDG Report*, argued that the 'developing world must not be allowed to decelerate or reverse the progress that has been made' in spite of the economic crisis of the time (UN 2012).

Most recently, in some parts of the world social unrest has turned to violent conflict that directly affects levels of poverty and hunger. Currently, 155 million children under the age of 5 are considered stunted, of whom nearly 75 per cent are living in countries affected by conflict. In these countries, women and children of all ages suffer from hunger. The UN Security Council has now acknowledged that 'ongoing armed conflicts and violence have devastating humanitarian consequences, often hindering an effective humanitarian response, and are therefore a major cause of . . . famine' (UN 2018*a*). As Ambassador Jonathan Allen has argued, although we live in a world of abundance, today 'hunger is used as a weapon of war' (UN 2018*b*).

The orthodox model of development is being held up for closer scrutiny as we become more aware of the risks as well as the opportunities brought by globalization and neoliberal economics. The key question is: can globalization develop a human face?

The current development orthodoxy is following a reformist pathway. History will reveal whether this pathway bears the seeds of its own destruction by delivering too little, too late, to too few people. As students of International Relations, we must bring these issues in from the margins of the discipline and pursue them as central to our study.

Questions

1. Define poverty.
2. Explain the orthodox approach to development and outline its measurement criteria.
3. Summarize and assess the critical alternative model of development.
4. In what ways has the neoliberal approach to development responded to its critics?
5. Outline the advantages and disadvantages of the neoliberal approach to development.
6. What can we expect to achieve from large UN international conferences on poverty and hunger?
7. Critically explore the gendered nature of poverty.
8. Do the Millennium Development Goals on poverty and hunger take account of the alternative approach to these problems?
9. Why has the discipline of International Relations been slow to engage with issues of poverty and development?
10. Assess the prospects for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

General

Baroch, P. (2013), *The Economic Development of the Third World* (London: Routledge). Offers a history of policies to bring development to the less developed world, including a critique of attempts to implant Western ideas of development.

Thomas, C. (2000), *Global Governance, Development and Human Security* (London: Pluto). Examines the global development policies pursued by global governance institutions, especially the IMF and the World Bank, in the 1980s and 1990s. It assesses their impact on human security and analyses different paths towards the achievement of human security in the twenty-first century.

Development

Berger, M. T., and Weber, H. (2014), *Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Places Third World development in the context of postcolonial critique and debates about modernity.

Sen, A. (1999), *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Asks why, in a world that has seen spectacular growth, many in the less developed countries remain unfree.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (annual), *Human Development Reports* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Focus on a particular issue each year (e.g. human rights, democracy, equality, women) and include a wealth of statistical information on many aspects of social and economic life.

Poverty and hunger

Caparros, M. (2019), *Hunger: The Mortal Crisis of Our Time* (New York: Other Press). Looks at the paradox of poverty in a world of plenty.

Sen, A. (1981), *Poverty and Famines* (Oxford: Clarendon Press). A ground-breaking analysis of the causes of hunger that incorporates detailed studies of a number of famines and convincingly challenges the orthodox view of the causes of hunger.

Von Grebmer, K. et al. (2010), *Global Hunger Index 2010: The Challenge of Hunger: Focus on the Crisis of Child Undernutrition* (Washington, DC: IFPRI). This edition of the Global Hunger Index (GHI) focuses on child malnutrition. The GHI is published by the International Food Policy Research Institute; it was first published in 2006 to increase attention on the hunger problem and to mobilize the political will to address it.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Global trade and global finance

MATTHEW WATSON

Framing Questions

- **Given the recent rise of populist nationalism and the associated retreat of liberal globalism, are the political premises from which global trade and global finance have been managed for so long now in terminal decline?**

- **Why is the global economy so good at allowing some people to own untold riches while many others have too little money to meet basic subsistence needs?**

- **Would the world be better off without the institutions of global economic governance?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter introduces students to important issues in the conduct of global trade and global finance. It shows that the two spheres are regulated by different governance institutions, but that disturbances in one can result in related disturbances in the other. This corresponds to one of the most widely cited definitions of economic globalization, in which globalization is understood as the increased sensitivity of one part of the world economy to events originating elsewhere. The chapter provides a brief outline of the increased turnover of trade and financial flows in recent decades. However, it is not immediately obvious that such flows are genuinely global in their geographical scope, because they appear to be heavily concentrated in those countries that are powerful enough to have shaped world economic relations to their own advantage. The remaining sections focus on the institutional history of the regulation of trade and finance. Once again, they suggest the significance of political power, demonstrating that a global elite has successfully imprinted its interests in prevailing institutionalized regulatory norms. This has generally overridden the search for systemic regulatory coherence, enhancing the degree to which difficulties in either trade or finance create knock-on problems in the other sphere. The recent rise of populist nationalism has challenged the dominance of the global elites, but its 'successes' will do nothing to enhance systemic regulatory coherence.

Introduction

The 1970s was an economically troubled decade for the advanced industrialized countries of the Western world. Growth rates fell substantially from their post-Second World War plateau, with unemployment rising to a level unseen since the **Great Depression** of the 1930s. State-led attempts to energize new growth failed to revive the economy, and instead governments paid the price for their well-intentioned policies in accelerating inflation. The political mood subsequently turned against government involvement in the economy. National controls on the free movement of capital, money, goods, **services**, and people were progressively eased, and the language of 'markets' began to dominate the way politicians talked about their economic priorities. International institutions were also given extra authority to deprive markets of their previously overwhelmingly national character and to superimpose an increasingly global logic in its place (**see Ch. 16**).

The 2010s has been a similarly troubled decade. Growth rates among the advanced industrialized countries have been more badly affected since the onset of the **global financial crisis** of 2007–8 than at any time in the 1970s. The nature of work has changed rather dramatically for many people, with the trend away from secure employment, labour rights, and workplace protection. The 'jobs for life' phenomenon now looks like an historical artefact of the so-called **golden age of welfare capitalism**, and wages have stagnated for around the bottom 40 per cent of earners in the Western world. As yet, however, it looks as though the response of global policy-makers has been to ask, 'Crisis? What crisis?' There have been no repeats of the public pleas of mea culpa from the 1970s, when policy-makers began to think through the process of challenging previously agreed economic certainties so that governance priorities could be systematically refashioned. The most important global economic opinion-formers have generally stuck to the old story that, in essence, markets know best. It was, of course, excesses of market ideology, the breakdown of market logic, and the malfunctioning of market institutions that led to the global financial crisis in the first place. It is not immediately obvious, then, why 'more market' remains the orthodox policy prescription of how to now put things right.

However, this should not be misread for the conclusion that absolutely everything has stayed the same politically in the crisis-hit countries. Almost without exception, those countries which experienced the economic shock of the global financial crisis have also recently witnessed the rise of populist politics domestically. Some of this—think of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain—has projected a left-leaning politics of protecting the poorest, making sure that work pays enough for a dignified life for everyone, and forcing those who benefited from previous market excesses to pay for their own financial crisis. But most of it—think of the election of Donald Trump in the US, the UK vote to leave the European Union, the Front National candidate reaching the run-off for the presidency in France, the Alternative für Deutschland making a parliamentary breakthrough in Germany, the decimation of the mainstream parties in the Italian general election, and the very strong recent showing of anti-immigrant parties in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—has had a very different political face. This has been a populist nationalism which has harked back to its own perceived golden age: a time before globalization, when national society was a more authentic version of itself than it has subsequently become. In this new conception of the world, capital and money are to remain relatively unrestricted in their movement across national borders, goods also unless a well-targeted trade war is likely to prove popular with the electoral base (**see Case Study 27.1**), but people much less so (**see Chs 18 and 25**). The hallmark of this new politics is the stigmatization of immigrants and the rejection of any claims that can be made to move from one country to another if this is likely to dilute the perceived purity of the national community. It is around these questions, allied to their implications for the future of liberal globalization, that the biggest fractures in Western politics have recently opened up.

The globalization of trade and finance

The political cleavage between populist nationalists and liberal globalists is activated by different answers to the question of whether economic globalization has been beneficial domestically. However, significant disagreement remains in the academic literature about just how prevalent the trend towards genuine economic

Case Study 27.1 The Chinese currency and the US trade deficit

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In August 2018, Donald Trump broke with another of the conventions associated with his office. He became the first US president in a quarter of a century to accuse another country directly of using the levers of the state for the purpose of currency manipulation: 'I think China's manipulating their currency, absolutely' (Mason and Holland 2018). This simply repeated the populist nationalist message that he had used consistently when on the campaign trail. China is not playing fair by US workers, Trump claims, by using an artificially cheap yuan to undercut the price of US products.

It is difficult, however, to find any economist who agrees with Trump's diagnosis of the problem. Nonetheless, this remains an example of global political posturing of great interest, because it shows how actions in one sphere of global trade and finance can have implications in the other. The mammoth US trade deficit with China is not in dispute, but it can be politicized in many different ways. Trump's version of populist nationalism involves making symbolic gestures to a domestic workforce which has good reason to think that it has been ill-served by economic

globalization in recent decades. His willingness to march his country into a trade war with China tells his electoral base that he wants to stick up for their interests by repatriating jobs that have previously been lost to overseas competitors. The announcement that the Chinese monetary authorities are deliberately keeping the yuan undervalued against the dollar is all the 'evidence' he requires to say that he has right on his side to continue pre-emptive action against China.

Unfortunately for Trump, though, the actual evidence points in the opposite direction. Throughout his candidacy and presidency so far, **futures market** trading has implied that the yuan is overvalued not undervalued. China has burnt through a considerable amount of its foreign exchange reserves to keep the yuan at a higher level than would have been the case under pure exchange rate floating. This is a rate that remains significantly higher than when the Chinese monetary authorities first allowed their currency to partially float in 2005. The removal of state support for the yuan would cause the price of Chinese merchandise goods to fall relative to US prices, thus providing Chinese producers with an enhanced competitive advantage and most likely widening the US trade deficit still further—the exact opposite of what Trump wants. China's on-going support for an overvalued currency is also a symbolic gesture. It is designed to facilitate the yuan's inclusion into the IMF's system of **Special Drawing Rights**. Although this is a purely honorary role, it would send the political signal that the yuan is now an international reserve currency increasingly on a par with the dollar and the euro.

Question 1: What does it say about the present state of domestic US politics that Trump's claim about Chinese currency manipulation continues to resonate despite having no obvious basis in economic reality?

Question 2: Why might China continue to pursue an overvalued yuan for political reasons, even though this operates against its producers' economic interests?

globalization is. The word 'globalization' has become synonymous with the time period of enhanced national market integration since the crisis of the 1970s, but it also tends to be used—with varying degrees of analytical precision—to describe the pattern of interdependent economic flows which has resulted (**see Chs 1 & 2**). There have certainly been large increases since the 1970s in the integration of national markets for both traded goods and financial flows, but this does not in itself mean that the ensuing market arrangements incorporate all countries of the world in any way evenly. As Held et al. (1999) argued 20 years ago, it is important to differentiate between the 'intensity' and the 'extensity' of supposedly global flows of trade and finance. Intensity measures reveal the degree to which national

economic borders are now traversed by such flows: they indicate whether there are higher volumes of flows than previously, but remain silent on their geographical character. Extensity measures, by contrast, focus on the geographical dispersal of contemporary trade and finance: they ask not simply about overall volumes of flows but also whether they systematically incorporate more countries of the world. The distinction, then, is between the speeding up and the spreading out of flows of trade and finance. Somewhat confusingly, the single word 'globalization' is frequently used to describe both patterns, even though it would clearly be preferable to keep them analytically distinct.

What seems to have occurred in general is the emergence of particular globalization 'hotspots'

centred on the most advanced industrialized countries, in which there has been a significant augmentation of cross-border economic activity. Intensity measures therefore appear to illustrate the essence of these changes better. They are captured in relation to trade by economists' so-called **gravity models**. Such models provide robust empirical corroboration for a very straightforward proposition: that trade flows are likely to touch down with a final consumer who lives closer to, rather than further away from, the place of production. Merchandise goods are much more likely to move between countries with similar levels of per capita income, and they are also cheaper to transport over shorter rather than longer distances. By contrast, financial flows are conventionally regarded to be 'weightless'. Even here, though, the concentration of advanced financial infrastructure in a limited number of world cities means that financial flows typically repeat the same established geographical patterns rather than create brand new connections of a truly global nature. Greater extensity of economic globalization *is* also apparent in some very important cases—for instance, the emergence of the BRICs economies and the continued rise of East Asia (**see Ch. 5**). However, many of the poorest countries of the world remain largely bystanders to the new structures of production and consumption. They thus appear to have little connection to the prevailing pattern of globalization hotspots, registering little in terms of either the intensity or the extensity of globalization.

Partly this is an issue of development, because the organization of cross-border economic activities has tended to focus only on the most advanced sectors of the world economy. Partly it is an issue of political asymmetries in the regulatory system for global trade and global finance, with the advanced industrialized countries keeping most of the economic gains from globalization for themselves. As other chapters in this volume address development issues (in particular **see Ch. 26**), this chapter instead focuses primarily on the regulatory principles on which global trade and global finance are today grounded. The aim is to highlight the means through which the balance of power in the inter-state system is imprinted on these two regimes. This will make it possible to conceptualize the tendency towards economic globalization as a clearly political process. The same basic conceptualization will also be necessary if the recent rise of populist nationalism continues unchecked and leads to significant subsequent *de*globalization (**see Case Study 27.1**).

The most frequently cited indicator of economic globalization is the eye-catching increase in world trade (**see Box 27.1**) since the 1970s. This reflects the successful constitution of ever deeper international markets for merchandise goods. The relevant increase is demonstrated best by looking at standardized figures for the volume of world exports, because this allows for meaningful direct comparisons to be made. Taking the 2000 figure as the baseline number of 100—which itself corresponded in value terms to approximately $8.6 trillion of world trade—this compares with standardized numbers of 22 for 1970, 37 for 1980, and 54 for 1990. In other words, in this take-off and early maturation stage of economic globalization, the volume of world exports grew by roughly a factor of 4.5 between 1970 and 2000, a factor of 3 between 1980 and 2000, and a factor of 2 between 1990 and 2000 alone. This signifies an upward trend that has only partly survived the fallout from the global financial crisis and the dawning of an era of new uncertainties. The overall value of world trade on merchandise goods stood at $16.0 trillion in 2016, the latest year for which complete records were available at the time of writing (September 2019)—or $16,000,000,000,000 when written out in full. This is up from $13.7 trillion in 2007, immediately before the onset of the global financial crisis (WTO 2008: 9), but down from $18.5 trillion in 2014, the current record (WTO 2015: 24). The standardized number for 2016, again using 2000 as the benchmark of 100, was 186, as compared with the all-time high of 215 recorded in 2014 (all figures calculated from WTO 2017).

Historical figures also show that the world economy, in general, was becoming more open to global trade from the 1970s onwards. The relevant indicator here is the ratio of growth in global trade to growth in global GDP. If the two numbers are exactly the same, and therefore the ratio is 1:1, all increases in world export demand are fully accounted for by the fact that the world economy as a whole is growing, not that it is becoming generically more open to trade. The WTO (2017: 18)

> ### Box 27.1   What is international trade?
>
> Simply stated, international trade occurs when one country's citizens produce a good that another country's citizens consume. There is consequently a geographical mismatch between the site of production and the site of consumption, with the good travelling across at least one national border to connect the producer economically with the consumer. The country producing the good for sale elsewhere in the world is the exporter; the country in which the good is eventually sold is the importer.

has calculated that, from 1945 to the present day, this ratio has averaged around 1.5:1 as a whole. The take-off period to economic globalization, 1970–2000, witnessed a ratio of 1.77:1, showing that increases in global trade were approaching double those of global GDP. Since 2000, however, the picture has been more mixed: well above 2:1 in good years for global merchandise trade, but averaging only around 1:1 since the global financial crisis. The most up-to-date figures, those for 2016, even dipped well below not only the long-term historical trend but also the post-global financial crisis trend, to 0.6:1. This shows the world economy becoming *less* open to trade and, therefore, for that year at any rate *less* globalized in intensity terms.

The trend for the changing extensity of trade globalization is even more difficult to evaluate and can be presented only on a case-by-case basis to conclude with any certainty that a particular country is experiencing a spreading out, as well as a speeding up, of its import/export activities. Extensity increases are more likely to happen the more deeply embedded a country is in a **regional trading agreement**. Yet even here the geographical pattern of the observed changes will almost certainly be more pronounced within the regional bloc than beyond its borders, as economists' gravity models suggest very clearly. Those borders in fact often present a good proxy for the outer limits of the extensity of global trade flows. North America, Asia, and Europe, with their deeply embedded regional trading agreements, accounted for 88 per cent of global trade in 2016 (WTO 2017: 13).

What, then, of financial flows? Most of the more remarkable changes in global financial markets since the 1970s do not require money to actually change hands. Therefore, they do not have a geographical character consistent with an explicit movement across space (**see Box 27.2**). Most financial markets today have an undeniably global component, insofar as advances in computer technology allow their trading activities to be accessed by anyone with a suitable network connection. Yet the trading itself typically takes place through highly capitalized and reputable counterparties—banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, professional investment bodies, pension funds, and so on—swapping giant IOUs. These are either added to or subtracted from their 'paper' position at the end of each day's trading. In this instance it is at most possible to talk about intensity measures.

We should be under no illusions, though, about just how significant trading flows on financial markets

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Box 27.2 What is international finance?

Even though the language and economic imagery used to describe international trade and international finance are often the same, in practice their dynamics differ substantially. Except for the case of **foreign direct investment**, it is very difficult to think of examples from the financial sphere in which one country 'produces' money for another country to 'consume'. Activity generally takes place on financial markets through taking paper positions using advanced information technology networks. Financial products only very rarely flow across borders in any straightforward import/export sense.

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now are. The average daily turnover on world **currency markets** alone was $5.07 trillion in 2016—in longhand $5,070,000,000,000. This represented a fall of 5 per cent on the figure recorded in the previous triennial Bank for International Settlements report in 2013, but still more than a fourfold increase since it was first reported in 2001 that the symbolic figure of $1 trillion per day had been passed (Bank for International Settlements 2016: 9). This means that despite the very impressive increases in world merchandise trade under conditions of economic globalization, flows of global trade are nonetheless completely dwarfed by flows of global finance. The dollar value of currency market turnover alone is presently over 80 times higher than the dollar value of all countries' export activities in aggregate. Moreover, outstanding positions on currency markets are themselves only a fraction of those on **derivatives contracts**, the type of financial instrument to which banks found themselves hopelessly overexposed after house prices stopped rising in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While not as big in purely monetary terms, **bond markets** have also been in the news throughout the past decade as the ensuing crisis evolved through various other forms into the **eurozone debt crisis** (**see Box 27.3**). Adverse patterns of trading on bond markets pushed the debt repayment schedules of Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and, in particular, Greece so high that they were required to seek external support in exchange for commitments to deeper public spending cuts. This is typical of the speculative impulse which drives so much of the activity in the global financial hotspots of major world cities such as New York, London, and Hong Kong. Gargantuan sums of 'paper' money are now used routinely as bets placed on the power of private financial institutions to force the movement in asset prices that will benefit them most.

The regulation of global trade

The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference brought together 44 soon-to-be victorious Allied countries. Its goal was to design a post-war governance structure for the Western world that would negate any chance of returning to the depression conditions of the 1930s (**see Ch. 16**). The new **Keynesian economic theory** of that time suggested that it was output rather than prices that adjusted to global imbalances in trade, thus forcing national economies into a repetitive cycle of reduced production and job losses. The ensuing blighting of lives through unprecedented levels of unemployment had preceded the embrace of fascist ideologies in many European countries, and British economist John Maynard Keynes was determined that the structure of global trade be stabilized to prevent political history from repeating itself.

His priority was to create a multilateral institution that would facilitate the continual expansion of global trade. The proposed institution was to be called the **International Trade Organization** (ITO). However, concerted dissent in US domestic politics meant that President Harry S. Truman did not even bother sending the final bill to Congress for ratification. It was deemed too interventionist for US politicians' tastes, because it would have introduced common standards in areas such as labour and the environment in an attempt to create a genuinely level playing field for import/export activities. In the 1940s the United States was by far the world's largest exporter, accounting for around a quarter of total global exports (WTO 2017: 100), and so an ITO without the US was deemed unthinkable. The plans for its introduction were therefore hastily dropped, leading to the establishment instead in 1947 of an ostensibly interim institution, the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT).

The GATT provided a negotiating context in which any country could extend **tariff** concessions agreed bilaterally to third countries. Despite some obvious progress in this regard in eight completed rounds, by the 1990s it had become increasingly unsuited to the purpose for which it was designed. The GATT looked most appropriate for deepening the intensity of trade globalization, but it became increasingly unwieldy, with each influx of new entrants into the international trade system following the process of decolonization multiplying exponentially the number of third-country agreements that had to be struck. None of the first five

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Box 27.3   The eurozone debt crisis

The eurozone debt crisis is one of the many aftershocks originating from the 2007–8 global financial crisis. The initial disturbances resulted from banks' failure to anticipate that their gigantic investments in **mortgage-backed securities** could become equally gigantic losses on their balance sheets. This was a problem specifically of private debt, but by the time it had morphed into pressure in the eurozone it became an issue of public debt. The countries at the heart of the eurozone crisis—Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and Greece—had not previously experienced major difficulties selling new public debt on bond markets to replace retiring public debt. Yet when speculators sniffed an opportunity for profit, these countries were suddenly forced to pay such high rates of interest on new public debt issues that their previous debt holdings became increasingly expensive to recycle. This situation was exacerbated by their lack of autonomy to set their own monetary policy to try to force down the cost of their debt recycling, since the eurozone operates a single monetary policy determined in Frankfurt by the European Central Bank. Critics of the ECB argue that it continually marginalizes the interests of weaker members of the Economic and Monetary Union and that eurozone monetary policy consequently follows the old **Bundesbank** policy model of strict counter-inflationary orthodoxy. The insistence of Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, that the ECB maintain its pre-set policy course throughout the worst of the crisis—even in the face of an imminent Greek default—did nothing to dispel such accusations.

rounds took more than a year to complete, whereas the Uruguay Round that began in 1986 ballooned to over seven years. Its members subsequently passed provisions to formally shut down the GATT in 1995, replacing it with a permanent multilateral institution designed to embed free trade norms in international law—the **World Trade Organization** (WTO). Since then, this body—with its emphasis on enhancing the extensity of trade globalization—has been formally charged with overseeing the regulation of import/export activities.

However, the WTO has proved to be a far from perfect institutional fix, with political tensions remaining high in the global trade regime and the objective of enhanced extensity remaining out of easy reach. The WTO prides itself on serving the interests of all its members equally by enshrining the single economic logic of **comparative advantage**. This theory now dates back two centuries, and it has been described by Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson as the most beautiful law ever devised in economics. The theory asserts that if all countries can be persuaded to specialize national production in line with what they are able to do best, global production will be at its most efficient. This is because every country will have organized its production so that the **opportunity cost** of the resources that could have been used to make other things is minimized. Put more simply, comparative advantage is about encouraging countries to concentrate their economic activities on what they can produce more cheaply than anyone else. If they then trade their surpluses on this specialized production on open markets under the most favoured nation principle (**see Box 27.4**), the possibility exists for everyone in the world to benefit from falling consumer prices. However, the WTO has been accused since its inception of being much better at protecting its most powerful members' comparative advantage, consequently leaving its less powerful members isolated from the potential gains from trade. The more that it has moved to add further issue-areas to its purview—including trade in services and trade in **intellectual property**—the louder critical voices have grown on this point.

As of September 2019, the WTO has 164 members and a further 23 observer governments. The majority of these are developing countries, and over 20 per cent of the entire membership has the United Nations designation of least-developed country. The principal export goods for many developing countries are in agriculture and textiles, but these sectors are among

The most favoured nation principle provided the bedrock of GATT negotiations and is formally laid down in GATT Article I. It states that any preferential trading agreement reached with one country should be extended to other countries. The aim—which also continues to be the case under the WTO system—was to disqualify members from using asymmetric tariffs in order to impose higher trading costs on some countries than on others. It is hoped that this will enable a higher proportion of world GDP to be traded globally because level playing field conditions will prevail. The principle has been distorted, however, by the move towards regional trading blocs. Such arrangements allow countries to set lower tariffs for their in-bloc trading partners than for countries outside the bloc. This is why some globalization purists argue that regional trade agreements are an impediment to genuine economic globalization.

those least comprehensively covered by the WTO's free trade agreements. Advanced industrialized countries have damaged the WTO's reputation most through their reluctance to expose these sectors domestically to direct competition from low-cost developing country producers. Instead, they have retained a complex structure of subsidies and tariffs that contrasts sharply with WTO law in nearly every other sector of the world economy. By contrast, the WTO has proved to be very effective at removing government subsidies that artificially reduce home producers' costs of production on merchandise goods relative to overseas producers' costs, as well as preventing developing countries from producing generic versions of products protected under intellectual property law. It also boasts successes in removing tariffs that artificially inflate the price at which overseas producers can sell both merchandise goods and services relative to home producers' prices. In all of these instances, the ensuing absence of protective national legislation works to the advantage of advanced industrialized countries.

Developing countries' incentives for WTO membership therefore lie less in direct welfare gains resulting from enhanced export earnings than in other mechanisms. Most developing countries have fragile public finances, and they depend for their continued financial viability on the capacity to tap the global financial system for flows of money. If developing countries are to benefit from inward capital flows, they need to secure a positive assessment of their economic outlook in the regular country reports written by the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) and the global **credit rating agencies**.

Opposing Opinions 27.1 The institutions of global economic governance work to the benefit of developing countries

For

There are lots of econometric studies which show that the more integrated developing countries are into global structures of trade and finance, the higher their levels of economic growth. Institutions of global economic governance serve that integrative function and therefore help developing countries to lift their citizens out of poverty.

The current governance trend in the global economy is very much towards the sort of bilateralism which reveals the perilous political position of most developing countries. The institutions of global economic governance remain the most obvious defenders of multilateralism, offering safeguards to developing countries when they need protection from the actions of powerful states.

Developing countries are beginning to have success in bringing legal actions against more powerful countries when the latter have breached WTO rules. This is very different from the earliest years of the WTO, when the dispute settlement mechanism was used primarily to reinforce developing countries' subordinate position in the global trade regime.

If developing countries could not rely on the IMF and the World Bank for financial assistance, respectively, to stabilize their economies and to fund development projects, they would not be able to access that assistance at all. The institutions of global economic governance therefore act as global lenders of last resort for developing countries.

Against

Developing country critics of their incorporation into global structures of trade and finance can point to just as many studies which show how disproportionately few of the economic gains of globalization have flowed to them. The critics' voices would be at least partially nullified if all of the plausible evidence was in the opposite direction.

Proposed new initiatives to extend the multilateral governance system into new areas always seem to be met with the most obvious immediate resistance from developing countries concerned about further losses of autonomy. Obvious examples in this regard involve proposals to introduce the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the 1990s and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the 2010s.

The WTO's disputes resolution mechanism still seems to privilege those countries that can afford to maintain the largest permanent legal delegations at the institution's headquarters in Geneva. This most definitely does not include anything other than the smallest imaginable subset of developing countries.

In assuming the role of global lender of last resort, the IMF and World Bank do not provide developing countries with what economists call a 'free lunch'. They offer loans not gifts, and those loans are often accompanied by controversial conditionalities which deprive developing countries of an important element of their political self-determination.

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1. Why might developing countries only be reluctant members of regimes of global trade and global finance?

2. Do developing countries really get an equal say in how the institutions of global economic governance are managed?

3. Are the WTO, IMF, and World Bank guilty of treating the Western economy as a universal template for global norms?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

This in turn depends on finding ways of assuring global investors that the rule of law is sufficiently established to prevent the state from appropriating overseas financial investments, such that the success of those investments will be determined solely by market mechanisms. Membership of the WTO guarantees not only that its specific free trade rules are internalized, but also that its broader market-based mind-set permeates the general national approach to issues of **macroeconomic** management. For many developing countries, then, joining the WTO is a signalling device designed to reassure global investors that any money committed to their country is likely to remain safe. Decisions about WTO

membership for least-developed countries are thereby infused with global power relationships (**see Opposing Opinions 27.1**). The WTO is much more important to them than their membership is to the WTO.

The more powerful WTO members know this only too well, and they have increasingly used the accession process to impose ever more stringent conditions on entry for new members. The most recent entrants have been required to harmonize many of their economic laws with those of existing members, irrespective of whether or not it makes economic sense for them to do so. As a consequence, the accession process has steadily become longer and costlier, and it is

increasingly dominated by the need for applicant states to make concessions to more powerful countries that become, in effect, their political taskmasters. That same subordination is then imprinted into the WTO's decision-making processes. Votes are not taken on individual measures to build up incrementally a body of international trade law that is acceptable to a majority of WTO members, as would be expected under a genuinely participatory system. Instead, at every WTO ministerial meeting members must decide whether to accept as a whole a package of reforms known as the **Single Undertaking**. The economic substance of this package is largely agreed in advance—and outside a democratic context—by an informal alliance of agenda-setting countries known colloquially as the Quad. This reduces the politics of the meetings themselves to delivering sufficient inducements to secure reluctant members' nominal consent for the Single Undertaking.

The US and the EU (the two global trade powerhouses) hold the most prominent position as regards the pre-agreement process, increasing the likelihood that the outcome of ministerial meetings will satisfy their interests. Historically, they were joined in the Quad by Japan (with its ability to bring Asian countries into agreements) and Canada (balancing EU with NAFTA interests but also representing **Cairns Group** concerns for agricultural liberalization). However, with subsequent changes in the centres of global economic production, there are now competing G4 groupings. A new Quad has emerged, comprising the US and the EU (still the powerhouses), Brazil, and India (newly industrializing countries with huge potential consumer markets, but positioned differently on the question of agricultural liberalization). In neither scenario will the vast majority of developing countries have agenda-setting power, and even though there is a voice on both G4 groupings for the liberalizing agricultural reforms that would play to developing countries' comparative advantage, that voice is always going to be the minority. In order to reinforce their already significant advantage at the pre-meeting stage, the US and the EU take much larger diplomatic delegations to ministerial meetings than anyone else, increasing their chances of persuading other countries to sign up to the Single Undertaking.

However, despite having formalized a set of internal operating procedures that seem loaded heavily in their favour, the US and the EU are still showing increasing signs of impatience with what they see as a toothless WTO system. In August 2018, the WTO finally tested Trump's patience in the same way that the mere existence of other multilateral organizations always seems to do, as he described its creation as 'the single worst trade deal ever made' by US negotiators (Micklethwait, Talev, and Jacobs 2018). Precedents already existed for such an outburst, in that very quickly after his inauguration he signed executive orders to strike down legislation that paved the way for the completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The negotiation of these partnerships—with 11 Pacific coastline countries and 28 EU member states respectively—had been triggered by previous US administrations becoming concerned that the WTO's formal one-member-one-vote rules introduced too many potential veto players who might frustrate US commercial interests. Trump himself has subsequently responded to the continuing US trade deficit by branding the EU a 'foe' because its producers sell more to the US market than its consumers buy from it. He has also lumped together China and the EU by calling them both currency manipulators who use aggressive exchange rate interventions to ensure that their products are priced below those of the US (**see Case Study 27.1**).

Indeed, every Quad head of government had been in Trump's cross hairs at some stage in the first three years of his presidency, making it difficult to see how the Quad structure might survive in either of its pre-existing forms even if Trump does not come good on his threat to remove the US from the WTO altogether. One country likely to be watching developments in this area particularly closely is the UK. If it eventually leaves the European Union and its associated place in both G4 groupings, it will have to construct much of its short-term trade policy on the basis of WTO rules handed down by others. Its adjustment to economic life outside the EU is likely to be harder the more dysfunctional the WTO becomes in the face of a resurgence of Trump-led bilateralism.

Perhaps, though, this is just another example of presidential bluster designed to bring other participants in the multilateral trading system into direct bilateral negotiations. After all, Trump has based his political appeal on being the self-styled master of the deal, someone who could use his business prowess in face-to-face negotiations to make gains for the US that other politicians would be unable to deliver. By August 2018, this tactic had already led to one-on-one talks with the-then President of the European Commission,

Jean-Claude Juncker, which each man described as creating a platform for future bilateral negotiations to replace the failed TTIP venture. It had also led to Mexico agreeing to renegotiate some of the terms of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, thus pressurizing Canada to respond in kind. Trump appears to trust himself to get more done in behind-closed-doors one-on-one meetings than he trusts the legions of well-paid professional US trade negotiators to get done multilaterally.

Key Points

- The move to disband the GATT in favour of the law-making WTO system was an attempt to create more straightforward negotiations for global free trade by eliminating the logjams associated with complexly cross-cutting bilateralism.

- The WTO system has always operated asymmetrically to the advantage of its agenda-setting members.

- Developing countries' decisions about whether to become members of the WTO are often influenced heavily by the political pressures placed on them to demonstrate their commitment to the existing global economic order.

- The WTO faces an uncertain future as its most powerful members have recently shown an increasing willingness to bypass it in favour of bilateral trade negotiations.

The regulation of global finance

The regulation of global finance has none of the democratic pretensions associated with the WTO's (nonetheless much-derided) one-member-one-vote system. In the main, expert rather than political communities decide the contents of global financial regulation, and its objectives are determined almost solely by the countries that finance the maintenance of the regulatory system. The International Monetary Fund and the **World Bank** are the two principal bodies in this respect, both dating back to the original **Bretton Woods** agreements of the 1940s. The formal task of the IMF is to provide short-term monetary assistance to countries struggling with financial instability, that of the World Bank to provide longer-term monetary assistance to countries seeking enhanced development prospects. Both institutions prefer to present themselves as providing purely technical help to countries in economic distress. Yet their willingness to embrace the use of conditionalities as a prerequisite for loans immediately politicizes their activities (**see Ch. 26**). Just as with the new accession demands placed on potential WTO members, IMF and World Bank conditionalities create a context in which national politicians have often had to ignore their electoral mandates and sacrifice their domestic political legitimacy in order to satisfy the institutions' demands (**see Box 27.5**).

Concerted political dissent has followed from allowing financial market actors unrestricted scope to invest their money in the ways they choose, as this has resulted in further concentrations of wealth in the hands of the already well-to-do. The overall logic of redistribution in the post-war Keynesian era was from rich to poor, but since the first attempts were made in the 1970s to re-establish a framework of self-regulating financial markets, that logic has been completely reversed. In general, **market self-regulation** is a rich person's playground. For instance, I cannot make money from correctly reading the price signals emanating from financial markets if I have no money to invest there in the first place. Yet if investors can manipulate those price signals to their own advantage

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Box 27.5 The controversies surrounding political conditionalities

IMF and World Bank conditionalities are so named because they ensure that countries qualify for financial assistance not only on the grounds of their need, but also on the condition that they follow the policy objectives laid down by these institutions. In effect, this allows IMF and World Bank officials appointed in Washington for their technical expertise to appropriate the power of policy determination from governments, including those elected democratically. The Bretton Woods institutions have often been reproached for selecting policy objectives drawn only from within the ideological perspective of Western free market capitalism, thus destroying local economic customs and traditions in preference for globally homogeneous neoliberal economic lifestyles. The technical expertise their officials display typically reflects Western assumptions, priorities, and interests. In this way, critics allege that the Bretton Woods institutions operate as covert agents of Western foreign economic policy, preparing developing countries for investment by Western firms by making them seem more 'familiar', both legally and culturally.

Case Study 27.2 Tax havens and overseas aid budgets

The Cayman Islands
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Tax havens offer a rare example of a political issue where populist nationalists and liberal globalists tend to agree. Populist nationalists typically object to high-wealth individuals and corporations exploiting offshore financial centres' tax loopholes because this is evidence of global elites refusing to be bound by the same laws that govern national society. Liberal globalists, meanwhile, object to offshore financial centres' potential for undermining the integrity of global governance structures. Populist nationalists therefore protest against the way in which the mere presence of tax havens can fracture what might otherwise be a united national political community, whereas liberal globalists protest against the way in which in practice they play off one part of the global political community against another. But the fact of protest is a common theme. It might therefore come as a surprise that the shared belief that 'something must be done' about tax havens has not yet resulted in decisive action against them.

Many of the newly decolonized small island states which act as offshore financial centres have conventionally been regarded as 'underdeveloped' countries. Their governments have almost always pushed back rather hard against any suggestion that they should 'put their house in order' by becoming more transparent and more willing to close tax loopholes. They have presented such arguments as a moral veneer used by richer countries to pursue a protectionist policy designed to prevent offshore financial centres from exploiting their comparative advantage. You developed in a way that best suited your economy in the past, they say, so let us do the same now that we have broken the bonds of colonization. Besides, they continue, what harm can we be doing to the governance structure of the world economy when the investment practices we allow are legal both in our country and in yours?

The reality, though, is rather more complex than this line of defence permits. Wherever nationalist populism has come to greater political prominence, a more sceptical approach to overseas aid budgets has followed. Why should we divert our citizens' hard-earned tax payments to other countries, the argument goes, when there is not enough revenue to pay for the social services that we want to deliver at home? The UN target of contributing just 0.7 per cent of GDP to overseas aid looks to be an increasing stretch the greater the gap becomes between what high-wealth individuals and corporations would be expected to pay in the absence of tax havens and what they actually do pay. Liberal globalists, meanwhile, assert that those who have done well out of economic globalization have an obligation to compensate those who have not by funding enhanced development trajectories. The overseas aid budget is less able to act as such a compensation mechanism the more the very presence of tax havens suppresses global tax revenues.

Question 1: Do offshore financial centres promote their own economic development at the direct expense of development funded through overseas aid budgets?

Question 2: Does the moral case against tax havens matter more than the fact that people can often invest in them perfectly legally?

and undermine my livelihood through forcing down the price of the good I hope to sell, I can experience the adverse effects of market self-regulation without ever once becoming a market player myself. As Occupy's slogan of 'We are the 99 per cent' implies, there are a considerable number of people globally who find themselves in this unenviable position (**see Case Study 27.2**).

One of the main reasons that the IMF and the World Bank evoke dissent from civil society is because they have typically been the most visible formal symbols of the institutionalized power of global finance. Economic globalization has generated a widespread perception that a systematic transfer of power has occurred, whereby individuals working in private financial institutions have usurped the power traditionally ascribed to governments under systems of representative democracy. From this perspective, the main role of the Bretton Woods institutions is simply to ensure that good sense prevails by guaranteeing that *all* governments—of developing and developed countries alike—respect this new reality. Nobody elected the representatives of global finance to make political decisions on their behalf, of course, but this increasingly is what the academic literature says happens in practice.

What can be made of this assumption, though, in light of the IMF's actions post-global financial crisis? It has consistently criticized governments it believes have prioritized the austerity solution to imbalances

in public finances for purely ideological reasons. Its pleas may have fallen on deaf ears for those governments that have seized on the economic difficulties created by the global financial crisis to try to shrink the size of the state in line with the political prescriptions that emerged following the crisis of the 1970s. But the IMF's advice has been clear: welfare-enhancing programmes are not the expensive luxury that pro-austerity discourse routinely depicts them to be; rather, the benefits system guarantees a greater number of people viable incomes, with wide-ranging macroeconomic benefits. It ensures that there is enough spending in the economy to keep growth rates high, and growth is the surest means of being able to rebalance public finances without forcing the poorest members of society to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the costs of doing so. It is starkly ironic when pro-austerity governments ignore this advice. They have justified austerity by arguing that this is the only approach that the representatives of global finance will sanction and that any deviation from this path—however slight and however temporary—will result in punitive price movements on bond and currency markets. However, they have done so in the face of the IMF, the institution that supposedly acts to ensure that market sentiment is respected, consistently urging a different course of action.

The IMF was also the only one of Greece's creditors to protest the terms of the eleventh-hour agreement that was designed to forestall imminent default on the country's debt during the summer of 2015. Eurozone finance ministers had been engaged in diplomatic brinkmanship with Greek negotiators ever since the advent of the avowedly anti-austerity Syriza government in January 2015. Its mandate was to secure a degree of debt forgiveness and to restructure the repayment terms of the remaining loans from the so-called Troika: the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF. It had run on a promise that a definite limit would be placed on scaling back the welfare system in order to meet creditors' demands; a snap referendum on the bailout terms on 5 July 2015 reinforced its political mandate to continue to ask for more favourable terms. Ultimately, though, Alexis Tsipras, the Syriza Prime Minister, steered a barely better deal through the Greek Parliament less than a fortnight later. The IMF remained critical of the deal, arguing that the new austerity path would prove unsustainable. The supposed global watchdog of financial market orthodoxy

has thus proved once again to be less willing to play the policing role than many of the governments it is meant to be monitoring.

Despite these changes to the IMF's approach, the perception that financial markets punish governments that fail to protect the interests of global investors is by no means invalidated. The representatives of global finance continue to enforce 'correctives' to supposedly errant government behaviour. This is how the eurozone crisis started in the first place (**see Box 27.3**). Once the global financial crisis shut down markets in more complex derivatives instruments, the new normal became betting on the highest price that the markets would bear for Irish, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Cypriot, and Greek debt. The European Commission, the ECB, and many eurozone countries' political leaders might well have said that Greece had no choice other than to face up to market 'reality', but that reality was itself produced by market actors' speculative activities.

These recent developments suggest that the Bretton Woods institutions have not had the same modus operandi throughout the whole of their existence. Despite the academic literature's understandable focus on the IMF's and World Bank's controversial period of rampant pro-market advocacy in the 1980s, it is important to remember that they had a distinctive history both before and after that time. As formally inscribed in the original Bretton Woods agreements, for instance, the priority of global economic governance following the Second World War was to stimulate free market flows of traded goods rather than to stimulate free market flows of finance. The successful long-term development that the World Bank was intended to oversee was assumed to be the outcome of stable trading conditions. In an attempt to enhance such stability, obstacles in the form of capital controls were placed on the movement of finance among countries and defended by the IMF. Today's excessive paper trading of increasingly complex and increasingly abstract financial instruments was completely unthinkable under the remit of the original Bretton Woods agreements. Market self-regulation of finance was formally disqualified in this period. In effect, the IMF was initially designed as a subsidiary regulator of global trade. At the very least, in its day-to-day activities it was the regulator of heavily restrictive capital controls in which trade could flourish. It is somewhat ironic that the WTO system now arguably serves the opposite function. Given that a primary reason for WTO membership for developing countries is as a signalling

device to international investors, the WTO can now be seen as a trade regulator assisting in the maintenance of the financial regime.

This role reversal demonstrates clearly that the political settlement which cast finance as the servant to the rest of the world economy was only short-lived. In a series of steps between 1971 and 1973, the Nixon administration first backed the US away from its currency responsibilities in the Bretton Woods system and then formally reneged on them altogether. The system relied on US dollars being available freely in the world economy at a fixed rate relative to the price of gold, which had the effect of fixing all exchange rates with respect to one another. Once the Nixon administration had allowed the value of the dollar to be set by global financial market activity rather than by government commitment to currency pegs, all currencies eventually floated against one another. As soon as this happened, incentives arose for the advanced industrialized countries to dismantle their capital controls in an attempt to attract flows of finance from elsewhere in the world economy. This they duly did, and the shackles that Bretton Woods had placed on global finance were undone (**see Chs 1 & 16**). Today's experience of an increasingly politically assertive financial sector originates from this time.

Key Points

- There is much more 'money' in the world today than goods to spend it on: the dollar value of total domestic financial assets is over four times higher than world GDP.

- Under the Bretton Woods system of the immediate post-Second World War era, finance was stripped of its global mobility and generally boxed in by political decree so that it would serve the interests of stable global trade relations.

- The institutionalized power of global finance has led to a regressive redistribution from the 1970s in which the global rich have become significantly richer and the global poor have been increasingly marginalized.

- There are now many activist groups challenging the influence of global financial elites, especially their use of **offshore financial centres** to hide their money from domestic tax authorities (**see Case Study 27.2**).

Conclusion

The move towards market self-regulation is the most noteworthy trend since the 1970s in both global trade and global finance. Yet, as the dramatic downturn in world trade in the immediate aftermath of the 2007–8 global financial crisis shows, the complementarity of regulatory forms is not necessarily synonymous with an internally coherent regulatory system. Regulatory coherence arises only when there are overarching economic regime features that impose institutional constraints on one sphere so as to facilitate regulatory effectiveness in the other. Recent changes in global economic governance priorities increasingly rule out such a scenario, suggesting that the 1940s might prove to have been a high water mark for global economic regulatory coherence.

The system of global trade and global finance therefore looks to be generically prone to uncertainty. There might be little that is genuinely global about this system, and there might also be little that allows it to act as a genuine system. Neither of these things might count decisively against it if it nonetheless sustained the impression that everyone got their fair share from economic globalization. However, this has never been the case, and the increasingly all-encompassing sense that a global 99 per cent is pitted against a global 1 per cent suggests that nothing will change on this front very soon. Moreover, in the West at least, the political pressure for change is currently coming most obviously within the parliamentary system from a populist nationalism. Its proponents have embraced the imagery of an authentic national population being diluted, undermined, and exploited by outsiders at the behest of an unelected and unaccountable global elite. The febrile nature of the political environment into which this argument is currently being pitched threatens merely to intensify existing problems caused by on-going regulatory incoherence.

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Questions

1. Is it significant that economic 'globalization' does not seem to be global, strictly speaking?
2. Why does the current structure of global economic governance provoke such resentment among political activists from both left and right?
3. How has the failure of the International Trade Organization impacted subsequent attempts to tie trade globalization to the introduction of progressive social conditions of production?
4. Has the WTO failed in its mission to promote a symmetrical trade globalization that benefits all countries?
5. If it leaves the European Union, how should a post-**Brexit** UK seek to insert itself into international trade deals?
6. What image would you try to foster for the IMF if you were its current managing director?
7. When governments invoke all-powerful financial interests in order to justify austerity policies at home, what does it suggest about the political interests embedded in global trade and global finance?
8. Insofar as finance was the servant of world trade under the original Bretton Woods agreements, is it now unequivocally the master?
9. If you had been a member of the Greek Parliament in July 2015, would you have voted for the final debt crisis bailout plan?
10. Is a 'new Bretton Woods' necessary if regulatory coherence is once again to be achieved between the spheres of global trade and global finance?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Blyth, M. (2013), *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Highly readable critical account of the embrace of austerity following the global financial crisis of 2007–8.

Clift, B. (2018), *The IMF and the Politics of Austerity in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The most comprehensive account of the IMF's changing thinking over the past decade.

Crouch, C. (2011), *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press). Challenges the reader to understand how, with the world so much in flux in the midst of the global financial crisis, so little actually changed.

Helleiner, E. (1994), *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1980s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). The best political history of the process through which governments negotiated away the capital controls of the original Bretton Woods agreements.

Narlikar, A. (2005), *The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive account of the politics of the WTO, written specifically for the student audience.

Shaxson, N. (2010), *Treasure Islands* (London: Bodley Head). An investigative account of how tax havens distort the operation of the global tax system.

Trebilcock, M., **Howse, R., and Eliason, A.** (2012), *The Regulation of International Trade*, 4th edn (London: Routledge). In-depth yet readable treatment of the historical evolution of the regulatory system for global trade.

Watson, M. (2018), *The Market* (New York: Columbia University Press). An account of how the conceptual abstraction of 'the market' has wrongly been given its own agential characteristics in contemporary political discourse surrounding global markets in trade and finance.

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Chapter 28

Terrorism and globalization

JAMES D. KIRAS

Framing Questions

- **Is global terrorism the price states pay for entry into and continued access to a globalized system?**

- **Why does violent Islamic extremism continue to be the primary motivator for global terrorist violence?**

- **Should freedoms be restricted to ensure greater security against the threat of global terrorism?**

Reader's Guide

Globalization has contributed to the growth of terrorism from a regional phenomenon into a global one. Precisely how it has contributed, however, is hard to determine. The difficulty lies in the complex nature of terrorism and in disagreements about what constitutes globalization. Global terrorism has been explained in cultural, economic, and religious terms linked to globalization. However, such terms are not sufficient to explain the relationship. Technology associated with globalization has enabled terrorist groups to conduct operations that are more deadly, distributed, and difficult to combat than in the past. Yet technological advantage is not one-sided; states can use technology to diminish the global impact of terrorism.

Introduction

The relationship between **terrorism** and **globalization** is difficult to describe accurately. Each phenomenon is complicated and defies simple characterization. It is inaccurate to suggest that globalization is responsible for terrorism, but terrorists have indeed exploited technologies associated with globalization. Such technologies have increased the ability of terrorist groups to work together, share information, and reach out to previously unavailable audiences. Technology cannot change the character of terrorist messages or the nature of terrorist struggle. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak, conducted by a minority who promote an extremist ideology—it often fails to create political change. The global community is not powerless in the face of such violence. In order to combat terrorism successfully, the global community must utilize the resources at its disposal collaboratively, in a way that is consistent with international law and human rights, to diminish support for terrorism and demonstrate the illegitimacy of terrorist messages and aspirations.

Definitions

Terrorism and globalization share at least one thing in common—both are complex phenomena open to subjective interpretation. Definitions of terrorism vary widely but all have a common point of departure. Terrorism is characterized, first and foremost, by the use of violence. This tactic of violence takes many forms and often indiscriminately targets non-combatants. The purpose for which violence is used, and its root causes, are where most of the disagreements about terrorism begin. Historically, the term 'terrorism' described state violence against citizens during the French Revolution (1789–99). Over the past half-century, however, terrorism has come to mean the use of violence by small groups aiming to achieve political change. Terrorism differs from criminal violence in its degree of political legitimacy. Those sympathetic to terrorist causes suggest that violence is the only remaining option by which the aggrieved can draw attention to their plight. Such causes have included ideological, ethnic, and religious exclusion or persecution.

Defining terrorism is complicated by the fact that terrorist groups often espouse multiple grievances and compete with one another for resources and support. In addition, the relative importance of these grievances within groups can change over time (**see Box 28.1**). Those targeted by terrorists are less inclined to see any justification, much less legitimacy, behind attacks that are designed to spread fear by killing and maiming civilians. As a result, the term 'terrorist' has a pejorative value that is useful in delegitimizing those who commit such acts.

Reaching consensus on what constitutes terrorism is difficult. The legitimacy of terrorist means and methods is the foremost reason for disagreement. Some view terrorist acts as legitimate only if they meet the criteria associated with revisionist interpretations of 'just war' tradition, which focus on the actions of individuals. These criteria, which apply to all applications of force, have been expanded to include a just cause, proportional use of violence, and the use of force as a last resort (**see Ch. 13**). Realists suggest that the political violence used by terrorist groups is illegitimate on the basis that states alone have a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.

As with other forms of irregular warfare, terrorism is designed to achieve political change for the purpose of obtaining power in order to right a perceived wrong. However, terrorism is the weakest form of irregular warfare with which to alter the political landscape. The reason for this weakness is that terrorist groups rarely possess the broader support of the population that characterizes insurgency and revolution. Terrorist groups

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Box 28.1 Types of terrorist groups

Audrey Kurth Cronin has outlined different types of terrorist groups and their historical importance in the following way:

There are four types of terrorist organizations currently operating around the world, categorized mainly by their source of motivation: left-wing terrorists, right-wing terrorists, ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists, and religious or 'sacred' terrorists. All four types have enjoyed periods of relative prominence in the modern era … Currently, 'sacred' terrorism is becoming more significant … many groups have a mix of motivating ideologies—some ethnonationalist groups, for example, have religious characteristics or agendas—but usually one ideology or motivation dominates.

(Cronin 2002/3: 39)

often lack broader support for their objectives because their goals for change are based on radical ideas that do not have widespread appeal. In order to effect change, terrorists must provoke drastic responses that catalyse change or weaken their opponent's moral resolve. In a few cases, terrorist acts have achieved relatively rapid transformations. The bombings in Madrid in 2004, for example, dramatically influenced the outcome of elections in Spain, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the attack was designed with just this purpose in mind. Many terrorist leaders hope that their actions will elicit disproportionate state reactions, which will in turn sour public or international opinion and increase support for their cause. Other leaders using acts of terrorism seek immediate impact to demonstrate the weakness of their opponent and to extend the group's power and reach by generating fear through media coverage. For example, during the 2008 attack in Mumbai, terrorists were ordered to tell the media that the attack 'was just the trailer, just wait till you see the rest of the film' (ABC News 2009). However, terrorist campaigns often take years or decades to achieve meaningful results, and the amount and nature of force used is problematic. Terrorist groups risk fading into obscurity if they do not cow the public or conduct newsworthy attacks. However, attacks by terrorists that are horrific, such as the immolation of a Jordanian pilot by the so-called Islamic State in Syria in February 2015, puts support for terrorist causes at risk. Therefore terrorism is defined here as the use of violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear, by attacking civilians and/or symbolic targets, for purposes such as drawing widespread attention to a grievance, provoking a severe response, or wearing down their opponent's moral resolve, in order to effect political change.

As with definitions of terrorism, there is general agreement on at least one aspect of globalization. Technologies allow the transfer of goods, services, and information almost anywhere quickly and efficiently. In the case of information, the transfer can be secure and is nearly instantaneous. The extent of social, cultural, and political change wrought by globalization, including increasing interconnectedness and homogeneity in the international system, remains the subject of much disagreement and

debate, as other chapters in this volume have outlined. These disagreements, in turn, influence discussion of the extent to which globalization has contributed to the rise of modern terrorism (**see Box 28.2**). There is little doubt that the technologies associated with globalization have been used to increase the effectiveness and reach of terrorist groups. The relationship between globalization and terrorism is best understood as the next step in the evolution of political violence since terrorism became a transnational phenomenon in the 1960s.

> **Box 28.2** The dual nature of globalization and its impact on conflict
>
> Emile Simpson characterizes the impact of globalization on war in the following manner:
>
> > The speed and extent of inter-connectivity brought about by the information revolution is fundamentally changing the world, and war too. People, individuals, and communities, fragment in each's other's image: the intertwining of all kinds of cultures has huge power to unite people through common understanding; conversely, the endless disagreement over the meaning of an event becomes more common, as world audiences are so diverse.
> >
> > *(Simpson 2018: 243)*

> **Key Points**
>
> - Agreement on what constitutes terrorism continues to be difficult given the range of potential motivations for acts involving violence.
> - Terrorism, or acts of violence by sub-state groups, is distinguished from criminal acts on the basis of the purpose for which violence is carried out, namely political change.
> - Terrorist groups succeed when their motivations or grievances are perceived to be legitimate by a wider audience. Disproportionate or heavy-handed responses by states to acts of terrorism often increase support for terrorist groups.
> - The definition of globalization, like that of terrorism, is open to subjective interpretation, but the technologies associated with globalization have undeniably increased terrorist capabilities.

Terrorism: from transnational to global phenomenon (1968–2001)

Historically, terrorists have used readily available means to permit small numbers of individuals to spread fear as widely as possible. In the late nineteenth century and

the early twentieth, anarchists relied on revolvers and dynamite. Yet terrorists and acts of terrorism, including bombings and assassinations in Austria-Hungary

(Empress Elisabeth of Austria, assassinated in Geneva in 1898), Tsarist Russia (Tsar Alexander II, assassinated in St Petersburg, 1881), the United States (Wall Street bombing, 1920), and the United Kingdom (the 1885 London Underground bombing), among others, rarely had an impact beyond national borders. Three factors led to the emergence of transnational terrorism in 1968: the expansion of commercial air travel, the availability of televised news coverage, and broad political and ideological interests among extremists that intersected around a common cause. As a result, terrorism grew from a local to a transnational threat.

Air travel gave terrorists unprecedented mobility. For example, the Japanese Red Army trained in one country and attacked in another, as in the 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Israel. Air travel appealed to terrorists for multiple reasons. Airport security measures, including passport control, were almost non-existent when terrorists began hijacking aeroplanes. These **skyjackings** suited terrorist purposes well. Hijacked aeroplanes offered a degree of mobility, and therefore security, for the terrorists involved. States acquiesced to terrorist demands, which encouraged further incidents. The success of this tactic spurred other terrorist groups, as well as criminals and political refugees, to follow suit. As a result, incidents of hijacking skyrocketed from 5 in to 94 in 1969. Shared political ideologies stimulated cooperation and limited exchanges among groups as diverse as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatist Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and groups demanded the release of imprisoned 'fellow revolutionaries' in different countries, giving the impression of a coordinated global terrorist network. The reality was that groups formed relationships of convenience based around weapons, capabilities, and money in order to advance local political objectives.

Televised news coverage played a key role in expanding the audience who could witness the theatre of terrorism in their own homes. Individuals who had never heard of 'the plight of the Palestinians' became notionally aware of the issue after incidents such as the live coverage of the hostage-taking conducted by Black September during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Although media coverage was termed the oxygen that sustains terrorism, terrorists discovered that reporters and audiences lost interest in repeat performances over time. To sustain viewer interest and compete for coverage, terrorist groups undertook increasingly spectacular attacks, such as the seizure of **Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)** delegates by 'Carlos the Jackal' in Austria in December 1975. Terrorism experts speculated that terrorist leaders understood that horrific, mass casualty attacks might cross a threshold of violence. This understanding may explain why several terrorist groups have attempted to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The Iranian 'Islamic Revolution' of 1979 was a watershed event in transnational terrorism. Although Israeli interests remained primary targets for attack, due to continued sympathy for the Palestinian cause, a number of groups began to target citizens and other symbols of the West. The 'decade of terrorism' (1980–90) included incidents such as suicide bombings (Lebanon, 1983) and hijackings (TWA Flight 847, 1985). During this decade, three disturbing trends emerged: fewer attacks that were more deadly and indiscriminate; the increasing sophistication of attacks; and a greater willingness to perform suicide attacks.

Transnational Marxist-Leninist groups discovered that their sources of support disappeared at the end of the cold war. At the same time, state law enforcement and paramilitary forces became increasingly effective in **combating terrorism**. Other terrorist groups discovered that transnational attacks were counter-productive in achieving local aims. For example, both ETA and the IRA sought negotiations but still used terrorist attacks as a bargaining ploy and to remain visible domestically until eventually giving up armed struggle entirely. Although Marxist-Leninist transnational terrorism was decreasing in scale and intensity during the 1990s, militant Islamic terrorism, symbolized by the group Al Qaeda and enabled by globalization, was growing into a global phenomenon.

Key Points

- Terrorism is a form of political violence that aims to achieve disproportionate effects with limited means.
- The majority of transnational terrorist attacks from 1979 onwards targeted Western citizens and symbols.
- Trends in terrorism since 1968 include greater casualties, increasing sophistication, and suicide attacks.
- Transnational Marxist-Leninist groups have been replaced by global militant Islamic terrorist groups.

Terrorism: the impact of globalization

Violent Islamic extremism drew global recognition as a result of terrorist attacks conducted by Al Qaeda, 'The Base', in New York and Washington, DC, on **11 September 2001**. But what exactly is violent Islamic extremism? Is it a global movement threatening Western civilization and values, an aggregation of substate groups connected to a common cause, or merely an extremist set of beliefs that justifies political violence to fulfil militant Islamic myths? Experts continue to debate what violent Islamic extremism is, what it represents, and the actual threat that it poses. Experts disagree, in part because even though Al Qaeda and Islamic State lost their territory and many of their senior leaders, both groups continue to have global influence and reach. Today violent Islamic extremism appears less identifiable with any single terrorist group and more as a global movement that markets and exploits its own form of violent and radical religious ideology

in a loose network of 'franchised' cells and groups (**see Fig. 28.1**). Others conclude that the focus on violent Islamic extremism overlooks other, potentially more problematic forms of terrorism such as right-wing extremism. They point to examples such as the massacre conducted by nationalist and Islamophobe Anders Breivik in Norway (2011) (**see Box 28.3**) and more recent statistical analysis as evidence of the pervasiveness of right-wing political violence (US General Accounting Office 2017). Regardless of how one views violent Islamic extremism, it remains 'a polymorphous phenomenon . . . a dynamically heterogenous collection of both radicalized individuals and functioning terrorist organizations' (Hoffman and Reinares 2014: 628). Efforts to explain the vitality of global terrorism in general—and violent Islamic extremism in particular—focus on three areas linked to aspects of globalization: culture, economics, and religion.

Figure 28.1 The terrorist nebula and regional clusters
Source: modified from Rabasa et al. 2006

Box 28.3   Anders Behring Breivik

Anders Behring Breivik represents the new wave of right-wing terrorism. He is a Norwegian citizen, born in 1979, who had a troubled, but relatively comfortable upbringing. He spent time in London as a child and travelled repeatedly to France to visit his father. Breivik had several encounters with the law as a teenager but turned his energy towards a computer business and then farming. According to Breivik, he developed a decade-long plan to commit an attack against elements within Norwegian society he was convinced were undermining it from within. He grouped various socially progressive elements under the banner of 'cultural Marxists' and also singled out Muslims as erosive influences on Western culture. He outlined his worldview in a rambling 1,500-page manifesto entitled '2083: A European Declaration of Independence', written under the pseudonym 'Andrew Berwick'.

Breivik carried out his attack plan on 22 July 2011. After travelling from his remote farm, Breivik parked his vehicle filled with 950 pounds of ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer-based explosive, near the Regjeringskvartalet, or Norwegian government offices

quarter in Oslo. While the bomb detonated and first responders rushed to the scene, Breivik travelled to Utøya Island, where he posed as a policeman. The island is the site of a Labour Party summer youth camp. Breivik proceeded to shoot teenagers and adults on the island for over an hour-and-a-half, until a heavily armed Norwegian police response unit arrived. He surrendered to police. His attacks claimed the lives of 77 people and injured more than 300.

Breivik's worldview and attack were shaped by a number of elements associated with globalization. He styled himself as a modern-day European Knight Templar and claimed to be part of an organization of like-minded individuals spread across England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Russia, and Serbia. Despite living in a remote part of Norway, Breivik used the internet as a research tool, a method of connecting with like-minded individuals, and as a means for promoting his nationalist and Islamophobic ideology through his blog posts, manifesto, and YouTube videos.

Cultural explanations

Culture offers one way to explain why violent Islamic extremism's call for armed struggle has been successful in underdeveloped countries. It may appear that violence is the only method of preserving traditions and values against a cultural tsunami of Western products and materialism. Once sought after as an entry method to economic prosperity, Western secular, materialist values are increasingly rejected by those seeking to regain or preserve their own unique cultural identity. The social changes associated with globalization and the spread of free market capitalism appear to overwhelm the identity or values of groups who perceive themselves as the losers in the new international system. In an attempt to preserve their threatened identity and values, groups actively distinguish themselves from despised 'others'. At the local level, this cultural friction may translate into conflicts divided along religious or ethnic lines that aim to safeguard identity.

According to one influential explanation, the number of distinct civilizations is limited globally. Samuel Huntington suggests that a major fault-line exists between the liberal Western civilization and an Islamic one 'humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and . . . [unable] to shape their own destiny' (Huntington 1993: 32). Critics of Huntington argue, among other things, that he ascribes a degree of homogeneity within the Islamic world that simply does not exist. Theologically and socially, the Islamic

'civilization' contains a number of deep fault-lines that impede the cooperation required to challenge the West. The extremely bloody sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a in Iraq is only one example of these very real fissures. Violent Islamic extremist calls to kill individuals including non-combatants, non-believers, and fellow Muslims represent another internal fault-line. Non-believers fall into the categories of infidels (those of different religion) and apostates (those Muslims who do not share their interpretation of the Koran). Osama bin Laden gave unequivocal sanction to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to kill Muslim Shi'a in Iraq. Such actions call into question the morality of the means, and therefore the legitimacy of bin Laden and militant Islam as the champions of Muslim values among the wider and moderate Islamic community. The victims of violent Islamic extremist terrorist violence largely have been other Muslims and not Western 'others', a fact bin Laden acknowledged in 2011 (Lahoud et al. 2011: 21–42).

Economic explanations

Not everyone agrees that defence of culture or identity is the primary motivation for globalized terrorist violence. Others see economic considerations as the crucial motivating factor in the use of violence to effect political change. Although globalization provides access to a world market for goods and services, the net result has also been perceived as a form of Western economic imperialism. The United States and the post-industrial

states of Western Europe form the Global North, or economic 'core', which dominates international economic institutions such as the World Bank, sets exchange rates, and determines fiscal policies. These actions and policies can be unfavourable to the underdeveloped countries, or Global South, that comprise the periphery or gap. Political decisions by the leaders of underdeveloped countries to deregulate or privatize industries to be competitive globally may lead to significant domestic social and economic upheaval. The citizenry may shift loyalties to illegal activities such as terrorism if the state breaks its social contract with them. Such activities outside of state control include engaging through global shadow economies such as 'System D', using alternative currencies (BitCoin), and frequenting alternative websites on the 'Deep Web' accessible through browsers such as Tor.

Wealth is also linked to personal security and violence. With little possible opportunity to obtain wealth locally, individuals will leave to pursue opportunities elsewhere. Paradoxically, rising standards of living and greater access to education associated with globalization may lead to increased individual expectations. If these expectations are unrealized, individuals may turn to extreme political views and action against 'the system' that denies them the opportunity to realize their ambitions, as Ted Robert Gurr hypothesized in 1970 (Gurr 1970: 46). Some suggest that a sense of alienation and lack of opportunity among some Muslim males is a contributing factor in their decision to turn to violence globally. In violent Islamic extremist groups, however, most leaders and senior operatives attended graduate schools around the globe in fields as diverse as engineering and theology, and were neither poor nor downtrodden (Sageman 2004: 73–4, 95–6).

Other views offer a broader explanation. In particular, the writings of the revolutionary Frantz Fanon provide insights in the use of political violence to right economic wrongs. In the 1960s, Fanon suggested that violent struggle would continue until economic and power imbalances were removed (Fanon 1990: 74). Terrorist violence is motivated by inequalities in the global economy. Therefore terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001 were not reactions against the policies of the United States per se, but rather a blow against an icon of global capitalism. Statements by fringe groups, including neo-Nazis, anarchists, and the 'New, New Left', are additional evidence that globalization might be a stimulus for political violence (Rabasa et al. 2006: 86–93).

The links between terrorism and poverty also vary considerably among regions. Many violent Islamic extremist terrorists in Europe and the United States have employment rates and salaries that are close to the averages for their age groups. The changing character of militant Islamic violence, and its ebbs and flows in Yemen, Nigeria, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, suggests that while the ideology, leadership, and facilitation are still the purview of the relatively privileged within terrorist groups, economic and ethnic factors may increasingly become the means by which the next generation of terrorists are recruited.

Religion and 'new' terrorism

In the decade prior to 9/11, a number of scholars and experts perceived that fundamental changes were taking place in the character of terrorism. The use of violence for political purposes, to change state ideology or the representation of ethnic minority groups, had failed in its aims and a new trend was emerging (**see Ch. 15**). **Postmodern or 'new' terrorism** was conducted for different reasons altogether. Motivated by promises of rewards in the afterlife, some terrorists are driven by religious reasons to kill as many non-believers and unfaithful as possible (Laqueur 1996: 32–3). Although suicide tactics had been observed in Lebanon as early as 1983, militant Islam had previously been viewed as a **state-sponsored**, regional phenomenon (Wright 1986: 19–21).

New terrorism, which some authors use to explain the global **jihad**, is seen as a reaction to the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual bankruptcy of the West. As globalization spreads and societies become increasingly interconnected, some Muslims feel they have only one choice: accept Western beliefs to better integrate, or preserve spiritual purity by rebelling. Believers in the global jihad view the rulers of 'Islamic' countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq as apostates who have compromised their values in the pursuit and maintenance of secular, state-based power. The only possible response is to fight against such influences through jihad. Most Islamic scholars and imams understand jihad to mean the internal struggle for purity spiritually, although it has also been interpreted historically as a method to establish the basis for just war. Extremists who espouse militant Islam, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, understand jihad in a different way. For the jihadi terrorist, there can be no compromise with either infidels or apostates. Al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi may die but the ideology and the 'cosmic struggle' can and must continue.

The difference in value structures between secular and religious terrorists makes the responses to the latter difficult. Religious terrorists will kill themselves and others to secure rewards in the afterlife. Differences in value structures make the deterrence of religious terrorism difficult if not impossible, as secular states cannot credibly threaten materially that which the terrorists value spiritually. Secular terrorism has had as its goal the pursuit of power in order to correct flaws in society but retain the overarching system. Religious terrorists, in contrast, do not seek to modify, but rather to replace the normative structure of society (Cronin 2002/3: 41). Terrorists may be unable or unwilling to compromise on what they see as a 'sacred value' (Atran 2010: 400).

The use of religion as a reaction to and an explanation for the phenomenon of global terrorism contains some of the same incongruities as accounts focused on cultural and economic factors. For Western observers, religious reasons appear to explain how individual terrorists are convinced to take their own lives and kill others. Personal motivations can include promises of financial rewards for family members, achieving fame within a community, taking revenge for some grievance, or simply achieving a form of self-actualizing. Yet few religious terrorist leaders, planners, and coordinators martyr themselves. Religion provides terrorist groups with a crucial advantage: the mandate and sanction of the divine to commit otherwise illegal or immoral acts. There is a substantial difference between religious motivation as the single driving factor for individuals to commit acts of terrorism and the ultimate purpose for which violence is being used. A common theme among jihadi statements is the purpose of overthrowing apostate regimes and assuming political power. Political power, in turn, is necessary to impose the militant Islamic form of Sharia law in a state and restore the just and pure society of the caliphate, as the June 2014 declaration by so-called Islamic State to establish one in Iraq and Syria suggests.

> **Key Points**
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> - Experts disagree on what violent Islamic extremism precisely represents.
> - Cultural, economic, and religious factors provide necessary explanations for globalized terrorist violence, but they are insufficient individually.
> - 'New' terrorism uses religion as a motivator and to provide the justification for killing non-combatants.
> - The ultimate purpose for modern violent Islamic extremism is obtaining political power in order to conduct wide-scale reform according to Sharia law.

Globalization, technology, and terrorism

Few challenge the point that terrorism has become much more pervasive worldwide due to the processes and technologies of globalization. The technological advances associated with globalization have improved the capabilities of terrorist groups to plan and conduct operations with far more devastation and coordination than their predecessors could have imagined. In particular, technologies have improved the capability of groups and cells in the following areas: proselytizing, coordination, security, mobility, and lethality.

Proselytizing

Terrorist groups have traditionally sought sympathy and support within national boundaries or in neighbouring countries as a means to sustain their efforts. Sustaining terrorist causes has traditionally been difficult as terrorist messages, goals, and grievances tend to be extreme, and therefore less appealing, than those of insurgents. For example, land reform, government corruption, or foreign occupation motivates larger numbers of individuals to support or join insurgencies, whereas the radical political ideology espoused by groups such as the Japanese Red Army or the Weather Underground had little appeal in largely prosperous and stable democratic societies. States have traditionally had an advantage in their ability to control information flows and use their resources to win the battle of hearts and minds against terrorist groups. But terrorist leaders understand how the internet has changed this dynamic. One stated that 'we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma' (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2005: 10).

The continued expansion of the number of internet service providers, especially in states with relaxed or ambivalent content policies or laws, combined with

increasingly sophisticated and inexpensive mobile devices, laptops, tablets, software, applications, and wireless technologies, have empowered individuals and groups to post tracts on or send messages throughout the internet and social media. One form of empowerment is the virtual presence that individuals have. Although prominent jihadi terrorists' physical presence can be removed through imprisonment or death, their virtual presence and influence is immortalized on the internet, as the case of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar suggests (**see Case Study 28.1**).

Globalization has also empowered terrorist groups by enabling increases in the volume, range, and sophistication of propaganda materials. Terrorist groups were once limited to mimeographed manifestos and typed communiqués. Today, terrorist supporters and sympathizers now build their own websites and boast thousands of followers on social media. An early example was a website of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, which posted the group's communiqués and videos during the seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1997. Since then, terrorist groups in Chechnya and the Middle East have made increasing use of video cameras to record the preparations for and results of attacks, including successful roadside bombings and

the downing of helicopters. Individuals and small groups have produced music and videos to inspire potential recruits and seek donations. Messages, files, and polemics can be dispatched almost instantaneously to almost anywhere on the globe via Facebook, Twitter, or instant messaging. Brenton Tarrant, who was inspired by Anders Breivik's online manifesto (**see Box 28.3**), live-streamed on Facebook his attack in Christchurch, New Zealand (2019) in a manner that resembled a first-person shooter video game to spur others into action. Although media content is generated by individuals, that is not to say it is simple or crude. YouTube videos with slick production values and electronic publications, such as *Inspire*, *Dabiq*, and *Rumiyah*, combine graphics and well-produced content, including technical advice (**see Fig. 28.2**). Various lone wolves, such as the Boston Marathon bombers (2013) and Sayfullo Saipov (2017), have been inspired by such means, as were the estimated 35,000 foreign fighters who flocked to Syria and Iraq to fight for Islamic State.

To spread messages to the widest possible audience—including those without online or text messaging capabilities—and where speed of communication is not a requirement or a possibility for security reasons, terrorists need not rely exclusively on virtual

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Case Study 28.1 Three generations of violent Islamic extremists

The first generation of violent Islamic extremists who coalesced under the banner of Al Qaeda shared several traits. A number fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and aligned with Osama bin Laden over disagreements in 1994 about who to fight next. Bin Laden believed it was necessary to fight the 'far' enemy, the United States (and by extension, the West), which was responsible for a number of perceived injustices against Islam. Others advocated the overthrow of 'near' enemies who ruled over secular Islamic states. To fight the far enemy, bin Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1998. One of those who also migrated was Mustafa Setmariam Nasar.

Nasar is better known as 'Abu Musab al-Suri' or 'The Syrian'. He fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and supported local jihadist groups in Spain, Algeria, and elsewhere. Prior to 9/11, Nasar ran a training camp in Afghanistan tied to bin Laden. Like his peers, Nasar is well educated and this is apparent in his writings. His works are numerous and include various interviews and pamphlets, as well as a 1,600-page tract and detailed training manual entitled *Global Islamic Resistance Call*. In addition, Nasar videotaped a number of his lectures based on the manual. Nasar foresaw the effectiveness of US and partner nation efforts against the traditional hierarchical organization of Al Qaeda; he decried the 'Tora Bora mentality' of fighting fixed battles against forces that dominate air and space. Nasar argued for moving to something more secure, elusive, and difficult to defeat: a system of jihad comprising 'a method of secret guerrilla war consisting of unconnected cells, numerous

and different types of cells' rather than a first-generation organization (or *tanzim*) (Lia 2008: 315). He transferred his knowledge and skills to next-generation militant Islamic terrorists virtually. Despite Nasar's capture in Pakistan in November 2005, both the manual and the videos are available online, realizing part of Nasar's ambition.

Ardit Ferizi represents the new generation of terrorists who support violent Islamic extremism. Ferizi, a Kosavar, led a group known as Kosava Hacker's Security. He achieved notoriety in jihadist circles for hacking a company located in the United States, stealing data, and sharing it with ISIS's hacking division. The data comprised the names, home addresses, and other personally identifiable information of over 1,300 US service members. ISIS subsequently released the information as one of its dozen 'hit lists' online and encouraged its members in the United States to 'kill the dogs'. Cooperation between Malaysian and American officials led to Ferizi's arrest in Malaysia in late 2015. Ferizi is one of the first individuals convicted in the US on hacking and terrorism charges. He was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

Question 1: What qualities characterize the three different generations of violent Islamic extremists?

Question 2: Will violent Islamic extremism increasingly become a virtual phenomenon, or does it need a tangible, physical presence to succeed?

Figure 28.2 Covers of *Inspire* and *Rumiyah* magazines

methods. Any computer of modest capabilities can be used by terrorist groups and their sympathizers to create propaganda leaflets, posters, and even magazines in large quantities at very low cost. Whereas offset printing machines and photocopiers are difficult to move, a laptop or tablet and printer can be packed in a suitcase, increasing the mobility of the terrorist cells generating the material and making them more difficult to locate.

Coordination

During the era of transnational terrorism, groups planned and conducted individual attacks or mounted multiple attacks from a single staging base. The technologies associated with globalization have enabled terrorist cells and groups to mount coordinated attacks in different countries. Indeed, a hallmark of violent Islamic extremist groups is their ability to conduct multiple attacks in different locations, such as the simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, synchronized detonation of 10 of 13 bombs on packed commuter trains in Madrid in March 2004, and six separate gun and bomb attacks by Islamic State operatives in central Paris and St Denis in November 2015.

The technologies associated with globalization, including commercially available handheld radios and phones, have allowed terrorist cell members and groups to operate independently at substantial distances from one another and network together. The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard, for example, ensures that any compliant phone will work anywhere in the world where a GSM network has been established. Email and mobile phone contact among geographically separated group members allows them to conduct their attacks in separate locations or converge on a specific target area. For example, the 9/11 hijackers used cheap and readily available prepaid phone cards to communicate between cell leaders and senior leadership. In Mumbai in 2008, cell leaders maintained regular contact with operational controllers in Pakistan via mobile phone and satellite phone throughout the three days of the attack. Twitter and Instagram provide means to spread messages and pictures in easily accessible and digestible chunks.

Under pressure from aggressive countermeasures, terrorist groups have utilized technologies and other innovations to maintain their activities tactically and strategically. On a tactical level, Irish Republican Army

(IRA) and Al Qaeda bomb manufacturers have demonstrated the ability to respond rapidly to electronic countermeasures. Press reports suggested that Shi'ite groups in Iraq were able to intercept and download Predator drone video feeds using commercially available software. At the strategic level, so-called Islamic State has assumed the mantle from Al Qaeda over a virtual global violent Islamic extremist 'community of practice', characterized by individuals exchanging information and discussing the best ways to coordinate and conduct attacks. Cells form around individuals sympathetic to violent Islamic extremist goals, accessible via webcast or online jihadi discussion forums. The volume of propaganda can be staggering. At its height, Islamic State was producing and posting 38.2 unique propaganda items, including YouTube videos, every day (Winter 2015: 5). Thousands of Twitter and Facebook accounts of so-called Islamic State supporters have been shut down, only to spring up again, largely by crowdsourcing propaganda. The watchword for such violence can be thought of as a variation on the activist motto 'think globally, act locally', which reinforces the perception of militant Islam's global depth, power, and reach.

Security

Terrorist cells without adequate security precautions are vulnerable to discovery and detection. For example, translations of captured Al Qaeda manuals demonstrate the high value its writers place on security, including surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques. The technological enablers of globalization assist terrorist cells and leaders in preserving their security in a number of ways, including distributing elements in a coordinated network, remaining mobile (**see 'Mobility'**), and using clandestine and/or encrypted communications.

The security of terrorist organizations has been preserved historically by limiting communication and information exchanges among cells. This ensures that if one cell is compromised, its members only know each other's identities and not those of other cells. Therefore the damage done to the organization is minimized. Security is even more important to clandestine cells operating on their own without central direction. Technological advancements, including faster processing speeds and software developments, now mean that those sympathetic to terrorist causes can contribute to the cause virtually through servers located hundreds or thousands of miles away.

Terrorist groups have been able to leverage technological developments designed to shield a user's identity from unauthorized commercial or private exploitation. Concerns about infringements on civil liberties and privacy during the early years of the internet led to the development of 128- and 256-bit encryption freeware that is extremely costly and time-consuming to crack. In addition, access to hardware such as mobile phones and computers can be restricted via the use of lock-outs. The use of internet protocol address generators, anonymity protection programs, peer-to-peer applications such as Telegram, Signal, and Surespot, as well as chat rooms and content sites such as JustPaste.it, also provide a degree of security. Within the virtual jihadist community, youth sympathetic to the violent Islamic extremist cause post information in discussion groups on ways to circumvent electronic surveillance through awareness of phishing and mobile phone monitoring techniques and the use of electronic 'dead letters'—saving draft messages in shared third-party email accounts, such as Gmail, without sending anything that could be intercepted.

Mobility

The reduced size and increased capabilities of personal electronics also give terrorists mobility advantages. Mobility has always been a crucial consideration for terrorists and insurgents alike, given the superior resources that states have been able to bring to bear against them. In open societies with well-developed infrastructure, terrorists have been able to move rapidly within and across borders; this complicates efforts to track them. The globalization of commerce has also improved terrorist mobility. Globalization has exponentially increased the volume of air travel and goods that pass through ports and across borders. Measures have been taken to ease the flow of goods, services, and ideas among states to improve efficiency and reduce costs. The European Schengen Agreement was a shining example of such a measure among EU member states, although the Syrian refugee crisis and the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris have led to a revisiting of this concept.

The use of international air travel by terrorists has been well documented. Carlos the Jackal evaded arrest through air travel, and two of the London 2005 bombers travelled to Pakistan before the attack, allegedly to film their 'martyrdom videos' and receive bomb-making instruction. Terrorist use of transportation

need not necessarily be overt in nature, as the volume of goods transported in support of a globalized economy is staggering and difficult to monitor effectively. For example, customs officials cannot inspect all of the vehicles or containers passing through border points or ports. To illustrate the scale of the problem, the United States receives 10 million containers per year; one port, Los Angeles, processes the equivalent of 12,000 20-foot containers daily. Western government officials fear that terrorist groups will use containers as a convenient and cheap means to ship WMD.

Lethality

Globalization has undoubtedly already had a troubling influence on terrorism, but counter-terrorism experts and practitioners are most concerned about the possibility of future catastrophic attacks using WMD. During the transnational era, terrorists could obtain advanced weapons to conduct more lethal attacks, including rudimentary WMD, but on the whole they did not. Few tried to acquire them and fewer still, including the Weather Underground, threatened their use. The precise reasons why terrorists did not acquire and use such weapons during this era are unclear. Experts have speculated that terrorist leaders understood that the more lethal their attacks were, the greater the likelihood that a state or the international community would focus their entire efforts on hunting them down and eradicating them.

Since the end of the cold war, however, some terrorist leaders have expressed both the desire and the will to use WMD. US troops recovered evidence in Afghanistan in 2001 that outlined plans by Al Qaeda to produce and test biological and chemical weapons under a plan code-named *zabadi* (curdled milk). A raid on a suspected Al Qaeda flat in London in 2004 revealed quantities of ricin, a toxin, and Islamic State has used mustard and chlorine gas in attacks in Syria and Iraq (2015–18). Violent Islamic extremist statements have mentioned—and one fatwa supports—the use of any means, including WMD, to kill as many infidels and apostates as possible. Globalized media may play a role in shaping terrorist plans, as violent Islamic extremist leaders are alleged to have been inspired by the spectacular special effects of Hollywood blockbuster movies.

Globalization has also facilitated access to the weapons, resources, and proficiency required to conduct smaller, but more lethal attacks. Terrorist groups from Chechnya to Pakistan have shared their expertise in the manufacturing of lethal bombs triggered by increasingly sophisticated and globally available remote control devices. In Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, insurgent and terrorist groups have built sophisticated 'improvised explosive devices' (IEDs). IEDs vary in lethality and complexity, and state sponsorship may no longer be required for their construction given globalization. Digital videos suggest that terrorists conduct distance and blended learning through a 'virtual jihad academy' in which prospective terrorists study everything from conducting ambush attacks to making and using IEDs, to increase their effectiveness and lethality. As further evidence that state sponsorship is unnecessary in a globalized world, Islamic State has developed and fielded its own air power, in the form of drones. While relatively crude and improvised, Islamic State drones began dropping bombs from the air in 2015, leading to widespread concern among defence officials worldwide that such attacks are only the beginning of a new, frightening era of terrorist reach and lethality.

> **Key Points**
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> - Elements of globalization that permit the rapid exchange of ideas and goods are also exploited by terrorist groups.
>
> - The internet and social media allow terrorists to reach and influence audiences instantaneously and recruit new followers.
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> - The technologies associated with globalization allow terrorists to operate in a highly distributed global 'network' to share information, conduct highly coordinated, lethal attacks, and permit a high degree of mobility and security.
>
> - Globalization may allow some terrorist groups to acquire, manufacture, and use weapons of mass of destruction to conduct catastrophic attacks in the future.

Combating terrorism

States plagued by transnational terrorism responded individually and collectively to combat the phenomenon during the cold war. Responses included passing anti-terrorism laws, taking preventative security measures at airports, and creating special operations counter-terrorism forces such as the West German Grenzschutzgruppe–9 (GSG–9). Successful rescues in Entebbe (1976), Mogadishu (1977), Prince's Gate,

London (1980), and Singapore (1991) demonstrated that national counter-terrorism forces could respond effectively both domestically and abroad. A normative and multilateral approach to tackling the problem, founded on the principles of international law and collective action, was less successful. Attempts to define and proscribe transnational terrorism in the United Nations (UN) bogged down in the General Assembly over semantics, but other cooperative initiatives were successfully implemented. These included the conventions adopted through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to improve information-sharing and legal cooperation, such as the Hague Convention

for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970). Another collective response was the creation of the Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate in Interpol in 1985. However, most initiatives and responses throughout this decade were largely unilateral, regional, or ad hoc in nature. More recent efforts, such as the UN's ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, have had some degree of success in sanctioning specific global terrorist groups (**see Case Study 28.2**).

State leaders disagree on how best to deal with the current form of global terrorist violence. Some national leaders view violent Islamic extremism as an

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Case Study 28.2 The 2016 Lahore terrorist attack

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On the evening of 27 March 2016, the Gulshan-e-Iqbal park was teeming with families picnicking and relaxing. The park, spread out over 67 acres in a western suburb of Lahore, is a popular meeting and gathering place and open space, akin to New York's Central Park, the Boston Commons, or London's Hyde Park. The park was even more popular than usual that evening, as members of Pakistan's Christian minority community were celebrating Easter with families and friends. At 6:30 p.m., a lone individual made his way through the packed crowds and detonated a suicide bomb. His suicide vest contained an estimated 25–35 kilogrammes of explosives. The effect of the explosive was further augmented by objects embedded in it, nuts, bolts, or nails, which became flying shrapnel. Seventy-five individuals, almost half of whom were children, were killed immediately or succumbed to their wounds. Another 340 people were injured.

A Pakistani group, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA, roughly translated as 'Assembly of the Free'), immediately claimed responsibility for the attack. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar formed in the wake of a leadership split in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, in 2014. JuA's short history has been a violent one. In seven attacks, including one, prior to the park attack, on a Roman Catholic church during services, the group has claimed almost 200 lives.

This attack and others by JuA highlight several aspects of globalization. The social networking company Facebook sent a notification to a number of its users after the attack. Users in Egypt, Canada, Belgium, China, the United States, and elsewhere received a message as part of the company's 'Safety Check' feature. The cryptic message provided no specific details, but rather asked if an unspecified explosion had affected them. The message immediately led to a level of confusion and panic among many Facebook users across the globe.

Another element of globalization relates to the leadership split that led to the formation of JuA. On 1 November 2013, a drone strike killed the leader, or emir, of the TTP, Hakimullah Mehsud. Although the TTP elected a new emir after Mehsud's death, his decision to engage in peace talks with the government of Pakistan enraged some members, who split off into two different factions, including JuA. According to news reports, the strike was conducted by an armed Central Intelligence Agency drone. Such drones are often controlled and flown from halfway around the world, guided by advanced satellite and information technologies.

A third and final element of globalization is associated with actions taken by the member states of the United Nations. The UN's ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee formally sanctioned, or 'blacklisted', JuA on 6 July 2017, in part for its attack, but mostly for its connections to the global terrorist groups Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. The sanctioning resulted in JuA's split into two groups in November 2017, as well as leadership losses through Pakistani government crackdowns and other drone strikes.

Question 1: What responsibilities should social media companies accept when it comes to terrorism? Are they just conveyors of content or should they accept responsibility for the nature of the content they provide, including terrorist propaganda?

Question 2: Who benefits most from the technologies associated with globalization: the terrorist groups who can coordinate episodic attacks, or the states who respond to them individually and collectively?

intractable problem in which there can be no negotiation. The stakes in 'the Long War' consist of the preservation of basic freedoms and a way of life. In order to defeat terrorism, individual states have a responsibility to protect civilian populations while dealing with terrorist cells, supporters, and sympathizers within their own borders. Given the global, elusive, and adaptive character of the violent Islamic extremist threat, the best approach for dealing with global terrorism is to pool resources together in a coalition of the willing: the Global North improving the capabilities of the Global South. The end result will be the development of a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (GCTN) of states able to detect, track, and eliminate terrorist threats while non-military efforts address the root causes of terrorism. One example of globalization in practice has been the United States' use of unarmed and armed Global Hawk, Predator, and Reaper drones to conduct surveillance and strikes against terrorist targets. The drones are flown remotely, their video feeds are disseminated to operations centres and users locally, regionally, and globally, and attacks are authorized, conducted, and monitored without US forces having to engage in direct combat. While the United States claims these operations have succeeded in gathering intelligence and attacking terrorist operations, the use of drones has also prompted claims of 'extrajudicial' or 'targeted killing' by others.

Other national leaders are less comfortable with the concept of 'war' against terrorism. In their view, military actions can only lead to terrorist reprisals, or worse—the return of terrorism to its original connotation, the sanctioned use of terror by the state to repress its own citizens. In their eyes, terrorism is a crime that is best dealt with through law enforcement methods. By dealing with terrorism as a police problem, states uphold the rule of law, maintain the moral high ground, preserve democratic principles, and prevent the establishment of martial law. Military force should only be used in extreme circumstances and even then its use may have negative consequences. Terrorism is best dealt with inside state borders and through cooperative international law enforcement efforts to arrest suspects and provide them with due process. The law enforcement approach to terrorism must balance taking enough measures against terrorist groups without crossing over into the realm of '"political justice", where the rules and rights enshrined in the principle of due process are either wilfully misinterpreted or completely disregarded' (Chalk 1996: 98).

To do little against domestic or global terrorism, in the name of upholding the rule of law, risks offering terrorist groups a sanctuary and the security of rights and laws.

The opinions of a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), expressed online, and those of blog writers and their followers have also been critical of the 'war' on terrorism. Those suspicious of the motives of the political elite of the United States range widely in their opinions. Conspiracy theorists online suggest that wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are the first stage in the establishment of an Orwellian system that is constantly in conflict with the terrorist 'other' to justify continued violation of personal rights and privacy. Communities of practice and NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, routinely provide monitoring and online reporting of suspected government human rights and civil liberties abuses. One example is the persistent attention paid to the status of terrorist detainees held in US custody at Guantanamo Bay.

Although disagreements still exist over how best to deal with terrorism philosophically (**see Opposing Opinions 28.1**), pragmatically the largest problems are locating terrorists and isolating them from their means of support. Locating and identifying terrorists is tedious and time-consuming and requires collecting, assessing, and analysing information. Information technologies associated with globalization have been useful in assisting this process. Such technologies allow identification of terrorist patterns before and after attacks, with systems capable of performing calculations measured in the trillions per second (floating point operations, or 'flops'). Terrorist finances and organizations can be evaluated through link analysis to construct a more comprehensive picture of how terrorist elements interact. In addition, algorithms and nascent forms of artificial intelligence may prove their value in data analysis and pattern recognition, although the ethical aspects of being associated with targeting terrorists led some Google employees to protest. However, discovery of terrorist cells has much to do with luck and pursuing non-technical leads. States' bureaucracies can impede or negate technical and resource advantages over terrorist groups.

In order to deal with global terrorism, the international community must address its most problematic modern aspects: the appeal of messages that inspire terrorists to commit horrific acts of violence. Killing or capturing individuals does little to halt the spread of extremist viewpoints that can occur under the guise

Opposing Opinions 28.1   States targeted by terrorism should pre-empt or attack threats beyond their national borders

For

Modern terrorism represents a paradigm shift. Terrorist groups are extra-legal and extra-normative by their very actions. The combination of ideology, mobility, access to information, and lethality gives modern terrorists capabilities close to those of states without the latter's restraint. Terrorists used to act in order to coerce and strengthen their bargaining position; now they kill others who do not conform to their beliefs.

Globalization renders national boundaries irrelevant. Information and commodity flows make 'national boundaries' a quaint, unrealistic way of framing responses to terrorist threats. Few states can enforce or protect their borders; the measures they undertake are largely 'security theatre' to reassure domestic populations. Sovereignty is not an inviolable concept when states are unable or unwilling to address the global threats within them.

Pressure on terrorist groups abroad keeps the homeland safer. A proactive approach that engages terrorist groups in 'ungoverned' or 'undergoverned' geographic spaces denies them sanctuary and restricts their ability to act freely. Efforts by group leaders and facilitators to ensure their personal safety and survival sap energy from terrorist groups and prevent them from husbanding resources and attacking the homeland. Novel threats require novel, aggressive responses. Better to take action elsewhere, or the result will be attacks on the scale of New York City, Paris, Brussels, or worse.

Against

Interventions never work. The record of foreign states intervening to address security threats, especially terrorism, has been abysmal. US, French, and Israeli interventions in Lebanon from 1983 until 2000 failed to achieve stability. The same is true of more recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Interventions buy limited time before future attacks but do not address the root causes of terrorism.

Interventions create more problems than they solve. Actions by states outside their borders have unintended consequences and create unanticipated effects. The likelihood that those intervening elsewhere understand the complex political, economic, and cultural terrain into which they are embarking is slim to zero. Those who previously had no grievance against the intervener will have one as a result of altered local or regional power dynamics. Interventions create more terrorists than they remove.

State responses that overreact to the threat of terrorism are more damaging than terrorist attacks themselves. Terrorists deliberately target non-combatants and conduct outrageous attacks to draw attention and provoke a response. Aggressive responses to terrorism only validate the status groups seek to achieve. Leaders' temptation to respond to extra-normative violence with extraordinary measures can only undermine their states' credibility and legitimacy. Existing responses may be imperfect and take time, but they preserve the moral authority of the state.

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1. Is the adage of 'the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must' the best method of dealing with the phenomenon of globalized terrorism?

2. Should state leaders cede the initiative to terrorists, and be willing to accept their attacks, as the cost of doing business in a globalized world?

3. What matters most when confronting terrorism: protection of the domestic population or preservation of national reputation?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

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of discussion and education. In the case of Islam, for example, radical mullahs and imams twist the tenets of the religion into a doctrine of action and hatred, where spiritual achievement occurs through destruction rather than personal enlightenment. In other words, suicide attacks offer the promise of private goods (spiritual reward) as a public good (positive contributions to the community over a lifetime). Precisely how the processes and technologies of globalization can assist in delegitimizing the pedagogy that incites terrorists will remain one of the most vexing challenges for the international community.

Key Points

- Globalization does not convey advantages to terrorists alone.

- States should utilize their advantages against terrorists individually and collectively.

- Differences among states regarding the threat of terrorism, and how best to respond to it, reflect subjective characterizations based on national biases and experiences.

- Combating the appeal of ideas that inspire terrorism is crucial.

Conclusion

The onset of the 'Arab Spring' and the 'Twitter Revolution', combined with the deaths of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki and the collapse of the Islamic State, suggest to some that militant Islamic terrorism is in its final throes. However, the wide range of lone wolf terrorist attacks at home and continuing conflicts abroad serve as a reminder that such terrorism will be with us for years to come. Terrorism remains a complex phenomenon in which violence is used to obtain political power to redress grievances that the process of globalization may have rendered more acute.

Globalization has increased the technical capabilities of terrorists and given them global reach, but it has not altered the fundamental fact that terrorism represents the extreme views of a minority of the global population. In other words, globalization has changed the scope of terrorism but not its nature. The benefits that globalization provides terrorists are neither one-sided nor absolute. The same technologies and processes also enable more effective means for states to combat them. Global terrorists can only succeed through popular uprising or the psychological or physical collapse of their state-based adversary. Neither outcome is likely given the limitations of terrorist messages and capabilities. Terrorist and counter-terrorist campaigns are characterized by prolonged struggle to maintain advantages in legitimacy domestically and internationally. The challenge for the global community will be in utilizing its advantages to support a 'clear, countervailing vision' as an alternative to the ideas that motivate and sustain the on-going wave of terrorist violence (Fishman 2016: 259).

Questions

1. Why is linking terrorism with globalization so difficult to do theoretically?
2. When did terrorism become a truly global phenomenon and what enabled it to do so?
3. In what ways are the technologies and processes associated with globalization more beneficial to states or terrorists?
4. Given that terrorism has been both a transnational and a global phenomenon, why has it not been more successful in effecting change?
5. Of all of the factors that motivate terrorists, is any one more important than others, and if so, why?
6. What has changed in terrorism over the past half-century and have any factors remained the same? If so, what are they and why have they remained constant?
7. What is the role that technology plays in terrorism and how will it change the way terrorists operate in the future?
8. What are the dilemmas that terrorist groups face with respect to WMD?
9. What is the primary challenge that individual states and the international community as a whole face in confronting terrorism?
10. How has the concept of security in personal, societal, and international life changed as a result of globalized terrorism—and how will it change in the future?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Atran, S. (2010), *Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists* (New York: Ecco, HarperCollins). Argues that kinship—or blood and belonging—explains contemporary terrorism better than organizational causes.

Cronin, A. K. (2011), *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Explores why and how terrorist groups largely fail to achieve their goals.

Hoffman, B. (2017), *Inside Terrorism*, 3rd edn (New York: Columbia University Press). Explains clearly the development of terrorism, its evolution over time, and future prospects for defeating it.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2000), *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). Highlights similarities between religious leaders across faiths and sects in how they justify killing non-combatants.

Lia, B. (2008), *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri* (New York: Columbia University Press). Examines al-Suri and assesses his significance to Al Qaeda. Noteworthy for a translation of key excerpts of al-Suri's Global Islamic Resistance Call.

Moghadam, A. (2017), *Nexus of Global Jihad: Understanding Cooperation Among Terrorist Actors* (New York: Columbia University Press). One of the better examples of the current wave of scholarship that explores alliance formation and cooperation between violent Islamic extremist groups.

Schmid, A. P., and Jongman, A. J. (2005), *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 2nd edn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction). A still useful, if at times overwhelming and dated, reference work that highlights the problems associated with defining and studying terrorism.

Shapiro, J. (2013), *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Argues that terrorist leaders face the problem of controlling their groups and must risk security to do so.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS

Framing Questions

- **What patterns do we observe in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945? What explains these patterns?**

- **How have nuclear weapons changed world politics?**

- **Have non-proliferation efforts been successful? Why or why not?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter examines the enduring importance of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and non-proliferation efforts in world politics since 1945. The chapter begins by explaining WMD technology and describes its spread over time. It then considers major theoretical debates about proliferation, including why states want weapons of mass destruction and what effects they have on patterns of international conflict and cooperation. The chapter next looks at the evolution of various attempts by the international community to control or limit the spread of these weapons. Throughout, it examines how globalization has shaped the worldwide landscape of WMD proliferation, and how it is likely to shape the issue in the years to come.

Introduction

The spread of technology that enables weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains a central issue in a globalized world and has had long-term consequences for international peace and security. The United States' explosion of the first atomic bomb—the world's first and thus far only use of nuclear weapons—in two Japanese cities in 1945 demonstrated the extraordinary destructive power of nuclear weapons. Since then, the growth of technology that can be used in WMD has diffused across the globe, but weapons programmes themselves have spread more gradually.

The total number of nuclear weapons has actually declined since the height of the cold war, and today there are only nine nuclear weapons states in the world. Globalization and the end of the cold war, however, introduced new and complex challenges related to proliferation. These include continued debate over particular countries' nuclear programmes, the growth of nuclear energy, and the prospect of the rise of non-state actors and WMD terrorism. As proliferation challenges have evolved, so have international efforts to address them.

WMD technology and its spread

Nuclear weapons states

Since 1945, the technology that enables the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction has spread across the globe. WMD themselves, however, have been slower to spread. By 1965, for example, four countries in addition to the United States had tested nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union (Russia), the UK, France, and China. These five were recognized as nuclear weapons states under the 1968 **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** (NPT), and are also the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Only nine countries are thought to possess nuclear weapons today: the five nuclear weapons states, plus India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Several other states have developed or inherited nuclear weapons arsenals, but chose to relinquish them. Similarly, although a number of states developed chemical weapons arsenals, many have chosen to destroy their stockpiles under their commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997.

Technical basics: what is a nuclear programme?

Nuclear technology is **dual-use**, meaning that it can be used either to generate energy or to make a weapon. A nuclear reactor uses nuclear chain reactions in a sustained, controlled process to generate energy in the form of heat. A nuclear weapon, on the other hand, seeks to create a large explosion. The earliest nuclear weapons were fission weapons, which split atoms in a chain reaction to release large amounts of energy.

By the mid-1950s, however, both the United States and Soviet Union had developed thermonuclear weapons, which use a combination of fission and fusion, which compresses and heats hydrogen atoms so that they combine (fuse), generating energy.

Developing nuclear weapons requires an array of sophisticated technologies arranged in complex organizational patterns. This is one reason why the creation of a full nuclear programme is difficult and has been achieved only by a handful of states.

First, states must obtain weapons-grade fissile material, either plutonium or uranium. Making a weapon from uranium requires Uranium-235 (U-235). Because U-235 is a small fraction of the uranium found in nature (~0.7 per cent), it must be separated from the non-fissile isotope (U-238) through a process called **enrichment**. Once the uranium has been enriched to 20 per cent or more U-235, it is called highly enriched uranium (HEU); above 90 per cent is considered **weapons-grade**. Plutonium, on the other hand, is created by humans in reactors and must be **reprocessed**, or chemically separated from the non-fissile material in spent nuclear fuel, in order to be used in a nuclear warhead.

Once weapons-grade fissile material has been obtained, it must still be weaponized: made into a warhead that can be delivered to its target. Uranium and plutonium can both be used to make implosion-type bombs, in which explosives around a mass of fissile material implode the fissile material to reach critical mass and start the nuclear reaction. Uranium, however, can also be used to make a gun-type bomb, in which one piece of uranium is fired into another to achieve critical mass.

Because of their explosive capacity, nuclear weapons are considered **weapons of mass destruction** (along with chemical, biological, and radiological weapons). The explosive yield of nuclear weapons is measured in kilotons (thousands of tons) or megatons (millions of tons) of TNT equivalent. Fission nuclear weapons, the kind dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, release energy equivalent to tens of thousands of tons of TNT; the destructive capacity of fusion or thermonuclear weapons can reach as much as several megatons. Nuclear weapons release energy, and can therefore cause damage, in three different ways: a blast, thermal radiation (heat), and nuclear radiation. Nuclear weapons also cause an electromagnetic pulse that can disrupt the operation of electronic equipment, as well as fires that create further damage (Eden 2006).

Globalization has heightened concern that a non-state actor such as a terrorist organization or criminal group might try to acquire a nuclear weapon or radiological material—the kind that could be used in a so-called 'dirty bomb' (Allison 2005). Because of the complexity and cost of establishing a full nuclear programme, these actors are generally expected to acquire a nuclear weapon by stealing one or purchasing it on the black market, rather than developing it themselves. Concern about nuclear theft has been particularly acute since the dissolution of the Soviet Union—the only time that a state with a nuclear arsenal experienced political disintegration. Command and control arrangements over those weapons became questionable. In response, the United States and the international community launched a series of efforts to secure nuclear materials in the countries of the former Soviet Union. In the mid-2000s, discovery of the global proliferation network run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan raised concerns that in a globalized world, private actors could share or sell nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge, thereby circumventing state control of proliferation (**see Box 29.1**).

Evolving views on nuclear weapons since 1945

During the cold war, the superpowers built large arsenals of nuclear weapons, with wide-ranging yields and multiple delivery vehicles. Some were smaller, tactical nuclear weapons, intended for use against targets on the battlefield and delivered by aircraft, artillery, or short-range ballistic or cruise missiles. Others were strategic nuclear weapons, typically with larger yields, delivered via long-range bombers, land-based intercontinental

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Box 29.1   A. Q. Khan and 'proliferation rings'

A metallurgist trained in Europe, Abdul Qadeer Khan returned to Pakistan to work on uranium enrichment after India's 1974 nuclear explosion, and became known as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. In 2004, however, Khan admitted his involvement in an extensive international network that traded in nuclear technology and materials, stretching from Europe to Dubai to Southeast Asia. The network provided assistance to nuclear weapons programmes in Iran, North Korea, Libya, and possibly Iraq. Khan claimed that his activity was undertaken without Pakistani government knowledge, a claim that outside observers regarded with scepticism (and which he later retracted).

Khan's network raised troubling questions about proliferation in an age of globalization. First, it highlighted the role that covert business and illicit networks could play, and raised the question of whether states can maintain control over sub-state actors who could gain financial or professional interests in promoting proliferation. Second, it drew attention to what Braun and Chyba call 'proliferation rings' or 'second-tier proliferation'—cases in which 'states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts'. Third, the case raised concern about whether or not the Pakistani government is in full control of its nuclear assets, and whether internal instability might produce a 'loose nukes' problem in Pakistan.

(Braun and Chyba 2004: 5–6; Chestnut 2007)

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ballistic missiles (ICBMs), or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Starting in the 1970s, some missiles carried multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which meant that a single missile carried multiple warheads that could strike different targets.

Thinking about nuclear weapons during the cold war focused primarily on the bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The main question was how to prevent conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) or nuclear war between the superpowers. A huge body of literature examined **nuclear deterrence**—the question of 'how nuclear weapons could be used to prevent an opponent from taking an undesirable action' (Walton 2013: 198). Thomas Schelling (1980) famously discussed deterrence as 'the threat that leaves something to chance'—the idea that if there was even a small risk that conventional attack would cause an opponent to escalate to nuclear conflict in response, that risk would deter the conventional attack.

More concretely, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies feared that the Soviet Union would take advantage of its conventional military superiority to invade Western Europe, and relied on the threat of nuclear retaliation to prevent

it from doing so. To deter the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies used two different nuclear targeting strategies. In a **counterforce strategy**, American nuclear weapons targeted the Soviet Union's nuclear and conventional military assets. In a **countervalue strategy**, the assets threatened with nuclear retaliation were targets of industrial or social value, typically cities with large populations. The USSR's nuclear strategy during the cold war evolved as well, as the Soviet arsenal grew in size and the country's leaders considered the utility of nuclear weapons for deterrence and war-fighting purposes.

The United States also developed what was known as **extended deterrence**—the threat of nuclear response in order to deter an attack on one of its allies. This, however, created a dilemma that persists in American alliances and extended deterrence relationships today: if an attack on an American ally led the US to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the opponent's home territory, that opponent might itself retaliate by using nuclear weapons against American soil. Was (or is) the US really willing to trade New York for Paris, or Los Angeles for Tokyo?

As more regional powers acquired nuclear weapons, scholars began to research the strategies these countries adopt with respect to these weapons. It turns out that they developed arsenals that were very different from the superpowers, and have envisioned using them in different ways. Narang (2014) identifies three types of nuclear posture adopted by non-superpower nuclear states: a catalytic posture designed to catalyse third-party intervention; an assured retaliation posture designed to guarantee the ability to respond to a nuclear attack; and an asymmetric escalation posture designed to respond to conventional attack with nuclear escalation. These postures differ in terms of the precise nuclear capabilities developed and deployed; the level of transparency a state has about its arsenal; and the command and control arrangements by which the state manages its nuclear weapons. They also have different effects on conflict (**see Box 29.2**).

Globalization has also created new challenges for international security and nuclear safety, particularly with respect to global growth in nuclear power, which has become more attractive as various countries endeavour to reduce worldwide carbon emissions (**see Ch. 24**). Fissile material is necessary to generate nuclear energy, but controlling its production and use is also one of the most important ways to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is in charge of monitoring and ensuring that countries that have signed the NPT do not divert fissile material from nuclear power plants to nuclear weapons. Monitoring

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Box 29.2 Nuclear posture

Vipin Narang (2013) identifies three types of nuclear posture based on how decision-makers envision using nuclear weapons. The postures differ in terms of capabilities, transparency, and command/control arrangements. Consequently, some postures work better than others for deterrence.

1 Catalytic: This nuclear posture, used by Israel, is designed to catalyse outside assistance from a third party in the event of a severe crisis. The state does not have weapons capable of surviving a military attack, and their capabilities are not transparent. This posture is relatively less successful in deterring conflict against either a nuclear-armed or non-nuclear opponent.

2 Assured retaliation: China and India adopt this posture. It seeks to deter nuclear attack by guaranteeing retaliation through the use of survivable weapons deployed in a transparent way. This posture has mixed effects on conflict depending on whether the attack is low- or high-intensity and whether the attacker itself has nuclear weapons.

3 Asymmetric escalation: This posture, used by France and Pakistan, is intended to deter conventional attack by threatening an attacker with rapid escalation to a nuclear counter-attack. Nuclear weapons are therefore deployed for possible first use against that attacker. Asymmetric escalation is the most successful posture in terms of deterring conflict, but it raises the most concerns about accidental use and command and control, so it comes with steep trade-offs.

(Narang 2013)

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and compliance, however, are continually debated. For example, much of the concern about Iran's use of nuclear energy (**see Case Study 29.1**) has centred on the belief that Iran is leveraging its nuclear energy programme to create the capacity for nuclear weapons production.

The systems used to produce nuclear energy are also complex, and so nuclear energy carries the risk of accidents with potentially serious human and environmental consequences. The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and resulting meltdown of three reactors at Fukushima, underscore this safety risk (**see Case Study 29.2**). The global anti-nuclear movement—which includes organizations such as Greenpeace, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and others—points to the risk of disasters like Fukushima, and the safety issues associated with nuclear waste, to both call for nuclear disarmament and oppose the use of nuclear power.

Chemical and biological weapons

Chemical and biological weapons also represent significant threats to international security. They can be

Case Study 29.1 Nuclear programmes: North Korea and Iran

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Much international concern over nuclear proliferation today focuses on North Korea and Iran (**see Ch. 15**). The two countries, however, present different challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

North Korea

Fears in the early 1990s that the country was pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme prompted the 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to shut down its plutonium reactor at Yongbyon in exchange for fuel oil and construction of two Light Water Reactors (LWRs). Following delays, and amid political uncertainty exacerbated by North Korea's missile testing over Japan in 1998, North Korea again announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, which it did in 2003. Six-party talks (involving North Korea, South Korea, the US, China, Japan, and Russia) produced a 2005 Joint Statement affirming the goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but after a round of new financial measures placed pressure on North Korea, the country tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006.

Additional tests followed in 2009, 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017, and a series of missile tests throughout 2017 also demonstrated the advancement of North Korea's ballistic missile programmes and delivery systems. Pyongyang claims to have developed a thermonuclear warhead, and experts generally believe that its missiles can strike long-range targets, including part or all of the US mainland. In 2018, North Korea announced that it would pause nuclear and missile testing in the context of the summit in Singapore between Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump. As of late 2018, although talks were on-going and North Korea had offered to close a few testing sites, the technical importance of this 'concession' was considered debatable and no agreement to roll back any weapons development had been reached.

Iran

Iran's nuclear energy programme began under the US Atoms for Peace programme in the 1950s, and its first nuclear power plant, constructed at Bushehr with Russian assistance, became operational in 2011. Iran has argued that it needs enrichment for energy security, and cites its right to nuclear energy under the NPT (which it remains a member of).

In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had failed to declare enrichment activities as required under IAEA safeguards agreements; pressure via the UN Security Council and initial negotiations produced a temporary suspension but no resolution. In 2011, the IAEA further reported that Iran had conducted weapons-related research, heightening concern that Iran sought to achieve a latent nuclear capacity from which it could quickly 'break out' to become a fully fledged nuclear weapons state. Heavy sanctions eventually resulted in a 2015 agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed limits on Iran's enrichment activities in exchange for lifting (most) sanctions. Critics charged that verification processes were insufficient to detect cheating, and in 2018 the Trump administration announced that the United States would withdraw from the agreement, leaving the future in question.

Question 1: How are the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges similar? How are they different?

Question 2: What should the Trump administration do to address the North Korean nuclear challenge? Why?

spread via the air, water, contact with human skin, or food and other materials, and can quickly injure or kill large numbers of people. However, the technical issues around chemical and biological weapons, their proliferation history, and the measures required to deal with the threats these weapons pose are distinct both from nuclear weapons and from each other.

Chemical weapons use manufactured chemicals to kill people. Chemical warfare has been used in modern wars since Germany deployed chlorine gas in the First World War, and periodically since. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons (mustard gas and sarin) on Kurdish civilians in Iraq, while terrorist group Aum

Shinrikyo released sarin gas on the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 and injuring many more. More recently, the United Nations (UN) confirmed that Syria's dictator, Bashar al-Assad, used chemical weapons against the opposition during the Syrian civil war in 2013–14, and that other parties in the conflict may also have employed chemical weapons (**see Opposing Opinions 29.1**).

The chemicals used in chemical weapons are often widely and commercially available, posing a particular problem for arms control. Chlorine, for example, can be bought to decontaminate drinking water and clean swimming pools, but it can also be used in chemical weapons attacks. Arms control efforts with respect to these

Case Study 29.2   Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster

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On 11 March 2011, an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 shook Japan, leaving over 15,000 people dead. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster—the largest such disaster since Chernobyl in 1986—occurred when a tsunami resulting from the earthquake struck the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant on the coast of Honshu.

Fukushima's reactors automatically shut down when the tsunami struck, but flooding caused power outages. This prevented coolant circulation and led the reactors to overheat, with three of them reaching meltdown. The meltdown complicated existing earthquake and water damage, releasing radioactive material into the air and water. 160,000 people were eventually evacuated.

Japan's government, which initially reported the disaster at level 4 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), eventually raised its assessment to level 7, and received sharp criticism for having underestimated the disaster's severity. An independent investigatory commission characterized the crisis as at least partially man-made, resulting from poor crisis management and overall complacency about nuclear safety. As of 2018, the IAEA judged that the situation at Fukushima was stable, but called for quick action to deal with radioactive water that had been temporarily stored in tanks at the site. Full decommissioning of the reactors is expected to take several decades.

The incident was not predicted to significantly increase residents' risk of cancer and radiation-related illnesses (Tabuchi 2013; World Health Organization 2013). Nevertheless, it raised questions about the nuclear power industry in Japan and elsewhere, reminding observers that even carefully designed, properly maintained systems experience disaster (Sagan 1995). The disaster raised citizen and political objections to reliance on nuclear power, and Japan temporarily idled all 54 of its nuclear power plants (which in 2011 provided around one-third of the country's power supply). Given Japan's lack of domestic energy alternatives and pressure to meet the country's carbon emissions requirements, the government in 2017 approved a draft plan aiming for 20 per cent of Japan's energy to be provided by nuclear power as of 2030. Worldwide, concerns about carbon emissions and climate change have led to a global reconsideration of the use of nuclear energy; in 2016, the IAEA predicted continued global growth, though at a slower rate than before the Fukushima disaster.

Question 1: Given concerns about both climate change and nuclear safety, should the world expand the use of nuclear energy, or get rid of it? Why?

Question 2: What steps should be taken to limit the risk of accidents at nuclear power plants?

weapons, however, are relatively well developed: 193 states are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997 and which aims to verify the destruction of all chemical weapons worldwide; assist states with defence against chemical weapons; and monitor the chemicals industry to prevent new weapons from emerging through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Over 90 per cent of the world's previously declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have been destroyed as of early 2018. Nevertheless, challenges remain; states including Egypt and North Korea have not signed the CWC, and chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in Syria's on-going civil war, despite the country's signing of the CWC in 2013.

Biological weapons use bacteria, bacterial toxins, or viruses to kill people, and have also been used throughout the history of warfare, both ancient and modern. The first biological weapons attack in the United States occurred in 2001, when an attacker sent anthrax spores in the mail, killing five people, disrupting the mail service in major cities, and eventually costing over $1 billion to address. Although there is a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), monitoring and enforcement are difficult; the manufacture of biological weapons can be hidden in sites such as health research centres or pharmaceutical production facilities. In 2005, a US presidential commission said that American intelligence on biological weapons and which countries had them was poor, and noted that traditional intelligence methods useful for monitoring nuclear weapons development—such as satellite imagery—were not as effective in detecting the development of biological weapons (Lipton 2005). In 2007, another US government commission concluded that 'to date, the US government has invested most of its nonproliferation efforts and diplomatic capital in preventing nuclear terrorism. The commission believes that it should make the more likely threat—bioterrorism—a higher priority' (Hylton 2011).

Opposing Opinions 29.1 The initial use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria

For

Humanitarianism demands it. The humanitarian cost of chemical weapons use required the international community to intervene to protect Syrians.

Treaties must be enforced. Use of chemical weapons in Syria violated international treaties that have protected people from exposure to chemical weapons for decades. The international community must enforce these agreements or they become meaningless. Without intervention, leaders in Syria and worldwide will see that there are no consequences, and chemical weapons will be more likely to be used in the future. Lack of intervention after 2013 has led to these weapons being used in Syria again, as late as 2018.

Risk from non-state actors. The Syrian government could lose control of chemical weapons stockpiles, allowing them to be used by non-state actors and terrorists. There is evidence that the so-called Islamic State has also used chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. There was also concern that Syria may not have reported everything that it possessed to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), making it harder to detect if stockpiles go missing.

Red lines and credibility. US President Obama said that chemical weapons use would be a red line triggering American action. Not acting on a declared red line weakens American and international credibility and makes it harder to deter or coerce countries away from using these weapons (or taking other threatening actions).

Against

Give diplomacy (more of) a chance. Syria acknowledged that it had chemical weapons and agreed to destroy them in 2013. The international community should rely on diplomacy, and should not punish Syria by intervening right after it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

High costs. The costs of intervention are simply too high, especially given that great powers like Russia have supported the Syrian government.

Perils of intervention. The UN and OPCW found in 2016 that both sides of the Syrian civil war have probably used chemical weapons, so it is not clear whose side the international community should intervene on.

1. Who has used chemical weapons in Syria? What type, how often, and under what circumstances? How do these answers affect your opinion about intervention?

2. Why did the US or international community not intervene after the 'red line' was first crossed?

3. If not chemical weapons use, what other factors have determined when and how world powers have responded to the crisis in Syria?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Key Points

- The technology that underlies nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons has spread rapidly since 1945. Chemical and biological weapons production is particularly difficult to monitor and detect.

- Nuclear weapons use weapons-grade fissile material (plutonium or uranium) to produce an explosion through either fission or fusion. These explosions produce blast, heat, and radiation, and have explosive yields equivalent to thousands or millions of tons of TNT.

- Nuclear deterrence is about using nuclear weapons to prevent an adversary from taking an undesirable action they would otherwise take. Nuclear deterrence can be achieved using strategic or tactical nuclear warheads employed in a range of delivery vehicles in either a counterforce or countervalue strategy.

- The growth of nuclear energy and the spread of dual-use technology have raised concerns that non-state actors could acquire nuclear or radiological material.

Theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation

Theoretical and academic debates on nuclear weapons are extensive, while discussions of chemical and biological weapons are far less so. Debates about nuclear proliferation can be grouped into three major clusters. The first debate concerns definitions and discussion of what counts as nuclear proliferation. The second debate has to do with states' motivations for different behaviours regarding nuclear weapons. The third debate concerns what effects nuclear weapons have on stability and conflict in the international system.

Definitions

The first set of questions asks what nuclear proliferation really is. This question has emerged because a number of states that have acquired nuclear weapons more recently have not followed the superpower pattern of developing massive arsenals, and have complicated our ideas of what it means to have nuclear weapons. These cases highlight two main issues for defining nuclear weapons proliferation.

The first issue is **nuclear opacity**, a policy pursued by Israel. Israel has not signed the NPT, but has also never confirmed that it possesses a nuclear arsenal, nor has it conducted a full, overt nuclear test. Its leaders have stated publicly that Israel will 'not be the first' to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. This approach is sometimes referred to as 'nuclear ambiguity'—or, more colloquially, 'the bomb in the basement' approach.

The other issue is that of **latent nuclear capacity**, which describes a country that possesses the infrastructure, material, and technical capabilities to quickly assemble a nuclear weapon, but has never done so. Japan, for example, is sometimes described as being 'five minutes from a nuclear bomb', since it has enough fissile material, technical ability, and knowledge to assemble a nuclear weapon at short notice if it ever chose to do so. Because of the very small gap between nuclear latency and nuclear weapons proliferation, understanding a country's intent becomes a critical factor in the international community's evaluation of and reaction to a country's nuclear activities (Panofsky 2007). In this sense, latent capacity is also an issue for chemical and biological weapons, in that many countries possess the infrastructure and technical capacity to create these weapons, even if they have chosen not to do so.

Motivations and behaviour

A number of other questions surround states' behaviour with regard to nuclear weapons and the motivations for these patterns of behaviour. Why do states want nuclear weapons? Why have some states chosen to give them up? Why have nuclear weapons been used only once? Why do states help other states acquire nuclear technology?

Early scholars writing about nuclear weapons focused on their potential utility in fighting and winning major international armed conflicts. Indeed, this is the only context in which nuclear weapons have ever been used: against Japan in 1945. During the cold war, however, nuclear weapons were seen as useful for strategic reasons, particularly for their ability to deter one's adversaries from engaging in military provocation or conventional attack. This led to a technological determinism about nuclear weapons: the belief that all countries that were capable of developing nuclear weapons would eventually do so because of the obvious security benefits. As the gap between states that have the capability to acquire nuclear weapons and states that have actually acquired them has widened, however, scholars have examined a range of other potential motivations (**see Box 29.3**).

Box 29.3 Why do states build nuclear weapons?

- **Security**: States build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats.

- **Domestic politics**: States build nuclear weapons because they advance domestic and bureaucratic interests.

- **Norms**: States build nuclear weapons because of their beliefs about whether weapons acquisition or restraint is good or bad.

- **Leader psychology**: States build nuclear weapons because leaders hold a conception of their nation's identity that makes these weapons desirable.

- **Political economy**: States build nuclear weapons because their country's political economy—whether or not it is globally integrated—creates incentives for proliferation or restraint.

- **Strategic culture**: States build nuclear weapons because their strategic culture gives them certain ideas about how valuable the acquisition/use of nuclear weapons is.

(Sagan 1996; Hymans 2006; Solingen 2007; Johnson, Kartchner, and Larsen 2009)

In addition to security justifications for acquiring nuclear weapons, two other major explanations have been advanced. The first argues that domestic politics drive proliferation behaviour. States pursue nuclear weapons because doing so confers a domestic political advantage on leaders, or because it serves the interests of powerful bureaucracies and military organizations (Sagan 1996). They may also pursue nuclear weapons because political leaders and ruling coalitions opt for inward-looking political and economic platforms rather than pursuing growth through integration in the global economy (Solingen 2007). Alternatively, states may pursue nuclear weapons for reasons to do with prestige, identity, or culture. Nuclear weapons may be pursued because they give states influence and 'a seat at the table', or because leaders hold a conception of their nation's identity in which fear or pride push them towards proliferation (Sagan 1996; Hymans 2006). The strategic culture of countries may also influence their decisions (Johnson, Kartchner, and Larsen 2009). In addition to proposing new motivations for why states might acquire nuclear weapons, these explanations raise questions about the appropriate level of analysis: are the causes of proliferation found at the state level, the sub-state or domestic politics level, or even the level of the individual leader?

Despite this range of reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons, no one has used nuclear weapons since 1945. Paradoxically, the same reason given for acquiring nuclear weapons is also the most common reason advanced for not using them: that states have been deterred from using nuclear weapons by the threat of nuclear retaliation from adversaries (Brodie 1946). Other writers, however, have focused on normative arguments for nuclear non-use, and on the development of a '**nuclear taboo**' against the use of nuclear weapons. Buzan and Herring define a taboo as 'a strategic cultural prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons . . . an assumption that nuclear weapons should not be used rather than a conscious cost–benefit calculation' (Buzan and Herring 1998: 165). Nina Tannenwald (2007) argues, for example, that it is this taboo that has prevented the United States from employing nuclear weapons.

In addition to non-use and nuclear restraint, several countries that have developed or inherited nuclear weapons have chosen to give them up (Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss 2004). In 1993, South African President F. W. de Klerk announced that South Africa had developed six nuclear weapons, but had chosen to relinquish them and join the NPT. At the end of the cold war,

three countries that had been part of the former Soviet Union—Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine—suddenly found themselves inheritors of the USSR's large nuclear stockpile. All three countries agreed to give up these weapons and sign the NPT; since the early 1990s, they have worked with the United States and the international community to eliminate their stockpiles of fissile material. Explanations for these decisions have included changes to the security environment at the end of the cold war, as well as, in South Africa's case, the desire to rid the country of its nuclear arsenal before the end of apartheid (Sagan 1996). More recently, some work has focused on the US role in stopping its allies from pursuing nuclear weapons programmes (N. Miller 2018).

Given the international community's efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, it might seem surprising that countries would help each other acquire nuclear technology. Yet that is exactly what has happened: nuclear weapons states have regularly shared materials, technology, and knowledge. Sometimes they share peaceful nuclear technology because they hope that providing this assistance will help them achieve certain foreign policy goals. For example, some countries have knowingly shared sensitive technology related to nuclear weapons because they believed that doing so would help constrain a more powerful enemy (Kroenig 2010). Overall, however, scholars currently disagree about whether a nuclear energy programme makes countries more or less likely to acquire nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann 2012; N. Miller 2017).

Effects of nuclear weapons

A third set of questions about nuclear weapons has to do with their effects on global politics. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having nuclear weapons? How do they affect international security and patterns of international conflict?

Nuclear weapons have long been assumed to confer certain security and strategic advantages on countries that possess them. Writings during the cold war, largely focused on the superpowers, talked about **existential deterrence**, which suggested that possession of a single nuclear warhead was enough to deter conflict, because the credibility of severe punishment for a provocation was enough to deter adversaries from being provocative. And, indeed, the possession of nuclear weapons does seem to confer security benefits. Although countries that have nuclear weapons are involved more often in low-level conflicts, their disputes are less likely to

Box 29.4 Proliferation optimism and proliferation pessimism: the Waltz–Sagan debate

Kenneth Waltz notes that although states with nuclear weapons have increased the size of their arsenals since 1945, the spread of nuclear weapons to new states has been slow. He argues that gradual nuclearization will contribute to stability, since 'new nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced' and will show similar caution. Consequently, he says, 'The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars harder to start . . . Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.'

Scott Sagan, by contrast, argues that when it comes to nuclear weapons, 'more may be worse'. He suggests that 'professional military organizations—because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests—display organizational behaviours that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war'. Moreover, weak civilian control over the military in future nuclear-armed states is likely to keep civilian government from reining in the military's conflict-prone tendencies. The risk of nuclear accidents and of conflict between nuclear-armed states makes the spread of nuclear weapons undesirable.

(Sagan and Waltz 2003: 44–5, 47–8)

escalate to major war, and they are more likely to get the outcomes they want in a crisis involving non-nuclear opponents (Rauchhaus 2009; Beardsley and Asal 2009).

At the same time, however, there are significant risks to the spread of nuclear weapons in terms of international peace and stability. Some scholars continue to believe in existential deterrence. They argue that new nuclear states, large or small, will be held back by the same constraints as the existing nuclear powers, and be deterred from engaging in provocation or conflict. Others argue that the systems that govern nuclear weapons safety and use are extraordinarily complex, and because new nuclear powers are not likely to possess the same systems of checks and controls, the risk of accidents will be higher. They further argue that the countries now acquiring nuclear weapons may have weaker civilian control. If this is the case, military routines and procedures, which tend to be more aggressive, more offensive, and less risk-averse, are likely to dominate national decision-making and lead countries into conflicts that could escalate to the nuclear level (**see Box 29.4**).

Still others argue that nuclear weapons create a **stability–instability paradox**. This occurs when nuclear-armed countries feel safe from large-scale retaliatory attack because they have nuclear weapons, and thus feel free to engage in low-level provocations against other countries. This means that countries with nuclear weapons are more likely to be involved in low-level conflicts, but less likely to be involved in serious conflict, because the fact that they have nuclear weapons keeps anyone from threatening them with national disintegration or any other scenario that would require the use of nuclear weapons to defend the integrity of the state.

Another question is whether the effects of nuclear deterrence are the same for all countries, or whether deterrent effects stay the same for a given country over time. There is some evidence that states that have recently acquired nuclear weapons are more likely to respond aggressively to military challenges early in their nuclear history. States with longer experience of having nuclear weapons reciprocate these challenges less frequently, meaning that nuclear weapons have different effects on conflict over time (Horowitz 2009). The effects of nuclear weapons also seem to differ country by country. Rather than existential deterrence—where a single nuclear warhead is enough to deter conflict—what appears to matter is not just nuclear possession, but **nuclear posture**. Effective deterrence is not just a matter of having nuclear weapons, but of what a country does with the weapons once it has them: some nuclear postures are better than others at deterring conflict (**see Box 29.2**).

Key Points

- Nuclear opacity and latent nuclear capacity raise questions about how to define nuclear proliferation. Latent capacity is also an issue for chemical and biological weapons.

- States acquire nuclear weapons for different reasons. They also vary in how often and why they adopt policies of nuclear restraint, nuclear reversal, and providing nuclear assistance to other countries. Strategic factors, culture and ideology,

political economy, domestic politics, and leader psychology may all influence these decisions.

- There is a debate about whether the spread of nuclear weapons will lead to more stability and less conflict, or more accidents, instability, and conflict.

- The effect of nuclear weapons on conflict varies over time, and from country to country.

Evolution of non-proliferation efforts

Almost immediately after the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, countries began thinking about how to limit the destructive power of nuclear weapons while allowing the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under UN auspices to assist in the sharing of scientific and technical information related to nuclear energy.

Efforts to limit the spread and destructive impact of nuclear weapons have taken a range of forms. These efforts have sought to limit both **horizontal proliferation** (the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries) and **vertical proliferation** (increases in the size of existing nuclear arsenals). Some efforts have focused on universal non-proliferation and complete nuclear disarmament, while others have emphasized nuclear restraint rather than complete abolition. Others have taken a counter-proliferation approach, trying to interrupt the acquisition of new nuclear weapons capabilities.

Efforts to limit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons have taken a somewhat different form and followed a different timeline (**see Box 29.5**).

Box 29.5   Non-proliferation efforts related to chemical and biological weapons

Efforts to limit the development of chemical and biological weapons began with the 1925 Geneva Convention, which prohibited the use (but not development or possession) of these weapons. In later years, countries began to supplement the Geneva Convention with more specific and more forceful agreements.

Today, the main agreement governing non-proliferation efforts targeting chemical weapons is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The treaty entered into force in 1997 and is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which verifies the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. Only a handful of countries have not ratified the treaty, and as of early 2018, OPCW stated that well over 90 per cent of the world's declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed.

The chief agreement governing the non-proliferation of biological weapons is called the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which entered into force in 1975. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, however, the BWC has no formal verification procedures or procedures for monitoring compliance, and its impact has been more limited.

(UN 1975; OPCW 2015)

Non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control during the cold war

Efforts at non-proliferation accelerated in the 1960s, particularly after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought the superpowers close to nuclear war (**see Ch. 3**). In 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the UK signed a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which limited them to underground nuclear tests rather than tests in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. French and Chinese leaders declined to sign, because they believed that these efforts advantaged states that already had nuclear weapons; France and China tested their first nuclear weapons in 1960 and 1964 respectively (**see Table 29.1**).

In the late 1970s, the five nuclear weapons states all issued negative security assurances about the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries. These assurances varied: China, for example, stated that it would not be the first to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. US policy as of 2010 was that it would not use nuclear weapons against countries that had signed and were in compliance with the NPT; much of the language about US declaratory policy remained unchanged in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, though some experts questioned whether the changes that were made represented a shift in US doctrine on the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons (Mount and Stowe-Thurston 2018).

Table 29.1 Chronology of first nuclear weapons tests

1945	United States
1949	Soviet Union
1952	Great Britain
1960	France
1964	People's Republic of China
1966	Israel (alleged cold test)
1974	India ('peaceful nuclear explosion')
1979	Vela Incident (potential test by Israel and South Africa)
1998	India (weapon) Pakistan
2006	North Korea

Non-proliferation also gained traction in the wider international community. By the mid-1960s, the IAEA had implemented a safeguards programme to monitor the use of fissile materials for peaceful purposes and ensure that they were not being diverted. In 1967, the Tlatelolco Treaty created the first **nuclear-weapons-free zone** in Latin America. In 1970, the Zangger Committee adopted guidelines to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports, and in 1975 the Nuclear Suppliers Group—formed in response to India's 1974 'peaceful nuclear explosion'—strengthened safeguards and conditions for particularly sensitive nuclear exports. In 1987, a group of states also signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to limit the export of nuclear-capable ballistic or cruise missiles.

The centrepiece of the modern nuclear non-proliferation regime, however, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After a wave of discussion on nuclear issues in the 1960s, the NPT was opened for states to sign in 1968, and entered into force in 1970. Five states—the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, France, and China—were recognized as having the right to possess nuclear weapons. All other states agreed to forgo the development of nuclear arsenals in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology and a promise by the five nuclear weapons states to move towards elimination of their arsenals. United States Ambassador Thomas Graham, whose long diplomatic career focused on arms control and non-proliferation, described the NPT as a 'bargain' based on three pillars: non-proliferation, eventual disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy (**see Box 29.6**).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the superpowers also began to think seriously about arms control and about limiting the build-up of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Eventually they signed a series of agreements, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I, 1972), the SALT II treaty (1979), and the Intermediate Nuclear Force Agreement (1987). Together, these agreements limited the deployment of nuclear-armed missiles and **ballistic missile defences** (BMD). These efforts provided a forum for superpower cooperation and discussion, but they fell short of achieving the reduction in tension that arms control advocates hoped for.

After the cold war

The end of the cold war provided a new opportunity for the United States and Russia to revisit arms control. In 1991, the two sides signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that reduced (rather than just limited) the number of warheads and delivery vehicles on each side. START II was signed in 1993 and, most significantly, banned the use of MIRVs on ICBMs. These efforts slowed in the 2000s, however. The US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue ballistic missile defence, and Russia withdrew from START II. Under President Obama, the US cancelled some elements of missile defence while continuing others, including sea-based BMD platforms to defend European allies against short- and medium-range missiles from Iran. At the same time, however, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed in 2002, reduced the two countries' nuclear stockpiles further, and the New START Treaty, which replaced SORT in 2010, limits the two countries to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each.

Global efforts at non-proliferation also saw renewed momentum in the early 1990s. The discovery after the Gulf War that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was more advanced than the international community thought prompted the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee to review and update their safeguards lists, including more emphasis on dual-use items. In 1995, the signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty met to review its provisions, and decided to extend it indefinitely. Today, 190 states have signed the NPT, and the treaty is generally regarded as a success.

The 1995 NPT Review Conference, however, also highlighted on-going issues related to nuclear proliferation. The first problem is that the NPT is not universal. Israel, India, and Pakistan never signed the treaty; North Korea signed, but withdrew in 2003. A resolution adopted alongside the 1995 extension agreement called for all states in the Middle East to accede to the NPT, and countries have worked bilaterally and multilaterally for years to convince North Korea to return to the NPT. These efforts have been unsuccessful. Second, the NPT has

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Box 29.6 The NPT's 'grand bargain'

The NPT is based on a central bargain: the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. To use the words of a former Indian foreign minister, the NPT was not designed to establish 'nuclear apartheid', permanently authorizing great-power status and nuclear weapons to a small group of states and assigning the rest of the world to permanent second-class status. Maintaining both ends of this central bargain is vitally important to the long-term viability of the NPT.

(Graham 2004)

weak provisions for enforcement, and regional powers have generally thought that additional agreements are necessary to address proliferation by countries such as Iran and North Korea (**see Case Study 29.1**).

Third, critics of the NPT charge that it is unfair: freezing the nuclear status quo privileges the nuclear status of the five nuclear weapons states recognized in the treaty over other countries, but does not put enough pressure on them to actually dismantle their nuclear arsenals.

Two other non-proliferation measures discussed around the same time encountered similar objections and implementation difficulties. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban nuclear weapons testing entirely, was adopted and opened for signature in autumn 1996 after three years of intensive negotiations (K. Hansen 2006). To enter into force, however, the CTBT requires signature and ratification by 44 states, including all five recognized nuclear weapons states as well as nuclear powers not recognized as such by the NPT. Critics of the CTBT are concerned that the treaty is not effectively verifiable, while others have suggested that a commitment not to test would constrain the national security interests of existing nuclear powers. Several countries (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have tested nuclear weapons since the treaty was opened for signature, and there is no sign that the treaty will enter into force.

Similar difficulties were encountered with the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Although some nuclear weapons states saw this as a way to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, and some **non-nuclear weapons states** saw it as a way to constrain the vertical proliferation of the nuclear weapons states, others lodged objections. India, for example, objected to both the CTBT and the FMCT as measures that would constrain its retention of a 'nuclear option'. There was also disagreement over whether the treaty should only prevent the creation of *new* fissile material stockpiles, or whether it should encompass plans for the elimination of *existing* stockpiles (something Pakistan wanted, for example, to address the advantage that it believed India had in fissile material). And, as with the CTBT, whether effective verification exists has been a major criticism of the FMCT.

The search for new approaches

As the post-cold war optimism about arms control and non-proliferation weakened, concern grew that traditional agreements might not be sufficient to deal with the new, more complicated landscape of nuclear threats. CIA Director James Woolsey famously compared the situation to having killed a dragon, only to find oneself lost in a jungle full of poisonous snakes (Woolsey 1998). There was also the sense that, just as the United States and NATO had used nuclear weapons to compensate for an inferiority in conventional forces relative to the USSR during the cold war, today smaller powers (or even non-state actors) might seek nuclear weapons to offset tremendous American or Western advantages in conventional military capability. The international community began to look for other initiatives and strategies capable of addressing the world's proliferation challenges.

One of these was **counter-proliferation**, which generally describes efforts to obstruct, slow, or roll back the programmes of states that are actively pursuing nuclear weapons, as well as to deter and defend against their actual use (**see Box 29.7**).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004, requires states to legally prohibit individuals, companies, or other actors from supporting non-state actors that seek to acquire WMD. It also requires states to enforce domestic legislation prohibiting these activities, and to establish effective controls over items and financing in order to do so. A 1540 Committee was set up to report on and assist implementation and to facilitate international cooperation on these efforts. The 1540 Committee's mandate was extended in 2011 until 2021. The UN Security Council has also, at times, adopted more specific resolutions placing sanctions on countries that have pursued nuclear weapons. For example, a series of resolutions since 2006 have applied sanctions to North Korea over its nuclear activities; a specific sanctions committee composed of

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Box 29.7 The US definition of counter-proliferation

Counter-proliferation aims to eliminate or reduce threats caused by the development and spread of WMD. To do this, the US Government focuses on five objectives:

1 Discourage interest by states, terrorists, or armed groups in acquiring, developing, or mobilizing resources for WMD purposes.

2 Prevent or obstruct state, terrorist, or other efforts to acquire WMD capabilities, or efforts by suppliers to provide such capabilities.

3 Roll back or eliminate WMD programmes of concern.

4 Deter weapons use by those possessing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

5 Mitigate the consequences of any use of WMD against the United States or its allies.

(US National Counterproliferation Center 2019)

an international panel of experts researches and writes annual reports on this process.

Other counter-proliferation efforts include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched in 2003; the Nuclear Security Summit, first held in 2010; and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which opened for signature in late 2017. The US-led PSI focuses specifically on improving international cooperation to interdict trafficking and transfer of WMD materials and delivery systems. A voluntary initiative without a set multilateral framework, PSI began with 11 members and expanded, by late 2015, to over 100 participating countries. The Nuclear Security Summit, held every two years since 2010, seeks to prevent nuclear terrorism by increasing cooperation to secure nuclear materials and prevent nuclear smuggling. More recently, a group of non-nuclear weapons states dissatisfied with the pace of progress in nuclear disarmament created the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which bans use, possession, development, testing, transfer, and deployment of nuclear weapons on humanitarian grounds. Proponents of the new treaty applauded its effort to delegitimate nuclear weapons status, while critics dismissed it as rhetorical grandstanding; the negotiations were boycotted by the nuclear weapons states, NATO countries, and many allies of nuclear weapons states (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2019).

Key Points

- Non-proliferation efforts address both horizontal and vertical proliferation, and can focus either on disarmament or on limiting the size and use of WMD stockpiles.
- The NPT is seen as a bargain between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.
- However, critics complain that the NPT is not universal, is unfair, and is difficult to monitor and enforce.
- Since the end of the cold war, the international community has also used counter-proliferation approaches to disrupt the pursuit of nuclear weapons, nuclear smuggling, and the risk of nuclear terrorism. These approaches have included UNSC Resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Nuclear Security Summit, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Conclusion

The technology that underpins nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons has spread steadily since 1945, raising new challenges for international security. The end of the cold war marked a shift in focus, from a world of two nuclear superpowers in bipolar competition to a more globalized world containing a larger number of nuclear powers with smaller, more varied arsenals. The spread of WMD technology thus reflects both the extent and the unevenness of globalization processes.

This global change in the landscape has forced scholars to re-examine some of their assumptions about weapons of mass destruction: why they are acquired, why states forgo them, and under what conditions they increase or dampen the risk of international conflict. At the same time, the spread of WMD technology, the increased complexity of the global security environment, and the potential for non-state actors to play a role in proliferation have also become important strategic challenges. Much of the current debate, therefore, has to do with how we should think about security in a complex and globalized world.

Efforts to limit or combat proliferation have evolved too, from an early focus on disarmament, to efforts to limit weapons stockpiles through arms control, to a more recent focus on counter-proliferation. The very complexity of the contemporary WMD landscape suggests that no single policy is likely to be a panacea; different challenges demand different solutions. As the proliferation landscape evolves, so too will the efforts of individual states and the international community to meet that challenge.

Questions

1. Why have nuclear weapons spread so slowly, even though nuclear capabilities have spread more rapidly?
2. Why do states decide to build nuclear weapons? Why do they choose not to?
3. How is the technology for chemical and biological weapons different from nuclear weapons technology? Are the technologies likely to be used in different ways? Why or why not?

4. Have the motivations for building nuclear weapons changed since 1945? Why or why not?
5. Are you a proliferation optimist or a proliferation pessimist? Why?
6. How does having nuclear weapons change patterns of international conflict?
7. What role do non-state actors play in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Are they a new kind of proliferation challenge?
8. How have arms control and non-proliferation changed since 1945?
9. How has globalization changed proliferation? Does it fundamentally change how states and the international community should address proliferation challenges?
10. What new policies or initiatives are needed to address the challenge of WMD proliferation today?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

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Freedman, L. (2003), *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Outlines how thinking on nuclear strategy developed during the cold war.

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Lavoy, P. R., Sagan, S., and Wirtz, J. J. (2000), *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Discusses the spread of weapons of mass destruction and how states might employ them.

Miller, N. (2018) *Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Examines how American policy during the cold war shaped patterns of global nuclear weapons proliferation and restraint.

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Tannenwald, N. (2007), *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Explores the role of the nuclear taboo in preventing American use of nuclear weapons since 1945.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations

JOHN BREUILLY

Framing Questions

- Is it useful to distinguish between different types of nationalism and, if so, how do these vary from one to another?

- Is the commonly accepted historical sequence of nation > nationalism > nation-state actually the reverse of the normal sequence?

- Is the principle of national self-determination incompatible with that of state sovereignty?

Reader's Guide

Nationalism has been central to the globalization of world politics. It has played a key role in shaping the major institution of modern international relations: the nation-state. It furnishes the principle which legitimizes this institution: national self-determination (NSD). Yet there is a paradox: nationalists insist their nation is unique, but they do so to justify the formation of a state like other nation-states which interact according to generally agreed-upon rules. This was a global process yet nationalism is opposed to globalization, claiming it homogenizes national identities and undermines territorial sovereignty. This chapter presents arguments about the emergence and spread of nationalism, how this was a global process, and the role played by NSD in modern international relations since 1918.

Introduction

A standard view of the relationship between nationalism, **nation-states**, and **global politics** goes as follows. (1) From about the mid-seventeenth century an order of sovereign, **territorial states** (the 'Westphalian system') developed in Europe (**see Ch. 2**). (2) Nationalism transformed these states from monarchies into nation-states, a phenomenon that diffused from **Europe** until the whole world was organized as a series of nation-states (**see Box 30.1**). International relations became relations between nation-states. (3) **Globalization** threatens this political order by eroding territorial **sovereignty** and national **identity**. Before considering propositions (2) and (3), this chapter outlines key concepts and debates concerning nationalism and nation-states.

Nationalism, nation-states, and global politics

Definitions

This chapter defines **nationalism** as the idea that membership in a nation is the overriding focus of political identity and loyalty, which in turn justifies national self-determination (NSD). Although nationalists think of the **nation** in different ways, they generally mean a 'whole society' occupying a specific territory. The same society can be claimed by competing nationalists. Turkish nationalists claim Kurds in Turkey as Turkish, a view Kurdish nationalists reject (**see Case Study 30.1**).

Box 30.1   The development of a world of nation-states

Date	Rough number of nation(al) states*
1500	2 (England, France)
1800	6 (Britain, France, Holland, United States, Spain, Portugal)
1900	30 (including Belgium, Germany, Italy, Serbia, Romania, Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, Canada)
1923	45 members of the League of Nations
1945	51 states establish the United Nations (UN)
1950	60 members of UN
1960	99 members
1970	127 members
2006	192 members
2018	193 members

* Before 1923 this is an estimate based on historical judgement. Thereafter it is based on membership of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

In defining a nation some social scientists deploy 'objective' criteria such as language or common descent; others stress its subjective, imagined character; while others are sceptical about any definition. **Box 30.2** provides examples of these views. Whatever the academic view, there is a widespread belief today that the world *is* divided into nations which are the main, if not sole, focus of political loyalty, and should therefore enjoy **self-determination**, usually meaning a sovereign state.

Nationalism can be considered as ideology, as politics, as sentiments. Definitions of nationalism usually frame it as ideology. This ideology is studied because it is significant, meaning that it shapes popular identity (sentiments) and/or is proclaimed by movements pursuing or exercising state power (politics).

It is helpful to distinguish types of nationalism. One distinction is between civic and ethnic. **Civic nationalism** is commitment to a state and its values. State membership determines nationality, as in the multi-ethnic immigrant society of the United States. **Ethnic nationalism** is commitment to a group of (imagined) common descent. Nation precedes state, as in ethno-national states formed in modern Europe. There are problems with this distinction. Every nationalism invokes culture and values, and these change, often quickly. Cultural factors such as religion and language cannot clearly be labelled either ethnic or civic. There is a danger of moralizing the distinction (civic good; ethnic bad). Nevertheless, the distinction might be useful, as when classifying justifications for NSD.

One can also distinguish between elite and popular nationalism, and between state-supporting and state-opposing nationalism. State-supporting nationalism aims to nationalize further the existing state, internally

Case Study 30.1 Kurdish nationalism and Kurdistan

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Greater Kurdistan refers to the cultural region claimed by Kurdish nationalists as predominantly inhabited by Kurds; this includes parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia. Kurdish nationalism claims a historical lineage based on place names, language, culture, and religion. There were Kurdish 'principalities' with much autonomy linked to their location between the Ottoman and Safavid (Iranian) empires. However, variations in dialect, religion (Sunni and Alawi), and local political affiliations undermine claims about a single Kurdish nation. Resistance to late Ottoman rule came from local notables, not nationalists. Nevertheless, some Western observers saw this resistance as national, which in turn stimulated political leaders and urban intellectuals to construct a nationalist ideology. The end of the First World War intensified such ideas, as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and Woodrow Wilson preached NSD.

At the Paris Peace Conference (1919), nationalists asserted the existence of 'Kurdistan', illustrated with 'historical' maps. The Western powers hinted at autonomy, but suspicion grew as France and Britain carved up the Middle East on different lines. This and the creation of a Turkish state shattered Kurdish hopes. Kurdish nationalism was opposed by all the occupants of 'Kurdistan': Turkey, Iran, the French and British mandates of Syria

and Iraq, all themselves using nationalist arguments. The Kurdish movements were factionalized, and varied between these states, ranging from classic nationalism through Islamism to revolutionary socialism, and from insurrectionism through political negotiation to cultural promotion and quietism.

After 1945 all four states—Syria and Iraq were now independent —mainly repressed and occasionally negotiated with their own and other Kurdish movements, producing a series of fast-changing and often bewildering political combinations. An Iraqi Kurdish nationalist faction once allied with Saddam Hussein against a rival faction!

Yet historical maps of 'Greater Kurdistan' sustained Kurdish nationalism and were referenced by the US State Department, giving the idea credibility. Repressive state policies usually had the unintended effect of promoting Kurdish national sentiment. However, Kurdish nationalism remained fragmented, interacting with rivalries within and between the four states. The collapse of the bipolar cold war order and the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to increased interventions in the region by the US and its allies.

Post-2003 Iraq includes an autonomous Kurdish region that has negotiated oil supplies with Turkey, which in turn represses its Kurdish nationalist party, the PKK. The recent breakdown of the Assad regime in Syria creates new opportunities for Kurdish nationalists with the formation of autonomous zones and US support, but also new threats such as the so-called Islamic State movement and escalating Turkish persecution. The constant shifts in domestic and international power constellations keep changing the character of Kurdish nationalism.

Diaspora nationalism is important. Many Kurds have emigrated to Europe (with large concentrations in Berlin, Stockholm, and Paris) and further afield. Diasporas wield great influence because they are often wealthy, network with host governments and civil society associations, are fairly free to organize, and connect to their home states using the latest communication technologies. They can take an 'all-Kurdish' view and are alert to what will persuade international opinion. Like the other aspects of Kurdish nationalism, diaspora nationalism changes as global politics does.

Question 1: Is the Kurdish nation an invented rather than an imagined community?

Question 2: 'There is no such thing as a Kurdish nationalist movement, but rather competing factions shaped by whichever state is their principal enemy.' Discuss.

by 'purifying' the nation and reforming government, externally by reclaiming 'national' territory. State-opposing nationalism seeks a new state, either by separation from a larger state or by unifying several smaller states.

Different combinations of these types produce different nationalisms. Elite-nationalism using civic claims to secede from an existing state is very different

from popular nationalism, using ethnic arguments to nationalize further an existing state.

It is generally agreed that nationalism is modern, although there is a significant minority of dissenters from this view. Explanations of its origins and growth centre on four key questions. (1) Does nationalism depend on the prior existence of nations? (2) Are nations modern or do they extend far back in time?

Box 30.2 Definitions of nation

[The nation] … is an imagined political community—imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign … It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion … The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations … It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.

(Benedict Anderson 2006: 5–6)

Let us define it [the nation] at the outset as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. Many of these ties could be mutually substitutable—some playing a particularly important role in one nation-building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. But among them, three stand out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group—or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.

(Miroslav Hroch 1996: 79)

Neither objective nor subjective definitions are thus satisfactory, and both are misleading. In any case, agnosticism is the best initial posture of a student in this field, and so this book assumes no a priori definition of what constitutes a nation. As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such. However, whether such a body of people does so regard itself cannot be established simply by consulting writers or political spokesmen of organizations claiming the status of 'nation' for it. The appearance of a group of spokesmen for some 'national idea' is not insignificant, but the word 'nation' is today used so widely and imprecisely that the use of the vocabulary of nationalism today may mean very little indeed.

(Eric Hobsbawm 1990: 8–9)

(3) Should we privilege culture, or economics, or politics in our explanations? (4) What is the role played by internal factors (such as a shared culture) in relation to external factors (such as threats or support from powerful states)? **Table 30.1** summarizes positions in this debate.

A modernist interpretation is that nationalism is generated by some key element of modernization such as industrialism (Gellner), print capitalism (Anderson), or modern politics and modern warfare (Breuilly, Tilly) and that the 'nation' invoked is based more on modern needs than any significant pre-existing national identity. Opponents argue that there are long-enduring national identities which are the basis for nationalism, even if nationalism itself is modern. These identities may be socio-biological or sociological (**primordialism**), particular historical cases which might also involve some kind of nationalism (perennialism), or transmitted over generations as a complex of myths and symbols (ethno-symbolism).

There is a lack of clarity over the term 'nation-state'. The world's leading **international organization** is called the United Nations. The 'Divided States' might be a more accurate name! Cultural diversity renders implausible claims to an ethnic nation-state, just as lack of democracy casts doubt on claims to a civic nation-state. What, then, does the term nation-state mean? It is not worthwhile to identify how many 'national' states exist because the criteria are so fuzzy and the data so flawed, and because it implies accepting nationalist claims. Instead, this chapter treats as national states that claim to be national (however defined), are not challenged by powerful state-opposing nationalist movements, and are recognized internationally.

A brief history of nationalism in global politics

Some historians argue for the existence of ancient or medieval 'globalization'. Leaving that aside, from 1500 the Americas were brought into contact with Eurasia and Africa. However, nationalism as popular politics and sentiment became important only after 1750, when significant global political conflicts between states invoked nationalist arguments.

The Seven Years' War (1756–63) was arguably the first 'world war'. Britain and France deployed military forces against each other, directly or through proxies, in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Both states controlled global trading in mass commodities such as cotton, tobacco, and sugar. Europeans justified their power in terms of superior culture, religion, and occasionally race, treating the rest of the world as primitive societies and decaying civilizations.

This nationalism was state-supporting, civic, and elite. In France and Britain themselves there were demands to abolish privilege and make government accountable to the 'nation'. This 'civic nation' was linked to an expanding middle class shaped by commercial globalization. These similarities enabled public opinion in the two states to see the other as a clear threat. Their conflicts hit France harder than Britain, precipitating

Table 30.1 Debate positions on nationalism

Priority (nation or nationalism)	Time (pre-modern/ modern)	Type (ideology, politics, sentiment)	Key factor (culture, economy, politics)	Theory (short name)	Theorist (example)
Nation	Pre-modern (socio-biological) OR modern (sociological)	Sentiment	Culture (belief as identity)	Primordialism	Pierre van der Berghe (pre-modern) Walker Connor (modern)
Nation	Pre-modern (ethnie)	Sentiment	Culture (myths and memories)	Ethno-symbolism	Anthony Smith
Nation	Pre-modern	Sentiment	Culture (beliefs as creeds)	Perennialism	Adrian Hastings
Nationalism	Modern	Sentiment	Economy (industry)	Modernism	Ernest Gellner
Nationalism	Modern	Sentiment	Culture (communication)	Modernism	Benedict Anderson
Nationalism	Modern	Ideology	Culture (intellectuals)	Modernism	Elie Kedourie
Nationalism	Modern	Politics	Politics (elite and modern states)	Modernism	Paul Brass Charles Tilly Michael Mann

revolution. That revolution issued the declaration that the nation was the source of sovereignty, echoing the US Declaration of Independence. Revolutionary France, waging war on *ancien régime* Europe, appealed to nations to rise up against their rulers. Those governments deployed nationalist rhetoric in response.

Nationalism long remained a minority idea elsewhere. Rebellion in the Americas freed territories from Spanish and British control, but creole elites mainly used the language of popular sovereignty, not national identity, to justify independence claims.

Napoleon's defeat left Britain the major world power. Apart from **diplomacy** to co-opt or divide opponents, Britain relied on naval supremacy and informal collaboration with local rulers. Instead of the traditional combination of coercive and economic power, Britain proclaimed their separation. It abolished tariffs, ceased monopolizing overseas trade and shipping, and tied major currencies to the price of gold. This was linked to an on-going process of industrialization, accompanied by transformations in communications (telegraph, later telephone and radio) and transportation (steam, later electric and oil-powered). This enabled huge increases in long-distance migration.

British power was dependent on the weakness and division of its potential rivals. In Europe, the Americas, and Asia, wars in the 1860s were won by modernizing and nationalizing states that challenged British **hegemony**. Close links between technology and power led to state

intervention; the belief that power depended on control of overseas resources fuelled imperialist conflict.

Nationalism initially imitated the civic forms of France and Britain, with nationalists projecting their nations as 'historic', insisting that 'non-historic' nationalities assimilate. This stimulated counter-nationalisms, which stressed folk culture, popular religion, and spoken language.

Beyond Europe there was little stimulus to nationalism, given the indirect nature of British power which was rarely projected in nationalist forms. There were responses to Christianity and secular modernity, both of acceptance (Christian conversion, colonial liberalism) and rejection.

As the contradictions of British-led globalization grew, this generated new forms of nationalism. Imperialist conflict promoted popular state-supporting nationalism in challenger states. Ideas of racial supremacy supplanted civilizational and religious claims to superiority. Mainly projected onto the non-European world, such ideas were also used within Europe, as in modern anti-Semitism. The tightening of direct territorial administration in empires, justified in race and nationalist terms, stimulated counter-nationalisms.

The success of state-supporting nationalism was linked to war using modern technology and organization. Liberal values were abandoned as governments confronted challenges of state-building, economic

development, and imperial expansion. Ethnic, state-opposing nationalism had limited success against declining multinational states. Support from Russia against the Ottomans mattered more in the Balkans than the intrinsic strength of nationalist movements. As challenges to British hegemony grew, a vision developed of a world divided into imperial blocs. International relations were dominated by technologically driven arms races and formal military alliances. Politicians appealed to 'national opinion' and found themselves trapped by the very sentiments they had inflamed.

British hegemony had been framed in cosmopolitan and free trade terms. The challenger states ruled with a bureaucratic apparatus, large military forces, and state intervention in the economy. Armed with nationalist ideas, the state penetrated society in new ways: mass education and media, tariff protection, subsidies. It projected its aggressive nationalism abroad in pursuit of **empire**. As political conflict globalized, it nationalized. There was a contradiction between universalist justifications of empire and actual subordination and exploitation accompanied by ideas of racial supremacy. Counter-nationalism rejected imperial power, often framed in broad regional terms (Pan-Africanism, Pan-Asianism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Slavism).

In short, nationalism mattered for world politics before 1914 but in an unbalanced way. Imperial states dominated the world and the most powerful nationalism was located within the cores of those states. These empires could not accept the universal principle of NSD because it threatened their very existence. The creation of new states was by agreements among the major powers (**see Ch. 19**). Before 1918 there was no international organization or body of law which provided a general method for creating and recognizing new states.

Initially Eurocentric, the First World War became global (**see Ch. 3**). State control over population and the economy increased massively. Although the post-war period saw military dismantling and reduced state intervention, the Second World War was more global, state intervention more extensive, war more 'total'. Radio communication and air power, large-scale economic direction, and military inter-state **coordination** gave this war a transnational character. Military globalization was accompanied by economic 'deglobalization' as free trade and fixed exchange rates disappeared and economic migration decreased. Attempts to return to 'normality' in the 1920s were blown off course by the **Great Depression**. New technologies (radio, film and television, air travel, and automobiles) expanded immensely. They were brought under state control, especially during the wars. Rather than undermining nationalism, these global processes became components of state-supporting nationalism.

In the First World War the Western Allies proclaimed their cause as liberal democracy, not narrow nationalism, although liberal democracy organized through civic nation-states. However, their alliance with Russia compromised this claim, as did their failure to universalize liberal democracy after victory. Germany expressed ethnic nationalism in 1914. Its Ottoman and Habsburg allies went to war to block state-opposing ethno-nationalism. Victory for the Western Allies meant victory for the liberal democratic **principle** of 'NSD' embodied in Woodrow Wilson's **Fourteen Points**, though the unexpected beneficiaries were ethno-nationalists, as the following section discusses. Wilson's broader vision for international society declined as the US turned inwards, as did the USSR after a brief phase of promoting world socialist revolution.

One distinct form of nationalism—fascism—was not insular. Fascists hated both communism and **liberalism**, while rejecting old conservative elite politics. Fascists saw the nation as a supra-individual, classless collective requiring a strong state, mass mobilization, and a genius leader to enable the nation to assert itself in the world. The First World War gave nationalism a statist and militarist character on which fascists built. With economic depression and loss of faith in liberal democracy, fascism gained popularity. Fascist ideology was imperialist but profoundly anti-universalist. The fascist vision was of huge power blocs, each organized as a master nation/race ruling over inferior slave nations/races.

In the colonial world, military mobilization and attempts to boost economic development increased subordination and exploitation. World war made clear the divisions and fragilities of existing colonial power structures. This promoted nationalist dreams of gaining independence, often with reference to liberal, communist, or fascist models.

However, nationalism alone was inadequate to form nation-states in the colonial world. Indeed, imperial power increased after 1918, with Britain and France taking over German colonies and Ottoman provinces, Italy making conquests in North Africa, and Japan likewise in Asia. The League of Nations, without the US, came to be dominated by France and

Britain. The League did much to pioneer concepts of **international law** and administration, but was unable to create a peaceful new world **order**.

International relations remained violent and increasingly accompanied by shrill ideologies linked to domestic as well as inter-state conflicts, aiming to mobilize popular emotions. Communist and fascist ideologies justified extreme policies, insisting that sheer willpower could overcome 'reality'. Fascism and communism did not envisage a global order of nation-states, but rather super-empires led by dominant races, nations, or classes. Communist states eventually recognized limits, which helped them survive this era. In contrast, the Third Reich pursued an escalating and ultimately self-destructive radicalism (**see Case Study 30.2**).

Liberal democracy was reactive and defensive, confronted by communism and fascism. In 1941, the fascist world vision seemed close to realization. However, nationalists who initially welcomed fascists as a means to throw off imperial rule soon discovered they had exchanged a bad master for a worse one. Nationalism could only succeed if old empires were dismantled but not replaced by new ones. How did this come about? In 1941–2, the USSR and the US were forced out of isolationism by attacks from Germany and Japan respectively. Within two years, Allied military victory looked likely. Global strategy turned to plotting the shape of a post-war world in which nation-states figured centrally.

Stalin regarded Soviet expansion as a defensive bulwark rather than a stepping-stone to global domination. Yet that expansion, plus the victory of the Communist Party in China, made communism a global force. Communist power was organized as conventional territorial rule, albeit with novel institutions and ideologies. The US envisioned hegemony differently. Sole control of nuclear weapons initially made it possible to envisage power as coordinating rather than direct (except in occupied Japan and Germany). It laid the foundations for a liberal world order based on national **sovereignty**, low tariffs, managed exchange rates, and extensive post-war reconstruction. The first wave of **decolonization** in 1947–9, mainly in Asia, presaged the worldwide extension of this order.

However, the USSR soon acquired nuclear weapons and credible missile delivery systems. This intensified mutual perceptions of overwhelming and global threat. The US retreated from its anti-imperialist stance. The nuclear umbrella handed initiatives to local states, which presented themselves as valued clients of one or other **superpower**. Each had its own sphere of influence: the USSR in Eastern Europe and China, the US in Western Europe and the Americas. Contested zones in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa were where nationalism could flourish. US hegemony contributed to economic and cultural globalization, in such forms as mass media and consumption. US aid, private investment, low tariffs, stable exchange rates, and cheap energy produced high growth rates and integration among developed regions of the 'free world'. In turn the USSR extended control over its zones. The number of new nation-states increased as the decolonization process resumed from the late 1950s.

In Europe, the focus was on stabilizing nation-states within a supranational framework (**see Ch. 23**). Ethnic homogenization had rendered ethno-nationalism redundant, making civic nationalism acceptable. This ideology accommodated US doctrines of free markets and national sovereignty. The USSR accorded formal sovereignty to its European satellites. Beyond Europe, colonial nationalists demanded territorial independence, a principle enshrined in numerous UN **conventions** and declarations. Yet independent states with poorly integrated political institutions, economies, and cultures confronted major problems. Nation-states were highly unequal and mostly located in one or other of the superpower blocs, although the political order was presented as one of equal sovereign nation-states.

Decolonization made the colonial territory, and not the ethnic nation, the basis of NSD. Anti-colonial nationalism preferred gaining international legitimacy to violently achieving liberation. This, along with continued economic dependence, helps explain postcolonial problems such as military coups, corruption, and ethnic politics: national solidarity, which had been weak under empire, was unlikely to be forged without a struggle for independence. These problems generated new forms of nationalism: some demanding separation, others calling for reforms to create 'real' independence. Nationalist opposition could precipitate state collapse. However, the bipolar international order and sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty prevented state collapse from producing new states. The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan was the major exception that proves this rule. The system preferred dysfunctional states to new states. This only changed with the end of the cold war and the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world

Case Study 30.2   Germany

© istock.com / RolandBlunck

After 1815, the German lands constituted one of Europe's weak zones, with smaller states under the overall influence of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties. The major German nationalist challenge took a liberal, constitutional form, influenced by Britain and France, but with little popular and unified appeal and opposed by Austria and Prussia. Change came when liberal nationalists shifted to a Prussian state-supporting position and mobilized popular support. Early industrialization, especially railways, print media, and telegraphy, as well as coal, iron, and steel production, helped Prussia gain swift and unexpected victories over Austria (1866) and France (1870–1) and proclaim a national state, though it was neither democratic nor ethnically homogenous.

Continued rapid industrialization in Germany and challenge to British hegemony stimulated populist, illiberal, and imperialist nationalism, part of a global trend. This led by a complex route to war between Germany (allied to the Habsburg and Ottoman empires) and the three other major European powers, joined by Italy (1915) and the US (1917).

By 1919 there was a general belief that ethno-nationalism was a popular force, intensified by the experience of the war. Though 'national self-determination' was mainly linked to the division of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires into nation-states, it was also applied, by default, to Germany. Despite its defeat and the burdens imposed by the victors, there was little appetite for dividing Germany. What were seen as territories belonging to other nations (French Alsace-Lorraine, Danish Schleswig, Polish Prussia) were taken away.

German defeat in the First World War radicalized ethnic nationalism in what was potentially a strong nation-state. This, compounded by economic decline, helped bring Hitler to power at the head of a mass movement. Nazism pursued the creation of a race empire in Europe, and parity with what Hitler envisaged would be the two remaining world powers, the British Empire and the US.

It required a global coalition to defeat the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. This time there was no question of allowing a sovereign ethno-German state to survive. Occupation terminated sovereignty. Division between the USSR and the Western allies produced a de facto partition. Supranational liberalism or socialism replaced ethnic nationalism as the ideology of the two states. (The third German state—Austria—declared itself neutral and distanced itself from German nationalism.) A new generation was socialized in different ways in these states.

German reunification could appear to be a revival of nationalism. However, reunification was one consequence of Soviet collapse. There was no powerful demand for unity before that sudden and unexpected event. For East Germans, unification offered a fast track into the European Union and the allure of Western affluence and freedom. West Germany's liberal democratic commitment to unity with less fortunate brethren made it impossible to reject unification, also seen as part of the move towards European unity. The unified Germany has been strongly committed to the European ideal, although the rise of populist nationalism following the economic crisis of 2008 has called that commitment into question.

Thus, although there have been one or more states called 'Germany' since 1871, their territory, institutions, ideology, and place in the international community have altered dramatically, especially in the aftermath of state collapse caused by war (1866, 1870–1, 1918, 1945) or social crisis (1930–3, 1989–91). Nationalism interacts with global politics, connected by the changing uses of the idea of national self-determination.

Question 1: Is German nationalism necessarily a threat to European stability?

Question 2: Did Germany as a whole only become part of the 'West' after 1991?

after the collapse of the USSR (this will be considered later—**see 'Nationalism, nation-states, and global politics today'**).

This is an outline of the complex history of the close relationship between nationalism and global politics.

There is no linear direction to this history, such as the rise of nationalism followed by the challenge of globalization. There are patterns, some of them suggested here, but it is up to you to decide if the historical record supports such suggestions.

Key Points

- There is no single, dominant form of nationalism. It can be ethnic or civic, elite or popular, and it may support or oppose existing states.

- There is no simple sequence leading from nationalism to nation-state formation to changes in the global political order.

- The political ideology of the leading states matters most because others respond to their power and ideologies. In a first phase, Britain and France set the tone for nationalist developments elsewhere, but by 1900 German and Japanese models also became important, and after 1918, and especially after 1945, US and Soviet models mattered most.

- A combination of imitation and challenge, conflict among the major powers, and nationalist assertion in the peripheries produced a world order of nation-states and turned nationalism into the dominant political idea.

- The cold war era stabilized the new world order, which became one of nation-states with the break-up of European overseas empires.

- The collapse of the Soviet Union and the crises in Western capitalism have been accompanied by the rise of nationalist movements. In Western Europe there is 'civic' separatism (Scotland, Catalonia) and 'ethnic' state-supporting nationalism (UK Independence Party, Front Nationale). In Central and Eastern Europe problems for ex-communist states, especially since 2008, have stimulated popular ethnic nationalism. Beyond Europe, state breakdown sometimes stimulates nationalism (e.g. Kurds), but often is so complete that it undermines any political movements, or enables radical Islamism to overshadow nationalism.

The changing meanings of NSD since 1918

One can discern an overall pattern in the development of nationalism by reference to three waves of nation-state formation after 1918, 1945, and 1989. Imperial collapse preceded each wave, accompanied by the justification of NSD (**see Fig. 30.1**). Yet as the global context changed in each wave, so did the meaning of NSD. This chapter presents the general argument and supports this in its four case studies. These case studies each display unique features, but also reflect common global political changes.

General outline

Establishing a new state requires power, legitimacy at home, and recognition abroad. In a Europe of Christian princes, legitimacy and recognition were framed mainly in monarchical and religious terms. The first clear break with this practice came with the US Declaration of Independence in 1776. The delegates' meeting at Philadelphia stated that 'a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind' required an account of why 'one People' was justified in breaking away from

another one. The practical purpose was to gain French support, but it also set out the case for a new kind of state: a non-confessional republic.

Such arguments were deployed intermittently during the nineteenth century, which was dominated by national-imperialism, not anti-imperial nationalism. This changed in 1918. The major powers involved in the First World War were all multi-ethnic and—except for the US—empires. The war massively increased the appeal of nationalism: in the national cores of the empires; in small nation-states like Serbia; in the 'shatter-zones' of conflict in central Europe where opposing powers mobilized nationalist forces; in colonies embroiled in the war. The unprecedented scale and destructiveness of the war meant the post-war peace could not be merely an adjustment of pre-war arrangements like those of previous peace settlements (1714–15, 1814–15) or great power agreements such as the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and the Berlin Conference of 1884.

Two newcomers to world politics made the change dramatically clear in 1917. In Russia the Bolsheviks declared a break with old-style politics, published secret

Figure 30.1   The global spread of the nation-state, 1816–2018
Source: Adapted with permission from Wimmer, A. *Waves of War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Copyright © 2013 CUP. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198318.003.

treaties between Russia and its allies, and proclaimed support for national liberation movements. In direct response the US President, Woodrow Wilson, insisted that a new, open politics must be practised, with states founded on the principle of NSD. With the defeat of the central powers by the end of 1918, this had an electrifying effect. In Europe, nationalists claiming to represent small nations demanded independence. In Asia and the Middle East, NSD claims were loudly raised.

NSD was applied only to the defeated empires, using ethnic criteria. Although US nationality was civic, Wilson consulted academic 'experts'—often European emigrés—who used censuses, maps, and language data to determine national boundaries. Successor states were named after their dominant ethno-nation(s), as in Yugoslavia (**see Case Study 30.4**). Germany and Hungary were preserved as nation-states but stripped of 'foreign' territory. Tsarist Russia remained multinational as the Soviet Union, but the non-Russian republics were named after their 'titular nations'.

Although there were plebiscites in some disputed borderlands, national self-determination was largely based on identifying ethnic majorities. This created resentful national minorities. The settlement included minority protection measures but only for new states, using ethnic criteria. Population transfers were internationally recognized on the same basis, notably between Greece and Turkey in 1923.

Defeated or disappointed states such as Germany, Italy, and Japan expressed ethno-nationalism in the form of fascism, which proclaimed the right of superior nations or races to rule over others. Nation-states mobilized resentment among 'their' national minorities in other states. The Soviet Union promoted colonial liberation movements in areas of both formal and informal European control.

The situation was different after 1945. The defeat of the Axis powers was seen as the defeat of extreme ethno-nationalism. The post-1918 settlement and its accommodation with ethno-nationalism was regarded as a grave mistake. The much expanded US State Department no longer consulted academics but relied on its own experts, who were more concerned with stability than ethnic justice. The USSR also had a great deal of influence, unlike after 1918. The very success of ethno-nationalism after 1918 (continuing after 1945 with the

expulsion of 'ethnic Germans' from restored Poland and Czechoslovakia) had largely 'solved' the 'problem' of national minorities. Decolonization in ethnically fragmented colonies—something the USSR demanded and the US in principle supported—was not amenable to an ethno-nationalist approach. Consequently NSD after 1945 was framed in civic terms. The various declarations and charters of the United Nations referred to the freedom of 'peoples', not 'nations'. Beyond Europe it was the colonial territory which delineated the boundaries for new states and there was no recognition of minorities within that state. The great exception to this rule—the partition of India in 1947—was something imposed 'from below', not what the imperial power wanted (**see Case Study 30.3**).

Colonial nationalist movements accordingly framed demands in civic terms which appealed to the major powers. The timing of successful nation-state formations was mainly a function of how imperial politics and regional conditions combined, which explains why much of Asia acquired independence in the late 1940s, the Middle East in the 1950s, and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Nationalists who led the new states aimed to create 'new nations' and saw ethnic or other internal divisions as obstacles. The odds were stacked against irredentism and secessionism: from the major powers worried about potential instability and from the new states which these directly threatened. The cold war dampened conflicts that might otherwise have escalated. It appeared that civic nationalism had triumphed and ethno-nationalism was a thing of the past.

However, this changed again with the third wave of imperial collapse and new nation-state formation following the downfall of the Soviet Union. Initially the procedure resembled that after 1945. Just as European colonies had been treated as 'states in waiting', so now were the federal units of the USSR and Yugoslavia. With Yeltsin willing to surrender claims over the non-Russian republics, it seemed that a new round of 'civic' NSD could be peacefully achieved.

This hope was undermined by various factors. First, unlike European colonies, the federal units of the USSR and Yugoslavia were defined in ethno-national terms. This raised again the spectre of national majorities repressing national minorities, especially 'Russians in the near abroad'. Second, unlike Yeltsin, the Serb leader Milošević was not prepared to surrender claims over Yugoslavia. This led to violent ethno-nationalist conflict. Third, with the end of the cold war bipolar balance of power, there was no umbrella arrangement to restrain local conflicts. Fourth, claims to national recognition spilled beyond the federal units. Finally, increasing anxieties since the recession of 2008 have given a new impetus to popular ethno-nationalism. Whereas politicians and academic disciplines largely ignored 'nationalism' after 1945, it became a major concern in the 1990s and remains so.

Nationalism, nation-states, and global politics today

The collapse of the USSR led to a new wave of nation-state formations and changes in the balance of international power (**see Chs 4 and 5**). The end of the cold war permitted the emergence of state-opposing nationalism. The end of managed exchange rates and deregulation of financial markets undermined state power. The regional concentration of economic development has permitted supra-state coordination in certain regions, notably Europe. But while capital, goods, services, and information move freely and quickly across the world, the same is not true of labour, especially that of unskilled people in poor countries. The digital information revolution has opened up the prospects of global culture, whether envisaged as homogenized mass culture or a plurality of niche cultures, including diaspora ones. All of these developments created opportunities for new forms of nationalism.

The cold war labelling and preservation of a particular set of states as civic nation-states was undermined, enabling the rapid emergence of new state-opposing nationalisms, beginning with ethno-nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

There has been opposition to this resurgence. One important change since the cold war is the increased resort to external intervention, whether by the United Nations, regional organizations like NATO, individual states, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The justifications for these interventions are universalist—human rights, the promotion of democracy—not protection of ethnic minorities or state sovereignty. That, in turn, has conditioned how nationalists frame their demands. Noting that the international community disapproves of ethno-nationalism, whether practised by states or opposition movements, nationalists often present their cause as one of human rights. Instead of independence, they demand devolution or multiculturalism. Nationalism frequently combines sub-state and transnational features, for example using the European

Case Study 30.3   India

Celebrations in Delhi during the declaration of Independence Day in India

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Before 1750 India was enmeshed in global ties. The Mughal Empire was linked to Islamic, imperial, and long-distance trading networks spreading into China, through Asia Minor and the Middle East, into North and West Africa and, through connections with European powers, to the Americas and Southeast Asia, even north Australia. The British East India Company built on existing trading and political networks and introduced new features, such as plantation production of tea, coffee, opium, and cotton. There was little attempt to impose European culture or religion, or direct rule. Britain and France fought for influence, and by 1815 Britain had prevailed. The following period was one of free trade and informal empire. The East India Company ruled, but under public scrutiny. Christian pressures increased; reactions against Christianization promoted the codification and indigenization of Hinduism.

Increasing anti-British sentiment culminated in the uprising of 1857 and, after its repression, the imposition of formal imperial rule. This, along with the increased exploitation of India (including discriminatory tariffs) in rivalry with other imperialist challengers, promoted nationalist ideas. The Indian National Congress—elite, civic, and at first state-supporting—was founded in 1885. By 1914, the British had responded with communal electorates and local councils which classed Hindu and Muslim as distinct political identities.

World war brought home to many Indians—especially those enlisted into imperial armies—that they were part of a system of global conflict. Wilson's call for national self-determination stimulated the emergence of popular nationalism in the 1920s. Depression intensified mass discontent while the Congress Party penetrated and came to control most of the devolved provincial governments. Britain, confronted by opponents in every part of the world, made concessions. By 1939, independence seemed to be just a matter of time. However, with the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain tightened control, imprisoned nationalist leaders, and courted Muslim politicians. British collapse against Japan increased nationalist expectations in the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League which formulated the demand for Pakistan, initially as a bargaining lever rather than a genuine objective. Britain could not resist these nationalist demands once war ended, but the speed of decolonization meant this took the form of violent partition rather than a single, negotiated postcolonial state.

Independent India tried to detach itself from cold war polarization by acting as a leader of non-aligned states. The Indian National Congress pursued civic territorial nationalism with much success but was confronted by vibrant religious resistance to secularism, culminating in Hindu and Sikh nationalist challenges. Pakistan, set up as a secular but Islamic state, was unable to keep control over physically separate and culturally quite distinct East Pakistan, which with Indian support violently seceded as Bangladesh. The rump state of Pakistan is beset by Islamist movements and continuing enmity to India.

With the end of the cold war and the advent of the latest era of globalization, India has begun to exhibit spectacular economic growth rates. The civic nationalism and state planning of Congress has given way to a Hindu nationalist regime espousing neoliberalism. The old model of India as part of the 'Third World' no longer applies.

Question 1: 'India achieved independence when the indigenous elites which assisted imperial rule turned against Britain.' Discuss.

Question 2: Was the division between Hindus and Muslims bound to lead to a division of the subcontinent once free of British rule?

Union to promote autonomy within and across individual states.

Nationalism may still be framed ethnically, but increasingly in pursuit of cultural recognition and affirmative action. Consequently, the nation-state appears to decline as the central legitimate political unit. This can stimulate state-supporting nationalism in defence of the nation-state, as with the rise of radical right nationalism in Europe, opposed to mass immigration and the European Union. The success of the Leave campaign in the UK referendum on 23 June 2016 is testimony to the continuing significance of

Case Study 30.4 Yugoslavia

Destroyed bridge

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New bridge

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The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 sparked the outbreak of the First World War. Sarajevo was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupied by the Habsburgs since 1908, while Slovenia and Croatia were Austrian provinces. Serbia had broken away from Ottoman rule in the early nineteenth century. Other Balkan regions subsequently took advantage of Ottoman weakness and great power support to establish sovereign states (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania). Serbia massively expanded during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. It was a Serb nationalist who murdered Ferdinand. Russian support for Serbia and German support for Austria escalated a regional conflict into world war.

The short-term consequence was the occupation of Serbia by Austria and the flight of its government and army into exile. Yet by 1919 Serbia had been not only restored but unified with Habsburg 'south Slav' (English for 'Yugoslav') territories to form the 'Triune Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs', soon renamed Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia was one of several successor states legitimized by NSD. A special feature was that Habsburg 'south Slavs' were merged with the restored Serb state. Croat nationalists realized they could only acquire statehood this way, using the fiction largely contrived by British and French intellectuals that South Slavs were a nation.

The new state was beset from divisions from the outset, especially as the king was from the Serb royal family. It was weakened by the failure of the League of Nations to provide international support and by the impact of the Great Depression. Yet, just as there had been a strong nationalist reaction in Serbia against occupation during the First World War, so there was against German occupation in the Second World War. However, Yugoslavia was deeply divided between royalist and communist resistance and opposed by a native Croat fascist movement.

Yugoslavia was restored after 1945 and the communist movement won out over its enemies. Josip Tito (a Croat) was its leader until his death in 1980. His dominance, along with the strong roots of communism, maintained unity and sustained a break with the Soviet Union.

However, the collapse of the USSR and ethno-nationalist exploitation of the federal system undermined Yugoslav communism. Slovenia rapidly broke away, with Western recognition. In Belgrade the Serb ex-communist Milošević utilized the new open, popular politics to mobilize ethno-nationalist sentiments in defence of what remained of Yugoslavia, thereby provoking a similar movement under Tudjman in Croatia. This opposition between the two dominant politico-military forces engulfed Yugoslavia in bloody conflict.

Only belated intervention by Western powers ended the violence. As with the Soviet Union, the West granted recognition to former federal republics, seen as 'states in waiting'. However, strong ethno-nationalist conflicts within and across republican boundaries proved intractable, as the continuing divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate.

One new element was intervention to protect human rights rather than to promote ethnic justice, defend state sovereignty, or extend imperial power. New kinds of evidence (aerial photographs, witness testimonies) were used and new types of institutions (international tribunals, commissions for reconciliation) formed, which in turn had global ramifications.

In the case of Kosovo, recognition was complicated by its having been part of the Serb federal republic, and reluctance to use the ethnic majority (Albanian) principle. Perhaps the crucial justification for eventual widespread international recognition was that of human rights.

Once again we see that 'national self-determination', though a constant refrain since 1919, takes on different meanings after successive waves of state collapse under different global conditions.

Question 1: 'Yugoslavia was created by France and Britain, and destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union.' Discuss.

Question 2: Does Yugoslavia's division into separate nation-states arise directly from long-standing ethnic divisions within Yugoslavia?

popular, state-supporting, ethnic nationalism. Framed as defence of sovereignty and identity, this nationalism was politically mobilized by a unique combination of factors including elite (Conservative Party) and populist (UK Independence Party) leadership, powerful media support, a coincidental mass refugee crisis in Europe, widespread discontent with the effects of austerity, and a preference for social media views over those of 'experts'. All this, channelled into a simple message of 'Yes or No: Us against Them', gained a narrow and unexpected majority over the less focused and less emotional case put by a distrusted establishment.

Yet the erosion of nation-state power can also promote shifts in nationalism away from supporting or opposing states to generate new forms. These might take up connections to transnational or global political actors other than states, such as diaspora organizations, as has been the case with Kurdish nationalism and Kurdistan (**see Case Study 30.1**).

The rapid emergence of new kinds of nationalism, the formation of new nation-states, and the violent conflicts this has sometimes involved have profoundly altered patterns of global politics. They have stimulated new interventions by various state and **non-state actors**, which have been justified in universalist terms: human rights and democracy (**see Ch. 31**). This is new: in the era of world wars the justification was (ethnonational) minority rights, and in the cold war period the principle of state sovereignty blocked intervention. All these interventions appear to undermine nation-states: culturally, politically, economically, and militarily. The impact is greatest for the weakest states. Nationalism is not the same as nation-state. It is precisely when nation-states are most threatened that nationalism, in reaction, can be strongest. At the same time, the globalization of world politics can stimulate new forms of subnational and transnational politics, including forms of nationalism.

Key Points

- The sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty was weakened by the end of the cold war, new nation-state formation, and new economic and cultural forms of globalization.

- This provoked a wave of state-opposing ethno-nationalisms, which sometimes led to violence and ethnic cleansing.

- However, international recognition for new states as civic, territorial entities, along with new forms of intervention, put pressure on nationalism to move away from this ethnic and state-opposing character.

- There is a state-supporting nationalism that focuses on the threats globalization poses to the nation-state, and which can paradoxically get stronger the more the nation-state is weakened.

- However, also important is the shift of nationalism away from a state focus towards concerns with devolution, cultural recognition, and transnational linkages.

Conclusion

Nationalism and global politics have mutually shaped each other from at least the mid-eighteenth century. One can discern major changes over subsequent periods as the basic patterns of global power changed from Anglo-French domination to British hegemony, to global imperialist conflict and world war, to cold war, and to US hegemony after 1990. There is no reason to believe there will not be further fundamental changes in the distribution of global power (e.g. the rise of China), and therefore the development of new forms of nationalism. It may not be associated with increases in the number of nation-states, and it may severely challenge the idea that the world order is an order of sovereign nation-states, but this does not mean nationalism will diminish in significance.

There has long been a tendency to see nationalism as a passing phase. The first secular creeds of modernity—liberalism and socialism—assumed that global ties would create a cosmopolitan world, whether based on free trade **capitalism** or classless communism. 'Narrow' nationalism had no place in such a world. What these ideas failed to grasp was that the major unit of power managing these global processes would be the territorial, sovereign state. This state used new technologies to create superior military power, guided economic development, increasingly shaped populations through mass schooling and control over the patterns of their interactions, and provided many of the social services previously associated with families and small communities. At the same time, the formation of a mobile,

participatory society swept aside legitimations for state authority based on privilege, heredity, and religion.

Nationalism was initially strongest in the national core of empires. However, with imperial collapse or weakening after 1918, 1945, and 1990, there was a shift to nationalism based on the NSD principle providing a legitimation for the world political order. NSD, with its vision of the world as a series of nations, complemented the territorial sovereign state claiming to rule in the name of its people. The nation replaced privilege or religion as the source of authority. It was able to generate emotional solidarity in large-scale societies made up of people who were strangers to each other. This was something that neither liberalism nor socialism had been able to do.

Why nationalism managed this is a matter of debate. At one extreme, nationalism is seen as an expression of a pre-existing and strong sense of solidarity (nations, ethnicities, races). According to this argument, only this kind of solidarity enables the modern bonds of nationalism. At the other extreme, nationalism is seen as something manipulated by elites to secure power in the state. This perspective fits well with the view of international relations as relations among states that act rationally on the basis of clear interests and calculations. The first view, by contrast, tends to see honour and emotions as playing an important part in international relations and making them unstable (**see Opposing Opinions 30.1**).

Opposing Opinions 30.1 The principle of national self-determination threatens stable international relations

For

The principle of national self-determination encourages constant challenges to the existing order of sovereign states. Hardly any existing state is truly 'national' in the sense of ethnic homogeneity and a strong and shared sense of national identity. Therefore there is always an opportunity for political elites claiming to represent a repressed national minority to raise a demand for a new state justified by NSD.

Alliances between oppositional movements and external actors, especially those claiming a common national identity, can amplify demands for NSD. For example, Russia has supported 'Russian' demands for de facto autonomy in parts of Georgia and Moldova, has annexed the Crimea, and assists 'Russian' opponents of Ukraine in the eastern regions of that state. This in turn raises fears of further Russian incursions into other east European states with significant Russian-speaking minorities.

The current era of globalization is eroding territorial sovereignty and national identity. This process renders increasingly redundant the notion that the world can be divided into sharply separated states justified on the basis of national self-determination.

Against

States can only be stable if they rest on popular consent. For that to exist, people have to believe that the state 'belongs' to them. A sense of national identity, buttressed by ideas about common descent, or language, or other shared features, is crucial to establishing this belief. One of the reasons why the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires failed to rise to the challenges of war between 1914 and 1918, unlike the nation-states of Britain, France, and Germany, was because they lacked this national underpinning.

A world order of nation-states based on NSD is essential for stable international relations. Imperial European empires ceased to be sustainable when the impact of world war meant they could no longer depend on force to prop up their power overseas, and when popular political movements demanded their 'own' governments. Stability could only be restored by the formation of new nation-states.

The extent of globalization has been exaggerated. States remain the most important units of power in the modern world. National solidarity remains the most important political loyalty. For example, the European Union's lack of such solidarity fatally weakens its prospects for future political integration, no matter how strong a rational case can be made for transferring power from individual states to a supranational European government.

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1. 'The key problems with the principle of national self-determination are that no one can agree on what is a nation and what self-determination means.' Discuss.

2. Under what circumstances, if any, is it advisable to redraw the boundaries of existing states in the name of national self-determination?

3. Could globalization and multiculturalism help separate the issue of national self-determination from that of state sovereignty?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

The view presented in this chapter is different. It has argued that nationalism is a political idea and practice that mirrors the emergence of the new order of sovereign, territorial states, and alters its character as that order goes through different historical phases. Where there are shared values, nationalism will exploit these as expressions of national identity (e.g. making Hinduism 'Indian'), but this only works effectively in the context of modern state-formation and global political conflict. As nation-states espousing nationalist values have been generalized throughout the world, so nationalism becomes 'common sense'. The nationalist idea is derivative in that there is a repetitive imitation of the assertion about the existence of nations and their right to have their own states. However, nationalism takes distinctive customs, histories, values, and ways of life to justify this assertion, making it appear different from one case to the next. It is this that makes plausible the self-perception of each nationalism that it is unique, and that these unique national qualities account for its appeal and strength. Nevertheless, one nationalism, on closer inspection, looks very like another. Nationalism mirrors as much as it shapes the global movement towards a world order of nation-states. We see this clearly in the way the principle of NSD fluctuates after 1918 between ethnic and civic language as the pattern of global political conflict changes.

In the most recent phase of globalization, this world order of nation-states has been questioned. Yet whatever we think might happen to the nation-state, that is an issue distinct from nationalism. State-supporting nationalism might mobilize in defence of an apparently threatened nation-state. State-opposing nationalism might exploit the new preparedness of the US and international bodies to intervene in domestic state affairs. Beyond this, nationalism might take on new forms in which the sovereign nation-state is no longer central, where what matters are claims to devolution or cultural recognition which weaken the concept of state sovereignty. Having established itself as such a powerful idea, sentiment, and politics, nationalism is likely to adapt to new global political patterns as it has done over the course of more than two centuries. Where it may once have matched the formation of a global political order founded on the sovereign nation-state, it may adapt to a new political order in which the sovereign nation-state is less central. It is too early to write the obituary of nationalism.

Questions

1. Which came first: nations or nationalism?
2. Is nationalism the major reason for the formation of nation-states?
3. Why has nationalism spread across the world in the last two centuries?
4. Is it useful to distinguish between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism?
5. How and why did nationalism develop into imperialism?
6. Why did colonial peoples take up the idea of nationalism?
7. How has the rise of the modern state shaped the development of nationalism?
8. 'Nationalism is more important for supporting than opposing the state.' Discuss.
9. 'Contemporary globalization undermines the nation-state but not nationalism.' Discuss.
10. Is the principle of national self-determination a threat to stable international relations?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Debate on nationalism

Özkirimli, U. (2017), *Theories of Nationalism,* 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A good introduction to the different views and debates about nationalism.

Broad historical studies of nationalism

Breuilly, J. (1993), *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edn (Manchester and Chicago: Chicago University Press). Compares various cases, starting in Europe around 1500 and including material from twentieth-century Asia and Africa.

Breuilly, J. (ed.) (2013), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Thirty-six historians contribute chapters on thematic aspects of nationalism as well as regional case studies from across the world.

Hobsbawm, E. (1990), *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Focuses on Europe in the nineteenth century and the world more broadly after 1918.

Broad historical studies of globalization and modern global history

Bayly, C. A. (2004), *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell). Places the formative phase of nationalism in a world-historical framework.

Darwin, J. (2007), *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire* (London: Penguin Allen Lane). Shows how empires have shaped modern nationalism and nation-states.

Osterhammel, J. (2015), *The Transformation of the World: A Glocal History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). An innovative thematic history.

Osterhammel, J., and Peterssen, N. P. (2005), *Globalization: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A short and clear overview.

Nationalism, global politics, and international relations

Buchanan, E. L, and Moore, M. (2003), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (New York: Oxford University Press). An account of the problems of nation-state formation.

Halikiopoulou, D., and Vasilopoulou, S. (eds) (2011), *Nationalism and Globalisation: Conflicting or Complementary?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A useful collection of essays which question the influential view that globalization is a post-national development that unfolds at the expense of nationalism, national identity, and nation-state.

Malešević, S. (2018), *Grounded Nationalisms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Challenges the view that nationalism is a declining social and political force, focusing on the recent rise of populist movements.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Human rights

RATNA KAPUR

Framing Questions

- **Are human rights universal?**

- **Why is there a strong faith in the ability of human rights to repair the damage done and violence inflicted on individuals by states?**

- **What are the limitations of such a faith in human rights?**

Reader's Guide

This chapter on **human rights** introduces you to the structure as well as politics of human rights in the twenty-first century. It not only gives an introduction to the formal structure of human rights, but also encourages you to think about how human rights have developed historically. In particular, we will examine the influence of liberal internationalism on human rights and how this is shaped by the legacies of colonialism, slavery, **apartheid**, and engagements with sexual, religious, and racial differences—or what has been described as the 'dark side' of human rights. The chapter encourages you to question whether rights are universal instruments of emancipation, or complex, contradictory, and contingent in their functioning.

The chapter also sets out the dominant understandings of human rights as progressive, universal, and based on a common human subject. You will

be asked to engage primarily in a critical analysis of each of these claims, and how human rights may not necessarily be a project that can be steered exclusively by good intentions. Postcolonialists and some feminists have suggested that it can also have harmful effects.

Human rights advocates can also differ on the strategies to be adopted to address violations; these can have material, normative, and structural consequences that are not always empowering. These competing positions will be illustrated through two case studies: one on the Islamic veil bans in Europe and the second on **LGBT** human rights interventions.

Thus, the chapter seeks to:

- offer an overview of human rights;

- analyse the core claims of human rights as emancipatory and progressive;

- show how human rights practices are complex and contradictory.

Introduction

An introduction to human rights is no easy task. There are many different starting points. The reason that introductions to human rights are so different stems from who is relating the story—the victim, the state, the conqueror, the oppressed, the vanquished, the colonial power, or the nationalist.

The dominant narrative about human rights emerged in the post-Second World War era, after the devastation of Europe that resulted in the death of millions of gay people, blacks, Jews, and others. At the same time, a similar devastation wrought by the colonial encounter or slavery—the very barbarous acts that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is the main declaration of human rights, claims to prevent or address—did not trigger a similar sense of responsibility or anguish. Why have some violent actions, harms, and injuries drawn the attention of advocates of 'human rights' while others have not? Is this a political issue? A policy failing? Or is it intrinsic

to the ways in which human rights have functioned in the history of world politics?

The dominant story of human rights is embedded squarely within the liberal philosophical framework (**see Ch. 6**). There are three central features to human rights according to this story. The first is that human rights are *universal*. The second is that they are based on liberal *individualism*: that every individual is entitled to the full and free exercise of human rights. And the third is that human rights are *progressive*. They move in a teleological direction, meaning something that is defined in terms of its end purpose, and represent an important step forward in human progress and evolution. Thus, the accumulation of more human rights is associated with more freedom and more equality.

This introduction to human rights examines each of these three claims of liberal internationalism, setting out a range of positions on human rights that reflect the many possibilities and what are regarded as its core features.

The global human rights structure

The twentieth century witnessed an extraordinary explosion in human rights after the traumas of the Second World War (**see Ch. 3**). The Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 26 June 1945, identified human rights as a key objective of the organization. The **Commission on Human Rights** was established initially to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and to thereafter direct and manage the **accountability** of state-parties for human rights violations. The Commission was subsequently replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006. The UDHR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its third session on 10 December 1948, marking the culmination of conversations among member states to assert that human rights were integral to a free and democratic world order.

The UDHR sets out the primary **civil and political rights** as well as **economic, social, and cultural rights** that constitute the anatomy of human rights in the modern era. These rights are considered as indivisible, interdependent, and universal, applying to individuals everywhere. While the UDHR sets out in a comprehensive and succinct manner a consensus of internationally recognized human rights, these are further elaborated in two key international covenants. The **International Covenant on**

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets out the legal protections available against abuse by the state and seeks to ensure the political participation of all citizens. Some of the key rights available under the ICCPR include the rights to equality before the law, protection against arbitrary arrest, and protection of the rights to free speech, assembly, political participation, and the right to life. The second covenant, the **International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights** (ICESCR) guarantees individuals access to essential goods and services, including education, food, housing, and health care, and aims to ensure the equal participation of all citizens in social and cultural life. Both covenants are also regarded as universal, indivisible, and interdependent (**see Box 31.1**).

The ICCPR and the ICESCR both entered into force in 1976. Thereafter, several binding international human rights treaties were adopted by state parties, including international treaties dealing with issues of racial discrimination, gender discrimination, torture, enforced disappearances, as well as the rights of children, people with disabilities, migrants, minorities, and indigenous peoples (**see Box 31.2**). At a formal level, these declarations, treaties, and conventions constitute the legal apparatus of international human rights.

Box 31.1   The indivisibility, interdependence, and universality of human rights

- Equality of rights without discrimination (D1, D2, E2, E3, C2, C3).
- Life (D3, C6).
- Liberty and security of person (D3, C9).
- Protection against slavery (D4, C8).
- Protection against torture and cruel and inhuman punishment (D5, C7).
- Recognition as a person before the law (D6, C16).
- Equal protection of the law (D7, C14, C26).
- Access to legal remedies for rights violations (D8, C2).
- Protection against arbitrary arrest or detention (D9, C9).
- Hearing before an independent and impartial judiciary (D10, C14).
- Presumption of innocence (D11, C14).
- Protection against *ex post facto* laws (D11, C15).
- Protection of privacy, family, and home (D12, C17).
- Freedom of movement and residence (D13, C12).
- Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (D18, C18).
- Freedom of opinion, expression, and the press (D19, C19).
- Freedom of assembly and association (D20, C21, C22).

- Political participation (D21, C25).
- Social security (D22, E9).
- Work, under favourable conditions (D23, E6, E7).
- Rest and leisure (D24, E7).
- Food, clothing, and housing (D25, E12).
- Special protections for children (D25, E10, C24).
- Education (D26, E13, E14).
- Self-determination of peoples (E1, C1).
- Seeking asylum from persecution (D14).
- Nationality (D15).
- Human treatment in detention (C10).
- Protection against arbitrary expulsion of aliens (C13).
- Protection against advocacy of racial or religious hatred (C20).
- Protection of minority culture (C27).

(The source of each right is indicated in parentheses, by the document and article number: D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; C = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; E = International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.)

Box 31.2   The treaty bodies

The treaty bodies meet in Geneva, Switzerland. All the treaty bodies receive support from the Human Rights Treaties Division of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva.

- *Human Rights Committee* (CCPR) monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and its optional protocols;
- *Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (CESCR) monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966);
- *Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* (CERD) monitors implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965);
- *Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and its optional protocol (1999);
- *Committee against Torture* (CAT) monitors implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1984);

- *Committee on the Rights of the Child* (CRC) monitors implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and its optional protocols (2000);
- *Committee on Migrant Workers* (CMW) monitors implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990);
- *Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* (CRPD) monitors implementation of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006);
- *Committee on Enforced Disappearances* (CED) monitors implementation of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006); and
- *Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (SPT), established pursuant to the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) (2002), visits places of detention in order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accountability

There are several mechanisms in the formal human rights apparatus that are designed to hold member states accountable for human rights violations or derelictions. Each of the treaties and covenants mentioned also have a reporting process, whereby state parties to the particular document are obliged to submit periodic reports to treaty bodies—bodies that consist of international experts on the issue concerned—and their practices are subject to review in public sessions, where state representatives are present and subject to questioning by the relevant treaty body (**see Box 31.3**). A report is prepared by the treaty body and thereafter it is for the state to comply with

Box 31.3 The core international human rights instruments and their monitoring bodies

		Adopted	Monitoring body
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	21 Dec 1965	CERD
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16 Dec 1966	CCPR
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	16 Dec 1966	CESCR
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	18 Dec 1979	CEDAW
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	10 Dec 1984	CAT
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child	20 Nov 1989	CRC
ICMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	18 Dec 1990	CMW
CPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	20 Dec 2006	CED
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	13 Dec 2006	CRPD
ICESCR-OP	Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	10 Dec 2008	CESCR
ICCPR-OP1	Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16 Dec 1966	CCPR
ICCPR-OP2	Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty	15 Dec 1989	CCPR
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women	10 Dec 1999	CEDAW
OP-CRC-AC	Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	25 May 2000	CRC
OP-CRC-SC	Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography	25 May 2000	CRC
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure	14 Apr 2014	CRC
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	18 Dec 2002	SPT
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	12 Dec 2006	CRPD

its recommendations. There are several treaties that provide for an individual complaint mechanism, referred to as optional protocols. While few states have signed up to these protocols, the mechanism affords individuals an opportunity to detail their grievances, and the committee then submits its views to the state concerned. There is no further enforcement mechanism, and it is for the state once again to comply as it sees fit. The Human Rights Council, which replaced the original Commission on Human Rights, also has a universal periodic review of states, in which states are the reviewers, and not independent experts.

A second, more country-specific and thematic procedure is available under what are termed special procedures. These consist of a retinue of experts, special rapporteurs, and working groups that investigate a broad array of issues. As of August 2017, there are 44 thematic and 12 country mandates. Special procedures undertake country visits (that have most recently included visits to Tunisia, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Argentina); act on individual cases and concerns; address issues of a broader structural nature, such as systemic racism or economic injustice; conduct thematic studies and convene expert consultations; and contribute to the development and visibility of the human rights situation across the world.

A third important mechanism is the **International Criminal Court** (ICC), which is mandated to examine instances of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. While the scope of the Court is narrow, it has powers of judicial enforcement.

Fourth, at the regional level there is a structure of multilateral and regional mechanisms that monitors human rights. These mechanisms include the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, established by the Organization of American States, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, established by the African Union.

Finally, the role of **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs) and individuals is an important component of human rights advocacy as well as accountability. These organizations range from those that play a central role in the formal human rights structure, especially at the Human Rights Council meetings, to grassroots-based or community-based organizations that mobilize around rights claims at the local and regional levels. The international groups are largely dominated by Western-based players such as Human Rights Watch, founded in 1978, with headquarters in the Empire State Building in New York, and Amnesty International, founded in 1961, with its headquarters in London. While NGOs represent the voice of civil society, their advocacy and efforts at rendering states accountable for human rights violations are constrained at times by funding and donor-driven agendas, as well as by North/South and East/West divides that tend to obscure the role and the importance of working with and centring community-based and regional-level players.

What are human rights?

At first glance, human rights are things that everyone agrees on—they are both obvious and universal. Most mainstream textbooks on human rights have a familiar format and approach. They generally adopt a formal, doctrinal approach to the topic. Typically, such texts set out the formal structure of human rights in the United Nations; offer a jurisprudential approach to human rights that focuses on international courts and expert bodies; identify the various mechanisms for seeking redress for the violation of human rights; and at times also include a focus on the role of non-governmental organizations, in particular Western-based groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, in promoting, protecting, and facilitating human rights. These texts tend to present human rights in fairly clear, doctrinal, and unambiguous terms, as apolitical, having a common origin, whose meaning has become a part of common sense, and as something that marks a society as civilized, developed, and democratic (Henkin et al. 2009; Tomuschat 2014; Schutter 2014).

However, despite these assumptions, human rights actually mean different things to different people, have political effects, and are more complex and, at times, contradictory than these texts would suggest (Dembour 2010). For example, for **natural law** scholars human rights are natural rights; human beings possess them simply by being human, and the rights exist independently of social recognition. They are negative obligations that impose a responsibility on states to refrain from doing certain acts, such as torturing, which is outlawed under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), or enacting racially discriminatory laws that are prohibited under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and they are absolute (Gewirth 1998; Donnelly 2002). For other scholars, human rights are political values that a society chooses to adopt. This position seeks to make human rights universal, but does not assume their **universality**, as this requires everyone around the world to accept them as the best political and legal values for running a society (Ignatieff 2001; T. Campbell 2006; Rajagopal 2003).

At the same time, this position continues to aspire for universal acceptance. Another position holds that human rights are primarily tools of resistance or protest on the part of those who have been left behind or excluded, including the poor, the disadvantaged, and the oppressed (Stammers 2009; Baxi 2007). Human rights are used to challenge the status quo and seek concrete social and political results. For these scholars, the struggle is a perpetual one as they do not see that there is an end to injustice. At the same time, they remain suspicious of human rights, given the tendency to favour elite groups. For critical scholars, human rights exist because people talk about them (W. Brown 2004; Mutua 2002).

They are neither natural, nor are they the solution to the woes and injustices in this world. Human rights are a powerful language through which to express claims against injustice, but they can and have been used to advance other competing agendas, such as imperial, civilizing agendas in the past and the goals of the neo-liberal market in the present. This position exposes the power relations that are obscured through the language of universality and claims that human rights are *the* best hope for freedom and emancipation. What is important to appreciate from this perspective is that human rights are about more than law, and that they are not necessarily progressive.

Key Points

- The UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR form the core of international human rights. They constitute the formal structure of the international human rights system and are the backbone of the entire international human rights apparatus.

- In international human rights law, the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR are understood to be indivisible, interdependent, and universal. That is, they do not function as silos, but as a collective whole, and are integral in their functioning and application.

- The international human rights regime has an inbuilt accountability process designed to monitor and reprimand

states that are found to have violated or failed to comply with their obligations under international human rights law.

- NGOs are part of the accountability mechanism, but these groups can be constrained by funding, donor agendas, and geographical location.

- Various multilateral mechanisms facilitate the compliance of human rights law at a national level, through mobilizing public scrutiny as well as publishing violations to help make states accountable.

- The global human rights regime is dependent on both the international structural process and regional process to compel compliance.

The core assumptions on which human rights are based

Despite the variety of different perspectives on what human rights are, there are three core assumptions associated with human rights in the dominant liberal internationalist perspective and also in international human rights law. First, they are transformative and progressive; second, they are universal; and third, there exists a universal, common subject on which human rights are conferred.

Human rights and progress

The formal apparatuses of human rights in the twentieth century were adopted as part of the development of international institutions in the post-Second World War period. This was a significant moment. States could no longer hide from wrongs committed against individuals and groups behind the fig leaf of sovereignty. It was a moment that ostensibly marked a movement forward in human progress, driven by a belief that history has

a purpose and direction, coupled with the idea that the world had emerged from a backward, more uncivilized era into a modern, civilized period (Douzinas 2000). There is ample evidence from around the world that human rights have proved to be a successful endeavour: slavery has ended; women have more rights; children are better protected. While there still remains a good deal to be achieved, human rights represent the antidote to the egregious wrongs and harms that have been inflicted on the human rights of persons from different backgrounds and histories. These victories have strengthened the veneration of human rights ideals and reinforced the profound faith in this justice-seeking project (Douzinas 2000; W. Brown 2004).

However, there are those who do not necessarily regard human rights as a transformative and progressive project. Part of the reason for this is that the idea that human rights mark the end to an ignorant past and enable the realization of freedom and equality is both

empirically and theoretically flawed. In purely factual terms, more human rights violations were committed in the twentieth century, which was ostensibly the most human rights-focused century, than at any other point in human history. But there is a deeper theoretical problem with the claim of progress exposed by post-colonial, feminist, and critical theory scholars of human rights. They have examined the costs of human rights interventions—what has been referred to as the 'dark side' of human rights (D. Kennedy 2004), and some of the often unanticipated damage done. They have argued that human rights is a discourse permeated by imperial ambition, assertions about moral, racial, and civilizational superiority, as well as religious evangelicalism (Mutua 2002; Douzinas 2007). For example, in the context of the Western military intervention and the bombing of Afghanistan in October 2001 (as a response to the 11 September 2001 attacks), there were claims by some Western leaders that this intervention was a 'crusade' against the 'evildoers', part of the war on terror, and that 'Western civilisation was superior to Islam' (Ford 2001). The initial claims of justified self-defence mutated into claims about human rights, where women's rights became the central justification for the military assaults, in particular saving or rescuing them from the burqa and the barbarism of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Nearly two decades later, the countless loss of life, the continued presence of the Taliban, and, for many, the fact that women continue to wear the burqa put into question just what was achieved in the name of human rights (Kapur 2002*b*; Klaus and Kassel 2005).

Others have been critical of the failure of human rights to address the structural and material causes for human rights violations due to the focus on a narrow, formalistic, and individual approach to rights. For example, after the establishment of the **Truth and Reconciliation Commission** (TRC) in South Africa to deal with the 'gross violations of human rights' that included the 'killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment' of persons under apartheid, the Commission used very narrow definitions of the 'victim', 'severe ill-treatment', and political motivations. The TRC did not address the effects of laws passed by the apartheid government, or the general policies adopted by the government, even if they were morally reprehensible. Instead, it focused only on politically motivated violations of bodily integrity rights (but not subsistence rights) of individuals (not groups). The very fact that the TRC excluded from its remit the project of apartheid suggested that the project did not fit within its narrow definition of 'political',

and thus the TRC failed to link gross violations to the implementation of apartheid. Some have argued that the narrow formalistic reading of human rights can produce results that do not alleviate the harms inflicted by racist structures, and thus bring little relief (Nesiah 2014).

Universality

Human rights are based on the notion of universality and the assumption that all humans are entitled to enjoy human rights without regard to distinction. This claim regards human rights as based on notions of objectivity, neutrality, and inclusion. There seems little doubt that human rights at a gut level and at the level of politics appear to be universal. They are regarded as a set of moral principles and norms that describe common standards that human beings ought to aspire to at the local and international levels. They are regarded as fixed, and the primary tools at the international level through which justice claims are made by social movements as well as states. They are used both by those who are violators of rights—that is states—as well as those who are trying to draw attention to these violations and contest the ways in which human rights are ignored, used, or advocated (Donnelly 2002; Perry 1998).

However, some scholars have argued that it is important to understand the historical legacy of claims to universality that expose their particularity, contingency, and malleability (Bagchi and Das 2012; Barreto 2013; Fanon 1966; Slaughter 2018). For example, a closer look at the assumptions of Western Enlightenment, the precursor to the human rights movement, suggests that the claims of universality and inclusion have coexisted with exclusion and subordination. For example, when Europe was in the midst of a struggle for liberty, equality, and freedom, Europe's **'Others'** continued to be subjugated under the weight of colonialism and slavery (L. Hunt 2007; Ibhawoh 2007). And even within Europe, gender and racial segregation established a hierarchy of who was the valid or legitimate subject of law and rights—white, Christian, propertied men. Thus, while there is an assumption that certain political values are indeed universal, such as liberty, equality, and freedom, these ideals have historically faltered when they have come into contact with the unfamiliar or difference.

The values of liberty, equality, and freedom also meet with some of the same difficulties today. For example, the desire in many liberal democratic countries to close the door to, deport, or incarcerate refugees is a graphic example of their failure to live up to the human rights

promise of universality to which the signatories in the main human rights documents committed themselves. In fact, such examples expose both the contingency of human rights claims to universality and their Euro-Atlantic understandings of who belongs and who does not, who is an eligible subject of rights and who is not. Many postcolonial scholars have argued that human rights are informed by the legacies of colonialism and its responses to the 'other' or native subject. In particular, they point to colonialism's distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized, and the perception of the outsider as a threat or danger to the existing political order and imagined social cohesion of Western states (Ibhawoh 2007; Chowdhry and Nair 2002). The search for a justification for the exclusion of non-European subjects from the realm of legal rights is based on the prevailing and unquestioned view that European states are more civilized, racially superior, and law abiding. This logic is also an inheritance of former colonial countries, where the practices and responses of the former colonial power have been adopted to sustain old hierarchies or to produce new ones. For example, the persecution of the Rohingyas in Myanmar, in what the United Nations has described as a genocide, is based precisely on the logic that they are infiltrators, threats to the dominant ethnic order, and outsiders to the dominant 'Burmese' ethos and culture, and therefore to be eliminated.

Thus, critics have claimed that assertions about the universality of human rights obscure their contingency and historical particularity, and also deny the experiences of those who have been at the receiving end of these claims to universality. From this perspective, it is important to understand that the claims of freedom and equal worth are informed by arguments about civilization, cultural backwardness, and racial and religious superiority. The 'dark side' is integral to human rights and not just an irregularity that can be repaired through greater inclusion.

The subject of human rights

As discussed in the previous section, a particular human subject rests at the heart of the international human rights regime: that is, the sovereign, autonomous subject. All human beings are regarded as being equally placed and entitled to human rights. The very language of some of the human rights documents, such as the UDHR, as well as the two covenants, includes terms such as 'all', 'everybody', and 'no one'. This idea of a common human subject, who is autonomous, existing prior to social relations, and ahistorical, at the heart of

the human rights edifice is a dominant and assumed idea that is rarely questioned. Most people who are able to successfully claim rights resemble this familiar subject of human rights discourse.

However, postcolonial and Third World scholars contend that the human subject at the heart of the international human rights regime is unable to survive without its counterpart, its 'Other' (Kapur 2002*a*; Fineman 2008; Bagchi and Das 2012; Barreto 2013; Selmeczi 2015; Butterworth 2016). Today, a host of subjects continue to be denied inclusion into the human rights project, or their access to human rights is enabled only to the extent that they resemble the familiar subject of human rights discourse.

There are at least three different ways in which the 'Other' has been addressed in relation to human rights. The first is through the assumption that the difference can be erased and the 'Other' assimilated. The second is to treat the difference as inevitable and natural. And finally, there is the response that justifies incarceration, internment, or even annihilation of the 'Other' because of the threat he or she poses.

Assimilation

Historically, the only way a subject of the colonies could acquire rights was by being trained into civilizational maturity, otherwise he or she continued to be treated as an object in law. Such laws reflect a fear of the 'Other', while also providing an opportunity to them both to be part of the universal project of rights and to acquire legitimacy through the process of assimilation and transformation into a subject that is familiar. For instance, the Islamic veil bans in a number of European countries are an example of the requirement to assimilate in order to have access to rights, including the rights to education and to wander freely in the public space. While those who wear the veil want both of these rights, the liberal democratic state compels them to choose between wearing the veil or enjoying their human rights (**see Case Study 31.1**). In the contemporary period, this response is incorporated into national laws in which new citizenship and nationality requirements are being enacted in Europe, South Asia, Australia, and elsewhere.

Essentializing the difference

Some subjects, including women, blacks, and gay people, were at different historical moments regarded as just different, incapable of changing. Their differences were conceived of as biological or natural and used to justify difference in treatment. As a result, they could

Case Study 31.1 The Islamic veil ban

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In 2010, the French legislature banned the wearing of the burqa—a traditional garment that veils both face and body—in public. Lawmakers endorsed the position that France 'cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity … That is not the idea that the French republic has of women's dignity … The *burqa* is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience … It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic' (former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, quoted in Naravane 2009).

The 'burqa ban' was challenged in S.A.S. v. France as a violation of the claimants' rights under various articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, although the Court focused on Articles 8, 9, and 14. The government's argument was based on public safety concerns, as well as 'respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society', which includes gender equality, human dignity, and 'respect for the minimum requirements of life in society' or 'living together'. Interestingly, the Court rejected some of these arguments, which had been successful in earlier cases. It did not accept the argument that the ban advanced the legitimate aims of gender equality and human dignity, partly for the reason that the practice itself was being defended by the woman wearing the burqa. The Court simply accepted that the burqa was a choice, avoiding the essentialism and paternalism of earlier cases.

The Court also rejected the argument that the ban advanced human dignity, stating that there was no evidence that the women who wore the burqa were expressing a form of contempt towards others or seeking to offend the dignity of others. Similarly, the Court rejected the public safety argument, finding that it had not been established that the veil posed a general threat to public safety, and holding that the ban was therefore disproportionate.

Instead, the Court's decision relied on the government's justification of 'respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society' or 'living together' as a legitimate ground for restrictions on the right to manifest religion or belief under Article 9. As this ground is not explicitly articulated as such in the Convention, the Court interpreted it as falling within the broad 'protection of the rights and freedoms of others'. Thus, even if the claimant wore the veil freely, and as an exercise of her choice, the ban would still be justified on the basis of the Court's reasoning that it was incompatible with the democratic precept of 'living together'.

In upholding this justification, the Court's analysis focused on the 'face', stating that it played an important role in the civility of social interactions and open interpersonal relationships. These were important markers of the community life of a society, and thus the wearing of the burqa in public was 'incompatible, in French society, with the ground rules of social communication and more broadly the requirements of "living together"'.

Question 1: The decision suggests that the universal right to gender equality is subject only to compliance with a specific set of conditions. Do you agree?

Question 2: Does the ruling protect the rights of Muslim women? Is it enabling? Are they liberated or empowered by it?

See a video of Professor Ratna Kapur discussing these questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

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be denied rights to education, or work, or speech, or political participation, simply because of this difference. For example, in the context of slavery blacks were denied their subjectivity based on an egregious assumption that they lacked the capacity to think. They thus remained objects to be bought and sold. And while blacks, women, and gay people have secured human rights throughout the world, racial, gender, and sexual stereotypes and essentialism continue to impede their access to rights. These stereotypes are often displaced onto a First World/Third World divide.

For example, in campaigns to fight violence against women, gender and racial stereotypes continue to pervade the interventions of women's human rights groups and NGOs in the developing world. In the name of protecting women's rights, these initiatives are invariably based on assumptions about women from the developing world as being more victimized and subjected to ill-treatment by a primitive culture, than their First World counterparts. These assumptions in turn have invited highly protectionist legislation, such as in the arena of anti-sex trafficking, or justified protective detention and intervention strategies that further reinforce gender, racial, and cultural stereotypes (Balgamwalla 2016; Bernstein 2010; L. Hunt 2007). The focus on carceral, law and order, and criminal justice approaches to human rights in the context of anti-trafficking interventions are largely based on such stereotypes, which deny the 'other' woman her agency, decision-making abilities, or subjectivity.

Incarcerating difference

Finally, there is the response of incarceration, internment, or even elimination, where the 'Other' is cast as completely outside of or undeserving of human rights. They are regarded as a threat, backward, uncivilized, and dangerous. These subjects are denied human rights protections as they are seen as being in opposition to such values and protections. In the contemporary period, there are a number of examples of difference being cast as a threat, contaminant, or evil. This includes the response to young Muslim men (especially after 9/11), who are increasingly perceived as a threat to the liberal democratic order. This perceived threat then justifies the adoption of exceptional measures that are non-human rights compliant, such as the creation of the category of 'enemy combatant', the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists in internment facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, or taking recourse to rendition. While these interventions may on one level be regarded as most probably violating liberal constitutional rights set by liberal states themselves, they are also at times justified by liberal states and scholars as the best hope for democracy and stability in certain anarchic parts of the world (Ignatieff 2003). In other words, such measures may be prescribed in order to save the liberal democratic world and its global project of human rights from the chaotic violence of feudal, illiberal societies that are assumed to exponentially breed evildoers, such as terrorists, who do not cherish or respect human rights, and hence are not entitled to their protections (Ignatieff 2017). Such interventions are examples of the 'dark side' of human rights.

Another example is the continued opposition by popular movements to the rights of gay people, even in countries such as France, the United States, or India, where same-sex relationships have been decriminalized, as they are perceived as destroying civilization, family, or faith (**see Case Study 31.2**). Similarly, there is resistance to migrants, who are perceived as disrupting the social and cultural cohesion of distinctive states. Responses to this 'Other' can compromise human rights, whether in the form of the war on terror, or incarceration without due process, or even refusal to rescue migrants from capsized boats who are attempting to cross into Europe.

Case Study 31.2 Same-sex relationships and LGBTQ rights in Uganda

Frank Mugisha, Executive Director, Sexual Minorities of Uganda (SMUG)

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It is a harsh reality that in many countries around the world lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people, and others of queer and diverse sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression are not able to look to human rights institutions for support and protection, or those institutions find themselves constrained and unable to offer such support and protection openly, or at all. On 30 June 2016, after extensive debate, in which much opposition was expressed, the Human Rights Council voted in favour of a UN Special Procedure establishing the office of the Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI).

Today on the global stage we are witnessing a polarized response to LGBT human rights. At one end, there is an increased criminalization of queer lives, where not just the sex act, but the very identity of LGBTQ people is criminalized, such as in Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Russia.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the struggle for rights claims has challenged the pathologizing and criminalizing of same-sex relationships, resulting in legal recognition in countries such as Nepal, Cambodia, India, South Africa, several European countries, and the United States.

But despite some countries in the Global South/non-West having decriminalized same-sex relationships, there remains a persistent belief that the ill-treatment of gay people is a feature of 'less civilized' and traditional cultures mainly in the non-West. However, in Uganda, where gay people have been persecuted and continue to face extreme violence and discrimination, sexual minorities have challenged this dichotomy by declaring that homophobia is a Western import, transmitted into the non-West by the West through the colonial encounter. The Sexual

Minorities of Uganda (SMUG) group argues that the civilizational argument actually deflects attention from the way in which Christian evangelicals from the US have been implicated in partly producing the anti-gay, homophobic agenda in these African nations and elsewhere.

The influence of conservative US evangelicals on the debate about sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) in Africa has been significant. Pastor Scott Lively, a US-based Christian evangelical, has relentlessly pursued an agenda against granting rights to LGBT and intersex groups in Uganda, and supported harsher laws against gay people. One of these laws was the Anti-Homosexual Bill of 2009 that made it illegal to have intercourse with an HIV-positive person (as of 2016, about 1.5 million Ugandans lived with HIV), and also provided for the cancellation of an organization's registration if they were found to be promoting same-sex relationships, while their directors faced imprisonment. The act was subsequently challenged in the Ugandan Constitutional Court by Ugandan SOGI community members and was struck down on the basis of a parliamentary formality (that is, lack of quorum).

The Constitutional Court victory was also parlayed with a case filed by SMUG in a US court under the provision of the Alien Tort Claims Act. SMUG brought a lawsuit against Scott Lively personally as well as in his capacity as the president of his church, the Abiding Truth Ministries, for activities in Uganda that SMUG claimed contravened fundamental human rights of the SOGI community in Uganda and led to increased persecution of gay people.

The case was ultimately dismissed and not allowed to go forward.

Question 1: Is homophobia a cultural problem? A heterosexual problem? A political problem?

Question 2: This case illustrates how a marginalized group of activists can take on a disruptive and well-funded force in order to ultimately address the risk to SOGI people living in Uganda. Do you consider this strategy effective?

Key Points

- Human rights mean different things to different people. They can be seen as tools of liberation as well as tools by which to prevent threats to liberal democratic values. Human rights can be understood as either natural rights, political values to be acquired, tools of protest, or as discourse.

- Human rights are based on three general assumptions—that they are universal, progressive, and based on a common, universal subject—that need to be critically interrogated.

- The idea of universal human rights has been challenged by those who have interrogated how human rights have also been used to exclude different groups historically, thereby exposing their contingency. These excluded groups include former colonial subjects or the subjects of slavery in the past, as well as gay people, sexual, and religious minorities in the present.

- Techniques that determine whether subjects will be included or excluded from the project of human rights include assimilation, essentializing the difference or treating the difference as natural, and treating the difference as a threat to the very idea of human rights and hence incarcerating, containing, or even annihilating it.

- The 'dark side' of human rights may not be an aberration, but rather may be constitutive of human rights.

- Human rights are not fixed tools that include everyone, but rather are tools whose meanings and understandings vary and shift in relation to their encounters with difference.

Doing human rights advocacy

In light of the discussions in this chapter, the question arises as to how to do human rights advocacy or give policy advice on human rights without in the process doing more harm, either materially or by reproducing stereotypes and the historical legacies that have produced the stereotypes. This question needs to be considered by NGOs and human rights advocates as well as students of international law who are learning about human rights.

A critical approach to human rights walks a fine line between the outright rejection of human rights (which can play into the hands of populist movements as well as culturally orthodox and nationalist groups) and the need to avoid complete despair when human rights are unable to meet their promise of transformation and complete emancipation.

Rights can be understood as radical tools for those who have never had them. Though a flawed ideal, rights are preferable to no rights at all. Human rights are an important and useful vocabulary. At the same time, the discussion in this introduction to human rights also reminds us that any advocacy strategy needs to always take into account the 'dark side' of human rights. At times, human rights have been complicit in making

the world less stable, less peaceful, more divisive, and even at times more violent. Thus, the first question to be asked when addressing the 'dark side' is: Who is accountable when human rights interventions actually harm more than they help? This is a challenging question that should form part of your vocabulary and that of advocates of human rights. In addition, there are several ways in which work with human rights can be both creative and constructive.

First, it is important to move beyond claims to the universality of human rights, while not getting bogged down in historical particularity (**see 'Universality'**) (Alston and Steiner 2009). In other words, the response to the critique of universality does not mean reverting to the local. Instead, the starting point is to recognize that human rights are a site of power and the vocabulary of human rights is indeed very powerful. It is this power in the hands of those who use it that should be understood, rather than its ability or lack of ability to transform people's lives, or its potential to bring about change. Because human rights are about power, then it matters who brandishes these tools. Human rights advocates wield power once they participate in the terrain, and they need to exercise caution in pursuing their tasks to avoid being implicated in perpetuating the 'dark side' of human rights.

Second, students of human rights need to be thoughtful in developing human rights interventions and strategies. There are invariably several approaches to the same problem, which may, as already discussed, be linked to broader competing ideological or political agendas (**see Opposing Opinions 31.1**). For example, in the area of human trafficking, a number of states have developed, in the name of human rights, legal responses that focus on sex trafficking and on rescuing women from the sex industry or even abolishing sex work. The question is whether such interventions have been helpful, empowering, discriminatory, or possibly even harmful. Organized sex workers' groups in the Netherlands, Thailand, and India have argued that such interventions deny women their subjectivity, treat them as victims to be rescued and rehabilitated, do not endow them with the rights they need to fight the abuses and harms they experience, and fail to reduce their vulnerability to and reliance on criminal networks. They further argue that not all sex workers have been trafficked, and nor is all trafficking directed into sex work. Migrants have similarly argued that anti-trafficking interventions have failed to understand the causes of migration, including the unavailability of safe,

legal routes for movement, that have rendered migrants dependent on clandestine migrant mobility regimes, which include a dependency on smugglers and traffickers. Thus, while anti-trafficking interventions have ostensibly been adopted in the name of human rights, they have at times resulted in human rights harms and injuries and increased the vulnerabilities of already marginalized and disenfranchised groups.

Some of the questions that students of International Relations who may be advising on human rights might address include: Have the minimum human rights criteria been met by the existing interventions? What are the broader structural and material causes that have produced trafficking? Are there better or more effective ways of enhancing the rights of vulnerable groups, that would reduce their exposure to exploitation and are empowering? It may be that a more human rights-friendly approach to irregular movement can be found by foregrounding the rights of migrants rather than focusing on anti-trafficking; lobbying for safer migration routes; developing more advocacy around the UN convention on migrant workers' rights and urging states to sign on; and by recognizing that the free flow of labour in a global era requires less resort to the criminal law and more attention to addressing the causes of migration.

A third consideration is to ensure that human rights materials, scholarship, and education include an awareness of the colonial trappings and the 'First World's' hegemonic underpinnings of the human rights project, and how the non-West has been frequently ignored or excluded from the formulation and discussions on how human rights should function. A postcolonial/Third World viewpoint can enrich the perspective of how human rights have sustained and continue to sustain, and even justify at times, exclusion at the same time as they include (**see Ch. 10**). This understanding can assist in revising the thinking and understanding of human rights that have been dominated by Western states or perspectives or by powerful actors, which include assumptions that human rights are needed only in the developing, 'less civilized' world. Drawing on the experiences of the world's 'Others', rather than seeking to rescue, patronize, or target them, requires understanding and learning, for example from the postcolonial, feminist, and racial critiques of rights (**see Chs 17 and 18**). These critiques include understandings on how human rights have been shaped by the legacies of the colonial encounter, slavery, apartheid, and gender discrimination.

Fourth, a student of human rights needs to look at how the story of human rights is told and who is telling

Opposing Opinions 31.1   States should be free to choose whether or not to let in irregular migrants

For

Every state has an obligation to give priority to its own citizens' needs. Given that a state's resources are limited, priority should be given to the citizens of a given state. Sharing resources such as jobs, education, and health care with irregular migrants becomes an unfair burden and denies resources to citizens.

Every state has the right to restrict the entry of people into its own country. States have a right to choose who can enter and who can become a citizen. States have not surrendered their sovereignty and have a right to refuse entry to people who have not adhered to their stated criteria.

A state has no obligation to receive migrants who pose a threat to the social cohesion of its own society. A state has a right and obligation to maintain the social cohesiveness of its own society and ensure that those who refuse to, or appear unable to, conform or assimilate be denied entry.

Against

States have an obligation to uphold the right to freedom of mobility. There are over 260 million people who live outside their country of origin. Many of these people have migrated under compulsion, due to war, ethnic conflict, persecution based on gender, religious, racial, or sexual difference, poverty, climate change, environmental or natural disasters, or lack of a homeland, among other reasons. Rich and privileged states are morally obliged to uphold the right to mobility.

Denial of safe legal routes for movement increases vulnerability. Migrants who are compelled to move are increasingly vulnerable, given the fact that safe legal routes for mobility are shrinking. They are forced to take recourse to the help of smugglers and other clandestine networks in order to move. This kind of movement is full of risk, including death, due to the precarious methods of transportation and conveyance.

Migrants are often forced to move because of conditions created in their own homeland by outside states, including the states where they seek refuge. The situations of war and conflict as well as poverty are often produced by outside states. Global economic powers are responsible for producing or aggravating conflict, as in the Middle East or Afghanistan, as well as facilitating a global economic market that benefits the few. These aspects produce the conditions for forced migration.

Migration is a global human rights problem, not a law and order problem. The lack of commitment to the human rights of migrants is justified by casting migrants as a threat to the social, cultural, and economic order of the recipient state, as potential terrorists, or simply as a burden.

Migrants are made vulnerable. The denial of rights renders migrants vulnerable to discrimination, appalling living and working conditions, and increased exploitation. As they may frequently end up working in the shadow economy, they are subject to a range of economic, physical, and emotional abuse, with little recourse to assistance.

1. Is the right to mobility an important human right?

2. Do states owe any obligation to humans beyond their own borders? Why? Why not?

3. Should assimilation be a criterion for admitting migrants? Why? Why not?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

the story, as this can offer valuable insights into the way human rights have functioned. This requires, for example, not treating impoverished persons as the object of rights, but as a constituency that may understand and be able to inform on how rights claims can have an ambivalent relationship to suffering. This includes an understanding of how human rights can sometimes work to create hierarchies of human suffering, and can themselves become equated with a market-friendly human rights paradigm that can exacerbate poverty and inequality.

Human rights advocacy needs to carefully negotiate strategies and interventions that do not reproduce false

dichotomies, but that instead learn from the contexts that have addressed these tensions. For example, as is evident in **Case Study 31.1**, freedom of religion and gender equality do not have to be placed in opposition to one another, nor does the veil have to be regarded as incompatible with commitments to secularism. In a number of countries, most evidently in postcolonial and Third World countries, these values can coexist. For example, in India, women in religious minority communities are constantly renegotiating the boundaries and contesting the meaning of equality, understandings of secularism, and the right to freedom of religion, at the same time as they are challenging iniquitous and discriminatory practices in their own communities. They are negotiating the complex and contradictory nature of the human rights terrain, and illustrate why rights need to be constantly monitored, revisited, and interrogated.

Key Points

- Human rights are more than the formal structure and rights. They are political and can be used by different groups to advance competing political agendas.

- Human rights interventions do not always work in ways that are progressive or emancipatory.

- Rights can be liberating as well as confining, and human rights advocates need to be aware of these multiple uses of rights.

- Rights need to be historicized and contextualized.

- Human rights advocacy needs to be careful, mindful, and thoughtful in formulating interventions to ensure that they do not reproduce some of the exclusionary aspects and 'dark side' of human rights.

- Rights are complex, contradictory, and contingent. For this reason, rights are never firmly fixed or entrenched. There are no permanent victories. Consequently, human rights need to be constantly monitored, revisited, questioned, and defended.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced you to the formal structure and framework of human rights, including the treaties, conventions, committees, and reporting mechanisms of the global human rights regime. It has also introduced the politics of human rights and how to think about the historical development of human rights. In particular, the chapter illustrates how human rights have been shaped by the legacies of the colonial encounter, slavery, and engagements with sexual, religious, and racial differences. You are not only encouraged to question the dominant understandings of human rights as progressive, universal, and based on a common subject, but also how these claims can at times obscure the ways in which human rights are based on relations of power. In other words, human rights can serve to advance competing agendas that are not always progressive or inclusive.

By adopting a critical analysis, including to postcolonial and Third World perspectives on human rights, we hope to develop a more mindful, thoughtful, and reflective approach to human rights advocacy or policy formulation. Introducing the dominant understandings of human rights as progressive, universal, and based on a common subject and exposing you to a critical analysis of each of these claims provides a deeper and more mindful engagement with the topic. It also raises awareness that human rights are not a project that can be steered by good intentions, and that sometimes these intentions can lead to harmful effects. By learning about the 'dark side' of human rights, students can become more thoughtful and informed in developing advocacy strategies and policy positions on human rights in the area of international relations.

Questions

1. In the international human rights structure and apparatus, what is the most effective model for alleviating extreme forms of cruelty and suffering inflicted by states?

2. Can you think of examples in which the conferment of human rights has manifestly transformed the lives of the individual recipient of those rights? In what ways?

3. Has the world become a better place with the establishment of human rights and the international human rights structure?

4. Can you think of situations in your own context or work in which human rights have been part of the problem in terms of either inflicting or aggravating pain and suffering or reinforcing or advancing colonial, racial agendas that are themselves extremely troubling?

5. Are human rights opposed to culture or are human rights themselves cultural? What are the implications of either position on interventions by civil society, as well as on international human rights mechanisms?

6. Are human rights about power? Discourse? Civilizational development? A form of resistance to state power?

7. How have different constituencies, including neo-colonial as well as orthodox/conservative forces, advanced their agendas in and through the discourse of human rights?

8. Are human rights on life support or do they still embody the potential to transform the world and individual lives for the better? Can you think of examples that illustrate this potential?

9. If human rights did not exist in the world, would anyone notice? Are we better off with human rights or without them—how and why?

10. Think about cases or issues in your own contexts or with which you are familiar, and identify how human rights have been used to advance the rights of marginalized or disadvantaged groups and how they have been used to undermine the rights of 'Others'.

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Barreto, J. M. (2013), *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing). Focuses on the experience of the colonized to develop a critique of human rights.

Baxi, U. (2007), *The Future of Human Rights*, 3rd edn (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Addresses human rights as an anti-hegemonic project that can have transformative effects when placed in the hands of the marginalized and disenfranchised.

Brown, W. (2002), 'Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights', in W. Brown and J. Halley (eds), *Left Legalism/Left Critique* (Durham, NC: Duke University). Demonstrates that human rights are not per se a force for good and can have contradictory outcomes.

Chandler, D. (ed.) (2002), *Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan). Analyses the role of human rights in international politics and how they can be used by different players to advance competing agendas.

Chowdhry, G., and Nair, S. (eds) (2002), *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender, and Class* (New York: Routledge). Uses postcolonial theory to discuss how race, gender, and class have been central to shaping global politics.

Douzinas, C. (2000), *The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century* (Oxford: Hart Publishing). Addresses the crisis of human rights in the contemporary period and the need to recapture the radical essence of human rights as a transformative endeavour.

Kapur, R. (2018), *Gender, Alterity, and Human Rights: Freedom in a Fishbowl* (London: Edward Elgar Press). Analyses how human rights have been unable to realize the promise of freedom for gender, sexual, and religious minorities, and argues in favour of the need to turn to non-liberal alternatives of freedom and address the future of human rights within these alternatives.

Kennedy, D. (2004), *The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Examines how human rights, among other humanitarian efforts, have gone awry and at times become part of the problem, and looks at what can be done to respond to this dilemma.

Santos, B. de Sousa (2015), *If God Were a Human Rights Activist* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Focuses on how to address the limits of human rights and some of their exclusionary effects by understanding and working with the progressive elements of different religious traditions.

Slaughter, J. (2018), 'Hijacking Human Rights: Neoliberalism, the New Historiography, and the End of the Third World', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 40(4): 735–75. Examines how the story of human rights is invariably told from an Americo-Eurocentric perspective that disregards people and events in the rest of the world as makers of human rights histories.

To find out more, follow the web links **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Humanitarian intervention in world politics

ALEX J. BELLAMY · NICHOLAS J. WHEELER

Framing Questions

- How should we resolve tensions when valued principles such as order, sovereignty, and self-determination come into conflict with human rights?

- Is humanitarian intervention ever justified? If so, in what circumstances?

- How have international thought and practice evolved with respect to humanitarian intervention?

Reader's Guide

Non-intervention is commonly understood as the norm in international society and international law that forbids the use of force except for purposes of self-defence and collective enforcement action authorized by the UN Security Council. But how should international society respond when governments commit genocide or other mass atrocities against their own populations, or if they are unable to prevent such violations, or if states have collapsed into civil war and anarchy? This is the guiding question addressed in this chapter. The challenges posed by humanitarian intervention are whether it should be exempted from the general ban on the use of force and whether it is an effective way of responding to the most serious of abuses. This chapter examines arguments for and against forcible humanitarian intervention. It considers humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, examines the 'responsibility to protect', and concludes with an analysis of the arguments for and against forcible humanitarian intervention to protect Syrians from so-called Islamic State and the Assad government.

Introduction

Humanitarian intervention poses a hard test for an international society built on principles of **sovereignty**, **non-intervention**, and the non-use of force. Immediately after the **Holocaust**, the **society of states** established laws prohibiting genocide, forbidding the mistreatment of civilians, and recognizing basic human rights. These humanitarian principles often conflict with principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Sovereign states are expected to act as guardians of their citizens' **security**, but what happens if states behave as criminals towards their own people, treating sovereignty as a licence to kill? Should **tyrannical states** (S. Hoffmann 1995–6: 31) be recognized as legitimate members of **international society** and accorded the protection afforded by the non-intervention principle? Or should states forfeit their sovereign rights and be exposed to legitimate intervention if they actively abuse or fail to protect their citizens? Related to this, what responsibilities do other states or **institutions** have to enforce human rights **norms** against governments that massively violate them?

Armed humanitarian intervention was not a legitimate practice during the **cold war** because states placed more value on sovereignty and **order** than on the enforcement of human rights. But attitudes shifted significantly among some states during the 1990s. However, the new norm was a weak one. Not until the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1973 in 2011 in relation to the humanitarian crisis in Libya did it authorize forcible intervention against a fully functioning sovereign state, and intervention without UNSC authorization remained deeply controversial. However, some states in the **Global South** especially have continued to worry that humanitarian intervention is a rhetorical device to justify the forcible interference of the strong in the affairs of the weak. At the same time, a group of states, from both the Global North and Global South, and **non-governmental organizations** (NGOs) attempted to build a consensus around the principle of the **responsibility to protect**. The responsibility to protect insists that states have primary responsibility for protecting their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The UN Security Council has now used the responsibility to protect in relation to a dozen crises, including those in Libya, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, South Sudan, Yemen, and Darfur.

The case for humanitarian intervention

Human security

For both **realists** and liberals alike, security has traditionally been understood as the purview of states. Security studies focuses primarily, therefore, on the security of *states*. According to this perspective, security is best achieved by establishing a basic degree of international order based on each state's recognition of every other state's right to rule a particular territory and engage in external relations. Two of the main guarantors of state security are the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. These were the foundations of the so-called 'rules-based' or 'liberal' order established at the end of the Second World War. This way of thinking about security is often labelled 'Westphalian sovereignty', referring to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which is commonly reckoned to have instituted a world order based on the right of sovereigns to govern their own people in whatever way they saw fit.

The value of this Westphalian system of security rests on the assumption that sovereign states are the best guardians of human security. That is, states are morally valuable because they protect their citizens from violence. In practice, however, states are often themselves a source of profound insecurity. According to one study, in the twentieth century alone some 262 million people were killed by their own government. This figure is six times greater than the number of people killed in battles during all the international wars of the same period. Emerging in the 1990s, the **human security** approach called for the reconceptualization of security to focus not on the security of states, but rather the security of individuals and communities (MacFarlane and Khong 2006; Kaldor 2007). Doing so had two profound effects on the way we understand security. The first was to significantly broaden the range of things that constituted a security threat. From the perspective

of the lived experience of humans, poverty, human rights abuses, gender violence, civil war, and climate change were much more significant threats than inter-state war. Second, the state came to be seen as not only a source of security, but also as one of the main sources of threat since states were among the primary perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities. This raised important moral, legal, and practical questions about whether states should lose their sovereign rights when they systematically abuse their populations (**see Ch. 15**).

The legal argument

The '**counter-restrictionist**' case for a legal right of individual and collective humanitarian intervention rests on two claims: first, the **UN Charter** (1945) commits states to protecting fundamental human rights; second, there is a right of humanitarian intervention in customary **international law**. Counter-restrictionists argue that human rights are just as important as peace and security in the UN Charter. The charter's preamble and Articles 1(3), 55, and 56 all highlight the importance of human rights. Indeed, Article 1(3) identifies the protection of human rights as one of the principal purposes of the UN system. This has led counter-restrictionists to read a humanitarian exception to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter. Michael Reisman (1985: 279–85) argued that, given the human rights principles in the Charter, the UNSC should have taken armed action during the cold war against states that committed genocide and mass murder. The ongoing failure of the UNSC to fulfil this legal responsibility led him to assert that a legal exception to the ban on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter should be created that would permit individual states to use force on humanitarian grounds. Likewise, some international lawyers (Damrosch 1991: 219) have argued that humanitarian intervention does not breach Article 2(4) because the article prohibits the use of force only against the 'political independence' and 'territorial integrity' of states, and humanitarian intervention does neither of these things.

Other counter-restrictionists admit that there is no legal basis for **unilateral humanitarian intervention** in the UN Charter, but argue that it is permitted by customary international law. For a **rule** to count as customary international law, states must claim that the practice has the status of law and actually engage in the activity. International lawyers describe this as *opinio juris*. Counter-restrictionists contend that the customary right to humanitarian intervention preceded the UN Charter, evidenced by the legal arguments offered to justify the British, French, and Russian intervention in Greece (1827) and US intervention in Cuba (1898). They also point to British and French references to customary international law to justify the creation of safe havens in Iraq (1991), Kofi Annan's insistence that even unilateral intervention to halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda would have been legitimate, and the UK's claim of a customary right to humanitarian intervention in the case of Syria in 2013.

Critics say that these arguments exaggerate the extent of consensus about the rules governing the use of force, and that their reading of the UN Charter's textual provisions runs contrary to both majority international legal opinion (Brownlie 1974; Chesterman 2001) and the opinions expressed by the Charter's architects at the end of the Second World War.

The moral case

Many writers argue that, irrespective of what the law says, there is a moral duty to intervene to protect civilians from genocide and mass killing. They argue that sovereignty derives from a state's responsibility to protect its citizens; therefore when a state fails in this duty, it should lose its sovereign rights (Tesón 2003: 93). Some point to the idea of **common humanity** to argue that all individuals have basic human rights and duties to uphold the rights of others (Caney 1997: 34). Others argue that today's globalized world is so integrated that massive human rights violations in one part of the world affect every other part, creating moral obligations (Blair 1999*b*). Some advocates of just war theory argue that the duty to offer charity to those in need is universal (Ramsey 2002: 35–6). A further variety of this argument insists that moral agreement exists among the world's major religions and ethical systems about a duty to prevent mass killing and punish the perpetrators (Lepard 2002).

There are problems with this perspective too. Granting states a moral permit to intervene opens the door to potential abuse: the use of humanitarian arguments to justify wars that are anything but humanitarian. Furthermore, those who advance moral justifications for intervention run up against the problem of how bad a humanitarian crisis has to be before force can be used. There is also the thorny issue of whether force should be used to prevent a humanitarian emergency from developing in the first place.

Key Points

- Counter-restrictionists argue in favour of a legal right of humanitarian intervention based on interpretations of the UN Charter and customary international law.

- Many lawyers contend that the counter-restrictionist position rests on flawed and overly liberal interpretations of the Charter and customary law.

- The claims for a moral duty of humanitarian intervention stem from the basic proposition that all individuals are entitled to a minimum level of protection from harm by virtue of their common humanity.

- Debate exists about which human rights are 'fundamental' and who may decide when their violation is sufficient to justify armed intervention.

The case against humanitarian intervention

Seven key objections to humanitarian intervention have been advanced at various times by scholars, international lawyers, and policy-makers. These objections are not mutually exclusive and can be found in the writings of realists, liberals, feminists, postcolonial theorists, and others, although these different theories accord different weight to each of the objections.

No basis for humanitarian intervention in international law

Restrictionist international lawyers insist that the common good is best preserved by maintaining a ban on any use of force not authorized by the UNSC. They argue that aside from the right of individual and collective self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, there are no exceptions to Article 2(4). They also point to the fact that when states have acted unilaterally, they have chosen not to articulate a general legal right of humanitarian intervention. Interveners have typically claimed to be acting in self-defence (for instance, India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan and Vietnam's 1978 intervention in Cambodia); have pointed to the 'implied authorization' of UNSC resolutions (for instance, the UK's justification for the 1999 intervention in Kosovo); or have refrained from making legal arguments at all (for instance, the US justification for the 1999 intervention in Kosovo).

States do not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons

States almost always have mixed motives for intervention and are rarely willing to sacrifice their own soldiers overseas unless they have self-interested reasons for doing so. For realists, this means that genuine humanitarian intervention is imprudent because it does not serve the national interest. For other critics, it suggests that the powerful intervene only when it suits them to do so, and that strategies of intervention are more likely to be guided by calculations of national interest than by what is best for the victims in whose name the intervention is ostensibly being carried out (Menon 2016).

States should not risk the lives of their soldiers to save strangers

Realists not only argue that states do not intervene for humanitarian purposes; their statist paradigm also asserts that states should not behave in this way. Political leaders do not have the moral right to shed the blood of their own citizens on behalf of suffering foreigners. If a civil authority has broken down or is behaving in an appalling way towards its citizens, this is the responsibility of that state's citizens, and crucially of its political leaders. Realists insist that states should not embark on risky military operations overseas except when their vital national interests are at stake.

The problem of abuse

In the absence of an impartial mechanism for deciding when humanitarian intervention is permissible, states might espouse humanitarian motives as a pretext to cover the pursuit of national self-interest (Franck and Rodley 1973). The classic case of abuse was Hitler's argument that it was necessary to invade Czechoslovakia to protect the 'life and liberty' of that country's German population. Creating a right of humanitarian intervention would only make it easier for the powerful to justify interfering in the affairs of the weak. Critics argue

that a right to intervention would not create more 'genuine' humanitarian action, because self-interest—not sovereignty—has traditionally been the main barrier to intervention. However, it would make the world a more dangerous place by giving states more ways of justifying force (Chesterman 2001).

Selectivity of response

Selectivity of response is the problem of failing to treat like cases alike. States always apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively, resulting in an inconsistency in policy. Because state behaviour is governed by what governments judge to be in their interest, they are selective about when they choose to intervene (Menon 2016). The problem arises when an agreed moral principle is at stake in more than one situation, but national interest dictates different responses. A good example of the selectivity of response is the argument that **NATO**'s intervention in Kosovo could not have been driven by humanitarian concerns because the alliance later did little to address the very much larger humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur (**see Case Study 32.1**).

Disagreement about moral principles

Pluralist international society theory identifies an additional objection to humanitarian intervention: the problem of how to reach a consensus on what moral principles should underpin it. **Pluralism** is sensitive to human rights concerns but argues that humanitarian intervention should not be permitted in the face of disagreement about what constitutes extreme human rights violations. The concern is that, in the absence of consensus on what principles should govern a right of humanitarian intervention, the most powerful states would be free to impose their own culturally determined moral values on weaker members of international society.

Intervention does not work

A final set of criticisms suggests that humanitarian intervention should be avoided because it is impossible for outsiders to impose human rights. Some liberals argue that states are established by the informed consent of their citizens. For example, one of the foremost

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Case Study 32.1 Darfur: barriers to intervention

Sudanese displaced people
© JOSE CENDON / AFP / Getty Images

In 2003–4, the Sudanese government under President Omar al-Bashir and its 'Janjaweed' militia unleashed what the UN described as a 'reign of terror' in Darfur. At least 250,000 people died and over 2 million were displaced. The rate of killing declined after 2004 but sporadic targeting of civilians continued. The world's response was slow and timid. When the violence subsided, the African Union (AU) deployed a small mission (AMIS),

but it was not capable of protecting civilians. This mission was eventually replaced by a joint UN–AU mission (UNAMID) in late 2007. This slow response points to the complexities of humanitarian intervention.

First, there were few prudent military options for intervention available to Western governments without Sudanese consent.

Second, intervention might have worsened the humanitarian situation by encouraging the Sudanese government to close access to aid agencies.

Third, the proliferation of militia groups made a military solution to the crisis unlikely.

Fourth, intervention in Darfur would have likely scuppered hopes for a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and South Sudanese rebels.

Fifth, coercion was strongly opposed by Russia and China, which argued that Darfur was an internal matter.

Sixth, Western militaries were overstretched by commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Question 1: Why was humanitarian intervention ruled out in the case of Darfur?

Question 2: Should states have intervened without a Security Council mandate?

nineteenth-century liberal thinkers, John Stuart Mill (1973: 377–8), argued that **democracy** could be established only by a domestic struggle for liberty. Human rights cannot take root if they are imposed or enforced by outsiders. Mill argued that oppressed peoples should themselves overthrow tyrannical government. Others argue that humanitarian intervention can actually cause mass atrocities by encouraging dissatisfied groups to launch rebellions in the hope of provoking a disproportionate response from their government, which will then trigger external military intervention (Kuperman 2005, 2008). However, the validity of this theory has been seriously challenged (Western 2005).

Key Points

- States may not intervene for primarily humanitarian purposes.
- States are often unwilling to place their citizens in harm's way in order to protect foreigners.
- A legal right of humanitarian intervention would be vulnerable to abuse, as states may employ humanitarian claims to cloak the pursuit of self-interest.

- States will apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively.
- In the absence of consensus about what principles should guide humanitarian intervention, a right of humanitarian intervention would undermine international order.
- Humanitarian intervention will always be based on the cultural preferences of the powerful.

The 1990s: a golden era of humanitarian activism?

It has become common to describe the immediate post-cold war period as something of a 'golden era' for humanitarian activism (T. Weiss 2004: 136). There is no doubt that during the 1990s states began to contemplate intervention to protect imperilled strangers in distant lands. But the decade also saw the world stand aside in the face of mass atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This section addresses these developments.

The role of humanitarian sentiments in decisions to intervene

In the case of northern Iraq in April 1991 and Somalia in December 1992, domestic public opinion in the United States played an important role in pressurizing policy-makers into using force for humanitarian purposes. With regard to the former, in the face of a massive refugee crisis caused by Saddam Hussein's oppression of the Kurds in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, Western military forces intervened to create protected 'safe havens' for the Kurdish people. Similarly, the US military intervention in Somalia in December 1992 was a response to sentiments of compassion on the part of US citizens. However, this sense of solidarity disappeared once the United States began sustaining casualties, indicating how capricious public opinion is.

By contrast, the French intervention in Rwanda in July 1994 seems to be an example of abuse. The French government emphasized the strictly humanitarian character of the operation, but this interpretation lacks credibility given evidence that they were covertly pursuing national self-interest. France had propped up the one-party Hutu state for 20 years. The French were reportedly anxious to restore waning French influence in Africa and feared that a Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) victory in French-speaking Rwanda would bring the country under the influence of the Anglophone countries. France therefore did not intervene until the later stages of the genocide, which was ended primarily by the RPF's military victory, and it gave safe passage to genocidaires into the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. French leaders may have been partly motivated by humanitarian sentiments, but this is a case of a state abusing the concept of humanitarian intervention since the intervention's primary purpose was to protect French interests.

The moral question raised by the French intervention is part of the reason why international society failed to intervene when the genocide began in early April 1994. The French intervention might have saved some lives, but it came far too late to halt the genocide, which killed some 800,000 people in a mere hundred days. There was no intervention for the simple reason

that those with the military capability to stop the genocide were unwilling to sacrifice troops and resources to protect Rwandans. International solidarity in the face of genocide was limited to moral outrage and the provision of humanitarian aid.

If the French intervention in Rwanda can be criticized for being too little, too late, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was criticized for being too much, too soon. At the beginning of the war, NATO said it was intervening to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Two arguments were adduced to support NATO's claim that the resort to force was justifiable. First, Serbian actions in Kosovo had created a humanitarian emergency and breached international legal commitments. Second, the Serbs were committing crimes against humanity and challenging common humanity. NATO was propelled into action by a mixture of humanitarian concern and self-interest centred on three sets of issues: first, a fear that, left unchecked, Milošević's military and paramilitary forces would replicate the carnage of Bosnia; second, a concern that protracted conflict in the southern Balkans would create a massive refugee crisis in Europe; third, NATO governments worried that if they failed to contain the crisis, it could spread and engulf the region (Bellamy 2002: 3). This supports the proposition that humanitarian intervention is nearly always prompted by mixed motives. This becomes a problem only if the non-humanitarian motives undermine the chances of achieving the humanitarian purposes.

How legal and legitimate were the interventions?

In contrast with state practice during the cold war, the interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo were all justified in humanitarian terms by the intervening states. This justification remained hotly contested, with China, Russia, and members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) defending a traditional interpretation of state sovereignty. However, that position became less tenable as the 1990s progressed, and by the end of the decade most states were prepared to accept that the UNSC was entitled to authorize armed humanitarian intervention. Thus many **peacekeeping** mandates passed by the UNSC since 2000 contain an instruction for international soldiers to protect endangered civilians, using force if necessary and prudent. Chapter VII of the Charter enables the UNSC to authorize military enforcement action only in cases where it finds a threat to 'international peace and

security', first controversially employed for humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992). Since the early 1990s, the UNSC has expanded its list of what counts as a threat to the peace to include human suffering, the overthrow of democratic government, state failure, refugee movements, and ethnic cleansing (Wheeler 2000, 2003: 32–41).

NATO's intervention in Kosovo raised the question of how international society should treat intervention when a state, or in this case a group of states, decides to use force to alleviate human suffering without the UNSC's explicit authorization. Although the UN did not authorize NATO's use of force, the UNSC also chose not to condemn it. Russia tabled a draft UNSC resolution on 26 March 1999 condemning NATO's use of force and demanding an immediate halt to the bombing. Surprisingly, only Russia, China, and Namibia voted in favour, leading to the resolution's resounding defeat.

What emerges from post-cold war state practice is that Western states took the lead in advancing a new norm of armed humanitarian intervention. Although some states—notably Russia, China, India, and some members of the NAM—remained very uneasy with this development, they reluctantly came to accept that military intervention authorized by the UNSC was justifiable in cases of genocide and mass killing. The best illustration of this is the fact that no member of the UNSC tried to oppose intervention in Rwanda to end the genocide on the grounds that this violated its sovereignty. Instead, the barrier to intervention was states' lack of political will to incur the costs and risks of armed intervention to save Rwandans. There were also important limits to the emerging norm: intervention outside the UN remained very controversial; the UNSC refrained from authorizing intervention against fully functioning states; and although it is inconceivable that any state would have complained about intervention in Rwanda, this was a uniquely horrible case with a rate of killing higher than that of the Holocaust.

Were the interventions successful?

Does the record of post-cold war interventions support the proposition that the use of force can promote humanitarian values? Humanitarian outcomes might usefully be divided into short- and long-term outcomes. The former refer to the immediate alleviation of human suffering through the termination of genocide or mass murder and/or the delivery of humanitarian

aid to civilians trapped in war zones. Long-term humanitarian outcomes focus on how far intervention addresses the underlying causes of human suffering by facilitating conflict resolution and the construction of viable polities.

'Operation Provide Comfort' in northern Iraq enjoyed initial success in dealing with the displacement problem and clearly saved lives. However, achieving a long-term, stable peace faced enormous problems owing to Iraqi hostility towards its Kurdish minority. Nevertheless, the Kurds were able to fashion a significant degree of autonomy in the 1990s, which has persisted since the 2003 US-led invasion.

Some commentators identify the initial US intervention in Somalia between December 1992 and May 1993 as a successful humanitarian intervention. In terms of short-term success, the US claims that it saved thousands of Somalis from starvation, although this is disputed (L. Weiss 1999: 82–7). What is not disputed is that the mission ended in disaster. This can be traced to the attempt by UNOSOM II (this UN force took over from the US in May 1993, but its military missions were principally controlled by US commanders) to go beyond the initial US mission of famine relief to the disarmament of the warring factions and the provision of law and order.

The NATO-led force that entered Kosovo at the end of Operation Allied Force succeeded in returning Kosovar Albanian refugees to their homes, but it initially failed to protect the Serbian community from reprisal attacks, though the situation has improved. Over time, ethnic violence has declined significantly and the governments of Kosovo and Serbia have begun to negotiate new territorial arrangements that they hope will ease those tensions further. Meanwhile, Kosovo's economy has improved steadily, with unemployment declining from around 50 per cent in 2001 to 25 per cent in 2016, although those improvements have stalled recently. Yet one of the principal lessons from Kosovo is that while rebuilding after humanitarian intervention is possible, it is also a lengthy process that requires significant investments of political will and financial support.

Forcible intervention in humanitarian crises is a short-term palliative that can effectively halt mass atrocities. By itself, however, it cannot address the underlying political causes of the violence and suffering. It is for this reason that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) insisted that intervention was only one of three international responsibilities, the other two being prevention and rebuilding.

Key Points

- The 1990s were described as a golden era of humanitarian activism because of a dramatic increase in the number of humanitarian interventions.

- Although some interventions were motivated by humanitarian concerns, others were not. Most interventions were prompted by mixed motives.

- The legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention remain hotly contested, but a norm of intervention authorized by the Security Council emerged in the 1990s.

- Interventions tended to be more successful in stopping immediate killing and less successful in building long-term peace.

The responsibility to protect (RtoP)

The debate about humanitarian intervention came to a head during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. NATO's intervention triggered a major debate on the circumstances in which the use of force for human protection purposes might be justifiable, the intricacies of which were reflected in the subsequent findings of an international commission, which deemed NATO's actions in Kosovo 'illegal but legitimate' (IICK 2000). At issue was the relationship between the state and its own population, the credibility of the international community's commitment to basic standards of human rights, and the role of the UN.

To find answers to these questions, Canada decided to establish an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. In articulating the concept of the 'responsibility to protect', the ICISS tried to shift the focus of debate away from the rights of interveners and towards the protection needs of the victims. It insisted that states had a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, mass killing, and ethnic cleansing, and that when they proved either unwilling or unable to fulfil this duty, that responsibility was transferred to the international community. The Commission argued that the responsibility to protect

(RtoP) comprised responsibilities to prevent, to react, and to rebuild (ICISS 2001). The Commission identified proposals to strengthen the international community's effectiveness, including a prevention toolkit, decision-making criteria for the use of force, and a hierarchy of international authority in situations where the Security Council was divided.

World leaders unanimously endorsed RtoP at the 2005 UN World Summit. The summit's outcome document was later adopted as a General Assembly resolution (**see Box 32.1**). In 2009, the UN secretary-general set out a comprehensive strategy for implementing RtoP, adopting a 'narrow but deep' approach: narrow in its exclusive focus on the prevention of four crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity) and the protection of populations from them, but deep in its ambition to employ all instruments available to the UN system (regional arrangements, member states, and civil society). This strategy was organized around the idea that, as agreed by member states in 2005, RtoP rests on three pillars. These pillars are non-sequential (one does not need to apply pillars 1 and 2 before moving to pillar 3) and of equal importance—the whole edifice of RtoP would collapse if it were not supported by all three pillars.

- Pillar 1: the primary responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement. The Secretary-General described this pillar as the 'bedrock' of RtoP, which derives from sovereign responsibility itself and the international legal obligations that states already had (para. 138).

- Pillar 2: the international community's responsibility to assist and encourage states to fulfil their responsibility to protect, particularly by helping them to address the underlying causes of genocide and mass atrocities, build the capacity to prevent these crimes, and address problems before they escalate (paras 138 and 139).

- Pillar 3: the international community's responsibility to take timely and decisive action to protect populations from the four crimes through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means (principally in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter) and, on a case-by-case basis, if peaceful means 'prove inadequate' and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations, other more forceful means through Chapter VII of the UN Charter (para. 139).

The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document represents an international consensus on the nature and scope of RtoP. It has been reaffirmed several times by the UN Security Council (including Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009)) and referred to in more than 70 other Security Council resolutions (such as Resolution

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Box 32.1 Paragraphs 138–40 of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document

138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a

case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.

(Ban 2009: para. 11 (a, b, c))

2431 (2018) on Somalia, Resolutions 2428 and 2429 (2018) on Sudan and South Sudan, and Resolution 2332 (2016) on Syria). The UN General Assembly has also reaffirmed the principle and committed itself to on-going consideration of its implementation, while the UN Human Rights Council has referred to the principle in more than 30 resolutions. However, it is important to distinguish between the RtoP that governments have agreed to adopt and the ideas that helped shape it, including the proposals of the ICISS, mentioned earlier. There are five key points to bear in mind in this regard:

1 RtoP is narrow in scope, but universal and enduring in its coverage. The concept applies everywhere, all the time. All states have a permanent responsibility to protect their populations from the four crimes. The concept is narrow, though, in that it relates only to the four crimes identified in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document—genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity—and to their prevention.
2 States have a responsibility to protect all populations under their care, not just citizens.
3 RtoP is based on well-established principles of existing international law. The crimes to which it relates are enumerated in international law. States already had legal obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; assist other states to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law; and promote compliance with the law. In addition, the UN World Summit Outcome Document is clear in stating that RtoP is to be implemented in accordance with the UN Charter.
4 The UN World Summit Outcome Document calls explicitly for the prevention of the four crimes and their incitement.
5 Force may be used only when authorized by the UN Security Council.

RtoP in action

The incorporation of RtoP into practice got off to a relatively slow start. Between the passage of Security Council Resolution 1674 in 2006, which reaffirmed RtoP, and 2009, the council referred to the concept only once—in a preambular paragraph of Resolution 1706 (2006) on the situation in Darfur. At the time, Darfur was often portrayed as a 'test case' for RtoP. For

example, the UK House of Commons Select Committee on International Development (2005: 19) judged that 'if the responsibility to protect means anything, it ought to mean something in Darfur'. It was a test that RtoP was widely judged to have failed (Grono 2006).

In the aftermath of the disputed 30 December 2007 elections in Kenya, ethnic and tribal violence resulted in the killing of some 1,500 people and the displacement of 300,000 more. The international community responded with a coordinated diplomatic effort led by AU mediator Kofi Annan and supported by the UN's Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (who succeeded Annan in January 2007) and the Security Council. Approaching the situation 'in the RtoP prism', Annan persuaded the country's president, Mwai Kibaki, and main opponent, Raila Odinga, to conclude a power-sharing agreement and rein in the mobs (Annan 2012: 189–202). This diplomatic effort, couched squarely in RtoP terms, pulled the two leaders back from the brink and saved Kenya from a terrible fate. It also provided a tangible demonstration of RtoP's capacity to facilitate atrocity prevention through peaceful means.

With the UN and its member states seemingly hesitant to translate RtoP from 'words into deeds', few—if any—anticipated the role that the concept would play in the events of 2011. In March, the Security Council responded to violence in Libya, which included the commission of crimes against humanity and contained clear potential for more, by unanimously passing Resolution 1970. Under Chapter VII, the resolution specifically referred to RtoP, demanded an immediate cessation of violence, established a political process, imposed targeted sanctions, and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. When the Gaddafi regime failed to comply, the council took the unprecedented step of authorizing the use of force to protect civilians from imminent danger, and enforcing a no-fly zone and an arms embargo (Resolution 1973). This was the first time in the council's history that it had authorized the use of force against a functioning member state for humanitarian protection purposes. A few days later, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1975 on Côte d'Ivoire. In the context of escalating post-election violence there, the Council declared Alassane Ouattara to be the country's president and authorized the use of force to protect the civilian population. These three resolutions, passed without a single negative vote, clearly demonstrated the Council's determination to act on its responsibility to protect populations, including through the use of force when necessary and possible.

They signalled a new phase in the council's history, from which there could be no return.

However, although regional organizations supported the actions in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire (**see Case Study 32.2**), some member states criticized them. In particular, critics complained that NATO and the UN overstepped their Security Council mandates by contributing to the forcible change of regimes in those countries, that they used disproportionate force which increased the risks to civilian populations, and that they ignored or outright rejected opportunities for further political dialogue. Indeed, a number of countries, including Russia, India, and China, went so far as to argue that armed responses to genocide and mass atrocities should never result in regime change. Subsequently, Russia in particular argued that the action in Libya coloured its thinking on Syria, pushing it to resist Western pressure on the Assad regime on the grounds that this might open the door to regime change.

Case Study 32.2 The role of Middle Eastern governments in Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011)

Meeting of army chiefs from Arab League nations at Arab League headquarters in Cairo

© Mohamed Mahmoud / Anadolu Agency / Getty Images

Humanitarian intervention is often understood as something that only Western states undertake. This is not the case. During the cold war, states from the Global South such as India (in East Pakistan), Vietnam (in Cambodia), and Tanzania (in Uganda) intervened militarily to end mass killing. The first example of humanitarian intervention after the cold war was conducted not by the West but by a sub-regional grouping in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which intervened in Liberia in 1990. More recently, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) played a key role in the diplomacy leading up to the 2011 intervention in Libya. Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar also participated in the intervention itself by contributing military assets to the mission.

The first sign that the Middle East's regional bodies would facilitate a robust international response to the crisis in Libya came on 22 February 2011 when the LAS—an organization traditionally wedded to the principle of non-interference—suspended Libya's participation until the violence ended. However, the situation continued to deteriorate and the threat to the civilian population grew, in Benghazi in particular. On 7 March, the GCC called on the UN Security Council to 'take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya', and condemned 'crimes committed against civilians, the use of heavy arms and the recruitment of mercenaries' by the Libyan regime. The following day, the **Organization of the Islamic Conference** (OIC) echoed the GCC position when it called for a no-fly zone over Libya, although it explicitly excluded the possibility of foreign military operations on the ground. On 10 March the GCC went one step further and claimed that Gaddafi's regime had lost all legitimacy, and urged the LAS to initiate contact with the Libyan opposition's Interim Council. It was the 12 March declaration by the LAS that proved decisive, however. This called on the UN Security Council 'to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring States', and to 'cooperate and communicate with the Transitional National Council of Libya and to provide the Libyan people with urgent and continuing support as well as the necessary protection from the serious violations and grave crimes committed by the Libyan authorities, which have consequently lost their legitimacy'.

Given subsequent debates about what was meant by a 'no-fly zone' and whether NATO exceeded its mandate, it is important to stress that the LAS statement called for a no-fly zone and the establishment of safe areas to protect civilians from shelling (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 839–41). During the intervention itself, Qatar provided six strike aircraft and two strategic airlift aircraft to support the no-fly zone, and towards the end of the mission Qatari special forces assisted in land operations and provided training to opposition forces. The United Arab Emirates contributed 12 aircraft, which participated in all aspects of the operation, and Jordan provided six aircraft to fulfil non-combat support roles, including support for the delivery of humanitarian relief.

Question 1: What role did the LAS play in the 2011 Libya intervention? How significant was it?

Question 2: Does the role played by the LAS in this case point towards a broader 'regionalization' of humanitarian intervention?

However, the vigorous debate over Côte d'Ivoire and Libya has not inhibited the Security Council from referring to RtoP in other contexts, and the principle is now a common feature of the Council's response to humanitarian crises. Since the intervention, for example, the Security Council has referred to RtoP in resolutions establishing robust peacekeeping forces authorized to use force to protect civilians in the DRC, Mali, South Sudan, and Central African Republic. It also referred to RtoP in a series of resolutions on the crisis in Syria. Although the Council is deeply divided on that crisis, it has occasionally proven itself willing to break new ground. For example, in Resolution 2165 (2014) the Council authorized the delivery of humanitarian aid into Syria without the consent of the Syrian government—the first time in its history that it has acted in this way in dealing with a functioning government. This resolution also referred specifically to RtoP. Overall, evidence suggests that while geopolitical considerations continue to inhibit decisive collective action in some high-profile cases, RtoP has been associated with improved international responses to humanitarian crises in at least two senses: the Security Council is now more likely to respond to atrocity crimes than it was prior to 2005, and it is much more likely to prioritize the protection of civilians from atrocities in its responses than it was prior to 2005 (Bellamy and Luck 2018).

At the same time, there has been an attempt by some states to establish greater control by the UN Security Council over military operations authorized in its name. Brazil introduced the concept of 'responsibility while protecting'. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff proposed this concept at the September 2011 plenary of the General Assembly, and it was further developed and discussed in a note and informal dialogue at the UN in February 2012. The concept has four key elements. First, 'responsibility while protecting' calls for a renewed focus on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities and the need to employ peaceful measures at an early stage in the crisis. Second, the concept calls for new mechanisms to ensure that states which act on Security Council mandates are held accountable to the Council. Third, it calls for agreement on criteria to guide prudential decision-making on the use of force, to ensure that force is employed only when necessary. Fourth, 'responsibility while protecting' calls for a greater degree of judicious analysis about the likely consequences of various courses of action before decisions are taken about whether to use force. Many welcomed the initiative, including the UN secretary-general, as

a way of building a new consensus on the implementation of the most controversial aspects of RtoP that relate to coercion and the use of force. However, some Western governments were initially suspicious about the new concept's capacity to stymie timely and decisive responses to mass atrocities through the Security Council.

In 2014, the rise of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria brought questions of humanitarian intervention to the fore once again. At the Iraqi government's request, the US and other allies employed air power to rescue Yazidis stranded on Mount Sinjar from Islamic State forces. The mission succeeded in sustaining the population and preventing further attacks on them. According to the UN, there are credible grounds for thinking that those Yazidis who were unable to flee so-called Islamic State and were subsequently killed were the victims of a genocide. More broadly, the US, the UK, Australia, and other allies launched an air campaign in support of Iraqi government and Kurdish forces trying to roll back so-called Islamic State. This campaign succeeded in stemming their advance and contributed to the gradual reclamation of territory inside Iraq. However, so-called Islamic State remained able to operate from bases inside Syria, prompting the US to extend its operations across the border, citing not the humanitarian imperative but the principle of collective self-defence to justify its operations. This sparked debates in the UK, Australia, and elsewhere about the expansion of their air campaigns into Syria (**see Opposing Opinions 32.1**).

Western air power has not only been employed against so-called Islamic State; it has also been used against Syrian government targets as a way of punishing the Assad regime for its well-documented use of chemical weapons against its own civilians. The Security Council has been unable to act decisively because of fundamental differences between Russia and the West, but this has not stopped the US, UK, and France using force against Syrian targets. Having explicitly employed the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999, the UK once again mobilized this justification on 14 April 2018 to defend its use of force, along with the US and France, against Syria's chemical weapons facilities in response to the use of chemical weapons on 7 April in Douma. The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, stated in a Parliamentary debate on 16 April that the strikes were 'morally and legally right' to prevent 'further indiscriminate humanitarian suffering'

Opposing Opinions 32.1 The West should have intervened in Syria to protect people there from so-called Islamic State

For

There was a moral case: so-called Islamic State violated basic human rights on a massive scale. The UN assessed that so-called Islamic State may have already perpetrated genocide against the Yazidis. Under the Genocide Convention, all states have a legal responsibility to prevent genocide and to punish the perpetrators. So-called Islamic State was also responsible for widespread and systematic crimes against humanity, including the mass execution of prisoners and civilians and the mass rape and sexual enslavement of women and girls.

There was a prudential case: military action was the only realistic means of protecting populations. So-called Islamic State adheres to a violent extremist ideology which separates humanity into two clear camps and denies basic rights to the opposing camp. The use of air power to support local forces opposed to so-called Islamic State stemmed and reversed their advances in Iraq and proved pivotal in supporting the Kurdish defence of Kobane.

There was a legal case: the UN Security Council authorized the use of military force. In Resolution 2249 (2015) the UN Security Council 'called upon' states with the capacity to do so to use 'all necessary measures' on the territory controlled by so-called Islamic State to 'prevent and suppress terrorist acts'. Given that the phrase 'all necessary measures' typically refers to the use of force, this resolution can be interpreted as implied authorization for the use of force against so-called Islamic State inside Syria. No UN Security Council member has indicated that this interpretation is incorrect.

There was a self-interested case: so-called Islamic State posed a threat to distant populations through terrorism. There is mounting evidence that so-called Islamic State intended to expand terrorist attacks in Europe and the US. Foreign fighters returning from serving so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq have been responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in the West. In addition, there are signs that terrorists received training and guidance from so-called Islamic State in Syria.

Against

It would be illegal. Resolution 2249 does not reference Chapter VII of the UN Charter, concerning enforcement, nor does it specifically authorize the use of military force. While Syria consented to Russian airstrikes, it did not give explicit consent to the US and its allies.

It was imprudent. There is no evidence to suggest that airstrikes alone would succeed in defeating so-called Islamic State. Past Western interventions in the Middle East have only ever made matters worse and such intervention in Syria would be no exception.

It would prove counter-productive. Western intervention would help so-called Islamic State to cast the conflict as one in which the righteous are pitched against Western-backed infidels and apostates. Intervention would only increase the flow of foreign fighters in Syria and the risk of terrorism at home, as radicals seek revenge on states participating in attacks on so-called Islamic State.

It would result in civilian casualties. Rather than saving civilians, using air power against so-called Islamic State would only cause more civilian devastation. Thus, all the West would achieve by bombing in Syria is to compound the suffering of civilians.

1. Was it right to intervene against so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria?

2. What were the regional implications of intervention?

3. Was the intervention lawful?

For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

(House of Commons Debates 2018). A statement released by the Prime Minister's Office described President Assad's use of chemical weapons as a 'war crime' and a 'crime against humanity', and justified the UK's use of force in the following terms:

> The UK is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to alleviate

overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force is humanitarian intervention, which requires three conditions to be met:

(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief;

(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and

(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).

(Prime Minister's Office 2018)

The UK government explained that there was a serious threat, pointing to previous chemical attacks in Syria and asserted that 'it was highly likely that the regime would seek to use chemical weapons again, leading to further suffering and loss of civilian life'. It maintained that its use of force fulfilled the condition of last resort, highlighting that the efforts of the UK and its 'international partners to alleviate the humanitarian suffering caused by the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime at the UN Security Council [had] been repeatedly blocked by the regime's and its allies' disregard for international norms, including the international law prohibition on the use of chemical weapons'. It also argued that, 'since 2013, neither diplomatic action, tough sanctions, nor the US strikes against the Shayrat airbase in April 2017 have sufficiently degraded Syrian chemical weapons capability or deterred the Syrian regime from causing extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale through its persistent use of chemical weapons'. Finally, the government argued that its actions fulfilled the condition of proportionality, explaining that the intention behind the use of force was to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, that

the force it deployed was the minimum judged necessary for this purpose, and that it was 'limited, targeted and effective' (Prime Minister's Office 2018).

In a pattern of previous Western military actions not explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council, Russia condemned the action. The Russian representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, condemned the attacks as a 'flagrant disregard for international law'. He stated that the US, UK, and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, had a 'special duty to uphold the provisions of the Charter'; instead, he said, they 'lean towards neo-colonialism' and 'scorn the Charter and the Security Council, which they attempt, shamelessly, to use for their own unscrupulous purposes' (UN Security Council 2018). China and Kazakhstan also urged the UK, US, and France to adhere to the UN Charter and to the norms of international law to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means.

> ## Key Points
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> - States adopted the 'responsibility to protect' at the 2005 UN World Summit. It is commonly understood as comprising three 'pillars'.
> - The 'responsibility to protect' switches the focus from a debate about sovereignty versus human rights to a discussion about how best to protect endangered people.
> - The use of force for protection purposes continues to be highly controversial, as the 2011 intervention in Libya shows. 'Responsibility while protecting' was a concept introduced to bridge the divides on this issue.
> - The UN Security Council is increasingly invoking the 'responsibility to protect' as it responds to emergencies around the world, with varying degrees of success.

Conclusion

Globalization is advancing cosmopolitan visions of global moral interconnectedness, but this growth in cosmopolitan moral sensibilities has not yet been translated into a new international consensus on **forcible humanitarian intervention**. Western publics are increasingly sensitized to the human suffering of others, but this sense of compassion is very selective in its response to human suffering. Interventions that begin with humanitarian credentials can all too easily degenerate into 'a range of policies and activities which go beyond, or even conflict with, the label "humanitarian"' (Roberts 1993: 448). A further fundamental problem with a strategy of forcible humanitarian intervention

concerns the so-called 'body-bag' factor. Is domestic public opinion, especially in Western states, prepared to see their military personnel die for the cause of humanitarian intervention? A striking feature of all post-cold war humanitarian interventions is that no Western government has yet chosen to risk its military personnel in defence of human rights where there was a significant risk of casualties from the outset.

The 'responsibility to protect' has sought to reshape the terms of the debate between supporters and opponents of humanitarian intervention. The concept has certainly helped change the political language used to describe and debate humanitarian intervention,

and its adoption at the 2005 UN World Summit was an important milestone. Although RtoP promises to re-conceptualize how international society relates to genocide and mass atrocities, it is a long-term agenda that is unlikely to generate new political will in the near future.

Questions

1. To what extent is the use of force the defining characteristic of a humanitarian intervention?
2. How important are motives, intentions, means, and outcomes in judging the humanitarian credentials of an intervention?
3. How persuasive is the counter-restrictionist case for a legal right of humanitarian intervention?
4. Should considerations of international order always be privileged over concerns of individual justice in the society of states?
5. Is there a new norm of legitimate humanitarian intervention?
6. Was the 2003 invasion of Iraq a legitimate humanitarian intervention?
7. To what extent does the principle of the 'responsibility to protect' overcome some of the problems associated with humanitarian intervention?
8. Does the UN secretary-general's approach to implementing RtoP and practice since 2005 suggest that RtoP is likely to strengthen the protection of civilians from genocide and mass atrocities?
9. Does 'responsibility while protecting' complement or challenge RtoP?
10. To what extent is military force an effective instrument for the promotion of humanitarian values?

Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter's Multiple Choice Questions **www.oup.com/he/baylis8e**

Further Reading

Bellamy, A. J., and Luck, E. C. (2018), *Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice* (Cambridge: Polity). Assesses the evolution of RtoP and its record in practice, focusing on the domestic dimensions, atrocity prevention, and international response.

Chesterman, S. (2001), *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). An excellent analysis of the legality of humanitarian intervention that strongly supports the 'restrictionist' view.

Evans, G. (2008), *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution). A book-length defence of RtoP from one of its principal supporters.

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Glossary

9/11: refers specifically to the morning of 11 September 2001 when 19 men hijacked four domestic flights en route to California. Two planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and a third into the Pentagon in Washington, DC. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania. There were 2,974 fatalities, not including the 19 hijackers, 15 of whom were from Saudi Arabia. The planning and organization for the attack was coordinated in Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda. Approximately a month after the attack the United States and its allies launched an attack against Afghanistan.

11 September 2001: see 9/11.

Accountability: refers to the process of ensuring that there are effective mechanisms for making states comply with their human rights commitments, and that states are made responsible for failure to comply.

Agent–structure problem: the problem is how to think about the relationship between agents and structures. One view is that agents are born with already formed identities and interests and then treat other actors and the broad structure that their interactions produce as a constraint on their interests. But this suggests that actors are pre-social to the extent that there is little interest in their identities or possibility that they might change their interests through their interactions with others. Another view is to treat the structure not as a constraint but rather as constituting the actors themselves. Yet this might treat agents as cultural dupes because they are nothing more than artefacts of that structure. The proposed solution to the agent–structure problem is to try and find a way to understand how agents and structures constitute each other.

Alter-globalization: refers to movements which seek to advance alternative forms of globalization which promote global justice, as opposed to purely neoliberal economic globalization.

Analytical philosophy: concerned with the application of logical techniques to moral propositions to achieve conceptual clarity and logical precision.

Anarchic system: the 'ordering principle' of international politics according to realism, and which defines its structure as lacking any central authority.

Anarchy: a system operating in the absence of any central government. Does not imply chaos, but in realist theory the absence of political authority.

Anti-foundationalist: the argument that there are never neutral grounds for asserting what is true in any given time or space. Our theories of world define what counts as the facts, and so there is no neutral position available to determine between rival claims.

Apartheid: system of racial segregation introduced in South Africa in 1948, designed to ensure white minority domination over a black and coloured majority.

Appeasement: a policy of making concessions to a revanchist (or otherwise territorially acquisitive) state in the hope that settlement of more modest claims will assuage that state's expansionist appetites. Appeasement remains most (in)famously associated with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's acquiescence to Hitler's incursions into Austria and then Czechoslovakia, culminating in the Munich Agreement of September 1938. Since then, appeasement has generally been seen as synonymous with a craven collapse before the demands of dictators—encouraging, not disarming, their aggressive designs.

Arab Spring: the wave of street protests and demonstrations that began in Tunisia in December 2010, and then spread across the Arab world, and have led to the toppling of governments in a series of countries and to serious challenges to many other regimes.

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): a geopolitical and economic organization of several countries located in Southeast Asia. Initially formed as a display of solidarity against communism, its aims have now been redefined and broadened to include the acceleration of economic growth and the promotion of regional peace. By 2017 the ASEAN countries had a combined GDP of about $2.77 trillion.

Asian financial crisis: the severe disruption to the economies of Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia in 1997–8, starting as huge international speculation against the prevailing price of those five countries' currencies and then spreading to intense balance sheet problems for their banking sectors.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations: see ASEAN.

Austerity: the name given to the political agenda for bringing public finances back into line through concerted cuts in public spending.

Axis of evil: phrase deliberately used by George W. Bush in January 2002 to characterize Iran, North Korea, and Iraq.

Balance of power: in realist theory, refers to an equilibrium between states; historical realists regard it as the product of diplomacy (contrived balance), whereas structural realists regard the system as having a tendency towards a natural equilibrium (fortuitous balance). It is a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states.

Ballistic missile defences: technologies designed to defend a country against attacks that use ballistic missiles.

Bandung Conference: a conference held in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, by representatives of 29 African and Asian countries to encourage decolonization and promote economic and cultural cooperation. The conference is sometimes credited as having led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement of 1961.

Biopolitics: concept introduced by Foucault—it identifies two intertwined forms of power: the disciplining of the individual body and the regulation of populations.

Bond markets: the markets used by national monetary authorities to try to sell government debt in order to facilitate additional levels of public sector spending.

Bretton Woods: the regulatory system introduced at the end of the Second World War in an attempt to bring stability to those elements of the world economy under the US sphere of influence. The underlying objective of Bretton Woods was to provide sufficient policy space in domestic economies for governments to intervene in the interests of ensuring full employment.

Brexit: a portmanteau word formed from 'Britain' and 'exit', it has become the standard way of describing the act of the UK leaving the European Union.

Brezhnev doctrine: declaration by Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev in November 1968 that members of the Warsaw Pact would enjoy only 'limited sovereignty' in their political development. The idea of 'limited sovereignty' was used to justify Soviet crushing of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

BRIC or BRICS: an acronym (coined by the banking firm Goldman Sachs in 2003) for Brazil, Russia, India, and China—the rising world powers of densely populated countries that have recently come to increased prominence in international economic affairs due to their high growth rates. South Africa was later added to the acronym: BRICS.

Cairns Group: a group of 20 agriculture-exporting countries committed to bringing about further liberalization of the rules for world agricultural trade.

Capabilities: the resources that are under an actor's direct control, such as population or size of territory, natural resources, economic strength, military capability, and competence (Waltz 1979: 131).

Capacity building: providing the funds and technical training to allow developing countries to participate in global environmental governance.

Capital controls: especially associated with the Bretton Woods system, these are formal restrictions on the movement of money from one country to another in an attempt to ensure that finance retains a 'national' rather than a 'global' character.

Capitalism: a system of production in which human labour and its products are commodities that are bought and sold in the marketplace. In Marxist analysis, the capitalist mode of production involved a specific set of social relations that were particular to a specific historical period. For Marx there were three main characteristics of capitalism: (1) Everything involved in production (e.g. raw materials, machines, labour involved in the creation of commodities, and the commodities themselves) is given an exchange value, and all can be exchanged, one for the other. In essence, under capitalism everything has its price, including people's working time. (2) Everything that is needed to undertake production (i.e. the factories, and the raw materials) is owned by one class—the capitalists. (3) Workers are 'free', but in order to survive they must sell their labour to the capitalist class, and because the capitalist class own the means of production, and control the relations of production, they also control the profit that results from the labour of workers.

Citizenship: the status of having the right to participate in and to be represented in politics.

Civic nationalism: a nationalism which claims the nation is based on commitment to a common set of political values and institutions.

Civil and political rights: one of the two principal groups of internationally recognized human rights. They provide legal protections against abuse by the state and seek to ensure political participation for all citizens. Examples include equality before the law, protection against torture, and freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, and political participation. See also Economic, social, and cultural rights.

Civil society: (1) the totality of all individuals and groups in a society who are not acting as participants in any government institutions, or (2) all individuals and groups who are neither participants in government nor acting in the interests of commercial companies. The two meanings are incompatible and contested. There is also a

third meaning: the network of social institutions and practices (economic relationships, family and kinship groups, and religious and other social affiliations) which underlie strictly political institutions. For democratic theorists the voluntary character of these associations is taken to be essential to the workings of democratic politics.

Civil war: a war fought inside a sovereign state over control of the state, or for the right to secede from the state.

Class: a group of people in society who share similar characteristics. Used by Marxists in an economic sense to denote people who share the same relationship to the means of production—in capitalist society the bourgeoisie, which owns the means of production, and the proletariat, which do not own the means of production and in order to subsist must sell their labour.

Classical realism: a version of realism, grounded in the political thought of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, that accentuates the role of human nature in accounting for the struggle for power and prestige among independent political communities.

Coexistence: the doctrine of 'live and let live' between political communities or states.

Cold war: extended worldwide conflict between communism and capitalism that is normally taken to have begun in 1947 and concluded in 1989 with the collapse of Soviet power in Europe.

Collaboration: a form of cooperation requiring parties not to defect from a mutually desirable strategy in order to pursue an individually preferable strategy.

Collective action: actors rationally choose to cooperate to maximize their interests, which maximizes all participants' gains compared with individual action.

Collective security: refers to an arrangement where 'each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression' (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 30). It is also the foundational principle of the League of Nations: namely, that member states would take a threat or attack on one member as an assault on them all (and on international norms more generally). The League would accordingly respond in unison to such violations of international law. Appreciating that such concerted action would ensue, putative violators—the League's framers hoped—would be duly deterred from launching aggressive strikes in the first place. As the 1920s and 1930s showed, however, theory and practice diverged wildly, with League members failing to take concerted action against Japanese imperialism in Asia, or German and Italian expansionism in Europe and Africa.

Colonialism: a system of external rule and settlement in a territorial space.

Coloniality: see Modernity/coloniality.

Combating terrorism: consists of anti-terrorism efforts (measures to protect against or mitigate future terrorist attacks) and counter-terrorism efforts (proactive actions designed to retaliate against or forestall terrorist actions).

Commission on Human Rights: the precursor to the United Nations Human Rights Council, it was responsible for monitoring compliance by State Parties to their human rights commitments.

Common humanity: we all have human rights by virtue of our common humanity, and these rights generate correlative moral duties for individuals and states.

Community: a human association in which members share common symbols and wish to cooperate to realize common objectives.

Comparative advantage: an economic theory that goes all the way back to David Ricardo in the early nineteenth century, which suggests that all countries stand to benefit by specializing in production and then trading their surplus stocks with one another.

Compliance: if a state is in compliance, it is living up to its obligations under a treaty. Many multilateral environmental agreements have some form of monitoring and compliance procedures to help ensure that this happens.

Concert: the directorial role played by a number of great powers, based on norms of mutual consent.

Concert of Europe: an informal process of consultation to negotiate disputes among European powers, lasting from 1815 to 1914.

Conditionalities: policy requirements imposed by the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank—usually with a distinctively neoliberal character—in return for the disbursement of loans. They are politically controversial in so far as they often nullify domestic electoral mandates.

Congress of Vienna: an agreement in 1815 among the great powers to meet at regular high-level political conferences to prevent conflict in times of peace.

Consequentialist: the idea that the likely consequences of an action should guide decisions. In international ethics, realism and utilitarianism are the most prominent consequentialist ethics.

Constitutive rules: in contrast to regulative rules, which are rules that regulate already existing activities and thus shape the rules of the game, constitutive rules define the game and its activities, shape the identity and

interests of actors, and help define what counts as legitimate action.

Constitutive theory: a theory that assumes that our concepts and theories of the social world help to construct the social world and what we see as the external world. Thus the very concepts we use to think about the world help to make that world what it is. Constitutive theories assume mutually constitutive rather than causal relations among main 'variables'.

Constructivism: an approach to international politics that concerns itself with the centrality of ideas and human consciousness and stresses a holistic and idealist view of structures. As constructivists have examined world politics they have been broadly interested in how the structure constructs the actors' identities and interests, how their interactions are organized and constrained by that structure, and how their very interaction serves to either reproduce or transform that structure.

Containment: American political strategy for resisting perceived Soviet expansion, first publicly espoused by an American diplomat, George Kennan, in 1947. Containment became a powerful factor in American policy towards the Soviet Union for the next 40 years, and a self-image of Western policy-makers.

Continental philosophy: a broad variety of approaches to philosophy that reject the methods of analytical philosophy. Continental philosophers generally reject scientism in favour of hermeneutics and historicism.

Convention: a type of general treaty between states, often the result of an international conference. A framework convention sets out goals, organizations, scientific research, and review procedures with a view to developing future action to establish and solve environmental problems—in terms of a 'framework convention–adjustable protocol' model.

Cooperation: approach required in any situation where parties must act together in order to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome.

Coordination: a form of cooperation requiring parties to pursue a common strategy in order to avoid the mutually undesirable outcome arising from the pursuit of divergent strategies.

COP: Conference of the Parties to a convention, usually held annually.

Cosmologies: ways of looking at and understanding the world.

Cosmopolitanism: denoting identification with a community, culture, or idea that transcends borders or particular societies, and implies freedom from local or national conventions/limitations. In the early twenty-first century, the dominant cosmopolitanism was that of globalizing capitalism, which promoted a community and culture that was informed by market economics, a concept of universal human rights, and a relatively liberal social culture. The cosmopolitanism of globalizing capitalism fostered a degree of multiculturalism, although it sought to reconcile particular cultures to a common ground of universal political and economic principles. The cosmopolitan model of democracy conceives of a condition in which international organizations, transnational corporations, global markets, and so forth are accountable to the peoples of the world. Associated with David Held, Daniele Archibugi, Mary Kaldor, and others, a cosmopolitan model of democracy requires the following: the creation of regional parliaments and the extension of the authority of such regional bodies (such as the European Union) which are already in existence; human rights conventions that are entrenched in national parliaments and monitored by a new International Court of Human Rights; the replacing of the UN with a genuinely democratic and accountable global parliament.

Counterforce strategy: type of nuclear strategy that targets an adversary's military and nuclear capabilities. Distinct from a countervalue strategy.

Counter-proliferation: term used to describe a variety of efforts to obstruct, slow, or roll back nuclear weapons programmes and nuclear proliferation.

Counter-restrictionist: international lawyers who argue that there is a legal right of humanitarian intervention in both UN Charter law and customary international law.

Countervalue strategy: type of nuclear strategy that threatens assets that are valuable to an adversary, such as cities with industrial assets and large populations. Distinct from a counterforce strategy.

Credit rating agencies: three private sector companies headquartered in New York—Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch's—who publish credit ratings for any firm or government seeking to sell debt on world bond markets in an attempt to enhance their access to ready cash.

Critical theory: attempts to challenge the prevailing order by seeking out, analysing, and, where possible, assisting social processes that can potentially lead to emancipatory change.

Culture: the sum of the norms, practices, traditions, and genres produced by a community, including the beliefs and practices that characterize social life and indicate how society should be run. Cultures may be

constructed in village or city locations, or across family, clan, ethnic, national, religious, and other networks.

Currency markets: otherwise known as, and perhaps strictly speaking more accurately called, foreign exchange markets. They are purely private sector arrangements for buying and selling currencies, with no public sector oversight of the price at which trades are made or the amount of money that is used to make particular trades.

Decision-making procedures: these identify specific prescriptions for behaviour, the system of voting, for example, which will regularly change as a regime is consolidated and extended. The rules and procedures governing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for example, underwent substantial modification during its history. Indeed, the purpose of the successive conferences was to change the rules and decision-making procedures (Krasner 1985: 4–5).

Decolonial: an approach to the study of International Relations that is closely related to the postcolonial approach, but which places greater emphasis on retrieving indigenous epistemologies and cosmologies with which to think about relations among humans, and often non-humans. This approach has been principally cultivated by Latin American thinkers.

Decolonization: processes by which colonies become independent of colonial powers and sovereign as states in their own right.

Deconstruction: holds that language is constituted by dichotomies, that one side in a dichotomy is superior to the other, and that we should destabilize the hierarchy between inferior and superior terms.

Democracy: a system of government in which the views and interests of the population are represented and promoted through the mechanism of free and fair elections to the political institutions of governance.

Democratic peace: a central plank of liberal internationalist thought, the democratic peace thesis makes two claims: first, that liberal polities exhibit restraint in their relations with other liberal polities (the so-called separate peace), and second, that they are imprudent in relations with authoritarian states. The validity of the democratic peace thesis has been fiercely debated in the IR literature.

Denationalization: highlights the fact that national borders are of declining relative significance to the organization of contemporary social, economic, cultural, and political affairs.

Deontological: deontological theories are concerned with the nature of human duty or obligation. They prioritize questions of the 'right' over those of the good. They focus on rules that are always right for everyone to follow, in contrast to rules that might produce a good outcome for an individual or for their society.

Dependency theory: a theory explaining why poor countries stay poor in the global economy based on its structure.

Derivatives contracts: often exceedingly complex, mathematically-oriented financial instruments used only by professional investors, either to insure themselves against adverse future price movements or, more likely, to place a potentially lucrative bet on advantageous future price movements.

Détente: relaxation of tension, for example between East and West; Soviet–American détente lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1980s and was characterized by negotiations and nuclear arms control agreements.

Deterritorialization: a process in which the organization of social activities is increasingly less constrained by geographical proximity and national territorial boundaries. It is accelerated by the technological revolution, and refers to the diminution of influence of territorial places, distances, and boundaries over the way people collectively identify themselves or seek political recognition. This permits an expansion of global civil society but equally an expansion of global criminal or terrorist networks.

Diaspora: movement around the world of people who identify themselves racially or through a common ethnic group or history.

Diffusion: concerns how ideas, beliefs, habits, and practices spread across a population.

Diplomacy: in foreign policy, a policy instrument, used possibly in association with other instruments such as economic or military force, to enable an international actor to achieve its policy objectives. Diplomacy in world politics refers to a communications process between international actors that seeks through negotiation to resolve conflict short of war. This process has been refined, institutionalized, and professionalized over many centuries.

Discourse: a linguistic system that orders statements and concepts. Poststructuralists oppose the distinction between materialism's factors and ideas and see the meaning of materiality as constituted through discourse.

Discourse analysis: a social-scientific method for examining the meaning of texts.

Dissident sexualities: forms of human sexuality and sexual expression that the state or society view as deviant and seek to repress.

Double burden: when women enter the public workforce working for wages, they usually remain responsible for most of the reproductive and caring labour in the private sphere, thus carrying a double workload.

Dual moral standard: in realist theory, the idea that there are two principles or standards of right and wrong: one for the individual citizen and a different one for the state.

Dual-use technology: technology that is normally used for civilian purposes, but which may also have a military application. As it refers to nuclear technology, it means technology or material that can be used to generate energy or to make a nuclear weapon.

Dysfunctional: describes an action that undermines a stated goal, for example the goal of an international organization.

Ecological footprint: used to demonstrate the load placed on the earth's carrying capacity by individuals or nations. This is done by estimating the area of productive land or aqua-system required to sustain a population at its specified standard of living.

Economic, social, and cultural rights: one of the two principal groups of internationally recognized human rights. They guarantee individuals access to essential goods and services and seek to ensure equal social and cultural participation. Examples include rights to food, housing, health care, education, and social insurance. See also Civil and political rights.

Emanation: when international organizations are created by other international organizations rather than through an international treaty composed, signed, and ratified by states.

Emancipation: the achievement of equal political, economic, and social rights.

Embedded liberalism: a term attributed to John Ruggie that refers to market processes and corporate activities backed by a web of social and political constraints and rewards to create a compromise between free trade globally and welfare at home.

Empire: a political entity incorporating multiple, differentiated political units into a hierarchical structure of governance, e.g. the Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire.

English School: academic writers who seek to develop the argument that states in interaction with each other constitute an international society.

Enlightenment: associated with rationalist thinkers of the eighteenth century. Key ideas (which some would argue remain mottoes for our age) include secularism, progress, reason, science, knowledge, and freedom. The motto of the Enlightenment is: 'Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding' (Kant 1991: 54).

Enrichment: in nuclear technology, a process that separates the non-fissile isotope Uranium-238 from the fissile U-235. Enrichment increases the amount of U-235 beyond what is found in nature so that the material can be used for nuclear energy or nuclear weapons.

Epiphenomenal: a by-product or secondary effect of some other primary cause.

Epistemic community: knowledge-based transnational communities of experts and policy activists.

Epistemology: the assumptions we make about how we can know something.

Essentialism: the idea that certain behaviours or traits are hard-wired, usually biologically, rather than malleable.

Ethic of responsibility: for historical realists, the limits of ethics in international politics; it involves the weighing up of consequences and the realization that positive outcomes may result from amoral actions.

Ethnic nationalism: a nationalism which claims that the nation is based on common descent; this descent may be indicated through such characteristics as language, history, way of life, or physical appearance.

Eurocentrism: a perspective that takes Europe and European values and ideas as central to world history and that focuses on Europe to the exclusion of the rest of the world.

Europe: a geographical expression that during the course of the cold war came to be identified with Western Europe, but since 1989 has once again come to be associated with the whole of the European continent.

European Union (EU): the EU was formally created in 1992 following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. However, the origins of the EU can be traced back to 1951 and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, followed in 1957 with a broader customs union (the Treaty of Rome, 1958). Originally a grouping of six countries in 1957, 'Europe' grew by adding new members in 1973, 1981, and 1986. Since the fall of the planned economies in Eastern Europe in 1989, the EU has grown further and at this time of writing comprises 27 member states.

Eurozone debt crisis: the name given to the increasing difficulty experienced from 2010 onwards by a number of members of the euro currency bloc when trying to defend their fiscal position in the face of historically high and escalating debt servicing charges. The worst-affected countries to date have been Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and Greece. In very shorthand form,

the crisis can be thought of as bond markets telling governments to keep a tighter rein on their public spending.

Existential deterrence: the belief that possession of a single nuclear warhead is sufficient to deter an adversary from attacking.

Explanatory theories: theories that see the social world as something external to our theories of the social world. On this view, the task of theory is to report on a world that exists independently of the observer and his or her theoretical position. Explanatory theories assume causal relations among main variables.

Extended deterrence: using the threat of nuclear response to deter an attack on one's allies (rather than on oneself).

Failed state: a state that has collapsed and cannot provide for its citizens without substantial external support, and where the government of the state has ceased to exist inside the territorial borders of the state.

Feminism: a political project to understand, so as to change, women's inequality or oppression. For some, this is the aim to move beyond gender, so that it no longer matters; for others, it is to validate women's interests, experiences, and choices; for others, it is to work for more equal and inclusive social relations overall.

Feminized labour: work that is in large part done by women, and which is associated by social convention with the feminine.

Flexible labour: refers to workers who lack job security, benefits, or the right to unionize. It gives companies more flexibility in hiring and firing their workforce.

Forcible humanitarian intervention: military intervention which breaches the principle of state sovereignty where the primary purpose is to alleviate the human suffering of some or all within a state's borders.

Foreign direct investment: the act of preparing money through economic operations in one country for the purpose of making a new investment in another country. This practice of outsourcing production takes place when costs can be lowered in some way by moving at least part of the production process away from the country in which the firm is headquartered.

Foundationalist: the assumption that all truth claims (about some feature of the world) can be judged objectively true or false.

Fourteen Points: US President Woodrow Wilson's vision of international society, first articulated in January 1918; it included the principle of self-determination, the conduct of diplomacy on an open—not secret—basis, and the establishment of an association of nations to provide guarantees of independence and territorial integrity. Wilson's ideas exerted an important influence on the Paris Peace Conference, though the principle of self-determination was only selectively pursued when it came to American colonial interests.

Frankfurt School: group of theorists associated with the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt. Working together from the 1920s and 1930s, they addressed questions relating to culture, bureaucracy, authoritarianism, family structure, reason and rationality, and theories of knowledge.

Free lunch: in economics this is a situation in which a given expenditure does not require the diversion of money from other projects; however, economists are fond of saying that there is no such thing as a free lunch.

Funds and programmes: activities of the UN which are subject to the supervision of the General Assembly and which depend on voluntary funding by states and other donors.

Futures market: a financial market on which investors can place bets on future asset price movements by agreeing to either buy or sell an asset at a specified price on a specified date.

G20 (Group of 20): established in 1999 as a forum in which major advanced and emerging economies discuss global financial and economic matters. Since its inception, it has held annual meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors, and more recently summits of heads of state. Following the first G20 leaders' summit in 2008, G20 leaders' summits were held twice per year in 2009–10, and since have been held annually.

G7 (Group of Seven): established in 1975 as the G5 (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US); subsequently expanded as the G7 to include Canada and Italy, and from 1998–2014 called the G8 to include the Russian Federation; and since 2014 again called the G7 following Russia's suspension and, eventually, permanent departure. The G7 conducts semi-formal collaboration on world economic problems. Government leaders meet in annual G7 summits, while finance ministers and/or their leading officials periodically hold other consultations.

G77 (Group of 77): established in 1964 by a group of 77 developing countries in the United Nations. Still in existence, the G77 aims to promote collective economic interests, mutual cooperation for development, and negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues in the United Nations system.

G8 (Group of Eight): see G7 (Group of Seven).

GATT: see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Gender: what it means to be male or female in a particular place or time; the social construction of sexual difference.

Gender essentialism: the assumption of the sameness of all women's experiences by virtue of being female, or men's by virtue of being male.

Gender mainstreaming: the process of considering the impact of gender across all the policies or activities of an organization. It is different from gender balancing, which is what happens when an organization tries to achieve greater equality between men and women in jobs, pay, and influence.

Gender relations: power relations involving the relational constructions of masculinity and femininity, in which the masculine is usually privileged but which are contested and changing.

Gendered division of labour: the notion of 'women's work', which everywhere includes women's primary responsibility for childcare and housework, and which designates many public and paid forms of work as 'women's' or 'men's' too. See also Sexual division of labour.

Genderqueer: gender identities that reject the binary of male and female.

Genealogy: a history of the present that asks what past political practices have formed the present and which alternative understandings and discourses have been marginalized and forgotten.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): the interim measure on tariffs and trade introduced in 1947 before a permanent institution was established in the form of the World Trade Organization in 1995. It provided a context, over a number of negotiating rounds, for countries to try to extend bilateral agreements for reducing tariff barriers to trade to multiple third countries.

Genocide: acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted in 1948.

Geopolitics: suggests that geographical position is a key determinant of the policies a state pursues, especially in relation to its security and strategy, both at global and regional levels.

Glasnost: policy of greater openness pursued by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985, involving greater toleration of internal dissent and criticism.

Global community: a way to organize governance, authority, and identity that breaks with the sovereign state.

Global egalitarianism: the argument that justice requires a globally equal distribution of the burdens and benefits of cooperation. It argues that all individuals, no matter where they are in the world, are entitled to the same human rights and to their equal share of global wealth.

Global environmental governance: usually refers to the corpus of international environmental agreements and organizations, but sometimes has a more specialized meaning that stresses governance by private bodies and NGOs.

Global financial crisis: refers to the increasingly pervasive sense that the whole of the North Atlantic financial system stood in imminent danger of collapse as one bank after another reported irrecoverable losses on failed investments in mortgage-backed securities in 2007 and 2008.

Global governance: the loose framework of global regulation, both institutional and normative, that constrains conduct. It has many elements: international organizations and law; transnational organizations and frameworks; elements of global civil society; and shared normative principles.

Global North: a shorthand term for the wealthy and 'developed' countries, usually used to refer to north America and Western Europe; used increasingly in place of 'First World'.

Global politics: the politics of global social relations in which the pursuit of power, interests, order, and justice transcends regions and continents.

Global responsibility: the idea that states, international institutions, and corporations should take responsibility for issues that do not fall under the rubric of the national interest.

Global South: a shorthand for referring to 'less developed' countries, usually meaning those in Africa, Latin America, and Asia; used increasingly in place of 'Third World'.

Globalism: a growing collective awareness or consciousness of the world as a shared social space. Conceptually, an ideology or set of beliefs, values, and normative prescriptions concerning the ideal global order. There are many different visions of globalism, from neoliberal globalism (global free market capitalism) to justice globalism (including human rights and justice for indigenous peoples) to religious globalism. Politically, in recent years globalism has become a derogatory term frequently used by populist movements referring to an imputed ideology and project of global elites to rule through global institutions, overriding national interests and the will of the people.

Globalization: a historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents. It is also something of a catch-all phrase often used to describe a single world economy after the collapse of communism, though it is sometimes employed to define the growing integration of the international capitalist system in the post-war period.

Gold Standard: the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century system through which all trading relationships were regulated through the movement of gold from importing countries to exporting countries. In theory this was supposed to lead to automatic adjustment in imports and exports, necessarily keeping all countries in trade balance; in practice it did not work this way.

Golden age of welfare capitalism: the period from the end of the Second World War to the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement when Western countries posted high growth rates, low unemployment rates, low inflation rates, and built up extensive domestic welfare systems.

Government: used narrowly to refer to the executive governing a country, or more widely to cover the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the civil service, the armed forces, and the police.

Gravity models: economists' models designed to show how important distance is to patterns of international trade, with countries that are geographically closer to one another repeatedly showing deeper import/export penetration than countries that are further apart.

Great Depression: a byword for the global economic collapse that ensued following the US Wall Street stock-market crash in October 1929. Economic shockwaves rippled around the world and the events of October 1929 were soon felt in countries as distant as Brazil and Japan. The longest, deepest, most widespread, and most painful economic depression of the twentieth century, it is synonymous with the economic conditions of the 1930s.

Great Recession: the popular name given to the significant downturn in world economic output, production, trade, and employment following the global financial crisis which began in earnest in 2007.

Gross domestic product (GDP): the monetary value of all goods produced in a country's economy in a year.

Group rights: rights that are said to belong to groups such as minority nations or indigenous peoples rather than to individuals.

Hague Convention or Hague System: two international peace conferences in 1899 and 1907 that extended the European Concert system to all sovereign states and enacted new bureaucratic methods for conference diplomacy, including arbitration procedures for conflict resolution.

Harmony of interests: common among nineteenth-century liberals was the idea of a natural order between peoples which had been corrupted by undemocratic state leaders and outdated policies such as the balance of power. If these distortions could be swept away, they believed, we would find that there were no real conflicts between peoples.

Havana Tricontinental Conference: held in 1966 in Havana, Cuba, as a follow-up meeting to the 1955 Bandung Conference. Five hundred delegates from independent and decolonizing states of Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa attended. The conference produced more radical proposals for achieving decolonization and non-aligned power, such as armed struggle.

Hegemony: a system regulated by a dominant leader, or political (and/or economic) domination of a region, usually by a superpower. In realist theory, it refers to the influence a great power is able to establish over other states in the system, ranging from leadership to dominance. It also refers to the power and control exercised by a leading state over other states.

Heteronormativity: the implicit or explicit privileging of heterosexuality as the 'normal' or 'correct' framework for human behaviour.

High politics: the themes highest on the foreign policy agenda, usually assumed by realists to be those of war, security, and military threats and capabilities.

Holism: the view that structures cannot be decomposed to the individual units and their interactions because structures are more than the sum of their parts and are irreducibly social. The effects of structures, moreover, go beyond merely constraining the actors but also construct them. Constructivism holds that the international structure shapes the identities and interests of the actors.

Holocaust: the term used to describe the attempts by the Nazis to murder the Jewish population of Europe. Some 6 million Jewish people were killed, along with a further million, including Soviet prisoners, gypsies, Poles, communists, gay people, and physically or mentally disabled people. The term is also used to describe an obliteration of humanity or an entire group of people.

Homonationalism: the claim that LGBTQI politics (particularly in the post-9/11 West) is increasingly linked with, or subsumed under, nationalism or patriotism. Usually carries the connotation that progress on gay rights is used as an ideological justification for war or intervention.

Horizontal proliferation: an increase in the number of actors who possess nuclear weapons.

Human rights: moral principles and values that are assumed to be common and universal, to which all societies aspire.

Human security: the security of people, including their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity, and the protection of their human rights.

Humanitarian intervention: the principle that the international community has a right and/or duty to intervene in states which have suffered large-scale loss of life or genocide, whether due to deliberate action by its governments or because of the collapse of governance.

Hybrid international organization: an international organization in which both private transnational actors (NGOs, parties, or companies) and governments or governmental agencies are admitted as members, with each having full rights of participation in policy-making, including the right to vote on the final decisions. They are called hybrids to contrast with the common assumption that only intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) exist. In diplomatic practice they are usually included among the INGOs and so they have sometimes been called hybrid INGOs.

Hyper-masculinity: a version of masculinity that accentuates certain stereotypical features, such as physical strength, aggression, heterosexuality, and dominance.

Idealism: holds that ideas have important causal effects on events in international politics, and that ideas can change. Referred to by realists as utopianism since it underestimates the logic of power politics and the constraints this imposes on political action. Idealism as a substantive theory of international relations is generally associated with the claim that it is possible to create a world of peace. But idealism as a social theory refers to the claim that the most fundamental feature of society is social consciousness. Ideas shape how we see ourselves and our interests, the knowledge that we use to categorize and understand the world, the beliefs we have of others, and the possible and impossible solutions to challenges and threats. The emphasis on ideas does not mean a neglect of material forces such as technology and geography. Instead it is to suggest that the meanings and consequences of these material forces are not given by nature but rather driven by human interpretations and understandings. Idealists seek to apply liberal thinking in domestic politics to international relations: in other words, to institutionalize the rule of law. This reasoning is known as the domestic analogy. According to idealists in the early twentieth century, there were two principal requirements for a new world order. First: state leaders, intellectuals, and public opinion had to believe that progress was possible. Second: an international organization had to be created to facilitate peaceful change, disarmament, arbitration, and (where necessary) enforcement. The League of Nations was founded in 1920 but its collective security system failed to prevent the descent into world war in the 1930s.

Identity: the understanding of the self in relationship to an 'other'. Identities are social and thus are always formed in relationship to others. Constructivists generally hold that identities shape interests; we cannot know what we want unless we know who we are. But because identities are social and are produced through interactions, identities can change.

IMF: see International Monetary Fund.

Imperialism: the practice of foreign conquest and rule in the context of global relations of hierarchy and subordination. It can lead to the establishment of an empire.

Indigenous: meaning coming from a particular territory; often contrasted with colonial.

Individualism: the moral and political philosophy, namely liberalism, that centres and believes in the primary importance of the individual. The view that structures can be reduced to the aggregation of individuals and their interactions. International relations theories that ascribe to individualism begin with some assumption of the nature of the units and their interests, usually states and the pursuit of power or wealth, and then examine how the broad structure, usually the distribution of power, constrains how states can act and generates certain patterns in international politics. Individualism stands in contrast to holism.

Institutional isomorphism: observes that actors and organizations that share the same environment will, over time, begin to resemble each other in their attributes and characteristics.

Institutionalization: the degree to which networks or patterns of social interaction are formally constituted as organizations with specific purposes.

Institutions: persistent entities having connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain

activity, and shape the expectations of actors. Institutions may include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements, and informal practices that states accept as binding. The balance of power in the international system is an example of an institution. (Adapted from Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993: 4–5.)

Integration: in a regional or international context, a process of ever closer union between states. The process often begins with cooperation to solve technical problems, referred to by Mitrany (1943) as ramification.

Intellectual property: creations of the human imagination, typically protected under the law using systems of patents, copyrights, and trade marks.

Intellectual property rights: rules that protect the owners of content through copyright, patents, trade marks, and trade secrets.

Interconnectedness: the interweaving of human lives so that events in one region of the world have an impact on all or most other people.

Interdependence: a condition where states (or peoples) are affected by decisions taken by others; for example, a decision to raise interest rates in the US automatically exerts upward pressure on interest rates in other states. Interdependence can be symmetric, i.e. both sets of actors are affected equally, or it can be asymmetric, where the impact varies between actors. A condition where the actions of one state impact on other states (can be strategic interdependence or economic). Realists equate interdependence with vulnerability.

Intergovernmental organization (IGO): an international organization in which full legal membership is officially solely open to states and the decision-making authority lies with representatives from governments.

International community: term used by politicians, the media, and non-governmental actors to refer to the states that make up the world, often in the attempt to make the most powerful ones respond to a problem, war, or crisis.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: the United Nations covenant setting out the minimum civil and political rights that individuals are entitled to. These are referred to as individual rights.

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: the United Nations covenant setting out the minimum economic social and cultural rights that people are entitled to. These are referred to as collective rights.

International Criminal Court: an institution based in the Hague, Netherlands and empowered with trying individuals who are accused of committing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

International hierarchy: a structure of authority in which states and other international actors are ranked according to their relative power.

International institutions: organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization that have become necessary to manage regional or global economic, political, and environmental matters. See International organization.

International law: the formal rules of conduct that states acknowledge or contract between themselves.

International Monetary Fund (IMF): an institution of 189 members as of late 2018, providing extensive technical assistance and short-term flows of stabilization finance to any of its members experiencing temporarily distressed public finances, while also monitoring all countries to see whether pre-emptive 'corrective' measures are considered necessary.

International NGO (non-governmental organization) or INGO: an international organization in which membership is open to transnational actors. There are many different types, with membership from 'national' NGOs, local NGOs, companies, political parties, or individual people. A few have other INGOs as members and some have mixed membership structures.

International order: regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent.

International organization: any institution with formal procedures and formal membership from three or more countries. The minimum number of countries is set at three rather than two, because multilateral relationships have significantly greater complexity than bilateral relationships. There are three types of international organization: see Intergovernmental organization, International NGO, and Hybrid international organization.

International regime: defined by Krasner (1983: 2) as a set of 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. The concept was developed by neorealists to analyse the paradox—for them—that international cooperation occurs in some issue-areas, despite the struggle for power between states. They assume that regimes are created and maintained by a dominant state and/or that participation in a regime is the result of a rational cost–benefit calculation by each state. In contrast, pluralists would also stress the independent

impact of institutions, the importance of leadership, the involvement of transnational NGOs and companies, and processes of cognitive change, such as growing concern about human rights or the environment.

International society: the concept used to describe a group of sovereign states that recognize, maintain, and develop common norms, rules, and practices that enable them to coexist and cooperate.

International system: a set of interrelated parts connected to form a whole. In realist theory, systems have defining principles such as hierarchy (in domestic politics) and anarchy (in international politics).

International Trade Organization (ITO): the one notable failure of the Bretton Woods Conference, with the Truman administration in the US refusing to endorse the proposals to establish a multilateral institution to govern trade relations within the Western alliance.

International war: a war fought between two or more sovereign states.

Internationalization: this term is used to denote high levels of international interaction and interdependence, most commonly with regard to the world economy. The term is often used to distinguish this condition from globalization, as the latter implies that there are no longer distinct national economies in a position to interact.

Intersectionality: the coming together of multiple oppressions (on the basis of race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, and more) and the claim that these must be understood in their combination, rather than according to one dominant oppression (for example, reducing the understanding of all harm to a single understanding of gender).

Intertextuality: holds that texts form an 'intertext', so that all texts refer to other texts, but each text is at the same time unique. Shows that meaning changes as texts are quoted by other texts. Calls attention to silences and taken-for-granted assumptions.

Intervention: when there is direct involvement within a state by an outside actor to achieve an outcome preferred by the intervening agency without the consent of the host state.

Issue: a set of political questions that are seen as being related, because they all invoke the same value conflicts, e.g. the issue of human rights concerns questions that invoke freedom versus order.

Jihad: in Arabic, 'jihad' simply means struggle. 'Jihad' can refer to a purely internal struggle to be a better Muslim, a struggle to make society more closely align with the teachings of the Koran, or a call to arms to wage war in self-defence of an Islamic community under

attack. Moreover, in the last of these meanings there are various interpretations of what constitutes 'attack' and 'community', and which methods can be used morally and spiritually for self-defence.

Justice: fair or morally defensible treatment for individuals, in the light of human rights standards or standards of economic or social well-being.

Kantian: connected with the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant and especially with his work *Perpetual Peace*.

Keynesian economic theory: named after the English economist John Maynard Keynes, who advised governments in the 1930s to use public spending to aim for full employment.

Latent nuclear capacity: the situation of a country that possesses all the necessary capabilities to construct a nuclear weapon but that has not done so.

Law of nations: literal translation of the ancient Roman term '*jus gentium*'. Although today used interchangeably with the term 'international law', or law between nations, its original meaning referred to underlying legal principles common to all nations. This gave it a strongly normative character, which was enhanced when, in the Middle Ages, it came to be closely linked to the ancient Greek concept of natural law. Although it retained something of this earlier meaning in Vattel's influential eighteenth-century work, *The Law of Nations*, the strong emphasis on state sovereignty in Vattel's work may be seen as marking a shift towards the more modern understanding of law between sovereign states.

Legitimacy: the acceptability of an institution, rule, or political order, either because it has come into being according to some lawful or right process; or because it provides valuable functional benefits; or because it has some innate moral quality; or because it embodies some superior knowledge or technical expertise.

LGBTQI: an acronym for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer (sometimes 'Questioning'), and Intersex; sometimes given as LGBT or LGBTQ.

Liberal internationalism: a set of beliefs about the world that emphasize the gradual process of integration and unification of states and peoples that has occurred over many centuries; through this process, a shared sense of identity and belonging have developed such that we can meaningfully talk about the rights and responsibilities that exist as a result of internationalism.

Liberalism: according to Doyle (1997: 207), liberalism includes the following four claims. First, all citizens are juridically equal and have equal rights to education, access to a free press, and religious toleration. Second,

the legislative assembly of the state possesses only the authority invested in it by the people, whose basic rights it is not permitted to abuse. Third, a key dimension of the liberty of the individual is the right to own property including productive forces. Fourth, liberalism contends that the most effective system of economic exchange is one that is largely market-driven and not subordinate to bureaucratic regulation and control, either domestically or internationally.

Liberalization: describes government policies which reduce the role of the state in the economy such as through the dismantling of trade tariffs and barriers, the deregulation and opening of the financial sector to foreign investors, and the privatization of state enterprises.

Liberation theology: a philosophy from South America bringing together Christianity and Marxism in the search for social justice.

Life cycle of norms: a concept created by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink to distinguish the different stages of norm evolution—from emergency to cascade to internalization.

Limited war: a war fought for stakes less than the political independence or continued existence of the parties to the conflict.

Logic of appropriateness: attributes action to whether it is viewed as legitimate and the right thing to do, irrespective of the costs and benefits.

Logic of consequences: attributes action to the anticipated benefits and costs, mindful that other actors are doing the very same thing.

Loyalty: an emotional disposition in which people give institutions (or each other) some degree of unconditional support.

Macroeconomic: relating to the economic system as a whole, and therefore usually the object of a government's economic policy.

Market self-regulation: a system in which financial institutions are allowed to regulate themselves solely on the basis of price signals emerging from markets. Those that interpret price signals successfully will make profits and stay in business; those that interpret them poorly will lose money and be forced into bankruptcy.

Marshall Plan: an American programme (formally known as the European Recovery Program) that was introduced by US Secretary of State George Marshall to aid nearly all Western European countries and to prevent the spread of international communist movements. From 1948 to mid-1952 more than $13 billion was distributed in the form of direct aid, loan guarantees, grants, and necessities from medicine to mules.

Marxism: the view that the most fundamental feature of society is the organization of material forces. Material forces include natural resources, geography, military power, and technology. The concept of class conflict is central to Marxist ideas of politics and history. To understand how the world works requires taking material forces and class conflict into account. For International Relations scholars, this leads to forms of technological determinism or analysis of distributions of military power for understanding the state's foreign policy and patterns of international politics.

Materialism: the view that material forces, including technology, are the bedrock of society. For IR scholars, this leads to technological determinism or emphasis on the distribution of military power for understanding a state's foreign policy and patterns of international politics.

Meanings: takes us beyond the description of an object, event, or place and inquires into the significance it has for observers.

Means (or forces) of production: in Marxist theory, these are the elements that combine in the production process. They include labour as well as the tools and technology available during any given historical period.

Militarism: the extension of norms and beliefs associated with the military to other parts of society.

Millennium Development Goals: target-based, time-limited commitments in the UN Millennium Declaration 2000 to improve eight areas: poverty and hunger, primary education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, tackling diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, environmental sustainability, and partnership working.

Miscegenation: an antiquated term for the mixing of different 'racial' groups through marriage, sexual relationships, or reproduction.

Modernity/coloniality: to describe the structure of modernity which is underpinned by hierarchical relations between the West and its 'Others'.

Mortgage-backed securities: mortgage securitization is a process through which financial institutions can take mortgage debt off their balance sheets by selling contracts to other financial institutions based on claims to future household mortgage repayments. These contracts were traded as securities on global financial markets in the early and mid-2000s without any obvious form of public oversight of how much banks were prepared to get themselves in debt by buying them.

Multilateral Agreement on Investment: a failed attempt by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development in the 1990s to legislate for standardized, but often lowest common denominator, rules for regulating international investment.

Multilateralism: the tendency for functional aspects of international relations (such as security, trade, or environmental management) to be organized around large numbers of states, or universally, rather than by unilateral state action.

Multinational corporations (MNCs):   companies that have operations in more than one country. They will have their headquarters in just one country (the 'home' country) but will either manage production or deliver services in other countries ('host' countries). Multinational corporations will outsource elements of their production where overseas locations give them some sort of economic advantage that they cannot secure at home: this might be a labour cost advantage, a tax advantage, an environmental standards advantage, etc. The term is also used of a company that has affiliates in a foreign country. These may be branches of the parent company, separately incorporated subsidiaries, or associates with large minority shareholdings.

Multiplex order: a world shaped by multiple but highly interdependent actors—not just the great powers (as in a multipolar world) or even states, but also emerging powers, international institutions, non-state actors, and corporations—in which the main challenges and approaches to peace and stability are transnational in nature.

Multipolarity: a distribution of power among a number (at least three) of major powers or 'poles'.

Nation: a group of people who recognize each other as sharing a common identity, with a focus on a homeland.

National interest: invoked by realists and state leaders to signify that which is most important to the state—survival being at the top of the list.

National security: a fundamental value in the foreign policy of states, traditionally holding that each state must seek its own protection.

Nationalism: the idea that the world is divided into nations that provide the overriding focus of political identity and loyalty, which in turn demands national self-determination. Nationalism can also refer to this idea in the form of a strong sense of identity (sentiment) or organizations and movements seeking to realize this idea (politics).

Nation-state: a political community in which the state claims legitimacy on the grounds that it represents the nation. The nation-state would exist if nearly all the members of a single nation were organized in a single state, without any other national communities being present. Although the term is widely used, no such entities exist.

NATO: see North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Natural law: the political philosophy that certain rights and values are inherent by virtue of being a human being.

Neoclassical realism: a version of realism that combines both structural factors such as the distribution of power and unit-level factors such as the interests of states (status quo or revisionist).

Neo-colonialism: informal processes that keep former colonies under the power and especially economic influence of former colonial powers and advanced industrial countries.

Neorealism: modification of the realist approach by recognizing that economic resources (in addition to military capabilities) are a basis for exercising influence, and also an attempt to make realism 'more scientific' by borrowing models from economics and behavioural social science to explain international politics.

Network: any structure of communication for individuals and/or organizations to exchange information, share experiences, or discuss political goals and tactics. There is no clear boundary between a network and an NGO. A network is less likely than an NGO to become permanent, to have formal membership, to have identifiable leaders, or to engage in collective action.

New International Economic Order (NIEO):   a 25-point manifesto presented to a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 by the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. It aimed to restructure the global economy in ways that would help Third World countries develop and improve their position in the world economy. It was adopted by the General Assembly but was not backed by major economic powers.

Non-discrimination: a doctrine of equal treatment between states.

Non-governmental organization (NGO):   any group of people relating to each other regularly in some formal manner and engaging in collective action, provided that the activities are non-commercial, non-violent, and not on behalf of a government. They are often presumed to be altruistic groups or public interest groups, such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, or Greenpeace, but in UN practice they may come from any sector of civil society, including trade unions and faith communities.

Non-intervention: the principle that external powers should not intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.

Non-nuclear weapons states: states that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, meaning they do not possess nuclear weapons.

Non-state actor: a term widely used to mean any actor that is not a government.

Norm entrepreneur: a political actor, whether an individual or an organization, that conceptualizes and promotes a new norm, to define an appropriate standard of behaviour for all actors or a defined sub-group of actors in the political system.

Normative: relating to accepted or expected standards or ethics of behaviour in a community.

Normative structure: international relations theory traditionally defines structure in material terms, such as the distribution of power, and then treats structure as a constraint on actors. By identifying a normative structure, constructivists are noting how structures also are defined by collectively held ideas such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms that not only constrain actors, but also construct categories of meaning, constitute actors' identities and interests, and define standards of appropriate conduct. Critical here is the concept of a norm, a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity. Actors adhere to norms not only because of benefits and costs for doing so, but also because they are related to a sense of self.

Norms: specify general standards of behaviour, and identify the rights and obligations of states. For example, in the case of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the basic norm was that tariffs and non-tariff barriers should be reduced and eventually eliminated. Together, norms and principles define the essential character of a regime, and these cannot be changed without transforming the nature of the regime.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): organization established by treaty in April 1949 comprising 12 (later 16) countries from Western Europe and North America. After the cold war, when East/Central European countries became members, NATO expanded to 28 states. The most significant aspect of NATO during the cold war was the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe.

Nuclear deterrence: concept that involves using nuclear weapons to prevent opponents from taking undesirable actions. Deterrence in general seeks to use the threat of punishment to convince an opponent not to do something; nuclear deterrence operates on the belief that if there is even a small chance that one state taking an action will cause an opponent to respond with nuclear weapons, the state considering that action will be deterred from doing so. Deterrence is generally viewed as an attempt to defend the status quo, whereas compellence refers to the use of threats of punishment to convince an adversary to change the status quo.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: international treaty that forms the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, opened for signature in 1968.

Nuclear opacity: also called nuclear ambiguity, this term describes a country that has never publicly confirmed that it has nuclear weapons.

Nuclear posture: term that describes what a state does with its nuclear weapons after developing them. Nuclear posture includes the actual nuclear capabilities of a state; the employment doctrine governing how these capabilities will be used, when, and against whom; and the command and control procedures governing the management and use of these capabilities.

Nuclear taboo: the idea that a specific international norm has gradually become accepted by the international community that the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable in warfare.

Nuclear-weapons-free zones: these are agreements which establish specific environments or geographic regions as free of nuclear weapons, although there may be varying requirements between zones.

Occupy: the umbrella name for a series of non-hierarchically organized protest camps, whose animating ethos in the wake of the global financial crisis followed concerns about the increasing concentration of power and wealth in the hands of an unelected global elite.

Offensive realism: a structural theory of realism that views states as security maximizers.

Official development assistance (ODA): refers to the resource flows to countries on the OECD Development Assistance Committee list. ODA must be from official sources (state and state agencies), be at least 25 per cent in the form of grants with loan elements charged at no more than 10 per cent, and be designed to further economic development and welfare.

Offshore financial centres: jurisdictions offering investors particular incentives to keep their money there, often in the form of tax advantages and secrecy.

Ontology: the assumptions we make about what exists.

Opportunity cost: the logic of forgone alternatives when one decision is made rather than another.

Order: this may denote any regular or discernible pattern of relationships that are stable over time, or may additionally refer to a condition that allows certain goals to be achieved.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC): the international body of Muslim states, formed following an arson attack on the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in 1969. The Charter of the OIC was instituted in 1972, and headquarters established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of 2010, participants included 57 member states as well as a number of observer states and organizations.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): organization created in 1960 by the major oil-producing countries of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, and later expanded in membership to include states such as Nigeria, Mexico, and Libya, to coordinate oil-production policies in the interest of market stability and profit for producers.

Organized hypocrisy: the gaps between an international organization's declarations and its actions. Faced with competing pressures, international organizations may 'decouple' formal procedures used to comply with external expectations from incompatible internal organizational activities.

Orientalism: Western interpretations of the institutions, cultures, arts, and social life of countries of the East and Middle East. The subject of a major study by Edward Said, Orientalism is associated today with stereotyping and prejudice, often against Islamic societies.

Ostpolitik: the West German government's 'Eastern Policy' of the mid-to-late 1960s, designed to develop relations between West Germany and members of the Warsaw Pact.

Others: a term coined by postcolonial scholars to expose how exclusion is integral to universality, which has always excluded certain subjects on the basis of their race, gender, sexuality, religion, and other attributes.

Paradigm: theories that share ontological and epistemological assumptions form a paradigm.

Patriarchy: literally government or rule by fathers; a form of rule characterized by male power, differential rights for men, and the passage of power and property through the male side (i.e. from fathers to sons).

Peace enforcement: designed to bring hostile parties to agreement, which may occur without the consent of the parties.

Peace of Westphalia: see Treaties of Westphalia.

Peacekeeping: the deployment of a UN presence in the field with the consent of all parties (this refers to classical peacekeeping).

Pedagogies: methods for teaching and learning.

Perestroika: policy of restructuring, pursued by former Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev in tandem with glasnost, and intended to modernize the Soviet political and economic system.

Pluralism: an umbrella term, borrowed from American political science, used to signify international relations theorists who rejected the realist view of the primacy of the state, the priority of national security, and the assumption that states are unitary actors. It is the theoretical approach that considers all organized groups as being potential political actors and analyses the processes by which actors mobilize support to achieve policy goals. Pluralists can accept that transnational actors and international organizations may influence governments. Pluralism is equated by some writers with liberalism, but pluralists reject any such link, denying that theory necessarily has a normative component, and holding that liberals are still highly state-centric.

Pluralist international society theory: states are conscious of sharing common interests and common values, but these are limited to norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Policy domain: consists of a set of political questions that have to be decided together because they are linked by the political processes in an international organization—e.g. financial policy is resolved in the IMF. A policy domain may cover several issues: financial policy includes development, the environment, and gender issues.

Political community: a community that wishes to govern itself and to be free from alien rule.

Popular culture: those genres and forms of expression that are mass-consumed, including music, film, television, and video games. Popular culture is usually seen as less refined than 'high culture'. The definition of 'high' and 'low'/'popular' culture changes across time and space.

Populism: refers to a set of beliefs which promote the general will of the people over that of ruling elites—the people versus elites. It transcends mainstream left and right politics by promoting a politics of protest against elite rule and the established order, as well as being generally anti-liberal and anti-globalization.

Postcolonial: describes contemporary international and transnational relations of race, migration, ethnicity, culture, knowledge, power, and identity; also the study of the interactions in the modern period between European states and the societies they had colonized.

Postmodern or 'new' terrorism: the activities of terrorist groups and individuals with millennial and apocalyptic ideologies and with system-level goals. Most value destruction for its own sake, unlike most terrorists in the past who had specific goals usually tied to a territory.

Post-Washington Consensus: an approach to economic globalization that stresses both pro-growth and pro-poverty reduction, while keeping largely to the principles of trade liberalization and state withdrawal from managing domestic economic and social policy.

Poverty: in the orthodox view, a situation suffered by people who do not have the money to buy food and satisfy other basic material needs. In the alternative view, a situation suffered by people who are not able to meet their material and non-material needs through their own effort.

Power: in the most general sense, the ability of a political actor to achieve its goals. In the realist approach, it is assumed that possession of capabilities will result in influence, so the single word, power, is often used ambiguously to cover both. In the pluralist approach, it is assumed that political interactions can modify the translation of capabilities into influence and therefore it is important to distinguish between the two. Power is defined by most realists in terms of the important resources such as size of armed forces, gross national product, and population that a state possesses. There is the implicit belief that material resources translate into influence. Poststructuralists understand power as productive: that is, as referring to the constitution of subjectivity in discourse. Knowledge is interwoven with power.

Practices: socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, produce and reproduce background knowledge and discourse.

Primordialism: the belief that certain human or social characteristics, such as ethnicity, are deeply embedded in historical conditions.

Principles: in regime theory, they are represented by coherent bodies of theoretical statements about how the world works. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade operated on the basis of liberal principles which assert that global welfare will be maximized by free trade.

Progressive: The assumption that time and history move in a linear, forward direction towards a specific progressive end goal.

Public goods: goods which can only be produced by a collective decision, and which cannot, therefore, be produced in the marketplace.

Public International Unions: international organizations created between 1850 and 1914 to regulate ostensibly non-political issue-areas arising from increasing inter-state interactions and new technologies.

Purchasing Power Parity: refers to the quantity of the currency needed to purchase a common basket of goods/services. This means taking account of the relative cost of living in different countries in order to compare levels of wealth and poverty.

Rapprochement: re-establishment of more friendly relations, in particular between the People's Republic of China and the United States in the early 1970s.

Rational choice: an approach that emphasizes how actors attempt to maximize their interests and how they attempt to select the most efficient means to achieve those interests, and that attempts to explain collective outcomes by virtue of the attempt by actors to maximize their preferences under a set of constraints. Deriving largely from economic theorizing, rational choice as applied to politics and international politics has been immensely influential and applied to a range of issues.

Rationality: the ability of individuals to place their preferences in rank order and choose the best available preference.

Realism: the theoretical approach that analyses all international relations as the relation of states engaged in the pursuit of power. Realism cannot accommodate non-state actors within its analysis.

Reason of state: the practical application of the doctrine of realism, and virtually synonymous with it.

Regime: a social institution based on a set of agreed, implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. These govern the interactions of various state and non-state actors in issue-areas such as the environment or human rights. The global market in coffee, for example, is governed by a variety of treaties, trade agreements, scientific and research protocols, market protocols, and the interests of producers, consumers, and distributors. States organize these interests and consider the practices, rules, and procedures to create a governing arrangement or regime that controls the production of coffee, monitors its distribution, and ultimately determines the price for consumers. (Adapted from O. Young 1997: 6.) See also International regime.

Regional trading agreement: the act of geographically contiguous countries endorsing in law the desire to introduce a single trade policy across all participating states, ranging from a simple customs union designed to bring existing tariff levels closer into line to a genuinely free trade area whose objective is to completely abolish all tariffs between members.

Regionalism: development of institutionalized cooperation among states and other actors on the basis of regional contiguity as a feature of the international system.

Regionalization: growing interdependence between geographically contiguous states, as in the European Union.

Regulative rules: in contrast to constitutive rules, which define the game and its activities, shape the identity and interests of actors, and help define what counts as legitimate action, regulative rules regulate already existing activities and thus shape the rules of the game.

Relations of production: in Marxist theory, relations of production link and organize the means of production in the production process. They involve both the technical and institutional relationships necessary to allow the production process to proceed, and the broader structures that govern the control of the means of production and the control of the end product(s) of that process. Private property and wage labour are two of the key features of the relations of production in capitalist society.

Relative gains: one of the factors that realists argue constrain the willingness of states to cooperate. States are less concerned about whether everyone benefits (absolute gains) and more concerned about whether someone may benefit more than someone else.

Reparations: forms of material or symbolic repair for historical wrongs done to a group of people.

Reprocessing: in the processing of spent nuclear fuel, the separating of fissionable plutonium from non-fissile material, typically for use in a nuclear weapon.

Responsibility to protect (R2P or RtoP): a framework developed by the United Nations to prevent or respond to the worst human rights atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. R2P begins at home: all states recognize a responsibility to protect their citizens from these four crimes. If a state fails to uphold this responsibility, then the international community—through the UN Security Council—has a responsibility to take action.

Revisionism: the desire to remake or to revise the dominant rules and norms of an international order, in contrast to those states that seek to maintain the status quo.

Rimland: those geographical areas on the periphery of continents and major oceans, control of which is said to confer major strategic advantage.

Rules: operate at a lower level of generality to principles and norms, and they are often designed to reconcile conflicts that may exist between the principles and norms. Third World states, for example, wanted rules which differentiated between developed and underdeveloped countries.

'Scientific' racism: the idea that one can—and should—establish a hierarchy based on biological markers, either visible (as in skin colour) or according to bloodline (as in who counts as Jewish, black, or Chinese).

Second cold war: period of East–West tension in the 1980s, compared to the early period of confrontation between 1946 and 1953.

Security: in international relations, efforts by state and other international actors to ensure the survival of states and the well-being of the people who live within them; in finance, a contract with a claim to future payments in which (in contrast to bank credits) there is a direct and formally identified relationship between the investor and the borrower; also unlike bank loans, securities are traded in markets.

Security community: 'A group of people which has become "integrated". By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure … dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. By a "sense of community" we mean a belief … that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change"' (Deutsch et al. 1957).

Selectivity: when an agreed moral principle is at stake in more than one situation, but national interest dictates a divergence of response.

Self-determination: a principle ardently, but selectively, espoused by US President Woodrow Wilson in the peace negotiations that followed the First World War: namely that each 'people' should enjoy self-government over its own sovereign nation-state. Wilson pressed for application of this principle to East/Central Europe, but did not believe that other nationalities (in colonized Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean) were fit for self-rule.

Self-help: in realist theory, in an anarchical environment, states cannot assume other states will come to their defence even if they are allies. Each state must take care of itself.

Services: the sector of the economy in which no physical product is made but in which one person pays someone else to do something for him or her; this can be anything from a haircut or walking a dog to advising on the latest 'must-buy' stock or explaining how to comply with legal changes embedded in new government policy.

Sexual division of labour: a situation in which different kinds of work are done by men and women. See also Gendered division of labour.

Sexual relations/power relations: the relational construction of heterosexuality and homosexuality, in which the heterosexual is usually privileged.

Sinatra doctrine: statement by the Soviet foreign ministry in October 1989 that countries of Eastern Europe were 'doing it their way' (a reference to Frank Sinatra's song 'I did it my way') and which marked the end of the Brezhnev doctrine and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Single Undertaking: under WTO rules, there is a requirement for members to accept or reject the outcome of multiple multilateral negotiations as one package of reforms, rather than only choosing those parts with which they are most happy.

Skyjacking: the takeover of a commercial aeroplane for the purpose of seizing hostages and using the hostages to publicize a grievance or to bargain for a particular political or economic goal.

Social construction of reality: suggests that reality is a product of human action, interaction, and knowledge. Actors and organizations will interact and develop shared ideas about what exists 'out there', and, once they have agreement about these concepts, this knowledge helps to form their understanding of the world.

Social facts: dependent on human agreement, their existence shapes how we categorize the world and what we do.

Society of states: an association of sovereign states based on their common interests, values, and norms.

Soft power: a term coined by the US academic Joseph Nye to highlight the importance in world politics of persuasion, attraction, and emulation, getting people to agree with you rather than trying to force them to do what you want through coercive or military power.

Solidarism: a view that the international society of states is capable of acting together (in solidarity) to uphold or defend shared values. International society is not merely a framework of coexistence but also an agent for change and humanitarianism.

Sovereign equality: the technical legal equality possessed by sovereign states as expressed in UN General Assembly votes.

Sovereignty: the principle that within its territorial boundaries the state is the supreme political authority, and that outside those boundaries the state recognizes no higher political authority.

Special drawing rights: this is the unit of account of the IMF, acting in lieu of the IMF having a currency of its own. States gain prestige from having their currency contribute to the value of special drawing rights.

Specialized agencies: international institutions which have a special relationship with the central system of the United Nations but which are constitutionally independent, having their own assessed budgets, executive heads and committees, and assemblies of the representatives of all state members.

Spillover: a key concept of neofunctionalism in which increased integration among states in one area generates increased pressure for integration in other areas.

Stability–instability paradox: the belief that stability at the level of nuclear war will lead to instability at lower levels of conflict. Nuclear-armed adversaries may feel emboldened to launch low-level conventional attacks if they believe their nuclear weapons will protect them from retaliation.

Stagflation: a situation experienced by many of the world's most advanced industrialized countries in the 1970s, where a period of very limited or even no growth was accompanied by seemingly runaway price increases. The word is a compound of 'stagnation' (indicating the no-growth scenario) and 'inflation' (indicating the large increases in the general price level).

State: the one word is used to refer to three distinct concepts. (1) In international law, a state is an entity that is recognized to exist when a government is in control of a population residing within a defined territory. It is comparable to the idea in domestic law of a company being a legal person. Such entities are seen as possessing sovereignty that is recognized by other states in the international system. (2) In the study of international politics, each state is a country. It is a community of people who interact in the same political system. (3) In philosophy and sociology, the state consists of the apparatus of government, in its broadest sense, covering the executive, the legislature, the administration, the judiciary, the armed forces, and the police. For Weber, the essential domestic feature of a state was a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.

State autonomy: in a more interdependent world, simply to achieve domestic objectives national governments are forced to engage in extensive multilateral collaboration and cooperation. But in becoming more embedded in frameworks of global and regional governance, states confront a real dilemma: in return for more effective public policy and meeting their citizens' demands, whether in relation to the drugs trade or

employment, their capacity for self-governance—that is state autonomy—is compromised.

State of war: the conditions (often described by classical realists) where there is no actual conflict, but a permanent cold war that could become a 'hot' war at any time.

State sovereignty: a principle for organizing political space where there is one sovereign authority which governs a given territory. The Treaties of Westphalia are usually defined as the birth of state sovereignty, although it took several hundred years before the principle was fully institutionalized. International relations theories hold different views of whether state sovereignty has been transformed or even eroded. They also disagree as to whether state sovereignty is a good way of organizing political community: that is, the issue of state sovereignty's normative status.

State system: the regular patterns of interaction between states, but without implying any shared values between them. This is distinguished from the view of a 'society' of states.

Stateless: describes individuals who do not 'belong' to any state and therefore do not have passports or rights.

State-sponsored terrorism: exists when individual states provide support to terrorist groups in the form of funding, training, and resources, including weapons. Claims of state sponsorship of terrorism are difficult to prove. States go to great lengths to ensure that their involvement is as clandestine as possible so that their leaders have a degree of plausible deniability when they respond to such charges. Other claims of state sponsorship are a matter of subjective opinion. In other cases the term confuses 'state terror' (the use of violence by the state to keep its own citizenry fearful, or the original connotation of terrorism) with state-sponsored terrorism.

Statism: in realist theory, the ideology that supports the organization of humankind into particular communities; the values and beliefs of that community are protected and sustained by the state.

Strategy: the planning and preparation involved in making war serve a political purpose. A strategy is the plan political and military leaders have to achieve their goals.

Structure: in the philosophy of the social sciences a structure is something that exists independently of the actor (e.g. social class) but is an important determinant in the nature of the action (e.g. revolution). For contemporary structural realists, the number of great powers in the international system constitutes the structure.

Subaltern: social groups at the lowest levels of economic power and esteem who are often excluded from political participation, such as peasants or women. Subaltern Studies, which developed first in India, focuses on the history and culture of subaltern groups.

Subsistence: work necessary for basic family survival, such as food production, for which the worker does not receive wages.

Superpower: term used to describe the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945, denoting their global political involvements and military capabilities, including in particular their nuclear arsenals.

Supranationalism: concept in integration theory that implies the creation of common institutions having independent decision-making authority and thus the ability to impose certain decisions and rules on member states.

Survival: the first priority for state leaders, emphasized by historical realists such as Machiavelli, Meinecke, and Weber.

Sustainable development: this has been defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

Tariff: a monetary levy taking the form of a tax and placed on a product by an importing country at the point at which it enters the country, or by an exporting country at the point at which it leaves the country.

Technical expertise: specialized knowledge, based on an actor's work in a specific issue-area as a result of their training and experience, that is valued as authoritative because it is not readily available to other actors.

Technological revolution: refers to the way modern communications (the internet, mobile phones, satellite communications, computers) made possible by technological advances have made distance and location less important factors not just for government (including at local and regional levels), but equally in the calculations of other actors such as firms' investment decisions or in the activities of social movements.

Terms of trade: the quantity of imports that can be bought with what is being exported. If the terms of trade are said to move in favour of a country, it finds that relative prices have just changed such that it is now able to buy more imports than it could previously with the same amount of exports.

Territorial state: a state that has power over the population which resides on its territory but which does not seek to represent the nation or the people as a whole.

Territory: a portion of the earth's surface appropriated by a political community, or state.

Terrorism: the use of illegitimate violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear, by attacking civilians and/

or symbolic targets. This is done for purposes such as drawing widespread attention to a grievance, provoking a severe response, or wearing down their opponent's moral resolve, to affect political change. Determining when the use of violence is legitimate, which is based on contextual morality of the act as opposed to its effects, is the source for disagreement over what constitutes terrorism.

The end of history: famous phrase employed by Francis Fukuyama in 1989; this argued that one phase of history shaped by the antagonism between collectivism and individualism had come to an end (200 years after the French Revolution), leaving liberalism triumphant.

Third World: a notion that was first used in the late 1950s to define both the less developed world and the political and economic project that would help overcome underdevelopment; the term has been employed less in the post-cold war era.

Time–space compression: the technologically induced erosion of distance and time giving the appearance of a world that is, in communication terms, shrinking.

Total war: a war fought for the political independence or continued existence of one of the parties to the conflict.

Trans/transgender: transgender (sometimes shortened to trans) is a term referring to people whose identity and gender presentation differ from what they were assigned at birth. This may mean people who identify as women but were designated 'male' at birth, those who identify as men but were designated 'female' at birth, or those who do not identify with either side of the gender binary (genderqueer or non-binary).

Transformationalists: a diverse corpus of scholarship which contends that globalization is associated with a structural change (a reconfiguration or transformation) in world politics and the role of the state.

Transition: in twentieth-century international relations, the lengthy period between the end of communist planning in the Soviet bloc and the final emergence of a fully functioning democratic capitalist system.

Transnational actor: any civil society actor from one country that has relations with any actor from another country or with an international organization.

Transnational company/corporation (TNC): see Multinational corporations.

Treaties of Westphalia (1648): the Treaties of Osnabruck and Munster, which together form the 'Peace of Westphalia', ended the Thirty Years' War and were crucial in delimiting the political rights and authority of European monarchs. Among other things, the Treaties granted monarchs rights to maintain standing armies, build fortifications, and levy taxes.

Treaty of Versailles: treaty that formally ended the First World War (1914–18). The treaty established the League of Nations, specified the rights and obligations of the victorious and defeated powers (including the notorious regime of reparations on Germany), and created the 'Mandates' system under which 'advanced nations' were given legal tutelage over colonial peoples.

Tribal: describes a community defined through family relations or as living in the same local space, usually applied to the non-Western world. When used as a non-academic term it often has the connotations of something that is pre-modern, underdeveloped, and inferior to Western societies.

Truman doctrine: statement made by US President Harry Truman in March 1947 that it 'must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. Intended to persuade Congress to support limited aid to Turkey and Greece, the doctrine came to underpin the policy of containment and American economic and political support for its allies.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a restorative justice body set up in post-apartheid South Africa to address the harms and injustices of apartheid.

Tyrannical states: states where the sovereign government is massively abusing the human rights of its citizens, engaging in acts of mass killing, ethnic cleansing, and/or genocide.

Unilateral humanitarian intervention: military intervention for humanitarian purposes which is undertaken without the express authorization of the United Nations Security Council.

Unipolar or unipolarity: a distribution of power internationally in which there is clearly only one dominant power or 'pole'. Some analysts argue that the international system became unipolar in the 1990s since there was no longer any rival to American power.

United Nations Charter (1945): the legal regime that created the United Nations as the world's only 'supranational' organization. The Charter defines the structure of the United Nations, the powers of its constitutive organs, and the rights and obligations of sovereign states that are party to the Charter. Among other things, the Charter is the key legal document limiting the use of force to instances of self-defence and collective peace enforcement endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. See also Specialized agencies.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the principal normative document of the global human rights regime. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, it provides a comprehensive list of interdependent and indivisible human rights that are accepted as authoritative by most states and other international actors.

Universality: the assumption that certain values and rights are universal and belong to individuals and societies everywhere.

Utilitarianism: philosophical approach that accepts Jeremy Bentham's claim that action should be directed towards producing the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'. In more recent years the emphasis has been not on happiness, but on welfare or general benefit (happiness being too difficult to achieve). There are also differences between 'act' and 'rule' utilitarians. Act utilitarianism focuses on the impact of actions, whereas rule utilitarianism refers to the utility maximization following from universal conformity with a rule or set of rules.

Vertical proliferation: the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by those states already in possession of such weapons.

War: organized violence between two or more political entities.

War and society: an approach to the study of war that involves asking how war shapes society and how society shapes war.

War on terror: an umbrella term coined by the Bush administration which refers to the various military, political, and legal actions taken by the US and its allies after the attacks on 11 September 2001; these actions were intended to curb the spread of terrorism in general but Islamic-inspired terrorism in particular.

Warsaw Pact: pact created in May 1955 in response to West Germany's rearmament and entry into NATO. It comprised the USSR and seven communist states (though Albania withdrew support in 1961). The organization was officially dissolved in July 1991.

Washington Consensus: the belief of key opinion-formers in Washington, DC, developed in the 1980s, that global welfare would be maximized by the universal application of neoclassical economic policies which favour a minimalist state and an enhanced role for the market.

Weapons of mass destruction: a category defined by the United Nations in 1948 to include 'atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effects to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above'.

Weapons-grade uranium: uranium that has been enriched to more than 90 per cent U-235.

World Bank Group: a collection of five agencies under the more general rubric of the World Bank, with headquarters in Washington, DC. Its formal objective is to encourage development in low- and middle-income countries with project loans and various advisory services. See www.worldbank.org.

World government: associated in particular with those idealists who believe that peace can never be achieved in a world divided into separate sovereign states. Just as governments abolished the state of nature in civil society, the establishment of a world government must end the state of war in international society.

World order: this is a wider category of order than the 'international'. It takes as its units of order not states, but individual human beings, and it assesses the degree of order on the basis of the delivery of certain kinds of goods (be it security, human rights, basic needs, or justice) for humanity as a whole.

World Social Forum: an annual gathering of civil society groups and anti-globalization organizations that met for the first time in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001.

World Trade Organization (WTO):   established in 1995 with headquarters in Geneva, with 164 members as of late 2018. It is a permanent institution covering services, intellectual property, and investment issues as well as pure merchandise trade, and it has a disputes settlement mechanism in order to enforce its free trade agenda.

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